fabian tract 394 
the nuclear future 


Frank Barnaby 1 the need for arms control 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
implications of nuclear energy 2 
existing control systems 9 
the non-proliferation treaty 16 
implications of a superpower 
arms race 25 
Alan Lee Williams 
6 
7 
prospects for arms control 
the East-West detente 
33 
44 

Geoffrey Lee Williams 


this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, , 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only the 
view of the individuals who prepared it. The responsibility of · 
the Society is limited to approving the publications which it 
issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour movement. 
Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street. London SW1. 
June 1969. SBN 7163 0394 9 


1. the need for arms control 
Frank Barnaby 

The fundamental problem facing man-In the future, further major technological 
kind is the development of a method of developments can be expected ; there is 
allowing peaceful change to take place no reason to assume that the rate at 
in the present international system of which these will occur will decrease. 
sovereign and ·independent states_ It Many ·technical and scientific fields have 
seems inevitable that, for the foreseeable the potential to produce significant milifuture, 
states will have power in the tary innovations, such as biological war-
military sense ; the problem is how this fare, defence against missile attack, psypower 
can be controlled or managed to chological warfare, intercontinental misminimise 
the risk of war in a dynamic siles of very high accuracy, and the mili


world society. In the nuclear age, when tary use of space vehicles. 
even limit~ wars would almost certainly 
lead to unimaginable destruction, this In addition to the vertical increase in 
problem takes on a special urgency. the number of technological innovations 

there is a horizontal spread of each of 
A systematic programme of arms control them. Typical of this is the spread of 
and arms reduction would probably nuclear energy. It is desirable to consimpbfy, 
but not solve, the task of the sider this in some detail, for firstly, a 
peaceful management of the power of nuclear energy programme can provide 
states and thus lead to a more secure a state with the option of acquiring nu-
world. The converse argument, namely clear weapons which are, at present, the 
that the greater the power of a state the most credible weapons of mass destrucless 
likely are others to interfere with tion; secondly, nuclear programmes have 
it and, therefore, that high levels of arms, become of great importance to some of 
even to nuclear levels, are likely to lead the smaller powers ; thirdly, attempts 
to greater stability, seems wrongly to have been made to control the military 
assume that all leaders of states will use use of nuclear facilities and useful lestheir 
power in a responsible manner. sons can be learnt from these efforts ; 

fourthly, there are important implica-
Once the necessity for arms control is tions for the future of the Non-proliferaagreed 
the question arises of the present tion Treaty ; and finally, to indicate the 
prospects for it. This question is greatly complexities of the .issues facing any 
complicated by the rate at which techno-country which wishes to adopt an arms 
logical revolutions now occur compared control policy. 
with the slow speed with which arms 
control negotiations proceed. In the past The substance used as the fissile material 
three decades there have been three mili-for nuclear weapons is either plutoniumtary 
technological revolutions: in the de-239 or uranium-235, but an important 
velopment of nuclear energy; in the de-distinction has to be made between these. 
velopment of intercontinental missiles; Judging from the experience of all the 

and in communications and control sys-present five nuclear-weapon powers, it 

tems. In the same period lengthy arms seems that the use of uranium-235 is 

control negotiations have produced : the necessary, or at least preferable, for the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963); the fissile material for thermonuclear wea-
Treaty Governing the Activities of States pons ; the technical reasons for this are 

in the Exploration and Use of Outer still classified. Plutonium-239 is produced 

, 
Space (1967); the Treaty of Tlatelolco in nuclear reactors whereas the separafor 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons tion of uranium-235 from natural 

uranin 
Latin America (1967) and the Non-pro-ium for use in nuclear weapons is a 

liferation Treaty (1968). The first three difficult operation involving a complex in-
of these were minor successes. The suc-dustrial process. For these reasons it is 
cessful negotiation of the Non-prolifera-justifiable to consider separately nuclear 
tion Treaty was an achievement of some capabilities which could lead to the ac-

importance, although it will be some time quisition of nuclear weapons and those 

which could lead to thermonuclear

· 
before it is known whether or not this 
treaty is viable. weapons. 


2. impl·ications of 
nuclear energy 
The development of nuclear powerstarted relatively slowly but in the past 
decade it has progressed and spread with 
a rapidity that has exceeded all ex.pectations. 
In 'the 15 years since the first small 
5Mw (MW=megawatts (one million watts) 
of electricity) nuclear power plant went 
into regular operation at Obninsk in the 
Soviet ·Union, nuclear power has progressed 
from the experimental to the 
commercial stage and is now signficantly 
contrilbuting to the world's almost 
insatiable demand for electricity. An indication 
of the rapidity with which nuclear 
energy has developed is given by 
Table 1 in which the yearly increase in 
the total world-wide installed nuclear 
c<~Jpacity is shown. In a single decade, 
nuclear industries have been developed 
in several industrialised countries to an 
extent which will enable them to construct 
-and install large nuclear powerplants which would produce power at 
economically justifiable costs in many 
areas of the world. 

Public and private power utilities in 
many countries are already operatingand constructing nuclear plants on a 
purely economic basis. At present there 
aie 107 power reactors, with a total c<~Jpacity 
of 20,000 MW, installed in 16 
countdes. In the next five years at least 
six additional countries will have nuclear 
power reactors, and the total installed 
capacity will exceed 113,000 MW, produced 
by at least 255 reactors (Table 2) . 
By 1980 the amount of electricity which 

TABLE I 
TOTAL INSTALLED NUCLEAR 
POWER CAPACITY UP TO 1974 

year 
1954 
(Mw) 
5 
year 
1965 
(Mw) 
7527 
1955 5 1966 8843 
1956 207 1967 10685 
1957 297 1968 13462 
1958 1157 1969 19938 
1959 1390 1970 30745 
1960 1560 1971 49365 
1961 2137 1972 71547 
1962 2836 1973 90570 
1963 4567 1974 113640 
1964 6113 1980 > 300000 

will be produced by nuclear power is 
estimated to be greater than 300,000 MW. 

The estimates for the projected nuclear 
capacity in the future are being continually 
revised upwards as confidence in the 
competitive position of nuclear plants 
grows. Long range calculations show 
that, in several countries of the world, 
nuclear power may provide more than 
50 per cent of the electric power requirements 
by the end of this century. The 
nuclear power programme in the United 
States is of particular interest as an illustration 
of the likely future pattern in the 

industrialised countries. The use of electricity 
in the United States has doubled 
roughly every ten years throughout this 
century, and is at present increasingtwice as fast as the gross national product 
and more than •five times as fast as 
the population. Electric power production 
is America's largest industry, with a 
present c<~Jpltal investment of about 
£3,500 million per year. At present, the 
major electrical energy sources in the 
United States are coal, gas, water power 
and oil, with nuclear power only supplying 
about one per cent of the installed 
generation capacity. However, with the 
knowledge that conventional sources of 
energy will not be adequate to satisfyfuture demand in the United States and 
with the establishment of the economics 
of nuclear power, the electric utilities are 
rapidly turning to nuclear fuel to meet 
future requirements. In addition to the 
24 nuclear plants already in operation, 
and producing over 7,000 MW, about 30 
are under construction and over 50 more 
in the planning stage. It is estimated that 
in 1980 about 30 ·per cent of her total 
generation ca;pacity will be in nuclear 
plants. At this time, the United States 
may generate at least 150,000 MW bynuclear reactors, which will representalbout 50 per cent of the total world 
capacity of nuclear power. Orders for 
nuclear plants now represent about 40 
per cent of the total new orders for 
steam-electric power plants, and this percentage 
will undoubtedly increase rapidly 
with time. 

An important feature of the American 
nuclear power programme is the increas



it 
Id 
ll 
~ 
lf r· 
ly 
it 
Id 
ll 
~ 
lf r· 
ly 
TABLE .2 . ,, 
COUNTRIES OPERATING NUCLEAR CAPACITY 
installed installed 
ArgentinaBelgiumBulgaria · 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Finland 
France · 
West GermanyEast GermanyIndill. 
Israel 
ItalyJapanNetherlands 
Pakistan 
SpainSweden 
No. of power 
reactors 
1969 
2 
1 
9 
9 
1 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2 
2 
nuclea:r 
powercapacity 
(MW) 
10.5 
226 
150 
1648 
982 
70 
580 
597 
534 
51.5 
593 
145 
No. of power 
reactors 
1974 
1 
3 
2 
13 
2 
2 
13 
15 
3 
6 
1 
5 
12 
2 
1 
7 
5 
nuclear 
powercapacity 
(MW} 
319 
1500 
800 
6513 
480 
600 
3693 
3450 
1570 
1180 
200 
1232 
5422 
451 
125 
2343 
2154 
Switzerland 2 357 6 2013 
Taiwan 1 300 
USSR 15 1682 24 4210 
United Kingdom 
USA 
29 
24 
5353 
7029 
42 
89 
13055 
62029 
107 20008 255 113640 

ing ca,pacity of the plants. At the end of 
1968 the nuclear power plants had capacities 
of less than 500 MW ; all but three 
of the plants under construction will exceed 
this capacity and at least seven will 
exceed 1 ,000 MW. Many more are in the 
planning stage. Studies have indicated 
that nuclear plants of up to 3,000 MW 
are technically feasible provided that engineering 
problems associated with the 
production of pressure vessels and turbines 
are solved. It is only within the 
past few years that it has been realised 
that power plants larger than about 600 
MW were economically and technicallyfeasible; this is a main reason why estimates 
of nuclear capacity have been 
conservative. 

Another interesting feature of the American 
programme concerns the locations of 
the nuclear plants. At present, these 
plants are concentrated in New England, 

California, the northern Atlantic sea


board and the Great Lakes region, which 
are all areas of high fuel costs in which 
nuclear plants offer a clear economic 
advantage over fossil-fuelled plants. The 
areas are also among the most highlypopulated and industrialised areas of the 
United States and therefore they require 
large base-load plants. Other areas of 
high fuel costs, such as parts of the Midwest 
and the Pacific Northwest, do not 
have a high enough electrical power demand 
to justify nuclear plants of a size 
sufficient to be competitive. In the next 
decade nuclear plants will be constructed 
along the Atlantic seaJboard to Florida 
and will be more numerous in North 
Central America. I1: is unlikely that nuclear 
power will be competitive with 
other fruels in areas like the Appalachian 
Mountains (coal) or in Texas (oil and 
natural gas) or will be used to supplyareas of low population density. 


The United Kingdom has most of its 
population concentrated in a few highly 
industrialised areas and nuclear energy 
is, therefore, a .particularly suitable 
source of electricity. The first phase of 
the British programme, representing an 
investment of approximately £750 million, 
has just been completed and has 
developed nuclear power to the pointwhere it is competitive with coal for the 
production of electricity. The generatingauthorities plan to invest a further £750 
million to obtain another 8,000 MW by1975. At that time a•bout 25 per cent of 
the total energy from all sources of electricity 
production (150 million tons of 
coal equivalent) will be produced bynuclear reactors. A similar pattern is 
emerging in the countries of western 
Europe. In West Germany between 
25,000 and 30,000 MW are likely to be 
installed by 1980. France will probrubly 
have 17,000 MW by 1980. In Belgium,
a nuclear capacity of up to about 4,000 
MW is likely by 1980. By the end of 
1970 Ita.Jy will be order.ing, on average, 
one 650 MW power plant each year for 
several years. Although firm plans have 
not been announced for the period 19701980, 
there is little likelihood that the 
pace of the nuclear energy programme 
will diminish. The growing competitiveness 
of nuclear plants and the rising demand 
for energy is likely to lead to an 
installed nuclear capacity in Italy of at 
least 12,000 MW by the end of the next 
decade. In the Netherlands, it is estimated 
that 2,000 MW of nuclear energy 
will be installed by 1980. It can, therefore, 
be concluded from the present indications 
that, by 1980, the installed 
nuclear capacity in the EEC will be at 
least 60,000 MW. 

Japan is yet another example of an 
industrialised nation with large concentrations 
of population, which regards its 
environment as being specially suited to 
nuclear power and, in fact, Japan plans 
to have installed aJbout 20,000 MW by1980. The Soviet Union has large reserves 
of fossil fuel, but these are not 
necessarily in the place where needed 
and she has been operating nuclear reactors 
since the early 1950s. Generallyspeaking, Soviet reactors are sited so 

that they supply power to large fudus· 
trial areas which are far removed from 
sources of conventional fuels. Because of 
the transportation costs of fossil fuels,
nuclear power is, under these conditions, 
the cheapest form of power. Some of the 
developing countries, like India and 
Pakistan, are attempting to solve their 
problem of limited fossil fuels by embarking 
on ambitious nuclear power pro-
grammes. 

It can be concluded from these few examples 
that nuclear energy programmes 
will develop very rapidly in those countries 
in which there is a highly developed 
technology, large electric power networks 
and a shortage of fossil fuels. 

Nuclear power will also be used in developing 
areas to encourage industrialisation. 
The prospect of very large(greater than 1 ,000 MW) nuclear power 
units introduces the concept of vast 
energy centres containing agro-industrial 
complexes whioh, <i!part from generating 
electricity, synthesise chemicals for fertiliser 
and desa.Jinise water for irrigation. 
A 1,000 MW plant could support the production 
of sufficient fertiliser to provide 
for an agricultural complex producing 
enough grain to feed about three million 
people with 2,500 calories per day, could 
produce about 50 miilion gallons of desalinated 
water per day for irrigation,
and in addition could provide energy for 
a large aluminium plant, for example. 
The attractions of such nuclear powered 
multiopurpose industrial complexes for 
a developing country like India are clear. 
Nuclear power, therefore, offers the prospect 
of an energy abundant world,
although it should be emphasised that, 
in some environments, fossil fuelled power 
plants have an important role to play. 

Apart from the direct benefits arisingfrom lower electricity generation costs 
compared with fossil fuelled plants, there 
are other benefits arising from a nuclear 
power programme. Nuclear power stations 
have greater siting flexibility. A 
1 ,000 MW plant is being built 17 miles 
from the Toronto centre. Nuclear power 
programmes encourage technical spin-off 
which assists the commercial develop



1• 

~ 

;s 

:r 
ff 
p· 

ment of various products and processes.
Acc;ident rates in nuclear power stations 
are low ; no fatal nuclear accident has 
occurred in 500 reactor years of operation. 
The transportation problems associated 
with reactor fuel are less serious 
than those for other fuels. Atmosphericpollution from nuclear stations can be 
reduced. to negligible levels. The use of 
nuclear power minimises the exploitationof accessible suppl'ies of organic substances, 
which~are required in large and 
increasing quantities for the rapidly expanding 
chemical industry, for fossil 
fuels. The total peaceful benefits arising 
from the use of nuclear reactors for 
power production are so substantial that 
the development of nuclear energyshould not, and could not, be impeded. 

In addition to power reactors there are 
a large number of research reactors scattered 
throughout the world. In fact, there 
are nearly 400 of these in 50 countries. 
These reactors are, in general, relatively 
small in output, have little military significance, 
and are used for teaching, for 
research and for gaining experience in 
reactor technology. However, the research 
reactors of Israel and Jugoslavia,
for example, provide enough plutonium 
to produce nuclear weapons at the rate 
of about one and a quarter per yearrespectively. 

the nuclear fuel cycle 
and capabilities 

The nuclear power reactor generatingelectricity, which performs the same function 
as the steam boiler in a conventional 
thermal tpower plant, is just an industrial 
plant in the so-called "nuclear fuel 
cycle". This term emphasises the cyclical 
nature of nuclear energy which creates 
new fuel at the same time as it consumes 
fuel. This new fuel can also be used as a 
source of energy creating still further 
fuel, and so on. The fuel for present dayreactors is contained in uranium. As this 
"burns" plutonium is produced. The 
starting point of the cycle is, however, 
natural uranium which is found in a 
number of ores. Uranium is mined byconventional underground and open pit 
methods and by place-leaching. 

There is no major difficulty in extracting 
uranium from its ores but several processing 
steps are involved before it is in 
a form suitable for use in a reactor. The 
ore is processed in mills to extract uranium 
in the oxide form {UaOa), known as 
"yellow cake". 

About 0.2 to 0.3 tons of natural UaOs perMW-year electricity production are required 
to operate each of the various 
types of thermal reactor systems at present 
in commercial operation. Except for 
heavy water reactors, the initial uranium 
requirement is about one ton of natural 
UaOs per MW installed. One ton of uranium 
oxide UJer Mw-year) is comparable 
with about 15,000 tons of coal to produce 
the same amount of electricity. 

Uranium oxide is dealt with in one of 
two ways, depending upon whether it is 
wanted to provide fuel for a reactor 
burning natural uranium or one burningenriched uranium. In the first case the 
oxide is converted to either uranium 
metal or uranium dioxide (UO,) and then 
made into fuel elements which are inserted 
into the reactor core. In the second 
case, the yellow cake is converted into 
the gaseous compound, uranium hexatluoride, 
and enriched in a gas diffusion 
plant where the content of uranium-235 
is increased from the natural value of 

0.7 per cent to between two and three 
per cent. Enriched uranium hexafloride 
is then converted into uranium dioxide 
powder and made into fuel elements. 
A given fuel element in a reactor may 
yiel'd heat continuously for up ·to three or 
four years before it is removed ; even 
after this time only about one or two 
per cent of the fuel is burned up. During 
this period neutron bombardment has 
converted some of the uranium-238 to 
pl'utonium-239, which can also be used 
as a fissile material. The amount of plutonium 
·bred from uranium-238 per MW-
year of electrical power ranges from 0.2 
Kg in the case of enriched uranium reactors 
to about 0.5 Kg in the case of 
natural uranium reactors. Plutonium is 
worth about £4,000 per Kg and a typical 
1 000 MW reactor can produce more than 
£BOO,OOO worth of plutonium annually. 


The fuel elements are chemically reprocessed 
in a separation plant to recover 
the unused uranium and the plutonium 
by-product. 

A country with a nuclear power pro-
gramme will gradually accumulate a 
stock of plutonium-239. Unless the country 
owns a plutonium separation plant it 
must arrange for its spent fuel elements 
to ·be sent to some other country that 
has a separation plant and is willing to 
separate and return the plutonium. Apartfrom its potential use in nuclear weapons, 
plutonium is used as fuel for breeder reactors. 
These reactors produce considerably 
more plutonium than they consume 
and they are, therefore, very economical 
in their use of fuel compared with thermal 
reactors in which only one or two 
per cent of the fuel is uti.t.ised. The proven 
resources of uranium ore, available 
at less than ten dollars per pound, will 
last only until the 1980s and the prospect 
of a shm,1:age of uranium available 
at economic prices is causing considerable 
attention to be paid to the development 
of "breeder" reactors. It is expected 
that the successful performance of 
experimental plants should lead to largescale commercial use of breeder reactors 
in the 1980s. A breeder reactor is the 
most productive source of plutonium. It 
is possible by a suitable design to convert 
uranium-238 in the core of the reactor, 
and uranium-238 placed around the core, 
into plutonium at a rate faster than the 
rate of consumption of the original uranium-
235. The efficiency of this processis increased if plutonium is used in the 
fuel because more fast neutrons (that is 
those with a relatively high velocity) ; 
which are the most efficient for converting 
uranium-238 to plutonium-239, 
are available from the fission of an 
atom of plutonium-239 than are obtained 
from the fission of an atom of 
uranium-235. The fuel for a breeder reactor 
is, therefore, normally plutonium 
mixed with uranium depleted in uranium-
235. A fast breeder should be able 
to produce about 140 Kg of plutoniumfor every 100 Kg used. The fact that 
breeder reactors are likely to be the 
power producers of the future means that 
plutonium is now a very valua·ble ma


terial and that, when breeder reactors 
become widespread, the a.mount of plUtonium 
disseminated throughout the 
world will indeed become extremelygreat. 

Having accumulated a stock of separatedplutonium, a country wishing to producenuclear weapons is faced with the task 
of designing, constructing and testing the 
weapons. It must then create and main-
ta.in a credible deHvery system, which is 
costly, and for which a large industrial 
base is requi,red. In some countries, 
India and Israel for example, the 
existing aircraft could be modified to 
deliver nuclear weapons and, therefore, 
the cost of a nuclear-weapon. programme 
will vary considerably according to its 
sophistication. 

The UN report, Effects of the possible use 
of nuclear weapons and security and 
economic implications for states of the 
acquisition and further development of 
these weapons, estimated that a "small 
high quality nuclear capability" would 
cost £2,300 million, corresponding to an 
average annual cost of £230 million for 
ten years. This estimate was based on a 
hypothetical programme comprising two 
stages each of five years' duration. Bythe end of the first stage, a nuclear 
force of from ten to 15 bombers and 
from 15 to 20 nuclear -weapons would 
be established and during the second 
stage the force would be expanded to 
include from 20 to 30 thermonuclear 
we<llpons, I 00 intermediate range missiles 
and two missile launching nuclear submarines. 
To build installations in which 
nuclear warheads could be produced, 
approximately 1,300 engineers and 500 
scientists would be needed. To produceover ten years and deploy 50 intermediate 
range ballistic missi.les it is estimated 
that "a peak labour force of 19,000 men 
directly applied would be needed, over 
5,000 of them scientists and engineerswith access to high speed electronic computers. 
Skilled personnel would include 
physicists, aerodynamic, mechanical, and 
other engineers and large numbers of 
production workers, including machine 
operators and welders. The suggestedfleet of 50 bombers would require a 


minimum of from one to two-million 
man-hours of skilled and unskilled 
labour just to assemble. The design and 
development tstage would absorb an additional 
two million or more engineeringman-hours, which would involve highly 
skilled efforts in aerodynamics, stress 
analysis, design work and flight testing. 
The French and British costs for their 
military nuclear programmes to date 
have been estimated at about £3,800 million. 


Outside the nuclear-weapon countries, 
plutonium separation plants have been 
built in India, Japan and Italy. There is 
one in Belgium which is owned and controlled 
by ten members of the European 
Nuclear Energy Agency. Plans for 
building a separation plant in West Germany 
are in an advanced state. The defence 
budgets of India, Italy, West Germany 
and Japan are respectively about 
600, 800, 2,100 and 490 mil.Jion pounds. 
So far as the first three are concerned,
the impact of the necessary increase in 
their budgets to finance a nuclear wea,pon 
programme would be large but by no 
means impossibly so. In the case of 
Japan, a major switch of national resources 
would be needed to achieve a 
nuclear ca,pability, since at present, her 
defence expenditure is only about one 
per cent of the gross national product. 

The conclusions to be drawn from this 
are: 

1. Sixteen countries are at present producing 
large quantities of plutoniumfrom their nuclear power reactors. This 
number will increase to 22 within the 
next five years. 
2. Of these countries, four (India, Italy, 
Japan and West Germany) can, or will 
shortly, be able to separate plutonium 
from spent reactor fuel elements, on their 
own territory. 
3. Each of these four countries has the 
necessary industrial base and could, although 
with varying degrees of difficulty, 
afford the economic cost of producing a 
small high quality nuclear force within 
a relatively short time of, say, five years. 
4. Two other countries (Canada and 
Sweden) have the capacity to producesuch a nuclear force and could afford the 
cost, but they rely on others for the 
separation of plutonium. 
5. Some of the remaining countries, like 
Israel, Czechoslovakia or Belgium, could 
probably produce a comparatively primitive 
nuclear weapon and use existingvehicles to deliver it. 
6. The amounts of plutonium disseminated 
throughout the world will increase 
mpidly ,with time. At present about 5,000 
Kg of plutonium are produced in reactors 
per year. This figure will increase 
to over 100,000 Kg by 1980. The minimum 
quantity of plutonium-239 needed 
for the production of a nuclear weapon 
may be assumed to be about 5 Kg. The 
future use of fast breeder reactors will 
be an added factor in increasing the 
amounts, and probably the spread, of 
plutonium. 
uranium separation 

At present, the production of weapons-
grade uranium-235 is confined to the 
nuclear-weapon powers. Uranium-235 is 
separated from natural uranium in a gas 
diffusion plant. The existing diffusion 
plants (the United States has three, the 
Soviet Union has two, and Great Britain,
France and Ohina have one each) were 
built to provide uranium, enriched to 
about 94 per cent uranium-235, for use 
in nuclear, and particularly in thermonuclear, 
wea.pons. Such diffusion plants 
are vast enterprises, costing at least £400 
million to construct and £100 miUion per 
year to operate, use an enormous amount 
of electric power and cover a large area. 
A much smaller plant would be sufficient 
to produce enriched uranium for those 
nuclear reactors which use this as fuel,
since a much smaHer degree of enrichment 
is required for this purpose. Euratom 
is at present considering building a 
diffusion plant to supply enriched uranium 
fuel for the countries of the EEC. 

Enriched uranium can also be produced 
by a gas centrifuge technique, although 


apparently only Ohina uses this method. 
Development work on gas centrifugeshas been done by the United States, 
Great Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, 
Australia and Japan. The technical 
problems which prevented the earlier 
production of gas centrifuges have 
now largely been solved ; it is eXJpectedthat they will eventually be used by some 
of the non-nuclear weapon states. This 
has very serious implications for the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and the 
Non~proliferation Treaty. A gas centrifuge 
plant would consume much less 
power than a gas diffusion plant and 
would be easier to conceal. 

motives for 
acquiring nuclear weapons 

The reason why a given state acquires 
nuclear weapons are complex and differ 
in each case. It appears, however, from 
the experience of the present nuclear 
we<lipon powers, that the main factors 
determining whether or not the nearnuclear-
weapon powers will take up their 
option on nuclear weapons will be status 
or security, or a mixture of both. It seems 
to be thought that somehow nuclear 
weapons enhance the status of a power 
even though this view cannot be supported 
from available evidence. Britain, 
for example, is generally reckoned to 
have lost status in the period since she 
acquired nuclear weapons. In international 
relations, however, perceptions 
are more important than facts. If the 
state in question is a signatory of the 
Non-proliferation Treaty then presumably 
the importance of status as a factor 
will decrease, if the treaty comes into 
force, since it will be apparent that anygain in status acquired by having nuclear 
weapons will probably be outweighed by 
the loss of prestige caused by violatinga treaty obligation. Status is likely to be 
a large factor in the calculations of 
Japan and West Germany. Japan may 
argue that, as the third greatest industrial 
state, she should have nuclear weapons 
to retain her influence in Asia, 
which she might feel is threatened byChina. West Germany may feel the need 
for nuclear weapons to give recognition 
of her position in Europe, particularly in 

view of the continuing importance which 
France and Great Britain place on their 
nuclear •power. This might also apply to 
Italy. India, however, is likely to be 
motivated by her perceptions of a threat 
from China. Sweden may argue that she 
needs nuclear weapons to protect her 
neutrality. Since the Non-proliferationTreaty can probably be used as a political 
means of inhibiting the near-nuclearweapon 
states from acquiring nuclear 
weapons for reasons of status, it is likelythat the implementation of the treatywould effectively inhibit all these sta-tes, 
except I~dia who, in any case, is unlikely 
to sign the treaty in its present form. 
This 9versimplified argument cannot, of 
course, be carried too far. If India, for 
example, acquired nuclear weapons then 
Japan might also do so in spite of anyobligations under the treaty. The main 
reason for Japan's action would still be 
status, but this factor might become so 
strong under these conditions that it ' 
tipped the balance. 

This still leaves a large number of other 
states who are acquiring a stock of fissile 
material on their territories. Some of 
these may take their obligations under a 
treaty less seriously and the future may 
prove that it is these states that are the 
main danger so far as proliferation is 
concerned. A new government, for example, 
may not regard itself bound by 
obligations undertaken by a previous 
regime, particularly after a revolution. 


3. existing control systems 
To guard against the possible diversion 
for military purposes of some of the 
massive quantities of plutonium which 
will soon become available throughoutthe world clearly requires some .form of 
control system. Any system of control, 
usually referred to as a safeguards system, 
which is botll practicable and efficient 
and which, in addition, will cause onlyacceptable inco11venience to commercial 
practices and normal operational procedures, 
is very difficult to devise and implement 
·mainly because of the greatcomplexity of the nuclear energy industry. 
The operations involved in this industry 
range from the initial location and 
mining of uranium ores to the construction 
and operation of nuclear power reactors 
; within this range are a largenumber of more or less separated, highly 
technjcal operations and it is only rarely 
that all of these are within the boundaries 
of a single country. 

The existing systems which attempt to 
provide international control of nuclear 
energy are : the bilateral safeguards systems 
of Canada, Great Britain, and the 
United States; the Western EuropeanUnion (w.Eu) ; the European Nuclear 
Energy Agency (ENEA) ; Euratom ; and tbe 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). The object of these is to secure 
international control, under internationa.l 
inspection, of weapons (typically nuclear) 
and warlike material (typically plutonium-
239 and uranium-235); the systems 
are based on the review of the design of 
nuclear facilities, visits by inspectors, the 
examination of operating records or control 
of the reprocessing of fuel' elements. 

Very few nuclear facilities have, in fact, 
been constructed in other countries bythe nuclear powers, without safeguards. 
The main exception is France, who has 
in the past been prepared to export reactors 
without any guarantee, for example, 
the Dimona reactor in Israel, 
although there is some evidence that this 
policy has changed. A small reactor was 
built in India by Canada without safeguards, 
but this experience has not been 
repeated. A second reactor, now beingbuilt by Canada, carries the provisionfor mutual inspection with a Canadian 

reactor in Ontario. The · United States 
exports reactors to members of the 
European Economic Community on the 
basis that Euratom is itself a suitable inspecting 
agency. The Soviet Union does 
not maintain formal safeguards ; the reT 
actors exported from the Soviet Union 
have mainly been small and it is arguedthat there is no need for special arrangements 
to ensure that the fissile material 
produced by them is not put to military 
use. The normal practice, however, seems 
to be that the fuel elements are returned 
to the Soviet Union for processing. Plutonium 
is, therefore, not stockpiled out, 
side the Soviet Union. 

Up to now safeguards have usually taken 
the form of bilateral agreements of inspection 
and guarantees between the 
country providing the nuclear facility,
for example Canada, Great Britain or the 
United States, and the receiving country. 
There is a growing tendency for exporting 
countries to rely on the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to provide safeguards. 
The United States, for example, 
has transferred to the agency safeguards 
and responsibilities assumed under bilateral 
agreements between the United 
States and 13 countries. 

the United States 
bilateral system 

The United States bilateral safeguards 
system anticipated the adoption of a 
more comprehensive international system 
and its development was, .therefore, a 
short term solution to the safeguardsproblem. The first agreement for co-operation 
in civil uses of atomic energy 
was signed with Turkey in 1955 in which 
the transfer of nuclear material was 
limited to that required to fuel a research 
reactor and was, in any case, not to exceed 
6 Kgs of uranium-235 contained in 
uranium enriched to a maximum of 20 
per cent. Since then agreements have 
been signed with near.ly 50 countries. 

Following the Atoms for Peace Pro-
gramme, initiated by President Eisenhower 
in his address to the United Nations 
in December 1953, the United 
States Congress enacted the Atomic 


JO 

Energy Act of 1954. Section 123 of this 
act states that any agreement for co-operation 
with foreign states by distributing 
nuclear material shall contain a guarantee 
by the foreign state that any material 
transferred under the agreement shall not 
be used for nuclear weapons or for research 
on or development of nuclear 
weapons or any other military purpose. 
The bilateral agreements of the United 
States with other governments for co-operation 
in civil uses of nuclear energy 
emphasise that any material, equipment 
or device made availa:ble to the government 
pursuant to the agreement will be 
used for civil purposes only. The bilateral 
sa~feguards provisions closely follow the 
provisions proposed by the IAEA and 
contemplate a future assignment of safeguards 
responsibiiities to the agency-"theparties will consult with each other to 
determine in what respects and to what 
extent they desire to arrange for the administration 
by the International Agency 
of those conditions, controls and safeguards 
required by the International 
Agency in connection with similar assistance 
. . . under the aegis of the International 
Agency". 

The United States has the right under 
the agreements to review the design of 
facilities supplied •by them and also the 
design of facilities using or processingnuclear or moderator materials so supplied. 
The receiving country must keep 
accountability and operating records and 
report periodically on these facilities. 
Maintenance of records and submission 
of reports are also required on nuclear 
material supplied by the United States 
and on material produced in facilities 
using such material or in facilities supplied 
by the United States. The United 
States has the right to conduct safeguards 
inspections on such material and facilities. 
Inspectors are to be accorded access 
to aM places and data, and permitted to 
make any independent measurements that 
are necessary to account for the material 
subject to safeguards. The receivingcountry undertakes to facilitate the applrication 
of safeguards and guaranteesthat the material and equipment will not 
be transferred outside its jurisdiction unless 
this is agreed by the United States. 

In the event of non-compliance with the 
above safegua11dsrequirements and guarantees 
the United States has the right to 
suspend or terminate the agreement for 
co-operation and to require the return of 
the nuclear material and equipment. The 
United States Atomic Energy Commission 
maintains a division of international 
affairs to administer the safeguards contained 
in the bilateral agreements. So far 
about 800 inspections have been made. 

In the bilateral agreement between the 
United States and Euratom the community 
guarantees that no material, equipment 
or device supplied by the United 
States pursuant to the agreement will be 
transferred from the community's control 
except by agreement with the United 
States. The community has agreed to 
make its safeguard's system compatible, 
within reason, with that of the IAEA. The 
United States does not inspect the uses 
made of materials or equipment supplied 
to Great Britain or Canada. 

The first trilateral agreement, providing 
for the transfer to the IAEA of safeguardsresponsibility for nuclear materials and 
equipment supplied bilaterally, was 
signed in September 1963 by the United 
States, Japan and the IAEA . Under this 
agreement the agency took over responsibility 
for nuclear material and faci.Jities 
supplied by the United States, including 
eight reactors, their enriched uranium 
fuel and other special nuclear material 
being used in various research and development 
facilities. Fissi.le material produced 
in these facilities is also safeguarded. 
This trilateral agreement has 
been followed by similar agreements with 
several other countries. The bi•lateral 
systems of Canada and the United Kingdom 
are essentiaJ:ly similar to the us 
system. 

Western European Union 

This regional settlement is largely military 
in character and came into beingafter the failure of the more far reaching 
European Defence Community. The 
agreements which set up the WEU were 
signed in 1954 by Belgium, France, Italy, 


Luxemburg, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and West Germany. The WEU 
was designed to absorb a re-armed West 
Germany into Europe with a greater degree 
of control over the level of West 
German forces and arms than could be 
achieved by NATO . Under the agreements 
West Germany renounced, until at least 
1998, the production on its territory of 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 
West Germany also agreed not to produce 
missiles, sea mines, warships of over 
3,000 tons, submarines of over 350 tons, 
warships with non-conventional powerand bombers. There were, however, conditions 
stated by which these restrictions 
could be varied. 

France, Italy and the Benelux countries 
agreed that when production of nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons had begun 
on their territories the levels of 
stocks they would hold was to be decided 
by the WEU Council by a majority vote. 
The six continental countries, that is the 
seven minus the United Kingdom, further 
agreed to report to an Armaments 
Control Agency, established by the 1954 
treaty, on the major armaments held by 
their forces and also agreed that the 
quantities of these armaments should be 
approved by the WEU Council. The 
agency was to verify, by inspection, that 
these restrictions were being observed. 

No method of enforcing the restrictions 
has been worked out. The council's powers 
when the "effective production" of 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
has actually started are vaguely defined 
and, in the case of the French nuclear 
programme, have not been exercised. 

The council claims that it "has not received 
any notification" from France that 
effective production of weapons has 
started. The treaty deems weapons-grade 
plutonium to be a nuclear weapon in 
itself. Prance began the production of 
this material in 1956 when her reactor 
at Marcoule started operation. Since then 
two more reactors have begun producing 
weapons-grade plutonium, probably giving 
a total production of about 100 Kg 
per year since 1959. Nuclear testing and 
the development and deployment of de


livery systems continues. The agencywould, in any case, not be able to effect 
anything in the way of control since it 
has been refused permission to recruit 
experts in nuclear weapons or to carry 
out inspections in the nuclear weapons 
field. 

The Armaments Control Agency has 
been instructed to accept the levels actually 
reported ·by the relevant governments 
as the appropriate level's. Its present activity 
is, therefore, mainly to check and 
confirm that the levels reported are accurate. 
The agency has an international 
staff of about 50 persons and an annual 
budget of about £170,000. The agencyworks by cross checking budgetary and 
other data provided by member governments 
and by the physical inspection of 
military installations, depots, shipyards, 
etc. The inspection covers levels of production 
and stocks of war material. In 
the case of West Germany it is also supposed 
to confirm that no wea,pons prohibited 
by the treaty are being produced. 

The physical inspections are limited in 
scope and are of doubtful value. The 
treaty requires that the ·inspections should 
not be routine but "in the nature of tests 
carried out at irregular intervals". Also 
it is required that the inspectors should 
be "accorded free access on demand to 
plants and depots". Neither provision has 
been met. France has not taken any steps 
to ratify the convention (signed in 1957) 
which contains the necessary regulations 
and, until this convention comes into 
force, the agency is not authorised to 
carry out inspections in the way laid 
down in the trea,ty. All it can do is to 
carry out so called "control exercises". 
It asks the permission of governmentsand private firms to visit installations, 
giving at .Jeast one week's notice. Such 
inspections are clearly not in accordance 
with the spirit of the treaty. 

The agency has, however, carried out a 
series of experimental visits to a few 
laboratories and factories 'in West Germany 
which might be able to producebiological and chemical weapons and reported 
that no such weapons were being 
produced. Lack of qualified staff and 


authority prohibit it from doing the same 
thing in the nuclear weapons field. The 
"contror exercises" are completely inadequate. 
The agency has the facilities and 
the power to inspect only a tiny proportion 
of all armaments subject to inspection 
and only a small number of installations 
capable of producing prohibited 
weapons could be visited to confirm that 
they were not producing these weapons. 
The agency is clearly hamstrung by the 
governments which formed it. Once the 
political obstacles to West German rearmament 
were removed the states of 
the WEU showed little interest in applying 
the arms control provision of the 
1954 treaty to themselves. 

As the authority which ensures that the 
treaties by which West Germany renounces 
the production of nuclear weapons 
and certain other armaments are 
obeyed, the WEU can claim to be successful, 
but this is about the only success 
that it can claim. West Germany is 
not prohibited by the treaties from manufacturing 
nuclear weapons abroad or obtaining 
these weapons from other countries. 
These gaps would, to a large extent, 
be filled by the Non-proliferation 
Treaty. 

The experience of the Armaments Control 
Agency has been of a largely negative 
character and limited to the cross 
checking of budgetary and other statistical 
data ; in this latter field, however, 
valuable experience has been gained. 
Little, however, has been learnt about the 
techniques of physical inspection and 
control. 

the European 
Nuclear Energy Agency 

This agency of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
set up a control system before the 
IAEA came into operation. The object of 
thi& safeguards system is to ensure that 
"the operation of joint undertakingsestablished by two or more governments 
or by nationals of two or more countries 
on the initiative or with the assistance of 
the agency, and materials, equipmentand services made available by the 

agency, or under its supervtston, by virtue 
of agreements concluded with the 
government concerned shall not further 
any military purpose". The members of 
ENEA are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Italy, Ireland, Luxemborg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom. The controls are based essentiaUy 
on the same concepts as those of 
the IAEA and !Euratom safeguards systems. 

A noteworthy difference is that an independent 
judicial tribunwl, known as the 
European Nuclear Energy Tribunal, consisting 
of seven independent judges, has 
been set up which is competent to consider 
appeals against decisions concerning 
·the application of the safeguards regulations 
and decisions prescribing the 
sanctions which the agency may impose. 
The president of the tribunal can grant 
a warrant for the execution of inspectionmeasures which are resisted by an installation. 
Sanctions may include the suspension 
or termination of the delivery of 
materials, equipment or services supplied 
by the agency or under its supervision. It 
may even be required that such materials 
and equipment are returned. The tribunal 
may, however, also order the agency to 
make reparations for any unreasonable 
damage caused by the agency or by its 
staff in the 'performance of their duties, 
including inspections. The ENEA system 
has provided valuable experience and 
knowledge concerning the practical aspects 
of the application of a safeguards 
system but may become redundant as a 
result of its middle position between 
the Euratom and the IAEA systems. 

Euratom 

Thetreaty establishing Euratom-came 
into force on 1 January 1958. It was 
et up by the six countries of the EEC 
(Benelux, France, Italy and West Germany) 
to build a Community nuclear 
energy industry for peaceful purposes. 
Euratom shares the European Parliament 
and the Court of Justice with the Common 
Market and the European Coal and 
Steel Community. It has its own Council 


:n :n 
of Ministers, each member representingone member state, and a five man commission 
which is independent of the 
member states. Euratom co-ordinates research 
within the EEC and promotes research 
in its own centres. It contracts 
specific tasks to national centres or firms 
and has joined international projects such 
as the European Nuclear Energy Agency 
project at Winfrith in the United Kingdom 
(the ..Dragon project). To developthis nuolear energy industry Euratom 
has: 

(a) formed a common· market for all 
nuclear materials and equ~pment ; 
(b) established a low or suspended external 
tariff towards non~member countries; 
(c) established a plan for free movement, 
within the EEC, for atomic workers ; 
(d) introduced an insurance convention 
for large scale atomic risks ; 
(e) established joint enterprises of importance 
to the community, which enjoyspecial privileges. 
Euratom has nuclear co-operation agreements 
with Canada, the United States 
and the United Kingdom. About 25 
other countries have missions or delegations 
accredited to Euratom. The Euratom 
safeguards system is based uponagreements with third countries each of 
which stipulates that materials supplied 
to Euratom should ,be used for nonmilitary 
purposes. AU enterprises have 
to report on their equipment and have to 
make regular declarations to the commission 
of stocks, transfers and transactions 
of nuclear material. 

Euratom inspectors visit installations and 
undertake physical and accountancychecks on materials held. Enterpriseswhich fail to carry out their obligations 
are liable to various types of penalty including, 
in the last resort, the denial of 
access to fissile material. Euratom's control 
system was the first to have legal 
force over a number of nations. The inspection 
system is similar to that of IAEA 

except that Euratom maintains a relatively 
larger number of inspectors. Euratom 
will negotiate, on behalf of the 
Euratom countries, agreements with the 
IAEA for the verification of their obligations 
under the Non-proliferation Treaty. 
The future of Euratom is, however, not 
at present clear. This is mainly due to a 
lack of common policy for nuclear development 
and of overall co-ordination. 
There is a danger that Euratom may be 
reduced simply to adding its programme 
to those of the member countries rather 
than co-ordinating policy for the growth 
of a strong nuclear industry within the 
EEC. 

the International 
Atomic Energy Agency 

The IAEA came legally into existence in 
1957; it now has 102 members. The total 
number of safeguards agreements is at 
present 40, involving 30 countries. However, 
the reactors covered by these agreements 
represent less than 8 per cent of 
the capacity of existing civi.J reactors. Recently, 
Mexico became the first state to 
place its entire nuclear programme under 
the agency's safeguards to ensure that the 
work is for peaceful purposes only. The 
statute of the IAEA authorises the agency 
to apply safeguards : when it grantsassistance to a state at the latter's request 
; when the parties to a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement on co-operation 
in nuclear matters request the agency to 
a;pply safeguards to installations and materials 
covered by this agreement ; and 
when a state requests the agency to apply 
safeguards to any or all of its activities 
in the field of nuclear energy. The statute 
requires the agency to "ensure, so far 
as it is able, that assistance provided by 
it, or at its request, or under its supervision 
or control, is not used in such a 
way as to further any military purpose". 
The agency is also required to "conduct 
its activities in accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations 
to promote peace and international 
good will . . . " 

The statute Jays down the way in 
which verification shall be carried out. 
The agency is given the right : 


(a) to examine the design of facilities 
and to approve them only i.f the agencyis sure they will not serve any military 
purpose and will permit the effective application 
of safeguards ; 
(b) to require the maintenance and production 
of operating records to ensure 
the accounting for special fissile materials; 
(c) to ask for reports periodically on the 
operation of the reactor designed to ensure 
that the agency will know what 
nuclear fuel has been received and what 
plutonium has been produced ; 
(d) to approve the means of processingirradiated fuel ; 
(e) to send into the territory of states inspectors 
designated by the agency after 
consultation with the state concerned ; 
these inspectors have rights of access to 
persons, places and data which are relevant 
to the use of nuclear materials, 
equipment or facilities; 
(f) to require the observance of anyhealth and safety measures prescribedby the agency. 
Unless a state submits all its nuclear 
activities to safeguards, the applicationof the system remains limited to specific 
nuclear installations and materials. The 
IAEA safeguards system must operate in 
such a way that the applications of safeguards 
does not hamper the economic 
or technological development of a state. 
Commercial and industrial secrets which 
the agency staff may meet while implementing 
safeguards must be protected. 
The statute details sanctions which can 
be applied in the event of a state not 
comply>ing with its safeguards obligations. 
The non-compliance will be reported to 
the agency's board of governors ; the 
board will call on the state to remedythe non-compliance; if the state persists 
in its non-compliance the board may curtail 
or suspend the agency's assistance 
and call for the return of material and 
equipment made available and/or suspend 
the membership rights and privileges 
of the state; the board of govern


ors must report to the Security Council 
and all members of the United Nations 
and the agency. The statute itself is, 
however, not enough to operate the safeguards 
system. The board of governorshas, therefore, drawn up the necessaryoperating procedures. When the agency 
was asked for the first time, by Japan in 
1958, to supply assistance, in the form 
of the provision of a quantity of nuclear 
fuel to which safeguards would have to 
be applied, a set of interim procedures 
was used. 

In 1961 the board adopted a system for 
reactors of up to lOO MW thermal (about 
30 MW) power. This was, in effect, confined 
to small research reactors. In 1964 
the system was extended to power reactors, 
which are the important producers 
of plutonium. The board also decided 
to review the 1961 safegua·rds document. 
As a result, a new document was produced, 
and accepted in 1965, which constitutes 
the basis of the present safeguards 
operation. The new system applies primarily 
to special fissile material which 
means: plutonium-239 ; uranium-233 ; 
uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 and 
233; any material containing one or 
more of the foregoing ; and such other 
fissile material as the board of governors 
shall from time to time determine. 

Not included is uranium depleted in the 
isotope 235, or thorium. In 1966, the 
agency's safeguards were further extended 
to cover facilities for the reprocessing 
of reactor fuel after use. Provisions 
for safeguarding nuclear materials 
in conversion plants and fabrication 
plants were approved by the board in 
1968. The present safeguards system now 
includes the entire nuclear fuel cycle except 
uranium enrichment plants. An important 
point on the safeguards document 
is the provision for review from time to 
time in the light of technological developments 
and ex,perience. 

The maximum frequency of routine inspections 
of a reactor, and of the safeguarded 
nuclear material in it, shall be 
determined from whichever is the largest 
of the following quantities : the facility 
inventory, the annual throughput, or the 


maximum potential annual productionof fissile material. In the case of small 
quantities, for instance up to one Kg of 
.plutonium, no inspection takes place. In 
the case of 55-60 Kg of plutonium, 12 
inspections may take place annually. If 
even larger quantities are involved inspectors 
have the right of access to the 
installations at all times. The frequencyof inspections for reprocessing plantsand the saf~guarded nuclear material in 
them depends on the annual throughput. 
If this is less than five Kg of plutoniumthe plant may be inspected twice a year, 
other·wise it can be inspected at all times. 
Moreover should the throughput exceed 
60 Kg, continuous inspection is envisaged. 


Inspection activities are required to be 
the minimum consistent with the effective 
application of safeguards. During an inspection 
the inspector may audit the records 
and accounts ; verify the nuclear 
material under safeguards, either by physica•
l inspection, measurements or sampling 
; examine any facility under safeguards, 
including checks of measuringinstruments and operating characteristics; 
and check operations generally. Inspectors 
may not operate any facility or 
direct the staff in any facility. One week's 
notice of any inspection must be given. 
Before an inspector is sent for duty in 
any state, the government of the state is 
consulted. If it accepts the nomination 
the government shall co-operate as much 
as .possible in a,Uowing the inspector to 
function on its territory. The inspectionapparatus consists of the Inspector General, 
the Director of the Division of 
Safeguards and Inspection, and the ten 
officers of the agency whom the Director 
General has been authorised by the 
board of governors to use as inspectors. 
In addition, 16 other agency staff members 
are available to assist in inspections 
when particularly specialised knowledge 
is required. The fundamental basis of the 
agency's safeguards system depends upon 
an agreement between the agency and 
the state concerned. The agency's main 
business in the field of safeguards has so 
far arisen from requests by the parties 
to bilateral agreements to apply safeguards 
to the arrangement and from the 

unilateral requests by the UK. and USA 
to apply them to a number of reactors. 

The Tiatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America and the Non-proliferationTreaty each provides for the verification 
of obligations by a state party to the 
treaty. Both these treaties do two things. 
Firstly, they impose on certain signatory 
states (in the case of the Non-iproliferation 
Treaty, the non-nuclear-weaponstates) an obligation not to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. 
Secondly, they require each non-nuclearweapon 
signatory state to negotiate an 
agreement with the IAEA for the verification 
of its obligation ; this means the 
application of IAEA safeguards to the entire 
peaceful nuclear programme of the 
state. 

Responsibilities under these particular

treaties have placed the IAEA in a position 

of pre-eminence with respect to the other 

safeguards systems. The IAEA has already 

negotiated many safeguards agreements, 

one of which involves all the nuclear 

activities of a state. The groundwork for 
the agreements to be negotiated under 
the Non-pwliferation Treaty has, therefore, 
already been laid. Although it is 
likely that these agreements will all be 
similar, some will ·be more complex than 
others since they will have to cover materials, 
equipment and facilities produced 
by the country concerned and also those 
imported from one or possibly several 
other countries. It is inevitable that negotiations 
for the more difficult cases will 
take a .long time, a factor recognised by 
the treaty which allows for a negotiation 
period of up to two years. In particular,
countries in western Europe are concerned 
about the future of Euratom and 
the development of peaceful nuclear activities 
within the Common Market. 


4. the non-proliferation treaty 
If the Non-proliferation Treaty comes 
into operation it will be by far the most 
significant international arms control 
agreement reached since the second wor.ld 
war. The negotiations which led up to 
the treaty illustrate the difficulties of obtaining 
such agreements in the modern 
world, the complexities of the issues involved 
and the long time taken to negotiate 
an agreed draft. Serious international 
discussions may be said .to have started in 
1961 with the "Irish resolution" to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations 
which, in fact, formed the basis of the 
final treaty. The resolution called for an 
agreement by which "nuclear states 
would undertake to refrain from relinquishing 
control of nuclear weapons and 
from transmitting the information necessary 
for their manufacture to states not 
possessing such weapons, and states not 
possessing such weapons would undertake 
not to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire control of such weapons". It is 
important to stress that both the original 
resolution and the treaty itself aim at 
the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons 
rather than the non-proliferation of these 
weapons. 

Very shortly after the adoption of the 
Irish resolution, agreement was reached 
on the organisation of a disarmament 
committee to consist of 18 members,
namely, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, Great 
Britain, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Poland, Roumania, the Soviet Union,
Sweden, the United Arab Republic and 
the United States. This committee was 
an enlarged version of the Ten Nation 
Disarmament Committee, consisting of 
five western and five communist countries, 
set up early in 1960. This committee 
itself grew out of the sub-committee 
(Canada, France, Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union and the United States) set 
up in 1954 by the United Nations Disarmament 
Commission, which was 
formed by a resolution of the General 
Assembly in January 1952. 

The first session of the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) 
opened in Geneva in March 1961 , but 
France was not represented there, 

and, in fact, has continued to remain 
absent from the committee. A remarkable 
fact which has emerged from the 
debate, both inside and outside the ENDC, 
over the years has been the almost unanimous 
agreement concerning the necessity 
to prevent the emergence of a sixth 
nuclear weapon state. Even the states 
which are closest to being able to produce 
nuclear wea,pons have supported a 
non...proliferation agreement. Althoughmany arguments have taken place about 
the form and details of a treaty, the 
principle of non-proliferation seems to 
have been almost universally accepted. 
There has been virtually no serious suggestion 
that a given state should actually 
acquire a national nuclear force. This 
climate of opinion was reflected in a 
series of United Nations resolutions calling 
on all states to negotiate a non-proliferation 
treaty and .to refrain from 
producing nuclear weapons in the meantime. 


nuclear defence 
within alliance systems 

Discussions in the ENDC between-March 
1961 and the signing of the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty on 5 August 1963 were primarily 
concerned with this treaty. Nonproliferation 
was frequently mentioned 
in the ENDC during 1964 but Soviet objections 
to proposals in NATO at that time 
for a multilateral nuclear force, including 
West German participation, made 
any agreement on a treaty impossible. 
During the eighth session of the ENDC, 
between July and September 1965, however, 
an earnest debate on non-proliferation 
began in accordance with the recommendation 
of the United Nations 
Disarmament Commission, comprising all 
United Nations members, which had met 
earlier in 1965 in New York. As a result, 
the Soviet Union and the United States 
submitted separate draft treaties to the 
United Nations and the ENDC respectively. 
These drafts were not too dissimilar 
except that the Soviet draft included 
the provision that "parties to the 
treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake 
not to transfer such weapons in any 
form , directly or indirectly through third 
states or groups of states, to ownership 


or control of states or groups of states 
not possessing nuclear weapons, and not 
to accord to such states or groups of 
states the right to participate in the ownership, 
control or use of nuclear weapons", 
and that the American draft included 
an undertaking "to co-operate on 
facilitating the application of International 
Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent 
international safeguards on all 
peacefu~ nuclear activities ..." and specifically 
mentioned the agency as a possible 
means of inspection. 

The debates which followed mainly concerned 
questions of nuclear defence 
within alliances. Since the American 
draft did not preclude the setting up of 
a multilateral nuclear force within NATO 
it was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet position was that any access 
to nuclear weapons by, for example,
states in a multilateral force, would constitute 
proliferation and, in particular, the 
policies of the West German government 
were strongly attacked. At this time 
the West Germans thought they saw in 
a non-proliferation treaty the possibility 
of a bargain with the Soviet Union concerning 
reunification. They were also interested 
in the possibility of co-operatingin a European nuclear force. The western 
position was that while NATO should be 
entitled to make plans for its collective 
defence, this did not mean that any nonnuclear 
wel!!pon state should acquire the 
right or ability to use nuclear weapons 
by its own decision. This view did not 
rule out the possibility that some future 
new federation of states would acquire 
the nuclear status of one or more of the 
original states. It was argued that this 
would not amount to proliferation since 
it would involve no transfer of nuclear 
weapons. At the end of 1966 the Soviet 
Union and the United States had a series 
of private meetings which resulted in a 
wide measure of agreement on the important 
articles for a non-proliferation 
treaty. Further discussion took placemeantime within the eastern and western 
alliances. In the western alliance there 
were discussions on the arrangementsconcerning nuclear decision making and 
participation in a possible future European 
nuclear force after the signing of a 

non~proliferation treaty, but there was 
an l!!pparent cooling off of American support 
for the multilateral nuclear force. 
It was mainly this that enabled some 
agreement to be reached on the details 
of a treaty by the Soviet Union and the 
United States. 

civil uses of nuclear energy 
and security guarantees 

When the disarmament committee reconvened 
in earJy 1967 the discussion centred 
on the principles and methods of 
international contwl and inspection of 
peaceful nuclear activities to be incorporated 
in the treaty. At this time new 
difficulties arose, largely outside the committee, 
within European and Asian 
countries and Euratom, from fears that 
the distinction between the present nuclear 
wel!!pon states and the others might 
lead to discrimination in civil nuclear 
energy development. Concern was also 
expressed by certain non-nuclear weapon 
countries regarding the absence of guarantees 
against nuclear blackmail. 

No agreed Soviet-American draft had 
been published at that time, but a press 
leak in January 1967 had indicated that 
the respective texts of Article 3 of the 
separate American and Soviet draft 
treaties had been consolidated in such 
a way that all the peaceful nuclear activities 
of the non-nuclear weapon states 
were brought under the exclusive inspection 
of the IAEA, while leaving the nuclear 
weapon states entirely free from inspection. 
Furthermore, it was suggestedthat the intended Article 3 included an 
obligation on aJ.l the signatories to the 
treaty not to provide any non-nuclear 
weapon state with fissile material or with 
specialised equipment for peaceful nuclear 
purposes unless subject to IAEA safeguards. 


It was during this period that the commercial 
and economic consequences of 
the tremendous expansion planned by 
the nuclear energy authorities of the industrialised 
countries, and the opportunities 
for exporting nuclear facilities to the 
developing countries, were fully realised. 
Together with the development of fast 


breeder reactors by certain countries and 
the rapid growth of domestic nuclear 
energy industries, these considerations 
naturally led to serious objections in 
some countries to any suggestion that 
they should accept a position of nuclear 
inferiority. For example, in a statement 
to the Bundestag on the proposed nonproliferation 
treaty, the West German 
Foreign Minister, WiHi Brandt, stated in 
April 1967 that the Federal Government 
considered it fundamental to support the 
conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, 
but he also enumerated certain standards 
by which his government would evaluate 
a universal non-proliferation treaty. He 
stated that there were essentially four 
types of problem involved: the unhindered 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes ; a clear commitment to generaldisarmament; a guaranteee of the security 
of all states ; and no adverse effects 
on regional efforts towards unification . 
Brandt also dealt with the question of 
co-operation between Euratom and the 
TAEA in the area of controls and stated 
that he considered such co-operation desirable, 
necessary and possible. He quotedArticle 28 of the agency's safeguards 
system of 1965 which makes express provision 
for the acceptance of other control 
systems. He assumed that the TAEA 
would take over the supervision of the 
provisions of the Non1proliferationTreaty 
concerning the use of fissile material, but 
made no mention of equipment and 
other facilities. So far as the effect of 
the proposed treaty on the western defence 
alliance was concerned, he regarded 
West German membership of the Nuclear 
Planning Group of NATO as ensuring 
her continuing influence on the nuclear 
planning of the alliance and mentioned 
assurances he had received that a nonproliferation 
treaty would not affect the 
Atlantic Alliance in the nuclear area. He 

did, however, stress that the difficulty of 
this subject lies in keeping open future 
defence possibilities in the "Atlantic as 
well as in the European framework". 

An issue causing considerlllble comment 
in some of the Common Market countries 
was the effect of a non~proliferation 
treaty on the supply of fuel and fissile 
material for peaceful purposes. An un


interrupted supply of nuclear fuel, particularly 
enriched uranium, is of vital 
importance to West Germany, Italy, Belgium 
and the Netherlands for their 
power reactors. This fuel must, at present, 
be obtained from the nuclear weapon 
states; in effect, so far as the Common 
Market countries are concerned, 
this means the United States. The supplyof American material comes exclusivelythrough Euratom, but fears were expressed 
in 1967 that complications might 
arise after a non-proliferation treaty. In 
dealing with this question Herr Brandt 
explained that, in accordance with written 
assurances, the agreement between 
Euratom and the United States would 
not be affected by a non-proliferation 
treaty. These assurances convinced the 
West German government that its supplies 
of nuclear fuel and material were 
assured. 

In a statement to the ENDC in August.
1967, Amintore Fanfani, Italian Foreign 
Minister, stated that an ideal non-proliferation 
treaty should meet at least the 
fol,lowing conditions: it should safeguard 
the security of countries which renounce 
nuclear weapons ; it should recognise the 
legitimate aspirations of all countries to 
benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy and the resulting technical and 
industrial progress ; it should not thwart 
efforts to unify and consolidate existing 
European institutions; it should not hinder 
the as yet unknown possibilities of 
progress in science, technology and the 
economy of states through too rigidformulae of unlimited duration; and 
lastly, it should direct the nuclear weapon 
states towards practical and concrete 
measures of nuclear disarmament. General 
Eedson Bums, the Canadian representative 
to the ENDC explained, in August 
1967 that his government had always 
accepted that a non-proldferation treaty 
in its essence must be to some extent discriminatory, 
but that it was the onlyalternative to allowing the continued 
spread of nuolear weapons. He urged,
however, that discrimination between the 
nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclearweapon 
states should be minimised and 
pointed out that it would help to achieve 
this if the nuclear-weapon powers sub



mitted all their· peaceful nuclear activities 
to IAEA control. 

In March 1967 Mahomedali Chagula,
the Indian Externa~! Affairs Minister, in a 
statement to ParliaJment stressed that a 
sat!isfactory agreement on non-proliferation 
would have to take into account the 
peculiar circumstances in which certain 
countries are placed. He pointed out that 
lnd'ia had a special probllem of securityagainst nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail 
and that this aspect would be taken 
into fuH account before India's final attitude 
to a non-proliferation treaty was 
determined. First, he expJ:a.ined, India 
was a non-al,igned country and, as such, 
was not a member of a military ailliance 
or under the protection of any kind of 
nuclear umbrella; secondly, she was far 
advanced in nuclear technology; and finaHy, 
she faced the continuing threat of 
China, a nuclear power. For these reasons 
India would require a "credible 
guarantee" for her security before signing 
a non-proliferation treaty. 

use of civil nuclear explosives 

There was also much discussion during 
the first eight months of 1967 of tlhe potential 
use of nuclear explosives for civil 
purposes. For example, in March 1967, 
in an address to the Diet, Takeo Miki, 
the Japanese Foreign Minister, stated 
that when it becomes possible in the 
future for nuclear explosions to be utilised 
for peaceful purposes, the opportunities 
for such utilisation wHl have to be 
secured for non-nuclear-weapon countries. 
A more forceful position was taken 
by S. Correa da Costa, the Brazilian 
representative to the ENDC, who stated,
in May 1967 that Brazil had no intention 
of acquiring nuclear weapons, but would 
not wa;ive the right to conduct research 
without restriction and eventua.Jiy to 
"manufacture or 'receive nuclear explosives 
that wil:l enable us to perform greatengineering works, such as the connection 
of hydrographic basins, the digging 
of canals or ports-in a word, the reshaping 
of geography, if necessary, to 
ensure the economic development and 
the welfare 6f the Brazilian people". It 

was stressed that Brazil would not accept 
any measure which would impose upon 
her the "permanent status of technological 
under development". Jorge Casteiieda, 
the Mexican representative, pointed 
out that the Treaty of Tlateloleo permitted 
explosions for peaceful purposes 
which do not constitute an explosion of 
a nuclear wea;pon, as defined in the 
treaty. Vishnu C. Trivedi, the Indian representative, 
supported these statements. 
Alva Myrdal, the Swedish representative, 
in a statement to the ENDC in June 1967, 
pointed out that any nuclear expl'osive 
device might be used as a nuclear weapon 
since the structure of both is very 
similar and therefore that it was necessary 
to prohibit the manufacture of such 
devices in a non-proliferation treaty.
This was ·also the view of the Soviet, 
American and British representatives. 

the joint Soviet-
American draft treaty 

After the discussion of these various 
issues the eo-chairmen of the ENDC, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, were 
able to submit, in August 1967, identical 
drafts of a non-proliferation treaty to 
the ENDC. This draft, however, left the 
safeguards clause (Article 3) blank because 
of the failure to resolve the difficulties 
expressed by certain western 
European countries, particularly West 
Germany and Italy, a;bout the effect of 
IAEA control on the future of Euratom 
and the nuclear industries in the Common 
Market countries. 

In support of the draft treaty A. A. 
Roshchin, the Soviet representative, said 
that his country regarded the prevention 
of the further spread of nuclear weapons 
as one of the key issues of European and 
international security. He emphasisedthat the draft treaty confirmed the inalienable 
right of aM signatories "to develop 
research and the production and 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without any discrimination" and 
that the potential benefits from anypeaceful application of nuclear e~plosives 
should be available through appropriate 
international procedures to all 
non-nuclear weapon signatories on a non



discriminatory basis. The text of the 
draft treaty laid down that the charge 
for nuclear explosive devices intended 
for peaceful purposes should be as low 
as possible and exclude any charge for 
research and development. William Foster, 
the United States representative, 
affirmed the willingness of the United 
States to make available nuclear explosive 
for ,peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory 
basis to signatory states. 

Commenting on the draft text Paul Martin, 
the Canadian External Affairs Secretary, 
expressed the hope that the nuclear 
weapon powers would compensate 
the non-nuclear weapon signatories for 
their renunciation of nuclear weapons by 
offering them reasonable security assurances. 
The Brazilian representative, commenting 
again on the issue of the peaceful 
uses of nuclear e~plosives, stated that 
in Brazil's view the countries that are 
willing to renounce nuclear weaponsshould not be forced into another renunciation 
and that "no convincing argument 
of a purely technical nature can 
be raised in favour of the imposition of 
restriction on the applications by national 
means, under effective international 
control, of nuclear energy in the form of 
explosive devices intended for peaceful 
pur;poses, such as engineering works,
mining activities and other civil uses. 
Whatever the cost of such ventures, the 
foreclosing of any country's possibility 
to accelerate its economic development 
in such an important field of knowledgeand thus to achieve a technologicalbreakthrough that might be of vital significance 
for its industrial developmentwould be so damaging to its future in 
the community of nations that no governments 
would feel entitled to imposesuch limitations on future generations'. 
He stated that he could see no reason 
why Brazil should adhere to a treatythat imposes greater restrictions than the 
Treaty of Tiatelolco, especially since 
Brazil regarded these additional restrictions 
as unjust and unnecessary. 

An Indian spokesman stated that the absence 
of provisions for the security of 
non-nuclear weapon countries and the 
failure to ensure progress towards nuc


!ear disarmament or the participation of 
France or China made the treaty unacceptable 
in its present form. Most other 
members of the committee, however, expressed 
a positive attitude to the draft 
treaty and the main obligations contained 
in it, although there was much comment 
on the fact that the treaty effectively 
froze the non-nuclear weapon states in 
a position of inferiority and did nothing 
to restrain the present nuclear weapon 
states or, in other words, the treatylacked balance. However, it was also 
argued that the nuclear weapon states 
could not consider arms limitations unless 
the non-nuclear weapon powers committed 
themselves to continue their present 
status and that the treaty, if successful, 
would benefit all powers in the 
long run. Various modifications and 
amendments were suggested during the 
discussions, and negotiations continued 
between the eo-chairmen for an acceptable 
text of Article 3. Agreement was not 
reached before the ENDC completed its 
session on 14 December 1967. However, 
when the ENDC resumed on 18 January1968 agreement had been reached by the 
eo-chairmen on a draft text for Article 3 
and a complete draft treaty was submitted. 
In effect, the control article 
stipulated that each non-nuclear weapon 
state party to the treaty should accept 
safeguards as set forth in an agreementwith the agency concerning all their 
peaceful nuclear activities. Furthermore, 
transfers of fissile material and nuclear 
equipment to non-nuclear weapon states 
coul'd not take place unless material and 
equipment were put under agency safeguards. 
A slightly modified form of the 
treaty was submitted, with the ENDc's 
report, to the United Nations General 
Assembly on 11 March 1968. The draft 
treaty was further discussed in the first 
committee and final small changes made. 

On 12 June 1968 the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution commending the 
Non-proliferation Treaty and requesting 
the depository governments to open the 
treaty for signature and ratification. In 
the vote on this resolution 95 states voted 
in favour and four against, with 21 abstentions. 
The countries voting against 
were Albania, Cuba, Tanzania and 


;t 
e. 
;t 
e. 
Zambia. The following abstained: Algeria, 
Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), 
France, Gabon, Guinea, India, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Portugal, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra 
Leone, Spain and Uganda. Cambodia 
and Gambia were absent from the vote. 
The treaty will go into effect when it has 
been ratified by the depository governments 
(the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) and 40 
other states. So far only The United 
States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Nigeria, 
Canada, Mexico, Denmark, Cameroon,
Finland, Norway, Mauritius and Ecuador 
have ratified the t·reaty. 

Thus the actual negotiations that led upto the adoption of the treaty lasted for 
five years. In the first three years, agreement 
on a treaty was frustrated largely 
due to the issue of the multilateral nuclear 
force. During 1%7 the industrialised 
countries realised the economic importance 
of the ra.pid expansion of nuclear 
energy programmes and the control arrangements 
of the treaty became the 
central issue. Additional complications 
arose from demands for security guarantees, 
the use of nuclear explosives for 
peaceful purposes, and positive measures 
of disarmament by the nuclear weapon 
powers. Of <these issues, the ones of the 
most political importance were the effect 
of the treaty on civil nuclear energy pro-
grammes and the question of security 
guarantees. 

On 2 December 1967 President Johnson 
announced that the United States was 
prepared to submit all American peaceful 
nuclear installations to the same procedures 
of inspection and control as 
would be imposed on the non-nuclear 
weapon states under the Non-proliferation 
Treaty. Two days later, a similar 
offer was announced in the House of 
Commons on behalf of the British Government. 
The Soviet Union has, so far, 
made no such offer, but argues that this 
gesture is unnecessary since all of its 
peaceful nuclear installations are "open"
establishments and visited by many persons 
from other countries, and undesira<
ble since the object of safeguards is the 

prevention of the use of fissile material, 
produced by peaceful nuclear installation, 
for military purposes, and this has 
no relevance in the case of a nuclear 
weapon state. 

the non-proliferation 
treaty 

Under Artiole 1 of the treaty nuclear 
weapon states are prohibited from transferring 
nuclear weapons or control over 
them, to any recipient, and from assisting 
non-nuclear wea.pon states in the 
manufacture or acquisition of such weapons. 
Article 2 obligates non-nuclear 
weapon states to undertake not to receive 
nucleaT weapons, or control over 
them, from any country, and not to 
manufacture or acquire such weapons or 
to seek assistance in their manufacture. 
The prohibitions on both nuclear weapon 
and non-nuclear wea.pon states apply 
to all nuclear explosive devices. The most 
critical cl'ause of the Non-proliferationTreaty is the control clause, Article 3. In 
fact, the future viability of the treaty 
largely depends upon the acceptabilityof the safeguard system and its successful 
implementation. This does not mean 
that the safeguard system has to be so 
technically accurate as to ensure completely 
that no fissile material is diverted 
for military purposes but rather that the 
system must be politically acceptable. 

It seems that at .present the IAEA systemis adequate for this purpose. There has 
in the past been some political resistance 
to some of the activities of the IAEA, but 
it now appears that this is no longer the 
case since the agency has already signed 
agreements with 30 countries and is expected, 
in the near future, to sign several 
more. However, as the amounts of fissile 
material disseminated throughout the 
world increases, the safeguard systemwill probably remain politically acceptable 
only if its accuracy improves, because, 
as time passes, a given percentage 
of fissile material diverted for military 
purposes wi.JI represent an amount of 
material from which could be produced 
an increasing number of nuclear weapons. 
Whether or not the technical improvement 
of the safeguard system will 


keep pace with the amount of material 
produced will depend to a large extent 
on whether the member states are prepared 
to supply the finance to allow the 
necessary research and development work 
to be performed. There is little doubt 
that the present resources of the IAEA are 
inadequate to allow it to fulfil its functions 
under the treaty. Some states are 
at present performing safeguard research 
projects for the purposes of national control 
and this activity will no doubt increase 
in the future. If the results are 
made available to the agency it would 
significantly assist it in performing its 
new functions, but even so the agency 
will need a very substantial increase in 
its budget. To fulfil its responsibility under 
the treaty the agency will probably 
need an inspection ·budget of about £6-.jmillion. 
In 1969 the inspection budget is 
£375,000. If member states do not make 
this money available in time, the effect 
on the Non-proliferation Treaty could 
be disastrous. It is also essential that safeguards 
are seen to provide equal confidence 
that all parties to the treaty are 
fulfilling their obligations. It is essential 
that the new emphasis on the control 
function of the agency should not shift 
attention from its basic function of promoting 
the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. This is of particular importance 
for the developing countries. 

Article 4 contains an obligation on 
states to contribute alone, or in co-operation 
with other ·states and international 
organisations, to further the developmentof nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
especially in the non-nuclear weapon 
states party to the treaty. An effective 
safeguards system would, by increasing 
confidence, facilitate this co-operation. 
It is, however, essential that the agency 
is seen to remain as free as is possiblefrom political and economic influences 
and that the financial resources of the 
agency are increased. At present, funds 
are avai.lable for only a fraction of the 
technically sound requests to the agency 
for assistance in nuclear programmes. 

So far as the effect of Article 3 on Euratom 
is concerned, there seems to be no 
theoretical reason why the Euratom and 

the IAEA control systems should not coexist. 
The treaty will, ·however, require 
that the IAEA verify Euratom control in 
those Common Market countries which 
sign the treaty. The.· treaty itself recognises 
that states regionally associated 
may jointly enter into an agreement with 
the IAEA for the application of safeguards. 
The principles and practices of 
the two systems are so similar that the 
agency should be wble to verify Euratom 
control by statistical checking methods 
with as much validity as would be derived 
by the direct application of its own 
controls. One further point which will 
have to be settled in the verification 
negotiations is that Euratom controls are 
essentially concerned with fissile material 
whereas IAEA controls also cover equipment 
and installations. The Treaty of 
Rome provides for non-discrimination 
between its members, whereas the Nonproliferation 
Treaty discriminates between 
nuclear wea,pon and non-nuclear 
weapon states. This distinction could 
raise difficulties for new countries wishing 
to join the EEC. The main concern 
of the Common Market countries is that 
the treaty should not hamper the competitiveness 
of their nuclear industry ; 
that there should be guaranteed adequate 
supplies of fissile material for fuelling reactors 
; and that there should be no risk 
of monopoly development. 

Euratom countries will argue that IAEA 
control of installations should •be restricted 
to verification of research activities, 
but the Non-proliferation Treaty 
should assist these countr·ies by removing 
much of the commercial discrimination 
that now exists in international 
trade in nuclear fuel and facilities . It is 
not now possible, for example, to send 
IAEA safeguarded material to Euratom 
countries. The treaty should enable the 
IAEA to negotiate a safeguards agreement 
with Euratom which would satisfy Euratom's 
demands and which would make 
full use of Euratom safeguards, but the 
negotiation of the agreement is likely to 
be complex. France's unwillingness to 
acept IAEA safeguards on imported nuclear 
material will still remain a problem. 
Fears have been expressed that the operation 
of agency safeguards may lead to 


industrial and commercial espionage.
However, it eem that further enquiryhas as ured mo t countries that these 
fears were ill-founded. The fact that the 
United State and the United Kingdomhave agreed to place their peaceful nuclear 
in tallations under similar safeguards 
to those adopted for non-nuclear-weapon 

tate , although not required to do o 
under the treaty, could have increa ed 
confidence in the sy tern in thi re pect. 
Article ") of the treaty deals with the 
potential benefits that might be obtained 
from the peaceful use of nuclear explosives. 
If the use of nuclear explosives becomes 
safe, practical and economic for 
civil engineering projects its potentialbenefit for many countries is very great. 
Although an underground nuclear explo 
ion has already been used in the 
United States to increase the output of 
natural gas at a location in New Mexico 
and a consortium consisting of the 
and certain European countries has been 
formed to promote the peaceful application 
of nuclear explosive , it has not 
yet been proven that such application 
are generally beneficial. It was, however. 
felt neces ary to make provi ion in the 
treaty for the u e of such device and 
to en ure that, if they prove ucce ful, 
they should be available without discrimination 
to all ignatories of the treaty. 

Under the pro i ion of Article 5 the ignatory 
non-nuclear weapon state will be 
able to obtain the benefits from any 
I· peaceful application of nuclear explo 


cy ion , through an appropriate international 
body, at a charge which i a low 
a po ible and e eluding any charge for 
re earch and development. For rea on 
that are not entirely clear, ome tate . 
like Brazil, ugge t that countri igningthe treaty are making a significant sacrifi 
e m gi ing up their right to de elop 
the technology of peaceful nuclear explo 
i e . It \ ould appear, hov e er. that 
the ad antages of obtaining peacefulnuclear explo 1 e without the very great 
t f de elopment out\\eigh any di advantage 
to the non-nu !ear \\eapon 
tate in Article 5 of the treaty. The 1 · 
''10uld b abl ffecti,ely t p rf rm th 
dutJ f an "appropriate internattonal 
h d " for pr tding the ern e requir d 

in connection with the peaceful uses of 
nuclear explosives. It will take several 
years of development work in the nuclear 
weapon states before nuclear explosives 
can be widely used for civil engineering 
projects and it is to be hoped 
that during this time the agency will 
make the necessary preparations for its 
probable role. The only afeguard which 
will be required is that of ensuring that 
the nuclear weapon country providingthe explosive actually retains control of 
the device up to the moment of firing. 
A an attempt to seek a elution to the 
problem of providing credible and effective 
security guarantee for non-nuclear 
weapon signatory tates, the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom and the 

nited tates ubrnitted a re elution to 
the United ation Security Council on 

ecurity a urance and, in addition, 
reaffirmed the inherent right of everynation, under Article 51 of the charter, 
to provide individually or in alliance with 
others for its own elf defence. The 

nited tates would make a declaration, 
her repre entative tated, to provide 
a si tance to non-nuclear weapon signatorie 
of the treaty in the event of a new 

ituation created by acts or threats of 
nuclear aggres ion against them. The 

o iet delegate tated that the Soviet 
nion would affirm its intention to seek 
immediate nited ation action in an 
emergency. The e ecurity a urances are 
only available to countries which signand rat1fy the treaty. 

They have been critJci ed becau e the1r 
operation would not be ufficiently immediate 
and automatic; they are also 
ubject to the eto and do not define 
what "a i tance" mean . It 1 true that 
action under defence agreements would 
be more automatic but. on the other 
hand, uch agreement tmpo e obligation 
on their member V\h1ch non-aligned 
countrie would be unprepared to accept 

!though the ecurity a uranc are 
much I than perfect, it has been 
argued that once the on-prollferauon 
r aty corn mto force 1t will be m the 
elf intere t of the three nuclear weapon 
tate that hav off red them to en ure 

theu credibility. However, the most credible 
guarantee i a millt ry guarant 


within an alliance. Such guarantees have 
contributed to the prevention of proliferation 
in Japan, Canada, and West Germany, 
although the nuclear proliferation 
that has taken place so far has occurred 
within alliances. In fact, China, France 
and Great Britain have probably been 
more influenced by their relations with 
their major alliance partner than by the 
attitude of a perceived potential adversary. 
In the case of India, there might 
be considerable credibility in a joint 
treaty, with explicit terms, with the 
Soviet Union and the United States. 
India would be too reluctant to jeopardise 
her non-alignment to accept a unilateral 
guarantee from either side. The 
credibility of the joint treaty would follow 
from the fact that it is unlikely that 
either the United States or the Soviet 
Union would take no action if China 
overran India. Recently, the two superpowers 
have, in fact, made some concessions 
in the direction of a joint guarantee 
to India. The major problem with 
all guarantees is their credibility. It has 
to be admitted that no guarantee can be 
completely credilbfe, but it does not follow 
that they need be wholly incredible. 

Article 6 of the treaty commits the signatories 
to the treaty to pursue negotiations 
on Ill:easures of nuclear disarmament 
and on a treaty of general and 
complete disarmament. Article 7 states 
that the treaty does not affect the rightof any group of states to conclude regional 
denuclearisation treaties. Under 
Article 8 a review conference will be held 
five years after the treaty comes into 
force which will give an opportunity to 
both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear 
weapon states to assess whether it is 
achieving its purposes. Article 9 deals 
with signature and ratification of the 
treaty. Under Article 10 of the treaty a 
signatory can withdraw from the treaty 
if it decides that "extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of the treaty 
have jeopardised the supreme interests of 
its country". A country has to give three 
months' notice of such withdrawal. A 
review conference will be held 25 yearsafter the treaty's entry into force which 
will decide whether the treaty shall continue 
in force. 

It is too early to judge whether. or not 
the treaty will be successfuUy implemented, 
although to date the UK and 
the us have both ratified the treaty. 
The Soviet Union should also ratify in 
the near future, but 40 other ratifications 
are required. The EEC commission has 
advised its members to sign the treaty, 
but not to ratify it until the agreements 
with the IAEA are clarified. The current 
debate on the treaty in West Germany 
is connected with the elections and it is 
probable that the ratification process will 
start next year. Other near nuclear weapon 
countries will probably wait until the 
agreements with the IAEA are negotiatedand this could take up to two years. It 
is, therefore, possible, but unlikely, that 
the treaty will not get off the ground. 

If it does its long term viability will depend 
on the continuing political acceptability 
of the IAEA control system which 
in turn depends on whether the member 
states are prepared to supply the agency 
with financial and other resources it will 
urgently need to maintain its presentstandards. It will also be essential that 
the superpowers are seen to make progress 
with negotiations on curtailing their 
arms race. The support of many countries 
for the treaty is conditional on the 
progress made in further arms control 
negotiations and the rate of ratifications 
may depend on the rate of such negotiations. 
It is unlikely that the present 
security guarantees will be sufficient to 
satisfy some non-nuclear weapon states 
that they are adequately protectedagainst nuclear attack or the threat of 
such attack. India and Japan will probably 
require additional guarantees if they 
are to give up their nuclear options. 

Acceptable safeguards, further arms control 
measures and additional guarantees 
are, therefore, the probable prerequisites 
of a successful treaty. Assuming that 
these are met, the treaty should, except 
in extreme circumstances, provide the 
pol'itical means to restrain the presentnear-nuclear-weapon signatory powersfrom acquiring nuclear weapons. It cannot, 
however, be expected to preventcompletely the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by all states for all time. 


5. implications of a 
superpower arms race 
'Tile via,bility of the Non-proliferation 
Treaty then, wiH depend to a large extent 
on whether or· not the signatorynuclear weapon powers take · seriously 
their commitment in the preamble and 
Article 6 of the treaty to take effective 
measures to achieve an early end of the 
nucfear arms race. In fact, it is possible 
to regard the treaty as a means by which 
the smaller powers can apply pressure on 
the s.,upe11powers to negotiate an arms 
control agreement, and some peoplethink of this as the main value of the 
treaty. 

the strategic forces 
of the superpowers 

To date, the arms race between the 
superpowers has continued with no signof abatement. The United States has, so 
far, deployed a strategic force of about 
1,050 intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) in hardened underground silos 
and has acquired a fleet of 41 nuclear 
powered missile submarines, each carrying 
16 Polaris . missiles. The land based 
ICBM force consists of about 650 Minuteman 
I and 350 Minuteman II solid fuel 
missiles. It is intended eventually to replace 
all the Minuteman I missiles with 
Minuteman II, which has a two megaton 
warhead and a range of 8,000 miles. An 
improved ICBM, the Minuteman Ill, is 
being developed which will be equipped 
with multiple independently-targetablere-entry vehicles (MIRvs). Some of these 
missi,Jes have already been tested. About 
50 Titan liquid fuel ICBMS are still in 
service; these have a range of ' 9,000miles and carry a warhead of over five 
megatons, but they have a slower reaction 
time than solid fuel missiles. It is 
planned to replace the Polaris missiles in 
31 of the nuclear submarines with Poseidon 
missil'es, which are equipped with 
MIRVs. At present, 28 of the nuclear submarines 
carry Polaris Ill missiles (range 
2,800 miles; ,0.7 megaton warhead) and 
13 carry PolariS II missiles (range 1, 700 
miles, 0.7 megaton warhead).· The Poseidon 
missil'e will be capable of delivering 
a tota~ of· nearly 1.5' megatons. The 
Strategic. :.Air Command operates about 
500 ·13-5t2: long .range bombers, each probably 
ca.pable of carrying· four thermo


nuclea·r weapons, two of which are in 
Hound Dog air-to-surface missiles·. The 
B-52 has a maximum range . of' about 
12,000 miles, but is subsonic ~mach number 
0.95); the Hound Dog missile has a 
range of 700 miles. The SAC intends to 
bring supersonic aircraft into operation 
and plans to have over 200 of these by 
the end of 1971. However, the current 
controversy about the performance of 
the F-111 aircraft has temporarily postponed 
this operation. The strategic forces 
of the United States could, therefore, at 
present launch at least 4,000 thermonuclear 
warheads each with an averageyield of over one megaton (about 1,000 
in ICBMs, 656 from submarines, and 
over 2,000 in aM-craft). In addition, 
there are all the thermonuclear weapons 
that tactical aircraft can carry and the 
7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe. At 
ranges of about 7,000 miles strategic missiles 
are sufficiently accurate to fall within 
about a mile of their targets. For a 
missile with a one megaton warhead this 
is sufficient to ensure, with a high probability, 
that a targetted ,city would be 
very severely damaged. 

The' Soviet Union has deployed about 
1,000 liquid fuel ICBMS and an increasing 
number of these are being installed in 
hardened silos. It is expected that solid 
fuel missiles will soon be produced and 
deployed. It has recently been reported 
by Tass that Russia has developed a 
vehicle launching site for solid fuel ICBMs 
which, so it is claimed, is impossible to 
detect from the air or space reconnaisance 
satelites. Soviet ICBMS have, in general, 
larger warheads than American mishiles 
; there are several sizes varyingfrom one to 20 megatons. The range of 
these missiles varies between 5,000 and 
10,000 miles. The Soviet strategic force 
also includes about 750 intermediate and 
medium r-ange ballistic missiles, with 
ranges of about 1,000 miles and 2,000 
miles respectively and warheads of about 
one megaton. It is likely that these missiles 
will,' in the future, be suplemented 
by solid ,fuel mobile missiles. The Soviet 
Union is thought to have a very · large 
missile, possibly ca.pable of 'carrying_ a 
warhead •of ,about •30 ~ megatons, whtch 
may have an orbital capa•bility. The test



·..' 

. ( 

ing of this device would infringe the 
Outer Space Treaty and such a test has 
not taken place. It has been reported, 
however, that the Russians have tested 
a Fractional Orbital Bombardment Sys· 
tern (FOBS) which would require a veryadvanced rocket as a booster. By a legalistic 
intePpretation of the Outer SpaceTreaty, a FOBS does not contravene the 
treaty because the weapon does not 
make a complete orbit of the earth. The 
Soviet navy has a large submarine fleet 
including 50 nuclear powered vessels. 
About 45 of the submarines can fire ballistic 
missiles and, on average, each carries 
three missiles. A new type of nuclear 
powered ballistic missile submarine, 
similar to the American Polaris, is beingproduced at the rate of about two peryear ; each of these will carry 16 ballistic 
missiles capable of being fired while the 
submarines are submerged. The submarine 
launched missiles have warheads of 
about one megaton but comparativelyshort ranges of between 400 and 700 
miles. A new submarine launched missile, 
capacble of carrying a heavier warhead 
over a long range has been developed. 

The Soviet Strategic Air Force has about 
150 long range bombers, with maximum 
ranges of about 8,000 miles, and about 
50 of these carry one air to surface missile. 
There are also about 1 ,000 medium 
range (about 3,000 miles) bombers, each 
capable of carrying one air to surface 
missile. About 200 of these are supersonic 
(roach number 1.9). The Soviet 
Union has tested ICBMs with multiplewarheads. 

Both superpowers are deploying, or planto deploy, antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. 
The Soviet system, which began 
some years ago, is deployed around Moscow 
and possibly also Leningrad. It is 
based on the solid fuel Galosh missile 
which is believed to carry a nuclear warhead 
of about 1.5 megatons and to have 
a range of a few hundred miles. It is possible 
that the Gr-iffon missile, which has a 
high acceleration and a short range(about 30 miles), is also used in an ABM 
capacity. Sentinel, the American ABM 
system was originally planned to consist 
of 15 to 20 batteries of long range 

r.J 
' 

,j 

\_ 

Spartan missiles spaced around the 
United States. The preliminary estimates 
put the most of the system at aJbout five 
billion dollars to deploy and five hundred 
million do11ars per year to operate. About 
900 million doJ.lars were to be made 
available in the current fiscal year, $300 
million to be used for research and development, 
$400 million to begin production 
and deployment, and $200 million 
to purchase land for Spartan sites ; 
but the actual costs would have been 
more. 

The Spartan missile, which carries a warhead 
of over one megaton, can intercept 
an incoming missile at an altitude of 
about 300 miles and at ranges of up to 
400 miles from its location. The aim was 
to provide protection for the entire country 
against an unsophisticated attack of 
the type that the Chinese could mount 
with the first generation of their· ICBMS\ 
(It is tentatively estimated that the Chinese 
will have a modest force of ICBMS 
in the mid-1970s.) Also associated with 
the American ABM system is the Sprint 
missile, designed to intercept enemyICBMs which escape the Spartan missiles. 

Sprint has a high acceleration and is designed 
to intercept incoming missiles at 
a short range of between 20 and 30 
miles. The rocket used sends the Sprint 
to an altitude of 12 miles in about four 
seconds and carries a nuclear warhead 
equivalent to several tens of kilotons of 
TNT. Whether or not Sprints are to be 
used in the Sentinel system is not, at present 
clear. If they are used it will probably 
only be for the defence of keyelements of the ABM system itself, such 
as the radars and not for the defence of 
cities. The highly complex and expensive 
radar system associated with the United 
States ABM system includes: the Perimeter 
Acquisition Radar (PAR), a low 
frequency radar which detects the missile 
at a long range, tracks it and predicts its 
path ; the Missile Site Radar (MSR), a 
higher frequency radar, which guides the 
Sprint and Spartan missiles from each 
battery ; the Multi-function Array Radar 
(MAR) which is a powerful phased array 
radar designed to perform all the functions 
associated with countering a full 


scale attack, that is detect the hostile 
targets, select the warheads from decoys,
track the trajectories of the warheads 
and direct the interceptors ; and the 
TACMAR radar which is a smaller version 
of M~R having a lower target handling 
ca;pactty. The MAR system is controlled 
by a complex computer system and is 
composed of many individual separateunits which can be combined into systems 
Qf different sizes. 

It was planned that Sentinel should have 
six PAR installations along the northern 
boundary of the United States. An incoming 
missile on a minimum energyballistic trajectory would be sighted by 
PAR at a distance of about 2,500 miles 
providing a warning time of about 10 
minutes. After the incoming missile is 
sighted by PAR its trajectory would be 
tracked by MSR and this information 
allows the ABMs to be guided to the incoming 
missile using the computer system, 
the "brain" of Sentinel, which has a 
data handling and decision making capacity 
greater than any previously constructed 
system. The MAR or TACMAR 
systems are not designed for use with a 
light ABM system such as Sentinel but 
would be installed only if the system 
were extended to counter a ful1 scale 
attack. In this connection it should be 
noted that Sentinel is designed to be of 
a flexible, building block nature, ca;pable 
of extension into a heavier system into 
which the more complex radars and computers 
could be incorporated. Because of 
the strength of the opposition by the 
population near areas chosen for ABM 
sites it has been decided to modify the 
Sentinel system. The modified system, 
known as Safeguard, will use the same 
components designed for Sentinel, but 
will consist of only two ABM installations 
placed around remote ICBM sites in Montana 
and North Dakota. Safeguard will 
probably be expanded, possibly to 12 
installations. The cost of the system is 
likely to be a1bout 50 per cent more than 
the original Sentinel system, but the cost 
will be spread over a longer period. 

Both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
there is now a rough equality between 
the strategic forces of the superpowers. 

the strategic balance 


The strategic situation created by these 
forces is based on mutual "deterrence" 
which is assumed to guarantee stability 
o~ the strategic level. Deterrence is pro-
VIded by the so-called second strike assured 
destruction capability of each 
superpower. This is the capability to inflict 
an unacceptable degree of damage 
on the other side by a retaliatory strike 
even aft.er absorbing an all out sur.prisefirst strike, even though the latter is 
aimed at strategic forces. There is, of 
course, a psychological element in the 
determination of what the adversary 
~ould regard as "unaccepta:ble" damage;
m fact, no one really knows, in a quantitative 
sense, what would constitute "deterrence' 
in any given situation. 

This question involves complex philosophical 
and moral issues. Most men 
maintain that some values are to be defended 
even at the risk of personal survival, 
but whether this is also true when 
the survival of the society, or a large 
part of it, is at stake is not so simplydetermined and the issue becomes infinitely 
complex when the whole of humanity, 
or a large fraction of it, may be 
involved. It could be argued that the defence 
of the values of a society is only 
rational if the society survives in a recognisable 
form. On the other hand, the 
admission of this by one society may 
lead to the blackmail or subjection of it 
by another society. The greater the military 
power at the disposal of a society, 
the greater this dilemma becomes. In the 
present situation, deterrence is largely a 
matter of perceptions. Superpower A convinces 
itself that a certain degree of assured 
destruction in superpower B will be 
perceived by superpower B as a deterrent 
if it threatens the most vital interests 
of superpower A. In practice, of 
course, this calculation is not made in 
any refined sense but each superpower 
arms itself to a given posture, determined 
by a complex of reasons, and then rationalises 
this by "deterrence" arguments. 

Bearing the perceptual nature of the 
subject in mind, it can be stated that because 
strategic stability is based on the 


effectiveness of the threat of assured destruction 
to deter either side from Jaunching 
a surprise attack, the preservation of 
the capability of second strike assured 
destruction is perceived to be of fundamental 
importance by the decision makers 
in both superpowers. 

A categorisation of new weapons is possible 
in terms of their effect on the strategic 
equilibrium between the superpowers 
based on deterrence. New weapons 
which reinforce the second strike 
capability against enemy cities and populations 
can be regarded as stabilising,
whereas new weapons whioh increase 
first strike capacility against the enemy's 
strategic forces are destabilising. This 
categorisation arises because the enemy'scities and populations are the hostageswhen deterrence is based on a bal'ance 
of terror. The theory suggests that an 
aggressive first strike by strategic weapons 
would be aimed at the enemy'sstrategic forces, that is it would be a 
counterforce strike. Second strike assured 
destruction, and strategic balance, requires 
that sufficient stategic forces would 
remain intact after such a first strike to 
enable the superpower who has absorbed 
it to inflict a level of damage on the 
other side's cities and population which 
the superpower, who made the first 
strike, would regard as so high as to 
deter him from making the strike in the 
first place; a strike against cities and 
populations is called a countervalue 
strike. Thus, nuclear deterrent strategydiffers from conventional strategy in that 
weapons aimed at populations are considered, 
in a sense, less dangerous than 
weapons directed at the enemy's strategic 
forces . A similar difference arises 
with defensive measures since those designed 
to preserve strategic forces are, 
if effective, stabilising whereas those designed 
to protect populations are destabilising 
to the extent that they reduce 
the effectiveness of the other side's retaliatory 
second strike countervalue capability. 
At first sight it might be thought 
that on this basis the United States 
Safeguard ABM system is stabilising. However 
because present ABMs are ineffective 
and because they are nevertheless likely 
to cause the opponent to increase his 

offensive forces this argument cannot be 
used. In practice, if one side deploysdestabilising weapons it is likely to lead 
to a reinvigoration of the arms race bycausing the other side to react, usuaJ.Jyby increasing the number or performance 
or both, of his strategic forces in an 
attempt to restore the strategic deterrence 
balance. The perception by both superpowers 
that a strategic deterrence balance 
exists between them and the realisation 
by them of the damage which 
would be caused by a general nuclear 
war has entailed a policy of co-existence. 

This has resulted in a growing detente 
between the superpowers which has 
allowed some progress to be made in 
arms control and which has produced 
some of the conditions necessary for a 
real prospect of progress towards disarmament 
while, at the same time, maintaining 
stability based on deterrence. It 
is not suggested that this was the result 
of a deliberate policy, in fact politicalleaders do not usually realise the political 
consequences of the deployment of a 
new weapons system until some time 
after the weapons have been installed, 
but rather that the superpowers were inevitably 
led to a situation of stalemate 
by the momentum of weapons technology. 
The use of the word "balance" here 
should not be taken too seriously since 
the United States seems only to perceive 
a "balance" if it continuously has superiority 
in strategic forces . Recent statements 
by Presiden Nixon could indicate, 
however, that this attitude may be changing. 
At a recent press conference he 
said, "the gap has been olosed. We shall 
never have it agruin, because it will not 
be necessary for us. Sufficiency, as I have 
indicated, is aU that is required." The 
meaning of this statement depends, of 
course, upon the definition of the word 
"sufficiency". 

effect of new weapons 

The development and deployment of 
ABM systems and MIRVS could have a 
profound effect on the strategic balance 
and indeed upon future arms control 
negotiations. Although present officially 


announced levels of ABM deployment will 
not seriously impair the present strategic 
military balance between the superpowers, 
the practicability of its deployment 
carries with it the prospect that one or 
other of the superpowers might perceive 
a chance of attaining a dominant position 
in the .Jong run. In practice, neither 
superpower is likely to attain a winning 
posture but the perception of the possibility 
might be sufficient to produce 
pressures within the superpower to attempt 
to attain it. The political implication 
of this would be to revert the relationship 
between the superpowers from 
one of co-existence to one in which they 
compete for world dominance. Thus, the 
actual or projected deployment of ABM 
systems, while not altering the basic 
strategic situation of mutual deterrence, 
may have produced forces which will 
erode the stability between the superpowers 
in the future. This factor is accentuated 
by the lack of knowledge concerning 
the effectiveness of ABMS. The 
doctrine of deterrence is most acceptablewhen the technical performance of strategic 
forces i;s reasonably well known to 
the world at large. 

A development that causes doubts or uncertainties 
about this performance undermines 
confidence in the capability of 
strategic forces upon which the strategicbalance depends. Present ABM systems are 
not, and are not likely to become, effective 
in the sense that they cannot be 
made adequate relative to the offence 
existing at the time the systems become 
operational. For example, there are some 
who seriously doubt whether the Sentinel 
system (both the original and modified 
version) would be able to cope effectivelywith the first generation of Chinese 
ICBMS. 

An ABM system is an extremely complex 
system consisting of many components 
and, since none of these has been fully 
tested under operational conditions, it is 
not possible to assess the effectiveness of 
the system. However, it can be predicted 
that an ABM system can be relativelyeasily overcome by the use of penetration 
aids, such as dummy missiles, or 
suitable strategies. 

ABM systems have resulted in a reinvigoration 
of the arms nee. This arises because 
the likely response to a deployment 
of an ABM system by superpower A is for 
superpower B to increase the performance 
and I or numbers of her offensive 
weapons. This increase is likely to lead 
to the deployment of a heavier ABM system 
by superpower A in an attempt to 
protect against the increased strategicforces of superpower B. Superpower B 
would then probably respond by a further 
increase in offensive forces and so 
on. A second effect on the arms race 
arises from the uncertainty of the effectiveness 
of ABM systems. If a supelipower 
deploys an ABM system the other superpower 
is likely to assume that the effectiveness 
of it is greater than it actually is 
and therefore to overact to the deployment. 
On the other hand, the first superpower 
is likely to assume that the effectiveness 
of his ABM system is less than it 
actually is and to employ a heavier system 
than is necessary for given defence 
requirements. Moreover, if one side begins 
the deployment of an ABM systemthe other will probably tend to respond, 
not to the .[eve! of the deployment, but 
to a 'level which this superpower calculates 
could be deployed by the other if it 
devoted a maximum effort to the deployment. 
It should in fairness be mentioned 
at this point that one serious school of 
thought has argued in favour of ABM 
systems on the grounds that .if ABM systems 
are deployed extensively by both 
superpowers and if offensive forces are 
not increased, or better still if they are 
decreased, then the strategic bal'ance between 
the superpowers will cease to be 
based on deterrence but, instead, will become 
based on defence. The advocates of 
this theory argue that, after this transition, 
general nuclear war would be less 
likely, and that nuclear disarmament 
much easier to negotiate. Under these 
circumstances, the deployment of ABMS 
would, of course, amount in itself to a 
measure of disarmament. The theory requires 
that the superpowers mutually 
agree to undergo the necessary changesin their strategic and defensive postures. 
There are several difficulties with this 
argument. Tlie transition from deterrence 
to defence involves passing through a 


phase of great strategic instability between 
the superpowers during which the 
chance of general nuclear wa:r is greatly 
increased compared with the relativelysmall chance of such a war which exists 
with the present strategic balance. Furthermore, 
the amount of mutual trust 
which would have to exist between the 
superpowers to achieve the transition is 
unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. 
If such trust between them did exist 
then a great deal of disarmament would, 
in any case, be readily negotiated since, 
in such a world, high levels of strategic 
or defensive forces would be irrelevant. 
Experience has shown that the most 
likely result of the deployment of ABMs 
by one side is an increase, rather than a 
decrease, in the quantity or quality of 
the offensive forces of the other side. 
An example of this process is that the 
response of the United States to the 
threat of a Soviet ABM deployment was 
the development of MIRVS. 

Deployment of these MIRVS could have 
even more serious .long term consequences 
than the deployment of ABM 
systems. If the development of these 
weapons continues, their accuracy will 
probably improve to a point at which 
one superpower could destroy all, or a 
large fraction, of the other superpower's 
strategic ICBMS by a first strike. MIRVS 
are, therefore, potentially very destabilising. 
Once again, it is the introduction 
of a factor of uncertainty which is so 
serious. At present, each superpower can 
calculate, to a fair degree of accuracy, 
the size of the opponent's strategic force. 

The deployment of these MIRVS, however, 
would make such calcul'ations extremely 
difficult since it would not be the number 
of missiles that was important, but 
the type of warheads each missile carried. 
Relatively invulneraJble launchingsites, such as submarines, would help to 
stabilise the strategic situation created by 
MIRV deployment and the developmentof more accurate MIRVS would place a 
high premium on missile launching submarines 
and undetectable mobile land-
based launching sites. These are, however, 
very much more costly than present 
devices ; a submarine missile, for 

example, is considerably more expensive 
to maintain than a static land-based missile. 
The development or deployment of 
MIRVS by the superpowers presents a 
danger that one or other superpower mayperceive that jt has acquired the capability 
of a successful pre-emptive first 
strike. Although such a perception is 
likely to be an illusion it would have a 
grave effect on llhe stability of the relations 
•between the superpowers. 

The most serious foreseeable development, 
if the arms race is allowed to continue, 
would be the deployment by both 
superpowers of accurate MIRvs togetherwith an effective ABM system. At some 
stage during this process one of the 
superpowers might perceive it to be to 
his advantage to make a first strike, depending 
on the rate of improvement of 
defence compared with that of offence, 
but it is more likely that this would not 
hCi!ppen but that both superpowers would 
acquire the weapons systems. If this stage 
in the arms race is reached it would be 
extremely difficull to negotiate gradual, 
step by step disarmament. The use of 
submarines does not significantly affect 
this argument since the deployment of 
extensive ABM systems, it is assumed, 
would eliminate the relatively few submarine 
based missiles. Therefore, if the 
weapons at present being developed and 
tested are deployed in significant numbers 
the outlook is bleak. First, the present 
stabil'ity of mutual deterrence will be 
eroded by uncertainties on both sides 
concerning the effectiveness of their own 
and the other's strategic forces. This will 
produce such mutual distrust that arms 
control and disarmament negotiationswiJ.l be much more difficult than theyhave been so far. The fact that it took 
fi ve years of hard negotiations to reach 
agreement on the Non"proliferationTreaty indicates how difficult such negotiations 
are even during a period of relative 
stability. In the absence of arms control 
measures, the continuance of the 
arms race will then ultimately lead the 
superpowers to a position from which 
any disarmament wiJ.l be almost impossibly 
difficult to negotiate since neither 
superpower will dare reduce his forces 
without an absolute guarantee that the 



other will simultaneously reduce his 
forces equa11y. In view of the rea.lities of 
international politics it is not possible to 
envisage such a guarantee in the foreseeable 
future. The arms race is, therefore, 
at a threshold. At present there is a relatively 
stable strategic balance between 
the superpowers and it is realistic to expect 
them to be able to negotiate a significant 
reduction in the levels of their 

forces because, even after such a · reduction, 
each superpower would retain sUfficient 
weapons to ensure a second strike 
capability and, therefore, the balance of 
deterrence would be maintained. However, 
after the extensive deployment of 
the new weapons, a similar reduction in 
strategic forces would put one superpower 
in a position of relative inferiority 
with respect to the other superpower and 
the new strategic situation would no 
longer be sta:ble. ·It is very unl'ikely that 
either superpower could be will.ing to 
rely on the good faith of the other and, 
therefore, would not risk the possible 
consequences of reducing his strategic 
posture. Indeed if such a high level of 
mutual confidence and trust existed between 
the superpowers disarmament 
measures would not be necessary. 

effect on European countries 

The extensive deployment of ABMs and 
MrRvs by the superpowers would have 
serious effects on other countries, particularly 
those in Europe. Moreover, 
these effects could have consequences for 
the Non-proliferation Treaty. Althoughthere are unlikely to be any significantshort term consequences of present levels 
of deployment, the continuation of the 
arms race by the superpowers will probably 
create strong pressures for a re-designing 
of the European alliances. The 
arguments for the development of independent 
nuclear forces may become irresistible. 
Even without the effect of the 
superpowers' arms race it is probablethat the continued existence of the British 
and French nuclear forces will eventually 
cause significant pressures in other 
European countries, such as West Germany 
and Italy, for a nationa.l nuclear 
force. 

There are, of course, many factors which 
wi~l determine the future of Europeanalliances, of which a continuation of the 
arms race is only one. It is, however, an 
important factor which, so far, has 
tended to be overlooked in debates on 
the alliances. European security at present 
depends on the strategic stability 
between the superpowers and any significant 
change in this stability affects the 
European situation. The main consequence 
of ABM deployment arises from a 
psychological and political factor, namely 
the feeling that the superpowers are protected 
by the defensive shield provided 
by their ABM systems while Europe . remains 
undefended. This feeling is illusory 
and not dependent on the effectiveness 
of ABM systems. It is the presence of 
such a system that has political consequences. 
The insecurity it engenders produces 
a resentment against the superpowers 
and is likely to reinforce the 
nationalistic tendencies produced by politica.
l events such as the Soviet invasion 
of Czechoslovakia. It is probable that 
this factor will overcome the more constructive 
tendency toward the co-operation 
of non-nuclear weapon Europeancountries. It is also possible that some 
governments or peoples may argue in 
the future that ABM systems should be 
extended to cover Europe, both for their 
own defence and to keep the alliances 
intact. Not only is this technically unfeasible, 
but it will deepen the gulf between 
East and West. Similar arguments 
apply to the suggestion that Europeansshould deploy their own independentABM systems. The ineffectiveness of present 
ABM systems does not, however, prevent 
political pressures building up for 
their deployment. The deployment of an 
ABM system in any European non-nuclear 
wapon state would violate the Nonproliferation 
Treaty ·because warninghmes would be so short that it would 
be impossible to retain foreign control 
over the use of the nuclear weapons contained 
in the warheads of the ABMS. 

The British position is of particular interest 
because the question of ABM deployment 
has arisen at a time which 
coincides with the withdrawal of military 
forces from various overseas areas. It is 


not impossible that, in the future, disaffected 
military personnel will apply 
pressure for the acquisition of the latest 
military weapons, including ABMS, and 
they may be supported by the aerospaceindustry. It appears that the British government 
intends that Britain should remain 
a nuclear power for the foreseeable 
future, even after Polaris submarines 
become obsolete. The question of the 
development of an ABM system is, therefore, 
likely to be raised if the superpowers 
continue with or extend their 
systems. It is noteworthy in this context 
that the British are llipparently developing 
more complex multiple warheads for 
their submarine launched missiles. 

The development of new weapons by the 
superpowers widens the gap between them 
and potential new nuclear-weapon powers. 
This in turn tends to prevent proliferation 
because a relatively small nuclear 
force would not deter a superpowerwhich had deployed an ABM system. This 
clearly does not llipply to non-nuclear 
weapon countries where potential enemies 
are either non-nuclear weapon powers or 
potentially only small nuclear weapon 
powers. It also does not necessarily apply 
to non-nuclear weapon powers who are 
interested in ~btain.ing a minimum deterrence 
against a superpower which is a 
neighbour or near neighbour. In these 
cases, the non-nuclear weapon power 
could acquire nuclear weapons and instal 
them in medium or short range missiles. 

An ABM system deployed against ICBMS 
is not suitable for use against such low 
flying missiles. The strategic deterrent of 
a small nuclear power depends on the 
perception that a superpower would not 
be willing to accept the loss of even a 
~mall number of cities if the only gain 
was the acquisition of the ravaged territory 
of the small power. A small power 
could, therefore, argue that it has a credible 
deterrent if it can produce some 
damage in the superpower, for a superpower, 
even defended by an ABM system, 
could not exclude all damage. These arguments 
are, however, based on doubtful 
premises and the strategic reasons 
that have been given to justify the ac-
qui~ition of nuclear weapons by the 

smaller powers are not convincing. The 
anti-proliferation argument is, to say the 
least, a very weak one to support the 
deployment of ABM systems by the superpowers. 


Judging from the long period taken so 
far to negotiate arms control agreements, 
it is not easy to be hopeful that adequate 

measures will be taken within the necessary 
time. In any case, it is not likelythat a comprehensive test ban will be 
negotiated in the near future. This follows 
from the fact that the developmentof ABM systems requires continued underground 
testing of nuclear weapons to 
examine the success of modifications and 
to measure the performance of new missiles. 
While ABM systems are being considered, 
therefore, there are strong pressures 
for the continuation of underground 
tests. In fact, the continued 
development of ABMS will also greatlyincrease pressures for atmospheric tests 
to determine the performance of the system 
(including radars) under operationalconditions, and, therefore, even the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty may be jeopardised. 
Moreover, it is not possible to 
arouse public opinion over the consequences 
of radioactive contamination as 
it was for a partial test ban. It is also 
claimed that underground nuclear explosions 
are needed to develop nuclear 
explosives for peaceful purposes. Further, 
unless the superpowers restrain the development 
and deployment of new weapons 
systems during the period that the 
arms control negotiations are going on, 
the difficulty of obtaining even a simple 
agreement will increase rapidly, to a very 
high level, because of the erosion of the 
strategic stability between the superpowers. 
Finally, if new weapon development 
and deployment are not restrained by the 
supe~powers there will be secondary 
effects in third countries. There are likely 
to be growing pressures for ABM systems 
even though these are ineffective. This 
could have serious consequences for the 
Non-proliferation Treaty and for future 
European attempts for co-operation. The 
present smaller nuclear powers will probably 
be encouraged to improve the quality 
of their nuclear forces in an attempt 
to maintain their perceived credibility. 


6 . prospects for arms control 
The present situation is complex and 
fluid . First, both superpowers are anxious 
that the Non-proliferation Treaty should 
be a success and know that its viability 
depends on them showing good faith towards 
their commitments under Article 
6, before the treaty comes up for review 
five years after it enters into force. 
Secondly, the most likely arms control 
measure to be negotiated first is a simple 
agreement on a freeze on offensive and 
defensive missiles. This, however, is unlikely 
to satisfy many of the non-nuclear 
weapon powers who are looking for a 
more positive measure such as a comprehensive 
test ban or a significant reduction 
in numbers of offensive missiles. 
An assessment of the prospects for arms 
control in, say, the next five ar ten years 
is difficult. Some factors lead to feelingsof optimism, others to pessimism. 

Optimism is engendered ·because the 
political conditions for successful arms 
control negotiations may now exist. The 
leaders of the superpowers have both 
expressed a desire to start discussions on 
arms measures and are convinced of the 
necessity for the success of such negotiations. 
There is no reason to doubt 
their sincerity. In both superpowers there 
are urgent and serious domestic problems 
of which the populations are 
aware; this has produced strong internal 
pressures on the political systems demanding 
that energy and avai.lable resources 
are devoted to these problems. 

There is, at present, a measure of detente 
between the superpowers and a perceived 
strategic balance between them. Recent 
political events have not seriously affected 
the nature of this detente, although 
there may have been a change in the 
detente between the superpowers and 
other countries, for example, between 
the Soviet Union and certain western 
European countries. Both superpowers 
are probably willing to accept the strategic 
situation which would exist after 
the implementation of significant reductions 
in their strategic forces. In fact, the 
equilibrium of the strategic balance 
would be maintained after such reductions. 
Both supel'lpowers are very anxious 
to prevent the emergence of new nuclear 

weapon powers and know that this depends 
mainly .on a halt to the arms race, 
followed by further positive measures of 
arms reductions. There is strong evidence 
to indicate that the superpowerscontrol their actions in a way designed 
to prevent confrontation which could 
lead to general nuclear war. They know 
that the likelihood of a general nuclear 
war would increase during the periodsof instability which will inevitably occur 
if the arms race continues and the weapons 
which have already been developed 
are extensively deployed. Another reason 
for optimism is that arms control is becoming 
part of the foreign .policy and 
strategy of the major powers, particularly 
the superpowers. In the United 
States, for example, it has recently been 
decided that the Director of the United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency should attend all relevant National 
Security Council meetings. Although 
this has occurred for limited 

•periods in the past, since the second 
world war it has not generally been the 
case. Disarmament negotiations have 
been mainly undertaken as an issue separate 
from the main stream of government 
policy. The personnel dealing with 
questions of arms control have usually 
operated remote from policy making, and 
have not been allowed full access to information 
or integrated into the decision 
making process. Now, however, even the 
military lobbies in the superpowers appear 
to be beginning to regard arms control 
as a possible part of strategy. It is, 
of course, true that national security is 
still the primary official concern and that 
arms control ·and disarmament take 
second place, but the indications are that 
governments are beginning to realise that 
arms control can increase security. Some 
·people regard the arms control successes 
so far achieved, particularly the Partial 
Test Ban and the Non-proliferationTreaty, as a reason for optimism and 
argue that, once begun, negotiationsacquire a momentum of their own and 
subsequent agreement becomes progressively 
easier to obtain as confidence and 
mutual trust increase. 
So far as the reasons for pessimism are 
concerned , a main one is the unabated 


continuation of the arms race. The longtime taken to negotiate arms control 
agreements is another. Recurrent periodsof international tension, which are probably 
inevitable, tend to lengthen negotiating 
periods. The arms control agreements 
so far achieved have had little impact 
on the tempo of the arms·race. The 
Partial Test Ban Treaty did not preventthe emergence of the fourth and fifth 
nuclear weapon powers, France and 
China, and did not significantly hinder 
the superpowers in the development of 
warheads for their missiles and antimissiles. 
The Outer Space Treaty has 
banned the use of nuclear weapons in 
complete orbit but has been interpreted 
in such a way as to allow the development 
and testing of FOBS. The success of 
the Non-proliferation Treaty remains to 
be seen. Historical evidence is sometimes 
quoted to indicate that significant multilateral 
disarmament has, in the past, only 
occurred immediately after great wars. 

The stated aims of the superpowers are 
not reflected in their actions and this 
causes serious doubt about their ability 
to reduce the tempo of the arms race. 
This is well typified by the fact that the 
detonation of the most powerful yet underground 
nuc·lear explosion in Nevada 
occurred just when the debate on the 
Non-·proliferation Treaty began in the 
General Assembly. In fact, ignoring very 
low yield explosions, the United States 
has conducted, on average, at least 30 
underground tests per year since the 
Partial Test Ban was signed and the 
Soviet Union has conducted an average 
of about ten a year ; this testing can be 
related to the development of ABM systems. 
Since signing the Non-,proliferationTreaty, both superpowers have tested 
MIRVs and the United States Senate has 
voted in favour of the deployment of 
an ABM system. There is no doubt that 
there are very large vested interests in the 
arms race and the pressures which the 
so-called military industrial complex can 
bring to bear are very great. This factor 
might limit the successful implementation 
of arms control agreements. 

These considerations and the fact that, 
although the superpowers appear strongly 

to desire arms reductions, they may be 
unable to achieve them, even to a limited 
extent, raises the possibility that the main 
destabilising factor in international relations 
today may be technology itself. 

effect of 
momentum of technology 

In advanced industrial society technology 
acquires an inherent momentum on a 
very broad front and that this makes 
specific technological advances extremely 
difficult to direct and control since each 
part affects the whole. So it may be misleading 
to regard the effects of weaponstechnology as a separate issue, as it is 
regarded and studied at present. Instead 
of isolating the issue of arms control and 
disarmament, it may be more fruitful to 
think of the subject as part of a much 
wider problem and to attempt to suggestsolutions on the basis of a study of this. 

Little effort has been devoted to a fundamental 
analysis of the total consequences 
and effects of the technological revolutions 
that have occurred, and will occur, 
and of the means to control and direct 
them. Attention has, so far, been concentrated 
on considering the effects of 
each narrow technological advance separately 
and little consideration has been 
given to the way that each one interacts 
on the others. 

To illustrate this from an example in 
weapons technology, the case of the 
United States ABM deployment can be 
used. Not only is the deployment of an 
ABM system ineffective, but it results in 
a reinvigoration of the arms race ; has 
an adverse affect on the superpower detente 
and arms control negotiations ; 
reduces the possibility of a comprehensive 
test ban treaty; and jeopardises the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty. Most of the 
arguments used in favour of the deployment 
of an ABM system are either based 
on emotional premises, such as the feel ing 
that all defensive measures are desirable 
or that, because the other side 
has it, we must also acquire it, or are 
based on the types of arguments used 
by the more militant groups in society, 
such as the illusory concept that the de



ployment of an ABNt system can lead to 
a dominant posture in the long run. The 
official argument for the deployment of 
the "thin" system by the United States 
was that it would provide protectionagainst an attack by China ; it would reduce 
or eliminate the possibility of catalytic 
war initiated by a small nuclear 
weapon power ; it would insure against 
accidental war caused by the misfiring of 
a missile by any one of the nuclear 
weapon powers ; and it would remove 
the credibility of sma·ll token attacks by 
tCBMs made for bargaining purposes in 
times of crisis. None of these reasons is 
convincing. The China argument assumes 
that she will behave irrationally since an 
attack by China on the United States 
would be suicidal and 'there is no evidence 
that China's actions, as opposed to 
her words, are either unpredictable or 
irrational. There is no reason why the 
United States should not rely on deterrence 
rather than defence against China, 
as she has against the Soviet Union. In 
fact, the United States' ABM system is 
likely to increase the credibility of the 
Chinese nuclear deterrent in Asia, which 
is· just the opposite effect to that intended. 

To achieve the insurances required of it 
the system would have to be kept fully 
alert continuously since warning times 
would be extremely short. The chance of 
nuclear accidents associated with the ABM 
system itself, operated under these conditions, 
is .probably greater than the chance 
of the occurrence of the events beinginsured against. It follows that, on a reasonable, 
non-emotional assessment, the 
advantages of ABM systems are completely 
outweighed by the disadvantages, 
even ignoring the questions of cost and 
loss of resources. The only argumentused by serious students of the subjectin favour of ABMs is that their deployment, 
together with a reduction in the 
numbers of offensive weapons, ·is equiv' 
alent to a measure of disarmament. Very 
few authorities regard this view as 
at all va•lid. The question is, therefore, 
why, in spite of this, have the superpowers 
deployed, or planned to deploy,
ABM systems? So far as the Soviet Union 
is concerned, it is probable that the traditional 
role of defence in Soviet military 

planning ·.played an important part in the 
decision: The fact that the Soviet people 
suffered over 20 million casualties and 
huge losses of property during the second 
world war would make the task of those 
within the decision making process who 
favoured deployment easier, since those 
who attempted to resist deployment could 
be accused of suggesting that the country 
should be left undefended. 

It has been suggested that the decision 
to approve and fund the Sentinel system 
in the United States was taken for political 
reasons and in response to political 
pressures. This is summed up by the 
statement that the Sentinel system was introduced 
"against the Republicans rather 
than the Chinese". The political advantage 
obtained during the Kennedy election 
campaign· from the supposed missile 
gap demonstrated the dangers of appearing 
dilatory about strategic and defensive 
matters, and has made politicianssensitive to such pressures. That these 
pressures are strong is undeniable, coming 
as they mainly do from the military-
industrial complex which has powerfulfriends in the appropriate congressional 
committees. These groups favour the deployment 
of a "thin" system as a first 
step towards the eventual deployment of 
an extended system ; when it becomes 
clear that the government is not prepared 
to concede their demands, a policy of 
settling for a lesser system is adoptedand then, once this has been installed, 
pressure for a larger system is brought 
to bear. An ABM system is so complexthat very large investments in the electronics, 
aerospace and other industries 
are concerned and these have powerful 
lobbies in the political system. These explanations 
for the fact that the decisions 
to deploy expensive weapons systemswere taken in the absence of sound strategic 
reasons are not convincing as the 
entire story. There is a significant anti-
ABM group in America and it should have 
been possible for the .political leaders, 
with their support, to resist the pressures 
and counter the arguments put forward 
for deployment by pointing out to the 
American population the great disadvantages 
of, and arguments against, the deployment 
of ABMs ; emphasising the 


spiralling costs of weapons systems; explaining 
that even an effective ABM system 
would need a shelter programme, a 
prospect which, as experience has shown, 
is very disconcerting to the American 
public ; and pointing out how rapidlythe proposed system would become ob


olete and that, had the government goneahead with the first possible ABM system,
the country would now have just such 
an obsolete system after the expenditureof billions of doHars. 

That these pressures could not be resisted 
despite the serious efforts made in this 
direction by Robert McNamara, the then 
Secretary of Defence, seems to indicate 
that the totality of the forces set in motion, 
once technology had made the weapons 
available, almost inevitably led to 
the decision to deploy them. It is always 
possible to rationalise this decision and 
it has, for example, been recently arguedthat a sufficient justification for an 
American ABM system is its . bargaining 
power in the forthcoming disarmament 
talks with the Soviet Union . It is noteworthy 
that the opposition from those 
living near the sites chosen for Spartandeployment did not cause the decision 
to deploy the Sentinel system to be reversed. 
The ABM are 'instead to be moved 
to protect ICBM sites. This decision introduce 
uncertainties into strategic calculations 
and threatens the equilibrium of the 
strategic balance. Even though these uncertainties 
may be minor at first, anyfurther deployment will increase them to 

levels which will threaten arms control 
negotiations. The difficulty of reversingthe decision to acquire a weapons system 
indicates once again, the strength of the 
forces involved. 

Another example of the difficultie 
created by the momentum of technologyis provided by the development of gascentrifuge for uranium separation. Beeau 
e of the seriou implications of these 
for the proliferation of nuclear weapon 
it would be de irable that they be not 
developed or, at least, put under international 
owner hip and control. The argument 
in favour of the development of 
centrifuge are mainly economic and 
commercial one . There i no doubt that 

the nuclear fuel cycle will soon become 
a sizeable world industry. It can be predicted 
with confidence that the turnover 
in this industry is likely to be at least 
ten times greater by the end of the next 
decade than it will be during the next 
year and even during the latter period it 
should exceed £100 million. About 24 
per cent of the final cost of nucl~ar fuel 
goes in the enrichment process. The governments 
and industry of some countries, 
particularly Great Britain and West Germany, 
believe that the talents of their 
societies are particularly suited to the 
nuclear energy industry. The industry in 
these countries is at present making large 
contributions to the domestic markets 
and great importance is attached to the 
exploitation of future opportunities in 
the export markets. Great Britain and 
West Germany are hoping to secure significant 
portions of the fuel cycle industry 
by being able to offer all aspects of 
the fuel cycle under single management 
control, since they feel that this would 
put them in a strong position in a highly 
competitive market. At present the cost 
of enriched uranium from the United 
States is lower than can be achieved by 
any other western country, mainly because 
the American gas diffusion plants 
are very large and cheap electric power 
to run them is readily available. For a 
country wishing to offer all the fuel cycle 
services the supply of enriched uranium 
is the weak link in the chain. The main 
advantages claimed for the gas centifuge 
method of enrichment is that it should 
be reasonably economic on a small scale 
and the plant could be expanded in stages 
to match the requirements of a growing 
power programme. Great Britain, the 
Netherlands and West Germany have 
negotiated a collaborative agreement for 
the development of gas centrifuges, under 
which two experimental plants will be 
built to produce enriched uranium. Although 
it ha been decided that West 
Germany will participate only in an ad-
mini trative way and will not build an 
in tallation of her own. 

They claim that ga centrifuges are of 
major importance for their nuclear 
energy indu tries to provide fuel for 
dome tic reactors and becau e they would 



:ts 


greatly benefit exports, particularly if the 
enriched uranium produced is competitive 
in price with enriched uranium from 
the United States. In addition, it is 
argued that a country's power generation 
should not depend on a single, foreign 
source for the supply of fuel. Some of 
these arguments are, however, open to 
challenge. 

Fast breeder reactors are likely to become 
competitive by the end of the 
next decade and this will reduce the demand 
for enriched uranium. In the 
meantime, the IAEA, given the resources, 
could become a major supplier of enriched 
uranium. It would need to buy its 
~tock from the nuclear weapon powers 
but, even so, it would represent a source 
of supply independent of the present 
sources. The argument that gas centrifuge 
development can be justified on 
economic grounds is also open to challenge. 
It is predicted that, in 1980, the 
Capenhurst .plant will supply only about 
30 per cent of the enriched uranium required 
to fuel the British nuclear power 
reactors installed at that time. The cost 
of importing from the United States the 
additional enrichment services then required 
will be about £12 million per year 
at present prices. The cost involved for 
the Common Market countries is likely 
to be about ten times this sum. But a 
gas centrifuge plant adequate for the 
separative work required for Europeancountries would cost at least £500 million 
and would be expensive to run. The real 
price of the enriched uranium produced 
is likely to be, at best, only marginally 
chea,per than that of fuel imported from 
the United States. The main argumentagainst the development of gas centifuges 
is that they could be used as a source of 
supply of uranium-235 for the production 
of nuclear weapons and also of 
thermonuclear weapons. Moreover, because 
it could be enclosed in a small 
area, a plant would be easy to conceal. 

The major danger is that, once the technical 
problems of the production of centrifuges 
are overcome, as now seems to 
be the case, some country might produce 
and export them. Therefore any government 
anxious to avoid assisting pro


liferation would not undertake the production 
of gas centrifuges for what 
might prove to be very marginal economic 
reasons. If a new source of supplyof enriched uranium is felt to be necessary 
for political reasons, then a more 
suitable solution would be for the IAEA 
to become the supplier, and if a gas cen· 
trifuge plant really proves to be a necessity, 
this should be owned ·by the agency. 

The fact that Great Britain, West Germany 
and the Netherlands are proceeding 
with the proposed collaborative development 
in spite of their stated sincere 
intentions not to encourage the proliferation 
of nuclear wea,pons is difficult to 
explain except as the result of an almost 
irresistible process which began when 
technology made the development of gascentrifuges possible. Once this has occurred, 
the momentum of the process 
carries it on until the development has 
been completed. The problem is that, at 
an early stage, the effects of a technological 
advance begin to spread mpidly 
and to involve an ever increasing number 
of subsidiary industries, institutions 
and interests. It is the totality of the 
forces that can be brought to bear by 
these that produces the momentum of 
the development. An extreme exampleof this is the development of the automobile, 
the production of which now involves 
such a complex network of 
secondary concerns that the pressures 
which would be called into play if the 
production of automobiles were interfered 
with would be virtually irresistible. 
Therefore, if a development is to be controlled, 
it is essential that this be done 
soon after it is shown to be feas·ible, 
otherwise the momentum acquired inevitably 
carries the process 'along to the bitter 
end, in spite of reasons against it. 
This state of affairs has the most serious 
consequences in advanced societies because 
the scale of technology is now so 
large, and has so many facets, that the 
very existence of the pol-itical institutions 
in these societies is threatened, as is indicated 
by the social unrest in these ad


vanced societies. 

Tf future arms control and arms reduction 
negotiations are to have a reason



able chance of success it will be necessary 
to find a method of influencing the 
momentum of weapons technology. The 
simplest way to achieve this would be 
for political leaders to intervene, arnd stop 
or restrain at an early stage any development 
which is likely to have adverse 
effects on either the strategic balance between 
the superpowers or on the forthcoming 
arms control negotiations. It is,
however, unlikely for several reasons that 
political leaders will perform this task. 
First, these actions are likely to be politically 
unpopular, at least until people 
are educated in the necessity for these 
measures, and influential lobbies have to 
be contended with. Secondly, the leaders 
do not necessarily fully understand the 
consequences of a given development until 
it has passed the stage where restraint 
can be easily imposed . Thirdly, the expert 
advisors to the leaders are often 
themselves involved jn the relevant technology 
and are, therefore, not able to 
give objective advice. Finally, the, ultimate 
decision may depend on a cho.ice 
between alternatives which can only be 
made on the basis of sophisticated knowledge 
of more than one subject. 

British policy 

The probable consequences of a continuation 
of the superpower arms race 
are so serious that all states should adlllpt 
their policies in an effort to prevent this. 
Otherwise it is likely that the conditions 
necessary for arms control and disarmament 
negotiations will not occur againfor the foreseeable future and that the 
strategic balance between the superpowers 
will be eroded and destroyed. The 
forthcoming disarmament talks are, 
therefore of extreme importance for the 
future of world security and it is clearlyin the British interest that they should 
be successful ; any deterioration in the 
detente between the superpowers has an 
adverse effect on Britain. If they are not 
successful a large general increase in the 
levels of arms in all states can be predicted, 
including the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and the acquisition and 
dis emination of biological and chemical 
weapom by smaller power . 

It can be expectep that jt will take a long 
time·to reach an agreement ·On significant 
arms reduction measures and it is important 
that Britain plays a positive role 
during this period. The primary aim of 
British policy should be to avoid extending 
her own nuclea.J," forces or, better still, 
to reduce them and.. not to. make easier 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or 
the means to obtain such weapons byother powers. , 

., 

I feel that the IAEA should be given sutficient 
resources and. support ,to enable 
it to become the body recognised as having 
the major responsibility for internation,
al co-operation in the development of 
nuclear energy. If the agency had this 
role, not only would the development of 
reactor programmes, , particularly. in the 
developing countries, be more efficientlyperformed, but the entire operation could 
be organised in a way which would minimise 
the probability of the . spread of 
nucJear weapons. •The agency alreadyperforms pre-investment studies on nuclear 
power in developing countries and 
there seems no good reason why the 
agency should not become generally responsible 
for advising on contracts for 
nuclear power reactors, acting as consultants 
during the instal1ation of imported 
reactors, supplying the fuel for 
these reactors, collecting the spent fuel 
elements and separating and storing the 
plutonium. In the next decade it is expected 
that about 50 power reactors will 
be imported by less advanced countries. 

If the fuel for these were to be provided 
free by the agency then it would own the 
fuel throughout its life ; this would 
largely solve the problem of the diversion 
for military purposes of plutonium.
stored on the territory of many states and 
would also ensure that non-industrial 
countries obtained the cheapest possible ' 
electricity since they would have no fuel 
costs. There are, of course, objections to 
this proposal, but none of them is serious 
compared with the dangers inherent 
in the dissemination throughout the world 
of huge quantities of plutonium. It i to 
be hoped that the Non-proliferation 
Treaty will not cause states to be lulled 
into a sense of false security, because this 


treaty cannot be relied upon completely 
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, for the treaty is likely to be 
most effective in the cases of the present 
near-nuclear weapon . powers, but mightbe relatively ineffective in preventingproliferation to some of the other countries. 
If just one more state acquires even 
primitive nuclear wea,pons others will 
probably follow the example. As a potential 
expQrter of power reactors Britain 
has a clear responsibiHty to devise a 
pol.icy which would avoid increasing the 
possibility of proliferation and should 
negotiate with the other present or likely 
reactor exporters (Canada, Sweden, 
France, Japan, West Germany, the Soviet 
Union and the United States) to get an 
agreed export policy. A possible policy 
would be that reactors are exported only 
if the receiving country agrees to obtain 
its fuel from the agency and to return 
the spent reactor elements to the agency. 

The fuel could be supplied free, as suggested 
above, and the plutonium produced 
in fuel elements sold back to the 
country, if and when required for peaceful 
purposes. Britain should not supplymaterials of technical assistance for the 
construction of new plutonium separation 
plants. British policy should be that 
all separation plants and all new enrichment 
plants, gas diffusion or centrifuge, 
should be owned and controlled by the 
IAEA. A considerable expansion of IAEA 
activities must, in any case, take place if 
it is to fulfil its inspection functions under 
the Non-proliferation Treaty. British 
support for the strengthening of the 
agency will be important and every effort 
should be made to ensure that the necessary 
resources are available in time. It is 
important that the agency is seen to have 
full political support from Britain and 
this could be achieved by such methods 
as making available to the agency the 
results of the research on safeguards being 
done in this country for national control 
purposes, the .initiation of joint research 
projects and concrete proposals 
for an expansion of the agency's activities 
on the lines suggested above. 

After the RAF Vulcans are withdrawn 
from service, which wiH occur before 

1970, the British strategic nuclear force 
will consist only of Polaris submarines. 
By 1970, the Polaris fleet of four nuclear 
powered missile submarines will be complete. 
The recent reports that the government 
is consider-ing the possibilityof installing MIRV warheads on the Polaris 
missiles are disturbing and it is 
hoped that they are not true. Polaris 
missiles already contain primitive multiple 
warheads, but there are not target-
able. The Ministry of Defence has apparently 
largely solved the technical 
problems involved with MIRVS but it is 
likely that the system is still in the development 
stage. The deployment of 
MIRVs by the British would be a wrongdecision, not only because it might comp!.
icate the negotiations between the 
superpowers but also because of the implications 
for British relations with European 
states. The French, for example, 
are likely to find objectionable a continued 
special relationship between Britain 
and the United States, by which 
Britain obtains nuclear information, and 
this could greatly complicate British entry 
into the Common Market. H Britain 
does not restrain future developments of 
her nuclear forces it could stimulate the 
French to improve the quality of their 
nuclear forces and this will produce increasing 
pressure for national nuclear 
forces in other European countries. It 
will, in any case, be difficult enough to 
prevent such pressures building up in the 
future in West Germany, for example, if 
the British and French indefinitely continue 
their nuclear forces even at present 
announced levels. The growing prosperity 
and the current emphasis on independence 
in many European countries mayaccentuate demands for nuclear weapons, 
and the British government should be 
aware that its actions could encouragethose groups within these countries which 
argue in favour of a nuclear force. Some 
authorities argue, however, that an integrated 
Anglo-French nuclear force assigned 
to the Western European Union 
would reduce such pressures for independent 
nuclear deterrents. The most 
sensible British reaction to the Soviet 
ABM deployment is, therefore, not to respond 
at all. An additional argumentagainst any further hardening of Polaris 


warheads, if any further reason is necessary, 
is that the cost is likely to be very 
large. 

So far as NATO is concerned, a majorproblem at the moment is the desire of 
some European countries for a greaterinvolvement in nuclear planning and decision 
making. British policy on this issue 
ought to emphasise the opportunities for 
mvolvement in the co-ordination on nuclear 
issues within the Nuclear PlanningGroup and to attempt ·to ensure that this 
satisfies those powers who desire more 
participation. For the sake of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty and future arms 
control agreements it is essential that all 
proposals for a European nuclear force 
are rapidly rejected. For the present,
there is a good case for leaving NATO 
essentially undisturbed and, as a main 
aim, working for cohesion within western 
Europe and an eventual improvement of, 
relations with eastern Europe. 

There should not, however, be significant 
changes in the present nuclear decision 
making process, although it could be 
argued that Britain should make definite 
and elaborated proposals concerningnuclear planning in order to influence 
such factors as the actions which should 
precede the contemplation of the use of 
nuclear weapons or the size of forces. 
In spite of recent statements, the best 
policy for NATO would be to acquire a 
non-nuclear option in Europe and a 
greater flexibiLity in its plans. Finally,
the Nuclear Planning Group is keepingunder review developments of ABM systems. 
lt is to be hoped that the British 
representative will emphasise the complete 
undesirability of a European ABM 
system. 

lt can be concluded that the first aim of 
British policy should be to influence, in 
a positive way, the forthcoming arms 
control negotiations, in particular byexercising extreme restraint in her commercial 
nuolear practice and in the development 
of her nuclear forces, by giving 
all possible support to the !AEA, and 
by attempting to negotiate an agreedpolicy for reactor exporter countries. It 
1s probably unrealistic to expect a reduc


tion of British nuclear forces in the near 
future, but it is important that the quantity 
and1quality of these forces should 
not be increased. A possible policy would 
be to make nuclear disarmament byBritain conditional on a significant arms 
redLlction agreement by the superpowers. 

the problem of China 

The problem of China is often raised 
as a reason why sign·ificant disarmament 
measures are unlikely to be taken by the 
superpowers. It is not likely, however, 
that the Chinese will become a serious 
mil·itary threat to the rest of the world 
in the foreseeable future. Not only are 
the Chinese leaders preoccupied with internal 
problems, but they have shown 
theselves to be both rational and predictable 
in their external affairs. Contrary to 
the popular view, the available evidence 
indicates that the Chinese have a realistic 
view of the consequences of nuclear 
war, even a small one, and are anxious 
to avoid the outbreak of such a war. 

They consider it unwise, however, to emphasise 
the dangers of nuclear war and 
argue that the best way to avoid such a 
war is to be militarily strong. China has, 
so far, expressed little interest in arms 
control and disarmament and appears to 
believe that, to show such an interest 
would indicate a fear of nuclear war, 
which would make it more likely to 
occur. In 1962, however, the Chinese 
government did propose a conference of 
an countries to discuss the question of 
the complete prohibition and destruction 
of nuclear weapons, although this was 
before China had acquired nuclear weapons, 
of course. The motive for acquiring 
nuclear weapons was almost certainly 
based on Chinese ambitions to attain 
superpower status as quickly as possible 
and on the argument that all great powers 
have nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons 
are probably regarded as a method 
of deterring, rather than threatening, the 
United States (or the Soviet Union) and 
of increasing Chinese power within the 
communist system and in Asia. So far ~s 
China is concerned, therefore, there JS ' 
no reason why the superpowers should 


not go ahead w.ith . their arms control 
and arms reduction negotiations with the 
hope that China could be •incorporated 
into them later. It is realistic to hopethat when China has increased her 
strength to a point where she feels relatively 
secure she will then be prepared, 
and possibly anxious, to enter into arms 
control agreements. This, after all, is 
what has happened in the case of United 
States and the Soviet Union. It is significant 
that China is the only nuclear 
power to have made a pledge not to be 
the first to use nuclear weapons. 

A no first-use agreement in which all 
five of the nuclear weapon powers would 
pledge not to utilise nuclear weaponsagainst, or on the territory of, non-nuclear-
weapon powers, may assist the fulfilment 
of the present need to provide the 
non-nuclear weapon powers with further 
guarantees of their security and therebyhelp to balance and reinforce the Nonproliferation 
Treaty by imposing obligations 
on the nudear-weapon powers. As 
we have seen, the existing guarantee 
arrangements are probably not sufficient. 

The no first use agreement would only 
be plausible if it were followed by reasonable 
arms control and arms reduction 
agreements. The combination of these 
measures would have several importantadvantages: it probably represents the 
most effective practicable guarantee to 
protect non-nuclear-weapon states against 
nuclear attack or the threat of attack ; 
it would indicate that the nuclear-wea.pon 
powers recognise the limited value of 
nuclear weapons in the conduct of international 
affairs; it would reduce reliance 
on "tactical" nuclear weapons for the 
defence of areas like Europe ; and it 
might lead to a future total prohibition 
of the use of nuclear wea.pons. 

It is not unlikely that Great Britain, the 

' 
United States and the Sov.iet Union 
would be willing seriously to consider 
such a no first use pledge. So far as the 
French are concerned, the officially announced 
purpose of the force de frappeis solely to provide a deterrent against 
nuclear attack and the French govern· 
ment should, therefore, have no objec


tion to joining the agreement. In view 
of her unilateral pledge, it would be reasonable 
to e~pect China tacitly to adhere 
to the pledge. The problem of non-nuclear-
weapon powers who have nuclear 
weapons on their territory but not under 
their control, .is a complex one and, to 
obtain agreement, it may be necessary to 
exclude these from the pledge. As with 
all guarantees, the main objection raised 
to the suggestion of a no first use pledge 
relates to its credibility. However, solemn 
undertakings by states are usually not 
taken lightly and a no first use pledgeis probably the best guarantee, short of 
complete nuclear disarmament, that 
could be hoped for in the present circumstances. 


future weapon developments 

If the superpowers fail to agree to re~ 
strain future weapon development new 
weapons are likely soon to be made 
available. 

It can be predicted that MIRvs will be 
made increasingly accurate. The United 
States is at present developing a MIRV 
containing a guidance system and thruster 
rockets that enable it to make minor 
manoeuvres soon after the main booster 
rocket has stopped so that, at an altitude 
of 600 to 800 miles a number of course 
and speed changes occur and a warhead 
is ejected each time. Because of the attitude, 
the targets at which the warheads 
are aimed could be hundreds of miles 
a.part and sever·al degrees of longitude or 
latitude to either side of the missile trajectory. 
It is likely that a MJRV can carry 
up to 20 kiloton size warheads, each with 
its own guidance system programmed to 
take it to a specific target. If the accuracy 
of MIRVs becomes high they will be 
exceedingly formidable weapons. 

In addition, FOBS will probably be developed 
to an operational level . These 
weapons are launched into a very low 
orbit around the earth about 100 miles 
high, and, at a point in the first orbit, a 
retro-rocket is fired to slow down the 
missile which then drops out of orbit on 
to the target. The orbit of P<>Bs would 


have an almost constant altitude above 
the earth's surface (an rcBM would follow 
a true ballistic trajectory, which has 
much more curvature) which means that 
a FOBS would not be detected by groundradar until it was within a range of 
about 900 miles. The warning time would 
be only a!bout three minutes, comparedwith the corresponding warning times for 
an TCBM of ten minutes. Also, a missile 
on a fraction orbit trajectory could be 
made to approach the opponents' radar 
system from a direction which would 
make its detection less likely. 

ABM systems will almost certainly be further 
developed. A new high acceleration 
(500g) anti-missile is being developed in 
the United States for the point-defenceof ICBM sites. Seaborn ABMS (SABMIS) are 
also under development. These presumably 
are designed to intercept enemy

•CBMS in the early part of their trajectory. 
In addition, space based and sea 
bed systems, to intercept ICBMs soon after 
they have been fired, are no doubt under 
active consideration. 
An ABM system could be based upon a 
defence screen estabJjshed by exploding 
very large nuclear warheads in space. If 
this occurred inside the earth's magneticfield the charged particles released by the 
nuclear explosions would move along the 
lines of the field and might achieve a 
density sufficient to inactivate an incoming 
enemy warhead. As alternatives to a 
plasma of charged particles, defence 
screens of small pellets and gasses have 
been suggested. The future use of lasers 
for ABM systems is another possibility, 
although this requires the projection of 
large ftuxes of radiation over great distances. 


As far as the smaller powers are concerned. 
the development of chemical and 
biological weapons presents a grave dan 
ger to their stability. The dissemination 
of these weapons. which are the cheapest 
weapons of mass destruction, could be 
particular serious for some regions, such 
as the Middle East. There has been much 
rliscussion of the feasibility of controlling 
the development of chemical and 
biological weapons. The 1925 Geneva 

Protocol provides sorne guard against the 
use of these weapons, but many coun-. 
tries such as the United States and Jrupan 
are net parties to the protocol. Only 60 
states ·have signed, and all states partyhave the right to manufacture and stockpile 
such weapons ; and some reserve 
the right to use them against non-
parties, or violators of the protocol and 
their allies. There is also doubt about its 
legal status. Even if all states acceded to 
the, protocol there would still be a risk 
of the use of the weapons since states 
have the right to manufacture them and 
use them against those who violate it. 

Moreover, the definition of chemical and 
biological weapons is unsatisfactory and 
the prohibition of their use only applies 
"in war". There is, therefore, ambiguity 
about its applicability in the case of hostilities 
which do not amount to war in 
the legal sense. In view of this, the British 
delegate at the ENDC has proposed 
that the questions of chemical and microbiological 
methods of warfare should be 
considered separately to decrease the difficulty 
of dealing with their control. It 
was proposed that a new Convention for 
the Prohibition of Microbiological Methods 
of Warfare be concluded, to supplement, 
but not to supersede, the 1925 
protocol and, with a view to aiding consideration 
of further measures for controlling 
chemical warfare, it was proposed 
that the Secretary General should 
in fact be asked to prepare a report on 
chemical weapons. The reason for exoluding 
them from the convention at this 
stage is that it ~s difficult to secure agreement 
on banning all chemical agents because 
some of these have legitimatepeaceful uses in the field of riot control. 

There is disagreement on whether the 
protocol signed in 1925 covers all chemi-. 
ea! agents or just lethal ones. Because 
chemical weapons have been used in war 
it was felt that states might not be wiH-~ 
ing to give up the manufacture of chemi· 
ea! agents and the right to conduct re· 
search in this field . The convention would 
require that states "declare their belief 
that the use of microbiological methods 
of warfa re of any kind and in any cir· 
cumstances should be treated as con



trary to international law and a cnme 
against humanity and undertake never 
to engage in such methods of warfare 
themselves in any cirmumstances". It is 
envisaged that there would be a ban on 
the .production of biological agents on a 
scale which was not justified for peaceful 
application. There is disagreement over 
the feasibility of effective verification of 
control agreements concerning biological 
weapons., The official British position is 
that strict verification is not possible and 
it has been suggested that a United Nations 
body of experts be set up to investigate 
allegations, made by a party 
to the proposed convention, which appeared 
to establish that another partyhad violated the convention. It has, however, 
been argued by others that a measure 
of verification may be possible in 
the production phase of biological weapons 
of military significance and that control 
over production and testing are sufficient. 
A final answer to this questionmust await further research. 

A serious omission from the protocol is 
a formal procedure for investigating violations. 
Chemical weapons have been 
used in the Yemen and Vjetnam, but no 
effective investigations have been performed. 
An urgent requirement is, therefore, 
the establishment of a procedure 
to investigate the use of chemical and 
biological weapons which would enable 
sanctions to be imposed and act as a 
constraint on use. So far as the control 
of chemical weapons is concerned, it has 
been sug.gested that even a modest production 
of these weapons could be detected 
from an analysis of a country's consumption 
of certain raw materials and 
the existence of plant and equipment. If 
this is so, the verification of the control 
of chemical weapons may be less difficult 
than is usually assumed. 

Future steps to achieve control of chemi' 
cal and biological weapons might be: 

I. the improvement of the Geneva protocol 
to remove present ambiguities and,
I thereby, to attempt to obtain greater adherence 
to the protocol. A main requirement 
is international agreement on the 
definition of chemical warfare ; 

2. the supplementation of the protocol by 
the proposed UK Convention on the Prohibition 
of Microbiological Warfare, including 
a ban on the production and possession 
of biological weapons ; 
3. a thorough investigation of the feasibility 
of developing effective inspection 
methods to verify control agreements, 
particularly in the production phases of 
biological and chemical weapons ; 
4. the establishment of a sound procedure 
to investigate the alleged use of 
chemical and biological weapons. 
If some powers equip themselves with 
chemical and biological weapons others 
find it necessary to develop defensive 
measures against these weapons. It is, 
for example, officially claimed that British 
efforts in this field are purely defensive 
and that Britain is not manufacturing 
or stockpiling chemical or biological 
weapons. The fact is, however, that if a 
defence is found for these weapons there 
is likely to be a further escalation of the 
means of attack. In this sense, the relationship 
between offence and defence so 
far as chemical and biological weapons 
are concerned does not differ from that 
for any other type of weapon. 


7. the East-West detente 
Alan Lee Willl ams MP and Geoffrey Lee Williams 

The present strategic nuclear balance between 
the United States and the Soviet 
Union will probably remain a permanent 
feature of the international scene 
for as long as we can forsee, although 
the nature of that balance will itself 
change from time to time under the impact 
of a volatile military technology. 

Strategic parity between these two superpowers 
will be accepted as an inescapable 
and desirable fact which neither 
country will wish seriously to challenge.
Although it should be noted that the 
Nixon administration appears to believe 
that the Soviet Union is now going for 
a first strike capability vis-a-vis the 
United States. The supposition, however, 
in Robert McNamara's time as Secretary 
of Defence was that the Soviet Union 
was incapable of acquiring the ability to 
launch a devastating attack which could 
destroy America's capacity to retaliate. 
Yet recently in detailed testimony before 
the us Senate Armed Sevices Committee, 
Defence Secretary Melvin Laird asserted 
that, "the potential threat from 
the Soviet Union lies in the growing missile 
force, which could destroy a portion 
of our deterrent, or destroy a portion of 
our retaliatory force". The nature of the 
new threat, he explained, lay in the deployment 
by the Soviet Union of the 
SS-9, a hard-sited, liquid-fuelled Soviet 
h BM capable of delivering a 25 megatonwarhead, or as many as five scottershot 
smaller ones. He claimed that more than 
200 SS-9s had been declared operational 
and that still more were due for deployment, 
which might give the Soviet Union 
a realistic pre-emptive strike capacity. 

Later, before the same committee Deputy 
Secretary Packard concluded: "analysisbrought us to the conclusion that the 
Soviet Union has the capability of being 
able to destroy substantially all of our 
land based Minuteman capability in 
hardened silos, if they chose to do so". 
Melvin Laird further declared that the 
Russians had embarked upon a crash 
nuclear missile submarine con truction 
programme which might give them a lead 
over the us Polaris submarine force pos~
Jbly as early as 1971 . This development 
was made potentially more seriou be


cause the Soviets had developed a fast 
nuclear attack submarine designed to 
hunt down and destroy the Polaris submarines. 
Laird suggested that as a result 
it remained doubtful whether, after 1972 
the us Polaris fleet would "remain very 
free from attack". However, the likelihood 
remains that the Soviet SS-9 ICBM 
is almost certainly a second strike weapon. 
The us does not possess a first strike 
capability against the Soviet Union for 
precisely the same reason that the Soviet 
Union does not possess it against the us. 

Both superpowers have built up second 
strike capabilities to the point that a 
first strike capability on either side is 
now frankly impossible. The inescapablefact is that neither the Soviet Union nor 
the United States can attack the other 
without being destroyed in retaliation ; 
nor can either side attain a meaningfulfirst strike capability in the foreseeable 
future . The present us attitude on the 
question of ballistic missile defence must 
be seen as having relevance to the maintenance 
of a credible second strike retaliatory 
system. This can be gauged bythe fact that President Nixon has decided 
to protect the Minuteman sites as opposed 
to the previous attempt under 
Johnson to try to protect cities as well. 
The Soviet government decided to deploya ballistic missile defence system around 
Leningrad and Moscow and as a result 
provoked an American response. 

Neither the appearance of President 
Nixon nor the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
can be regarded as likely to induce 
a greatly accelerated arms race between 
the two military giants. Their jointinterests will dictate a realistic mutual 
accommodation, the extent of which depends 
upon the settlement of the Vietnam 
war and at least some kind of tacit 
understanding over the Middle East. 
None of this will be easy. South Vietnam 
cannot be cynically betrayed by the 
us nor Israel denied us displomatic and 
military support; the former would 
gravely damage America's image as the 
reliable superpower committed to the defence 
of vul nerable allies and the latter 
could conceivably compel Israel to gonuclear. 



It is necessary to put into perspective the 
nature of Russo-American strategic relations 
since 1945 and in passing to question 
the intellectual foundations which 
seem to underlie the theory of their converging 
strategic interests. For it is this 
convergence which has produced the 
divergence of strategic interests within 
the respective alliance systems. 

i 

the rejection of isolationism 

The United States, in the wake of Hitler's 
defeat and the sudden collapse of Japan, 
based its diplomatic hopes on the concept 
of "one world" and the rejection of 
isolationism. In future she would encourage 
the doctrine of co-operation between 
the great powers. This kind of 
thinking explains how the USA concluded 
that the fact that the threat to peace had 
been removed would now enable a war 
tormented world to settle down to an 
orderly existence based upon Russo-
American co-operation and political understanding. 
Then the cold war intervened. 
The ensuing arms race, however, 
Y ended in stalemate at the strategic nuc~ 
lear level within a decade, and this bet
·, came virtually total by the end of the 

1 

r second post-war decade with the coming]. of second strike retaliatory systems. The 
Y Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955, 
~ through a spectacular diplomatic failure,
marked the acceptance of stalemate 
based as it then was on the manned 
bomber. Again, the abortive Paris Sumnl 
mit Conference of May 1960 marked the 

O· 

reality of approaching strategic nuclear 

n· 

deadlock. The Soviet breaking of the 
e· nuclear test moratorium the following 
nl year, added reality to this deadlock, for 
ral she thus improved her deterrent caple
· acity vis-a-vis America. Finally the 
el· liquidation of the Cuban missile crisis 
cit laid the foundations for the successful 
1
111· negotiations leading to the partial Nucel
· ' lear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963 , 
rhe and five years later to the Non-prolifer.
od ation Treaty. Indeed, not even the Vietild 
nam war shattered this superpower rela!
be tionship which was in some perverse wayde· actually strengthened by their collective 
ter fear of having to back recalcitrant and 
go intransigent allies. 

China refused to sign the test ban treatyand South Vietnam at first refused to 
negotiate an end to the war that was 
causing America so much diffioulty, in 
loss of life and treasure. This certainlymade Russo-American understanding inevitable 
and palatable and led to renewed 
interest in the concept of "one world" 
which was now to be frankly based upon 
a bi-polar relationship. Now the diplomatic 
dialogue spoke a·bout international 
security, common interest in 
the prevention of the spread of nuclear 
weapons and "crisis management". Both 
superpowers wished to check the anarchic 
tendencies of a world of sovereign nation 
states living in a "state of nature". The 
growth of such a conservative attitude 
was in a sense inevitable ; it was not in 
fact entirely unexpected. 

The idea of a bipolar world or "duopoly", 
frankly based on the hegemony of 
the two great powers, seemed a highlyattractive prospect. The burdens of alliance-
based diplomacy began to affect 
the us perspectives and many American 
academic strategists gave brilliant expression 
to a change of emphasis which gave

birth to the hope that the realisation of 
a safe and less complicated world was,
perhaps, just around the corner. This 
sort of speculation soon caused alarm 
to many differently placed governmentsboth inside and outside the western 
alliance. Franco-German alarm at the 
prospect of this duopoly found an echo 
in the Chinese press that America and 
Russia, particularly over the war in Vietnam, 
were on collusion course, not collision 
course! The spectre of a superpower 
domination of the entire globe 
became the nightmare of many statesmen, 
aligned and non-aligned, whose 
thoughts turned to "spheres of interests" 
tightly held under the grip of a Soviet 
and American imperialist design. 

the Soviet refusal 

The Soviets have ideologically found the 
us interest in a possible joint power relationship 
an impossible idea. But in 
terms of power they did perceive the 
advantages of an understanding over so



called spheres of influence. The Summit 
Conference of 1955 and Mr. Khrushchev's 
visit to the USA in the Autumn of 
1959 confirmed the nature of the emerging 
balance frankly based upon irreconcilable 
social systems whose militarymight was now.._ _oriented towards stalemate 
and in time total nuclear deadlock. 

A stabilised world order was ideologically 
speaking inadmissable, but the idea 
of joint spheres of interest led to Mr 
Khrushchev's definition of co-existence. 
This was essentially, though not entirely,
pragmatic. Soviet interest in co-existence 
diplomacy was not entirely bogus since 
it was also a device to perpetuate the 
power dominance of the Soviet Union in 
an increasingly polycentric and differentiated 
world as well as a means of embarrassing 
the West. The communist 
world movement was threatening to fly 
apart and between 1960 and 1964 the 
process had begun to occur at a pacewhich highly alarmed the exuberant 
Khrushchev, Russian diplomacy struck a 
real note of accord with the growingAmerican interest in disarmament and 
arms control . The meeting of the Ten 
Nation Disarmament Committee, though 
not without real moments of tragi-comedy, 
was a reflection of the joint power 
interest which both Russia and America 
felt about the arms race. 

Furthermore even the Soviet politicaloffensive over West Berlin carried with 
it strong collusive aspects which in fact 
led to a crisis within the western camp(Coral Bell, The debatable alliance, 
Chatham House, 1964). Of course the 
nuclear test ban talks were the chosen 
vehicle for the unfolding of the collusive 
intent of the two superpowers and the 
non-proliferation talks further evidence 
of this. 

joint power considerations 

The two superpowers were growingalarmed about the secondary nuclear 
arms race and as a result discovered a 
characteristic in common which "theycould not or would not share with their 
respective allies: the final decision over 

peace or war" (C. · Gasteyger: The 
American Dilemma: Bipolarity or Alliance 
Cohesion. ISS, 1966). Their respective 
alliance systems, however, were flying 
apart ; and this tended to undermine 
their conjoint control of events which 
might lead to war. In the case of NATO 
the difficulties are well known. The 
events of 1958-1962 over Berlin led to 
the Franco-German alliance and the 
French withdrawal from NATO in 1966. 

The Warsaw Pact powers were also to 
display fissiparous tendencies which in 
1956 and 1968 took a dramatic form. 
The Soviet attitude to this problem is of 
interest because her growing interest in 
accommodation with her superpower adversary 
is in part a reflection of heightened 
alliance difficulties. Of course, the 
incidents in March 1969 over DamanskyIsland between Soviet and Chinese troopsfurther strengthened the case for detente. 

The Soviet government, for example, invested 
the Warsaw Pact with a militarysignificance after 1961, which it singularly 
lacked prior to this, since, at the 
time of its foundation in May 1955, it 
was merely a political device to offset 
the rearmament of West Germany within 
the framework of the western European 
agreements. But the increased importanceof the Warsaw Pact countries in the 
military defence of the Soviet Union 
merely increased the political disaffection 
of its members. Indeed, prior to the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968 both Roumania and Bulgaria, 
the latter usually thought to be 
reliable, had shown a marked tendency 
to oppose the Soviet Union on important 
matters. The Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was seen by the Soviet 
mil·itary as essential if the strategy of the 
"flexible response" was to be fully implemented, 
that is, Soviet troops had to 
be certain of being in the right positionshould a NATO aggression occur. 

Two features of the contemporary world 
scene in fact emerged clearly by the early 
'sixties : neither superpower could ensure 
the fate of the world even though one 
or the other or both could destroy it 
several times over ; and the sustained 


confl'ict between them actually created an 
interdependent relationship which led 
to the convergence theory, or at any rate 
to an American interest in the apparentsocio-political similarity of the mammoth 
Russian and American societies. 

convergence 

The essential prerequisite of the convergence 
theory was the somewhat over optimistic 
belief that the industrialisation 
of society must in time lead to a greater 
degree of liberalisation. Communist 
societies, so ran the argument, would increasingly 
need to reform and acceptbourgeois models of political and 
economic behaviour. Therefore, the two 
superpowers were increasingly attractive 
suitors whose social systems were becoming 
progressively alike in the face of 
encroaching maturity. The convergencetheorists argued that the Soviet Union 
and the United States were about to embark 
on a phase of "mutual discovery"
in which both would discover just how 
complementary their societies really were. 

This doctrine was fully endorsed by the 
late John Strachey (The pursuit of peace, 
Fabian tract 328, 1960). "Naturally the 
differences between them (the us and 
USSR) are still great. But the significant 
fact is that they are beginning to diminish, 
Apparently huge industrial, vigorous,
highly organised communities such as 
these come to bear certain resemblances 
to each other, however you organisetheir productive and social life". The 
decisive factor, so this school of thoughtmaintained, was the gradual socio-political 
convergence of western and Soviet 
society as a result of basic economic and 
technological advances which, thoughfounded on different ideological grounds, 
' were both determined by the economic 
basis of society. That one was thought to 
be "capitalist" and the other "communist", 
with capital owned privately in the 
former and publicly owned in the latter, 
was now discovered to be a semantic 
trick, a sleight of hand concocted bypolitical theorists whose a priori reasoning 
had invented or rationalised a formidably 
impressive theory of conflict. 

Soviet scholars rejected the new theoryas a specious notion based upon a series 
of politically semi-literate assumptions(A Kunika: The latest word in imperialist 
ideological subversion, International 
Affairs (Moscow), 1965). No Marxist 
could publicly admit that the communist 
world would in time approximate to the 
more sophisticated open societies ; the 
reverse had always been thought likely. 
China vigorously ·rejected the notion of 
convergence, but gave unexpected sup-
po-rt to the theory that since Russia was 
not genuinely communist then it was inevitable 
that she and capitalist America 
would gang up on China, and present a 
common front against her, because she 
alone was genuinely revolutionary. The 
convergence theory seems to have little 
valid1ty, and such evidence as exists, tends 
to point to a Russo-American military 
deadlock which has yet to lead to real 
political detente. Even if this did happen, 
detente does not signify a growing social 
and economic similarity between the two 
widely different social systems. It merelysignifies a diminished sense of tension 
between them. 

The convergence theory has implications 
far beyond the relations of the two superpowers 
for it is a potent cause of mischief 
within their respective alliance systems. 
The ever increasing possibility of 
an American-Soviet rapprochement must 
have the most profound impact uponAmerica's allies and Britain in particular, 
consequently it is essential not to 
confuse the convergence theory with that 
of detente. But having said that, anymarked degree of great power mutuality 
of interest, whether sociologically justified 
or not, must affect the respectivepositions of the member countries of the 
two alliance systems in a situation where 
the two superpowers have reached accommodation. 
That much is already 
clear. For example, despite Czechoslovakia, 
the East-West detente has, in part, 
reinforced the strategic dichotomy between 
those powers in Europe who believe 
western Europe must do without 
America by the mid-seventies and those 
who believe she ·is indispensable to the 
defence of Europe for, at least, the next 

twenty years. 


Some American strategists perceived that 
the two superpowers, now possessed of 
such enormous might, had really created 
the conditions of pax atomica, which 
must result in a co-existence increasingly 
based upon the mutual interests of the 
two powers mostly concerned. This line 
of reasoning has undoubtedly much to 
commend it in terms of preserving international 
security, but is the cause of 
equally undoubted a'larm to some of 
America's allies. The potency of the 
Gaullist theory that Europe can defend 
itself has increased in Europe in direct 
proportion to the spread of the notion 
that a bilateral deal was in the interest 
of Russia and America, for the sphereof Russo-American co-operation is seen 
by some commentators to be severelylimited in the short term, but open ended 
in the long term (Ronald Steele : The 
end of alliance. New York, 1964). 

International security 
and non-proliferation 

The stability of the balance of powerbecame the major factor in determining 
the whole character of the bipolar wor:ld. 
The beneficial as·pects of that balance 
was the development of a common purpose 
which, though limited to the prevention 
of an untoward step towards 
nuclear holocaust, promised the spectreof a world in the image of the two giants 
but free of the dreaded fear of immediate 
vapourisation. In the end man would 
prefer the whips of tyranny to the scorpions 
of anarchy, and the tyranny of the 
two superpowers would be a mi1d 
dynasty of enlightened self interest. The 
overriding importance of the superpower 
relationship could be seen in the way in 
which it compelled "each giant to focus 
upon crises, while rendering most of 
them of relative inconsequence". The 
concept of crisis management was born 
(see Alastair Buchan : Crisis management. 
The Atlantic Institute, 1966). 

The challenge implicit in the spread of 
nuclear weapons to new countries raised, 
according to us defence specialists, a 
profound threat to the stability of the 
bipolar world. As one writer put it, "the 
existence of a number of nuclear states 

would increase the temptation for the 
more virile of them to manoeuvre . . . 
one would be back in the 1930s with 
the addition of a new dimension of 
strength which would increase the pressure 
upon status quo powers to make 
piece-meal concessions" (Kenneth Waltz: 

The stability of a bipolar world. 

Daedalus, Summer 1964). Waltz advanced 
three basic assumptions, which 
were: "that the global balance is basically 
bipolar and stable" ; ' that it rests on 
two "status quo powers", who behave 
more responsibly than would some of 
the nuclear newcomers ; and that a 
multinuclear world is also "a multipolar 
one and, therefore, politically less manageable". 
These propositions must be 
examined. 

stable global balance 

bi 

ar 

ot 

• ab 
eo 
l 
p

it) 

In 

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st1 
o 

a 
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tic 
a 

fo 
IO 

n 

Over the last 18 to 20 years the uncon-er 
trolled arms race has resulted in some-re 
thing like mutual sta!lemate, and this has h 
effectively polarised the world into two pchuge military alliances in which the two posuperpowers have played a decisive and fn 
dominating role. Yet the distribution of th 
military power was uneven, and the bal-eq 
ance of power between these two superpowers 
always seemed to favour the USA. H1 

The principal! reasons for this were that 
the USA was essentially a maritime power 
with an enveloping commitment stretching 
half way round the gl'obe and that 
the unfolding of nuclear technology favoured 
the USA . Being first into this field, 
and also possessing an experienced strategic 
air force, the advantage of building 
a diversified deterrent system in 
which, finally, the advent of the soHd 
fuel rocket was to play a decisive role, 
meant that a strategy of "flexible response" 
(the deterrent theory of the 
stable balance of power) conferred on 
America a greater range of options than 
her major rival possessed. It could be 
clai med that the war in Vietnam has 
destroyed the validity of the flexible response 
because America was not prepared 
to escalate that conflict to the 
point of nuclear warfare. Yet this argument, 
though widely propagated, is mis



taken, for the strategy of the flexible 
response is more appropriate to conflicts 
between powers of equal rank, and to 
areas such as western Europe, rather than 
other possible theatres of conflict. The 
absence from western Europe of purely 
conventional divisions available for "below 
the threshold" miilitary operations, is 
perhaps a reason for doubting the validity 
of the flexible response strategy even 
in that theatre, although such a doctrine 
n was formally introduced by NATO in 1963. 
e The opposite of the "flexible response" 
1f · strategy is massive retaliiation. Because 
of its promise of dissuasion, this is more 
1r attractive to France, and especially to 
. West Germany than to Britain, whose na


1

1e 
tional interests dictate, should war come, 
a conventional / tacticaJl nuclear conflict 
fought on the territory of others for as 
long as possible. 

Though America possessed a prepond-
1 erance of power it is clear that a bipolar 

n· 

relationship can be said to exist where 

e· 

as two powers possess and exert enormous 
vo power in relation to other palpably lesser 
vo powers, even if the polar extremes are far 
nd, from equal; and in relation to each other, 

the two superpowers are in fact far from 
al 
0 equal. 

However, though the balance of power

cannot be said to rest on a mathematical 
1at equation, or even a rough approximation 
ver of real militaJry strength, it can be 
:ht thought of as basically stable. Again any 
nal such judgment must be qualified by the 
av certainty that stability its indeed inherently 
:id, subject to a volatille military technology. 
~a· It is stable in the sense that neither side 
i\dl can win by simply striking first because 

in both have the power, or capability, to 
Jiid retaliate. Of course it is the fear of reole, 
taliation in the face of the absence of a 
re-credible defence or interception system 
thr. that constitutes deterrence. 

0

haO The balance of power, though not a bat-
be ance of arms, is relatively polarised and 
h stable. Indeed, even in terms of a ba~lance 
the estimate of comparative strategic 
strengths in early 1969 reveals that in 
land based intercontinental balfistic missiles 
(ICBMs) the USA will have 1,054 
compared with ·between 900 and 1 ,000 

such Soviet delivery ·systems. This represents 
a fairly dramatic change in favour 
of the Soviet Union, for the position in 
early 1968 was that the USA had 1,054 
land based rcBMs, compared with the 
Soviet Union's 520. It must be remembered, 
however, that Polaris submarines, 
where the us advantage in numbers and 
performance is equally dramatic, probably 
more than compensate for the 
Soviet build up in land based delivery 
vehicles. (The USA has 656 submarine 
based missiles compared with 125 deployed 
by the Soviet Union.) But 
America still retains, in our view, overaU 
superiority even if there is a growinga,pproximation of milita·ry strength. This 
superiority does not consist merely in 
terms of gross megatonnage or indeed in 
the number of missile launchers available; 
the real test lies in the number "of 
separate warheads that are capable of 
being delivered with accuracy on in-
d'ividua•l high priority targets with sufficient 
power to destroy them" (see McNamara's 
statement to UPI editors in San 
Francisco on Monday 17 September1967). In this respect there may be said 
to be a military balance between the 
superpowers, but America probably has 
much the most efficient delivery system, 
and it is this capability which matters 
mJther than sheer weight of numbers. 
The superpower balance has been recently 
altered by the introduction of 
anti-ballistic missile defence systems, 
although the ways of overcoming the 
ABM, in fact, appear currently to be a•lmost 
limitless for the attacker. As Robert 
McNamara observed in his San Francisco 
speech, which on the question of 
American defence was an exquisite exposition 
of deterrence theory, any ABM 
system "can be defeated by an enemy 
simply sending more offensive warheads, 
or dummy warhead's, than there are defensive 
missiles capable of disposing of 
them". The issue of ballistic missile defence 
was for McNamara virtually a 
closed one in relation to a possihleSoviet nuclear attack. This was made 
clear, repeatedly, in his -testimony before 
the Sena.te Armed Services Committee 
and was maintained in the face of 
the views of the Chiefs of Staff and certain 
elements in Congress, and of the 


atomic energy establishment and aerospace 
industry. The following dialogue 
makes this perfectly clear: 

Senator: "You are saying that the Nike 
X system--even as envisaged in the 
1970s-can be offset without too much 
trouble?" 

McNamara: "In a.ll probability, all we 
would accomplish would be to increase 
greatly both thek defence expenditures 
and ours without any gain in real security 
to either side". 

Wheeler: "We believe that we should go 
ahead now and start to deploy ; one nation 
will probably survive best in a nuclear 
exchange, and the 30, 40 or 50 million 
American lives that could be saved 
are, therefore, meaningful in everysense". (festimony before the Senate 
Anned Services Committee, Ma·rch 1967).
The latter's argument, incidentally, was 
echoed in Tass oby Marshal Chuykov(Head of Soviet Civil Defence) on Moscow 
television in February 1967, when 
he said : "There exists every possibility 
to exclude completely or cut down considerably, 
losses in human life and material 
values in the event of nuclear 
attack" (quoted •in Survival, August1967). 

Robert McNama•ra was clearly against 
trying to provide the us with an impenetrable 
shield against a possible Soviet 
nuclear attack since he was convinced on 
the basis of the best evidence available 
that such an enterprise is futile. The 
offence still rema~ins supreme and for the 
us to spend vast sums on ABM procurement 
against a Soviet attack would represent 
a bad piece of investment which 
would leave America in her quest for 
security relatively no better off. But in 
McNamara's thinking there was a qualification 
about the uses to which ABMS 
might be put and he said, "We should 
seriously consider" in relation to the 
nuclear capability of China "greater protection 
of our strategic offensive forces" 
in a situation where "the Chinese are 
devoting very substantial resources to the 
development of both nuclear warheads 
and missile delivery systems". 

The susp1c1on that the Ohinese oriented 
ABM system was really the thin end of 
the wedge of a thick procurement vis-a


vis a Soviet nuclear attack became widespread. 
The Times on 18 September 1967 
described the us decision as "a terrible 
baga.teJ.le" and observed "there seems no 
readiness to accept, however, that as the 
Chinese missile programme expands and 
develops, so the American ABM defence 
will also have to expand and develop to 
the stage when it may be hard to distinguish 
between a system designed apparently 
to defend America againstChina and one which could perform that 
function very adequaJtely against Russia 
as well". Indeed in McNamara's statement 
itself there was the suppressed promise 
that Russia was the rea.l source of 
the ABM syndrome: "The Chinese 
oriented ABM deployment would enable 
us to add, as a concurrent benefit, a 
further defence of our Minuteman sites 
against Soviet a.ttack, which means that 
at a modest cost we would in fact be 
adding even greater effectiveness to our 
offensive missile force and avoiding a 
much more costly expansion of that 
force" . This interpretation must look awfully 
clear to Soviet military strategists 
who are ready enough to identify the 
American interest in ABM as an overt 
anti-Soviet move. The Russian procurement 
of ABM might after all be seen bythem as a ·limited and measured response 
to us superiority, a posture made necessary 
:by the need to retain a credible 
second strike capacity and thus ensure 
Soviet deterrent capability? However, 
the Nixon decision to deploy ballistic 
missile defences around Minuteman bases 
under the limited system called Safeguard 
is clearly consistent with a second 
strike doctrine as opposed to the Soviet 
objection that the McNamara deploy-· 
ment was consistent with a pre-emptivestrike posture because American cities 
were to be protected against nuclear 
attack. 

responsible status quo 
powers 

The contention that the "two status quo 
powers" can be expected to behave more 
reasonably and responsibly than perhaps 


any potential new nuclea·r powers, is a 
belief which it is difficuLt to sustain and 
which in any event rests heavily uponthe supposition that the two superpowersdo in fact behave responsibly. This maybe difficult to prove because any judgment 
about the "responsible behaviour" 
of the superpowers can be disputed not 
merely by an examination of the his: 
torical record but according to whether 
one considers the word "responsible" a 
synonym for the word "cautious". It is 
true that by and large the superpowershave behaved cautiously towards each 
other, but that does not mean that theyhave always behaved responsi,bly either 
towards each other or towards other 
powers, especially those middle and small 
ranking powers whose interests have been 
in conflict with theirs. 

e' 

It is the way of all great powers to cons 
sider smaller powers not merely deficient 
t in power but deficient in political lead-
e ership as well. However, this widespread 
1 assumption is not supported by any con-
a siderable body of evidence. In fact, quite 
.t the reverse. The view that the status quo 
:· · nuclear powers behave responsibly is a 
~ matter of judgment and the view that 
some potential nuclear powers mightbehave irresponsibly is a matter of speculation. 
Yet in a sense what is being as-

y serted by those who believe the nuclea·r 
:e oligarchs to be responsible is that they 
;. have mastered or come to terms with 
le the essentials of second strike nuclear de:
e terrence. What, therefore, is the evidence 
r, that new or potential powers would beic 
have more recklessly? 

es 
e· The supposition is, of course, that China 
td is certainly in the category of an irreet 
sponsible nuclear power. But this may 
y· not be so, and certainly is a hypothesis 
ve of doubtful value. It is one thing 
es ' to demonstrate that China has a reckless 
ar regard for the efficacy of wars of national 
liberation but quite another to demonstrate 
that she is actually willing to embark 
on a reckless or bellicose nuclear 
policy. In fact the major Chinese justification 
for her nuclear policy is the conuo 
ventional one which applies both to Bri


•re tish and French deterrent thinking. As 
P5 one sinologist observes, "the high prior-
Sl 


ity which China attaches to developingnuclear capability may be explained in 
terms of the Chinese desire both to deter 
an American nuclear attack and to wield 
increased influence within the communist 
world and within the third world of 
Afro-Asian-Latin American nations. The 
Chinese may also see their nuclear weapons 
as a means for establishing Chinese 
hegemony in Asia" (Morton H . Halperin: 
"China's nuclear strategy", Diplomat, 
September 1966). De Gaulle would not 
have dissented from the need of a similar 
justification for his nuclear weapons 
in which deterrence of Russia was to be 
secured by an independent French nuclear 
capability. China's acquisition of a 
credible deterrent will have a considerable 
impact on the present distribution 
of nuclear power. Its significance is comparable 
with that to be expected from 
a European deterrent system of the kind 
advocated by Edward Heath. 

Some potential nuclear newcomers like 
Israel and Egypt are thought perhapscapable o( reckless conduct. Recent 
events in the Middle East would seem 
to confirm the reality of this (or at least 
the fear of reckless nuclear sabre rattling). 
Yet the present Israeli-Arab tension 
and periodic violence can be indulged in 
because neither as yet fears that it will 
involve "unacceptable damage". Even 
the June war of 1967 was no real exception 
to this rule. 

Without endorsing the facile view that 
the world would actually be safer if 
some nations now threatening the status 
quo became nuclear powers, it cannot be 
said that potential nuclear powers are 
inherently any more likely to behave 
recklessly than did America and Russia 
at the height of the cold war when both 
these powers were strongly motivated by 
a sense of ideological as well as greatpower chauvinism. At best the assumption 
that America and Russia conform 
to behavioural patterns different in kind 
from those expected of other potential 
great powers or middle powers. is a view 
firmly rooted in the belief that both these 
powers are now conservative and cautious 
in the li.ght of the nuclear stalemate 
that exists between them . 


It is certainly better not to have a vast 
number of small nuclear powers from an 
international security point of view, 
though it must be ·recognised that there 
is nothing in history or logic which has 
it that all nuclear powers must acquire 
second strike retaliatory systems. The 

fact must be faced that the Israeli situation 
(and perhaps that of Egypt too) is 
probably not amenable to second strike 
deterrence. Unfortunately, pre-emptive 
war makes perfectly good sense in this 
context-as long as the other side does 
not have nuclear weapons. Israel could 
build nuclear weapons ; Egypt probablycould not-and is unlikely to get them 
from the Soviet Union if the nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty, ever comes into 
operation. Israel will most probably be 
the next nation to explode a nuclear device. 
Amid-the isolation of the Negevdesert, on the road to the Dead,. Sea, a 
24 megawatt reactor at Dimona symbolises 
the reality of Israeli nuclear potential. 
Once described as a "textile plant'' 
th'is site received until recently French 
technical assistance which before June 
1967 may have included separation services 
carried out at the plutonium plant 
at Marcoule, and certainly the reactor 
was supplied by France in the first instance. 
Egypt on the other hand claims 
to be a major producer of uranium, but 
she probably cannot produce enoughplutonium at the "atomic city", just outside 
Cairo, where the two megamatt research 
reactor is located, to produce a 
nuclear device. This reactor was supplied 
by the Soviet Union under conditions 
not yet clearly established. Unless 
and until Egypt possesses a 20 megawatt 
reactor she will remain incapable of producing 
the necessary plutonium for nuclear 
status. 

a multinuclear 
world less manageable 

Th~ third contention underpinning the 
notiOn of bipolarity is "that a multinuclear 
world is a multipolar one and therefore 
politically less manageable". This 
argu~ent ru~s to the core of the present 
Amencan d11lemma. But in fact there 
ar~ good g~ounds for doubting whether 
1t IS true. F1rstly, such nuclear prolifera


tion as has so far taken place has merely d 
emphasised the basic: bipolarity of world Pre 
power. Secondly, the gap between a !~~ 
superpower and a second class nuclear 
power is still quite enormous and, if any-mo 
thing, the advent of the anti-ballistic mis-,arg

'it 

mile (ABM) will further intensify this. The 
development of the multiple individually-ten 
ta·rgetted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) anq the So 
fractional orbital bombardment system to 
(FOBS) will consolidate and even extend ibtil

Y 

this technological gap. Thirdly, the slow 
spread of nuclear weapons, though pos-th 
ing a threat to the monopoly of the de 
nuclear oligarchs, is unlikely to lead to a nu 
multilateral configuration in the foresee-con 
able future. Even more arguable is the the 
contention that a foreseeable multinuc-ga!ear world which was also a multipolar ren 
one would be politically more diversified cap 
and hence more difficult to manage. But the 
since the concept of m11n~gement seems ;196 
to presuppose superpower <:ontrol if not 
close supervision of the course of. inter-Th1 
national politics there may be some well ho 
merited opposition to the idea. Though to 
·in fact the long term threat to the basic ciplbipolar world lies in the improbable de-to 
velopment of an exclusively "European the 
centre of deterrence". However, China 1Vo1 
represents a possible destabilising factor nuo 
should she acquire a credible nuclear ve11 
force. She lacks the capacity, however, ere< 
to constitute in the short term a major Eur 
nuclear threat to either superpower. tnf! 

po~ 

A great power constellation in western resu 
Europe based upon British, French, Ger-iflll 
man and Italian science and technology Po~ 
could no doubt provide the technological Oecjbasis for a sophisticated deterrent sys-tne 
tern, which, though possible and per-Po4 
haps desirable, is still remote from natt 
reality. 

'lt c 
In fact, two contradictory impulses have ern 
worked towards a veritable increase in ,Po~ 
bipolar alignments. The first impulse was fee, 
the development of an independent de-new 
terrent system of the kind produced byfirst Britain and then France which, 
whatever the motivation behind this development, 
actually added to the bipolar 
nature of the world, by increasing the 
strategic nuclear means at the disposal 
of the western alliance. Even the French 


deterrent has a catalytic function as· ex-
President de Gaulle once made clear to 
the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Vinogradov, 
' 
1Eh bien, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, nous 
mourons ensemble". There are other 
arguments for the force de frappe. For 
it is seriously thought that France intends 
deterring America as well as the 
Soviet Union, but that ha·rdly threatens 
to add muoh to SoV>iet retaliatory capacity 
vis-a-vis America! There is the possibility 
that Russia and China will mend 
their fences and agree on a mutual understanding. 
Should this happen Chinese 
nuclear capacity may be regarded as 
complementing Soviet nuclear power in 
the same way as the British deterrent 
gave added credibility to western deterrent 
forces, largely based upon American 
capability, in the period from 1957 to 
the Nassau Agreement of December, 
1962. 

The second impulse which was initiallyhostile to the bipolar alignment related 
to the corrosive influence that, in· principle, 
nuclear proliferati'on was expected 
to have on the western alliance (that is, 
the belief that the independent deterrent 
would reduce the need for American 
nuclear protection) which in fact developed 
in such a way as actua:lly to increase 
American readiness to meet her 
European obligations (the McNamara 
thesis) and to an increase in American 
power so as to fulfil her obligations. The 
result was a slight intensification of the

~ed 

arms race and a further bipolarisation of

}~ 

power. America became stronger and the 
necessary readjustments made by Russia, 

:ic 

the nuclear tests of 1961 being a case in 

s)'J 

point, further increased the essential

pe 

rOll nature of bipolarity. 

It can furt.her be contended that if western 
Europe ~hould become a nuclear 
power in its own right, or if the Anglo-
French deterrent did become actual, this 
new accretion of power would merelycomplement, and perhaps reinforce, the 
American deterrent system and not supplant 
it or necessarily rival it. This can 
be reckoned ·to be so where a potentialand actual Soviet threat to dominate 
Europe remains constant. A "greatpower" complex in western Europe may 

transform politically the present bipolar 
relationship into a multipolar relationship 
and we may see this , before ·1980, 
but the mere acquisition of nuclear weapons 
need not be seen as inevitably leading 
to this situation. A multinuclear 
world might lead to a multipolar one 
but there is nothing determinant about 
this and no inevitable trend towards such 
a development needs come from a wider 
distribution of nuclear power. The development 
of a western European deterrent 
seems likely to make East-West 
Eu~opean · c0-operation more difficult. 

Although such an·'event might actually 
lead to a panic Russo-American agreement 
to manage their relations at the 
expense of western Europe. It can be 
said that a European deterrent both 
weakens and strengthens the impulse towards 
superpower detente. 

The paradox is, of course, that the 
more America and Russia emphasise the 
need for a manipulated bipola·r world 
the more likely it is that they wi!ll release 
forces which will tend to undermine it. 
But the problem for America in particular 
under ·its new president is whether to 
give top priority to the development of 
the East-West detente or whether to promote 
cohesion within the western alliance. 
The nature of the dilemma, however 
is not what it is conventionalilythought to be. 

break up of NATO 

The present incipient break up of NATO 
is attributable to the growing suspicion 
that member states have that their interests 
are about to be cynically sacrificed 
. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
has in some curious way perhaps 
emphasised the danger since in 
some European eyes America reacted 
less to this violation of a country's inderpendence 
than, say, Great Britain or 
West Germany, who were outraged by 
this example of treachery and ruthlessness. 
For the position of West Germany, 
in particular, is grea·tJly affected by, and 
conditioned to, the East-West conflict 
which, if the nature of that conflict 


should change, one way' or the other, 
inevitably .raises doubts about specificGerman interests and any American 
guarantee of those interests. West Germany 
is both exposed to the possibleeffects of an expanded Russo-American 
detente (which must by . definition throw 
doubt on the priority that the us attaches 
to German reunification) and to anyshow of militancy by the Soviet Union 
along her Warsaw Pact frontiers, which 
threatens her tenuous security. 

There can be perhaps no clear answer 
as to whether there can be any kind 
of German reunification without East-
West deten1e. But it would be foolish to 
ignore the possibility that German reunification 
might in any event be, in 
principle as well as in practice, abandoned 
·in some superpower dea:l which 
allows a modicum of liberalisation in 
eastern Europe in return for a permanently 
divided Germany within the framework 
of a European security pact. The 
conditions in which this might be 
achieved must, however, be such as to 
be generally acceptable to the German 
people, as a whole, and this is unl·ikely to 
be the case where the Germans feel 
themselves to have been betrayed to their 
enemies. If, therefore, Germany is to remain 
divided one way or the other, then 
America should be cautious about seeming 
to disregard the legitimate national 
interests of West Germany, which are 
likely to be sacrificed in a Russo-Amer·ican 
accommodation. Moreover, Britain 
is now seeking to establish a new relationship 
with West Germany, involving,
among other things, some understanding 
about the joint development of an advanced 
combat aircraft as well as the 
peaceful development of nuclear energy, 
and will increasingly line up with the 
Germans on diplomatic issues, unless a 
threatened collapse of the international 
monetary system forces an Anglo-Frenchunderstanding, which most certainly will 
be at the expense of West Germany. 

Therefore Britain is unlikely to abancfon 
the idea of German reunification for 
the time being, but her long term commitment 
to it, like so much else, maychange. · 

France has rejected the strategy of "the 
flexi·ble response" which she has falsely 
equated with subserv•ience to America 
within NATO : this with an insistence that 
her natural dominance of the EuropeanEconomic Community remains unchal


·

lenged by British membershi.p compounds . 
the nature of the· present crisis of confidence 
within the western alliance system 

G

as a whole. With ·both flanks in some 

u

disarray, and with the prospect in the 
mid-seventies of the northern Scandinavian 
members opting for neutrality, and 
the southern Mediterranean members 
falling out in vio1lent disagreement, the 
scene can be said to be set for a period 
of acute crisis within the western alliance. 

In fact with a diminution of the East-
West conflict and the resultant feelingthat the immediate military threat to 
western Europe has dedined below a 
point where it is a credible threat, the 
old unity of the western alliance has 
evaporated. Even the presence of the 
Red Army in Czechoslovakia straddled 
along her Bavarian borders was hardlyenough to compel prosperous West Germany 
to spend more than a modest extra 
fraction of its GNP on defence or to helpfinance on more generous terms BOAR's 
expensive stay in Rhine-Westphalia. 

Clear thinking on the subject of NATO 
has always been obscured by the widespread 
acceptance of two powerful legends. 
These are the legend of alliance 
cohesion and ·the legend that all member 
states of NATO are equal and sovereign 
(Philip Windsor "Recent developments 
in NATO", The W orld Today, June 
1966). Be that as it may, the contemporary 
difficulties within NATO, at any 
rate, stem in part from the diverging 
nature of the interests of its 15 member 
states. The differing interests can, however, 
be reconciled even if the notion 
that it is "in some manner iJilegitimatefor countries, that belong to a common 
alliance but have different geographical 
positions and degrees of power, to have 
different interests" is an erroneous one 
(ibid) . But the real question is whether 
the apparent dilemma in us policy between 
bilateralism and alliance cohesion 
is rea)l)y the problem that it appears to 



be. It rests perhaps on a double misconception: 
"the failure to distinguishbetween the effects of a mainly military 
Soviet-American bipolarity and a politically 
more differentiated international 
system" has been combined with "a ~ 
wrong idea about where the actual 
causes of East-West detente lie" (Curt I Gasteyger: Adelphi Paper no 24, ISS, 
London, 1966). Professor Kissinger, however, 
appears to appreciate this point and 
Nixon's foreign policy has already exhibited 
a greater perception of realitythan that of his predecessor. 

the present 
east-west detente 


There seems little doubt that the present

' 
East-West detente is strictly limited in 
character and has come about because 
of the enormous military power both 
superpowers possess. The military deadlock 
at the strategic nuclear level has prevented 
what the political situation seemed 
likely to induce-a major wa-r. The East-
West detente was therefore severely circumscribed 
and does not involve more 
than "a vital aim of preventing war" 
(ibid). Now in the post-Czechoslovakianperiod, the question of how best to transform 
milita·ry deadlock into political 
agreement can be described as the cri-ti


<1 
cal one in Nixon's "era of negotiation". 

Some American commentators saw in 

:e 
the horrific nature of nuclear war the 

1' 
emergence of an overwhelming conviction 
that we must start from the propo


?e 
sition that "war is no .Jonger an inherent 
necessity of the social process, but rather 
an absurd monstrosity." A rather more 

1 
modest interpretation of the impact of 

1R 
nuclear technology was advanced in 
which Soviet behaviour was seen as veering 
between policies under the pressure 

J • 
of extremist or moderate elements and 

.t 
that something similar was occurring in 

J' 
the us (Louis J. Halle : "War ·in Gesta


:~ 
tion", New Republic, November 1961). 

It is clear that the current military detente 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union must be seen as one development 
and the, as yet, unrealised 
political detente as another. The former 

has s~aHow foundati??S and is essentially ' 

negative. The us military together with \ 
their Soviet colleagues, according to Professor 
Seymour Melman in his memorandum 
to President Kennedy in December 
1960, can "no longer advise their 
governments how to win a major war" 
and this fact explains the nature of the 
detente which slowly emerged as the 
balance of power became more and more 
stable. The military detente is a frank 
and realistic recognition of a position of 
total) st·rategic nuclear stalemate. Within 
its perimeters both the Vietnam and the 
third Arab-Israeli wars have been fought 
and contained. 

The present military detente has, therefore, 
made the world safe for limited 
conflicts between the major powers. 
Major war would devastate them beyondendurance. This fear sustains the neces


sity of detente. Russo-American understanding 
is sustained by conflict that cannot 
reach the stage of open war on a 
large scale without threatening their jointexistence. They live in awe of each other 
in the posture of gladiators. Neither willingly 
able to fight the other. War, should 
it come between them, will spring from 
untoward design or plain folly. Neither 
prospect can be dismissed. Russia, however, 
has been much better led since the 
death of Stalin, despite Czechoslovakia. 
Likewise America, despite Vietnam, is 
more responsibly led in international 
politics than its colossal power mighthave otherwise led one to expect. That 
both powers a•buse their power is hardlysurprising, but that they abuse it so little 
is truly remarkable. Russian and American 
imperialism, insofar as it exists, 
though no more attractive than the British 
variety, is not entirely without reason 
or merit. 

The strictly military character of the detente 
must be recognised and this carries 
the important corollary that we must. 
however, avoid the false conclusion that 
a ready sword is an adequate substitute 
for politics. And, of course, the military 
might of both superpowers insofar as it 
has induced detente might be regarded 
as an end in itself, were it not for the 
fact that the omnipresent bipol•ar con



frontation provides neither power with \ 
the m~ans to assure peace and order 
throughout the globe, as successive 
Middle East crises olearly ·indicate. Conflicts 
in the third world, or outside the 
areas of overt Soviet-American confrontation, 
still remain impervious to great 
power diplomacy. Tl)e great powerformula for a Middle East settlement, 
guaranteed by "the four big powers", is 
a diplomatic gambit of an earlier agewhich is now totally irrelevant. Israel 
cannot be coerced into accepting the 
November 1967 resolution of the UN 
security council by its permanent mem


bers. 

The impression both America and 
Russia often convey is that when it 
comes to alhance diplomacy within their 
respective spheres of interest no changemust be allowed to occur which weakens 
the bipolar relationship in any significant 
way. However, there is no absolute 
conflict between inevitable and desirable 
changes within the alliance systems, and 
an East-West detente essentially based on 
a tacit Russo-American understanding. 
The salvation of the world does not lie 
in a consciously manipulated condominium 
of the superpowers with sham military 
alliances frozen into the posture of 
ageing cold war warriors. And obviouslythe present military detente will in time 

become an entente when all the Europ-/
ean powers both East and West acquire 

vested interest in it. 

the way ahead 

Either detente or alli:-___---,h-s-,-_nhs

ance-co:-eio_ ::-+definite 
limitation (Curt Gasteyger'· 
Adelphi Paper no 24, ISS, 1966). Detente 
has resulted in the Partial Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty, the hot line, and the more 
recent Non-proliferation Treaty. The bilateral 
relationship upon which the above 
agreements were erected was gravely 
shattered by the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. The failure so far to 
agree on a ballistic missile defence moratorium, 
with President Johnson's decision 
in the autumn of 1967 to go ahead with 
anti-ballistic mis&He defence and President 
Nixon's adaptation of the Sentinel 

system, indicates its essentially modest prnature. But even the modest achievement in 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has seri-a 
ousl)f shaken the confidence of the West sla 
Genmm government ·in us intentions. exl 
And it would therefore be amprudent for ' en 
President Nixon to give undue emphasis ·Sta 
in declaratory policy to the need to mend 
his fences with Moscow at the expense Of 
of West Germany, or for that matter, of fia 
the western alliance as a whole. For one gu 
thing the options that President Nixon ex1 
has to choose from should not be based et 
on the erroneous •assumption that detente Fn 
or alliance cohesion are self contained u 
alternat~ves. They are not. To assume, as a 
do many Ame11ican senators, including a 
Fullibright, that such clea·r cut alterna-10 
tives exist, is to disregard completely the So 
complexity of international politics. lru 

cer 
Detente and perhaps, in time, entente, '!lr 
will be soundly based if America has en-dai 
sured to the greatest deg·ree possible the ou 
preservation of the national interests of mi 
those powers most affected. Those powers prc 
are easily identified : West Germany par-de! 
ticularly, but also Japan, Taiwan and lar 
Korea, as far as America is concerned ; 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany 
as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. 
Within western Europe a greatly 
extended Russo-American understanding 
will have enormous impltications. 

The ex•isting impulse towards the construction 
of a European deterrent would 
be greatly strengthened by a clumsyAmerican diplomatic manoeuvre to get 
ag·reement with the Soviet Union in order 
to avoid the complexities of alliance diplomacy 
and to preserve the essentials of 
a bipolar world. Perhaps the European 
deterrent will inevitably emerge anyway . 
as a concomitant of the growth of the 
European economic institutions, but its 
appearance and, in particular, the reason 
for its appearance, will depend uponwhat kind of agreement is reached bythe two superpowers. After all America 
must know that even the appearance of 
a European deterrent, which the strategic 
situation might make necessary, need 
not be a menace to peace or against 
specific American or Soviet interests. Indeed 
a European nuclear deterrent could 


st prove to be a great cohesive factor with-1 
1t in the western aU<iance and could remove ! 
i-anxieties aJbout the security of those 
states whose present opposition to an 

extension of the detente is currently so 
Jr crucial and embarrassing to the United 
is States. 
td, 

se Of course a European deterrent would ini


tially depend upon British warhead and 
1e guidance experience and growing French 
m exper•ience dn the field of solid fuel rock-\ 
:d etry. By .the early 1970s Britain and 
te France will have a total of nine ballistic 
ed subma•l'ines in service and they would be 
a capable of deHvering about 150 megaton 
ng warheads (in the order of about 100 mil-
a lion tons of TNT or its equivalent) on 
)le Soviet cities. But for •it to become a \ 
I truly European deterrent, or second 

centre of deterrence, a land based mobile 

strategic rocket echelon would be man-
m datory (see Neville Brown "Arms with:
ht out empire", Penguin Special, 1968). The I 
ol miLita·ry rationale of such a force would 
er' probaJbly need to ·be one of maX'imising 
aD• destruction in a manner strildngly simi.
nd lar to the more absolutist notions of de~;. 
terrence current in the fifties. Such a 
·er doctrine may, however, appear unattracont 
tive and dangerous as well as unaccept1ti 
able to the Americans but, again, as Proinl 
fessor Kissinger has repeatedly asserted 

in the past, the case for European de


terrents, or indeed a European deterrent, 

rests on the considera~ion that the deter


0 

1u\ renoe of the Soviet Union, whose strans) 
tegic doctrine includes the belief that 
gd European cities must be obliterated early 
:del on in a nuclear exchange, Js 'best accomdiR 
plished by those West European powers 
; ~ whose national interests are directly at 
,eaD stake. 

t The central power ba•lance lies in Europe

~ )

: 1 and is the product of the tensions that 
150.1! divide this a-rea. It cannot be altered on 
tpof weakened without inevitably involving 
1 b) the countries of both East and West 
:ri~ Europe whose lands are directly men


aced by either military bloc. The detente 
j~g between East and West was the direct renee' 
sult of a recognition by both sides that 
ain the line dividing Europe was likely to be 

[n Permanent or likely to remain unchanged 
~ul for a long time to come. War was re


cognised to be the only way of changingthis fact and this pol.icy was rejected by 
the two superpowers as unrealistic. 

In 1948 Stalin may have contemplated 
the use of force to change the status quo 
just as the Soviet Union actually used 
force in 1956 in Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 in order to preserve it. 
The West was reluctant to use force in 
1948 over the Berhin airlift but was prepared 
to fight in 1961 i.f Khrushchev annexed 
West Berlin. However, in 1956 
and in the 1968 the West, though in principle 
·in favour of a change in the status 
quo in eastern Europe, was not willing to 

•intervene to assist Hungary or Czechoslovakia 
gain her independence under 
a social democracy. This much we know. 
But the question yet to be answered is 
whether the growing detente between the 
two superpowers-if carried considerably 
further-will allow both halves of 
Europe to develop in a way of their own 
choosing and whether a greater measure 
of independence of the two superpowers 
can be achieved which wiH enable Europe 
to develop in peace and prosperity. And 
whether the relationship of both superpowers 
to a "European security system" 
that will become feasible in the 'seventies 
and 'eighties can be clearly defined and 
widely accepted as a necessary and desirable 
feature of Europe's long term security. 
This question of a European security 
system is a vexed one and has in the 
past been plagued by propagandist attempts, 
particularly by the Soviet Union. 
to suggest that such a system must be 
anti-German oriented. However, its real 
purpose must be to avoid a great power 
collision in Europe between t·wo heavily 
armed military aHiances whose mutual 
antagonism has but slowly diminished. 
Some day a security system .in Europewill emerge and n()body today can fore see 
its actual shape and character, but 
its essential features can be generallystated. Both NATO, or its successor, and 
the Warsaw Pact powers, will probably 
elect to maintain much the same kind of 
military structure, but military effort will 
need to be geared to jo.int requirements : 
surveillance, inspection of zones where 
phased withdrawal or "disengagement'' 


of forces has been agreed to, radar cover 
against rapid troop movements, and 
where appropria.te, mixed teams of observers 
engaged in supervising the operation 
pf the security system insofar as its 
implementation depends upon inspectionand control. Obv·iously, such a system 
cannot give absolute security, only rela 
tive security, yet given a permanent East-
West detente it might enable both the us 
army and Red Army to withdraw from 
their present positions. Provided this 
system is underpinned by the superpowers 
and freely negotiated with the full 
support of their respective allies, the I 
thing will work. Yet it will depend upon 
a continued American participation in 
the defence of Europe as well as genuine 
confidence amongst the western powers ; 
the Soviet government must also have 
guaranteed legitimate security interests 
in eastern Europe as well as a more stable 
internal relationship with small communist 
powers whose regimes will inevitably 
be distinctly Hberal and western oriented 
without being .pro-capitalist or hostile to 
the Soviet Union. However, the time for 
a general European security system is 
not yet and it has, of course, been retarded 
by the violent Soviet reaction to 

the Czech bid for a more civilised and 
democratic regime. 

conclusion 

Some would assert that the balance of 
power at the present time is inherently 
unstable, with the built in instability provided 
by the ballistic missile preventing 
a stable military balance aril!ling. In fact 
the present Soviet-American military balance 
at the strategic level is relatively 
stable and relatively free from quick 
changes of fortune. However, it is worth 
noting that since the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, the local military balance 
at the conventional level has moved 
against the West. In a period of 13 hours 
more than 20 Warsaw Pact divisions with 
about 250,000 men, weapons and supplies 
invaded Czechoslovakia from three exposed 
flanks and advanced as far as the 
border with West Germany, which hitherto 
had been occupied solely by Czechoslovakian 
troops. Thus last year, as Sum


mer passed into Autumn, a significantlylarger number of Soviet troops were in 
a state of readiness and tactically deployed 
for action ·in the Soviet Imperium 
than at any time since the formation of 

NATO. 

Western Europe felt exposed, so the 

slight but definite recredescence of the 

cold war was inevitable. But in the years 

ahead the local balance in Europe will 

be less susceptible to the vagaries of 

Russo-American politics, especial,ly since 

neither superpower need feel quite so 

strategically dependent upon Europe in 

age of global defensive/offensive mis


lery. So the chance of genuine detente 

P 
P
ust be reckoned to ·be good. 

wise and forward looking policy must 

ake allowances for the yearnings for 

freedom now evident in eastern Europe · 

without alarming the Soviet Union ; ar


rangements a'lso in relation to western 

Europe should allow for orderly and pro


gressive change without causing America 

to feel that she must break with her 

allies out of fear that her liabilities are 

open ended. 

A superpower Europe, or a United States 
of Europe, can have no place in the type 
Iof security arrangements we envisage as 
practicable and desirable over the next 
two decades. However, the best policyfor the West in the meantime is that of 
patient negotiation with the Soviet Union 
in the search for genuine detente as well

I

as a determination to maintain a credible 
defence structure based upon existing 
arrangements. Detente and all'iance fidel'
ty are the twins of good fortune. 


fabian society 


The Fabian Society exists to further 
socialist education and research. It is 
affiliated to the Labour Party, both nationally 
and locally, and embraces all 
shades of Socialist opinion within its 
rank8-left, right and centre. 

Since 1884 the Fabian Society has enrolled 
thoughtful socialists who are prepared 
to discuss the essential questions 
of democratic socialism and relate them 
to practical plans for building socialism 
in a changing world. 

Beyond this the Society has no collective 
policy. It puts forward no resolutions ol 
a political character, but it is not an 
organisation of armchair socialists. Its 
members are active in their Labow 
Parties, Trade Unions and Co-operatives. 
They are representative of the labour 
movement, practical people concerned to 
study and discuss problems that matter. 

The Society is organised nationally and 
.locally. The national Society, directed 
by an elected Executive Committee, publishes 
pamphlets, and holds schools and 
' conferences of many kinds. Local Societies-
there are a hundred of them-are 
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Enquiries about membership should be 
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Society, 11 Dartrnouth Street, London, 
SWI; telephone 01-930 3077. 

Cover design and typography by Geoffrey 
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the authors 


Dr. Frank Barnaby is a nuclear physicist. 
He has been Executive Seoretary,Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and World 
Affairs, since September 1968. From 1957 
to 1968 he was a member of the Senior 
Scientific Staff of the Medical Research 
Council and a Recognised Teacher at 
London University. 

He is at present doing a research project 
at University College, London, on the 
consequences for international relations 
of the development of nuclear energy,
with particular reference to the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. He has written 
a number of articles on arms control and 
the effects of new wea.pon systems. 

Dr. Barnaby is a member of the Fabian 
International and Commonwealth Bureau 
and is chairman of its Arms Control 
Study Group. The views expressed in 
this pamphlet are the author's personalviews only. 

Tn 1945, when Alan and Geoff·rey Lee 
Williams were both aged 14, they became 
apprentice Thames watermen and 
lightermen, a tradition going back in the 
Williams' family for over 300 years. 

For over seven years Alan Williarns was 
the National Youth Officer of the Labour 
Party. Greatly interested in international 
affairs, he became head of the United 
Nations Association's Youth Department.
After becoming Member of Parliament ' 
for Hornchurch, he specialised in defence 
matters and spoke in most of the defence 
debates until he was ·appointed Private 
Parliamentary Secretary to Denis Healey. 

Dr Geoffrey Lee Williarns is at present 
Lecturer in Strategic Studies at Southampton 
University. Appointed Disarmament 
Secretary of the United Nations 
Association in 1960, he has been teaching 
and researching at Southampton University 
since 1963. He will shortly become 
Associate Professor of Politics at 
Calgary University, Alberta. He is a De-
fence Consultant to the Ministry of De-
fence. His publications include: World 
without arms (1960) ; The natural alliance 
(1969); co-author of The rise and 
demise of the TSR-2 (1969). 


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