Fabian Tract No. 211. 


The Case Against 

PROPORTIONAL 
REPRESENTATION. 


BY 
HER:viAN FINER, D.Sc. (Econ.), Lond. 


Price Twopence. 

Published and sold by the Fabian Society, at the 
Fabian Bool<shop, 25 Tothill Street, Westminster, 
S.W. I. May 1924. 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: 
The Case Against the Proposal. 
FOR at least forty years Proportional Representation, or P.R., as 
it will be referred to here, has received continuous and organised 
advocacy. Men like John Stuart Mill and Lord Courtney have been 
its sponsors and popularisers. Parliament has frequently discussed 
the principle of the system, and once, at least (in the course of the 
discussions on the Representation of the People Act, 19 1 8), has been 
<m the verge of adopting it. Yet, whether a complete reform of our 
electoral system shall take place in the direction of substituting that 
form of P.R. known as the Single Transferable Vote• for our present 
system of Single-Member constituencies still remains an undecided 
question. There is apparently no certain and conclusive guidance 
to be obtained by the ordinary citizen as to the merits of a change ; 
and among politicians of all parties there is an extraordinary 
disarray of opinion. One generalisation on the subject may safely 
be made from the history of the P.R. movement in practical 
politics : Proportional Representation has always found more favour} 
with parties and groups in a minority and not likely to be in power, ../ 
than with those parties assured of an electoral majority in a not tooremote 
future. The system has always recommended itself to men 
with a mission, but without much visible evidence of popular support....- 
This fact should be remembered in judging the arguments which 
follow. 
Ultimate Political Assumptions seldom stated. 
Now, characteristically of English politics, the arguments for and 
against P.R. in this country have been put forward for public consumption 
piecemeal. Neither the arguments for it, nor those against 
it ha\'e been submitted as an harmonious piece of political philosophy 
resting upon certain deliberately accepted and postulated assumptions. 
Yet speakers and writers on both sides have been actuated by 
assumptions, mo~t often, unconsciously held and seldom examined. 
ese assumptions naturally refer to the type of relationship which 
uld exist between the representative assembly (Parliament) and 
electorate, between the electorate and the Cabinet and between 
~e Cabinet and Parliament. In short, the problem of P.R. is to be 
solved only by referring the Electoral System to the criterion of 
what, as a whole, makes up a good Governmental machine. It is 
sure that at one time or another in the course of past discussions 
the opposing as5umptions have been unveiled ; that can be seen, for 
example, in the Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commision on 
• See Aprendix. 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: 
The Case Against the Proposal. 
FOR at least forty years Proportional Representation, or P.R., as 
it will be referred to here, has received continuous and organisedadvocacy. Men like John Stuart Mill and Lord Courtney have been 
its sponsors and popularisers. Parliament has frequently discussed 
the principle of the system, and once, at least (in the course of the 
discussions on the Representation of the People Act, 19 18), has been 
<m the verge of adopting it. Yet, whether a complete reform of our 
electoral system shall take place in the direction of substituting that 
form of P.R. known as the Single Transferable Vote• for our present 
system of Single-Member constituencies still remains an undecided 
question. There is apparently no certain and conclusive guidanceto be obtained by the ordinary citizen as to the merits of a change ; 
and among politicians of all parties there is an extraordinarydisarray of opinion. One generalisation on the subject may safelybe made from the history of the P.R. movement in practicalpolitics : Proportional Representation has always found more favour} 
with parties and groups in a minority and not likely to be in power, ../
than with those parties assured of an electoral majority in a not too-
remote future. The system has always recommended itself to men 
with a mission, but without much visible evidence of popular support....-
This fact should be remembered in judging the arguments which 
follow. 
Ultimate Political Assumptions seldom stated. 
Now, characteristically of English politics, the arguments for and 
against P.R. in this country have been put forward for public con-
sumption piecemeal. Neither the arguments for it, nor those against 
it ha\'e been submitted as an harmonious piece of political philosophy 
resting upon certain deliberately accepted and postulated assump-
tions. Yet speakers and writers on both sides have been actuated byassumptions, mo~t often, unconsciously held and seldom examined. 
ese assumptions naturally refer to the type of relationship which 
uld exist between the representative assembly (Parliament) and 
electorate, between the electorate and the Cabinet and between 
~e Cabinet and Parliament. In short, the problem of P.R. is to be 
solved only by referring the Electoral System to the criterion of 
what, as a whole, makes up a good Governmental machine. It is 
sure that at one time or another in the course of past discussions 
the opposing as5umptions have been unveiled ; that can be seen, for 
example, in the Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commision on 
• See Aprendix. 

4 

Systems of Election (Cd. S35Z ; 1910, passim); but such discovery 
occurs as an incident in, and not as the keystone of, the whole fabric 
of arguments. The result is that people agree with this, that and 
the other on one side, and some, but not all, of the points established 
by the opposite side. This confused result may be avoided, 
and a definite and consistent attitude made possible, by a preliminaryexposition of the writer's assumptions. 

Before proceeding to state these, one further observation is necessary. 
Very little reference will be made to the experience of foreign 
governments. It is the traditional practice of disputants, and particularly 
of the advocates of P.R., who have a special fondness for 
argument from the unknown, to cite conditions in foreign countries 
as evidence of what might happen in this. In fact, that experienceis almost useless, even when our knowledge is complete. A study of 
foreign institutions teaches· only this, that problems and social institutions 
vary so widely from country to country, that, to take a singleitem, the electoral system, as a basis for persuasion is futile, and 
our own political aims and nature must be our guides in matters-
of political innovation. 

The Electoral System and Responsible Government. 

Given the principle that government should be responsible 
to the people, what rules ought to be expected in the Electoral 
System?

Firstly, as an external mark of the consent of the governed, the· 
Electoral System ought to provide a popular assembly representative 
of the main strains of political opinion possessing the nation. 
Rep1•esentativeness, proportional to number in the country, is desirable 
on this ground. But acceptance of this rule, which is one of the 
leading ideas of those in favour of P.R., does not commit us to 
" mathematz"cally exact proportional representation. Further, it is 

<( desirable that political opinions prevailing in the country shall obtain 
\\ the possibility of public statement in Parliament; and that where 
the number of adherents is large relatiYely to the total number of 
members in the assembly thatQl!inority shall have the effective 
opportunity of pressing amendments in legislation and refo!!W in 
the course of administration. Here, at once, the issue becomes 
controversial, and impinges upon a vital point in the case of 
those who propose P.R. The desire the latter seem to cherish most 
ardently is that Parliament shall accurately reflect the opinion of the 
constituencies. They long ago learnt off by heart Burke's famous 
phrase: "The virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons, 
consists in its being the express image of the nation." Burke's 
words are precious, and few would quarrel with those who recognise 
the importance of this dictum, and delight in the dialectical 
courage it gives. But we are not fighting, as Burke was, against the 
whole ''rotten borough " system ; we are not balancing the qualz"tatzve 
issue of absolutely representative against absolutely unrepresentative 
government. The present-day issue is the quantitatzve one of 
lww muclz rep1·esmtatzveness will the nature of the whole national 


5 
.complex of political conditions allow to the House of Commons. 
The answer, to anyone who has given time to the study of the 
internal conditions of the House of Commons, is that on!~ a few 
sali~p_Lprinciples,...representing the main opposing attitudes a Iirlnii, 
.can ever be there discussed. It would be useless for ever li tle v group to here resented in Parliament; for that assem ly has not 
event e t1me adequately to discuss the views of the three greatparties in the State on all the issues that arise. An Electoral Systembased wholly or mainly on the desire to give any and every small 
group the chance of returning_a represe_ntative would be a political 
fotili y ; or o~J>y a rare stroke of luck would the representative 
get the opportumty of speaking. If the House of Commons were 
fuTiy representative-as the more extreme advocates of P.R. suggest 
-no business could be done The exigencies of Parliamentary time 
(besides other matters) force men, therefore, to leave their small 
caves and enter into larger combinations for the support of a common 
programme ; and as they do this the exactness of representation is 
s to be a thing of neither real nor ultimate political moment. 
We are forced to the conclusion that any Electoral System which 
gives a rough numerical expression of the strength of main politicaltendencies, is the only one practically workable as far as Parliament 
is concerned. We have no choice between this and anv other. 
The Member and His Constituency. 
Secondly, the maintenance of the member's sole personal interest 
in his single and undivided constituency, and of the concurrent and 
similar personal interest of the constituents in their member is of 
the highest importance in securing many other desirable results. 
The member is stimulated in the most direct fashion to educate his 
constituents : they are "his " supporters. He knows that he will 
be rewarded for his efforts by votes, and that for neglect he will be 
punished. His sphere of duty and interest in the result is definite. 
For service, he receives recompense. If he is responsive to popularwishes he gets a seat-all this is good democracy. But the close 
personal relationship allows of another excellent benefit. It makes 
feasible the best operation of the English doctrine that a Member of 
Parliament shall be a representatiYe, not a delegate. It allows the 
individual member a latitude of personal discretion and initiative 
outside the party programme (to which he makes pledges rather than 
to his constituents), which makes for good government-because he, 
being subjtct to possessive relationship with his constituents has a 
circumscribed and definite electorate with whom he can discuss, 01~ 
familiar terms, the rectitude of his actions, and from whom he 
can secure support for any praiseworthy deviation from party stan-
dards. On the other hand, the electors have a single member uponwhom their praise or blame can be bestowed for action outside the 
somewhat rigid margins of the party programme. This personalsystem produces an intense responsibility and responsiveness to the 
electorate on one side, i.e., the system is of a highly representative.quality: and on the other, a predictable sphere of independence of 
the member. 
5 
.complex of political conditions allow to the House of Commons. 
The answer, to anyone who has given time to the study of the 
internal conditions of the House of Commons, is that on!~ a few 
sali~p_Lprinciples,...representing the main opposing attitudes a Iirlnii, 
.can ever be there discussed. It would be useless for ever li tle v group to here resented in Parliament; for that assem ly has not 
event e t1me adequately to discuss the views of the three greatparties in the State on all the issues that arise. An Electoral Systembased wholly or mainly on the desire to give any and every small 
group the chance of returning_a represe_ntative would be a political 
fotili y ; or o~J>y a rare stroke of luck would the representative 
get the opportumty of speaking. If the House of Commons were 
fuTiy representative-as the more extreme advocates of P.R. suggest 
-no business could be done The exigencies of Parliamentary time 
(besides other matters) force men, therefore, to leave their small 
caves and enter into larger combinations for the support of a common 
programme ; and as they do this the exactness of representation is 
s to be a thing of neither real nor ultimate political moment. 
We are forced to the conclusion that any Electoral System which 
gives a rough numerical expression of the strength of main politicaltendencies, is the only one practically workable as far as Parliament 
is concerned. We have no choice between this and anv other. 
The Member and His Constituency. 
Secondly, the maintenance of the member's sole personal interest 
in his single and undivided constituency, and of the concurrent and 
similar personal interest of the constituents in their member is of 
the highest importance in securing many other desirable results. 
The member is stimulated in the most direct fashion to educate his 
constituents : they are "his " supporters. He knows that he will 
be rewarded for his efforts by votes, and that for neglect he will be 
punished. His sphere of duty and interest in the result is definite. 
For service, he receives recompense. If he is responsive to popularwishes he gets a seat-all this is good democracy. But the close 
personal relationship allows of another excellent benefit. It makes 
feasible the best operation of the English doctrine that a Member of 
Parliament shall be a representatiYe, not a delegate. It allows the 
individual member a latitude of personal discretion and initiative 
outside the party programme (to which he makes pledges rather than 
to his constituents), which makes for good government-because he, 
being subjtct to possessive relationship with his constituents has a 
circumscribed and definite electorate with whom he can discuss, 01~ 
familiar terms, the rectitude of his actions, and from whom he 
can secure support for any praiseworthy deviation from party stan-
dards. On the other hand, the electors have a single member uponwhom their praise or blame can be bestowed for action outside the 
somewhat rigid margins of the party programme. This personalsystem produces an intense responsibility and responsiveness to the 
electorate on one side, i.e., the system is of a highly representative.quality: and on the other, a predictable sphere of independence of 
the member. 

6 

Now, the most essential element in the P.R. system is that the 
constituencies shall each, as a unit, return a number of members, 
from five upwards. Under such a system it is likely that some areas 
would be submitted to wasteful double doses of electioneering, while 
others would be neglected; that the stimulus to the personal effort of 
the candidates would be weakened, for the relation between personalservice and reward would be less direct and certain than it is in a 
Single·Member constituency; that constituents would have no single 
person upon whom they could focus their attention, and to whom 
they could submit their claims; and that they might visit on a partythe wrath which the personality of the candidate alone merited. 

It is good that the constituencies in an Electoral System should 
be small, and be in sole and undivided care and possession of one 
member. 

A Dynamic Factor. 

Thirdly, the latter rule attains a greater significance when it is 
remembered that the representative character of Parliament is not 
made by a general election alone. A Parliament is not created to 
work over a short period of weeks or months: the condition fC>r 
effective work is that it shall sit, whether by the law or the practiceof the constitution, some three or four years. Now it is clear that 
many issues will arise in the course of the Parliamentary periodwhich were but dimly perceived, or not perceived at all, at the time 
of the Election, upon which it is good, thC>ugh not vital, to have 
some definite indication of public opinion. The method of a Refer· 
endum is impossible. But the close connection between member and 
constituency, the interest of the member in the discovery of dynamicopinion in his constituency, is one guarantee of popular consultation. 
As there is an " atmosphere " in the House of Commons. 
"the sense of the House," which Ministers do well to assimilate, and 
which can only be assimilated by constant attendance on the 
Treasury Bench, so there is an electoral atmosphere the best appreciation 
of which can come about only by a highly personal interest 
in the constituency.

The House of Commons is, moreover, profoundly affected by the 
arguments raised at a By-election ; and an Electoral System, to be 
adequate, should make By-elections an easy possibility. 

The Electoral System and the Government. 

These are by no means all the results that an Electoral Systemought to secure to the country. There is a close and necessary con· 
nection between the Electoral System and the House of Commons : 
there is just as close and necessary a connection between that systemand the Government of the day.

In the Cabinet there is concentrated the polically vital function 
of initiating legislative and administrative policy (including finance), 
and the direction and control of the activities of the Civil Service. 
The Cabinet is the energising element pat' excellence in the EnglishConstitution. The House of Commons talks anQ. divides : the 


7 

Cabmet thinks and acts. Its touch with the country is as vital as its 
touch with the House of Commons. The innate dispositions of 
English politicians, perception of the need for decision and vigour 
in the Executive in the face of modern problems, the necessity of 
decisive leadership and time·distribution in the House of Commons, 
a popular inability to fix responsibility save when the agents of gov· 
ernment are few, not many, and the warnings derived from defective 
functioning of foreign institutions, have combined to the bestowal 

j 
of governmental predominance upon the Cabinet, and, since 1867, 
tightly to lace the Cabinet to the electorate by means of strong partyorganisations.

To be really responsive to popular opinion, the Cabinet must rest 
upon a party organisation which is most vividly in contact with the constituencies, 
z". e. , where the individual member has a clear and definite .terest in his constituency. The Cabinet, to be effectively re


~. ponsible to the country must rest upon the support of a single 

,Y" party. For then (i.) the electorate is best able to know who is to 
praise or blame. At each General Election the aspirant Ministrycomes before the electorate with a record and a policy ; and as it 
has been aptly said : "a general election is, in fact, considered by a 
large portion of the electorate of this country as practically a referendum 
on the question which of two Governments shall be returned 
to power." * And (ii.) there need be no surreptitious political bargaining 
between " ministrable " groups resulting in contracts as to 
policy not submitted for popular ratification, and which can be torn 
up by any of the contracting parties to the detriment of steady and 
effective government, without the country being able to hold 
the to their pledges.
Any Electoral System, therefore, which can be shown to militate 
against the maintenance of a Cabinet system based on a single partyorganisation is to be avoided. To the very frequent and highly 
c aracteristic question asked by English electors : "What government 
are we to make ? " the Electoral System ought to provide a 
clear and unambiguous answer. 

cE

Summary of Electoral Rules. 

Now, from this argument four concrete rules may be extracted 
before we examine what P.R. has to offer as its justification. 

(i.) Parliament ou )ll__t_o_ he epresentative of-majority and 
minority groups of opinion ; but need not-indeed, cannot be 
matbema 1ca11y representative. If we avoid a..minorit-yin the countrygetting a ma'ority of seats, and 1f our political manners as exhibited, 

-tor example, m t e ules and Practice of Parliamentary Procedure, 
give the minority a chance of effective debate and the majority the 
ultimate ruling force, we have done all we need to do. More than 
this is unfruitful pedantry.

(ii.) Constituencies sh l_d be small enoug~low the estabJishment 
of personal relationship between member and constituents. 

• Electoral Systema Commiss'on Report. Cd. 5163, rgro; p. 34· 

8 

(iii.) A dynamic element (it may be of By-elections) is necessaryto keep the House awake to public opinion ; and to warn or encourage 
the Government whose immediate policy is frequently the 
issue on which a By-election is fought. 

(iv.) The government of the country ought to be carried on bya Cabinet based on a single-party organisation having a sufficient 
majority in the country and Parliament to act decisively ; while, internally, 
the party may be conciliating groups, digesting new theories 
and shedding outworn ideas. 

These four things our present Electoral System, taken togetherwith Party Organisation and the current state of Political Manners, 
gives us; not, of course, all-perfectly, but not so imperfectly that a 
whofesale change is to be embraced until it can justify itself by the 
credible offer of priceless advantage. 

The Attack upon the Present System. 

The essential element in the present Electoral System is that it 
is based, Wrnr-:r--few-eXeptions which may be ignored, upon Single-
J Member constituencies. The whole country is divided into some 6oo 
c~proximatelyequal size, each returning one member. 
It is from this disintegration of the whole country(which,ideally, 
should be represented in the House, as a map represents the configuration 
of an area of land) that, according to advocates of P.R., 
many serious political evils flow. These evils are to be remedied by 

P.R. 
The defects of the present Electoral System are described as 
follows:(
a.) Though the House of Commons should be fully representative 
of all shades of electoral o£inion in proportion to t-he numbers 
hold in t eo 11110n, the present system of Single-Member constituen-
Cies ma es sue a result impossible, as can be seen by reference to 
the state of parties in the House. 

(b.) The System results in an exaggeration of the majority of 
seats gained by the Majority Party in proportion to \'Otes cast for it. 
The Elections from 1885 (when the Single-Member system was first 
adopted) to 1910, showed that even " the relative strength of the 
parties which are represented, is grossly distorted by the majoritymethod, actual majorities ranging from twice to over ten times their 
proper size."* The election of 1918 gave the Coalition 428 seats, 
when proportionally to voters it was only entitled to 292 seats ; it 
gave the Labour Party 47 seats, when it was entitled to 120 seats; 
and the In.dependent Liberals 25 seats, where 67 was their propernumber. These figures show that the ''will of the people," as expressed 
in erms of votes, is not represented by a correspondingnumber of seats in the House. This is not democracu 

The cause of this distortion of the electoral situation is normallytwofold:


(1) Parties win a large number of constituencies by narrow 
majorities ; 
-• Report, p. 2 5· 



9 

(2) Parties lose but a small number (compared with gains as 
in (r)) of constituencies by narrow margins. 
These twin causes of distortion account for the fact that a small 
shijt£ng of votes /1'0m one party to anotlier duri11,R an election may 
cause, aud, historically, ofteu has caused a great landslide ofseats in 
tile directiou of tile favoured party. =::::J 

(3) Besides these two causes of mal-representation, which we 
haYe called normal (only because they were in operation as the major 
causes from 1885 until 1918), there is the advent of Three-Party 
contests in a very large proportion of the total number of constituencies. 
(This is due to the emergence of the Labour Party as an independent 
and strongly-organised electoral combatant, and to the rapid 
decline, but, as yet, not the disappearance of the Liberal Party.) The 
Minority Seats, resultiug from multiple-cornered contests, numbered 
216 in the Election of December, 1923. Here, then, is a cause of 
unproportional representation which will remain potent until the 
Two-Party is restored. 
(c.) For the same reasons, the present system makes it theoretically 
possible for a minority of the electors in the country to return 
a majority of members to Parliament. It was alleged at the Commission 
on Electoral Systems that this had actually occurred in 1874 
and 1886, but this statement turned out to be not a solid mathematical 
truth, but a matter of opinion based upon methods of calculation 
subject to valid challenge. However, the theoretical possibility does 
remain. 

The Claims of P.R., and their weakness. 

Using these incontrovertible facts, the advocates of P.R. proceed 
to assess their meaning and importance according to their own 
peculiar scheme of political values. 

Let us take these opinions seriat£m, and submit each to a critique 
based on our own assumptions. 

(A.) A lleged : Exaggeration of political majorities leads to the 
passage of legislation for which there is no real demand, because the 
Majority mistakes the actual feeling of the country.

Dmied: This argument is untenable, because it leaves out of 
account the undeniable fact that, though the size of the Government 
majority is a ~tothe Ministrs,.as t_ \ILhatrtought and can hope 
to do, its views a!J:_!!!_I~yitabl)L.te.mpend by the arguments of the 
Opposition, the \·iews__Q_f___m_eml>ers who know the real state of affairs 
in their qwn constituencies, the prospects of the coming Election, 
the progress of By-Elections, and the important truth that English 
politicians are not pedantic extremists acting to the full beat of an 
arithmetically regulated pulse, but instead with a knowledge of 
realities existing in the hinterland of representation in the House. 
Why else do they employ Whips and Chief Party Agents, if not to 
discover fee:ings and prospects, as distinct from the statistical fa<;ade 
presented by what they can muster, at need, in a Division ? The 
politics of t his country are not determined once and for all by the 
General Election on the " mirror," or what has very aptly been called 


IO 

the "snapshot" theory of representation, but by a multitude of 
dynamic and spiritual factors as efficient in the cause of good Representative 
and Responsible Government as the General Election itself. 

These factors make for as true a representation as accurate proportions; 
and our present System of Single-Member constituencies 
and the tradition of electoral responsibility built on that system are 
fundamental to their continued vitality. 

(n.) Alleged: Doubt as to the actual force behind the decision of 
the House of Commons weakens the House as an exponent of the 
national will in the eyes of the people.

De11ied: The answer to the previous allegation is an answer to 
this, also. But something more may be added. Only the academic 
thinker, out of touch with real electoral conditions, can accept thb 
opinion. The actions of Parliament are, in point of fact, accepted 
or r~ected bx.J...h~ thinkin Jew in this country, not on gr.a.und.s of 
votes or representativeness of the decision at all. They are praised 
or con emnea on grounds of social utility, and the particular advantage 
giYen or denied to the various sectional interests. The people 
are more concerned about the intrinsic merits of policies than about 
the commas on their certificate of origin.

(c.) Alleged: A small transfer of votes may mean a sweeping 
change in personnel of the House, and thus endanger the efficiencyof the latter. 

Deuied: It may ; but there are always sufficient old members to 
educate new-comers; and the enthusiasm of the new member, as the 
last two Parliaments have hown, has brought back the much-needed 
spirit of vitality into Parliamentary activity. "The stability of legislation 
" for which some advocates of P.R. have respect, will not be 
endangered, because the Civil Service, the repository of in format ion 
and a most frequent source of policy, is a safeguard against instability. 
Has there been any instability in legislation in the last half-century?
The dogmatic slumber of old parliamentary hands is not a guarantee 
of good government ; and it is all to the good that seniority should 
be refreshed by youth, and experience 5timulated by innovation. 
__.(n.) Alleged: The dominance of party organisation in the Single-
Member constituencies crushes out small groups and the independentmember; under P.R. this would be mitigated and the freedom of 

e member be enhanced, because independent-minded men could 
threaten to break away from a party if they were sure of a quotaof electors in the enlarged constituency.

Dc11ied: It cannot be admitted that the Single-Member systemmakes more for party denomination than would P.R. As a matter 
of fact, discipline in party organisations would with large and Multi-
Member constituencies be increased for the mass of members. Go\'ernment 
is government ; and ultimately someone must govern. The 
independent member in a team of 5 or 7 candidates would be a source 
of weakness to his party colleagues during a campaign, and still more 
during the Recess, when members go down to their constituencie . 
There would grow up, necessarily, a convention of Collective Responsibility 
of membets in the con tituency. The independently-
minded man, if he were selected, would be told (especially during a 


JI 

-campaign), without much ceremony, that reticence on his part was 
essential. The 11 regular " party candidate would be adopted as the 
best colleague. Is there a politician who has spoken from the same 
p!atform with friends and not wanted to contradict them? P.R.7
then, makes for dishonest simulation by silence, or exgressed conformity, 
m a large constituency, because a candidates v1ews will not 
react upon his prospects alone, but on the prospects of his colleagues. 
They will 11 shut up" the weak man. In the Single-Member constituency[ 
e candidate, certainly, is also called upon to conform to 
the general party views, but h~ay ress his nonconformit with 
those views as far as his electors can be persuaded, and the personal
refations 1p makes this feasT5le-and, meanwhile, his own cause is 
neither bei2_g prejudiced by his colleagues in contiguous constituen<:
ies, nor oes his nonconformity inJure them and bring upon him 
and them the full rigour of E_arty orthodoxy.


Further, as regards the political education of the constituencies, 
the personal struggle in a small constituency between two or three 
men for one prize, has a dramatic attraction about it, whtch brings 
<JUt electors to meetings, and takes them to the poll. The big constituency, 
with the party doctrines in the forefront, would offer a 
rarified atmosphere in which the elector would not be so inclined to 
listen to the megaphonically reiterated speeches of candidates. 


The actual processes of politics would not, in such a system, leave 
room for tfie independence c aimed. For to be effective, heresies 
must exist anil work inside an organisation based on orthodoxy; and, 
in point of fact, the most singular and, perhaps, beneficial angularw·ties 
are represented and expressed within the existing system. The 
vista of 6oo men, divided into a number of groups, each independent 
in views and line of action, may bring happiness to the individualistic 
moralist. But democracy cannot be run by eclectics and 


~single-point rhapsodists. art rganisation maintains its essential 
stream of tendency unimpaired from one election to another. It 'v ,_,.
educates the electorate, and explains to the electorate the works of 
its members within the representative assembly. It educates itself 
by research, and criticises the action of the Opposition. _ nd_!Pendence 
from such party orgamsation is separation from the only insti


~ 
~ 
'i tl.!.tion wlri~ 1 on any large scale, can secure that Representative 
overii"ilient shall also be Responsible Government. A threat to 
1\ e Two-Party System and party discipline is a threat to responsility 
in the democratic system, and P.R., avowedly, is such a threat. 

(E.) Alleged: The minority in each Single-Member constituency, 
is there directly unrepresented, and this is destructive of political 
interest, because the vote of the minority is merely" a sterile exhibition 
of impotence."


Denied: Anybody who has any electoral experience knows that 
this argument is untrue. Even if there is no chance of winning the 
seat for themselves, the minority try to get as many votes as possible 
as a mark of popular confidence in their party doctrines, and particularly 
in their par y eailers. e horizon of a minority is not 
limited by the boundan s of the constituency. The minority has 
sufficit:nt sense to know that the full exhibition of its sti1!TI'g'th--wtlllfot 



12 

fail to have its influence upon the member actually re~~he 
cons 1 uency, and moaera e the extremity of his _party views. And 
t e very act that a small turnover of votes may resulT in the captureof the seat heightens the intensity of political feelings, and results 
in energetic prosecution of a campaign all through the period for 
which Parliament sits. 

The Practical Defects of P.R. 

These, then, are the main arguments for P.R., and these the 
grounds on which they must be rejected. The system of P.R. also 
suffers from certain inherent practical defects. 

First, the elector faced with a bailot paper containing 10 or 15 
names would be confused, and find it difficult to mark his preferences 
without guidance. Either, then, his paper would be spoilt ; or his 
preferences would not be marked in full (when the merit claimed for 

P.R. would not be realised). or the party organisation would need 
to guide the elector by means of careful coaching beforehand, and 
this would tend to increase the power of the organisation. Confusion 
might be overcome in the course of time ; it is at least possible that 
early difficulties would stereotype the control of the party-machine.
Secondly, in relation to the size of constituencies which would, 
under the p1 oposal, be s, 6 or more times as big as they are at 
present, the comment of Mr. Graham Wallas is true so far as practice 
gives any clue, and seems to me decisive. "Even if it onlymultiplied the size of the ordinary constituency by six," he writes, 
" it would multiply by at lea~t six the difficult}L.O eifectiv electioneering, 
and even if each candidate were _prepared to spend six-times 
as much money at every contest, he could not multiply by six the 
range of his voice or the number of meetings which he could address 
in a day." Amateur advocates of the proposal have been heard to 
say that the parties could divide up the constituency for electioneering 
purposes, and concentrate attention of those districts whence 
came their strength, and thus economise their efforts. But, in practice, 
there are few constituencies which do not contain potential surprises,
and majorities are not there ready-made. The party must seek its 
majority, and cannot neglect a vote. The larger constituency would 
necessitate vaster and richer " machines " than we have now ; and 
there is everything to fear that they would fail to bring the personalcharacter of the candidates home to the electors as vividly as under 
the present System. The small party will not be benefited, for it 
too, and more than the large party, will have to bear a greater financial 
burden if it wishes to be sure of finding a quota : with no 
extra advantage relative to its cost and effort over the presentconditions. 

Thirdly, the advocates of P.R. have never been able to offer the 
country a substitute worth having for the invaluable periodicalreferenda on the action of the Government, the By-elections on the 
death or resignation of a member. One solution offered is, that the 
whole constituency should be polled for the seat vacant. This would 
clearly entail a great and disproportionate expense ; and the bigger 


13 

the constituencies, the fewer of them in the country, and, therefore, 
the greater possible number of expensive By-elections. Another 
suggestion is that a tradition would grow up of the majority takingthe seat without a contest-This is not a solution : it is an evasion. 
There are other fantastical schemes which are also merely ingenious. 

Summary of the Case against the Proposal. 
Thus, the net result of this examination of the proposal to substitute 
P.R. for our present Electoral System is this : We would lose 
the Single-Member constituency, which is simple for candidates, 
electors and local party executives. The regime of big and responsible 
parties in the country and in the House of Commons would be 
threatened, and with that would arise the possibility of indecisive 
and vacillating goyernment waiting upon electoral and Parliamen~ 
bargains. The close personal relationship of member atiCIConstituency 
would give way to a rather dehumanised operation of the Partymachine, seeking to bring its principle into the electors' line of 
vision. ''The swing of the pendulum" in elections would be diminished 
in amplitude, and the political life of both majority and 
minority tend to stagnation. The type of. referendum known as 
the By-election would be lost. 
To compensate for these clear losses no substantial advantages 
are offered by P.R. Accurate mathematical representation is practically 
impossible, and is undesirable, given the congestion of business 
in Parliament, and, as a matter of fact, there is representation of all 
opinions in the House. No cause which arises for discussion in the 
encylop<edic programme of the House ever lacks a champion : none 
a challenge. While it is a theoretical possibility for a minority of 
electors to get a majority of votes, this has never occurred indisputably 
; and if it did the conventions of decency in English politicswould prevent the majority from taking advantage of the accident. 
Indeed, majorities and minorities are being guided to an ever-
greater extent by statistics of voting as well as by those of seats won ; 
because we realise nowadays, as it was impossible to realise a couple 
of generations ago, when P.R. was born, that the major issues of 
politics are not determined in the House of Commons so much as in 
the constituencies. The advocates of P.R. still live within the fold 
of John Stuart Mill's political synthesis-before the Reform Bill, 
even, of 1867, and before the creation of the great "parliamentoutside Parliament," the tribunal of an active and enfranchised 
electorate. 
On these grounds, there is no alternative but to reject the proposed 
System of P.R. Men and organisations which look to makingthe world safe and happy for democracy might better turn their 
attention to examining the conditions of research and policy-makingwithin the Parties, rather than occupy their time in preserving an 
an ancient and sterile faith. 

The Alternative Vote. 
The Alternative Vote is the method whereby, in a Si11gleMember 
co11stitumcy in which there is a three-or-more-cornered con



test, voters mark their ballot-papers with Preference I1 21 3, etc., for 
the various candidates. Should no candidate receive an Absolute 
majority of First Preferences-i.e., half the total number of votes 
cast, plus one, there are transfers of the 2nd, 3rd, etc., votes of the 
least successful candidates to the top men, until one candidate is 
credited with an Absolute Majority. He is then declared elected. 

The method is suggested as a safeguard against minority seats. 
It is true that the successful candidate would be able to boast of a 
mathematical majority as proof of his representative quality. But 
this mathematical majority would not be a majority in the Englishpolitical sense of the word, i.e., a majority of positive supporters.

trecandtda e would be returned partly by the votes-given to him 

~ y o keep other candidates, considered as less desirable, out ; and this 
( , · o morally decent basis for a Representative Assembly. MorevJ 
'f over, as it is likely that \Vithin I 5 years the Liberal Party will be 
V-\ electorally defunct, we shall then be troubled with fewer of such 


multiple-candidate contests. It would be the height of political 
"'lt"' unwisdom to introduce a new and vicious element into the constitur-.
111'( tion to counteract a temporary ill. 

Institutional change is not less a matter of experience than of 
logic. Proportional representation, where it has been tried, has not 
notably improved the quality of legislative assemblies. It does not, 
on analysis, seem endowed with the remedial virtues inherent in its 
:esthetic appearance. Our Electoral System suffers from temporarydislocation rather than permanent error. What it needs is to be 
built upon the foundation of voters educated to a judgment made 
with full minds. It is in a change rather of social principles than of 
voting expedients that we shall find the results we require. 

APPENDIX. 

THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 

THE following account is taken almost word for word from " The 
Reform of Political Representation.'' by ]. FJSCHER WJLLIAMS, 
C.B.E., Hon. Treasurer of the Proportional RepresentationSociety. (Murray, I9I8.) 

THERE are said to be some 300 systems of Proportional Representation 
in existence, and the ingenuity of inventors shows no sign of 
exhaustion. Here, an account is given only of the system known as 
that of the "Single Transferable Vote," as being that which has 
obtained more support in this country and the British Dominions 
than any of its rivals. 

Practically all systems of Proportional Representation agree in 
that they require constituencies returning several-at least three



IS 

members. And this for the simple reason that, when a constituency 
returns only one member, the representation cannot be divided-it 
naturally falls to a single party or body of electors. Therefore, the 
first step in the introduction of the system of the single transferable 
vote is the creation of constituencies returning several members. 
The number of members that each constituency should return would 
be governed either by the number of its electorate or its population 
-the constituencies themselves being, wherever possible, local government 
units. The new constituencies once created, redistribution 
in the future would be simplified enormously. As population shifted 
or increased, no alteration of boundaries would be needed, since the 
number of members allotted to a constituency could be altered. 

The constituency returning several members already exists-in 
municipal boroughs we have wards returning three, six, and sometimes 
nine members, but we do not thereby secure a just representation. 
We either have the provincial system of one member retiring 
every year, or the metropolitan system of the "block vote." The 
"block vote" is the negation of proportionality ; it allows everyelector as many votes as there are vacancies to be filled , but it forbids 
him to give more than one vote to any one candidate. Hence, if 
there are nine seats vacant, and three parties in the constiluency90I 
Reds, 900 Pinks and 899 Whites-and each party puts forward 
nine candidates, the nine Red candidates head the poll with 90I votes 
apiece, and not a single Pink or White candidate is returned. 

The first obvious amendment to this block vote system is to 
limit each elector to one vote only, as in Japan. But this amendment 
by itself is open to serious objection, for it may do grave injustice 
as between the larger parties. Suppose that a body of I I 5 
persons have to elect 5 representatives, and that there are in the 
body 70 Unionists, 25 Liberals and 20 Labour men. The just representation 
is 3 Unionists, I Liberal and I Labour man. Assume that 
there are 4 Unionist candidates, 3 Liberals and I Labour. Now, 
the Labour candidate must be elected if all the Labour voters vote 
for him, for he will then poll 20 votes, while all the Unionists and 
Liberals together can only muster 9 5 votes. But as, between the 
Unionists and Liberals, the number of candidates elected will depend 
on the skilful drilling of the electors, and the exact knowledge bythe party manager of the party's electoral strength. In the 
absence of organisation and exact foreknowledge we might easily getsuch a result as this :-

Bonar Law (Unionist) 50 l 
Henderson (Labour) 20 I 
Asquith (Liberal) 14 ~ Elected. 
Robert Cecil (Unionist) r r j 
Herbert Samuel (Liberal) 7 

Chamberlain (Unionist) 5}
Banhury (Unionist) ... ... 4 Not elected. 
Sir Thomas Whittaker (Liberal) 4 


The 5 at the head of the poll include 2 Unionists and 2 Liberals. 
although the number of Unionist electors is about three times that 


I6 

of the Liberal .electors, and the system thus gives an almost unintelligibly 
unjust result, the falsity of which is caused by the excessive 
concentration of the Unionist votes on Mr. Bonar Law. If the votes 
he did not need could have been passed on to Mr. Chamberlain, the 
latter would have been brought up above Mr. Herbert Samuel and 
even above Mr. Asquith, and elected. The problem of devising a 
means of making the surplus votes of Mr. Bonar Law available for 
the other candidates of the Unionist party-assuming always that 
the electors who vote for Mr. Bonar Law would also wish to see the 
other Unionists elected-is solved by allowing the elector to mark his 
preferences by the figures I , 2, 3, and so on, set against the names 
of candidates on the ballot papers, and making the vote transferable 
accordingly. If, at our imaginary election, Mr. Law's so votes had 
been thus transferable, and if all his fifty voters had marked one or 
other of the remaining Unionist candidates with the figure 2 1 the 
result might have been :


~w~-~ 

wl

Henderson 20 
Chamberlain (5 +I 5) 20 Elected. 
Cecil (11 +9) 20 ( 
Asquith 14) 


Banbury (4+6) 

10}

Herbert Samuel 7 Not ~lected. 
Sir Thomas Whittaker 4 
which is a just result-3 Unionists, I Labour and I Liberal candidate 
being elected. 
It is agreed on all hands that in making the transfer, regard must 
be had to the rights of the candidates who are to be the transferees. 
In the illustration Mr. Law can spare 30 votes-that is, three-fifths of 
his total, and these 30 Yotes are to go where the electors wish them 
to go. The returning officer finds out where the electors wish them 
to go by examining the ballot papers on which Mr. Law is marked I, 
and seeing what names are marked 2 thereon. In this case, let us 
suppose that on Io of Mr. Law's so voting papers Sir F. Banbury is 
marked 2 , Lord Robert Cecil on IS, and Mr. Chamberlain on 2s. 
In justice, Sir F. Ban bury claims -2-of the IO on which he is marked 2, 
z".e., 6 ; Lord Robert Cecil, %of the Is on which he is marked 2, £.e. , 
9 ; Mr. Chamberlain, -} of the 2S on which lze is marked 2, £.e., IS. 
But if a true result is to be reached it is not enough to provide 
for excessive concentration-excessive diffusion must always be 
guarded against. Thus, the figures of our imaginary election mighthave been:


Law 20)
H enderson 20 


Chamberlain 20J Elected. 

Cecil 19 

Banbury 11 

Asquith 

10}

Samuel 9 Not elected. 
Whittaker 6 
in which case the Liberals will have lost their solitary representative 
because they have unduly scattered their votes. It is simple enough 


17 

to find out whether the electors will consent to concentrate their 
votes on fewer candidates, and if they so consent to carry this 
through. The method adopted is to exclude from the poll the lowest 
candidate, in this case Whittaker, and make the votes which were 
otherwise wasted on him available (if the electors wish it) to putanother candidate of the same party above Banbury, and give the 
Liberals their one seat. 

In the case of the transfer of the votes of an excluded candidate 
no question of proportional transfer arises. The excluded candidate 
has no quota-a// his votes are transferred to the candidates indicated 
as next preference by the electors. 

The effect of the vote being made transferable is to ensure that 
all parties or divisions of opinion receive their fair share of representation. 
The elector entering the polling booth does not know 
whether his favourite will receive more support than he requires, or 
whether he will receive so little as to have no chance of election. 
Or, again, a party may have scattered its votes over too many candidates, 
and might (if the votes are not transferable) lose the reprentation 
which it would otherwise would gain. 

The transferable vote provides against both these contingencies.
It enables the elector to indicate the candidates of his second and 
further choice to whom his vote can be transferred :


(i.) When his first choice has more votes than he requires; or 

(ii.) When, after all excess votes have been transferred, the 

elector's first choice is at the bottom of the poll. 

The secrecy of the ballot is preserved, and yet the electors are 
allowed to combine into groups of the necessary size or "quota."
If any body of electors contains three such groups it will win three 
seats; if it contains two groups it will obtain two seats. And if it 
contains only one such group it obtains one member, and no combination 
of other parties, no bargain between headquarters, no skilful 
orders to electors can possibly prevent a number of electors in the 
constituency equal to the quota from obtaining the representativeof their choice. This is the peculiar merit of the system. Let 
popular feeling run ever so strong, a compact minority of reasonable 
size, who have the courage and consistency to stand together, will 
get into the House of Commons as many representatives of their 
own choice as their numbers entitle them to have. 


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