Fabian Tract No. ISS· 


THE CASE AGAINST THE 
REFERENDUM. 


BY 

CLIFFORD D. SHARP. 

P u BLISHED AND S o LD BY 

THE FABIAN SOCIETY. 

PRICE ONE P E NNY. 

LONDON: 
THE FABIAN SociETY, 3 CLEMENT's INN, STRAND, W.C. 
APRIL, I 91 I. 



J 

AGAINST THE 

REFERENDUM. 

THE proposal to establish the R eferendum in this country seems to 
have entered, temporarily at least, the sphere of practical 'POlitics. 
How long it will remain within that holy of holies probably depends 
upon how long its official sponsors continue to cherish the illusion 
that, once established, it can be so restricted as to make it a reliable 
instrument for the defence of hereditary privilege. It is never wise, 
however, to count upon the early dissipation of a political illusion, 
no matter how fragile, and for the present we must assume that the 
Conservative leaders seriously intend to incorporate the Referendum 
in our political system at the earliest opportunity.

The proposition has been so little discussed that it is not easy to 
estimate the forces which will be ranged on either side. So far the 
Liberals have found no difficulty in making up their minds, since it 
is fairly obvious that at the moment they have all to lose by the 
Referendum and nothing to gain. But whether their minds will 
remain made up in the same sense under all political circumstances 
may be doubted. The experience of other countries seems to have 
been that whilst the party in opposition generally favours any proposal 
to introduce or extend the use of the Referendum, the party in 
power is always hostile to it-which, indeed, is precisely what one 
would expect. At all events, there is no reason why Liberals as 
Liberals should be permanently opposed to the Referendum. Sooner 
or later the proposal is likely to find friends and enemies in every 
political camp ; and if we are to form any sort of stable judgment 
upon the worth of the Referendum as an instrument of democratic 
government we must ignore as far as possible its bearings upon 
current politics, and examine its intrinsic worth, not as a bar to 
Home Rule or Tariff Reform, but as a part of some definite and 
intelligible theory of government. That, at all events, is what is 
attempted here. 

Definition of Terms. 

The subject is not sufficiently familiar in England for definitions 
to be unnecessary.

The REFERENDUM is a popular vote for or against a law or an 
alteration of the constitution which has already been passed by the 
legislature. It may be ''compulsory" or "optional," according as 
to whether it has to be applied as a matter of course or only on the 
demand of a certain proportion of the electorate. 

The PoPULAR INITIATIVE is a deYice by which a certain number of 
electors can demand the adoption of a law or constitutional amendment. 
The demand may (r) be in general terms, or (z) take the 


3 

form of a Bill already drafted. In the first case, if the legislature 
~pproves it proceeds to draw up a Bill embodying the proposal, which 
rs then submitted to the popular vote ; if it disapproves, it may call 
for the decision of the electorate before it drafts the Bill. In the 
second case (which is distinguished as the "formulated initiative "),
the law which is demanded must be submitted at once to the popular 
vote in the exact form and phraseology in which it has been drafted 
by its promoters. Not so much as a comma must be altered by the 
legislature, which, however, generally has the right, if it wishes, of 
submitting at the same time an alternative Bill of its own. 

DIRECT GovERNMENT (as opposed to Representative Government) 
may be said to exist where the Referendum and the InitiatiYe are 
both freely used by the electors without restriction as to time or 
subject. By its chief advocates in the United States it is accurately 
described as "majority rule," pure and simple. 

History of the Referendum. 

Historically the Referendum is the offspring by unbroken descent 
of the primitive mass meeting of self-governing citizens. Both in 
Switzerland and in the United States, the only countries where it 
flourishes to-day, the whole body of citizens were from the earliest 
times (in the Swiss cantons from the thirteenth century, and in the 
American colonies from their foundation) accustomed to exercise all 
the functions of government for themselves in open assembly, This 
direct control over the affairs of State was never entirely surrendered, 
and when the assemblies of all the citizens became impracticable and 
more and more powers had to be delegated to representative councilst 
the Referendum came into being gradually and naturally, not as an 
accession of popular power, but as a mere retention by the sovereignpeople of certain important powers in their own hands. In its../
earliest form, in both countries, the Referendum consisted simply in 
the reference of a law from the'Legislative Council to the communes or 
townships, the citizens of which thereupon met together and decided 
what answer they should send to the Council. It is thus not easy to 
say precisely when the Referendum as we know it came into existence. 

The Un£ted States.-lt is clear, howeyer, although it was advocated 
by Victor Considerant and many of the "men of 1848," that it cannot 
be described as an invention of modern democracy. It was included 
in the programme of constitutional reform (the "Agreement of the 
People") which the Levellers tried to force upon Cromwell in 1647 ;and 
it was certainly in use in the Puritan colonies of America in something 
very like its present form during the earlier half of the seventeenth 
century.':' Throughout the eighteenth century it continued to 

* One of the first recorded instances of its use took place in Massachusetts on 
May 29th, 1644, when the legislative body of this Puritan colony conveyed an earnest 
request to the elders and freemen to "take into serious consideration whether God 
do not expect that all the inhabitants of the plantation allow to magistrates and all 
that are called to country service a proportionate allowance...." This seems to 
have been an early demand for" payment of members." 
Subsequently the Declaration of Independence was agreed to in this and other 
colonies by Referendum, and the number of votes given for and against the new 
constitution of 1780 after the war, is definitely on record. 


4 

be employed occasionally, and when, after the War of Independence, 
the young States set about the business of drafting constitutions for 
themselves they nearly all included as a matter of course a provisionwhereby the first draft itself, and all future amendments which mightbe proposed, should be confirmed by a direct vote of all the citizens. 
One State at least (Georgia) included also a provision for the 
employment of the popular Initiative for constitutional amendments. 

From that time onwards the Referendum has been in regular use 
for constitutional purposes in all the States of the Union exceptDelaware. But it was not until almost the end of the nineteenth 
century that it began to be applied to ordinary legislation. This 
development was partly due to propaganda, partly to the fact that 
ordinary laws were so often held to amount to alterations of the 
constitution that the distinction between the two became uncertain 
and unimportant.':' 

In 1898 South Dakota led the way to a still more importantdevelopment by formally adopting not only the Referendum, but the 
Popular Initiative as well, for all legislative purposes. Its examplehas since been followed by ten or twelve other States, and there is 
no reason to suppose that it will end with these. It appears, indeed, 
that we are about to witness throughout the United States an experiment 
in Direct Government on an immense scale, a scale restricted 
only by the not very important limitations of State, as compared with 
Federal, legislative activity. Already in a single decade a mass of 
material has been accumulated which, as soon as it is made available 
for the political student, will cause him to forsake for ever the little 
Swiss Republic which has hitherto so monopolized his attention. 

Switzerland.-At present, however, Switzerland cannot be ignored. 
The history of the development of the Referendum and Initiative in 
Switzerland is remarkably similar to their history in America, and need J not be detailed. The Initiative has been in use rather longer in the 
Cantons than in the States, but otherwise the differences are merelythose due to the different character of the populations. At the presenttime the position in Switzerland is briefly as follows. In the Federal 
Government the Referendum is compulsory for constitutional ame~ments, 
and is applied to ordinary laws upon the demand of thir ythousand electors. The Popular Initiative (for which fifty thousa d 
signatures are necessary) is applicable in either the "formulated" or 
general form to constitutional amendments, but not to ordinary laws 
The distinction, however, here, as in America, is of little consequen~esince practically any law can be drafted as an amendment of the con 
stitution. In all the Cantonal Governments the Referendum is co 
pulsory for constitutional amendments, and in some places for a 1 
ordinary legislation that is not expressly excepted. The Initiative 
also freely used, though its form differs from canton to canton. 

* This distinction, which was formerly the basis of the whole political system of 
the United States, was founded on the consideration that the constitution alone 
possessed the high sanction of a direct vote of the people. The extended use of 
the Referendum, by giving all sorts of laws the hiahest possible sanction, has now 
practically obliterated the distinction in most of fhe States. In Federal affairs, 
however, where there is no Referendum for any purpose, it is still of the utmost 
importance. 

5 


Australza.-The only country outside Switzerland and the United 
States in which the Referendum is in use is Australia. It appears 
to have been tentatively introduced in an advisory form in South 
Australia in 1896, when the Government called for a popular vote on 
the question of religious teaching in the State schools. The purposeof this vote was not to confirm any law, but merely to elicit the 
opinion of the electors, and the experiment has not been repeated.
When Federation took place, however, the Referendum was definitely 
adopted in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, which providedthat any future amendment must be confirmed both by a majority oL 
all those voting in the Commonwealth and by a majority of those 
voting in a majority of States. The new Constitution was itself 
submitted to a popular vote in 1898 and rejected. It was then 
modified and accepted by another vote in 1900. The first amend· 
ment was submitted and passed in 1906, and two further amendments 
were submitted in April, 19 ro, one of which was accepted and the 
other rejected.':' 

It will be noticed that the three countries in which the Refer


endum has established itself-if, indeed, it can be said to be yet

established in Australia-are all of them federations of States with 

a very large measure of local autonomy. This is a very important

fact, the significance of which will be apparent when we come to 

consider the practical merits and defects of Direct Legislation as 

applied to a large and centralized sovereign State. 

English Local Guvernment.-All that need be added here to 
complete the brief descriptive summary which has been given is a 
reference to the fact that a form of Referendum has long been in use 
in this country-and possibly elsewhere-in local and municipalaffairs. Certain adoptive Acts, such as the Public Libraries Act, have 
required a poll of the ratepayers to be taken before they could be putinto force in any district ; and upon various other questions of local 
government, like the purchase or lease of tramways, the electors 
have the right of demanding a poll after a Town or Parish meetinghas been held. t The public interest, however, attached to the 
Referendum as a municipal institution has never been very great,
and with the growth of large and fully responsible local authorities it 
seems likely to fall more and more into disuse. 

The Inevitable Corollary of the Referendum. 

We now come to the real subject of this paper : the pros and 
cons of the proposal to introduce the machinery of the Referendum 

* The amendment which was rejected concerned certain complicated adjustments 
"between the Federal and State finances which had been agreed to at a special conference 
of the Premiers of the different States. It is improbable that more than a very 
few of the electors understood the proposal which they voted against-which mayhave been the reason why they voted against it.

t It is interesting to notice that as with Referendum in America and Switzerland, 
so with this English practice of taking a '· poll of the parish": at no time did it 
appear as a democratic innovation, it arose as a perfectly natural development when 
parish meetings and "open vestries" of the ratepayers grew to an unwieldy and 
impossible size. It was, indeed, in law, merely an adjournment of the vestry meetingin order to take a vote of those whose presence was presumed. See " The Parish and 
the County," by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 


6 

for use in this country in national and Imperial affairs. The first 
important point to be considered is whether it would be possible,
having once introduced the Referendum, to restrict its application or to 
prevent the development of a system of Direct Legislation as complete 
as that which exists in Switzerland and America. 

The experience of America goes to show that as long as the use 
of the Referendum is confined to questions which can properly be 
described as constitutional there is no marked tendency on the partof the electors to demand its extension to other purposes ; but as soon 
as for one reason or another it begins to be applied to matters of 
ordinary legislation the momentum of its development becomes irresistible, 
and cannot be checked until its scope has been widened to 
include all possible subjects of legislation, and its inherent limitations 
corrected by the addition of the Popular Initiative. 

Now the actual proposal which has been put forward in this 
country is clearly to apply the Referendum to ordinary legislation, 
to anything which the House of Lords or some other undefined 
authority chooses to regard as "revolutionary"; it may be a Budget,

f a Church Disestablishment Bill, or even a mere Licensing or Education 
Bill. There is, therefore, good reason to suppose that if this 
proposal is carried out by any future Government it will either proveabortive, because incompatible with the spirit of our political institutions, 
and shortly be repealed ; or else within a comparatively few 
years the rest of the machinery of Direct Legi lation will be added 
unto it and it will become possible to submit "Right to Work" Bills, 
and "Conciliation" Bills and the like, to a vote of all the people by 
means of the formulated Initiative. Moreover, quite apart from the 
experience of other countries, there are strong reasons why this 
should happen. It is scarcely likely at the present juncture, when 
new legislation is being demanded on all hands and the chief complaint 
that is heard is of the slowness and the comparative barrenness 
of the Parliamentary machine, that the mass of the electors will 
remain content with the mere power of checking their representatives. 
The chief Conservative advocate of the Referendum, Professor 
Dicey, habitually refers to it as the "National Veto," apparentlyregarding the description as a tacit recommendation. But it may be 
safely asserted that the majority of electors at the present time are 
far more interested in the abolition than in the creation of vetoes 
upon the action of Parliament. Moreover, it would need but a short 
experience of the Referendum to teach the electors that the power of 
framing the question is scarcely less important than the power of 
voting upon it. 
For all these reasons it is impossible to consider the establishment 
of the Referendum in this country except as a first instalment of a 
more or less complete system of Direct Legislation which, althoughit would not of course displace, would modify fundamentally the 
whole of our representative system. \Ve are therefore justified in 
treating the issue as one not merely between the adoption or non-
adoption of a re tricted and rarely used Referendum, but between 
the essential principles of Direct and Representative Government. 


7 


The Case for Direct Government. 


Let us consider first the chief arguments in favor of Direct 
Legislation. The general contention of its advocates is, of course, 
that by no other means is it possible to ensure that "the will of the 
people" shall prevail. Thus Mr. ]. A. Hobson urges that "there is 
no certain way of determining this fact (z:e., whether a law is 'acceptable 
to the body of the people') unless an opportunity is afforded to 
ask the people." This assertion plainly begs the whole question at 
issue, namely, whether the people should be asked to give their 
judgment upon a Bill, a mere legal document, or upon an Act, the 
practical merits or defects of which they have experienced. The 
same may be said of all arguments which refer to "the will of the 
people " as a definite and easily ascertainable fact. They all beg the 
question of how the real "will of the people" may be discovered, 
which is, of course, the crux of the whole matter. Instances might be 
adduced from the experience of the American States of laws havingbeen enthusiastically adopted by large majorities which turned out 
to represent in practice anything but "the will of the people."

Another argument for Direct Legislation, an argument which in 
the United States carries decisive weight with the mass of the people,
is that it destroys the power of vested interests by making corruptionpractically impossible. This no doubt is true. Where the representatives 
of the people not only have their price, but can find some one 
eager to give it to them, there you have, not democracy at all, but 
plutocracy in its worst form, and every democrat in such circumstances 
becomes of necessity a staunch advocate of the Referendum. 
But it must be remembered that it is only certain flagrant forms of 
corruption obvious to the elector that can be effectively checkmated 
by the Referendum, and that the argument has therefore little application 
in this country. Moreover, it is worth noting that if the 
possibility of securing honest representatives be granted, the point of 
the argument is immediately reversed. For it is clear that wealthyvested interests which can control the Press must always be able to ' 
influence the electors far more easily than they can influence anyreasonably honest and public-spirited representative assembly." 

* Tn I8go an amendment of the Swiss Constitution providing for the subsequentestablishment by law of universal accident and invalidity insurance was enthusiastically 
adopted by an enormous majority (283,328 ayes, and 92,200 noes). But before the 
law itself could be drafted and passed through the legislature a campaign was organized 
by the insurance companies and wealthy employers regardless of expense. A special 
paper was started to oppose the law, and posters were showered all over the country.
As a result when the voting day came the law was rejected. (The Swiss Democracy, 
H. D. Lloyd and J. A. Hobson.)
This incident is interesting, because it is always contended by advocates of the 
Referendum that in so far as the electors may require education on any subject which 
they have to vote upon, it will be effectively provided by the various propagandistsocieties and leagues and by Members of Parliament anxious to get their measure 
through. A Referendum is referred to as if it would be like a General Election in 
miniature, except that, as Lord Courtney puts it, "there would in fact be no candidates, 
and their hopes and fears :md personal interest would not arise." Lord Coqrtney.apparently regards this absence of the hopes and fears of personal interests of candidates 
as a great advantage. In fact it would be likely to prove the reverse, since there 
would be no one to spend money on "educating" the electors, except persons who 
were financially interested in the passage or rejection of the submitted measure. 


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An argument of far greater force in Great Britain. is the contention 
that the Referendum acts as an immense stimulus to the politicaleducation of the people by forcing them to think about .their laws 
and to realize their privileges and responsibilities as citizens of a self-
governing State. Only so, it is urged, can they become the •L free 
and enlightened " persons they are expected to be. This argumentignores, of course, the corruptibility of what must always be the chief 
instrument of such education, namely, the Press ; but after makingfull allowance for that unfortunate circumstance, it remains undeniable 
that a series of popular votings on important questions would be 
calculated to have some extremely valuable educational results-
results which might startle many of the present advocates of the 
HNational Veto." All that can be said on the other side is that even 
education may be bought too dearly. 

But perhaps the most appealing of all the arguments for the 
system of Direct Legislation is the sobering and altogether healthyeffect which the mere existence of the Referendum and PopularInitiative inevitably has upon revolutionary movements of all kinds. 
The fact that any reasonably substantial section of the electors can at 
any moment demand an effective popular verdict upon any legislativeproject which they like to bring forward, deprives the disappointedpropagandist of all those excuses for failure with which he sometimes 
strives to conceal even from himself the real cause. Socialists need 
scarcely to be reminded of the forms these excuses take ; they are 
only too familiar. Sometimes it is •L the party system " that gets the 
blame, sometimes the consoling bogey is u a conspiracy of the governing 
classes," and occasionally we hear significant whispers about some 
powerful ring of Jewish financiers or, it may be, in Lancashire, of 
Roman Catholic prelates. Anything is apt to be good enough to 
explain away the unpleasant fact that the right sort of legislation is 
not forthcoming.

The moment the Popular Initiative becomes an established fact 
all these comfortable theories have to be abandoned, and the breath 
that is wasted in propounding them diverted into more fruitful 
channels. Far too many Socialists to-day are plainly obsessed with 
the idea that Parliament itself is the great obstacle to Socialism, and 
that if only the people could make their will directly effective all 
would be well-the Utopia would be at our doors. Twenty or thirty 
years ago when Socialism was young such errors were perhaps permissible, 
almost necessary; to-day they are deadly. Nothing is more 
vital at the present moment to the continued advance of Socialism 
than a clear realization of the facts, that the working classes of 
/~ngland are not yet Socialists ; that, until they are, Socialist legislation 
is impossible and undesirable ; and that in the meantime no 
energy can be spared from the work of education for mere abuse of 
political machinery. That it automatically keeps· all revolutionary 
propagandists in clear and -"Ontinuous touch with the hard facts 
of the situation is one of the most attractive features of Direct 

Legislation. 


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The Case Against Direct Government. 

The system of Direct Legislation is always identified by its advo


l cates with "majority rule." The issue which they raise is therefore 
a perfectly clear and straightforward one, namely, whether "majority 
rule" is superior or inferior to "government by consent." The 
difference between these two forms of government is, of course, 
essentially a question of how minorities are to be treated. Under a 
system of majority rule the only right possessed by a minority is that 
of complete submission. A system of government by consent, on the 
other hand, recognizes the claim of any minority to be granted all 
such rights as do not seriously conflict with rights of an equallyimportant nature of the majority. 
An imaginary example will illustrate the point. Suppose that a 
small group of persons dwelling in a certain street enjoy a sincere 
conviction that it is necessary to their eternal salvation that they 
should sing hymns at the top of their voices between nine and ten 
o'clock every Sunday morning, and at no other time. And suppose 
that that is exactly the time which the other inhabitants of the street, 
who form a considerable majority, have selected for a pleasant extra 
hour of sleep. How is the issue between the two parties to be settled? 
If it is settled on the principles of government by consent the noisyminority will be allowed to continue their matins, with a strong 
suggestion that they should moderate their tones as much as ever 
their consciences will allow. The majority will no doubt grumble 
until they get hardened to the disturbance, but comparative peacewill reign. If, however, the dispute is settled by a majority vote, the 
singers will be suppressed, and from thenceforward will constitute an 
outraged, and therefore dangerous, minority, whose respect for the 
justice of the law is gone for ever. Both solutions may be called 
" democratic" ; but one is a good solution, and the other a very 
bad one. 
This is an illustration of the first great argument against any 
system which approximates to pure majority rule : that it takes no 
account, and can take no account, of the quality or intensity of the 
feeling behind any individual vote. For it is just that intensitywhich matters, and which must constantly be considered and allowed 
for if any form of government is to be satisfactory. The primary,. 
indeed the only, object of having any government at all is that it 
may reconcile conflicting interests and conflicting desires and arrange 
) a general modus vivendi. And the only test of whether a Government 
is good or bad is whether or not the modus vivendi which it 
has arranged secures the voluntary respect and adhesion of the great 
mass of the community. No law can fully satisfy everybody. The 
most-and the least-we must ask is tl;lat the inevitable dissatisfaction 
should be reduced to a minimum, and especially that no section 
of the people should be given cause to regard themselves as unjustly1treated. The greatest crime which any Government can commit is 
to deal with any section of the citizens in such a way as to alienate 
their loyalty towards the common institutions of the nation and 


10 

· ( make them feel that resistance to the law is a moral duty. For 
such action must endanger the very foundations of civilized human 
I society.
The ideal of those who uphold majority rule is apparently that 
upon every separate subject of legislation the will of the majorityshould be made to prevail. So simple a definition of the problem of 
democracy begs every question and shirks every real difficulty. 
Ultimately any form of democratic government must stand or fall 
not so much by its perfect subservience to majorities as by its just 
treatment of minorities-a far more difficult condition to fulfil. That 
minorities must not rule is only the first canon of good government;
the second is that they must not be ignored. Yet how, under a system 
lof Direct Legislation, can they be other than ignored ? It must 
handicap them in two ways. In the first place, it is obviously far 
easier for a minority to submit their claims to a representative 
assembly than to the whole body of electors ; and in the second place,
representatives are far more likely than are the electors to give such 
daims adequate consideration. An individual elector in casting his 
vote for or against any proposal has naturally and properly no other 
object than to give expression to his own individual opinion upon the 
matter as it affects himself. But the same individual voting on 
the same proposal in the capacity of a representative would approachthe question in quite a different way, and would feel it his duty, on 
account of the trust reposed in him, to take into account claims which 
as a mere elector he would ignore.':' 
1 
1 Apart, however, from this sense of duty towards the communityas a whole, there are factors which tend to make representatives duly 
sensitive to the claims of minorities. The average Member of Parliament 
holds his seat by a fairly steady party vote. Once he has gotit, he can generally count upon keeping it, provided he does not 
arouse violent and active resentment amongst any section of his 
constituents. Consequently, where the feelings of the majority about 
any issue are lukewarm, whilst those of the minority are deep and 
strong, he will probably be guided rather by the latter than by the 
former. In other words, he will attempt to go behind mere numerical 
votes and take into account the relative intenszhes of conflictingdesires. He will thus tend to support such solutions of the various 
problems which arise as satisfy the fundamental requirement of good 
government, that popular dissatisfaction should be reduced to a 
minimum with a view to the maintenance of universal respect for 
the law. 

* The difference of attitude here referred to is the essential factor in the distinction, 
often misunderstood, between a delegate and a representative. The former has nothing 
to do but to carry out the instructions actually given to him by the majority of his constituents, 
and is responsible to that majority alone. The latter is responsible to all his 
constituents, and has the semi-judicial function to perform of deciding how far it maybe right that the wishes of this or that minority should receive consideration. In other 
words, whilst the representative is a device for securing the presence, as it were. of all 
the people at the making of their laws, the delegate is a mere telephone to which the 
majority in any given constituency alone has access. 

II 

Territorial Minorities. 

j 
j 
In considering the application of majority rule to this country a 
question of immense practical importance arises. Any given law is 
to be decided by a majority ; that is clear. But by a majority of 

whom? Of the persons who are directly affected by the law, or of 
all the adult inhabitants of the United Kingdom? This difficulty is 
fundamental with a system of government so centrahzea"""--as-uurs~ 

ake, for examp1e, the question of Welsh Disestablishment. What 
is the value upon this issue of the vote of, say, a Kentish farm labourer 
or a Yorkshire manufacturer ? What does either of them know or 
care about the subject? They will be no more affected by the 
disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales than they are now 
by the establishment of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland-a fact 
of which, by the way, they are both of them most probably unaware. 
By what conceivable themy of government could a Referendum of 
the United Kingdom on such an issue be justified? The result of 
the vote outside Wales would be merely irrelevant, that is to say, 
would afford no guide whatever to the statesman as to the decision 
which he ought to take in the interests of good democrat£c 
government.

The same reasoning applies to Irish Home Rule. The fact that 

the mass of the Irish people have been in rebellion for a century 
,against the government under which they live may be deplorable, but 
1it is the only fact in the whole situation which can carry any weightwith the democrat. Home Rule may have bad results for Great 
Britain, and even for Ireland herself. Union may have been worth 
trying, but it has failed because it has not secured the assent of the 
Irish people. They do not respect the law because they do not feel

\

it is their own law. Home Rule, in short, appears to be the only 
~~Ian by which this uuconqueraqly romantic race can realize the 
blessings and responsibilities of self-government ; and that, as far as 
the democrat is concerned, is the last word on the rights and wrongsof the problem. A knowledge of the views of the electors of Great 
Britain would not contribute to its right solution in the least degree. 

These two cases are of course rather exceptional. They belong 
to the category of questions, mainly or exclusively affecting a single 
locality, to which the Referendum has never been applied in any 
part of the world, and has never been regarded as applicable by anyof its advocates outside the English Conservative party. The ver.ysignificant fact has already been noted that the Referendum has only 
been adopted where a very complete system of local autonom 
already exists. Consequently one of the most obviou_§ dangers of 
Direct Legislation, the oppression of territorial minorities, has in 

ractice been lar ~d.-


Racial, Religious, and other Minorities. 

But the danger to other minorities, more or less permanent, which 
are not concentrated in one locality, and which, therefore, can enjoy 
no autonomy, remains, and has proved to be very real. Two instances 
may be cited. 


12 

First, there is the well-known case in Switzerland where the 
Popular Initiative was employed by an anti-Semitic faction to introduce 
a Bill imposing pains and penalties on all persons slaughtering 
animals in a certain manner, namely, the manner prescribed by the 
Jewish law. Under cover of a humanitarian agitation, and in the 
face of the opposition of both Houses of the Legislature, the Bill was 
carried into law. Fortunately its drafting was imperfect, so that the 
Executive authorities in the Cantons have been able largely to ignore 
its tyrannous provisions. It should be added that this is the only 
case up to the present where the Federal Initiative in Switzerland 
has been successfully employed. 

The second instance refers to America and is much more serious. 
It is that in State after State at the present time the Referendum is 
being used to disfranchise the negroes ; not, of course, by actually 
laying down a colour line-that is prohibited by the Federal Constitution-
but by imposing qualifications which are quite as effective a 
bar to the black man, an~ the purpose of which is understood by 
every one." 

~ Now is there any democratic advocate of "majority rule" who 
would defend this application of its principles? A1zd if not, why 
not'! There is no question but that in these States there are largemajorities in favour of the disfranchisement of the negroes, Why 
should not the will of th.e majority prevail? The answer to that 
question strikes at the very root of the principles of Direct Legislation, 
because it must involve an admission that laws are of different 
sorts, some properly requiring much more than a bare majority of 
votes, and some much less. Mr. ] . .A. Hobson, arguing in favour of 
the Referendum, urges that "experienced statesmen ... know that 
many laws ... fail to work chiefly because of their unpopularity 
among the people." Surely what experienced statesmen know is 
that when laws fail to work it i generally due, not to a majority, but 
to an active minority, of malcontents. The Referendum only intenifie 
the danger. Witness the history of Prohibition in the United 
States. Laws actually passed by a majority vote forbidding the use 
of alcohol have notoriously failed to work, simply for the reason that 
such an interference with indi' idual liberty requires somethingapproaching unanimity amongst the electors before it ought to be 
enacted. There are lots of similar questions upou which from time 
to time legi~lation is proposed, and which ought not to be dealt with 
by anything less than, say, a 7 ~ per cent. majority. 
On the other hand, there are propositions for which a majority{ought not to be required at all. Laws of a type already referred to 
affecting mainly or ~olely the inhabitant~ of a single locality come 

• It may be urged that in some States the feeling against the negroes being 
•dlowed to exercise the rights of citizenship is so strong that the Representative 
Assemblies would ha,-e been, and in fact have been, obliged to adopt these measures 
on their own initiative. This mJ.y be true. but on the other hand it is unlikely that 
a representative body would consent to such an abuse of power without a really overwhelming 
mandate. The danger, therefore, is much less under a representative than 
unde1 a direct legislative system. 

13 

under this heading together with others affecting minont1es of 
different sorts. Broadly, it may be said that if a substantial minority 
want something very badly indeed, whilst the majority are mildly 
opposed, then the minority ought to have their way. This proposition 
is but the corollary of the proposition laid down earlier in this 
\Paper, that legislation must not so outrage the feelings of any section 
iof the electors as to make them rebels against the law. Faults of 
omission may have as serious results in this respect as faults of commission. 
The Trades Disputes Bill of 1906 is a case in point.
Whether the majority of voters were behind that Bill may be doubted, 
but about the intensity of feeling and the moral force behind it there 
can be no doubt at all ; and it is to be noted as a signal instance of 
the success of our representative system that the Bill did actually 
become law. That is the answer to those people who complain that 
the present machinery of legislation enables the will of the people to· 
be ignored. The truth is that where any substantial section of the 
electors know clearly and definitely what they want, they get it_ 
The real difficulty is that generally they do not know what they 
want. 

What is " The Will of the People " ? 
This brings us back to the question already asked : what is " the 
will of the people"? It is not a question which can be answered 
offhand, but this much is certain, that you cannot discover the win 
of the people by any system of counting heads that was ever invented. 
The ideal elector who always knows exactly what laws he wants and 
always deliberately uses his vote to obtain them, is unknown to the 
practical politician. He is, indeed, every whit as much a figmentof the academic imagination as was the "economic man" with whom 
the la£sser-fa£re economists used to juggle. The votes of most 
electors, whether they be educated or uneducated, wise or foolish, 
are influenced by a hundred and one considerations entirely foreign 
to the merits of the matter in hand. 
Thus the experience of both Switzerland and America is conclusive 
on this point, that proposals submitted to a popular vote at 
the same time tend to stand or fall together. "An unpopular proposal 
will frequently carry down to defeat proposals which if submitted 
alone might easily have been adopted; and a popular proposalwill aid others submitted at the same time." '" On one occasion in 
Switzerland an entirely harmless Bill for amending the law as to 
patents happened to be submitted at the same time as a law to 
establish compulsory vaccination. The latter was extremely unpopular, 
and both proposals were decisively rejected. Subsequentlythe law about patents was put forward in better company and 
accepted by an enormous majority. Astute politicians will no doubt 
soon learn how to turn this tendency to account for their own ends, 
but the existence of such a tendency shows how uncertain is the 
relation between the vote and the real will behind it. And this is 

* Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions. By W. F. Dodd. U.S.A. 
rgiO. 


14 

but one instance out of a hundred that might be adduced of that 
uncertainty.* 


The Necessity of Compromise. 

But even if it were always possible to discover the will behind 
the individual vote, the problem of discovering "the will of the 
people " would not be solved. For clearly where there is a definite 


{ and serious cleavage of opinion on any subject the will of a bare 
majority must be a very different thing from" the >vill of the people,"
if any intelligible meaning is to be attached to that phrase. "The 
will of the people" would be best interpreted in such a case by some 
sort of compromise representing, not merely the resultant of so manyconflicting wills, but their greatest common measure, their substantial 
agreement.
The writer happens to have the honour to serve upon theExecutive 
Committee of the Fabian Society, a body whose methods of transacting 
business may or may not be unique, but are certainly instructive. 
There is an unwritten rule or custom, almost invariably observed, 
that divisions should never be taken upon really important questions, 
except in the very last resort. The use of divisions is to clear awayunimportant matters so that time may not be wasted in discussingthem at length. In matters of real consequence when there are two 
diverse opinions it is clearly absurd to divide and adopt the one 
which happens to have the odd vote behind it. The reasonable 
course is to go on discussing the question until a solution is discovered 
which everybody is ready to accept as a compromise. That 
compromise represents the substantial agreement of the Committee, 
and by the time it is reached the chances are that most of the 
members will regard it not in the light of a compromise at all, but 
as the best possible solution, and will be ready to give it active 
support without feeling that they have sacrificed to it any part of 
their better judgment.+
No one surely will deny that the character of all legislation ought 
to be determined by some such process as this. At all events a 
system under which nothing of the kind is possible must stand 
condemned. 
The subject of compromise, however, vital as it is to the success 
of any kind of government, is too wide to be pursued here. It must 
suffice to suggest that, after all, the device of counting heads is at 
best a very crude and unsatisfactory method of deciding important 
or complicated issues in accordance with "the will of the people."
We may be obliged to resort to it from time to time, but we need 
not glorify it as if it were in itself the pure quintessence of democracy. 
For in reality it is its reductio ad absttrdum. 

"' An interesting sidelight is thrown on the practical working of Direct Legislation
by the Constitution of North Dakota, U.S.A., which contains a provision to the effect 
that if two conflicting measures dealing with the same subject should be submitted at 
the same time and both should be passed (!) the one with the greatest number of 
affirmative votes behind it is to be taken as accepted, and the other as rejected.


t This, in point of fact, is the usual custom of a body much older than the Fabian • 
Society, the Society of Friends; and is also the way in which the Mir manages the 
affairs of every Russian village. 


IS 

Public Opinion v. Popular Opinion. 

There is another point connected with the determination of the 
real will of the people which demands brief reference. _g_very one 
who has paid any attention to political history knows that from time 
to time laws have been passed which would have been emphaticallyrejected by the people at the time of their enactment, but which 
would have been equally emphatically accepted if submitted after 
bemg in operation for a year or two. Obvious instances are Catholic 
Emancipation and compulsory Education. It would seem that 
certain propositions can never hope to be tt popular" until after they 
Di!Ve become accomplished facts. At the present moment there are 
at least two issues before the country which are probably of this 
character: W omen'sSuffrage and the raising ofthe school age. Public 
opinion-which is not necessarily the same at any given moment as 
the opinion of the majority-supports both these proposals. Both 
will certainly be adopted within a few years, and a little later will be 
fully, if tacitly, endorsed by the people. Yet if they were submitted 
to a popular vote before enactment they would just as certainly both 
be rejected, even if in the case of Women's Suffrage women were 
allowed to vote. 

These statements in regard to the particular questions selected 
may be doubted, but it cannot be denied that there are questions 
about which they would be true. We have here a definite political 
phenomenon which theoretical advocates of Direct Legislation must 
find some means of dealing with. There appears to be only one wayof meeting the difficulty, and that is to leg1s ate thTough representat~,
arrd throw upon them the responsibility of deciding-on penalty

p.f losing their se~in case o0roi=.!l_ot wh~t Bills but what .Acts 
w1_ secure t e ap.eroVil of tb:e people. To d1scover the real w1ll of 
the people, wntes Mf. Ramsay MacDonald, tt is the task of the 
statesman who knows how far expressed desire is not real desire, who 
understands how he is to speak for what is in the heart but not on 
the lips of the people, and who, without mandates, and even againstmandates, does what the people really want." ':' 
The Responsibility of the Representative. 

Most, if not all, of the simple issues of modern politics belong to 
one of the categories described above. Either because they deal 
solely with s~all minorities, or for some other reason, they are 
obviously unsuitable for the application of the Referendum. But 
what of those more complicated issues and projects which form the 
bulk of our legislative output at the present time ? 

The average elector may be able to judge principles, but he has 
neither the time nor the knowledge nor the will to consider details. 
It is common knowledge amongst State politicians in America that a 
Bill which exceeds certain very narrow limits of length and complexity 
is almost certain to be rejected by the electors. Advocates of 

* Socialism a11d Government, Vol. I., p. g. No student of Socialism, or, indeed, 
of any aspect of modern politics, can afford to miss this original and really masterlystudy of. political theory. 

' Direct Legislation, indeed, constantly cite this as one of the greatadvantages of the system, that it leads to a simplification of the laws. 
But whatever may be the advantages of simple drafting, they are 
surely insignificant compared with its drawbacks. For not only must 
it largely exclude concessions to minorities, but it carries with it as a 
necessary corollary that the executive officials should be given a free 
hand to deal with points of administration which in England, for 
example, would be dealt with in the Act itself and settled by Parliament. 
Both in Switzerland and in America the officials do, in fact, 
exercise unheard of powers which, if administration were anythinglike as centralized as it is in this country, would be intolerable. 

I 
I 
This difficulty becomes overwhelming in regard to that large class 
of modern legislation in which details are everything and principlescomparatively nothing. The creation or alteration of duties on imported 
articles is an example. It is impossible to conceive a more 
insane or a more dangerous proposal than that Tariff Reform should 

be decided by popular vote. Apart from objections to indirect 
taxation per se, not one elector in a thousand, be he wage-earner or 
University don, is in a position to form an opinion of any intrinsic 
value upon the question of whether Tariff Reform is likely to do the 
nation more harm than good. If the object be to reach a rightdecision you might almost as well save the cost and trouble of a 
Referendum by tossing a halfpenny instead. 

Suppose that, dismissing all preconceived theories of government,
the reader were called upon to devise a satisfactory method of settlingsuch a question. What would he propose ? W auld he not say something 
like this? "Let us select a number of men, as intelligent as 
possible, representing all classes in the community; let us insist that 
they shall have access to every possible source of information and 
opportunity of weighing expert opinion on all sides ; and then let us 
leave the decision to them, holding them responszOle for the consequences." 
If he were wise, he would add that the representativesshould not be allowed, upon any pretence whatever, to shift the 
responsibility for the decision on to the electors by referring the 
matter to a popular vote at the last moment. That is to say, he 
would choose the representative method and the representativemethod alone. 

It may be argued that Tariff Reform is a very exceptional case. 
But it is the case chosen for the first application of the Referendum. 
Besides, an ever-increasing proportion of our most important legislation 
is of a similar character, that is to say, its merits and defects are 
so much a matter of details that they can only be appreciated with 
the assistance of experts, and pronounced upon by persons who have 
devoted much attention to the art of legislation. If Great Britain 
were governed by counties it might be otherwise, but it is governedas a single community, and the consequences of that fact must be 
accepted. It is often asserted that all opposition to the Referendum 

' is inspired by the belief that representatives are wiser than the people,
and know better what is good for them. Tn other words, that the 
arguments against the Referendum might equally be employed to 


justify a system of oligarchy. Such assertions, ignorantly or intentionally, 
are altogether wide of the mark. No doubt it is true, 
though one can call to mind many exceptions, that a representativeis usually superior in general intelligence and ability to the average 
of the persons who have chosen him to represent them; and this is 
an important fact. But the case against the Referendum requires 
no such assumption. The point is that the representative has opportunities 
which in the nature of things are denied to the individual 
elector of hearing not some, but all, of the evidence for or against any 
proposal ; and it would be just as valid if representatives were chosen 
by lot instead of by election. A representative body is " superior" 
to the electors for the purpose of legislation in precisely the same 
sense as a jury is superior to the general newspaper-reading public 
for the purpose of giving a just verdict. Inherently there is no more 
"oligarchy " about one than about the other. 

There is, however, one essential condition which is by no means 
always fulfilled at present but must be fulfilled if representatives are 
really to represent ; and that condition is that they should be held 
strictly responsible for the consequences of their action or inaction on 
any subject. The right of the elector must be recognized even to give 
his representative a mandate for a certain policy and then to blame 
him if it turns out badly. Otherwise there can be no security for 
the proper exercise of those powers which under any system of 
democracy must be entrusted to the representative assembly. The 
experience of Switzerland proves, if proof be necessary, that the 
habitual use of the Referendum does, in fact, destroy this safeguard. 
Elections are rarely contested except for some personal reason, and 
the representative becomes in effect an irresponsible official, acting 
as he pleases in regard to all those matters which are not submitted 
to a popular vote. In Switzerland the volume and importance of the 
legislation not so submitted are small~ and the danger of excessive 
bureaucracy is so far mitigated. But in England the bulk of the 
legislation must under any circumstances be left to the discretion of 
Parliament, and the evils that would surely flow from any diminution 
of its responsibility to the electorate are hard to exaggerate. 

The Practical Working of Direct Legislation. 

There is no space here for any sort of detailed analysis of the 
actual results of the Referendum and Initiative where they have been 
adopted. Nor is it likely that such an analysis would afford a basis 
for judging the effect of the same machinery in this country. The 
total population of Switzerland is less than halfthat ofGreater LondoD:" 
and is divided amongst twenty-five cantons, each of which is autonomous 
for almost all the ordinary purposes of government. For Great 
Britain to adopt the Referendum on the strength of Swiss experience 
alone would be about as reasonable as for the House of Commons to 
adopt the principle of co-option on the strength of the experience of 
a Board of Guardians. In America the unit of government is larger;
but there Direct Legislation is still in the early experimental stage,
and neither the triumphs which it has achieved nor the absurdities 


J8 

which it has been responsible for afford a fair basis for generalization 
at present." · 
It should be said, however, that the widely prevalent notion 

' 
that the Referendum has a conservative effect upon legislation 
appears to be based on very insufficient evidence. It is true that 
in Switzerland a disproportionate number of measures submitted by 
the Federal Government are rejected, but this may be explainedby the deep-rooted preference of the Swiss elector to be governed by 
his Canton rather than by the Federation. The proposals of the 
Federal authorities are thus always more or less suspect, and opposition 
to them is no proof of conservatism. In America, on the other 
hand, the weight has been deliberately thrown into the other scale 
in some of the States, by allowing new measures to be placed on the 
ballot-paper as affirmative propositions, which must be crossed out 
by those who object to them; that is to say, the non-voter is counted 
on the affirmative side.. Elsewhere a definite anti-conservative bias 
has appeared without any such artificial aid, owing to the increasing 
number of proposals submitted at one time. In Oregon in 1906 the 
ballot-paper contained the names of thirty-seven candidates and the 
titles of thirty-two measures. Very few electors take the trouble to 
go more than halfway down the paper. Consequently proposals putforward by a small active minority tend to get passed, because the 
affirmative is organized and the negative is not. The only people 
who understand or are interested in the proposition sufficiently to 
vote upon it at all are mostly its supporters.+ 

To sum up, there seems no particular reason to suppose that the 
adoption of the Referendum in this country would result in special 
advantage to any party. A certain conservatism would no doubt 
become apparent amongst the electors in regard to large constructive 
schemes of social reorganization. But to balance this there would be 
the unquestionable popularity of land taxes, supertaxes, heavy death 
duties, and the like.t The case for and against the introduction of 
the beginnings of Direct Government rests, therefore, solely upon the 
merits of :hat system compared with the Representative System as a 

* The experience of the English Trade Unions has provided data as valuable 
perhaps as any for a study of the working of Direct Legislation. In this connection 
the reader is directed to Industrial Democrac_y, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, where 
he will find an analytical account of how the Referendum and Initiative were adoptedand enthusiastically employed by some of the largest Trade Unions during the 
nineteenth century, and how they fell steadily into disuse and discredit, until finally 
it was seen that the practice of taking a general poll was practically useful only for 
some such purpose as that of discovering whether the members might be relied upon 
to support individually a proposal requiring concerted voluntary action, e.g., a strike. 
t It might be suggested that this tendency meets the objection urged above, 
that the Referendum tends to the oppression or neglect of minorities. But it is to 
) be observed (I) that it is only a safeguard upon issues of little public interest, and 

(2) that to give minorities an improper influence in certain matters is no remedy for 
allowing them none in others. . 
t A vote taken in the Canton Grisons on Sunday, March 6th, Igii, suggests the 
possibility of other sorts of anti-capitalistic legislation. By a majority of more than 
three to one the electors decided to prohibit absolutely the use of motor cars upon any 

r:ublic road within the area of this Canton. 

satisfactory instrument of democracy. It must be admitted that when 
the unit of government is small and the population homogeneous in 
character, the advantages of the Referendum (as also, when practicable, 
of the mass meeting of citizens) are very considerable. But 
when the unit of government is large and the population heterogeneous, 
the inherent defects of " majority rule " assume overwhelming 
importance. 

The choice which must be made is a momentous one, fraught,
perhaps, with the most profound consequences in relation to the 
future prospects of democracy. For democracy is still upon its trial. 
Nowhere in the world as yet can it be said to have worked to the complete 
satisfaction of everyone. Everywhere still there are doubters. 
even in the foremost ranks of the democratic movement itself; people 
who despair of their faith and are turning to alternative theories, to 
Plato, to government by the best, government by a semi-ascetic 
voluntary order or government by a specially trained, or even specially 
bred, class. No great attention need be paid to the views of such 
pessimists, but they suffice to illustrate a fact which does deserve consideration, 
that the permanent success and stability of democracy J 
have not yet been conclusively demonstrated. Developments are 
perfectly conceivable which would lead to such widespread disgust 
with popular government as to cause a revolt in favour of some other 
alternative, possibly a personal dictatorship.

How can these dangers best be avoided? By following the ideal 
of ''majority rule " or the ideal of " government by consent"? In 
other words, is legislation to be determined by a mere counting of 
heads or by methods which allow of a more or less accurate estimation, 
both quantitative and qualitative, of all the forces and currents 
of opinion in the community? It may be that upon the answer to 
that question hangs the fate of democracy itself. 

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

STODDART, ]ANE T. Against the Referendum. rgro. H?dder. Is. 

DEPLOIGE S. The Referendum in Switzerland. r8g8. Kmg. 7s. 6d. n. 

BRYCE, ]A's. The American Commonwealth. New Edition. rgro.

OBERHOLTZER, E. P. The Referendum in America. 1893. Ne:v York. 2 dols. 

Donn W F Revision and Amendment of State ConstitutiOns. rgro. Johns 

Hopkins Press, U.S.A. 

LLOYD, H. D., and J. A. HoBSON. The Swiss Democracy .. rgo8. U~wi~. 6s. n. 

Reports from His Majesty's Representatives Abroad respecting the InstllutlOn known 

as the Referendum. rgr r. Cd. 5522. 

United States Smale. Papers communicated by Jenning~ and Pomeroy. r8~8_. . 

Note.-The literature of the Referendum m the Untted States may be dtvtded mto 

two classes : (r) Propagandist literature, which is very extensive but of little value to 

the student. The United States Senate paper referred to above ts of great length, and 

may be regarded as exhaustive in thi~ _class; (2) ~naly~ical lit_erature, which mostly

consists of articles in the numerous political and soctologtcal revtews, for example: 

The Political Scttnet Quarterly. (U.S.A.)

The A rma. (U.S.A.)

The A mtrican Journal ofSociology.

The A nttrican Political Science Review. 


men~ of Its Rules and ~he following oan be obtained from ihl 
Secretary, at the Fabian Office, S Olemen!i's Inn, London, W.O. 

FABIAN ESSAYS IN SOCIALISM. New Preface by BERNARD SHAW, 
Paper 6d. net; cloth I/6; postage 2~d. a.nd 4d. 
WHAT TO READ on Social and Economic Subjects. Fifth edition, revised 


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THIS MISERY OF BOOTS. By H . G. WELLS. 3d., post free 4d. 
FABIAN TRACTS and LEAFLETS. 
Tracts, each 16 to 52 pp., p1'ice 1d., or 9d. per do•., unless otherwise stated, 


Leaflets, 4 pp. each, price 1d.for siz copies, 1s. per 100, or 8f6 per 1000,
The Set of 78, JS.; post free 3/5· Bound in Buckram, 4/6 n.; post free sa. 
I.-General Socialism in its various aspects.

TRAOTB.-ISI. The Point of Honour : a Correspondence on Aristocracy a.nd 
Socialism. By RUTH CAVENDISH BENTINCK. 147· Capital and Compensation. 
By EDw. R. PEASE. 146. Socialism and Superior Brains. A reply 
to Mr. Mallock. By BERNARD SHAW. 142. Rent and Value. 138. Municipal 
Trading. 121. Public Service versus Private Expenditure. By Sir 
OLIVER LODGE. IIJ. Communism. By WM. MoRBIB. 107. Socialism for 
Millionaires. By BERNARD SHAW. 139. Socialism and the Churches, 
By Rev. JoHN CLIFFORD, D.D. I33· Socialism and Christianity. By Rev. 
PERCY DEARMER (in cover with portrait of the author). 78. Sociaism and 
the Teaching of Christ. By Dr. J. CLIFFORD. 42. Christian Socialism. 
By Rev. S. D. HEADLAM. 79· A Word of Remembrance and Caution to 
the Rich. By JOHN WooLMAN. 75· Labor in the Longest Reign. By S. 
WEBB. 72. The Moral Aspects of Socialism. By SIDNEY BALL. 6g.
Difficulties of Individualism. By SIDNEY WEBB. 51. Socialism: True 
and False. By S. WEBB. 45· The Impossibilities of Anarchism. ByBERNARD SHAW (price 2d.). 7· Capital and Land (7th edn. revised 1908).
S· Facts for Socialists (11th ed., revised 1908). 132. A Guide to Books 
for Socialists. LEAI!'LETB-IJ. What Socialism Is. I. Why are the 
Many Poor? WELSH TRACTS-143· Sosialaetb yng Ngoleuni'r Beibl. 
Gan J. R. JoNES (Caernarfon). 141. Translation of 139. 87. Translation of 

78. 38. Translation of 1. 
11.-Applications of Socialism to Particular Problems. 
TRACTS.-I 54· The Case for School Clinics. By L. HADEN GUEST. 153 , 
The Twentieth Century Reform Bill. By H. H. SCHLOESSER. 152. Our 
Taxes as they are and as they ought to be. By .RoBT. JONES, B.Sc. In 
cover, 2d. 150. State Purchase of Railways. By EMIL DAVIES. In cover, 
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2d. I45· The Case for School Nurseries. By MrG. TowNSHEND. 144. 
Machinery: its Masters and its Servants. By H. H. ScHLOESSER and 

C. GAME. 140. Child Labor under Capitalism. By Mrs. HYLTON DALE. 
136. The Village and the Landlord. By EDw. CARPENTER. IJI. The 
Decline in the Birth-Rate. By S. WEBB. 130. Home Work and Sweating. 
By Miss B. L. HuTCHINS. 128. The Case for a Legal Minimum 
Wage. 122. Municipal Milk and Public Health. By Dr. F. LAWSON 
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The Secret of Rural Depopulation. us. State Aid to Agriculture: an 
Example. II2. Life in the Laundry. 98. State Railways for Ireland. 
124. State Control of Trusts. 86. Municipal Drink Traffic. 84. Economics 
of Direct Employment. 83. State Arbitration and the LivingWage. LEAFLET.-104. How Trade Unions benefit Workmen. 
111.-Local 
Government Powers: How to use them. 
TRAOTB.-IJ7· Parish Councils and Village Life. 109. Cottage Plans 
and Common Sense. By RAYMOND UNWIN. 76. Houses for the People.
99· Local Government in Ireland. 82. Workmen's Compensation Act. 
New edition for the Act of 1906. 62. Parish and District Councils. 54· 
The Humanizing of the Poor Law. By J. F. 0AKEBHOTT. LEAFLETB,134
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IV. -General Politics and Fabian Policy.
127. Socialism and Labor Policy. n6. Fabianism and the Fiscal 
Question: an alternative policy. 108. Twentieth Century Politics. BySIDNEY WEBB. 70. Report on Fabian Policy. 41. The Fabian Society,
its Early History. By BERNARD SHAW.