to handle. Other colonial powers have 
faced the same problem. France had 
her Algeria, and it took even de Gaulle 
a long time to wrest power from the 

colons. 

The nature of Rhodesia as a settler 
colony has led to differences in its constitutional 
evolution. The electorate, 
overwhelmingly white, were allowed in 
1 922 to decide by referendum whether 
they wanted to join South Africa or to 
become-for the first time-a British 
colony wi·th an advanced degree of self 
government. Till that time the territory 
had been protected by Britain but had 
been administered by a commercial 
company, the British South Africa 
Company. The referendum went in 
favour of a self governing colony. Since 
then, Rhodesia has enjoyed its own 
elected parliament, its own cabinet, its 
own armed forces. The administration 
of all British colonies is left largely to 
men on the spot; in the Rhodesian casl': 
this was done without normal supervis!
on from London. . 

It is important to realise, however, that 
this high degree of self government did 
not detract from Britain's sovereignty. 
The constitution of 1923 was grantedby Britain. When it was altered in 1961 
this had to be done by the British parliament, 
and parliament has at all times 
retained the right to change the constitution. 
Moreover the 1923 constitution 
gave British ministers the right to veto 
Rhodesian legislation which they considered 
to be contrary to the interests of 
the African population. It was only by 
British legislation that this detailed 
supervision was ended-and it could be 
restored at any time. The legal situation 
is clear : the Bri.tish parliament is 
sovereign over Rhodesia. Even Ian 
Smith accepted this when he said in a 
BBC interview on 10 September 1964, 
" Although the British government say 
they have no intention of interfering in 

our internal affairs . .. nobody can 
deny that from a legal constitutional 
point of view they have a right to do 
so...." 

If Britain alone has a right to make 
Rhodesia independent, it is for Britain 
to decide on what terms she will do so. 
Before UDI refcrence was often made to 
a " convention " whereby Bri.tain, while 
possessing the right to legislate for Rhodesia, 
did not do so. Such a convention 
had certainly been referred to by successive 
British ministers. It had, however, 
no legal effect in that no act of 
the British parliament could be declared 
invalid even if it broke the convention. 
Moreover, the convention 
needs to be accurately expressed. It 
was that the British parliament did not 
legislate for matters within the competence 
of .the Rhodesian legislature. In 
other words, if Britain had given the 
Rhodesian legislature power to pass a 
certain kind of legislation she should 
not use her right to override the local 
legislature. The convention has its 
roots in the common sense point that 
there should not be conflicting legislation 
or two bodies responsible for one 
subject. But the convention never 
meant that Britain had lost .the right to 
revoke Rhodesia's constitution or to 
change those parts of it which the Rhodesian 
legislature itself could not 
change. 

Whatever the content of the convention 
before UDI the illegal seizure of the 
colony has created a new situation in 
which the convention does not survive. 
There may be, there certainly are, prac· 
ticallimitations on Britain's freedom to 
intervene in Rhodesia, but the convention 
is not such a limitation. 

H is as well to recall in passing that the 
present crisis in Rhodesia, which began 
with the election of the Rhodesian 
Front government at the end of 1962, 


was not initiated by the British government. 
The Conservatives were not at 
that time putting pressure on the Rhodesian 
government to liberalise, although 
they would have had plenty of justification 
for doing so, and there was no 
sign that a future Labour governmentwould be prepared to impose changes. 
The crisis arose because the Rhodesian 
Front government demanded independence 
and refused to continue under the 
1961 constitution. They forced Britain 
to discuss terms for independence and 
seized power illegally when they found 
the terms unacceptable. The crisis has 
been forced on Britain, not created by 
her. 

the transfer of power 

Our task in Rhodesia is to secure the 
orderly advance of the country towards 
a democratic cons-titution. How do we 
do it? In particular, at what point do 
we grant independence, before power 
has passed to the African majority or 
not until afterwards ? So far as the 
substance of policy is concerned, as 
against the means of carrying it out, 
this is the only vital point. 

Since um many people in Rhodesia and 
some in Britain have rejected the assumption 
that power should pass to the 
majority population at all. This is contrary 
to the assumptions behind the constitutional 
settlement of 1961 ; it is contrary 
to the basic principles applied in 
British colonial evolution ; it is contrary 
to the spirit of Rhodesia's existing 
constitution. But it is as well to 
look at the point again, for some argue 
that conditions have changed and that 
the Congo massacres and events in 
other African states call in questionprevious assumptions about the desirability 
of ultimate majority rule. The 
fact is that the continuation of dominance 
by a white population of 200,000 

over an African population of 4 million 
is not only immoral, it is bound to lead 
to a bloody explosion. Rhodesia has a 
choice of passing peacefully to majority 
rule reasonably soon, or passing to it 
later after a revolution. It is brave and 
dramatic to stand against the inevitable, 
but it does not succeed. The way to 
avoid a catastrophe is to meet the legitimate 
aspirations of the Africans by 
providing them with a gradually increasing 
share in power. As The Times 
said on the 24 November 1965, "Rhodesians 
are being pressed to avoid a 
revolution, not to embark on one." 

Against the view that democracy has 
been discredited elsewhere in Africa, 
it must be said that a white dictatorship 
forced to employ police state 
methods to maintain itself is no more 
democratic than a black dictatorship. 
Democracy is not justified by the ability 
of each man to govern himself, but bythe risks involved in allowing any group 
of men to govern their fellows. No 
better illustration of the risks could be 
provided than Rhodesia today. 

A transfer of power from the 200,000 
whites to the four million blacks in 
Rhodesia is inevitabl~. What is in 
doubt is whether this will entail a drastic 
decline in political standards and 
prosperity. We must do our best to ensure 
that the Rhodesia of the future 
possesses ,the maximum of politicalliberty. We shall do that cause no good 
if, despairing of success, we prop up a 
reactionary white supremacist regime, 
a course which will only encourage reactionary 
black racialism when the 
change comes. 

We need to recognise that what is involved 
in the transfer of power from 
white to black is no superficial thing. 
What we mean when we say that the 
whites govern Rhodesia is that, even in 
so far as Africans participate in govern



ment, enjoy educational facilities etc., 
they do so on sufferance by the whites. 
The number of seats in parliamentdominated by African voters can be reduced 
a.t any time by the white members 
of parliament. The areas where 
Africans may live are prescribed by 
law made by whites. Europeans enjoy 
the best land and ten times as much 
annual income per head. Not only do 
whites govern Rhodesia : the whole of 
Rhodesian life is organised for their 
benefit. At present Europeans can behave 
as if Africans are unwelcome intruders 
in their own country. 

If power passes to the majority all this 
will change. Segregation in land is 
bound to stop. There will be an African 
prime minister. Differences in incomes 
will diminish at least between 
those doing similar work. Salisbury'sexclusive white hotels, restaurants, 
clubs, residential areas-all these will 
go. There will not be wholesale pers~cution 
any more than there is in Zambia. 
Europeans will not be expelledRhodesia's 
economy needs them too 
much for that. A majority can afford 
to tolerate a minority on a basis of individual 
capability : it is minorities 
who cannot afford to be egalitarian.
Nevertheless, Europeans will inevitably 
and rightly feel that they are at the 
mercy of a vastly larger, foreign and 
basically hostile population. Their 
situation will be so utterly different 
from that which they enjoy today that 
it is quite unrealistic to expect them to 
acquiesce in the change. 

It may be said that this view attaches 
too much importance to race and that 
people should not be concerned with the 
colour of a government, but with its 
quality. They should not but they are ; 
and in the present feverish state of race 
relations in Africa and throughout the 
world it is fantasy to expect otherwise. 
For the foreseeable future race will 

count for a great deal in the formation 
of attitudes both of whites and blacks. 

As a matter of cold fact, entrenched 
racial minorities simply do not voluntarily 
hand over power. Such a conclusion 
is no more than commonsense 
suggests, but we can base our conclusion 
not on abstractions but on experience. 
Is there any case in history when 
an entrenched racial minority has 
acquiesced in the transfer of power to a 
previously subjugated majority if it 
could avoid doing so? Did the Zanzibar 
Asians? No. Did the colons in Algeria 
? No. Did the Europeans in 
Kenya ? No. (The latter were onlyless successful than the Rhodesians because 
they had no army with which to 
resist British pressure.) Are there any 
cases when a racial minority has clung 
on to power? Yes-in South Africa 
and the Portuguese colonies of Mo9ambique 
and Angola. And let us not forget 
that South Africa and Portugal are 
the two countries with which white 
Rhodesians express most sympathy. 

Common sense and experience both indicate 
that racial minorities do not 
voluntarily surrender power. It is 
against this background that we need 
to look at the situation in Rhodesia today, 
and then decide whether Britain 
can safely make Rhodesia independent 
before majority rule has actuallyarrived. 

There are only two important questions 
in the Rhodesia issue : as to objective, 
whether we grant independence before 
there is majority rule, whenever that 
may be ; as to means, whether we are 
prepared in the last resort to use force . 
The first step to realism is to recognise 
that nothing is of any significance except 
these two vital points. 


2. Rhodesia today 
There are about 217,000 Europeans in 
Rhodesia-about the same as the population 
of Harrow. Only about 28,000 
adults were born in the country. The 
rest of the adult population are immigrants. 
Small scale pre-war immigration 
was followed by a vast wave after 
the second world war, taking the European 
population up from 83,000 in 1946 
to 136,000 in 1951. A second wave followed 
in the fifties. About one third of 
the European population is of South 
African origin. Around a quarter have 
been in the country less than ten years, 
and three quarters for less than 20 
years. These figures need to be borne 
in mind when assessing the rights of 
Europeans against the four million 
Africans. 

the law and the constitution 

The franchise in Rhodesia's illegal1965 
constitution is the same as that in the 
legal 1961 constitution. It was worked 
out by Duncan Sandys for Britain and 
Sir Edgar Whitehead, Rhodesia's then 
Prime Minister. Whitehead acceptedthe objective of ultimate majority rule 
but he wanted to be rid of routine British 
supervision of Rhodesian legislation. 
The old franchise had stlipulated 
an income of £240 for the vote. Most 
Africans were excluded by this requirement 
and there was no chance of an advance 
in average African incomes fast 
enough to give them a majority. The 
new franchise was intended to provide 
a prospect of an African majority at a 
date perhaps ten or twenty years ahead. 
The qualifications for the vote are set 
out below. It is impossible to estimate 
how long it would take for an African 
majority to emerge under this system-
so much depends on the pace of educational 
and economic advance, and that 
in turn depends on the policies of a 
white dominated government who are 
very conscious of the effect of their 

policies on the electoral register. But 
even if a vast number of Africans were 
to be added to the rolls, it would still 
be possible for the government to reduce 
the number of members elected 
by the lower, mainly African roll, and 
so to put off an African majority into 
the unforeseeable future. 

THE RHODESIAN FRANCHISE : 
THERE ARE TWO SEPARATE 
REGISTERS OF VOTERS. 50 
MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY 
THE A REGISTER, 15 BY THE B 
REGISTER. 

who qualifies? qualifications 
A registerabout 100,000 £330 a year and 
nearly all 4 years secondary 
Europeans education ; or 
£528 a year and 
primary education ; 
or £792 a year and 
no education 
B registerabout 100,000 £132 a year and 
nearly all 2 years secondary 
Africans educationt ; or 
£264* a year and 
no education 

t primary only if over 30 

*£198 if over 30 
The above table, in the interests of simplicity, 
omits a few minor provisions. 
About 11-million adult Africans do not 
qualify for either register and consequently 
have no vote. Cross-voting is 
allowed. B voters can vote in A registerelections but the number of B votes for 
each candidate is scaled down to ensure 
that B votes do not exceed one 
quarter of A votes. A voters have the 
same right in elections on the B register. 

So long as nearly all Europeans support 
a single party, as they do at the moment, 
this cross-voting feature has no 
practical effect. 


The franchise as it stands, therefore, 
offers no evidence of a firm intention to 
secure, and certainly no guarantee of, 
an African majority soon. Even so, this 
franchise and the other provisions of 
the 1961 constitution were opposed by 
Smith and his party as too liberal. 

The other main features of the 1961 
constitution were the Declaration of 
Rights written into the constitution and 
the Constitutional Council charged 
with advising against new legislation 
which offended against the declaration 
of rights. But the Council was given 
no power to veto such laws as is the 
Supreme Court in the United States, 
and no power to exercise even advisory 
functions against legislation already on 
the statute book. Since Rhodesia already 
had a full range of discriminatory 
legislaHon before the Council was set 
up, its effectiveness is nominal. It is 
composed of a multiracial panel of 
judges and has itself condemned its 
lack of real power to affect discriminatory 
legislation. In its report on the 
Land Apportionment Act, the Council 
quest·ioned "what value the declaration 
of rights has in protecting rights in 
the future so long as one of those rights 
-the right to freedom from discrimination 
in regard to ownership of land .. . 
is specifically denied by this Act." This 
condemnation was entirely ineffective 
because the act in question had been 
pas ed before the 1961 constitution. 

The declaration of rights reads well. 
Discrimination is prohibited, but not if 
it takes place under an existing act. 
Arrest and detention without trial are 
prohibited, but not during an emergency 
and not if provided for by an 
existing act. There is freedom of ex-
press•ion-but Rhodesia's press is today 
censored in accordance with perfectly 
valid exceptions to the rule. 
No trust can, therefore, be placed in 
the guarantees in the 1961 constitution. 

The loopholes carelessly or deviously 
left are too great. 

The changes introduced by Smith in 
the illegal 1965 constitution are important 
for what they reveal about 
the inclinations of the regime when 
able to write its own law as it pleases. 
The 1965 constitution is largely copied 
from that of 1961. Whole sections are 
identical, in particular the declaration 
of rights. But the few changes are all 
important. The constitution was promulgated 
by the rebel ministers and it 
was not even presented to parliament 
for acceptance. For a period of six 
months after uor the constitution gave 
to the illegal governor power to alter 
any of its provisions by the stroke of a 
oen without reference to narliament. 
This orovision was actually used to 
alter the section relating to the Crown, 
without reference to parliament. 

The procedure for routine amendment 
of the constitution has been greatly 
weakened. The 1961 constitution laid 
down that its most important clauses, 
those affecting the franchise, for 
exaanple, could only be altered by a 
referendum in which each of Rhodesia's 
four races voted in favour of the 
change. If registered African voters 
were below a certain number they had 
to be supplemented by non-voters. We 
have already seen how this guarantee 
could be nullified by a reduction in the 
number of African dominated seats, a 
change that did not require a referendum. 
Nevertheless, in the new constitution 
the whole procedure is sweptaside. Any change in the constitution 
can be made so long as parliament 
passes the amendment by a two thirds 
majority and, at a later sitting which 
could be on the same day, passes a resolution 
by a similar majority requesting 
the illegal governor to assent to it. 
The Rhodesian Front has at presentwell over a two thirds majority and 


could therefore change the constitution 
in any way, abolishing votes for Africans, 
sacking the judges, abolishing the 
fundamental rights or introducing torture. 
Whether the Front is likely to do 
these things is not the point ; the constitution 
would not stop them and the 
fact that, given the opportunity, they 
have not imposed any restrictions on 
themselves, is significant. 

In the old constitution, the appointment 
of judges required the agreement of 
the Chief Justice. In the illegal constitution 
this power lies with the Prime 
Minister who need only consult the 
Chief Justice without being bound by 
his advice. 

emergency regulations 

Even long before um, Rhodesia possessed 
draconian statutes with which 
to deal with its opponents. The death 
penalty was mandatory for such offences 
as petrol bomb throwing even if no 
damage had been caused ; several 
people have been condemned to death 
under this provision and only saved by 
international pressure. A former Rhodesian 
Chief Justice, Sir Robert Tredgold, 
resigned in protest against the Law 
and Order Maintenance Act, which he 
described as outraging "almost everybasic human right" and as " an unwarranted 
invasion" by the executive 
in the sphere of the courts. Members 
of the public could be obliged to live 
in certain areas, under "restriction." 
In the case of Africans, the place of 
restriction was usually a remote and 
desolate part of the bush, uninhabited 
and sometimes unhealthy. The onlyfood and shelter were what the police 
provided and medical attention was 
minimal. Many of .the restrictees were 
well educated urban Africans. Because 
the aluminium huts provided by the 
police were painfully uncomfortable in 

all weathers, they often constructed 
their own mud huts. It was as if the 
regime wanted to humiliate educated 
men by forcing them to live like tribal 
natives. Some of the restrictees were 
sent to live in these conditions for five 
years. They had broken no law. Theyhad been seen by no court. They were 
only men who, in the opinion of a 
minister, for reasons he did not need to 
disclose, were considered a danger to 
the community ; and there was no appeal 
from the minister's decision. 

A fortnight before um these powerswere greatly extended. The governmentnow has power to ban meetings of three 
or more people and the police are immune 
from proceedings if they cause 
injury or death in breaking up an illegal 
meeting. The police may prohibit the 
printing, distribution or even posession 
of any written matter. It is an offence 
to publish information about persons 
in restriction or detention or about their 
place of confinement. It is an offence 
to pass a remark to another person that 
might cause alarm and despondency. 
Every publication requires government 
approval and every line has to be 
passed by the government censor. Radio 
stations and printing works can be 
taken over and mail can be impounded. 
Anyone can be detained for 30 dayswithout warrant or trial on suspicionthat he may be a person whose arrest 
is in the public interest ; and on release 
he can be rearrested. The traditional 
chiefs (who, the Smith regimelikes to claim, are not controlled by 
government) can be sacked and substitutes 
appO'inted. Finally, it is an offence 
to wear, carry or simply possess a 
hat or walking stick if it is like that of 
a restricted person and has beer. reputed 
to be the badge of an unlawful 
organisation ! 

The powers of the administration are 
such that the courts can afford no pro



tection. In January 1966 Mr. Maluleke, 
an African student, was charged 
with arson and malicious damage to 
property. The court found that there 
was no case to answer and acquitted 
him. As he left the court Maluleke 
was arrested and served with a government 
order restricting him for five 
years. Many more provisions and cases 
of the same kind could be quoted. They 
add up to a catalogue which amplyjustifies the charge that Rhodesia today 
is a police state. The view that, 
leaving aside the illegality of UDI, the 
Smith regime respects the rule of law 
and British legal tradition does not bear 
examination. No British people have 
ever accepted ·the Hitlerian machinery 
which is now directed against Rhodesia's 
African population. When a 
government resorts to such methods to 
maintain itself in power it has abandoned 
all claim to sympathy. 

education 

If Rhodesia is made independent under 
the kind of constitution it now possesses, 
great importance will attach to 
the educational and economic opportunities 
open to Africans for the vote 
goes only to those with money or education. 
Europeans point to !'heir large 
expenditure on African education as 
evidence of their generosity and their 
intent to help Africans. In 1965-66 
Rhodesia planned to spend £6.5 million 
on African education, the largest 
item in the budget. The figure has been 
rising rapidly in recent years-it was 
only £3.9 million in 1960-but it has 
now been decided that expendituremust be geared to rises in the national 
income. Total expenditure on European 
education is slightly less than that 
on African education. These facts 
sound superficially impressive but one 
must look behind them. There are ten 
times as many Africans at school as 

Europeans ; so expenditure per child 
is ten times higher for the European. 
Secondary education for Europeanchildren is compulsory ; for Africans 
no education is compulsory. The facilities 
for Europeans are nearly all provided 
by the state ; most African 
schools are provided by missions, 
farms, and other private bodies. Only11 per cenil: of Africans are in government 
schools. 

Most African children go to school for 
some period of time, but only 8 per 
cent reach secondary school and only 
one in every thousand reaches the sixth 
form. There is a big drop-out after 
three years' primary educa·tion and a 
massive drop-out at the end of primary 
school as shown in the table below. 

AFRICAN PUPILS 
ENROLLED IN 1964 
First Substandard class 122,000 
Primary Standard Four 42,000 
Primary Standard Six 26,000 
Secondary Form One 5,000 
Secondary Form Four 837 
Upper Sixth 35 

Nor is this shallow pyramid to be 
attributed to greater success in enrolling 
young pupils than in past years. 
The pattern has always been the same. 
The 35 in the Upper Sixth in 1964 were 
what was left of the 2,000 who were in 
Form 11 in 1960 and of 29,000 in Primary 
Standard Three in 1955. For the 
African the difficulty lies not in getting 
to school and learning enough to earn 
a living but in staying at school long 
enough to begin to compete with the 
European. 

The Rhodesian government's annual 
report on African education for 1964 
said, " The amount of contribution 
made by the parents and the voluntary 
agencies is tremendous. There must be 


very few systems where before the government 
grant for the teachers' salaries 
is made available the applicants for 
the school have to erect the school 
building and the teachers' houses, equip 
the school and buy the books and classroom 
requisites." To meet the demand 
for education, communities were allowed 
to open new upper primaryschools. The report states, "Not a 
single trained teacher was seen in 
charge of one of these classes, nor did 
any of them receive a satisfactory report." 
As for farm schools, said to 
vary from very good to very bad, the 
report quotes the words of a government 
inspector : " On farms where the 
school has been opened merely to 
attract labour and where .the farmer's 
only concern with the school is that of 
paying the teacher, scholastic standards 
hardly exist. All sorts of ruffians, sexual 
maniacs and budding politicians are 
employed and can contaminate the 
children freely and for as long as they 
like provided .they do not pester the 
farmer for pencils, books and other 
equipment. The farmer is quite happy 
to employ a dolt as long as by so doing 
school matters do not intrude uponfarm matters and his pocket." In 1964, 
the Smith government refused a British 
offer of a larger grant for a crash pro-
gramme on Mrican education. The pro-
gramme which has been announced 

since um concentrates almost exclusively 
on primary education and will 
do li1tle to bring Africans up to the 
standard where they can compete. 

the African's economic place 

The Smith regime argues that while 
more African education is desirable 
there is a limit to the extent to which 
the European taxpayer can be asked to 
pay for i't. In 1964 the average African 
income was £121 a year; the average 
European income was £1241. Afri


can agricultural workers averaged only 
£67 a year. These figures include all 
benefits in kind. If Africans do not pay 
high taxation it is because they do not 
receive a fair share of the wealth 
of the country. Nevertheless, as we 
have seen, African parents have to 
make a considerable contribution to 
the education of their children. 

The way in which an African can earn 
his living is dictated by the Land Apportionment 
Act. Under this act, 36 
million of Rhodesia's 96 million acres 
are reserved for the 5 per cent of Europeans 
in the population. This European 
land includes the best ; it is true that it 
has been better looked after than African 
land but it was also better .to start 
with and nearer to roads and railways. 
A Rhodesian parliamentary select committee 
reported in 1960 that between 
1936 and 1959 about 113,000 Africans 
had been compulsorily moved from 
their farmlands in the European area. 
The committee commented that " millions 
of pounds of badly needed capital 
has been spent for ideological rather 
than productive purposes." The Constitutional 
Council of Rhodesia although 
unable 1o take formal action 
against the Act, produced a unanimous 
report against i1. They said it had been 
" responsible for not only intangible 
prejudice but actual material prejudice 
in the financial sense to all races." It 
is often argued that the Act benefits 
Africans by keeping Europeans out of 
certain areas. Total absence of control 
would certainly allow Europeans to buy 
up African farms. But proper legislation 
should protect the under-privileged 
without giving massive advantage to a 
minori,ty. 

The Constitutional Council called the 
Act "the embodiment of racial discrimination." 
Under it an African cannot 
live in town centres because these 
are European areas ; he may work in 


the town, but must live in an African 
" township" on ·the outskirts. The 
Council commented "it matters not 
that he is a successful businessman, a 
member of the professions, a civil servant, 
a member of Parliament, a Parliamentary 
Secretary or a member of 
the Constitutional Council. He may, it 
is true, live in one of the few multiracial 
hotels, or at the University or 
other seat of learning, but he may not 
acquire, in the European area, a home 
for himself or his family ... not being 
sufficiently advanced he must live as 
far as may be-sometimes as far as 14 
miles or more-from his place of work 
in the European area. He must pay an 
undue proportion of his wages in transport 
costs." In a European area an African 
can only be an employee of a European, 
although in an African area a 
European is allowed to occupy land for 
mining. In Salisbury an Mrican can 
be a law clerk in a European firm, but 
he cannot become a partner because 
that would mean he was carrying on 
his own business in a European area 
Until the Rhodesian Front government 
came to power in 1962 successive Rhodesian 
governments were prepared to 
consider amendment and the eventual 
abolition of the Land ApportionmentAct. The Front has always insisted on 
its retention as the keystone of the 
European position. 

This description of some of the main 
aspects of life in Rhodesia to.day is 
given to show that there is no ground 
to believe that Rhodesia is moving,
however slowly, towards equality for 
the African. 

what do the whites want? 

The majority of whites wanted independence 
under the 1961 constitution 
or something like it and they have supported 
Smith in his illegal declaration 

of independence. It is revealing to consider 
why they should be so anxious to 
be rid of British control. Iif the Europeans 
mean ultimately to permit an 
African government, surely they would 
want a British presence, if only for 
their protection. Some years ago Ian 
Smith was fond of quoting an American 
businessman who declined to invest in 
Rhodesia until it was independent because 
only then would he know " who 
was in charge." But if Rhodesia becomes 
independent with guaranteedprogress to racial equality her present 
rulers will not remain in charge. Smith's 
remark only makes sense if you assume 
that after independence African advance 
is to be impeded. It requirescriminal gullibility to imagine that the 
Europeans mean to allow power to pass 
into African hands. 

Over the last ten years the European 
population and the governments they 
have elected have drifted consistently 
towards the right, away from the concept 
of non-racialism. When the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was 
formed in 1953, bringing together the 
normal colonies of Zambia and Malawi 
with the settler colony of Rhodesia, it 
was welcomed by both Europeans and 
Africans in Rhodesia. To Europeansit seemed to provide a more viable unit 
and the prospect of majority rule 
seemed so remote as to be negligible. 
Africans were relieved to be placed for 
the first time in the same bracket as 
Africans in the northern territories ; it 
gave them hope that they would now 
be regarded as the legitimate heirs of 
the country, rather than as a permanently 
subject race as in South Africa. 
Some Europeans wanted Federation to 
stop the African menace ; some were 
prepared to look kindly on multi-
racialism, often because they did not 
take it seriously. They did not mind 
telling the black man he was an equal, 
so long as the black man did not be



lieve it. To a great extent therefore the 
common welcome extended to Federation 
concealed divergent views between 
the races on what it should lead to and 
when. The optimism lasted for three 
years, until the time came to settle the 
new state's franchise. The proposals of 
the Federal government, accepted by 
Britain, were such that the prospect of 
significanrt African influence in government 
was pushed into the unforeseeable 
future. Meanwhile, some improvement 
had been achieved in reducing segregation-
enough to disturb some whites 
and whet the appetites of Africans. Oar-
field Todd, prime minister of Rhodesia 
since Federation, called for the extension 
of Rhodesia's own franchise to 
more Africans and further relaxation 
in discrimination. Africans still attacked 
his moderation but saw him as something 
of an ally. Todd lost the support 
of his white colleagues ; some of his 
ministers resigned ; his party summoned 
a caucus and replaced him as 
leader by Sir Edgar Whitehead. That 
was the end of racial harmony in Rhodesia. 
Till 1953 there had been peace, 
the peace of subjugation and resignation. 
From 1953 to 1958 there had 
been hope. From then on Africans 
looked more and more to their own 
leaders to fight for them. Many still 
co-operated with the moderate multiracial 
party, but most transferred their 
loyalty to the militant leaders of purely 
African parties. 

Rhodesian Front formed 

The Federation was not finally broken 
up untill963 but its future was in doubt 
for some years before. In the final 
stages the right wing European parties 
began to give it up for lost and concentrated 
on holding Rhodesia as a bastion 
of white rule. In March 1962 Welensky, 
Federal Prime Minister, called 
a general election to strengthen his hand 

in negotiations with Britain. Four right 
wing parties, Federal and Rhodesian, 
then amalgamated to form the Rhodesian 
Front. The Front announced 
that it would ignore the Federal election 
and concentrate on the Rhodesian election 
later that year. 

Whitehead, with his moderate United 
Federal Party, had kept his dominance 
in Rhodesia till this time. He had 
gained a ,two-to-one majority in a referendum 
on the new and slightly liberal 
1961 constitution. In the months before 
the election, however, Whitehead had 
promised to abolish discrimination in 
land within a year and he had told the 
United Nations that he foresaw an 
African government in about fifteen 
years' time. These statements confirmed 
the growing feeling amongEuropeans that they must either make 
a stand against African advance or lose 
control of the country within a few 
years. Emotional strength was added 
to the "hard line" by the fear and fury 
aroused by the treatment of Europeans 
in the Congo. The result was a victory 
for the Front which took 35 seats 
against Whitehead's 29. Of the 50 
European-dominated seats Whitehead 
retained only 15. 

drift to apartheid 

The Front's poli,tical ideology has been 
clear from the beginning. Its first 
leader, Winston Field, called for a defence 
pact between Rhodesia, South 
Africa and the Portuguese territories. 
Its first policy statement of 1962,
Principles and Policies said : "It 
must be recognised that the African 
and European peoples have different 
philosophies and ways of life, and a 
policy is now advanced in which neither 
group is forced to live under a system 
nor in a manner alien to the group concept." 
The authority of the tradi



tional chiefs was to be enhanced. In 
education "any sort of enforced integration" 
was "repugnant" and the 
Front had great success with an advertisement 
showing European and 
African children going to school together 
: the caption was " Rhodesia is 
not ready for this." 

Although apartheid was not overtly recommended, 
the Front's Policy Statement 
openly advocated separate development 
of the two main races. One 
of the Front's principles reads "The 
Party will ensure the permanent establishment 
of the European in Southern 
Rhodesia." Amendments to the 1961 
constitution were to be sought because 
" inherent in the new constitution there 
is the intention to ensure the dominance 
by the African of the European 
before the former has acquired ade,
quate knowledge and experience of 
democratic government." 

There is plenty of evidence therefore, 
of the Front's initial lack of interest in 
racial co-operation and its attachment 
to the anglicised form of apartheidwhich it called community development. 
More serious however is the 
trend since 1962 for attitudes to harden 
in the direction of apartheid. When 
the Front held its congress in August 
1965 a confidential paper set out ~he 
resolutions submitted by local parties. 
These resolutions were not adopted bythe congress but they give an indication 
of the views of the grass roots of the 
party which is the power behind Smith. 

The dependence of any Rhodesian government 
upon these people must be remembered 
when assessing its freedom 
to give or to honour promises about 
African advance. 

Some of the resolutions are laughable. 
like that which referred to UNESCO and 
the World Bank as "virtually commu


nistic organisations." Others are sickening: 
"That all educational and religious 
literature . . . should be lodged 
for approval with the Department of 
Internal Affairs before being issued 
... Films showing Europeans and non-
Europeans fraternising shall be 
banned." Another calls for government 
scrutiny of radio programmes which 
" propagate a multi-racial imageamongst school children." Many point 
towards apartheid : to the Front's original 
principle "that all men have the 
right to the opportunity to develop their 
individual ability" one party sought to 
add "in their own areas." Multi-racial 
schools and schools for African employees 
in European areas were criticised 
and a reduction called for in the 
proportion of the budget spent on African 
education. Such sentiments can be 
laughed off when expressed by the lunatic 
fringe of an otherwise balanced community-
not when they represent the 
real wishes of the rulers of a British 
colony. 

Since UDI there has been further drift 
towards apartheid. At the end of 1965 
private schools in European areas were 
instructed by government circular to 
stop taking African pupils. Those 
people outside Rhodesia who think that 
white Rhodesians favour a non-racial 
society even in the distant future should 
take note of such statements as that of 
the rebel regime's Secretary for Internal 
Affairs at a conference in February 
1966 to discuss tribal lands : "If we 
acceot at the outset that there is no 
solution to be found in racial integration, 
a fact that has been demonstrated 
and proved in many parts of the world, 
then from the start we must recognise 
and plan on the basis of ultimate territorial 
sel1)regation of the two majorraces-European and African. It is 
accepted Government policy that the 
basis of this territorial segregation is the 
Land Apportionment Act as read with 


Chapter IX of the Constitution. In 
effect the major part of the African 
population will be permanently accommodated 
in the Tribal Trust Land." 

In February 1966 the illegal legislature 
in Salisbury was presented with the report 
of a "Select Committee on Political 
Boycott." The recommendation of 
the committee goes completely contrary 
to the multi-racial ideal. Housing 
policy, the committee states, should 
" be directed towards encouraging the 
natural grouping of house owners and 
tenants according to tribal affiliations." 
The government later announced its 
acceptance of this principle. The report 
suggests that Africans should be given 
school books " in which African customary 
respect for elders and traditional 
behaviour patterns upholding social 
order are shown to emerge as moral 
examples." As for the rule of law, "regard 
for the rights of the individual 
must not be allowed to outweigh the 
suffering that the vast majority must 
endure if there is delay in taking appropriate 
action." And if one wonders 
what that could mean-" in cases of a 
criminal nature stemming from public 
violence and intimidation the Rules of 
Court Procedure be revised to permitthe concealment of the identity of complainants 
and witnesses, and that consideration 
be given to the admission of 
hearsay evidence in cases of this 
nature." Against this background there 
was nothing surprising in the announcement 
of the Minister for Law and Order 
on 8 July that Rhodesia will soon have 
a Suppression of Communism Act as 
South Africa does. 

Characteristic of the up-to-the-minut<! 
attitude of the Rhodesian Front is this 
statement by a Front Member of Parliament 
in the legislature on 23 June 
this year: "I believe that the policy 
ot partnership as enunciated by the 
Whitehead Government and as attemp


ted, in a different sphere, by the Welensky 
Government, having been rejected 
decisively on at least two occasions 
by the electorate, need no longerbe considered. Now we are said to live, 
it is true we do live, in a multi-racial 
society. One must ask oneself whether 
this is to be encouraged or whether it 
is to be deplored. I believe tliat the experiment 
having failed, a completelynew solution in terms of our political 
life must be considered. If the African 
people as a whole wish to develop their 
ability and they wish to advance in 
their own sphere, they must do it in 
their own territorial bases." 

The Front's leaders are straightforward 
enough not to attempt to camouflage 
overmuch their intentions. Those spectators 
who argue that the difference between 
them and the British government 
is only one of timing simply do not 
know Rhodesia today. If you ask the 
average white in Salisbury his opinion 
on African advance he does not tell 
you that he will be content to share 
power when Africans .are as well. educated 
as he is. More likely you Will be 
told that Britain gave up India and the 
rest of the empire to communist thugs 
because she had no guts and that if 
Rhodesia is to pass into the hands of 
Africans, educated or not, it will be 
over the dead bodies of the white population. 
(The Rhodesian definition of 
communism is a little wild. "The State 
Department," said an MP recently in the 
legislature, "like the British Gove~


ment, are riddled, they are rotten wtth 
communism.") 

Do the views of Smith's die-hard supporters 
matter ? First, there is no evidence 
that Smith does not share their 
opinions. Second, even if he dia not 
and attempted to carry the countryacrainst them he would go the 
w"'ay of Todd, Whitehead and Winston 
Field. Smith is only Prime Minister 


because the extremists put him there 
and he is popular because he satisfies 
the European voters. It is true that he 
is a more skilful politician than any of 
his predecessors, but the Europeanpopulation is in no mood for trifling. 
To imagine that he could use his popularity 
to get the country to accept a 
policy completely opposed to the basis 
of that popularity is fantasy. He could 
get away with a settlement holding out 
a real prospect of African advance only 
if his followers were brought to believe 
that he did not mean to honour it. And 
if afterwards he were tempted to hon-
our it, he would undoubtedly find himself 
replaced by one of the many others 
waiting in the wings, Lardner-Burke. 
Dupont, Gaunt or Haroer-Harper of 
whom even Mr. Patrick Wall said in 
1961, in the House of Commons, that 
he would not be happy about the future 
of Africans if there was a possibility of 
the success of what was then the Dominion 
Party under Mr. Harper. 

African politics 

It has been said that Africans are not 
yet able to govern Rhodesia and it is 
certainly true that there are not enoughwith experience in administration and 
government to take over without a 
lowering of standards at the present 
time. To deny them experience, however, 
is not the way to put this right. 
In any case, it must be noted that Rhodesia 
has a larger number of African 
graduates than most African states. 
Many have studied at their own expense 
at British universities or at the Inns of 
Court. Others have studied while in 
prison or restriction. Rhodesia is as 
well off as, say, Tanzania in this respect. 
But Rhodesia is a more complex 
and industrialised community than 
Tanzania and requires a larger number 
of trained administrators. There is 
still a great way to go before Africans 

can play a role in the government of 
their country proportionate to their 
numbers ; enough now to say that it is 
false to suggest that there is not a large 
number of capable Africans ready to 
take advantage of any real move towards 
equality. 

African political leaders are divided. 
On the one hand there is the African 
opposition in Parliament made up of 
men who have been prepared to fight 
elections under the present constitution 
and even to continue to sit in Parliament 
after UDI. The main group comprises 
the United Peoples Party led by 
Mr. Chad Chipunza, the official leader 
of the opposition. This group calls for 
liberalisation but without makingtrouble over it. On the other hand are 
the nationalists demanding universal 
suffrage immediately and in jail for 
their active opposition to the regime. 
The nationalists are divided between 
the followers of Mr. Joshua Nkomo 
(the People's Caretaker Council, formerly 
the Zimbabwe African People's 
Union) and those of the Reverend 
Ndanbaningi Sithole (the Zimbabwe 
African National Union). Differences 
of tactics are occasionally discernible 
between the two parties but basicallythey are divided by personalities and 
jealousy. ZANU has more support among 
the intellectuals ; ZAPU is credited with 
the mass following. 

A last group of Africans is the traditional 
chiefs and headsmen, over 600 
of them. The Smith regime says these 
men are the proper representatives of 
the African people. They are paid by 
the government and can be dismissed 
by the government, and steps have been 
taken recently to give them greaterpowers of administration in the tribal 
areas. Educated urban Africans laugh 
at their illiteracy and one of the Smith 
government's few tactical errors was to 
put them on show by sending them on 


foreign vtstts. In order to bolster the 
authority of the chiefs, the government, 
in 1964, sent loudspeaker vans round 
the tribal areas broadcasting a statement 
the text of which was later revealed 
in Hansard: "The Government 
wishes that all people should have 
a clear understanding of its policy. The 
Government is strong and its policy 
will be carried out. Nobody will be allowed 
to stand in the way. Anyone who 
tries to interfere will be severely dealt 
with . . . Increased powers are being 
given to the chiefs. They have been 
provided with specially trained messengers 
who know how to deal with 
troublemakers. Guns are being made 
available to the chiefs and headmen. 
They have the power to arrest persons 
who try to undermine their authority. 
Government proposes to give the chiefs 
authority to punish and to banish 
wrongdoers . . . Now that you know 
what policy is, you also must rally to 
your chief. Those who argue will be 
brushed aside." 

African attitudes 

A lot of argument takes place about 
the attitude of the mass of the African 
people towards the Smith regime. The 
regime itself claims that most Africans 
want only to live in peace and securityand that they welcome tough action 
against agitators who carry out political 
intimidation. There is no doubt that 
the two nationalist parties have indulged 
in violence, particularly in 1963 
when they were fighting each other to 
obtain mass support. There was probably 
relief in the African townshipsof Salisbury when troops were sent in 
to stop this intimidation. But to go on 
from this to claim that Africans are 
content to go on living under white 
government is not justified. White rule 
brings its own violence. To those Africans 
who accept it without question 

and are prepared to make do with the 
inferior place it grants them, life 
under Smith, though not prosperous, 
can be peaceful. But any African who 
tries to change things or even to advocate 
change will soon find that the regime 
exercises its own forms of intimidation. 


However non-political an African maybe there is within him a chord ~hat can 
be played upon : he is open to the appeal 
that in his own country he should 
enjoy economic and political equality. 
The claim that Rhodesia is the most 
peaceful country in Africa is false because 
the inevitable appeal of this argument 
creates an explosive force which 
can at any time be ignited, and which 
will prevent the maintenance of white 
rule without an ever-increasing degree 
of police suppression. 

Many white Rhodesians think of 
the nationalist politicians and their 
campaign as malicious and unnecessary, 
the consequence of a temporary political 
fever. Mr. Smith is reported to have 
said recently "this moment of madness 
in Africa and the world will pass."
These Rhodesians have not yet learnt 
that the dynamics of human affairs 
create certain inevitabilities which can 
be wept over but which cannot in the 
long run be evaded. If African government 
were to bring less peace and less 
prosperity, Africans would still say yes 
to it. In the manner in which Britain 
could bring it about the transition to 
African government should in fact 
bring greater security and prosperity. 


3. guarantees 
So far I hope I have shown that on 
general grounds it is folly to expect a 
racial minority to surrender powervoluntarily ; second, that conditions in 
Rhodesia today, far from suggestingthat Rhodesia will prove an exceptionto the r.ule, suggest that there is even 
less chance than usual of such a voluntary 
hand over there. We need now to 
consider whether arrangements can be 
made which would compel a gradual 
hand-over once Britain had grantedindependence. The devising of such 
arrangements, or " guarantees," has 
been the subject of all the discussions 
that have taken place with the Rhodesian 
government both before and 
since um. 

In most constitutions granted by Britain 
to her former colonies provisions 
are included to make it difficu1t or impossible 
to change the basic features. 
It can be made obligatory to obtain a 
two-thirds rather than a simple majority 
to alter the franchise. In federal constitutions 
the consent of provincialauthorities is sometimes required to 
certain measures. On some issues a referendum 
of voters may be required. 
Occasionally, no allowance at all is 
made for amending certain clauses. 

Whatever the means, these " entrenched 
" clauses constitute some kind 
of guarantee against breach. But it is 
vital to recognise that they do not prevent 
breach : they only make it necessary 
for a government to break the law 
if it wants to change these provisions 
without having the assent required by 
the constitution. The only thing that 
prevents a breach is the readiness of 
the public to resist the government physically 
in the event of its breaking the 
law in this way. A guarantee of this 
kind is worth more than a mere undertaking 
or promise of good behaviour, 
but its reliability depends on the reluctance 
of the government in question 

to break the law and the readiness and 
ability of the public to resist if it does. 

Those who draft constitutions are often 
reluctant to make a guarantee too restrictive. 
Britain herself enjoys no written 
guarantees and there is a bias in 
the British tradition against arrangements 
which leave no room for flexibility. 
There is some similarity in the 
functions of the Constitutional Council 
established by the 1961 constitution 
and the Supreme Court of the United 
States. But while the Supreme Court's 
decision is final and binding on the 
legislature, the Rhodesian Council's decisions 
are only advisory and can be 
over-ridden by a two thirds majority 
in parliament or by a simple majority 
after six months' delay. The Council's 
supervision can be entirely by-passed 
without a two thirds majority and without 
delay if the government of the day 
certifies that urgent action is required.
A provision of this kind is no guarantee 
at all, for it is not even necessary 
to break the law in order to get round 
it. 

Even if a really rigid guarantee is intended 
there is still the danger of leaving 
loopholes by accident, for it is difficult 
to anticipate and close every loophole 
in legal drafting. It has been suggested 
that the ability of the Rhodesian 
parliament to reduce the number of B 
roll seats is the result of an unintentional 
error in drafting the 1961 constitution. 
In 1965 the British government, 
legislating to prohibit evictions from 
houses, accidentally left a loophole. If 
British government lawyers can accidentally 
fail to bind their own courts, 
we can be sure they can fail to bind 
courts in another country, operating 
under a different legal base (RomanDutch law applies in Rhodesia), which 
may be glad at some future date of an 
opportunity to be free of restraints. 
These factors must cause us to hesitate 


before putting our trust in written 
guarantees. 

But even if loopholes could not be 
found there would still be the danger 
of plain straightforward breach. If a 
guarantee were worked out to provide 
for the automatic increase of African 
voters and to prevent the negation of 
this right by the reduction of African 
seats, it could be argued that such a 
provision would afford Britain her 
" honourable discharge " and allow her 
to grant independence with a clear conscience. 
It would be tragic and pathetic 
if Britain were to place faith in the 
readiness of the Rhodesian regime to 
stick to the law. Even before um Smith 
and his colleagues made clear that to 
them adherence to the law came 
secondary. When Smith was seekingsupport for UDI in June 1964, he said 
that he thought people would support 
his government whether independence 
came legally or illegally . . . " It depends 
on whether we bungle or run the 
country well. Civilised independence is 
what really matters." And, of course, 
um itself proves conclusively that the 
regime is prepared to break the law if 
necessary to maintain the present situation. 
This applies not only to the illegal 
government but to the mass of the 
white population who have supported 
it. Now that the Smith regime has written 
its own constitution and its own 
laws it may well abide by them. As we 
have seen, they are so loose as to make 
breach unnecessary. There is no evidence 
that they would stick to provisions 
not of their liking, and plenty of 
evidence to the contrary. 

One needs only to use a little imagination 
to see how things might work 
out. If independence were grantedunder a constitution which theoretically 
ensured advance to an African 
majority at some time in the future, 
there would be no blatant abrogation 

by Smith on the day after independence. 
Whether he could survive the 
signing of an agreement on these lines 
would depend on whether his supporters 
thought he meant it or not. But 
whether he or someone else were in 
power, the result would be the same. 
Africans, incensed by what they would 
call Britain's sell-out, would intensify 
their resistance. This would be aggravated 
by the cocksure attitude of whites 
who, feeling that they had won the 
fight by getting Britain to call off sanctions, 
would call for closer links with 
South Africa. White extremists would 
be encouraged. African states would 
send arms to help the resistance. Acts 
,of terrorism would mount. Finally,
there would happen some particularly 
appalling incident, a mother and children 
burned alive in their car perhaps, 
and the government of the day, protesting 
its best intentions and its deep 
disappointment with the way things had 
gone, would announce that this kind 
of thing was not anticipated when the 
guarantees had been drafted, that in 
the new circumstances African advance 
must be halted until a higher degree of 
civilisation was demonstrated and probably 
that the only solution was on 
South Africa's lines of complete racial 
segregation. The guarantees would lie 
in the dust. Britain would condemn 
both sides but protest her inability to 
intervene. And, at the time, there 
would even be grounds for sympathy 
with the Rhodesian government. No one 
would be really to blame. Britain's duty 
is to prevent the enaction of this tragedy. 


a treaty of guarantee 

It has been suggested that guarantees 
in the independence constitution could 
be fortified by a treaty between Rhodesia 
and Britain, giving Britain the 
right to intervene with troops if the con



stitution were broken. We have already 
had experience of such a device in 
Cyprus. The Cyprus constitution was 
more firmly entrenched than any other 
and to make assurance doubly sure a 
treaty was concluded between Britain, 
Greece, Turkey and Cyprus giving all 
three outside powers the right to send 
troops to restore the status quo in the 
event of a breach of the constitution. 
If the three powers could not agree on 
joint action each was to be free to act 
unilaterally. You could not devise a 
more cast iron guarantee : but what 
happened ? The constitution was 
broken and none of the guaranteeingpowers intervened. It was simply not 
practical politics to do so. It is true 
that international opinion on Cyprus 
was divided and rather favourable to 
the Greeks, who did not want intervention. 
Nevertheless the precedent is 
not encouraging. 

For the last three years it has been open 
to us to send troops to enforce our 
will. We have not done so either 
when Rhodesia accepted her position 
as a British colony, or in the face of 
the illegal seizure of the colony. If we 
decline to send troops at a time when 
we are unquestionably the sovereign 
power, is it reasonable to expect that 
we shall do so if Rhodesia is once recognised 
as an independent state in 
which our rights are only those 
accorded by a ·treaty ? Rhodesia would 
not be the first sovereign state to question 
the validity of an unequal treatyforced upon a country as a condition 
of independence. If we do not, for one 
reason or another, send troops to Rhodesia 
now, do not let us delude ourselves 
that it will be any easier 
if Rhodesia's independence were legalised. 


Another proposed guarantee, advanced 
by Sir Alec Douglas Home, is that the 
Judicial Committee of the British Privy 

Council might be given the final right 
of decision on the validity of changes 
in the constitution. So far as questions 
of law are concerned, the Judicial Committee 
is a body of unquestioned standing 
and integrity, and it is kept as the 
final court of appeal by a number of 
fully independent Commonwealth countries. 
But the value of this arrangement 
depends on the readiness of Britain 
to take military action to enforce 
any decisions the Privy Council might 
make. The difficulty of the Rhodesian 
problem is not to find a body to decide 
what is legal, but to find means of enforcement. 
It comes back to bayonets 
in the end. It is folly to imagine that 
the mere prestige of a body like the 
Judicial Committee would ensure the 
acceptance of its rulings in Rhodesia. 
This was the reasoning of Duncan 
Sandys in relation to the purely advisory 
nature of the Constitutional Council, 
and his judgement has proved false. 

the Hardwick Holderness 
plan 

In the last few months a· proposal has 
been canvassed by Mr. Hardwick Holderness, 
a white Rhodesian lawyer of 
liberal views. If operated according to 
the spirit, both the legal 1961 Constitution 
and the illegal 1965 Constitution 
should result in a rising proportion of 
Africans in the legislature, but the practice 
of drawing the government only 
from the majority party means that 
Africans would have no participationin government until they secured a 
majority in the legislature, whereupon 
Africans would themselves form the 
government and Europeans, as the 
minority, would have no place in it. 
This means that Africans would gain 
no experience in administration, which 
is exactly what they need if Europeans 
are to be brought to trust them in government. 
A further disadvantage of the 
present arrangements is that African 


majority is such a long way off that the 
African group in the legislature enjoys 
no influence on government policysince a minority party only exercises influence 
in proportion to its chances of 
becoming the majority. Mr Holderness 
concludes that Rhodesia must break 
away from the Westminster system of 
party government. He suggests that 
there should be a legislature in which 
Africans and Europeans each supply50 per cent of the members, and in 
which a majority of each race is required 
for the passage of laws. Similarly, 
the cabinet would be made up of 
both races. In the event of deadlock 
the powers of government would be 
exercised by a president, about whose 
precise powers and selection Mr Holderness 
advances no firm views. 

The disadvantage of the 1961 Constitution 
to which Mr Holderness points 
is a real one, but one may question the 
effectiveness of his solution. In a government 
balanced equally between the 
two races deadlock would not be an 
occasional occurrence, but a permanent 
state. The pressures on both sides 
would be too great to avoid it. In practice, 
therefore, power would be exercised 
by the president who would be 
obliged to favour one side or the other. 
Even if he tried to compromise by conceding 
half the demands of African 
ministers he would not have escapedthe dilemma, for he would then be torn 
between Europeans who wanted him to 
stop there and Africans who wanted 
him to go further. A constitution along 
these lines would not justify Britain in 
granting independence unless the balance 
of power lay with the Africans 
who must ultimately inherit it. But we 
must accept that if the balance of power 
did lie with the Africans, there would 
be no guarantee that they would not 
break the constitution to achieve untrammelled 
African dominance. It is 
unrealistic to imagine that there is any 

stable point of balance between these 
positions. As a way of letting Britain 
give up her legal sovereignty the Holderness 
plan fails. Something like it 
could, however, be the means by which 
Britain could exercise her supervision 
most effectively during a transitional 
period before independence is granted 
under majority rule. 

The clear conclusion is that no arrangements 
can be devised which can be relied 
on to bring about ultimate racial 
equality if once British control has been 
abolished and sanctions stopped. It 
follows from this that Britain's duty is 
to secure and maintain control until 
power has irrevocably passed to the 
majority. 

The process of bringing about majorityrule may be a long one if it is to be done 
without ruining the economy. The delay 
will, however, be acceptable once 
the end-result is assured. There are 
basically two ways in which Britain can 
provide for Rhodesia's administration 
during a transitional period. We can 
impose direct colonial rule; or, having 
brought down the illegal government, 
we can attempt the role of referee, encouraging 
people to come forward and 
run the country without direct British 
participation. At the moment there are 
neither leaders nor followers to form 
a moderate party, but the establishment 
of British control might create a 
new situation which could lead whites 
to make the best of a bad job, as they 
would no doubt put it. The attemptcould well fail and we should then be 
obliged to undertake direct rule. That 
would be dangerous, for it would make 
it possible for both black and white extremists 
to concentrate on irresponsiblesabotage of British rule ; to avoid this, 
it would be worth making strenuous 
efforts to restrain our role to that of 
referee and arbitrator if at all possible. 


4. the six principles 
In the course of Britain's discussions 
with the Smith regime, both before and 
after uor, six principles have been laid 
down as essential requirements for a 
legal granting of independence : 

1. the principle and intention of unimpeded 
advance to majority rule to 
be maintained and safeguarded ; 
2. guarantees against retrogressiveamendment of the constitution ; 
3. some immediate improvement in 
the political status of Africans ; 
4. progress toward ending racial discrimination 
; 
5. the British government to be satisfied 
that any basis proposed for independence 
is acceptable to the people of 
Rhodesia as a whole ; 
6. arrangements to prevent oppression 
of majority by minority or minorityby majority. 
I have suggested that no arrangements 
can be devised reliably to prevent abuse 
in the future. This leaves the fifth 
principle as the final defence, and it 
was on this point that the talks of 1965 
came to the crisis resulting in uor. It 
is dangerous to translate any of these 
principles, particularly the fifth, into 
more precise terms. However the natural 
meaning of ·the fifth principle is 
clearly that Britain will concede legal 
independence to Rhodesia only if Mricans 
want it and approve of the basic 
features of the independence constitution. 


Mr Smith and his supporters often 
claim that the majority of Africans 
support the present regime and want 
to see an end of British "interference." 
Indeed, Smith has based his claims on 
such support. The joint communique 

issued after his talks with the Conservative 
government in September 1964 
said, " The Prime Minister of Southern 
Rhodesia accepted that independence 
must be based on general consent and 
stated that he was convinced that the 
majority of the population supportedhis request for independence on the 
basis of the present constitution and 
franchise. . . . The Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia recognised that the 
British government were entitled to be 
satisfied about this...." When Smith 
proceeded to test African opinion by 
means only of an indaba or gatheringof traditional chiefs and headmen, he 
was informed by both the outgoingConservative government and the incoming 
Labour government that the 
opinion of these persons could not be 
accepted as evidence of the views of the 
African population generally. Nevertheless, 
this is the only form of evidence 
he has presented. At a la•ter 
stage in the negotiations before uor, 
a Royal Commission was proposed to 
ascertain the wishes of the Rhodesian 
people as a whole, which was to consist 
of Sir Hugh Beadle, Chief Justice 
of Rhodesia, a Rhodesian governmentrepresentative and a Bri·tish government 
representative : two Rhodesians 
against one British. Smith rejected this 
proposal when the British government 
would not say that Parliament would 
unquestionably accept whatever it 
might recommend. 

The Rhodesian regime has always declined 
to test African opinion by the 
holding of a referendum even thoughthe 1961 constitution provided for the 
holding of such a referendum to decide 
important constitutional changes. It is 
argued that intimidation would have 
caused Africans to vote contrary to 
their real wishes. Against this it must 
be stated that the police and militaryfacilities of the regime have alwaysprovided adequate assurance against 


intimidation. Moreover, this particular 
referendum could have been observed 
or supervised by British personnel to 
lend double assurance. Had a referendum 
been held and had it been favourable 
to Smith, the Rhodesian government's 
case would have been immeasurably 
strengthened and Britain 
would almost certainly have grantedindependence on their terms. The fact 
that a referendum was not held, indicates 
the regime's conviction that the 
result would have been unfavourable. 

When the regime objects to the " stirring 
up " of Africans that would take 
place in a referendum campaign they 
are objecting to the normal and legitimate, 
though no doubt emotional, exposition 
of the case for political reform. 

So long as the fifth principle is rigidlyadhered to, there is no danger of Britain 
agreeing to an unreliable independence 
constitution. There is, however, a 
danger that our resolution will fade and 
that the massive capacity of the British 
for self deception will lead us to interpret 
the principle in a loose manner. 
Any tendency in that direction will 
have to be firmly resisted. 


5. the means 
Having now suggested what Britain 
should want to do, it is at this point 
and at this poin1 only that we should 
consider how to do it. The Rhodesian 
problem, like most problems, presents 
issues of principle and of practicality.
Its solution is only rendered more difficult 
if the two faotors are muddled up. 
Although Britain does not at the moment 
exercise control in Rhodesia, the 
illegal regime is not being allowed to 
exercise untrammelled independencebecause of the severe economic sanctions 
applied against her by Britain and 
mher countries. 

In some ways Rhodesia is particularly 
susceptible to economic sanctions. Unlike 
South Africa she is not nearly self-
sufficient, but depends on exports to 
buy the imports she cannot produceherself. Sales of tobacco and sugar, the 
two principal exports, have been 
severely cut by the boycott. Certain 
other factors operate in Rhodesia's favour. 
She is a small country in terms of 
industrial activity, so her requirementsare tiny and she can be kept going by 
only a small leak in the boycott. Her 
own production of coal is abundant. 
Above all, Rhodesia has South Africa 
and Portuguese Moc;:ambique for 
neighbours, countries which are both 
prepared to help her break the blockade. 
The rest of the world is not boycotting 
these two countries and is not 
likely to. If it tried, the leaks would 
be even greater than in the case of Rhodesia 
because many countries which 
are prepared to help Britain bring one 
of her colonies to heel, would not be 
prepared to act in the same way against 
independent states. Consequently, 
South Africa and Portmml can see Rhodesia 
through by the diversion of only 
a small proportion of their imports. 

Rhodesians mainly notice the effect 
of sanctions in petrol rationing and 
higher prices. Enough oil appears to be 

getting in to keep stocks up, and the 
decision to allow the sale of unrationed 
petrol at a premium price suggests no 
desperate shortage. A great deal of 
publicity attached to the stoppage of 
supplies from the two tankers, Joanna 
V and the Manuella, but the publicity 
only detracted from the routine shipments 
through Lourenco Marques and 
South African ports. For the purpose 
of oil supplies, Rhodesia has become 
simply a remote part of South Africa. 
Oil and petrol can pass up the southernmost 
of Moc,:ambique's two railway lines 
to Rhodesia ; it can go up the South 
African line to Beit Bridge on the Rhodesia 
border and thence by road tanker. 
There has even been some smugglingof supplies up the other line which 
passes through the British protectorate 
of Bechuanaland. 

Nevertheless, the boycott is having an 
effect. Unemployment has risen, some 
of i1 mopped up by the extension of 
military service from four and a half 
to nine months. Perhaps the most critical 
feature is the tobacco sales, for on 
the income of these so much of the rest 
of Rhodesia's economy depends. With 
the traditional British market closed, 
new markets are hard to find. Devious 
routes by sale and resale have to be 
employed. Middlemen require their 
cut and when they run the risk of having 
undisposable goods on their hands, 
their cut is high. This reduces the return 
to the producer, and if his expected 
return falls too low he will not plant as 
much for next year and he will lose his 
income. The effect of sanctions is more 
in undermining confidence in the future 
than in the current standard of living. 
Nevertheless, even in the field of 
tobacco, the regime has been able at 
least to promise farmers a reduced but 
tolerable income next year. If we pinour faith in the inability of ·the regime 
to live up to that promise in 1967 we 
must assume that South Africa will not 


be prepared to pay a little last price 
to break the back of sanctions. 

who surrenders first? 

In assessing how sanctions will affeot 
political policy, it must be remembered 
that the whites see no alternative to 
their present course. They know that 
to give in to Britain's terms means uhimate 
African government. Even if 
sanctions are destroying their prosperity 
they do not see surrender as likely to 
save it. Therefore they have nothing to 
lose by hanging on as long as possible. 

The immediate damage can be mitigated 
by using up the country's financial 
reserves, that part of them which 
is not in British hands. The rebel regime 
can use the reserves to buy up 
its own tobacco. If by this means they 
succeed in holding out long enough to 
make Britain lose heart and call off 1he 
boycott, they know that they can easily 
build up the reserves again. If, on the 
other hand, they lose, and Britain finally 
gains control of the country, they 
know that its affairs will pass into other 
hands, and it will not be their own 
money they have squandered. Britain 
will be left to clear up the mess and pay 
the bills. Both the mood of white Rhodesians 
and the circumstances of the 
case incline them to hang on to the 
last. 

This IS particularly the case because 
even if the Europeans were preparedto surrender, there is absolutely no sign 
of a significant body of men prepared 
to take over and follow a more moderate 
policy. White Rhodesians are 
utterly committed to their present leaders. 
If economic ruin comes they are 
more likely to adopt a scorched earth, 
come-and-get-us policy than to support 
a moderate administration. At the end 
of his visit to Rhodesia in February, 

Mr Selwyn Lloyd advocated a " middle 
course " and said he thought the case 
for such a course had not been presented. 
He was answered immediately 
by a minister in the Smith regime, who 
said : " If the Conservative Party think 
that this concept can be revived and 
the government of this country can 
again be persuaded to drift along on a 
middle course until they, in their turn. 
are executed in the same manner as 
was the Federal Government, then all 
I can say is ' Think again, Mr Heath, 
think again.'" 

The most dangerous aspect of limiting 
action to economic sanctions is that the 
prolonged delay may cause Britain to 
give up. There is a temptation, which 
will grow greater as the months go by, 
to think that we have done our best and 
that we cannot be blamed if the activities 
of South Africa and Portugal render 
our measures ineffective. It can be 
said that we should hand the matter 
over to the United Nations. Even only 
a few weeks after um the DailyMirror, with a sure instinct for the predilections 
of the British public, said 
exactly that. If in a few months' time 
Britain were to be faced with a choice 
between sending troops or calling off 
the boycott, the long delay since um 
would operate against the political practicality 
of sending troops. No sane person 
would want to use force if it is not 
necessary, but prolonged delay will lose 
us the option to use force even if it is 
necessary. 

Yet, as the months go by, the case for 
using ·troops grows stronger. It has 
been officially stated that troops should 
be used only if required to maintain 
law and order. We have recently seen 
a clamp-down on those university lecturers 
and students who have chosen 
to remain loyal to the law ; further expulsions 
can be expected and when 
these articulate critics have been sil



enced a new campaign of repression 
can more safely be conducted against 
others. The law broke down in Rho~ 
desia last November ; what order exists 
is a lawless one. Nothing that has happened 
since um was unpredictable, or 
unpredicted ; but the actual realisation 
of our worst fears creates a justification 
for intervention which did not 
present itself in such inescapable form 
last year. In the new circumstances the 
case must be examined afresh. 

the United Nations 

But why should the matter not rather 
be handed over to the UN ? The first 
answer is that Rhodesia is a British 
colony and Britain is responsible for 
its good government. The case is not to 
be compared with South Africa. We 
do not approve of South Africa's policies 
and some action may be called for 
to put pressure on its government. Our 
duty there is of the same order as our 
duty in respect of oppression in Russia 
or any other country. But our responsibility 
towards Rhodesia is of a totally 
different character, for Rhodesia is legally 
our problem and its difficulties 
were created by our action or inaction. 

As important as the legalistic argument 
is the practical one. If it were 
merely a matter of coordinating economic 
sanctions, the job could be done 
as well by the UN as by Britain. But 
we shall only be tempted to hand the 
problem over to the UN if economic 
sanctions have failed. If military action 
should be called for, there is no doubt 
that the UN is less able than Britain to 
carry it out effectively. The UN has not 
overcome the problem of who pays for 
its peacekeeping activities. Moreover 
a mixed UN force is notoriously inefficient. 
Only in the Congo has such a 
force been called on to do serious fighting, 
and the precedent is not encourag


ing. It also suffers from a more creditable 
disability. Stuck deep in the cement 
of moral principle and bound by 
its own resolutions, the UN finds compromise 
difficult. Committed to the 
idea of one man-one vote now, the UN 
would not be able to effect the gradualtransition of power which is absolutelyvital if standards of administration and 
prosperity are to be maintained. Only 
a sin-tainted old colonial power like 
Britain can deal out virtue in small 
doses. Legally it's our job and in 
practice only we can do it effectively. 

first principles 

When a country holds sovereignty over 
territory it mus-t be prepared to exercise 
that sovereignty by the use of such 
minimum force as is required to apply 
the law. There is nothing outrageous 
about this : it is the very basis of political 
organisation. When Britain decides 
whether to recognise a new government 
in some other country, the test 
applied is whether the government in 
question is in effective control of the 
country. In this sense Britain today is 
not in effective control in Rhodesia. 
All the mechanics of governmentand administration are in operation in 
clear defiance of the law as laid down 
by Britain. Whatever verbal assertions 
Parliament in London may make about 
its continuing legal rights, there must 
come a time when international lawyers 
will have to conclude that Britain's 
rights have lapsed because they have 
not been exercised, but only asserted. 
This argument has already been advanced 
in a Rhodesian court and the 
judge who was faced with it commented, 
" If we are to remain the 
judicial branch of the state, isn't it inevita:
ble that we mus-t recognise de 
facto the people who constitute the 
executive ... Mr Bottomley is not here 
to carry out his functions." 


Nearly all the sanctions so far imposed 
are actions which it is legitimate for 
one sovereign state to take againstanother. The one action which Britain 
has not so far taken-the despatch of 
troops-is the one action which characterises 
the rights of a sovereign state in 
its own territory. 

David and Goliath 

In the last three years relations between 
Britain and Rhodesia have been distorted 
by the implied exclusion of the 
possibility of sending troops. Because 
of this exclusion the British government 
had no effective counteraction 
with which to nullify Rhodesia's threat 
to declare independence, and Rhodesia's 
bargaining power became inflated. This 
is why Rhodesia was able to resist British 
pressure to liberalise the constitution. 
Britain, by refusing to use the 
only ace in the pack, placed little Rhodesia 
in a position of equality with herself, 
the fifth most powerful nation in 
the world. 

The Rhodesian equation will never add 
up unless the factor of military force is 
reintroduced. Military force is the raw 
material of power. The factor does not 
always have to result in fighting. Deployment 
without fighting can often be 
enough ; and a threat which is meant 
and seen to be meant can make even 
deployment unnecessary. But, at bottom, 
power is based on bayonets and 
bombs. 

The reintroduction of the mere possibility 
of using force would transform 
the Rhodesian problem : you can lead 
a man by the arm if he knows you 
mean to frog-march him if you have 
to. Ever since the first sanctions were 
imposed on the day of UDI our greatest 
weakness has been the absence of 
the long-stop, ultimate deterrent to lend 

persuasion to lesser measures. Indeed 
the missing factor can be traced farther 
back. On 27 October 1964 the British 
government issued a public statement 
of the severe consequences that would 
follow from an act of rebellion. But it 
can be argued that such an act was even 
encouraged by what might be called the 
invisible last sentence of the statement. 
At the end of the catalogue of consequences, 
the absence of any reference 
to military action was taken as an indication 
that none would take place. 

A declaration that force would be used 
if other means fail, would make South 
Africa think even more carefully about 
the undercover support she now gives 
Rhodesia. Doubters in Rhodesia would 
be enormously encouraged. Judgeswould not have to face the impossible 
dilemma of choosing between an illegal 
government in full control and a 
legal government in London showing 
no conclusive evidence of really meaning 
to get control. Immediately after 
UDI, Rhodesian citizens were advised 
and even instructed not to lend assistance 
to the rebel regime. But is it 
reasona~ble or fair for us to expect loyal 
Rhodesians to risk their freedom and 
even their lives upholding the law, if 
we, the sovereign power, offer them no 
credible assurance that we shall reestablish 
legality in the end ? Even if 
finally we do bring the Smith regime 
down it cannot be questioned that there 
has been utter scepticism about our determination 
to do so. 

Although total commitment to restore 
legality and use whatever means are 
necessary to that end would paradoxically 
make peaceful sanctions more 
likely to succeed, there can be no bluff. 
A mere threat to use force stood perhaps 
a 90 per cent chance of being 
effective before um-now less so. If 
we threaten we must be prepared to 
carry out the threat. 


It has sometimes been argued that, on 
logistic grounds, Britain simply cannot 
get the better of Rhodesia militarily.
Rhodesia certainly enjoys certain military 
advantages. Zambia, the best base 
for British operations, normally obtains 
its main supplies through Rhodesia 
and is finding it difficult enough 
to switch her lines of supply for normal 
goods ; to take in supplies for a 
military operation would be no easy 
matter. An airlift would be needed to 
supplement the capacity of the bad 
roads from Dar-es-Salaam to Lusaka. 
The Zambesi cons-titutes good natural 
protection along Rhodesia's northern 
border. Rhodesia's forces would be 
operating on their own ground while 
we were operating far from our bases. 
South Africa would no doubt facilitate 
the flow of volunteers from the Republic. 


The military situation should however 
be assessed from first principles. Britain 
is a country of 50 million people ; 
Rhodesia has 4 million and only about 
200,000 who could be counted on 
actively to support the regime. Britain 
has almost as many men in her army,
leaving aside the Air Force and the 
Navy, as the number of Europeans in 
Rhodesia, men, women and children. 
Rhodesia's regular forces number 
about 4,500 and the reserve forces upto 10,000. They are well trained ; but 
if the reserves were away from their 
jobs for more than a few weeks the 
Rhodesian economy would collapse.
Rhodesia's annual military budget is 
about 8 million pounds ; Britain's is 
over 2,300 million pounds. 

One might say that if it were impossible 
for Britain to conduct such an 
operation, every battle in the last war 
was impo ible and our final victory a 
miracle. The point can best be expre 
ed thu : if we approach the bu ine 
in the same robust spirit in which 

the rebels have approached it, the difficulties 
will fade ; if the rebels had approached 
it in the way some people in 
Britain do, they would have frightened 
themselves to death long ago and never 
have dared to defy British authority. 
When one country is much strongerthan another, diplomacy, backed if 
necessary by military deployment,
should be able to secure the objective 
without recourse to fighting. A clearly 
demonstrated determination to use 
force if necessary, minimises the 
amount of force that has to be used. 
The first step in Rhodesia is to acceptthat in principle force may be right and 
necessary ; timing and method can 
then be worked out. 

objections 

The most compelling consideration 
against force is the possibility that it 
would cause a run on sterling to a degree 
that would wreck our sensitive 
financial position and make us unable 
to complete the operation. There is no 
doubt that to launch a policy of military 
intervention would have drastic 
and probably unbearable consequences 
on sterling unless the ground were well 
prepared in advance-not because the 
operation would be beyond our means 
but because holders of sterling would 
know too little about it to be confident 
where such an operation might end. 

The key to this problem is the United 
States. The United States has even 
more reason than Britain not to want 
Rhodesia to go the way of South 
Africa, a development which could 
only strengthen communism and would 
probably end African neutrality in the 
world power confrontation. The Americans 
know that they cannot pu h an 
unwilling Britain into effective intervention 
but if Britain her elf were clear 
in her will to perform the task she 


could convince the Americans of its 
necessity and practicality and so gainAmerican support. American supportwould in turn assure the success of the 
operation if it took the form of monetary 
and phychological help in the 
financial world. In this matter the wayin which American help is sought is 
all-important. The Americans need 
first to be convinced of our determination 
to succeed ; a half-hearted approach 
will not get the right response. 

The most commonly quoted reason 
against the use of force is that the British 
people would not stand for it. No 
government can, or should, drag its 
people into a policy completely against 
their wishes. If, however, it is found 
that the people are against what is considered 
to be the right course, it is the 
duty of us all to try to change their 
opinion. If we fail to convince them 
we must abide by the general will ; 
that is democracy. What is not democracy 
is to make no effort to place the 
facts before the public but merely to 
accept the limitation of their uninformed 
inclinations. There has been 
remarkably little publicity given to the 
appalling conditions in Rhodesia today 
and to the weight of Britain's responsibility; 
and there is consequently widespread 
reluctance to take strong action. 
It is hoped that this pamphlet will do 
something to help correct the situation. 
If the case is widely known there maywell be a recognition, no doubt reluctant, 
that it may be Britain's duty in 
the end to use force to preserve law and 
justice in Rhodesia. 

It is said that British troops cannot be 
sent to make war against our own kith 
and kin who fought at our side in the 
war. Rhodesia had a fine war record 
and the European population provided 
a high proportion of its numbers 
for active service. But war service 
was not limited to Europeans ; there 

were 15,000 Africans in Rhodesia's 
forces ag,ainst 9,000 Europeans, and 
this despite the fact that Africans were 
not conscripted as Europeans were. Although 
most Africans were kept at 
home, Rhodesia's roll of war dead contains 
about 125 non-European names 
-they are separately listed-out of 
1,000. If war decorations are important, 
which do we favour with our sup-
port-a Smith minister with his DFC, 
or Hardwick H o1derness, a strong opponent 
of Smith's racial policies, with 
his DFC and oso ? If all this has to be 
invoked, let's remember that service and 
bravery were not limited to Europeans, 
or, amongst Europeans, to supportersof Smith. 

But, in any case, British troops would 
not be sent to make war on anyone, 
but to protect those in Rhodesia who 
care to abide by the law. It is to be 
hoped that white Rhodesians would not 
open fire on their own kith and kin 
carrying out their duty according to 
law. Fighting could only take place if 
it was started by the rebel regime. 
It is objected that military action would 
lead to a bloody revolt by the African 
population and that the whole of Central 
Africa might blow up in a spasm 
of violence. There is no better way of 
getting violence in Central Africa than 
by allowing the Smith regime to entrench 
itself. In the end, 200,000 whites 
cannot stay on top of 4 million blacks. 
If they are allowed to sit tight there 
will be an explosion ; it may take a 
year or two but it will come and when 
it comes it will be bloody. A white 
government will be replaced suddenly 
by a revolutionary black government 
with all the fury that characterised the 
sudden transition in the Congo. In 
other British territories, where power 
has been transferred gradually, such a 
bloodbath has been avoided. To obligeRhodesians to adopt the method of 
gradual transition is not to force a 


Congo upon them but to save them 
from it. 

The objections to the use of force may 
seem imposing when presented in a confused 
mass ; but a hundred weak arguments 
do not make a strong argument. 
When the objections are examined 
separately the case is not convincing. 

the larger context 

The Rhodesian question must also be 

seen against its larger background.

South Africa has now entrenched her


self by means of ruthless police methods 

and by making her economy as self 

sufficient as possible. She is reluctant 

to prejudice her success by linking up 

with Rhodesia, Angola and Moyam


bique, regarding them as buffer states 

which may have to fall to African 

nationalism. But if Smith is allowed 

to gain untrammelled independence for 

Rhodesia, a link-up will become more 

attractive. A Greater South Africa 

will have been created against which 

the world could batter its head in vain 

for generations. The Bantustans within 

the Republic and the independent 

states of Swaziland and Basutoland 

would be held up as evidence of South 

Africa's tolerance of African govern


ment prepared to co-operate with her. 

The vision of such a Greater South 

Africa inspires the leaders of the Rho


desian Front. It is not Britain's sanc


tions that are driving Rhodesia into 

South Africa's arms but the fact that the 

two regimes share a determination to 

maintain white rule. 

have we got what it takes? 
Our duty is clear and the only question 
is whether we have got what it takes 
to allow it to be done. We, in this case, 
means the British public. Our govern


ment has already done more than most 
people wanted it to do. 

If we allow white supremacy to be 
established in Rhodesia, our whole 
colonial record will be in ruins. In the 
archives there are rooms full of 
speeches, statements, books, by leaders 
of all parties about our worthy discharge 
of colonial responsibilities. It 
will all have been lies if we allow Rhodesia 
to go the way of South Africa. 
We are fond of thinking of ourselves 
as a world power. The rest of the world 
is amused by our delusions ; they only 
want us to keep our own house in 
order-and Rhodesia is our own house. 
We like to think of ourselves as the extinguisher 
of brush fires, a country that 
can do the little peace-keeping jobs 
that the United States and Russia cannot 
do : in Rhodesia we have a brush 
fire in our back garden. 

The country is faced with a test of 
character. It is hard on us. We thought 
we had seen the last of colonial problems 
and here we have the toughest of 
them all, distracting us from domestic 
matters intrinsically more important to 
us. It would be nice if it would go 
away. It would be nice if we were not 
directly responsible. But we are. If we 
look in the opposite direction, if we do 
a little but not enaugh, we shall condemn 
ourselves as a small nation unfit 
to have colonies in our control. There 
is no honourable discharge until the 
job is done. 


fabian society 


The Fabian Society exists to further 
socialist education and research. It is 
affiliated to the Labour Party, both nationally 
and locally, and embraces all 
shades of Socialist opinion within its 
ranks-left, right and centre. 

Since 1884 the Fabian Society has enrolled 
thoughtful socialists who are prepared 
to discuss the essential questions 
of democratic socialism and relate them 
to practical plans for building socialism 
in a changing world. 

Beyond this the Society has no collective 
policy. It puts forward no resolutions of 
a political character, but it is not an 
organisation of armchair socialists. Its 
members are active in their Labour 
Parties, Trade Unions and Co-operatives. 
They are representative of the lab-
our movement, practical people concerned 
to study and discuss problems 
that matter. 

The Society is organised nationally and 
locally. The national Society, directed 
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are self governing and are lively centres 
of discussion and also undertake research. 


Enquiries about membership should be 
sent to the General Secretary, Fabian 
Society. 11 Dartmouth Street, London, 
SW! ; telephone Whitehall 3077. 

the author 

George Cunningham was on the staff 
of the Commonwealth Relations Office 
at home and abroad for six years. He 
became Commonwealth Officer at the 
Labour Party's headquarters in 1963, 
and visited Rhodesia in 1965. He was 
Labour candidate for Henley in the 
1966 general election. 

Cover design and typography by Geoffrey 
Cannon. Printed by Civic Press 
Limited (Tu), Civic Street, Glasgow, 
C4. 


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