f.>P I · 


THE FUTURE 
OF THE 

IJB)NS 


WILLIAM McCARTHY is a Research Fellow of 
Nuffield CoLlege, Oxford. He was prev,iously at Ruskin 
CoHege on a Clerical and Administrative Workers' 
Un,ion scholarship. 


FABIAN TRACT No. 339 

THE FABIAN SOCIETY 

11 Dartmouth Street, S.W.l 

'i 

Note.-This pamphlet, like all publications of the 
FAB/AN SOCIETY, represents not the collective 
view of the Society but only the view of the 
individual who prepared it. The responsibility of the 
Society is limited to approving the publications 
which it issue.s as worthy of consideration within the 
Labour Movement. 

September, 1962 


I. Introduction 
T
T
HiE outlook facing t:he leaders of bhe British trade union movement today 
is uncertain, impossible to predict, and potentially disastrous. 

The last two decades have developed in sharply contrasting directions. 
During the 1940's the unions gained in membership, power and prestige. 
From 1948 to 1958 total membership rose by 52 per cent-48 per cent more 
than the increase in the working population. The scope of collective 
bargaining was extended, the T.U.C. exerted a decisive influence over many 
aspects of government policy, the movement appeared to be united, and the 
unions were congratulated for their willingness to undertake wage restraint 
and productivity drives. As Allan Flanders has observed, 'One might have 
thought, many did at the time, that the unions had climbed to a pinnacle 
of responsibility from which they could never be shaken'.1 

Yet during the next ten years each of these developments was halted or 
reversed. Total membership rose by a mere 3 per cent, and the proportion 
of workers in trade unions fell by 1 per cent.2 There were few extensions 
of collective bargaining, the T.U.C. constantly complained that Ministers 
were ignoring its advice, examples of trade union disunity (like the recent 
Rootes dispute) received wide publicity, and a recent public opinion poll 
announced that in '22 years of polling . .. we have never found greater 
criticisms of the Trade Unions with the rest of the population than exists 
today'.'1 

The question therefore arises: will the 1960's resemble the thriving forties, J or will the tendencies which have emerged in the last ten years result in a 
continuing decline in membership, power and prestige? It is a mistake to 
assume, that trade union leaders are not aware of these problems, and have 
no explanation to offer; on the contrary, they have a whole series of 
explanations and excuses. 

Whose Responsibility? 

Firstly, and most frequently, they blame the Tories. By periodically 
inducing unemployment, and failing to solve the problem of economic 
expansion, the Tories have created a situation in which it is impossible to 
obtain regular advances in wages and conditions and show existing and 
potential members satisfactory results. By influencing arbitration awards, 
and interfering with established negotiation procedures, the Tories have 


1 Trade Unions in the Sixties, Socialist Commentary, August, 1961. 

2 Trade Union Membership, Political and Economic Planning Broadsheet, July,

1962. 

s Gallup Poll on Trade Unions. September, 1959, p. 156. 


2 THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

forced the unions to employ unpopular weapons like strikes and working 
to rule. 

Secondly, and almost as often, union leaders blame the newspapers. The 
Press, said a T.U.C. report in 1960, 

' ... which takes little interest in the positive achievements of collective 
bargaining, has shown an obsessional interest in irregularities.'1 

Left wing leaders, like Bob Edwards of the Chemical Workers, go even 
further. They suggest that the Press has built up the trade unions as a 
'bogey man' to distract attention from the 'real guilty men in British industry' 
who have 

' . . . forced the trade unions into the last six strikes because they refused 
to negotiate and because they were carrying out the business of the 
present Government.'2 

Often, however, union leaders are not content to explain the events of 
the last ten years simply in terms of a right-wing conspiracy between the 
Tories and their allies in Fleet Street. Sometimes they blame each other. 

Thus Bryn Roberts, the 'left-wing' ex-General Secretary of the National 
Union of Public Employees, charged the 'right-wing' leaders of the T.U.C. 
with over-caution, a failure to mainuain contacts with the rank and file, and 
collaboration with the employing class. The result of this was 'Labour's 
defeat in the 1959 General Election, as well as the decline in the influence 
and effectiveness of the trade union movement.'3 

On the other hand Bill Carron, of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
whom Bryn Rober.ts would undoubtedly regard as one of the 'right-wing' 
leaders most responsible, has blamed much of the growing unpopularity and 
disunity of the unions on the activities of 'left-wing' bodies like the 
'communist controlled' National Council of Engineering Shop Stewards, 
which, he says, promotes unofficial strikes, undermines the elected leadership 
of the unions, and fosters 'chaos and disruption'.4 

Arguments of this sort easily develop into attacks on the mass of inactive 
union members and even into criticisms of the working class in general. Here 
both 'left' and 'right' can unite. The modern working man, we ate told, is 
increasingly apathetic and reluctant to take his share of union work, 
unconcerned with anything outside his home and his family, and an unworthy 
successor to the pioneers of the past. Even those who do not go this far 
would generally agree with a recent statement of the General Secretary of 
the T.U.C., George Woodcock. 

'It may be a matter of regret that so many trade unionists think so little 
of their trade unions. But it is also a matter of fact.'5 

Now there is clearly a great deal of truth in many of these explanations 
particubrly the attack on ~be Todes. Many of the issues which they raise 

1 T.U.C. Report, 1960, p. 126. 

2 T.U.C. Report, 1959, p. 331. 

3 The Price of T.U.C. Leadership, Alien and Unwin, 1961. 

4 Presidential Address to the 1960 National Committee of the A.E.U. 

5 The Listener, February 20th, 1958. 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

and the reasons for them are discussed further below. But as they are too 
often presented they suffer from one major defect: they are essentially 
defeatist, or at least put the onus for action on others. The electorate should 
return a series of Labour Governments; newspapers should print the truth; 
right wingers should become left wingers, left wingers should become right 
wingers; members should attend branch meetings. Meanwhile, nothing can 
be done. 

If all this were really true it would be easy to predict the future of the 
unions; the sixties would be more likely to resemble the fifties than the 
f<>r•ties. This pamphlet has been wriHen .because i-ts author does not acceptthis pessimistic assumption. 

There is a great deal which the trade unions can do to meet the challenge 
of the 1960's if only they can muster sufficient will and imagination to try. 
EssentiallY, their many difficulties and opportunities can be reduced to 
four basic problems. The various explanations and suggestions advanced 
above are all related to these problems, but their nature and causes need to 
be analysed with more precision if the conditions of solving them are to be 
discovered. They may be termed: 

I. The Problem of Membership Growth. 
2. The Problem of Membership Communication and Control. 
3. The Probkm of Bargaining Priorities. 
4. The Problem of Trade Union Relations with Government and Public. 
The future of British trade unionism depends on the extent to which these 
pw.blems are debated and bow •they are decided within the movement during 
the next few years. 

2. The Problem of Union Growth 
B
B
EHLND the overall strubi:J.ity of total membership figures during the fifties 
there was considerable movement and change. Between 1951 and 1961, 
for example, the A.E.U. increased its membership by 36 per cent, while the 
E.T.U. and the Printing and Book-binding Workers grew by 27 per cent. 
Almost all the unions organising white collar workers grew by 25 per cent 
or more and the Clerical and Administrative Workers nearly doubled in 
size. On the other band the cotton weavers' union lost over 30 per cent of 
its members, the N.U.R. shrank by 15 per cen•t and the Boot and Shoe 
Operatives by 5 per cent. Even the two great general unions, which ended 
the period with about the same number of members as in 1951 , experienced 
very considerable shifts in the membership of their various industrial groups. 

The most important factor affecting these changes was movements in 
the pattern of employment. The cotton workers, the railwaymen and the 
boot and shoe operatives were almost as highly organised at the end of the 
period as they were at the beginning; there were just fewer of them. On the 
other hand the total labour force employed in electrical contracting and 
engineering rose throughout the fifties, as did the percentage of the working 


4 
THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

population employed on non-manual work. But all the vanatwns and 
changes cannot be explained in this way. In coal mining there was a 1 per 
cent fall in the number of workers employed between 1948 and 1958 but the 
unions involved increased their membership by 7 per cent. In distribution the 
labour force increased by 15 per cent, while total union membership rose by 
no more than 3 per cent. In the food and drink industries, and in chemicals, 
increases in the labour force were accompanied by a decline in the proportion 
of workers organised. In building the number employed rose by 1 per cent, 
but the percentage of workers unionised fell by 5 per cent.1 

There appear to have been several different factors at work here. The 
miners were aided by the advent of nationalisation, and the chance it gave 
them to obtain an industry-wide closed shop, and the 'check-off'-i.e. an 
agreement for the deduction of union contributions by the Coal Board. 

U.S.D.A.W. was hindered by the decline of the co-operative movement, the 
only section of the distributive industry where it has either the closed shop 
, 
or the check off. The building unions, and those organising in food, drink, ( 
and chemicals, have been afflicted more than most by a rapid turnover 
of labour, which makes it almost impossible for them to maintain a high 
level of membership without the aid of the closed shop. 

The prospects which these developments conjure up are depressing. Many 
highly organised sections of the labour force will continue to decline during 
the 1960's-for example coal-mining, textiles, footwear and railways. It has 
been calculated that if the present level of unionisation continues in these 
four trades, the shrinkage of the labour force alone will result in a loss of 
over 200,000 trade un-ionists by 1968! ~ 

Yet allowing for expected increases in the size of the labour force the 
unions must achieve a total mewbership of ten and a quarter millions by 
1968 if they are to maintain their present degree of organisation. This 
represents almost a million new members-an overall increase of a little less 
than 10 per cent. Where are these members to come from? 

For the most part, the expanding sections of the labour force-professional 
and 'business serv-ices, insurance, banking and distribution-are badlyorganised. It is true that there are two well-organised industries-engineering 
and paper box-which will continue to expand, but it is doubtful if there 
will be much more improvement in their degree of unionisation. Both are 
expanding much more rapidly among the non-manual grades, which are 
still badly organised. Despite gains made by the clerical workers' union in 
these and other industries during the last decade, it cannot hope to make up 
for the ground that will be lost elsewhere. 

) 
) 
On their present showing British unions face the certainty of a gradual 
reduction in the proportion of the labour force which is organised. This 

development can only end in them coming to be regarded as the increasingly 
outdated representatives of a declining industrial minority. 
But further examination shows that the problems posed by this situation 
are not insoluble; certainly much more could be done about them. Essentially 

1 
See Trade Union Membership, P.E.P. Broadsheet, p. 156. 
op. cit., p. 189. 



THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

the future membership prospects of the unions depend on making advances, 
or at least holding the line, in three contrasting situations which must be 
considered separately. 

The Established Centres of Strength 

The problem here is to advance towards 100 per cent unionisation in the 
more established centres of strength-such as the railways, road transport 
and furniture. The model in this respect is the miners' union. The force 
of thei·r example has not been lost on the N.U.R., which has been tryjng 
for some years to get the Transport Commission to agree to a closed shop, or 
at least a check off. Similarly the Transport and General Workers, and the 
Furniture Trade Operatives, have negotiated closed shops, and have supported 
members who refused to work with non-unionists. Other unions, 
like the General and Municipal, have sometimes resisted rank and file 
demands for the practice, particularly if it was liable to result in a strike. 
Few unions have given serious attention to the benefits of the check off. 

Many officials still regard the closed shop as incompatible with an active 
rank and file. All the evidence contradicts this. Areas of industry where 
the closed shop predominates, such as mining, shipbuilding, or the docks, 
are not notable for an acquiescent and apathetic rank and file. In engineering, 
where there are both open and closed shops, union membership is not notably 
more vigorous in the open areas-if anything the reverse. 

Similarly, it is sometimes argued that if the check off were introduced, 
the essential 'contact' between the member and the union, which is represented 
by the need to collect subscriptions, would be severed. This tiresome 
chore, which so often gives rise to arguments and bad feeling when the 
member is in arrears, is said to provide a unique occasion for the secretary, 
or shop steward, to give information to the member, and for the member 
to rai e any queries and complaints. The fears behind this argument are 
quite bogus. As a recent study of trade union officers in 17 different unions 
drawn from all sections of industry concluded: 

'The practice of the "check off" seems to yield at least two considerable 

advantages to the branch secretaries of the Mineworkers. Their secretaries 

, are assured of their members and for the most part are freed from financial 

business ... the Mineworkers' branch secretary appears to be able to 

spend far more of his time looking after his members' problems than the 

branch secretaries of other unions. '1 

This evidence can be paralleled in other .industr·ies, such as engineer.ingand chemicals, where the check off has been introduced. Once they are freed 
of the burden of subscription collection, stewards find the job much more 
attractive, they are easier to recruit, and give a better service to their 
members. 

The only case against a radical and open campaign to extend the closed 
shop is that if some employers resist union demands and force workers 
to strike to secure the dismissal of non-unionists, this will make unions even 

Trade Union Officers by H. A. Clegg, A. J. Killick and Rex Adams, Black well, 
1961 , p. 225. 



6 THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

less popular with the pUJblic in general and the middle class in par-ticular.1 
If this is likely to happen there may be a case for relying on an essentially 
voluntary dev.ice Like the check off.2 Where uni·ons are strong and active, as 
they are in the established centres of strength, management has a positive 
incentive to accept such a device. Employers in these industries often complain 
about the time stewards 'scrounge' to collect union dues, and of disputes 
that arise when members refuse to work with those who are in arrears. If the 
unions are prepared to defray the trifling expense involved in collection, the 
attitude of many employers might well be less of an obstacle than the 
prejudices of many union officials . 

. Areas of Low Organisation 

However, in less well-organised trades, the check off is more difficult to 

obtain and the closed shop is not a practical proposition. Before either of 

them is feasible the level of unionisation must be raised. How is this to be 

done? 

It is necessary to consider the problems involved in two different situations. 

The first occurs where the unions have secured recognition, and the right 

to bargain over wages and conditions; the second arises where recognition 

has yet to be conceded and the employer still denies the right of workers to 

join trade unions. The first situation is the norm among manual workers 

in industries like chemicals and the food and drink trades. In both cases 

most large employers recognise the unions, and belong to the national 

employers' association, but there is often_ little local activity and the overall 

level of organisation is not more than 35%. The second situation applies 

most typically to clerical workers employed in private industry. Here the 

overall level of unionisation is not much more than 5%, although some offices 

are highly organised. 

In the first situation the key to a solutiqn lies in the creation of a core of 

full-time officials whose job it is to inspire and organise a series of recruiting 

drives designed to lift the level of membership in the most promising places. 

At the moment the unions which organise in these industries are quite unable 

to undertake such a task; they just do not have the means. 

There are about 3,000 full-time officials in the British trade union move


ment, approximately one for every 3,250 members. This is the lowest ratio 

of officers to members of any trade union movement of comparable size 

in the world. A recent survey shows that they work, on average, a 57-hour 

week, spending between one and three even.ings in seven on union business.3 

They are employed to negotiate, to administer the union, to write letters, to 

attend meetings, to li sten to members' grievances and to serve on innumerable 

committees. If they have any time left they can go out and recruit new 

members. 

1 For example, the Gallup Poll on Trade Unions discovered that while 70 % of 

trade unionists supported the closed shop principle, only 23% of non-members 

were in favour. Op. cit., p. 7. 

2 The compulsory deduction of union dues as a condition of employment would 

be an offence against the Truck Acts. 

3 Clegg, Killick and Adams, o p. cit ., p, 90. 


THE FUTURE OF Tim UNIONS 7 

In the last ten years most unions have tried, from time to time, to free 
full-time officers for recruitment work. Results show that where the approach 
is sufficiently concentrated, and well staffed, gains can be made; particularly 
if the union is able to take advantage of some local problem or dispute 
which can be exploited to show what the union can do for its members. 
But it is impossible to maintain the impetus behind recruiting drives, as most 
unions are organised at present. Pressing work piles up on the desks of 
officers who are not primarily employed for this purpose. Gradually the 
amount of time they can spare for recruitment dwindles and opportunities 
are lost. 

Of course it will be said, with the experience of the N.U.G.M.W. in mind, 
that it is no use engaging special 'recruitment' officers because the members 
they enrol must be serviced and in time the additional work involved will 
cause them to be 'drawn in' to help overworked office staff and help out in 
negotiations. This is what happened in the N.U.G.M.W. before the war. In 
six years over seventy 'recruitment officers' were appointed before the scheme 
was abandoned, largely because district secretaries came to use the new 
officers to do traditional work.1 

But, properly considered, the experience of the N.U.G.M.W. does not 
prove the futility of appointing a special class of recruitment officer; quite 
the reverse. In fact during the six years of the scheme, and partly as a result 
of it, union member~hip went up rapidly, so that the ratio of members to • 
officers actually rose despite the appointment of seventy-seven officers in six 
years. The true moral of the story is that one of the strongest arguments for 
appointing special recruitment officers is that they will pay for themselves 
by recruiting new members. 

Nevertheless, bearing in mind the existing degree of pressure on all sorts 
of officers, it must be recognised that unless something is done, at the 
same time, to lighten their burden, future experiments on the lines of the 

N.U.G.M.W. are unlikely. The unions must plan to expand not merely by 
appointing a special class of recruitment officers, but by raising the ratio 
of officers to members in other directions as well. 
In fact there are good reasons why this should be done, quite apart from 
the needs of recruitment. It is arguable that most union research departments 
are understaffed, and it is doubtful if any union has a sufficient proportion 
of women officers.2 

Finance 

The difficulty here is finance. British ulllions are not merely the mos.t understaffed 
in the world, they are also the cheapest. In 1960 the average trade 
unionist in Britain paid about £3 a year in union dues. The average weekly 
earnings of male trade unionists are in the region of £15 a week. This means 
that, on average, workers pay less than 1 per cent of the sum they take home 
each week to their union; a smaller proportion than before the war. Out of 1 

J See H. A. Clegg, General Union, Blackwell, p. 75. 

2 Most unions would als·o need to employ a number of women recruitment 

officers who could give special attention to ways and means of attracting women 

into th~ union. The example of the C.S.C.A., where the great majority of members 

are women, shows that this can be done. 


8 THE FUTURE OF THE uNIONS 

this the union meets increased financial benefits, officers' salaries, and the 
rising cost of administration. 

Since 1956 the T.U.C. has tried to get groups of related unions to raise 
contributions. The main obstacle has been the fear that if any one union 
raised its dues more than others it would find it more difficult to recruit new 
members, while old members would gradually desert it and join rival organisations. 
One suspects that this objection is often advanced as an excuse for 
inaction, but the General Council could overcome it by urging the next 
Congress to call a conference to draw up a plan for raising the dues of all 
un~ons by equal degrees. The obiject would be ·M least to doUible union dues 
over a period of three years. For most un-ions this would mean raising 
weelcly contributions by less than 6d. each year. 

If this were done, and much of the additional revenue was spent on 
recruitment officers in industries like chemicals and food manufacture, membership 
in these industries could reach the level now existing in engineering 
and furniture. In these two industries alone, this would :represent just under 
a quarter of a million new trade unionists. 

But it can be argued that even without raising subscriptions more money 
could be found for recruitment, and existing officers could be more effectively 
used, if there were more amalgamations between unions in the same trade. 
This was :the view of the T.U.C.'s 1946 report on Trade Union Structure and 
Closer Unity. Yet although Congress accepted this report, the General Council 
found it was impossible to persuade many old-established and fiercely 
independent organisations to merge. They had to be content with persuading 
them to co-operate, rather than coalesce. However, in this way the worst 
examples of overlapping and wasteful competition were eliminated. 

In the changing conditions of the 1960s there is a case for another survey 
of union structure. The present set-up is really indefensible, except on the 
grounds that it defies reform. There are still over 600 independent unions, 
each of which has its own General Secretary and governing council. Over 
half of these have a membership of less than a thousand. Fortunately there 
are at least some signs, for example in the building industry, that the consequences 
of overlapping and waste are beginning to be realised.1 Another 

T.U.C. study of the problems at this time might do much to stimulate further 
mergers-particularly if it recommended a campaign to change the law 
governing amalgamations. The present Act stipulates a poll of all members. 
Fifty per cent of the membership must vote, and votes in favour must exceed 
those against by 20 per cent. In practice it is difficult to secure such majorities, 
and recently several desirable amalgamations fell through because of this.2 
1 The Amalgamation Committee set up by the twenty odd unions in the building 
trade has recently proposed a plan for the eventual merging of building unions 
into three broad seotions; building, metal trades and woodworkers. 
2 For example in Printing. Of course if a union wishes to achieve some of the 
effects of amalgamation without the need to fulfil all the conditions of the 
Amalgamation Act, it oan agree t·o 'transfer its engagements' to another union. 
This often means that in effect it ceases to exist in all but name, all its obligationsand functions being taken over by the other union. The advantage of this procedure 
is that it is n.ot necessary to hold a ballot in the union which takes over the 
engagements-although it is normally necessary to secure the consent of two 
thirds of the transferer un·ion, and this may be impossible to obtain. 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 9 

If the law was changed so that all that was required was the approval of 51 
per cent of members voting, necessary mergers would be much easier to 
achieve. 

The Problem of Recognition 

The problem facing clerical workers, and others denied the right to bargain, 
is more difficult. How are they to force employers to recognise the 
union? 

Before the Tories abolished the Indu trial Disputes Tribunal, in 1958, 
several clerical unions had developed a technique for using this body to 
obtain recognition. Under the terms of the Order setting up the Tribunal, 
unions with members in a particular firm could refer claims on their behalf 
to the Tribunal, who made an award which effectively bound employers. ~ 
Faced with a threat of being taken before the Tribunal, many employers 
agreed to settle with the union, and in the end to accord it recognition and 
full bargaining rights. 

When the Tribunal was abolished, uruons like the Engineers' Surveyors, 
who had made considerable use of the arbitration facilities it provided, criticised 
the T:U.C. fur pu~ting up only a 'token resistance'1 to save i•t. NaJturally • 
these charges were denied, but the truth seems to be that the bulk of the 
General Council, who are not overmuch worried about the problem of 
recognition, were not particularly concerned to salvage this aspect of its 
work.2 When it is appreciated how far the Tribunal procedure had been 
developed by white collar unions as an aid to recognition, it seems obvious 
that more fuss should have been made about its a~bolition. Cer~ajnly the 

T.U.C. should see that the Labour Party gives an unequivocal undertaking 
that when it is returned to power it will establish similar machinery. 
Meanwhile two other suggestions can be made. First, unions should 
disinter one of the oldest weapons for putting pressure on employers-the 
black list. The names of employers who have refused to recognise unions 
should be publicised-particularly within their local area. This is a practice 
which has tended to be forgotten now that trade unionism is respectable. 
If, as is often the case, the employer in question has recognised the right of 
manual workers to bargain, this should be stressed. 

The T.U.C. could also give more publicity to flagrant examples of employer 
intransigence-like the refusal of the Chairman of the National Provincial 
Bank to meet the Bank Employees Union to discuss plans for improving the 
safety and security of their members involved in hold-ups. Despite the 
deterioration of the publi·c image of unions, i•t is still easy to put an employer 
who refuses to recognise a union representing his employees in a bad light. 

1 Mr. A. Prestwich, quoted in the T.U.C. Annual Report, 1961, p. 343. 

2 It must be remembered that the Tories, via the 1959 Terms and Conditions of 

Employment Act, re-enacted the 'issues procedure' of the I.D.T. This allows unions 

to take empl·oyers to the Industrial Court if they refuse to pay generally accepted 

union rates-e.g. the nationally negotiated rate for the industry a:s a whole. But 

it is no longer possible to put in a claim for more than this, or to lodge a specific 

grievance, and then threaten employers with compulsory arbitrati·on unless they 

meet the union. By paying the b~sic rates. employers C!ln !\VOid the effeot of 

existing legislation, 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

To mobilise opinion effectively the unions would have to revolutionise their 
attitude towards publicity-but this subject is discussed at length below. 

Secondly, white collar unions struggling for recognition must be more 
prepared to take strike action. The Clerical and Administrative Workers have 
shown a growing militancy which is much to be welcomed. Other unions 
could profitably follow their example and, to help them, the T.U.C. should 
~et up a Recognition Fighting Fund Committee. Its job would be to raise 
money for distribution to unions who found it difficult to finance properly 
authorised strikes where the main object was the advancement of bargaining 
rights. 

The experience of unions organising non-manual workers in Britain and 
elsewhere indicates that once recognition can be obtained, there are no 
exceptional difficulties involved in recruiting and retaining members.1 Given 
encouragement and assistance, white collar unions would be able to achieve 
a level of unionisation at least as high as that now existing among manual 
workers. 

Conclusions 

The conclusions in this section derive from a refusal to accept that nothing 
can be done about the declining rate of membership growth. Almost all 
unions could raise the proportion of workers organised in the grades they 
recruit by at least ten per cent in the course of the next decade. In some cases 
this could be done by negotiating a check off, or obtaining a closed shop; in 
other cases it requires amalgamations, or joint action to raise subscriptions 
so that special recruitment officers can be appointed, or other devices tried. 
If the movement will accept its common responsibility to raise the level of 
union membership, the problem is not insoluble. 

At the moment about 46 per cent of wage and salary earners are organised. 
There is no good reason why, in ten years time, the figure should not rise 
to more than 50 per cent-there is also no reason why, eventually, Britain 
should not be as well organised as Sweden-where about two thirds of the 
workers are in unions. Workers in the new expanding trades, and in clerical 
employment, are nowadays just as good trade union material as those 
working in the older centres of strength. They may face different problems 
from those of the miner, or the docker; they may be more interested in 
questions of promotion, or pensions, but there is a growing realisation that 
they too require protection, security, and a defence against unfair and 
arbitrary decisions. Workers do not need a union less in a large chemical 
plant, or a vast office block. 

The problem facing the unions is one of organisation and imagination, 
not obsolescence. It is their structure that is out of date, not their social 

J function. 

Differences in the degree of employer resistance towards demands for recognition 
go far to explain variations in the level of union organisation among white 
collar workers. In private industry in Britain, for example, management has 
usually been extremely reluctant to grant recognition, while in the public services 
recognition and the right to bargain were granted after the .first world war. 
Similarly, American employers have generally resisted the unionisation of the 
staff, while employers in Sweden have encouraged the process. 



THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

11 

3. 
The Problem of Membership 
Communication and Control 
B
B
UT a mere growth in membership will not in itself lead to a rise in 
power and prestige. To grow in influence and respect a union must 
command the obedience of its members; it needs more than mere../ 
numbers, it requires loyalty, and a sense of solidarity. 

During the last ten years such qualities have seemed to be at a discount. 
The T.U.C. admitted this when they agreed to investigate the origins of 
recent unofficial strikes, and their relationship to shop stewards. In their 
report to the 1960 Congress/ the General Council accepted that a minority 
of stewards led 'needless strikes', acted 'contrary to policy' and were apt to 
'misuse their position'. Recommending this report to Congress, Harry 
Douglass of the steelworkers warned of the danger of allowing power to 
slip into the hands of 

'young men coming into the movement who view with 
some envy the power of the industrial machine which we 
control, and who think they would like to get their hands 
on the S·teering wheel.'2 

Unless the authority of the national leadership could be re-established, he 
continued, the unions would end by destroying 'not only the people against 
whom we are fighting, but the very Movement itself'. 

No doubt the majority of his fellow trade unionists on the General 
Council would agree that Harry Douglass may exaggerate, but the dangers 
be fears do exist. Essentially the problem arises as a result of the rapid 
growth in workplace bargaining which has developed since the war. This has 
·been pioneered, in indus·tries Eke engineering, by shop stewards who have 
taken advantage of local differences in union strength, the demand for labour, 
the profitability of particular firms and the desire of employers to settle 
matters inside the works, to negotiate a wide range of pa)lments and benefits 
far in advance of those national officials can obtain from the employers as 
a whole by industry-wide bargaining. 

In general such developments are a healthy sign, reflecting the growing 
strength of the unions at the workplace. Taken in conjunction with national 
bargaining, they enable workers to enjoy the best of both worlds. What the 
unions obtain nationally becomes accepted as a minimum below which 
earnings cannot fall, irrespective of the local bargaining situation. Where 
they are locally in a strong position, stewards can improve conditions and 
force up earnings to levels far above those that can be obtained by national 
negotiations. 

But although the increases obtained by the national leaders are usually 
added to the structure of local workplace rates, so that all members of the 


t 
T.U.C. Report, 1960, p. 129. 
Op. cit., p. 351. 


I 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

union actually benefit by the same amount as a result of national negotiations, 
this is not always appreciated by the members themselves. They come to 
regard all improvements as the consequence of local action, and in any case 
the various domestic struggles of their own stewards are much more immediately 
present in their minds. They develop a sense of identification with 
their stewards which is far stronger than that felt for the upper levels of the 
union hierarchy. The result is that if the stewards decide to defy the orders 
of these higher authorities, the members are likely to follow them. 

Making the Stewards Obey the Rules 

In any factory two different sorts of rules are supposed to govern the 
behaviour of stewards. They are: (I) the rules of their own union; (2) the 
rules agreed to by the unions and the employers, for dealing with grievances 
and claims made on behalf of the workers by the unions. These latter rules 
are usually embodied in what is termed the 'Procedure Agreement'. The 
orthodox solution to the problem of membership communication and control 
is that stewards mu t be made to respect both types of rule. If they will not 
do so, they must be punished. 

There are two objections to this simple solution. First, it is impractical. 
Occasionally the executive of a unionr plagued with stewards persistently in 
revolt against its authori-ty, decides to expel some of their number. The 
result is rarely encouraging. Since it is impossi ble to punish everybody associated 
with the acts of rebellion, action of this sort is apt to look unfair, 
and is immediately labelled 'victimisation'. In any case the widespread use 
of the threat of expulsion is unlikely to assist in re-establishing lost loyalties 
among the rank and file. It more often results in a more fanatical loyalty 
being shown to the leaders who have escaped punishment. 

Secondly, it is doubtful whether it is in the interests of the members to 
insist that all the stewards should obey all the rules all the time. It is 
questionable whether stewards can exploit their local bargaining advantages 
to the full unless they are prepared, at least sometimes, to ignore the rules. 

j 
j 
To some extent the T.U.C.'s own repor·t admits this. For example it says: 
'Procedure agreements are often narrow in scope and one-sided in operation' 

If the first is the case there may be no way of raising issues like redundancy 
and victimisation 'through procedure'. In such situations. says the T.U.C., 'a 
strike may be the only way of widening recognition'. But since the agreements 
complained of were often negotiated between all the unions in the 
industry and the employers' association, unle s most unions are prepared to 
back a demand that they shall be changed, if nece sary with a threat of strike 
action, there may be nothing that can be done to improve the position by 
'constitutional' means. The only alternative open to the stewards will be a 
threat of an unconstitutional stoppage to force the employer to negotiate 
despite the provisions of the procedure agreement. 

If an agreement is 'one-sided', what is usually meant is that, as in the 
engineering indu try, an order from management which adversely affects 
union members must be carried out even if the stewards object; all they can 
do i~ to raise the issue in a way provided for in the procedure agreement, 
and hope that management will change its mind. On the other hand, if th,. 


THE FUTURE OF. THE UNIONS 

members demand a change and management objects, nothing can be done 
until the procedure has been used in this case also. A more equitable .situation, 
whi.ch operates without trouble in many industries, is that in which the 
status quo is upheld if either side o1b~ects to a change proposed rby the other 
until the matter has been raised 'in procedure'. 

The fact that in practice this unfair rule is ignored is largely due to pressure 
at shop floor level. Management knows that the workers will strike if changes 
adversely affecting them are introduced without prior discussion and agreement. 
Nevertheless, so long as employers continue to resist attempts to 
introduce a more equitable arrangement, it is unfair and unwise to try to 
discipline stewards who rely on the 'unconstitutional' weapon of the strike 
threat to secure fair treatment. 

Employers' Attitudes 

But stewards are not merely forced to ignore procedural rules to take full 
advantage of their local bargaining position; they also often cannot afford to 
await instruction from the higher levels of the union hierarchy and observe . / 
all its rules. One reason for this is the attitude of employers, who usually V 
prefer to settle matters immediately with the stewards, rather than bring in 
the full-time officials. 

Employers' attitudes in this matter were well brought out in a recent study 
which asked a cross-section of personnel officers, drawn from different industries, 
whether they preferred to deal with full-time officials or their own shop 
stewards, if they had the choice. Shop stewards were preferred by 69 per cent 
of the sample, full-time officials by only 17 per cent, and 14 per cent gave 
no classifiable answer.1 The reasons given were instructive. By far the most 
important reason for choosing stewards was their 'intimate knowledge of the 
circumstances of the case', which was expressed by half of those who gave 
this answer. Preference for keeping issues in the factory, quick decisions, the 
better contact of stewards with members (or control over them), and the 
beneficial results on relationships within the factory, were all mentioned by 
about a fifth of those who preferred stewards. 

This, too, is in many ways a welcome development. It is not at all certain 
that the unions would benefit if full-time officials took over more of this 
work, as they do, for example, in the United States. Management in Britain 
is more prepared to make concessions to their own stewards, who they know, 
particularly if this can be done informally, without giving rise to precedents, 
and without the need to inform the local employers' association, or even the 
employer next door. In any case the present staff of fuhl-time officials in 
British unions could not undertake a tenth of the local negotiations performed 
by stewards, even if they had the time to master the complexities of 
individual wage structures, works rules and informal procedures. 

Nevertheless the development of what often amounts to a conspiracy 
between employers and the stewards to keep out union officials is a source 
of trouble. The officials grow to resent the power of the stewards, who 
in turn come to feel that the official has no knowledge of their problems. 

Clegg, Killick and Adams, op. cit., p. 175. 


THE FUTIJRE OF THE UNIONS 

More and more the steward tends to rely on the loyalty of his members, 
and the solidarity of fellow stewards. This is in itself a source of further 
difficulty. The crucial weakness of the steward's position in so many firms 

~ lttoday is that although he appears to be secure, and management is usually 
~prepared to tolerate his 'unconstitutional behaviour', he has very few formal 
rights. For example, the amount of time he is permitted to spend away from 
his work on union business is often very vaguely defined, although in practice 
he may be allowed considerable freedom. It may not be agreed that he has 
the right to call a shop floor meeting for the purpose of consulting his members. 
It may not be accepted that the leading stewards can demand to see 
top management at short notice. In practice these things will be done, and 
most of the time management acts as though it agrees that it is in its 
interests that they should be allowed to continue; nevertheless, such departures 
from the rules are viewed as privileges rather than rights, which can 
be suddenly withdrawn if, in the opinion of management, it is necessary to 
'stand up to the stewards', or 'cut them down to size'. 

Shop Steward Committees 

A realisation of this possibility underlies the growth of many unofficial 
shop steward committees, bringing together leading stewards in firms like the 
British Motor Corporation, or Smiths Electric. These bodies perform certain 
essential functions from the stewards' point of view. 

By attending the B.M.C. Joint Shop Stewards' Committee in Birmingham, 
for example, stewards from the B.M.C. plant in Oxford can learn of recent 
changes in earnings and conditions in other parts of the B.M.C. empire. This 
information is of considerable use to them in their efforts to force similar 
concessions from their own man'lgement. Now that so many firms are 
organised on a multi-plant basis it is necessary to pool information of this 
sort on the union side, if those responsible for workplace bargaining are to 
build up a coherent picture of managerial policy and agree on a common 
response. As organised at present the constitutional channels cannot provide 
the stewards with such facilities. 

Even more important to the stewards is the additional sense of security 
which they obtain from the existence of these committees. Above all they are 
a way in which they can stand by each other. rf management attempts to 
break a strike in one plant by transferring work to another, the joint shop 
stewards' committee for the whole group immediately declares the work 
black. If it is sent out to a non-unionist sub-contractor, no worker will handle 
it on its return. Moreover, most well-established committees run money-
raising schemes such as raffles and sweepstakes. In this way they raise considerable 
sums, sometimes running into thousands of pounds a year. In part 
these funds are required to pay out-of-pocket expenses to stewards themselves, 
but they are also used to support 'deserving causes', and a strike to 
secure the reinstatement of a shop ste.ward sacked for leading an unofficial 
strike is the most deserving cause of all. 

Nevertheless the development of committees of this kind tends both to 
/stimulate further rule-breaking and to produce an atmosphere of increasing 
V' extremism. Workers are encouraged more and more to use the strike threat 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

rather than the rules, even where the rules might work. Eventually management 
comes to feel that it is time it took a stand, while the higher levels of 
the union leadership become increasingly reluctant to help the stewards out 
if they should run into trouble. Thus, although the gap between the higher 
and lower levels of union authority cannot be bridged simply by demanding 
that stewards should from now on obey the rules, the present situation is 
not a satisfactory one, either from the union's or the stewards' point of 
view. During the next ten years the unions should try to discover more 
practical solutions. 

Training the Stewards to Make Use of the Rules 

One suggestion receiving increasing attention is that stewards should be"/... 
taught more about the rules, and how to make the most efficient use of them. 
It is assumed that one reason for the growing disregard of the rules is the) 
appointment of stewards who have little idea of now their union works and 
assume too readily that the national procedure agreement is there simply to 
frustrate them. 

One industry which is taking joint action to improve the level of shop 
steward training is the motor trade. In 1961, representatives of both sides of 
industry agreed to sponsor a series of day-release classes organised, for the 
most part, through the Workers' Educational Association. They did this 
because, in the words of a leading employer who took part, they believed 
tba.t one of the sources of trouble had :been that: 

'At any given moment, there must be many newcomers 
(and probably far too many of the older hands too!) who 
have only the haziest idea of what "the procedure" really is, 
and of how it is applied to their own practical problems.'1 

Even more encouraging, from the viewpoint of the unions as a whole, was 
the decisi•on of the 1961 T.U.C. to reorgaruise its own educational facili<ties. 
As a result, in 1962, the General Council has asked Congress to spend about 
£100,000 a year on a new co-ordinated education programme. The money 
is being used to provide correspondence courses for shop stewards and 
others, and also to establish a small staff of regional organisers, who will 
encourage the development of evening classes and weekend schools. 

But useful though both these developments are, they do not deal with the 
crucial difficulties which must be faced and overcome if there is to be any 
substantial increase in the scope of shop steward training. This problem was 
diagnosed in the report on Trade Union Education which Hugh Clegg and 
Rex Adams wrote for the Workers' Educational Association in 1958. Asked 
to consider the adequacy of existing facilities, these authors stressed the 
critical shortage of what they termed 'the right kind of tutors and materials'. 
Before shop stewards and others could be effectively informed about their 
own industrial relations arrangements, said Clegg and Adams, there must be 
considerable research into the 'practices and procedures' of various industries, 

Labour Relations in the Motor Industry, by J. R. Edwards, Managing Director 
of the .Pressed Steel Company in Picture Press, No. 2, Vol. 1, Joumal of the 
Pressed Steel Company, 1961. 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS

16 

presented in a way 'designed to engage the interest and attention of trade 
unionists'. Since most of the existing material published on the subject was 
unsuitable for this purpose, specially commissioned books, pamphlets and 
other training documents would have to be provided. To undertake this task 
they recommended the establishment of a small, but highly specialised, Trade 
Union College, whose staff would conduct the research, write the teaching 
material, and train existing W.E.A. and other tutors in the necessary 
techniques. 

The proposed re-organisation of the T.U.C.'s educational facilities pro


/ vides an admirable opportunity to implement this plan. If the T.U.C. were 
prepared to spend twice as much as is proposed on its educational scheme 
it would have more than enough to establish a first-class Trade Union College 
;Hong the lines suggested. If it were willing to make a grant to an existing 
/ institution, such as Ruskin College, to enable it to take on the necessary 
additional staff to do this work, it would be possible to provide what is 
required for a fraction of this cost. 

Changing the Rules to Fit the Stewards 

But shop steward training is only a palliative so long as it is necessary 
Jor stewards to break the rules in order to do the job. In some ways it is the 
/ rules, not the stewards, which are most in need of reform. 

Jt is sometimes said that the unions should advocate some kind of Shop 
Stewards' Charter-formalising their position in relation to the realities of 
the workplace situation. This would entail a reform of most existing procedure 
agreements so that they guaranteed the stewards certain constitutional 
rights; the right to consult their members, to approach top management, to 
demand information and bargain over issues like short-time working and 
victimisation, to move freely around the firm and so on. Provision might also 
be made for any loss of earnings incurred by the stewards and for protection 
against sudden dismissal. 

There is much to be said for action along these lines. The more the rules 
help the stewards the more likely it is that they will come to respect them. 
However, at the present time there is no sign that many national employers' 
associations would be willing to accept such a change. The attitude of one 
of the most important, the Engineering Employers' Federation, is significant 
here. In the last ten years two separate Courts of Inquiry set up to consider 
disputes in the industry have suggested ways of improving the engineering 
procedure agreement. The unions would undoubtedly have accepted these 
proposals, for they are similar to those that they themselves have advocated 
since 1945. Nevertheless the Employers' Federation still refuses to admit that 
there is anything wrong with the present procedure. 

Tn these circumstances perhaps the best immediate course would be for 
the unions to approach individual employers, in an attempt to persuade them 
to accept additional agreements designed to leg,itimise the steward's position 
in their particular factory. It might also be a good idea to approach the 
nationalised industries. Already they have procedures which are in some ways 
an advance on many private trades, although it is doubtful if they give 
adequate recognition to shop stewards. If some sort of stewards' charter were 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

17 

negotiated in industries like gas and electricity, and with leading firms in the 
private sector, they might serve as an example of what is desired. 

When considering suggestions for the reform of union rules, to make it 
easier for stewards to work within them, different difficulties arise. Where-
ever possible branches should be based on a particular place of work. Such 
branches are places where the problems of the factory can be discussed and 
decided by members and shop stewards who are themselves branch officers. 
Full-time officials can make regular visits and keep in touch with what is 
going on. One reason why the printing unions have been able to combine 
advanced forms of workplace bargaining with regular contact with officials, 
and the maintenance of national solidarity and loyalty, is that they have 
insisted on basing their 'chapels' on particular places of work and integrating 
them into the formal structure of the union. 

But the printing unions have also been helped by the fact that there are 
clear lines of demarcation between them, and an absence of inter-union 
competition for members. Each chapel in a branch functions as a self-
contained unit, determining the bargaining policy of its particular grade of 
workers. In other industries, such as engineering, or building, this is not the 
case. Not only are there more unions but, much more important, the lines 
of demarcation between them are more hazily drawn, and over large sections 
of the semi-skilled there are two or more unions openly competing for 
members. In these trades effective workplace bargaining is a multi-union 
affair. Inter-union rivalry and hostility are sources of weakness. It is only -~ 
where stewards from different unions can work together in an atmosphere of 
tolerance and co-operation that local bargaining opportunities are fully 
exploited. 

One of the most valuable features of the present growth of unofficial shop 
steward committees is that they provide a forum where stewards of all , 
unions can come together precisely in order to solve common workplace 
problems. No single union could provide such facilities. The danger is that 
if they tried to do so, although they might increase their own influence over 
their own stewards, they would tend to do this at the cost of weakening the 
factory-wide solidarity created by shop steward committees. Thus, the solution 
that works well in printing cannot be generally applied in industries like 
engineering and building. There the loyalties built up by the joint shop 
stewards' committees must be preserved. 

But this does not mean that the committees themselves could not be 
brought more within the ambit of official union influence. It does mean that 
this is a job which cannot be done by individual unions. It is essentially a 
multi-union task, and as such must be undertaken by bodies like the Confederation 
of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, or the Federation of 
Building Trade Operatives. But as organised at present, these associations 
are ill-equipped for such a task. Their functions are to conduct national wage 
negotiations. They are not an active force in the workplace, or even, in most 
places, at district level. 

Although the Engineering Confederation has District Committees their 
work is mainly consultative. They convene meetings of leading stewards but 
these are often badly attended. This is mainly because in a diverse industry 
like engineering, stewards from one geographical area have little in common. 



18 
THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

They are concerned with what happens in other factories belonging to the 
same firm in other parts of the country, or with similar firms making 
products in competition with their owner. This is the sort of information 
they can get from existing unofficial committees. 

A re-organised and re-vitalised Confederation could provide facilities for 
meetings of this kind, and ensure that appropriate full-time officials were in 
attendance. But it would require a larger budget and, most important of all, 
a revolution in union attitudes. At the moment most unions would oppose 
such a plan, partly because it could undermine their own autonomy, and 
partly because they still formally deny the need for stewards from rnfferent 
factories to meet in this way at all. 

Conclusions 

There are no easy solutions for the problems posed in this section, although 
if the amount of rule breaking is not to rise as the degree and scope of 
workplace bargaining widens during the next decade, the unions must find

I 
ways of improving communications and strengthening rank and file loyalties. 
A lot more couLd be done to teach stewards ho'w to use the rules, but it is 
even more important to face and overcome the difficulties involved in 
changing them. One thing is clear: the extent to which stewards are now 
encouraged to ignore union authority and break established rules is 
dangerous and indefensible. 

4. The Problem of Bargaining Priorities 
I
I
F declining membership trends are reversed and communications between 
the leadership and the rank and file improve, the unions will have dealt 
with the major deficiencies in their internal organisation which prevent them 
from advancing towards increasing industrial power. But at the moment any 
significant addition to union power would only add to their unpopularity, 
and might lead to demands that action should be taken to restrict their 
legal freedom. 

It is therefore also essential that the unions come to grips with the causes 
) of their deteriorating public image. Both this section, and the one that 
follows, are largely concerned with this question. 
One of the main reasons for the growing criticism of unions is the suspicion 

J that they have become exclusively concerned with the scramble for higher 
wages. Allan Flanders recently analysed this type of criticism, and linked 
the declining public approval of trade unions with what he termed their 
declining 'sense of social purpose'. He wrote: 

'Trade unions have always had two faces, sword of justice and vested 
interest. But it is the second, rather than the first, that is now turned most 
frequently to public view. More than that, it has become accepted as their 
normal, natural image by the unions themselves.'1 

1 Trade Unions in the Sixties, op. cit., p. 111. 



THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

19 

In the thirties, he continued, the primary social purposes of the unions were 
to establish their position in industry on a firm foundation and to gain a 
consultative relationship with government on an equal footing with employers. 
These aims could be justifiably presented as demands for elementary social 
justice; for a recognition of the legitimate rights of organised working men. 

Both purposes appeared to have been secured by the end of the 1940's. 
The unions then needed to raise their sights; 'New social purposes, appropriate 
to the changed situation, had to be formulated and pressed for'. 
Instead they seemed to be mainly concerned with exploiting their new 
position in a spirit of narrow materialism and sectional advantage; as a 
result they projected an image of trade unionism as a business rather than 
as a cause. They came to look less and less like a sword of justice and more 
and more like a vested interest. 

Flanders has emphasised one of the most important problems facing the \ 
unions at the present time. Essentially it is a problem of bargaining priori-
lies. How far, at national and local level, are the next ten years to repeat the 
pattern of the fifties, with unions continuing to direct their energies almost , 
exclusively to a struggle for higher pay? How far, instead, will they attempt \ to 
broaden their approach, concentrating on less immediate and materialistic/ 
issues-on reducing hours and raising minimum wages, as well as on security 
and status on the job? 

Reducing Maximum Hours and Raising Minimum Wage11 

The nature of the choice can be seen most clearly in the issue of the 
shorter working week. The introduction of an eight hour day has been a 
trade union objective since the 1880's. The results so far are that the 
majority of manual workers now have a standard working week of 42 hours. 
Yet in terms of hours worked, the 40 hour week is as far off as ever. 
Despite the reduction in standard hours the average hours actually worked 
by -adult ma:les are sUJbstantially wha.t they were jn 1938-about 48 a week. 
The difference has been made up by over,time. Each reduction in the standard 
working week has been met by a roughly equivalent extension of overtime. 
Systematic overtime has come to be accepted as a normal fea:tuTe of many 
manual workers' lives. 

The usual reason advanced for this is full employment. Labour has been 
short, so overtime has been necessary to raise output and meet the needs of 
economic expansion. The main difficulty with this explanation is that overtime 
has not risen to the same extent abroad, even in countries with full 
employment and a more rapid rate of growth. Only France needs as much 
overtime as we do. In most other European countries average hours are 
much lower than in Britain. In Germany they work, on average, a 43 hour ' 
week -in Italy an hour less. 

Moreover, if overtime was a response to labour shortages it would be at 
its highest where earnings are already high, in an effort to attract labour. 
Yet the reverse is the case. Official ,figures show that the longer the hours o'f 
overtime, the lower the average earnings. Industries where average hours 
exceed 50 a week have below average hourly earnings; those with above 
average hourly earnings work below average hours. 


20 
THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

Facts of this sort have led to the suggestion that overtime is used in Britain 
more to supplement the wage packet than to raise production, particularly 
in the lower paid trades.1 Workers develop a notion of what is a reasonable 
wage packet. Sometimes the weekly wage rate is sufficient to yield tbis, but 
this is often not· the case. In some instances incentive systems may be used 
to fill -the gap, but if they are not arvailabJe, overtime is the only aLternative. 
This is realised by many managements. Where basic pay is low, they allow 
'guaranteed' overtime to act as a sUJbstitute for bigher pay.z. 

From the employer's viewpoint the main disadvantage of this system is 
the waste. Excessive overtime involves unnecessary overheads. But from 
the union's viewpoint there are disadvantages too. The system makes a 
mockery of arguments in favour of a further reduction in the standard week. 
The T.U.C. may advocate this as a means of increasing leisure, but nobody 
bellieves it.3 A campa.ign for the 40 hour week ending in another two hours 
overtime is regarded as a prime example of union hypocrisy. It is felt that 
if the unions really wanted to see a reduction in hours they would tackle the 
problem of overtime. 

All the signs are that this could be done without any loss of production. 
As one employer -told a team of investigators: 'It has been our experience 
that reducing overtime in stages has not reduced our production'.4 What is 
involved is detailed negotiation industry by industry and firm by firm, and 
priority must be given to lower paid workers already working a 50 hour 
week. Since these groups cannot be expected both to give up their overtime, 
and to work more consistently for a shorter period unless they can be 
guaranteed the same money as before, priority must also be given to raising 
their standard weekly wages. It is here that the problem of bargaining 

1 
priorities and the need to choose !Jetween social justice and vested interests 
re-emerges most sharply. 

Improving the position of the lowest paid is not simply a matter of securing 
advances for workers in depressed trades like laundry work, jute manufacture, 
or retail bespoke tailoring. The 10 per cent of adult workers taking 
home £10 a week or less come from a variety of trades and the eight million 
or more earning £12 or under work in a wide range of industries. In a 
recent study of the engineering industry, for example, Hill and Knowles 
discovered that although some workers were poorly paid, some groups 
earned 'half as much again or even twice as much as other groups, though 
they were do.ing identical work'.5 They concluded tha·t variations of this 
sire were unjustifiaJble. either on economic grounds or on grounds of equity. 

To reduce such anomalies they recommended pro tanto agreements similar 
to those concluded in the industry in 1943 and 1950. These broke with the 

1 See H. A. Clegg, The Implica-tions of the Shorter Working Week for Management, 
B.I.M. pamphlet, 1962. 
2 See Work and Leisure, Summary of an Investigation by the Study Groups ba~ed 
on the Duke of Edinburgh's Study Conference, 1961. 


3 

See the Gallup Poll on Trade Unions, op. cit., p. 14. 
4 Work and Leisure, op. cit., p. 11. 
5 The Variability of EngineerJng Earnings. Hill and Knowles, Oxford Institute 
of Statistics Bulletin, May 1956, p. 129. 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

tradition of 'flat rate' increases, which award the same sum to all workers 
in a particular grade, and substituted graduated increases inversely related 
to individual earnings. Thus when an increase of 6s. was awarded in 1943, 
the only workers who received this in full were those receiving no more than • 
the district minimum. Those whose earnings were sufficiently far above the 
minimum got nothing at all. 

These agreements were unpopular at the time, largely because they awarded 
no increase at all to the majority of workers. Nevertheless it must be faced 
that even a modified pro tanto agreement, which included something for 
everybody, however small, would be resented by some sections of the highly 
paid -for example car workers. It would of course be open to them to 
take action at workshop level to improve on their nationally awarded increases, 
but even if they were completely successful this need not cause them 
to take a better view of the actions of their national leaders. It must therefore 
be realised that there is implied in the use of pro tanto agreements a 1 
potential threat to union solidarity. In changing bargaining priorities in this 
way one may make the problem of membership communication and control 
more difficult. Nevertheless I would argue that so long as action is taken 
along the lines outlined in the previous section to deal with this problem, 
there is a case for using national negotiations in the next few years as a 
means of raising minimum standards. This means that unions cannot totally 
reject the nation of pro tanto ag·reements. An attempt to put the worse-off 
sections of the working class first is not only a worthwhile social objective, 
it would also help to dispel their image as the mere guardians of the 
sectional interests of the most powerful. 

Security and 'Fair Treatment' 

Unions could also give more thought to questions of security and status./ 
This problem goes beyond the argument that manual workers should be 
given the status and privileges of 'staff' employees. Even the better-off staff 
worker in private industry today has little security, and in many ways he is 
still regarded as a 'hired hand'. Outside the public sector, workers can still 
be dismissed af:ter thirty years' service for tr,ivial offences. Their chances of 
promotion are still blocked by unfair supervisors or partisan office managers. 

fn the case of manual workers, who are subject to seasonal discharge, one 
of the main deficiencies is that there are practically no formal agreements 
covering redundancy. The main obstacle to progress here is the unions 
themselves. The A.E.U. insists that redundancy in any form must be 
opposed. This means that its <>fficials cannot raise the pwblem of job 
security in all its aspects until an employer is threatening members with the 
sack. Then, in a period of falling trade and rising unemployment when they 
are at their weakest, the A.E.U. demands work-sharing and no redundancies. 

The way out of this difficulty is for unions like the T. & G .W.U., who are 
not saddled with such a short-sighted policy, to take the lead where they can 
and negotiate the best agreements possible during booms. This involves 
recognising that even if labour requirements are planned in advance, and 
work-sharing is accepted as a short term expedient, there comes a time 
during a recession when management can insist on discharging workers and 


22 THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

the unions are unable to stop them. All they can do is ensure that the 
employfH gives adequate notice and reasonable severance pay.1 

What is required for dismissals is the negotiation of simple and fair 
disciplinary rules giving unions the right to make representations on behalf 
of members under notice. In a few instances these already exist. They specify 
the offences for which dismissal is justified, and ensure that for most misdemeanours, 
a man cannot be dismissed for a first offence. 

For promot·i<>n opportunities, the main safeguard unions usually insist on 
is that senior men shall not be passed over unless they are incapable of doing 
the work. This does not mean that the seniority principle is relied on blindly. 
For some jobs it is reasonable to allow for other factors-such as competitive 

/ examination. But promotions and transfers ought not to be entirely at 
management's discretion. In most workers' experience systems of promotion 
relying exclusively on 'merit' as defined by management, lead a few to curry 
favour with supervisors, and open the way to favouritism and arbitrary 
selection under the guise of measuring ability. 
Behind suggestions of this sort is the belief that it is time British unions 
moved beyond the limited framework of rights that have been their main 
concern since the war. The longer a man works for an employer the more 
his life becomes invested in that employment. His friends, his habits, his 
entire physical and emotional well-being and the future of his family may 
be greatly affected by his job. Increasingly he needs to feel secure, surrounded 
by a framework of rights he knows and understands. 
The fight to widen workers' rights is, as Allan Flanders has written, one 
which must be conducted 'at works level'. Nevertheless, he continues, 

'. .. it is a struggle which the trade unions have to lead 
nationally, even if it is fought locally. These are issues on 
which they need to develop their policy and give guidance 
and support, not least in terms of training and education 

to their workpl·ace representat:ives.'2 

A campaign to raise security and advance workshop rights would also provide 
an additional opportunity for union leaders, at all levels, to strengthen 
their contacts with stewards, and, through them, with the rank and file. 

Conclusions 

lt has been argued in this section that unions should change their bargaining 
priorities. They should place less emphasis on an annual scramble for equal 
increases for all, and more on raising minimum standards, improving job 
security, and extending workers' rights. This would not only help to dispel 
the public image of unions as apostles of materialism and sectional advantage; 
it would also provide them with worthwhile social objectives for the 1960s. 

1 A forthcoming Fabian pamphlet by Geoffrey Goodman deals with thi~ subject 
in more detail. / 
2 Flanders, op. cit., p. 15. 



THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

5. 
The Problem of Trade Union Relations 
with Government and Public 
S
S
O FIAR this pamphlet has been mainly concerned with the intemal 
affairs of unions; with maintaining memben>hip, preserving unity, and 
developing adequate social olbjeotives. It has been necessary to consider 
the policies unions ought to adopt towards employers in general, but this 
has not invo•lved any detailed discussion of extemal relation~hips be!Jween 
un·ions and the Gorvernment, or between the morvement as a whole and 
the public generally. l'his section considers these matters in a more direc·t 
and comprehensive way. 

When consideroing intemal prorblems it is o•bvious tha:t the main impetus 
for reform must come from inside individual unions-although the T.U.C. 
can help by p:rov.iding addi•tion•al facilities. The reverse is the case with 
the problems to be considered now. Here the role of the T.U.C. is vi·tal 
and it is necessary to beg1n with an analysis of its extisting functi·ons in the 
field of union-government relations. 

The T.U.C. and the Government 

Al·thougb it was founded in 1868, it was only in 1921 that the T.U.C. 
set up a permanent executive, knoiWn as the General Council, to review 
industrial and economic developmen.ts affecting un·ions and to formulate 
a policy for dealing with them. ALthough almost all issues of concern 
to the Counciol involved Go·vernment action, it was not until the second 
world war that it secured the right to be consulted on all aspects of 
Government policy. HoiWever, after Bev·in became Minister of La~bour, the 
Council began to feel that it was exerting a real and decisive influence in 
the fields of industrial and economic policy. War-time contacts were 
retained when Labour took office in 1945, and when the Tories returned 
in 1951 the Minister of La~bour seemed friendly and the Council looked 
forward to a continuation of i.ts in.fluence. 

The years that f·oHowed SaJW a progressi•ve decline in the effectiveness 
of the system created by Bevin. Since 1956 there has been a marked 
worsening of relations and the influence of the General Council has s·teadily 
declined. The formal machinery of consultation has been retain~d. but 
the Government has become less wi\1oing to give the T.U.C. advance notice 
of its in·tentions and more reluctant to act on its advice. 

The growing frustration ex•perienced by the Council can be seen from · 
a study of the repor-ts which i·ts specialist committees make to Congress. 
Here one can read of the failure of the Economic Committee to influence 
BudgetJary policy: the Production Committee records its criticisms o[ 
Government plans for high-unemployment areas, and the Education Committee 
reports its unsuccessful attempts to secure the implemen<tattion of 
the Crowther Report. But the decline in influence can be seen at its most 
tr·agic in the field of Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare; topics of 


24 THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

great concern to the union~. where the Geneml Council's past achievements 
have been considera;ble. The main objective of the T.U.C. in these fields 
is to secure improvemenrts in the facilities for dealing w:i·~h indusrtrial 
accidents and diseases-for their prevention and treatment, as well as the 
pwvjsion of adequate compensa.tion. 

Thus it has been concerned wbout the recent rise in f.actory accidents and 
has argued that it is related to the Government's refusal to provide for a 
sufficient increase in the number orf Factory Inspectors. It has pointed 
out that there are no~ not enough inspectors to implement the 1926 
recommenda-tion of Lhe I.iL.O., that each factory should be inspected 
annually. Despite these facts, the Go,vernmenrt has refused to expand 
the InSipectorate to the level required. 

To tackle the problem of preventing industrial diseases, and provJde 
more effective forms of treatment for diseases and accidents, the T.U.C. 
has long advocated an Occupational Health SePvice. .Lts representatives 
have stressed the increasing volume of dangerous sUJbstances in everyday 
indus·trri,al use, emphasising that mos.t factories have only a first aid box 
and a half trained vo·lunteer to deal with emergencies. I.t has dra,wn 
attention to the gr·owth in radiation r.is.ks, and the rise in the incidence 
of industnial bronchitis. The Government has continued to reply tha1 an 
industrial health serv.ice should be developed on a 'volun•tary basis' and 
has refused to take action to force employers to prov.ide more adequate 
facilities. 

But Government parsimony and obstinacy is sho·wn most clearly in 
questions of compensation and redress. 

For years the T.U.C. has demanded impro·vements in the arrangements 
for medical assessment and diagnosis under the Industrial Injuries Scheme. 
It has attempted to extend tl1e scope of the Industr·ial Injuries Act 
to cover injuries sustained during short breaks of employment. It has 
urged that complaints like industrial bronchitis, or bricklayers' elibow, or 
injuries to bearing caused by occl.IJpational noise, should be scheduled as 
industrial disease . It has tried to ex·tend payment of special hardship 
allowances beyond the ex·isting thirteen week limit, and abtempted to get 
injured WoPkers who aMend hospital their out-of-pocket expenses. T-he 
Government has refused to grant any concessions in all these cases. 

But the two most flagrant examples of Governmen·t meanness affect the 
very old and the totally incapacitated. The first concerns the plight of the 
30,000 older workers who receive benefits under the old Workmen's 
Compensation Act for injuries suffered before 1948. The most that can 
be paid the totally incapacitated under this Act is 50 I-a week. In 1956, 
follo~ing renewed S'Uibmissions, the T.U.C. orbtained one of i·ts last impoPtant 
concessions. when this group was given a supplement otf 17I-a week. 
This ensured that they were, for a short time, no worse off than workers 
covered by the improved industrial injuries scheme in,troduced by the 
Lrubour Government. Since that date, although disablement payments under 
the new S~Cheme have been twice increased, nothing has been done for the 

} old cases. This means a worker crippled before 1948 receives 30I-a week 
less than one disrubled afoter that date. 
The second case also concerns the incapacitated, but the anomaly here 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

has no·thing to do w1ith age. Labour's Na·ti.ona} Health Act gave the 
Minister .power to pr·ovide appliances for the disa<bled. Consequently mo•tortricycles 
were provided fo-r those whose disahi.Ji<ty involved a loss of both 
legs. During the last few years speciaLly adapted small oars ha;ve been 
designed for the use of the disabled, and they have been supplied, under 
the National Health Service, to the war-dis·a,bled. Yet successive Tory 
M~nisters have refused to extend this pro·vision to the industr•iaHy disaJbled. 
The T.U.C. has pointed out tha.t tricycles are less re1iaJble than cars, and 
in cases of breakdown disaJbled men have been stranded for long periods. 
They ha·ve stressed tha-t most tricycles are single-seaters, so tha>t a disa'b.Jed 
person canno-t be accompan·ied by a relative or friend. 

Despi•te the injustice and hardship causea by both these oases, and the \ 
trifling cost invo1ved, the representati·ons of the T.U.C. have had no effeot. 
T-here could not be clearer proof of the gr-ave weakening of the esltaNished 
techniques for affecting Government policy. 

The Decline in Influence 

There are two main reasons for this decline in influence. First, the longer 
the Tories remained in office the longer were the periods of economic 
s-tringency, and the less likely it has been that they would agree to any 
eX'tension of the provisions of the Welfare St;a,te. Second, and even more jimportant, is the refusal of the T.U.C. to co-operate in the implementat·ion 
of Go•vernment policies of wage restraint. H was o<bvious that sooner or 
later the day-to-day rel-ations between the specialist commi·ttee;; of the 
General Council and individual Go•vernment Departments must be affect·ed 
by this. Essentially the war~time system estaJblished by Bevin was based 
on the honouring o.f a bargain; in exchange for a share in n·ational decision-
taking, a system of anbitrabion that encouraged uni'On recogn·ition, and a 
great deal orf po•wer o·ver the hire and fire of labour, the unions agreed, 
for the duration o.f the war, to give up the legal right to s-trike and their 
claims to preserve skiill monopolies. The object of the b-argain was to 
ensure that the unions pl,ayed their part in achiev·ing the common v~ctory. 

When Laibour was returned in 1945 the terms of the bargain changed; 
but it was accepted that in exchange for the continuance of their new 
influence, unions would act 'responsi,bly', and promote the agreed ends 
they shared w.ith the Government. Thus they gave their blessing to the 
productivi•ty drive, and supported the in[roduction o.f wag.e restra·int. On 
the whole the bargain worked, and when the Tories returned, the more 
far-sighted hoped that the General Council might be persuaded to perform 
similar serv·ices on their behalf. But there was insufficient agreemen•t on 
O'Verall o1b~ectives for this to work. By 1956 the T.U.C. regarded the 
difficulties orf the Go·vernment as the consequence of a misguided and 
dootr·inaire Tory policy of abandoning all con,tmls. It passed a resolution 
den•ounoing 'pro.posals to recover control by wage restraint'. 

lt is this development which must be remembered when considering the 
T.U.C.'s reacti•on to the Governmen·t's decisi.on to set up the National 
Economic Devel·opment Council. The General Council decided, a.f,ter some 
hesitation, to co·ope!1ate in the work of Neddy, but this was not a sign 



26 THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

tha.t the breach between the unions and the Go¥ernmentt had n·arrowed. 
It agreed to serve on Neddy for three quite different reasons. First, it knew 
that the N.E.D.C. would concentrate a~t least at first, on ways of raising 
the rate of economic growth rather than on the beSit method of holding 
down wages. Second, the General Oouncil realised that this was its last 
chance olf restoring some of its lost influence. HnalJy, it felt that an 
outnigbt refusal would increase trade unions' general unpopularity wirth the 
pUiblic. 

There can be little dourbrt that in the circumstances the General Council 
was right to decide as it did-but this does not mean that the Government 
will allow Neddy to ha·ve the influence the Council would wish. 

The T.U.C. and Neddy 

The full-~ime staff of Neddy were told to consider how Britain could 
raise its ra.te olf growth to 4% per annum and they w~ll preserut a comprehensi,
ve report on the obstacles to greater growth by the end of 1962. 
What the T.U.C. says i<t would like to see then is a period of hard bargaining 
where assistance demanded from the unions can be exchanged fo~r binding 
concessions from the Government or empJoyers. 

This may not be ho~w things work out. The Government may not let 
tbe Council influence any,thing. They may prelfer it to degenerate into 
another form orf w,indow dressing -l~ke its predecessor the Cohen Council 
-a f~acade, intended to demonstrate that the Tor.ies are not entirely unconcerned 
with the rate of gro.wth, and intend, some time in the future. 
to work out a policy for deal,ing with it. The distinguished staff of the 
Council will con·tinue to circulate papers and po4nt to problems but 
econorn,ic policy will remain the province of the Chancellor and his traditional 
adrvisers at the Treasury. 

ln this case the T.U.C.'s representat·ives on Neddy must denounce it as 
a fraud and be prepared to resign in a body. If they fail to do this, or 
bungle their resigna•tion so that the electorate fails to understand why they 
lef:it, they may find they have unwiHingly played their part in ensuring 
another Tory ~ctory wit,hout in any way increasing their own influence. 

But if the Government does take the Council sel'iously the danger will 
then be that they will raise their growth target in an insufficiently controlled 
and selective way, which will end in the way the last Tory boom ended in 
1960 -with a balance of payments crisis and an attempt to impose another 
wage freeze. Tf this seems likely, the trade union members of the Council 
will have to make a public case for a more controlled and selective 
programme of expansion. In fact the General Oouncil has suggested a 
whole series olf measures designed to do just this in the past.l Wha.t it has 
failed to do is bring these ideas together as part of a coheren1t and wellpublicised 
trade union contribution to the pwblem of economic growth. 
If the Government emrbarks on a programme of insufficiently controlled 
expansion Neddy will pmvide the unions with an ideal platform from 

1 They include the idea of differential investment and depreciation allowances. 
increased public investment. greater control over the location of industry. the 
use of taxation to discourage unnecessary imports and encourage exports, and 
so on. 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

which to cnt1c1se; but only if their represenltatLves are prepared to seize 
their opportunities to the full. 

Yet the T.U.C. leaders will face their most critical challenge only irf the 
Government is shrewd enough to avoid both courses outlined; this will 
arise precisely if things work out in the way they say they hope. 

Suppose the Governmen1t aotuaHy increases ~he rate o[ grorw.th and accep~s ~ 
the need for some orf the con>tro·ls advocated by the T.U.C. Suppose i•t 
also ma.kes a number of concessions in the field of Social Insurance and 
Industrial Welf.are. lit would then be in a position to demand real coopera.
tion from the unions. Such demands would concern two potentially 
ex.plos·i•ve questions; union atti·tudes towards increased production and 
technical change, and the vital issue of wages. 

In the case of production ques<tions there can be l~ttle doubt tha.t more 
will be required than formal suppont fo·r another 'producti'Vity drive'. 
Neddy's staff are bound to stress ~he way the economy runs up aga;in&t 
shol'tages of skiil·led lrubour M an early s>tage of the expansion pmcess, and 
to point to bot>tlenecks which are the fault of the unions. 11hey will also 
produce detailed reports orf a number of industries, some of which are 
notorious for their lalbour restrictions and opposition to technical change. 
If the unions are not to be blamed for sa·botaging ex;pans·ion they must be 
prepared to make real conc·essions, or at least be ready to explain why 
what is suggested is impractical. 

On the wages front the Government will undoUJbtedJ.y make use of its 
newly estahHshed National Incomes Oommiss·ion to put pressure on the 
unions. This body of so called 'independen.t expel'ts' wiH be encouraged to 
pronounce on the justi.firubility of im.portanrt wage daims from the Vliewpoilllt 
o[ their effect on the national economy. The T.U.C. denies that such a 
body can perfo·rm any useful functions, and George Woodcock has denounced 
the idea of 'independent experts' pronouncing on wages as 
'arrogan>t, conceited and foolish'. It is understandable tJha<t the unions should 
take this a;Uj.tude, but unless they are prepared to maintain that wages are 
the one sector of the eoon>omy that can never be subjected to any sort of 
planning or set of priorities they will not be a1ble to maintain a completely 
negaJtive vdew on the sUibjeot. 

In faot they have already admitted that in the interests of higher groiWith 
it might be necessary to adopt a policy of wage restraint. In January this 
year the T.U.C. said: 

'It is poss~ble that a ooncer,ted move to a higher level of economic 
acti·vity could generaJte an increase in personal incomes which could no.t 
be ma•tched immediately by an increase in the resources aiVailwble for 
personal consumption. In such circumstances pressure might ha·ve to be 
reJ.ie'Ved not only by higher taxation but by temporary limi•ting increases 
in income.' 

I>t may be tha.t if it was satisfied that a 4% growth rate was going to 
be achieved, the General Council might be prepared to discuss such an 
idea-while reserving the r·igh>t to argue over the size of the figure itself 
and the need for it to be accompanied by limi•tations on profi<ts and capital 
gains. 


28 THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

Unfortuna:tely it is do•UJbtful if the Government would now be sa.tisfied 
with this. The increases announced since they trjed to impose their own 
'guiding light' in Apr·il, 1962, show that such a published maX"imum tends 
to become an actual minimum, in the absence of an agreed policy on how 
it should be distrilbuted. Wofikers in the Civil Service, and others with 
no industrial !>trength, get either the min.imum, or little more than the 
minimum, while more militant groups o.btain increa-ses roughly proportiona-
te to their industrial streng•th. (.Mearuwh.ile workers whose stewards can 
take advan•tage orf local bargaining opportunities to drive up piece ra•tes 
and increase o•vertime and other local payments can avoid the effect of the 
pause altogether.) 

This is not a wages pol•icy aJt all, and it will not become one simply 
by gebting T.U.C. support for a meaningless overall 'guiding light'. If the 
Government is serious a~IYout the implications of plann•ing in other dir·ections 
they w.ill demand more from the T.U.C. than this. 

The T.U.C. and Wages 

What they haJve in mind, and what rthey may wish to use the National 
Incomes Commission as a step .towards, is T.U.C. co-operation in a pollicy 
for wages which prescr~bes not merely the size of the guiding Hght, lbut 
how it should be dis·tributed. One can get some tidea of What •this would 
involve from the recent White Paper on incomes policy. 

In effeot the White Paper claimed to distinguish between 'good' and 'tbad' 
arguments for wag·e increases from the viewpoint of the public interest 
-much as the National Incomes Commiss·i·on is intended to do. In fact 
all demands were rejected as unjustified unless they would (1) attract wo.nkers 
.to undermanned industries or (2) cause •them to work harder. No doUJbt 
·this list is too shor·t, •but i·t must 'be admitted that every successful attempt 
at economic planning a~broad has recogn•ised that all wage daims cannot 
be treated as equal.ly val-id if inflation is to be avoided in a country trying 
to raise its ate of growth. 

George Woodcock may ·be rjght •to say that 'it is not possible for 
independent peorple, ho•wever ·eminen1, responsible and experienced' <to dra•w 
up such a list; 1but he and his fellow members on .the General Council 
cannot evade .their own responsi•bility in this matter so easily.1 

In a pamphlet of <this sort it is impossi1ble to lay dowa in advance either 
the criteria 1the T.U.C. should agree •to, or say how far .they would be 
wise to go in co-operating with •the Government over the implementation 
of such criteria.:!-All one can do is indicate the factors which would have 
to •be considered and ought to be discussed nOIW. 

1 See 'Desperate, Disastrous and Futile'. by George Woodcock, Sunday Pictorial, 
July 29th, 1962. 
2 It is important to remember here that the T.U.C. has very limited powers 
over member unions in matters of this sort. They cannot give an undertakingthat only certain kind of wage demands will be made; they cannot even 
guarantee that unions will only use certain sorts of arguments. What theycould do would be to give their 'moral' support to a Government White Paper 
which listed certain priorities and principle~ which ought to be followed in 
making wage settlements. 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

For example, .the White Paper said 1all wage claims basoo on changes 
in the 'cost ·Of living .or f.rom rtrends of pro·fi<ts or productivity' must be 
largely disregarded. The T.U.C. could not accept 1this, 'but might ibe prepared 
to admit ·that not all •arguments 'based on such mo!Vements are equally 
ju~tifia'ble. It is arguaJhle, lfor .instance, that wage increases are only 
jus-tified on oost of li.ving grounds if there has lbeen a substantial change 
in the retail price index, or jf profi·ts have ·been distributed rather than 
.invested. 

Similarly, it does not necessar~ly follow that wages in the expanding 
tmdes should always rise in line with increases in productivity; tthis may 
make it more difficult fo•r lower paid workers in industries where •producti,
vity is not rising to o.btain a li•v:ing wage. 

11hen, again, al.bhough uni·ons must rejeot the White Paper's view that the 
no.tion of 'oompambil•ity' must ·be largely ignored, they might dis·tinguish 
beuween the two senses in which the term is used. 1f 'compambil~ty' simply 
means that any group is enrtitled to the same size ·of increase as any other 
group, then the principle is difficult to defend because i<t justifies s·preading 
every rise, gr·anted for whMever reason, over the entire economy. More 
justifla•ble are the detailed 'comparisons' made lbet:ween workers in the 
public sector and those doing similar work outside. These ensure :that 
pUiblic employees 0whose wages cannot be settled by a competiti•ve market) 
get fair treatment. 

Finally, if the .unions were to accept the policy of giving priority, in 
national bargaining, to the lo•wer paid, as suggested in the pre·v1ous section, 
they might also consider <the case for holding hack 'On na.ti•onal wage 
increases for groups •who can evade the effects of periods of wage restraint 
by dri·ving up piece rates and other local supplements. 

lt is not suggested that the General Council should review arguments 
of this sort so as to de·velop hard and fast rules by which any given 
proposal for a wage .increase could he judged. It is not even maintained 
that they need make their views on the mhject tpUibtic !before they know 
more than they do now a1bout the GoiVernmen1:'·s intentions, particularly 
on such matters as the control of profits and capital gains. What is 
suggested i·s that the General Council must get o·ver its fear of even 
discussing the subject of jncome distributi.on. 

The Dangers 

The next year is a crucial one for the T.U.C. Its re~onse to the challenge 
of Neddy will affect much more than its relationship wi·th the present 
Government; it will largely determine its future standing wjtth the community, 
and may settle the fate of the La;hour Party as well. J.t is extremely 
likely that one of the decisive pre-election battles 1bet:ween the parties will 
be fought over the Government's handl,ing of Neddy, and the unions' role 
w.ithin it. If the unions can maintain the initiative, show that they are 
prepared to face the pro!hlems of planning growth, and make the necessary 
concessions then !Jhe La;bour Party has n·othing to fear from this battle-
whether the T.U.C. e!VentuaUy decides to str·ike a bar~gain with the present 
Go,vernmen<t o·r no't. 

The danger for the La1bour Party, and the pUiblic image of ~the unions, 


30 THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

will only arise if their representatives on Neddy make a bad shorwing; if 
they appear to •be on the defensive, unready •to discuss certain ·topics, 
uDJWilling to make concessions, evasive and disunited. Worst of all rwould 
be a situation where it was felt that they were imprisoned by their own 
vested interests, and the narrow pursuit of rank and file demands, to the 
exclousion of the general economic and social interests of the country. 
If this picture of the un~ons were reinforced by the behav•iour of their 
representatives on Neddy, it would not only be •the unions' image that 
suffered hut the Labour Party's as well. 

Unfortunately, although ·the more far-sighted members are aware of 
these dangers, the attitude of the General Council to most of the prob~ems 
involved is still very ill-defined. In part this .is because the Council consists 
of overworked union leaders meeting -every few weeks to deal with papers 
put ·before them lby their full-time staff. At the moment the staff is com-
mi·bted ro servicing ex·isting commi·ttees and discharging their da·ily duties. 
With their ·present resources they are incapa:bJe of prorviding the long term 
analysis that the Council needs if it is to define ·its attitude to the prOJblems 
raised by Neddy and maintain the initiative. 

To en<llble this serv•ice to be provided, the T.U.C.'s research sLali should 
be increased, and some of them should be organised in a long-term research 
and planning department, whose sole function it is to review Jong range 
trends. Even 1before the challenge represented by Neddy the T.U.C. needed 
such a department. The implications of a rising level of growth should only 
be the first .item on its agenda. It could also consider some orf the pr01blems 
discussed in earlier sections of this pamphlet-the effect of changes in the 
labour force on recruitment, or the impact of workshop bargaining on 
union structure. The future relationship between <the T.U.C. and its counterparts 
abroad might also 1be made the sub~ect of a full-scale review.1 If 
the General Council created such a department and defined its priorities 
they would be much more prepared to meet the challenge of the next 
decade. There is no shortage of problems; only an aJbsence of facilities 
and the will to increase them. 

Trade Unions and Public Relations 

But it will 1be little use for the General Council to face up to its longterm 
responsibilities, and O•Verhaul its po·licy~making machinery, unless it 
also revolutionises the facilities for communicating information about union 
attitudes and activities. During the next few years, the unions must make 
many crucial decisions, and some of them willlbe controoversial; the reasons 

1 A body of this sort would also be invaluable in developing a policy towards 
the institutions of the Common Market, if Britain goes in. These matters are 
not considered in this pamphlet, since they have been subjected to a comprehensive 
and thorough survey by Mr. Colin Beever in his P.E.P. Broadsheet. 
Trade Unions and the Common Market. The present writer is in broad agreement 
with Mr. Beever's conclusions. As he puts it. if Britain joins. the unions 
'will have to get used to the idea of concentrating their particular and positive 
efforts for the betterment of their members at public authority level as well 
as at the collective bargaining level'. This means that the role of the T.U.C. 
will be even more important. and the need for long term thinking still more vital, 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNlONS 

for them should ·be understood, !both by the pub)..ic and within the mo.vement. 
At the moment there are virtually no facilities for pUJblicising even the 
day to day decisions of the General Council. Unlike other sections of 
the T.U.C.'s 300 page report, the ~wo pages devoted to 'Press and Publications' 
do not record the activiti·es of an influential and important department. 
They are mainly concerned with relatively un.importan.t domestic matters 
-such as the circulation of the T ,U.C.'s monthly magazine. 

The sole references to the practice of 'Publric Relations' proper are an 
entry concerning the monthly General Council Press Conference, and the 
traditional statement that 'regular and frequent' contact has been maintained 
with Industrial Correspondents. Most members of the Council undoubtedly 
believe this is aU the T.U.C. needs to do. If this was ever the case it is 
no longer. Mass-oommunica•tions is a pmfessional business, and the unions 
cannot afford to adopt an amateur approach. 

Part of the trouble is that many union leaders retain, a>t base, an o·versimple 
and unsophisticated :belief that, in the end, 'truth must out', coupled 
·with a vague conviction that the plliblic must still 'be, in some sense, on 
their side. Others are the v·ictims of their own propaganda; convinced that 
they have .been misrepresented in the past by the professional Public 
Relations experts employed by the Tory Press', they feel it would be 
wrong for them to engage in such dishonest tactics themselves. 

Yet the fact is that an rubility to make the most of modern techniques 
of mass-commun-ication is neither good nor bad in itself. When such 
techniques are used, as they have been with great success, to awaken the 
publ·ic conscience about the plight of refugees, or the state of Westminster 
Albbey, we naturally Ciipplaud. When they are used to defend Apartheid, 
or white-®ash Welensky, we do not. In itself Public Relations is nothing 
more than a deli:berate, planned and sustained effort to arouse interest 
in an organisation's activities and objectives, both among its members and 
the pUiblic. lf members of the General Council believe in the activities of 
the T.U.C. and the trade union movement, they should be eager to use 
every technique at their disposal to interest others in their work. 

HOiw could this best •be done? Let us begin with the Council's monthly 
Press Conference. As run at present, it is only 50 % effective. It provides 
a forum for the General Secretary, enabling him to amplify the excessively 
formal statements issued af.ter each Council meeting, but it is at once 
too general in approach and too isolated in impact. It should be preceded 
by more detailed advance information, specifically designed to be of use 
to particular sections of the press and other types of mass media. The 
key to effective co'Verage today lies .in providing information designed to 
appeal to the individual interests of particular media. Th·is is no>t s·imply 
a matter of realising that what makes the front page of the Guardian will 
have little news value to the B.B.C.'s Tonight team, or the London evening 
plilpers. I1 involves appreciating ho·w items can be angled to appeal to the 
many different types of communication. At the moment the T.U.C. relies 
too much on speciaEst correspondents to sort out what is of interest to 
them, and consequently confines information to a lirn.ited public. 

This sort of a.ttitude is becoming more and more out of date. Plfess 

men today cannot expect to be specialists in all the activities of interest 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

to their readers. They, and their editors, are accustomed to dealing with 
specially prepared material, designed w.ith them in mind by communications 
experts. As many pwblic and private organisations with an effective public 
relations staff have discoiVered, this provides them with an opportunity. 
The organisation that can deliver a regular supply of suitable information 
abou-t its activities, prepared in a way fitting the style and character of 
different communications outlets, can expect to have the public better 
informed otf its affairs. 

But the proper handling of Press Conferences is only a beginning. 
A puhlic relati·ons department must be allowed to influence the timing of 
statements, and even have a say in what is publicised. They must appreciate 
that there are days of the ·week when statements will receive wider coverage 
than others; they muSit not c·ompete with Royal Weddings or the Cup Final. 
They must 'be a•ware of the different deadlines of London and pro·vincial 
papers and muSit be <11ble to stop spokesmen of the General Council making 
important pronouncements on the wrong day, and too late to catch the 
Scottish editions. 

Even more important .is what is to be publicised. Bureaucracies develop 
a taste for secrecy~ even where pubLicity would do the organisation good. 
The most obviously under-pUiblicised activities of the T.U.C. concern its 
constant battle to secure improvements in social insurance and industrial 
welfare. Curiously enough it never seems to ocour to it to publicise this 
side otf its activities; both its successes and failures remain unheralded 
and unkno,wn to the pubf,ic at large, and even to moSit trade un·ioni•s1s. 

One reason for this is that, operating as a back-stairs pressure group, 
the unions have .been encouraged, by successi·ve Ministers since Bevin, to 
believe that all rebuffs are temporary; mearuwhile it is bad form to embarrass 
Government departments by making capital out of indi·vidual concessions 
and refusals. This is a fallacy. Successful pressure group activity, as the 

N.F.U. and the B.M.A. halVe shown, does not depend on proceeding by 
stealth. 
Take, for example, the refusal to grant totally disa.bled workmen injured 
before 1948 a supplement, or the refusal to supply inval·id cars to the 
industrially disabled. Nothing is gained by burying these issues in the pages 

o.f the T.U.C.'s Repo·rt. The 'human interest" stories 1behind them are 
excellent material for the right kind of pUJblic relations campaign, resulting 
in additional pressure on the Government. 
A systematic and sustained attempt to present a comprehensive view of 
the T.U.C.'s activities would do much to correct the image of unions 
as the outposts of vested interest. Much of its work is in the inlterests of 
all classes; it can be presen·ted as the watchdog of politicians and bureaucrats 
of all kinds, particularly in the social insurance and industrial welfare field. 

But to undertake this task a Public Relation Department would have 
to use all the techniques of modern communications-specially designed 
pamphlets, exhibitions and films, as well as press and other forms of 
advertising. Apart from advertising in mass-circulation papers and on 
television, neither of .which would be very effective for the T.U.C. 's 
purposes, the cost of making an impact through media of this sort would 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

not be large, although there would doUJbtless tbe opposition •t·o the use of 
union funds for such purposes. 

One very relevant argument the General Council could employ in favour 
of such a scheme is that its effects would not be confined to non-unionists. 
As has been s<i'id, one of the aims of Public Rel,atiom; is to ra.ise the level 
of communicat·ion and informati·on inside an organisation. If, for example, 
the T.U.C. took a stand at the ·Motor Sho•w to tell ·peo.p)e rubout ·the men 
who make British cars, and the work of their unions, this would not only 
be seen 1by non-unionists. A campaign of the sort suggested would be wor-th 
i.t, if it only led to a greater degree of communicati'On and knowledge among 
the mass o[ rank and file union members. 

Hut so far twe .have only considered what the use of Public Relations 
techniques could do to inform people about the existing activities of the 

T.U.C. Sooner or later an effective public relations staff begins to suggest 
new things which the organisation could do to improve its standing or 
the level o.f communica.tion with its members. In a document of this sort 
it is impossible to say what sugg·estions a yet un:born depar·tment might 
advance, but it might be useful to suggest one idea to 'be considered. 
It is high time the T.U.C. pUiblished another comprehensi·ve Report on 
the future prospects facing trade un·ions, similar in scope to the historic 
'Interim Repor•t on Post..;War Reconstruction' published in 1944. This is 
not tbe place to list the things that should .be tin it; in effect the whole of 
this pamphlet is concerned with the sUJbjeot. What needs to be stressed is 
that the publicising of Stuch a report cannot 'be left to the present Press 
and .Publications Department. ]if it is to help project an image of unions 
as an up-ilo-date and progressi•ve force, eager to face up to their responsibilities 
and opportunities, it must be supervised and very larg·ely written 
by PUJblic Relations experts. 

Individual Unions' Publicity 

But it may not be enough for the T.U.C. to put its own house in order. 
There may be lit!tle that can be done to improve the unions' image while 
so many individual un1ons adopt an off-band attitude in their daily dealin.gs 
with the organs of mass-communica•hon when involved in diStputes. Fortunately 
·what is required in respect of inditv•idual unions is not so costly 
or ambitious. 

Most unions make three simple mistakes in dealing with correspondents. 
First, communications are either the responsi,bility of n·o one in particular 
or the exclusive pro•vince of the overworked general secretary. Second, 
information is only supplied •when he considers it o.pportune. Third, statements 
of the union's case come some time after the employers have given 
their v.iews, and are inadequate and poorly worded. Consequently correspondents 
rely far more than is necessary on rumours and 'leaks' to get the 
union case, and fit this into a background already prorvided lby employers. 
Tbe remedy in each case is simple, and several larger unions have discovered 
it. An official must be appo.inted as full-time press and communications 
officer. His duties should include answering all enquiries and keeping 
correspondents infQrmed of changes in union policy. Dur1ng disputes be 


34 

fHE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

would provide a ftorw of comment and background information. The work 
od' the N.U.R.'s Press Officer shows that this can be done, and an analysis 
of the union's disputes w~rth the B.T.C. over the last few years demonstrates 
that by getting in first with a sta·tement, and making it persuasi'Ve and 
conv-incing, it is possible to secure better coverage and a more sympa.thetic 
response. 

Conclusions 

This section concerned union relations with the Government and the 
public. It argued that the system of T.U.C.-Go·vernment consultation 
pioneered by Bevin only worked while the ~wo sides shared certain 
O'bjectives and got something out of it. Essentially the unions entered 
Neddy to see if they could re-esta.blish such a relationship. They were 
right to do this, hut it is doubtful if they are facing up to the pro<blems 
inrvol·ved. They ought to be thinking out their attitude towards things Jike 

./ job-demarcations, output restrictions, and opposition to techn1cal change. 
Above all they should .be getting ready for the day when wages appear on 
Neddy's agenda. To assist them ·in this •work they need a long-term research 
and planning department in the T.U.C. 
But it is little use impro.ving policy-maldng provisions unless steps are 
taken to revolutionise the facilities for disseminating information a.bout the 
policies and activities od' the movement. On their present form the un·ions 
appear to know less aJbout the techniques of modern communication than 
the average seller of soap flakes. 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

6. Summary
'THJS pamphlet has tried to account for the decline in the power, 
prestige and influence of trade unions during the 1950's, and to see 
what could be done to reverse such trends. 

The future of the unions is uncertain, impossible to predict, and potentially 
disastrous, but it depends, a•bove all, on the unions' own ability to 
face and overcome four different but related problems. 

The first concerns the rate of membership growth. Unless they can sol>ve 
this problem unions will become the representatives of a dwindling section 
of the t>otal labour force. To this end they should: 

1. 
Make more use of the closed shop and the check off. 
2. 
Recruit more full-time organisers. 
3. 
Double sUJbscriptions in three years. 
4. 
Prepare another Report on union structure and organisation. 
5. 
Attempt to get the llllw regarding amalgamations changed. 
6. 
Try to get the I.D.T. re-established. 
7. 
Make more use of blacklists. 
8. 
Set up a T.U.C. recogni•tion fund. 
The second pro1blem concerns the low level of membership communication 
and control. Unless something is done to improve this the next ten 
years will witness a gmwth in internal disunity and bitterness. To help 
deal with the problem the unions should: 

1. 
Extend steward training and found a trade union college. 
2. 
Negotiate the removal of one-sided procedures. 
3. 
Negotiate 'model' procedures with leading employers in public and 
private industry embodying a 'shop stewards' charter'. 
4. 
Provide facilities for stewards from different factories and unions to 
meet to discuss common prohlems within the official union organisation. 
The third problem is that o.f bargaining prior.iti-es. Unions today are 
rightly regarded as without adequate social purpose, too much concerned 
with the vested interests of the better paid and highly organised. To help 
alter this view of them they must change their 1bargaining priorities. Th·is 
means more emphasis on: 

1. 
Reducing unnecessary overtime. 
2. 
Raising minimum wages by pro-tant·o agreements. 
3. 
Negotiating redundancy agreements. 
4. 
Expanding workers' rights in ma~ters like promotion and discipline. 
The final problem facing the unions concerns their relations with the 
Government and the plllbllc. During the 1950's they have grown less 
and less popular, while their influence on Government policy has almost 
disa,ppeared. Going into Neddy was a bid to reverse this trend. It could 
be disastrous unless the unions are prepared to: 


THE FUTURE OF THE UNIONS 

1. 
Resign and explain their reasons if the Government does not take 
Neddy seriously. 
2. 
Campaign for a controlled, seleotirve programme of expansion both 
inside and outside the Council. 
3. 
Think out their attitude to issues like technical change and the role 
o.f wages policy in a programme for growth. 
4. 
Set up a long term research and planning department to help in 
this task. 
5. 
Revolutionise their attitude to public relations, both within the T.U.C. 
and in individual unions. 
llhe present generation of trade union leaders is a.ware of the question 
mark that bangs over their movement. But a.t the moment they seem 
to be too busy empty;ing their o'wn in->trays to take time off to think, 
while some of them are too steeped in their traditional philosophy of 
empiricist opportunism to try.

But although the present leaders may not be responsible for much that 
is now wrong, this does not entitle them to do nothing about i.t. The 
movement they lead, with aU its faults, has the right to ex.peot more 
from them than that. Theirs is the o·pportunity, and the responsihili.ty too. 

A resort to recrimination is no substitute for a plan. 


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