

HEADWAY

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FRANCE LOOKS FOR A NEW ORDER IN EUROPE AFTER THE WAR

The writer of the following article is a distinguished Frenchman who has been invited by "Headway" to set before its readers an impartial survey of present public opinion in France. It is particularly important that we in this country should know and understand the view here summarised, which in some respects differs much from that expressed by the L.N.U. in its statement on Peace Aims last December.

AT first sight it seems as if French public opinion were less preoccupied with the future than English opinion.

It must not be forgotten that three-quarters of the active population and two-thirds of the electorate are mobilised. But, above all else, the whole nation is determined to concentrate exclusively on winning the war. Perhaps France, which remains physically and psychologically nearer the danger, realises more fully than Great Britain the urgency of this immense task. Equally optimistic as to the final result, she understands, perhaps better than this will be achieved all the more quickly and more completely for our having devoted to it more fully every material and moral resource we possess. To this end she has given herself up entirely to the present struggle with a grim intensity which has impressed all foreign observers.

It would be wrong to suppose that those who fight and keep silent, those who work and keep silent, those who suffer and keep silent, have no idea of the world they would wish to build and live in after the war. Behind this stoic silence a serious meditation is going on. One can have little doubt, judging from letters and conversations, that much thinking is being devoted in the country, and perhaps even more in the Army, to the question of post-war order.

Law Must Prevail

It is, of course, as yet too early to form any definite idea of the conclusions to which this thinking will eventually arrive. One thing is certain: the whole process of reflection is dominated in everyone by the idea of Law. *What the French nation wants is the establishment of the reign of Law in Europe.*

What does this mean? An order which on the one hand takes all interests into account, but on which, on the other, individual egoisms cannot prevail. In the eyes of the French this order, as national experience abundantly proves, constitutes by itself for each member a higher advantage than the satisfaction of one's own passions. Because it assures to everyone what the anarchy of egoisms makes impossible, namely, general security, which is the basis of civilisation. Law, even when bad—and it must be realised once for all that there is not, and never will be, a law with no faults—must always be defended against anarchy. Those

who are afraid or ashamed of force will never build a city.

Here one may ask, Where can the force be found which is to back up the Law? For the French the answer is more simple than it appears: *it is the force of those who believe in the Law, and who for it are prepared to make every sacrifice.* First of all, France and Britain, since it is in order to save the possibility of a Law that they are fighting; then the neutrals, when they will stop being neutral, when they will cease to prefer preaching to acting; lastly, Germany—when she will have changed her ways, and not only her ways but her spirit, and not only her Government but her people.

Much Depends on War

Now let us take one step further towards things concrete: On what initial political bases should this new order be established, that is, with what kind of settlement shall we start the reign of Law?

This is one of the points on which the French, taught by dire experience, are inclined to show great restraint. Much, in their opinion, depends on the war itself, which is a tremendous experimentation of ideas, men, and things.

Three tendencies can, however, be distinguished in French public opinion in its present state:—

(1) Some—the traditionalists of the Right—continue to believe in nations and in the territorial foundations of nations, although no Frenchman, needless to say, expects from victory any territorial advantage for France herself.

This group is in a minority—an important and active minority, but a minority. Why? Because, in the eyes of French opinion taken as a whole, experience has shown that it is impossible to establish frontiers in Central Europe which can satisfy at the same time the needs of sovereign independent States for justice, such at least as understood by the principle of self-determination, for military security, and for economic stability. Much ill has been spoken of Versailles. It is doubtful whether we could do much better on the basis of the same principles.

(2) Another school of thought—the innovators of the Left—contemplates, on the contrary, a complete revision of the national idea and of its merits. They suggest, for example, that the federal idea should take the place of the nationalist principle, which in 1919 Balkanised Europe.

There is nothing in the federal idea to offend a French mind. Very far from it. It was a French Government which, in May, 1930, was the first to approach all the States of Europe with a Plan of European Federation. To-day a great many people in France think with M. Daladier that the federal idea could usefully be applied to "certain regions of Europe." In the Danubian basin, for example. Perhaps elsewhere. But public opinion as a whole remains sceptical as regards the immediate and general application of this principle to post-war Europe. It is not believed in France that the United States of Europe, so dear to Victor Hugo, can see the light of day on the morrow of a war which will have been prepared and fought by an exacerbated moral, political, and economic nationalism. In any case France would demand "solid material guarantees" before risking her existence in an experiment of this kind.

(3) More numerous than the Nationalists and Federalists are those who are in favour of a middle solution, consisting in reviving an international organism such as the League of Nations, revised in the light of the lessons of past experience. The principal aims of this organism would be to plan the economic reconstruction of a devastated Europe and a world radically disturbed by the war, and, above all, to put a break on nationalism and assist the evolution which would enable our States to pass gradually from the Nation stage to the Federation stage, as they have passed from the Cities to the Province and from the Provinces to the Nation.

League Not Condemned

The French do not believe that the failures of the last decades have condemned the idea itself of the League of Nations, but merely its application. What seems to them particularly requiring revision is the double legal and military powerlessness of the League of Nations of 1919 in its dealings with the nations. Geneva must be given a Tribunal and an Army—a super-national Tribunal and an international Army, before which, by reason and, if need be, by force, the great as well as the little nations will be obliged to bend the knee. While neither one nor the other exist, France, though still keeping the ideal of the days of Léon Bourgeois, Herriot, and Briand, will also keep her scepticism of the last few years as regards the reality of the League of Nations.

But whatever diversity of opinion may exist in France on the general methods of reconstructing Europe, there is complete unanimity as to the concrete starting-point of this reconstruction.

To raise the world Archimedes, who had discovered the lever, asked for a fulcrum. To draw up the Law of Europe the French, who think they have a solid lever, will demand a fulcrum. *The lever is the Franco-British association, the fulcrum is the permanent annihilation of the German war machine.*

The close association which to-day links France and Great Britain is a source of immense satisfaction to the French. They are particularly pleased by the fact that this entente has been methodically established in so many military, financial, economic, technical and commercial spheres, which are the foundations and the frame of policy. They even think that collaboration in these different fields can be pushed still further, especially as regards trade—home trade, Empire trade, foreign trade—colonial co-operation, and the social and spiritual compenetration of the two peoples. In this direction the French will go as far as you like, as far as one can.

What the French ask, what they hope for with all their heart, is that the present association should continue intact after the war. This is the centre of their preoccupations, to which I want most earnestly to draw the attention of my

English friends. For it is no good hiding the fact—if need be the German wireless is there to remind us of it every day—that the memory of the dissensions between the two countries in the past, notably as regards the German problem, has left some anxiety and disbelief about the future in French minds, which it would be unwise to overlook.

As for the destruction of German militarism—"Il faut en finir"—the French are thoroughly convinced that this is a matter of paramount practical importance. In their view it must not be reduced to the destruction of Hitlerism, which defeat will bring about of itself. We must not, either, be content with traditional formulas, such as breaking up Prussia. We must face the facts, however unpleasant they may be. *To-day Prussia is the whole of Germany, and in every German there is a potential Nazi.* This is the fundamental root of the German menace which we must get at and eradicate.

How? As the French see it there are two ways: one immediate and military, the other more far-reaching and of a spiritual character; the first conditioning the second, the second justifying the first.

Two Ways of Settlement

The first consists in reducing Germany to lasting military powerlessness:

- by disarming her,
- by enforcing this disarmament through an efficient international body,
- by having the bridge-heads of the Rhine occupied by an Anglo-French Army (which could include neutral contingents).

This prolonged occupation will have the effect of forbidding Germany the temptation of indulging in an aggressive policy in Central and Eastern Europe under cover of a Siegfried Line paralysing the West. To understand the full effect of such a measure, I would most earnestly recommend all my readers to read and study carefully the famous Memorandum which in January, 1919, Marshal Foch drew up at the request of the Supreme Council on the technical conditions of European security. "Who holds Mainz, holds Europe," said Foch. Never was a prophesy more completely verified by experience. On June 1, 1930, the French evacuated Mainz (five years before the date fixed by the Treaty): three months later, in September, 1930, that is to say well before the banking and economic crisis in Germany, the number of seats in the Reichstag held by the Nazis jumped from 12 to 104. In March, 1936, the Germans remilitarised the Rhineland: two years later they took Austria and then Bohemia without striking a blow. How long shall we remain blind to this object lesson?

The second way of freeing Europe of the German menace consists in insisting that Germany should adopt a new system of education, which alone can guarantee the efficacy of any new régime. This re-education of the German mind should constitute, with the restoration of world economics, the major objective of the generation to survive the war. On its success will depend the future of our children and our grandchildren. On its rapidity ought to depend, if we have the slightest common sense, the length of the occupation of which I have just spoken. The army of occupation should leave the Rhine when a new generation will have taken the place of the one formed—or rather deformed—by Hitler, Goebbels, Rosenberg, Streicher and so many others, and that we shall find facing us, against us, in the peace as in the war.

I for one most emphatically refuse to believe in an eternal and cursed Germany, as much as in an eternal and chosen Germany. There is nothing eternal in History. Peoples change constantly, profoundly, and the German people more than any other.

THE NEUTRALS AND THE WAR

From Our Correspondent in Switzerland

The writer of the following article occupies at Geneva a position which gives him quite exceptional chances to learn what the European peoples feel and think about the war. He has tried to sum up impartially his impressions from every source and to put the result before the readers of Headway, without attempting in any way to make a case.

WHEN Mr. Winston Churchill made his now famous speech, early in January, he was expressing a point of view that was held by most citizens of Great Britain. Some may have felt that the speech was not too well timed and that it did not take sufficient account of the economic difficulties and political dangers to which the neutrals were exposed. But very few would disagree with Mr. Churchill's conclusion.

To most it is self-evident that, if the neutrals maintain their present attitude, they are very likely to be attacked and defeated one after the other by Germany or Russia. Few in Great Britain would question that, if Germany were to prove victorious in the present war, the independence of such neutrals as had managed to remain outside the sphere of hostilities would be gravely threatened. The obvious conclusion seems to be that the neutrals may best hope to maintain their independence by all joining the Allies in resistance to the Germany which menaces them all.

Infinitely Greater Danger

But it must be remembered that the danger which the small State faces in time of war is infinitely greater than that faced by the large State. During the last war, the fact that Belgium, Serbia and Rumania proved eventually to be on the winning side and thereby secured some compensation at the peace treaty, should not make us forget that it was they who fared the hardest and who were occupied the quickest. And to-day we may feel confident that Poland will eventually be liberated; we are none the less sure that the memory of her subjugation and the physical traces of it will last long after that liberation. The intervention in the present war of all the neutral States of Western Europe might very well suffice to swing the balance decisively in favour of the Allies and thus produce a quick victory. But some at least of these would be almost certain to see war on their own territory and to suffer a temporary conquest.

It is very important to distinguish between the various sorts of neutral States in Europe to-day. A group of small countries, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and Switzerland, have long since come to realise that if they are to be really independent they must

abandon the aspirations of Great Powers; but the smaller States with a shorter history are not so willing to abandon these aspirations.

"Not Their War?"

For the traditional neutrals the present war, though they may be interested in its outcome, is not their war. They do not believe it to be a war fought for the preservation of small States; as a Dutch member of Parliament pointed out a short time ago, quite a number of small countries have been overrun during the last five years without Great Britain and France going to war. They do not even believe it to be a war fought for the sanctity of treaties; quite a number of treaties have been torn up without the Great Powers deeming it necessary to resort to force. For them it is a war for a perfectly explicable and perfectly just cause; for them it is the war which Mr. Chamberlain announced some time ago he was prepared to fight. It is a war to prevent the domination of Europe by one Great Power. In their view it is being fought now because if that Great Power were allowed to proceed one stage further it might then become invincible.

Sympathies With The Allies

The traditional neutrals are interested in the outcome of the war, because they wish to retain their independence. On the whole their sympathies are with the Allies, because they believe that, whereas Germany would abolish their independence, that independence would not be endangered by Great Britain and France. But they are not really interested in fighting for Great Powers at all. Some of them during their earlier history, when they were perhaps more trusting and less cynical, did assist a Great Power in a war that had as its objective the prevention of the domination of Europe by one State, and in the end they regained their independence; but they had to pay for it. The assistance of England to Holland during the Napoleonic wars cost Holland Ceylon and Cape Colony. They cannot be expected to relish an alliance with a Great Power. Yet the only method of participation open to them, short of being the direct victim of a German attack, is to sign an alliance.

Suspicious of Great Powers

The root of the matter lies in the memory of the neutrals. They believe that among the causes of the present war must be counted the breakdown of the League system, and to their mind that system broke down for two main reasons. The first was the Versailles settlement. The second was the policy of the Great Powers—all of them—Germany, Russia, the United States, Japan, Italy, Great Britain and France.

What they call Great Britain's policy of the Balance of Power is particularly distasteful to them, and the question they continually ask is whether that policy will be resorted to again as soon as peace is restored. By that they mean "Will Great Britain once again withdraw from Europe when the danger has disappeared, to intervene again at the last moment, or will she accept her obligations in Europe continuously in the future as she did not in the past?"

And What of the Peace?

The final settlement, too, is a matter of very great concern to them. Is it going to be a Carthaginian peace? Are the Great Powers prepared to see inroads made on their sovereignty? Are they willing to exchange power for responsibility? Are they, for example, going to do anything about colonial territories? Such questions may seem petty to peoples engaged in the present struggle, but they are indicative of the difference of outlook between the Allies and the neutrals. All the traditional neutrals are severely hampered by the war. They have financial and material burdens that, in relation to their strength, are only too like those of the belligerents; they suffer from a mobilisation that is as complete as that of France and far more serious than that reached in Great Britain; yet they are all small countries, neither having nor desiring great power, and the danger that menaces both them and the Western Powers is not sufficient to conceal or surmount the essential differences between the independence and the aspirations of a small people and a great people.

But, despite all these differences that cause the neutrals to resent Mr. Churchill's speech and to reject his invitation, their solid sympathy is with the Allies. They will forgive them all their past mistakes, and perhaps their future ones, too, provided they win.

CHINA'S CAUSE IS OURS

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE FAR EAST IS VITALLY IMPORTANT FOR EUROPE

By H. J. TIMPERLEY, who was the "Manchester Guardian" Correspondent in China and incurred the hostility of the Japanese authorities by his outspoken dispatches

IN the midst of the critical events now taking place nearer home, we are tempted to forget that other war against aggression which China has been waging with valour and determination for more than two and a half years. The decisive phase of that conflict now seems to be approaching. Well-informed observers on the spot report that developments are moving towards a climax and that the coming months may determine the final issue.

With the occupation last November of the important strategic city of Nanning the Japanese apparently reached the geographical limit of their striking power. Indeed at this writing it is by no means certain that Nanning may not be recaptured by the Chinese. The dangers which now threaten China are less military than economic. Japan's recent offensives have been directed mainly against Chinese communications in the south-west in order to disrupt the routes over which foreign imports are coming in and exports are going out.

Trade Must Be Maintained

China's immediate problem is to maintain the minimum of foreign trade essential for the conduct of the war, and in this connection the overland route from British Burma to Yunnan is playing an increasingly important rôle. Its present traffic capacity of 3,000 tons per month during the dry season, when landslides are less frequent, is shortly to be increased to a capacity of 9,000 tons per month all the year round. The development of inland transportation to connect with international routes is likewise proceeding apace. During the last six months 1,200 miles of new roads have been constructed between important centres in free China, while a further 1,200 miles are under construction, and almost 6,000 miles of existing roads have been improved considerably. The Chinese hinterland, which possessed relatively few highways before the outbreak of war, now has 40,000 miles of roads—four-fifths of the pre-war mileage in China as a whole. There has also been a remarkable growth of manufacturing industries in free China, where more than half of the 120,000 tons of valuable machinery removed from the chief industrial centres in advance of the Japanese occupation has now been reassembled.

It has been said that the war in China is one between destruction and

reconstruction, and that the Chinese are reconstructing more rapidly than the Japanese can destroy. But that is in free China. In the invaded provinces it is a different story. Unhappily the extension of Japanese control over a large part of China has been accompanied by one of the worst features of the Manchurian occupation, namely, the production and sale, under Japanese military protection, of narcotics. Abundant supplies of both opium and heroin have been made available, and in consequence hundreds of thousands of Chinese have become addicts, including children and numerous young people of both sexes. A report recently prepared by an independent American observer, Dr. M. S. Bates, of Nanking University, states that in Nanking between a third and a fourth of the population is being supplied by the Japanese-supported government and the military with vicious drugs. Every day the police find the bodies of between twenty and thirty starved heroin addicts dumped in the streets.

Japan's Money from Opium

As in the case of Manchukuo, the Japanese-sponsored régime in the Nanking area relies upon the opium traffic to finance its activities, receiving a monthly revenue of \$3,000,000 (approximately £60,000) from a tax of \$3 per ounce. Apart from officials, some thousands of traders, large and small, are engaged in the business, which has gradually developed into a powerful vested interest. Dr. Bates estimates that the Japanese policy in fostering this traffic takes away from the impoverished population of the region a minimum of \$5,000,000 (approximately £100,000) monthly, reducing their buying power for more wholesome goods and their ability to do productive labour.

It is under these conditions that the Japanese are seeking to establish a puppet government under the leadership of Mr. Wang Ching-wei. So far this attempt has failed. Any chances of success it might have had appear to have been killed when two of Mr. Wang's chief associates disclosed the terms of the bargain which they say that their chief reached with the Japanese authorities on December 30. Publication of the terms of the agreement, which, to quote Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, "aims at the political, military and economic domination of

China, making of her a Japanese protectorate in all but name," has caused throughout China a wave of resentment comparable in intensity with that provoked by the Twenty-One Demands which Japan sought to impose upon China in 1915.

Once again, it is clear, Tokyo is endeavouring to turn Europe's extremities to her advantage. And, unfortunately for China, she is helped in this aim by the tendency on the part of British people and British officials to feel that it does not matter very much what we do in the Far East so long as we win the war in Europe.

During the last war, as a recent Chatham House survey has pointed out, British Far Eastern policy "was completely subordinated to the all-absorbing aim of winning the war. The British commercial interest in the Far East was largely eclipsed owing to the dislocation of industry and transport, security in the 'long-term' sense had ceased to be of account for a nation which was actually in the midst of a life-and-death struggle while the preservation of peace, as a goal of policy, had no meaning when there was no peace to preserve. British diplomacy in the Far East was therefore temporarily bereft of its standing objectives and became, for the time being, merely an adjunct to the British 'war machine'..."

The Fatal Secret Bargain

It was under these conditions that on February 16, 1917, the British Ambassador in Tokyo communicated to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs the following message from his government:

"His Britannic Majesty's Government accede with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being understood that the Japanese Government will in the eventual peace settlement treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator."

Written into the Versailles Treaty, this secret bargain had far-reaching results. It strengthened Japan in the consolidation of her strategic position on the Asiatic Continent and helped to vindicate the aggressive policy of the Japanese

militarists. To quote Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, now principal adviser on Far Eastern affairs at the State Department: "It did more probably than any other one thing in the Treaty to create among the American people distrust of the work of the Paris Conference; it certainly contributed very substantially to the argument and sum total of considerations which led to America's refusal to ratify the Treaty. It injected new complications into the problem, first, of Chinese-Japanese relations, and, second, of Occidental-Oriental contact."

Will History Repeat Itself?

That was twenty years ago. Will history repeat itself in 1940? Is it likely that Britain's long-distant objectives in the Far East—observance of the principle of the Open Door and respect for the territorial and administrative integrity of China—will be again submerged? Will China, and our commitments under the League Covenant, be

sacrificed upon the altar of expediency?

Such questions as these trouble the minds of many thoughtful observers of the Far Eastern scene. They derive little comfort from the contemplation of a policy which appears to aim at giving a minimum amount of support to China while at the same time remaining on the best possible terms with Japan. The thought of what might happen if Britain were suddenly to find herself at war with Russia as well as with Germany is profoundly disturbing. A Russian advance towards the borders of India was the pet bogey of the nineteenth century and the Anglo-Japanese alliance was forged to meet this contingency. To-day the same bogey is rearing its head and the same counter-measure is being advocated.

Japanese Price for Co-operation

It is not difficult to guess the price that Japan would demand for co-opera-

tion against Moscow. Certainly she would insist upon the cessation of any sort of British assistance to China. Recognition of the "New Order in East Asia"—in other words of Japanese hegemony in the Far East—would be stipulated. We should find ourselves again shackled firmly to the chariot wheels of Japanese imperialism.

Any such bargain at the expense of the Chinese would unquestionably arouse widespread resentment not only in China itself but in India and the Dominions, and, most important of all perhaps, in the United States. It might well affect the amount of help we could count upon receiving from the United States just as the Allied support of Japan's claims in Shantung affected America's adherence to the Versailles Treaty. Surely, apart altogether from the question of principle, that would be far too big a price to pay for an arrangement which in any case could be only of doubtful value.

THE I.L.O. MAKES HISTORY

By MAURICE FANSHAW, head of the Intelligence Section, L.N.U. Headquarters

PRAISE of the I.L.O. is in all the churches, and important governments which refuse to join the League have been drawn by the sheer magnetism of its practical usefulness to take part in the Labour Organisation." True words, and never more true than of the first war-time meeting of the Governing Body which recently took place at Geneva, February 3 to February 5. Mr. Carter Goodrich (U.S.A. Government) was in the chair, and the meeting in spite of the difficulties of travel owing to the war was fully attended, sixteen members representing Governments, eight the employers and eight the workers. The British Government was represented by Mr. Myrddin Evans, the Employers' Group by Mr. Kellar, and the Workers' Group by Mr. Joseph Hallsworth.

The Governing Body decided to hold the Annual Conference as usual at Geneva, on June 5, but for a shorter period, ten days instead of three weeks.

Round the agenda a most lively and free discussion revolved, such as can often be heard at Geneva, when belligerents and neutrals meet. The Danish employers' representative proposed that it should contain one question only—the methods of collaboration between government authorities, employers' organisations and workers' organisations; in other words that tripartite collaboration, which is the basis of the successful democratic procedure of the

I.L.O., and the need for which has been enhanced by the war. This was warmly supported by Léon Jouhaux (French Workers' Group) and by the British and U.S.A. Government representatives. But Mr. Watt (U.S.A. Workers' Group) urged that the agenda should also contain the problem of the post-war unemployment of millions now under arms or in armament factories. In the discussion which followed the outstanding speech was made by Mr. Hallsworth (British Workers' Group). Mr. Watt's proposal, he declared, was premature, and out of touch with the actual situation, where there was no question yet of a passage from war to peace economy, but on the contrary, one of a passage from a "white war" to that of a real war. The real problems of vital concern arose out of the very war from which we are suffering to-day—the relations of professional organisations with the governments for establishment of the economic and social regimes of the countries, problems of workers' families deprived of their bread-winner from mobilisation, of children separated from parents, of destroyed workers' dwellings, etc. These were the things British and French workers were concerned about now. The war was upon them and must be won. Later they would think of peace problems. The I.L.O. should study the immediate problems which the fact of war created, both for belligerents and mobilised neutrals.

In the end, the June Conference, it was decided, should discuss primarily tripartite collaboration.

Two other pieces of constructive work call for attention. The next session of the Governing Body will be held immediately before the Conference, and it will then convene a new Committee on Migration for the special study of the problems of international financing of migration for settlement, a question which will become of vital importance after the war. Finally, a new feature was introduced at this session by the submission to the Governing Body of a whole year's program of technical work for the I.L.O. The program is ambitious and alive to the needs of the hour, and was adopted *en bloc*. It includes questions such as compensation and social rehabilitation of men disabled in war; organisation of the labour market arising out of the war; influence of war and mobilisation on national regulations concerning hours of work and rest conditions of work of women; adjustment of wage rates to changing prices; safety in loading and unloading ships; industrial relations in colonial territories; low cost of housing. The advantages of having the expert staff-work for these vital matters prepared in time and on scientific lines need no stress. The League's work is founded largely on lessons learnt from the last war and adapted to present conditions.

LETTERS FROM HEADWAY READERS

WAS IT RIGHT FOR THE LEAGUE TO EXPEL RUSSIA?

Wrong Thing Denounced

Sir,—Mrs. Elliot denounces the wrong thing. What deserves condemnation is not the League's condemnation or expulsion of the U.S.S.R., but the Soviet Government's violation of its Covenant and brutal aggression against Finland. The League would (as the L.N.U. has said) have been in a much stronger position for expelling Russia under Art. 16, para. 4, if it had applied this sanction previously to Japan and Italy.

It is true that the U.S.S.R., under M. Litvinoff's leadership, was for four years more consistently loyal to the League than any of the other great powers. But that is beside the point, for Litvinoff has been sacked and his policy utterly reversed. The loss of loyal Russian partnership is, of course, a first-class disaster. But the retention of the partnership of a State flagrantly violating the Covenant by the attempted murder of the liberties of a fellow member would be a still greater disaster.

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER.

Why No White Paper?

Sir,—I write to heartily endorse every word of Mrs. Elliot's letter. I meant to write long ago on exactly similar lines. For years I worked as Secretary of my Branch numbering 300 members in a naval and military area. At times I collected 50 per cent. of the subscriptions and also organised the Peace Ballot. All the time the hardest workers were those on the Left; in spite of all our efforts to woo the Right, we never got much active support from that quarter. With a few exceptions all the work was done by the supporters of the only socialist and democratic State.

As to Finland, I ask your readers whether they think we would allow say, Germany, to use Ireland as a naval and military base, as we used the Baltic and Finland ever since 1918? Can you also tell me why our Government still delay issuing a paper on the Russian negotiations? If they prove that Russia was in the wrong they would surely have been published months ago!

I am still retaining membership, although I have withdrawn from active work for the Branch. I feel that we should try to make the League and Union a better instrument for peace and social justice. I am not prepared to sit down and do nothing until a socialist world, or even a real democratic system, is brought about. I feel much the same about this as Mr. Acland, and I hope Mrs. Elliot's friends will also assist those of us who want to take all steps, however slight or faltering, to get a better world system, capable of enforcing peaceful solution of international differences.

GORDON D. CLOTHIER.

Gillingham, Kent.

Back to the School of Experience

Sir,—As Mrs. A. de Z. Elliot has instructed you not to send her HEADWAY

again, she presumably does not intend to read any replies that might be made to her letter. Perhaps she thinks it unanswerable! But some of those who read it may be prepared to consider what can be said in comment upon its statements and arguments.

Mrs. Elliot informs us that she resigned from the L.N.U. in circumstances which she describes with rhetorical picturesqueness, of which the one point of importance is that in her opinion Russia is "the only member which (as historical records show) had ever really and sincerely worked for peace and disarmament."

No fair-minded person could deny or belittle the contribution, to all appearance, made by Russia to the cause of the League during the comparatively short period she was a member. But her behaviour since the unmasking of her designs upon the Baltic States has more than blotted out any credit she may have gained from that earlier and worthier conduct. Indeed, it throws grave doubt upon the sincerity of her protestations and the genuineness of her efforts towards international peace. In face of the revelations of the duplicity of her diplomacy last spring and summer, it requires some hardihood to make the above fantastically false claim.

Mrs. Elliot is very free with her language. HEADWAY'S "humbag" makes her "sick." But so grossly distorted a version of the documented facts as that which she presents would entitle one to make an equally vigorous—in her term "vulgar"—remark thereon.

I will refrain, however, from such controversial manners, and merely say that many who deplored and condemned the League's failure—or, rather, the failure of its members—to act more dutifully and courageously in the cases she adduces, viz., China, Abyssinia, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Spain, Albania, cannot in common fairness shut their eyes to the difficulties and dangers which then confronted the League States, and led them to take the course they did.

It was a real dilemma—a cruel choice between comparative risks and evils.

Probably they now wish they had acted more boldly and taken the other course. But they are entitled—their great and far-reaching responsibilities being remembered—to be judged in the light of conditions then existing. It is easy, and cheap, to be wise after the event. If, for instance, we had embroiled ourselves in war with Italy over Abyssinia, might not that have left us far weaker in Europe, *vis à vis* the growing menace of German imperial ambitions and desire for revenge? And where should we—and the world—have been now?

Mrs. Elliot's reliability in argument may be judged from her assertion that Britain and France "aided Hitler's aggression in every possible way."

How did we help his invasion of Austria, of Czecho-Slovakia, of Poland?

I refrain again from characterising her statement as it deserves to be.

The Soviet, Mrs. Elliot opines, "deals in actual realities"—in Finland, for example! Could infatuation go further?

People of the political Right, Centre and Left are severally discovering how greatly they have been deceived by some of the perplexing features of this strange world upheaval.

But the open-minded and candid among them are admitting their error and humbly going back to the school of experience. I must say, however, that in my observation the "Leftists" are the most reluctant to take that wholesome discipline.

D. E. AUTY.

St. Andrews Manse,

Castle Douglas,

Kirkcubrightshire.

A Soldier on Federation

Sir,—I have read the article entitled "League and Federation" in your current issue, and feel that the problem of the relationship between the League of Nations Union and the Federal Union Society urgently needs far more radical treatment than Professor Brodetsky gives it.

The supporters of both are acutely conscious of the need to secure peace through some effective international government. It is most important that the energies of these people should not be dissipated by unnecessary division, nor is it enough for "those who work for the League of Nations to have no fear of Federal Union," or for those who work for Federal Union to work "without antagonism" to the League. The policies of both overlap in so many places that some more positive co-operation should be possible.

To achieve this I would make two suggestions:

First, that a basic formula should be drawn up to which both could agree. Very tentatively I would suggest that this formula might include such points as these:—

1. That we take as our ultimate goal the creation of a Federal Government democratically elected by, and responsible to, all the citizens of the Federation; it should grow by granting full and equal membership to any nation which may become willing to subscribe to its democratic principles.

2. That the activities of this Federal Government should include control of:—

- (i) International political relationships, including admission and expulsion of members.
- (ii) All armed forces.
- (iii) International relations between members.
- (iv) Currency relationships.
- (v) Colonies and mandated territories.
- (vi) International communications.

3. That such a state of affairs can never be brought about by waiting, or "hoping for the best." While admitting that it is bound to take a long time, we must constantly study contemporary affairs and use our democratic privileges with a view to hastening its realisation.

4. That during the present war public opinion must be trained to regard politics internationally, with the immediate object of securing a just peace settlement on which a satisfactory international order may be built.

5. That any reconstruction of the League of Nations or other international authority which may be established after the war must have at its disposal more adequate means of enforcing its decisions than did the original League of Nations.

This formula should be expanded and made as detailed and far reaching as possible. It should constantly be overhauled and brought up to date with current events. Subjects on which agreement could not be reached (such, possibly, as the extent to which the cause of internationalism could safely be advanced in the actual peace terms at the end of this war) should be regarded as open questions to be dealt with as quickly as possible by study and discussion. In some such manner what Professor Brodetsky calls "the various contributory conceptions . . . that will lead to a really permanent peace system," might be co-ordinated and made politically more effective.

My second suggestion is that there is bound to be wastage of effort and loss of effect if the League of Nations Union and the Federal Union Society continue to operate under different names. Here I

will not venture to discuss what single name would be most appropriate.

J. B. BROWNE.

C. Company, Royal Military College,
Camberley, Surrey.

But Why "Stand Still"?

Sir,—Mr. Street, in a rousing letter in last month's HEADWAY, with the title of "To Stand Still is to Fall Behind," suggests that Branch workers have no feeling of urgency in their work.

The L.N.U.'s statement, "World Settlement after the War," implies, by its very title, the end of hostilities, and urgency seems to lie, at the moment, with the war and not with the peace.

Do we not, then, need an appeal for urgency from our leaders? The L.N.U., with its knowledge and experience, can well take its place in the van of the Peace Movement as a force for the development of a public opinion based on the principles of world co-operation and social justice.

It can also apply these principles to our own Dominion and Colonial problems in a sincere endeavour to practise what we preach.

Let us suppose, then, that "Urgency" is the cry of our leaders, what can we do about it?

We all know the difficulties—the black-out, A.R.P. duties, evacuation that re-

duces the number of workers in each Branch area, and so on. . . .

However, it has been proved that afternoon and even evening meetings can be held, especially when the moon is full. (By the way, could not the half-hour before morning service be used on Sundays for a League address or a discussion on the basis of Mr. Arnold-Forster's excellent Outlines?)

House-to-house visitation is almost impossible owing to bad weather and serious reductions in the number of collectors.

There seems little left to us but the post.

Would it not be possible to start a series of postal discussions by sending the original question to X, another to Y, and so on, according to the size of the Branch. X, Y and the rest would be asked to write their comments on the paper enclosed, send it on to the second name on a list of ten to a dozen members also enclosed, and post a card to the local secretary to indicate that the scheme is going on and to suggest where it has collapsed—if one of the addresses on the list is incorrect.

When one group has completed its round, the findings could well be summarised for an article in a local paper and in a report to Headquarters.

MARGARET DARNLEY NAYLOR.

Evacuated to 15, West Way,
Lancing.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

TYNESIDE HOLDS AN L.N.U. CONFERENCE ON FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS

Sir,—In view of the greatly increased need for the further education of the public with regard to international affairs, may I commend to branches a somewhat unusual form of conference on War Aims which was held in this town recently.

At most conferences one or two principal speakers put forward their views, and these are discussed, but our object was to ascertain the views of the Man in the Black-out. We, therefore, sent notices asking for delegates to all organisations likely to be interested, and after a short speech outlining the scope of the conference the ninety persons present were split up quite arbitrarily into small groups under group leaders. Each group had a room to itself and an hour in which to find answers to the seven questions which had been prepared after careful consultation between the group leaders: the sole duty of these leaders being to see that all the questions were discussed and the answers taken down.

After tea the groups came together to compare and report progress, and there was a final discussion of some questions which had had to be passed over too hurriedly.

Question 1a, "What are we fighting against?" produced mainly the answers: Nazi Aggression, Direct and Indirect Aggression or the Use of Force in the Settlement of Disputes, although one group replied: "An Incurable Aggressor." 1b, "What are we fighting for?" was answered by National Security, a Just World Order, International Understand-

ing and Co-operation, the Settlement of Disputes by International Law, the Right of Peoples to decide their own form of Government, the Safeguarding of Minorities, Self-Government and Security for the Free Peoples—in fact, each group had different ideas about this, and there was, in addition, a large number of people who felt that we were merely fighting for the preservation of vested interests or because the present Governments of Britain and France felt their power threatened by the Nazi Régime.

Question 2, which concerned our attitude to the Empire (India and Africa in particular) and to the neutrals (Italy and Japan in particular) produced a resolution by the whole conference that we have an obligation to bring the subject-peoples as rapidly as possible to the stage of self-government and are under an obligation to make no arrangements with the neutrals at the expense of countries suffering from aggression.

Question 3, "What should be our minimum conditions for an armistice?" brought fairly unanimous answers with respect to the restoration of the independence of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Austria, although there was a strong minority in favour of stopping hostilities at once and discussing the terms afterwards.

Question 4, "How are we to provide security for countries restored to independence?" brought unanimously the answer that there must be a strong system to keep international law and order—most groups

recommending an international police force.

Question 5a, "Are we to hold a Peace Conference?" brought the reply: "Yes, but after a lapse of time." 5b, "Whom should we ask to attend?" brought various suggestions such as All the Powers, the Belligerents and Friendly Neutrals, including the U.S.A. There was a minority which thought this Peace Conference should be followed by a later World Conference.

Question 6, "What sort of machinery can this conference set up?" brought suggestions varying from a Modified League to Complete Federation.

Question 7a, "Do you envisage that such machinery could be worked by totalitarian States?" brought mostly Noes, but there were some Yeses, while 7b, "By States retaining national sovereignty?" brought unanimous Noes.

The answers to some of the questions surprised us. We all felt that there was a great lack of clear and fundamental thinking displayed—the delegates falling into two main groups, i.e., those who related all questions to a closely held but not very closely examined creed (Communism, Imperialism, Pacifism, Free Trade, Social Credit, etc.) and those who were merely bewildered. Most group leaders came away sadder, and perhaps not wiser. But I think the reverse held good of the delegates who invited us to repeat the experiment.

ENID ATKINSON

Chairman of the Jesmond, Newcastle,
Branch of the L.N.U.

A NEW COUNCIL FOR EDUCATION

FOR twenty years the Education Committee of the League of Nations Union, with considerable success, tried to ensure that all pupils in the schools should be instructed in the aims and activities of the League of Nations. H.M. Government, in common with the Governments of other States that were members of the League, undertook to promote such teaching. A chapter on the League was included in the Board of Education's Handbook of Suggestions for the Consideration of Teachers. And the County Councils' Association, the Association of Municipal Corporations and other associations of Local Education Authorities and of Directors of Education, as well as the great professional associations of Teachers, appointed representatives to serve on the Union's Education Committee, whose special task it was first to examine *how* League teaching might best be given in schools of various types and then to advise and assist the teachers in giving such instruction.

To supplement the formal teaching of the classroom in ways recommended by the Education Committee, Junior Branches of the Union were at one time or another formed in some 1,500 schools, and for their members the Committee organised a very full programme of holiday camps and summer schools at home and at Geneva, correspondence exchanges, exchange visits and numerous other activities which helped to bring the young people of this country into friendly contact with boys and girls of other lands.

Unique Position in Schools

Since it was the official policy of H.M. Government to promote League teaching, the Education Committee of the Union had in many ways a unique position in relation to education authorities and schools which was a fine tribute to a purely voluntary organisation, and its work was carried out with the full authority of the national associations of Local Education Authorities and of Teachers, whilst constitutionally it was an *advisory* committee of the Union's Executive. The position was always anomalous, but caused little difficulty.

As time went on, however, it became desirable to make a clearer distinction between the general work of the Union and the purely educational work in the schools. For this reason it was decided to empower the Education Committee to reconstitute itself on October 1 last as a self-governing educational council, established by and drawing most of its support from the Union and empowered by the Union to carry out, in colleges and schools and other organisations within the public system of education, certain clearly defined educational work entrusted to it.

Owing to the outbreak of war the new Council could not meet in the autumn term but has now been set up and will be known as the Council for Education in World Citizenship. The Council will in future help and guide the work of the Union's School Branches, and assist all the other Junior Branches of the Union. It will also seek to associate with itself and to give advice and assistance to certain other clubs and societies in the schools which are in general agreement with its aims but which are not and, for one reason or another, do not wish to be School Branches of the Union. Nothing in these arrangements will affect any special relations that may in some places exist

between the local adult organisations of the Union and Junior Branches in their areas: such relations have always been a matter of local arrangement, provided that the Junior Branches remained attached to headquarters and set their subscriptions direct to the Union's head office.

Inaugural Meetings

The new Council extends to all who are engaged in the practice or administration of education a most cordial invitation to attend its public Inaugural Meetings to be held at Oxford from April 11 to 15, when it will submit proposals for work during the war and will seek to find out exactly how it can be of most assistance to the schools. The President of the Board of Education has already intimated that he hopes to be present and to address the Council, and a full programme of speakers will be available from the head office at the beginning of March. The fee, including board and lodging at Somerville College for four full days will be £2 17s. 6d. with a separate registration fee of 5s. A week-end conference for boys and girls has already been held at Bristol and a Week-end School will be held from April 8 to 11 for senior pupils from the upper forms of Public and Secondary Schools.

In a statement which it is now publishing the Council pays tribute to the assistance which the Royal Institute of International Affairs and certain private organisations already in existence or now being formed can give to teachers in studying for themselves the *facts* of international affairs. But it has always been a fundamental principal of the League of Nations Union Education Committee that the problem of *how* to teach this subject was an *educational* question to be settled by the teachers themselves. That is the purpose of the Council for Education in World Citizenship and, in establishing this Council, the Union hopes that it will be able to ensure that young people in the schools to-day shall grow up with a better understanding of the problems of the modern world and with the *will* to play their part in building a new order based upon the principles of freedom and justice, co-operation and good faith.

FINLAND

LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION MEETING

SPEAKERS:

The FINNISH MINISTER LORD LYTTON
IN THE
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