BRITISH LIBRARY 
OF POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC SCIENCE 


LONDON SCHOOL OF 
ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 


lO,PORTUGAL STREET, 
LONDON WC2A 2HD 


Tel. Ol-405 7686 



fabian tract 463 
can Labour win again? 

chapter 1 the defeat and after : what the 
polls said 1 
2 the road to 1984 15 
3 perfecting the policy 20 
4 conclusion 29 

the author: 
Austin ·Mitchell was elected ·MP for Grimsby in a by-election in 
1977. Previously he lectured in history and politics at the University 
of Otago and Canterbury in New Zealand before taking up 
a post as Official Fellow at 'Nuffield College, Oxford. Between 
1969 and his election to parliament he worked as a journalist 
for Yorkshire TV and the BHC. 

this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only the 
views of the individual who prepared it. The responsibility of 
the Society is limited to approving publications it issues 
as worthy Qf consideration within the Labour movement. 
Fabian Society,. 11 Dartmouth Street, london SW1 H 9BN. 
September 1979 ISSN 0307 7535 'ISB'N 7163 0463 5 


1. the defeat and after: what 
the polls said 


Some election defeats are traumatic. 1945 
shook the Conservatives into agonisingreappraisal. 11959 produced our counterpart: 
more agony less appraisal. Others 
are so mild, 10r so long expected, that 
they are treated as stumbles on the long 
march. Superficially 1979 fai'ls ·into the 
second category. Becoming aJccustomed 
to sk<l'ting on thin ice, we carried on after 
the ice had melted. lot was not entirely,
even largely, our fault that power slippedfrom our hands. Having done our best 
we were badly served by allies and mis· 
judged by an electorate which hadn't 
reconciled i.tse1f to economic real'ities. 

Yet sulky self-righteousness is a bad 
electoral stance. It can''t obscure an electoral 
failure which was more disaster 
than defeat. 'Winning our lowest share 
of the vote since 1931, we handed ~o an 
unregenerate Conservative Party .the prospect 
for which both parties had calculated, 
dallied and manoeuvred: powerin the orl ·rich decade. A Tory Partywith policies totally irrelevant to the 
troubled and difficult world of the 1980s 
w.on the right •to guide Britain back down 
the same dead end street 'from which it 
had escaped in 1974. A country with a\.1 
too little time left was forced .to waste 
more. 

Defeat was also a party disaster. Having 
achieved power almost by accident in 
1974, we had the prospect of usi•ng it 
to ·check our -long term decline and show 
that we are the party of government. We 
had gone some way towards the second. 
Grappling with the worst economic crisis 
since 1931, our government had learned 
to manage the system, had won union 
cooperation and had got both inflation 
and unemployment down. We were 
adjusting to the straightened circumstances 
of a na•tion in comparative and 
near absolute decline. Prospect and reality 
were both ·lost in an election which reduced 
us to the ·l'Ol•e .of a Greek Ohorus, 
commenting on action, unable to determine 
it, though the analogy is not exact. 
The audience listens to Greek choruses. 
We now have to reconstruct, prey to that 
perennial ·conflict between left and right,
idea-logue ·and pragmatist, which is more 
divisive .jn opposition than ·in power. 

Reconstruction involves reform of a partyorganisation which has now become more 
of an obstacle to achieving power than 
a machine to win it. It means resassessment 
o'f policies, images and associations 
which have become an electoral handicap, 
because we haven't adjusted them with 
·the aspirations of the people whose support 
we depend on. It mean~'> a reappraisal 
of our pohcies .for Britain so that we are 
not caught in the saJIDe trap and can offer 
hope instead of misery more fair.ly sha·red. 

The changes a-re fundaJmental. No resprayis sufficient when the chassis is collapsing,
the trim has fallen off and the steering 
doesn't work. The objective is to get and 
hold power and use it to improve the 
lot and advance the well ·being of our 
people and our oountry. A political partyhas no responsibility •to keep the torch 
of ideologi.cai puri.ty burning •wi'th a flame 
which can't be taken into the real world 
for fear of wind, wet and •competing 
illuminations. Nor are we in business to 
win power at any price, going in empty 
headed and leaving our people empty 
handed. Our policies must be popularand attractive to win support. They must 
a•lso be right and relevant to ensure that 
our basic (jbjectives are adjusted to the 
circumstances of a richer, much riskier, 
situation. The two poles are not as far 
a:part as the left and the right often 
assume. Real'isa:tion of the nature m the 
disaster and the magnitude of Labour's 
problem are the first necessary steps. 

from '74 to '79 

In one sense the defeat was predestined. 
We hadn't won the 1974 election. We'd 
simply proved better at not losing it than 
an incompetent Tory government. Our 
inheritance was blighted. With no real 
majority, we faced a world crisis .to which 
Brita-in was more exposed .than other 
i·ndustrial countries. 

Incomes policy and public spending kept 
activity and jobs up. Support for the 
Government remained at a reasonable 
'level. Tough measures don't always lose 
support. Yet the appearance of a l•oss of 
control is crippling. That caJIDe with the 


GALLUP POLLS 
'75 '75 '75 '75 '76 '76 '76 '76 '77 '77 '77 '77 
Jan Apl Jly Oct Jan Apl Jly Oct Jan Apl Jly Oct 
Labour 48 45 41 41 42 46 41 36 34 33 34 45 
Conservative 34 43 43 42 40 41 41 48 47 49 49 45 
Labour lead +14 +2 -2 -2 +2 +5 0 -12 -13 -16 -15 0 

collapse of sterling and the IMF ordained 
cuts. Government pop u 1 a r i t y dulycollapsed. 

The 1964-70 Labour Government had 
plumbed lower, to an •opposition lead 
of 28 per cent. Ted Heruth's Government 
had sunk to a gap of 21 per cent, near 
to our maximum of 22 per cent. No 
government which had fal,Jen to these 
depths had been Te-elected. They had 
recovered, however, as we did, with the 
Lib-Lab pact. By 1978 the poli·cies 
appeared to be paying off. Jim Callaghan 
emerged more popular than any leader 
since Harold Wilson's bubble burst in 
1967. He eas'ily outdistanced MargaretThatcher. The party itself drew Ieveii. The 
session ended in an atmosphere of near 
euphoria. 

the campaign and its timing 

The party expected an October election. 
Two thirds of those poHed by MORJ 
wanted it. Postponement was Jim Callaghan's 
personal decisi'On. Cabinet was told, 
not consulted. The arguments againstOctober •were that the outcome was uncerta.
jn; bhe economi·c situation could 
deteriorate in the campaign. Ootober 
trade figures are frequently :bad. The 
Conservatives 'could claim >that the 
government was dodging a winter of 
industrial problems. Then there was the 
unspoken reason : a desire to see the 
country through its difficulties. Hm 
Callaghan had all along inclined to 1979 
and was supported by some in the 

Cabinet, though not by the younger members 
nor his backbenchers. 

Cabinets unfortunately do not include a 
statutory strategist. FormaHy this is the 
Prime Minister's rol·e but if he ~s more 
concerned wi-th statesmanship than partyinterest the strategi·c voice can go unheard. 
The decision was taken on the 
basis of hearsay, hopes and hunch. 
Labour had just financed two majormarginal seat surveys with interviews in 
April / May and recaH in August. The 
first had been sent to the party and the 
Pnime Minister. The initial findings of 
the second had >been relayed to his aides. 
They told a Jess cheerful story than pub-
l·ished polls. Labour was 4 per cent behind 
in a>ll the marginals and 7 per cent behind 
in its 1974 gains, a verdict Gallup concurred 
in. The Labour vote was "softer" 
than the Tory, giving rise to fears that 
Labour's improvement was founded on 
an unstable political base which could 
collapse ,if tested. The pollster, Bob 
WoPCester of MORI, had always made 
clear his 'OWn view that the best time for 
an election was with Labour 2 per cent 
behind to get the underdog effect, and 
being pushed not jumping. He now told 
the Prime Minister's aides that Labour 
wou>ld "squeak home" but with no over· 
all majority. 

Later evidence bears this out. In the 1979 
campaign, three polls showed a swing to 
Labour of between 2 and 2.5 per cent 
respectively, one showed a Labour •loss 
of 0.5 per cent. Averaging 'the figures for 
August and early September (Labour 

GALLUP POLLS 
'78 '78 '78 '78 '78 '78 '78 '78 '78 '78 '78 '78 
Jan Feb Mar Api May Jne Jly Aug Spt Oct Nov Dec 
Labour 43 39 41 43 43 45 43 47 4'2 47 48 42 
Oonservative 43 48 48 45 43 45 45 43 49 42 43 48 
Labour lead 0 +9 -7 -2 0 0 -2 +4 -7 +5 +5 -6 


45.0 per cent ; Conservatives 46.5 percent) ·gives a final Laibour lead aHowing 
for the favourable average swing of 
around 1 per cent-enough for a majority 
Olf more than a dozen .over the Conservatives. 
In any case Labour would have 
found it easier to make up ground in a 
1978 campa·ign when the background was 
one of a successful goverll!Illent. The unfavourable 
survey trends in the Labour 
marginals never emerged in the actual 
election. Then Labour did >better, overall, 
in its 'OWn marginals. 
Hindsight ·is the consolation prize for 
those excluded from decisions. It indicates 
that the failure to fight in October 
1978 was a mistake but more in the light 
of what was to come. Primarily it was 
a risk. ParadoxicaHy the only man to 
draw abtention ·to the odds was the Prime 
Minister who warned Cabinet how drastically 
their view could change if a winter 
of discontent ensued. No ·one could have 
foreseen the disasters of 1979. Yet taking 
a risk should have dictated certain precautions. 
Surviva!l became the first 
priority and the major threat to it was 
a hard and fast 5 per cent rather than 
the vaguer incomes target of " an out-
turn better -than last year". Since the 
aim of staying on was to pick a time 
with better .electora!l prospects than October 
1978, if prospects in <fact deteriorated 
it would become imperative •to hang on 
at all costs. Neither of ·these consequences 
seems to have been understood fully, or 
at all. 

Within a week there was a 2 per cent 
swing to the Conservatives. Over half the 
public ·thought the delay wrong. H crea~ed 
the impression that Labour was hangmg 
on. The buoyancy on which ·it was based 
was already coming to an end. GaUup 

Poll expectations turned down as the 
proporti·on expecting the economic situation 
to get worse rose 'from 25 per cent 
in September to 42 per ·Cent in December 
and 52 per cent in February. More important 
was the effect on events. The economic 
improvement of 1978 had been 
achieved by incomes policy combined 
Wlith tax cuts. Cabinet was determined 
to repeat it with the lower pay limit. In 
di·scussions with the TUC Neddy Six this 
paved the way for two sets of misunderstandings. 
Ministers were unconvinced 
When -the union leaders pointed out that 
their members would neither accept nor 
understand the arithmetic. Union leaders 
had opposed the previous year's paypolicy. Y~ it had worked. The leaders 
may also have fa-iled to clari:fy ·the position. 
Some assumed rthat the 5 per cent 
was a piece of pre-election window 
dressing. 

The gamble misfired. In December, sanctions 
on companies breaking .the payguidelines fell and the .prospect of an 
election ·On ·incomes .policy, srtiH a p·opularissue, vanished. Then came January and 
February and the house of ca·rds ·carne 
tumbling down. 

After the strikes came the unrforeseen 
fiasco of the Scottish referendum and 
the perversity of the SNP turkeys voting 
for Christmas. The Prime Minister declined 
to use baPgaining counters such as 
the .gas pipeline .to Northern Ireland, even 
though there was a strong case 'for this 
on other grounds. He a•lso declined to 
make devolution a vote of oon'fidence to 
win over the SNP and, perhaps, the 
Liberals. The main ·imperative should 
have been to reach calmer waters a>t a11 
costs. 

1979 POLLS (%) 
Dec Jan Feb Feb Mar Mar 
AVE GP MORI GP MORI GP 
Labour 
Conserva,tive 
Labour lead 
leader g<tp"satisfied" with govt. 
44 
47 
-3 
+27 
38 
41 
49 
-8 
+16 
34 
36 
55 
-19 
-36 
17 
33 
53 
-20 
-34 
23 
39 
52 
-13 
-9 
22 
37 
51 
-14 
-21 
27 


The .timing of the election made defeat 
inevitable. It was to take place at a time 
not of the government's choos-ing, when 
it was 13 per •cent behind in the rpol•ls and 
had •the aura of defeM about it. The gap 
separa·ting the parties was the widest 
since the war. We compounded these 
initial disadvantages hy campaign mistakes. 
We faliled to get our press conferences 
on first in the morning. This 
lo~t the ini•tiative and •the main purposeof the campaign putting the questions.
CaUaghan's performance was often lack· 
iustre, like a man inured to defeat. Indeed 
the whole Labour campaign had a stuffy 
and complacent •tone. Good issues, such 
as .the Common Markct, •the welfare 
state and spending on educati·on and pensions, 
were largely ignored. Ther·e was 
continuous friction between Number 10 
and Transport House; the advertisingand strategy •lacked inspiration. "The 
Better Way" must be the most forgettable 
slogan of recent decades. The Trade 
Union .campaign added litvle .tha.t was 
useful (except money). The Conservative 
campaign was much more effective, rely· 
ing on a lbio-feedba·ck technique of 'broadcasting 
the pUJblic's <:'omplaints, •gr.ievances 
and grumbles back to .them at -increased 
volume, but also offering strong and 
specific inducements to target groups wno 
could be lured from Labour. l•t was a 
clever stra•tegy, carefully market tested. 

Yet Labour won the campaign. We 
narrowed the gap steadily until the penultimate 
week. But from here the gap reopened 
and the Liberal vote rose. The 
dawning possibility of a La·bour victoryproduced its own antibodies. 

The campa·ign was successful •in other 
respeots. Jim Cal>laghan restored his standing 
and finished ahead of his opponent.
Some 6 per cent more thought he would 
make the better Prime Minister. 

Labour a!lso did bet•ter on the arguments. 
Industrial relations •and strikes, which had 
mushroomed in both reality and •the issue 
league, sl>ipped to second place. Labour 
emerged as the party wit'h the besc 
policies on them and improved its position 
on every issue except 'law and order. 
Yet the Conservatives still finished ahead. 

We won ·the campai.gn, but only ma·rginaHy. 
Most recent elections have seen 
a swing ·of between I and 2 per cent to 
the Government. We got this but no 
more. 

the voting 

The political decisions of those who duiytramped to the polls •to ratify the inevitable 
are well document·ed. Eliminatingthose who did not reveaJI both decisi•ons, 
rhe remain·ing 2,083 .int-erviewees in a 
BBC poll-ing day survey voted thus : 

ELECTORAL CHANGES 1974-1979 

1974 vote 1979 vote 
Nat& no 
(recoJ.Jeotion) Con Lab Lib other vote 

Conservative 611 31 44 2 17 
La·bour 79 565 78 4 24 
Liberal 59 19 96 1 9 
Nat & other 5 6 4 28 2 
no vot-e 65 60 16 4 76 
too young 63 48 18 5 44 
totals 882 729 256 44 172 

The pattern of change is complex. In 
1974 the trend had been a loss to the 
Liberals. This time the transfers cut out 
the middle man and went direct between 
the maj·or parties. Labour lost 10.5 per 
cent of its 1974 vote direcl'ly to the 
Tories, two and a ha.Jf times what the 
Tories lost to us. The Conservatives hung 
on to a mass·ive 87 per cent of their 
previous vote. The I.;iberals ·retained 52 
per cent but ·their losses were three to 
the Conservatives to every one to Labour, 
enough to make the difference between 
a bare majority for Mrs Thatcher and the 
thumping one she got. 

The trend among those too young to 
vote last time (35 per cent df whom went 
to the Tories; 27 per cent to us with a 
full quarter abstaining) points •to ·another 
weakness. In past elect·ions most younger 
voters have gone to Labour. Now the 
Conservatives got a bare ma'jority. 

The swing fell off up the age scale and 
was lowest among the over 65s, ·thoughthis top age group st-ill went main>ly to 


the Tories. Labour's chief strength was 
among the middle aged: two fifths of 
our vote. A middl·e il!ged party with 
middle aged policies musters a middle 
aged vote, mainly in the older industrial 
areas. 

Confidence ~n the government was in 
almost inverse ril!tro to prosperity. The 
swing ran at 0.7 per cent in Scotland 
and 3.9 per cent in the North East CDmpared 
with 6.3 per cent in the West Midlands 
and 6.8 per cent in the South East. 
Since there are three seats north of the 
Humber to every five south of it, these 
trends reaped a substantial crop of sea-ts 
for the Conservatives, ·leaving them as 
the party of the prosperous south and 
relegating Labour to dependence on ·the 
older, poorer and, rfor the most part, 
declining industrial areas. 

New •towns and car worker and miningconstituencies had unusually high swings 
against the government. These are constituencies 
with concentrations of the 
more highly paid '\Vorkers, so tthis trend 
is a clue to the occupationa'l •breakdown. 
Butler and Stokes showed a Tory •trend 
among the skilled workers in the sixties. 
The MORI marginal seats survey pointed 
to it in 1978. In 1979 it became a flood. 
Three poJ:ls show its effect though their 
basis is slightly different. 

SOCIAL CLASS AND SWING 
TO CON~BRVATIVE (%) 

AB cl C2 DE 

JTN -5 -2 +10 +9 
BBC -3.5 -1.5 +II +6.5 
Harris / MORI -I +15 +12 

SkiHed workers withdrew from Labour, 
a •trend strongest among single and 
younger people. The skiHed worker groupended up very evenly divided. Labour 
held its own among the ABS, and mainly 
among profess·ional groups and white 
coNar workers. Class alignment had been 
declining through the sixties. Measured 
by the difference between •the Tory vote 
among manua•ls and non-manuals it declined 
from 43 ·in 1964 to 32 in 1970, 
rising back to 38 in the ::ir:::ctmstan-.:es 

of 1974. It dropped to an a:ll-time low of 
22 per cen>t in 1979. 

Those who changed sides were more 
likely to feel it was "time iior a change"
and more concerned about " extremism " 
in the Labour Party. On the most important 
issues, where the whole sa:mple gave 
prices, unemployment and taxa·tion as ·the 
mos·t importa-nt -issues, the new recruits 
to the Conservatives listed •their priorities 
as pri·ces, -industrial relations and taxa·ti•on. 
On the .tax issue, where 63 per ·cent of 
the sample thought the Conservatives 
best, 89 per cent of the Conservative 
recruits put them first. These recruits 
also seem more concerned than the 
average about s-trikes, taxes and law and 
order. Thus taxes and [aw and order, 
but par-ticularly the former, seem to have 
been " sleeper " issues. They emergedlate. The Tories were 26 per cent ahead 
on taxes and 39 per cent on law and 
order. The importance of taxes as an 
issue points right to the heart of 1he 
socia•l democratic dilemma. How to payfor public ~pending at a t·ime of low 
groWth? 

can Labour still win? 

The campaign is crucia-l when the partybalance is close. In 1•979 it was not, so 
that atJtention must shift to the long term 
trends underlying the decisi·on. One 
election records and reflects the electorate's 
experience of one .government.
Long term trends are a cumulative experience 
of both parties. They should 
both read this testament of experiencewith some dismay. 

Long term ground swells were originaNy 
assumed to be a p·roduct of 'basic social 
changes. After the 1959 defeat, Must 
Labour Lose? and Tony Crosland's Can 
Labour Win? tooJd a tale of woe as the 
affluent society, de-proletarianisation and 

•the growth o'f the white collar work force 
eroded Labour a:ttitudes and •loyalties. 
Crosland conlfident'ly predicted that "the 
La:bour vote will probably decline . . . 
by about 2 per cent at each successive 
general election." When Labour defied 
its own obituaries and won, this theory 


of glacial erosion began to give way to 
the image of volatility. Labour collapsedin popularity but bounced back almost 
to win in 1970. The Conservatives then 
repea:ted the whole operati·on in 'the new 
complication ·of an 18 per cent Liberal 
vote. The new fashion was almost to 
treat the electora:te as perverse, putting 
governments in and throwing them out 
with sudden abandon. 

This interpretation emphasised the primacy 
of political ra:ther than sociologicalfactors. People were reacting, with an 
apparently increasing distaste, to 'the per· 
formance of both pa:rties -in office. The 
result was a growing alienation and 
steady deoline in the two party share ·of 
the nation rfrom its height over 80 per 
cent in 1951. This trend 'Wasn't found 
in ~comparable two party democracies 
such as Germany, Austr,ia, Ireland, the 
United States or Canada. University of 
Essex researchers who gave this emerging 
emphasis an academic respectability 
by ca:tchingly dubbing it "partisan dealignment 
", began to discuss the possibility 
of a fundamental re-alignment. 

The relative balance between these two 
trends, the soci'Ological and !!he pol,itical, 
and their impact can be rough1ly assessed 
from the changes in the relative shares 
of the population entitled to vote. 

In 1951 Labour had had 40 per cent. The 
long term erosion after that is clear. So is 
the contribution to that process made bythe '64-70 Labour Government. Yet the 
Conservative vote was suffering in the 
same way. The .long 'term trend in the 
two party share took ;it to a low pointo'f 55 per cent 'in 1974. Five years later it 
went up 8 per ·cent largeily because the 
Conservatives did so well. So in 1979 the 
two party system revived. Apa,thy and 
alienation were a'lso less extensive and 
less powerful than .five years before. 

Nevertheless, rhey a'r·e stiU there and the 
two party share is not back even to its 
1970 level. The Libera'ls and the SNP 
both seem well placed for further 
advance. Conservative Governments suit 
them welL Much of Labour's ·~oss in 1970 
went into abstention, but .the Conservatives 
in 1964 and 1974 appear to have 
lost to the Liberals. If the Tory Government 
now does badly, ~the L'iberais should 
benefit and the tlong term trend to realignment 
could well be ~resumed. 

The politica:l migin ·of ~long term changeis indicated by the major turning points. 
Power often causes British parties to 
droop. The Conserva~ive loss ·in 1964 
was the same (5.4 per cent) as Labour's 
drop in 1970. However, the process isn't 
impartial because periods ·of Labour 
Government tend to benefit the Conservative 
opposition more, at 1.7 per cent in 
1'970 and a massive 8.1 per ~cent in 1979, 
than Labour gains in reverse situations. 
Our 1964 and 1974 victories were both 
won on a declining share. So was October 
1974. The l~ong term decline in the tWo 
party share appears to be due to the 
perception of poor performance in office. 
Rather than negative alienation, it is a 
rationa1l reaotion to political facts. 

This hurts us most. Our share of the 
electorate has faHen fairly steadily and 
is now below a third. The Conservative 
share has fa1len too, but they have been 
more successful on key occasions such 
as 1959, 1970 and particular.ly 1979 in 
adding new support. The advent of a 
Labour Government and their own efforts 
at reconstruction allow !!hem to win new 
support. We are not accorded the same 
generosity but contJinue to loose in

1

oppos·ition. 

Ignoring many complexities, a workinghypothesis of ~the mechanics of these 
processes is to divide the electorate in!!o 

SHARES OF THE ELECTORATE(%) 
1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 (Feb) 19741'(0ct) 1979 
Labour 34.5 34.0 36.3 30.9 29.2 28.5 28.8 
Conservative 38.8 33.4 31.7 33.4 29.8 26.1 34.2 
Liberal 4.6 8.6 6.5 5.7 15.2 13.3 10.8 
no vote 21.3 22.9 24.2 28.0 21.9 27.2 23.8 


three categories. The majority are supporters 
of one or other of the politicalparties. They turn out more Qr less 
regularly and vote for the same party.
The second group are not .integrated ·in 
the same fashion. They may once have 
supported a party, they may never have 
got the habit, they may regard themselves 
as independent or floaters, they 
may be in the process of changing sides. 
The hallmark is that they do not vote 
regularly for one party. A descriptive 
noun is difficU'It but "autonomous" best 
describes them. The third group, the 
apatheti•c, are those whose lack of 
involvement is expressed by not bothering 
to vote. These groups overlap to 
some extent but the categories stil·l 
provide a reasonable picture of the 
mechanics of ·electoral processes. 

The characteristics of each gr·oup could 
only be defined after survey. Each is 
probably a cross section of the electorate 
by age, sex and class differentiated mainly 
by attitudes. The integrated have a long 
term C!!llegiance which the autonomous 
have escaped. The apathetic have less 
involvement a-ltogether though they do 
have attitudes. Numbers can only be 
guessed at. The apathetic are the smaHest 
group. Around a quarter of the ·electorate 
do not vote but this number rises and 
falls depending on the interest in a particular 
election. A proportion of the nonvoters 
are young electors who have not 
yet got the habit of voting, so the proportion 
of apathetics is sma~ler than the 
abstenbion rate. The proportiOn changmg 
sides ·is measured. In <the BBC survey, 72 
per cent of those who remembered wh~t 
they had done ·in 1974 d1d the ·same m 
1979. Similar figures were produced by 
MORI and NOP though all such figures tend 
to underestimate the amount o1f change. 
given the fallibility of memory. Surveys 
between ·elect·ions indicated that manywho had voted Liberal in 1974 had forgdtten. 
Two million Liberal votes had 
vanished. Allowing for this and for new 
electors, the indication is that the integrated 
s·ection is something over hal<f of 
the elect·orate, -the autonomous is probaibly 
under a third. The former mayhave been shrinking ·over the years, the 

•latter <growing. This is shown by the 
voting trends. The University of Essex 
survey suggests <that party allegianceshave been getting weaker and their 
associa:tion with class more t-enuous. The 
assumption therefore is that the autonomous 
section, the proportion up for 
grabs, is substantial and growing. This 
accounts for the increasingly mer·curical 
·characteristics of the electorate. 

how can we win? 

Being in business to get power, our problem 
is to win elections. The traditional·ist 
might argue that to think in terms of the 
committed, the autonomous and the 
apathetic is not only to ·court the danger 
of intellectua•l hernia but is unnecessary.
A.Jl we have to do is enthuse the Labour 
vote and wait for Mrs Thatcher to make 
a mess. However well the Conservatives 
started on the road back to 1974 (andthe 6 per cent swing to Labour by the 
second week of July was the shortest 
government honeymoon on r·ecord) -losing 
p·ower demands not only incompetence 
on a scale equaHing that of Edward 
Heath but also the politica•l suicide which 
he induLged in. The repetition of both 
is unlikely. We have to face the fa·cts 
tha.t we have not tbeen recruiting young 
peop·le and we run the r:i·sk of entrenching 
ourselves into a kernal• of supportwhich is contracting. This would relegate 
us to the wle ·of a permanent opposition,
unable to win rpower ·unless the Toryvote drops once again more precipitatelytha:n ours. 

Our real task is to use -the committed 
sup!porters a:s a base to build on, then 
adding as much support as we can rally 
from autonomous voters and at the same 
time combatting any drift to apathy and 
abstention. AN three processes have to 
go together. Un<fortunately, our prospectof furthering them is better ·in powerthan in opposition. Indeed ·the only times 
when we reversed the trend to decline, 
and hence presumC!!bly become more 
attract·ive to autonomous voters, were 
when we were .in power. 

This occurs because the public are 
eva.Juating poEtical parties .in the light of 


whM they feel a paPty should be. Re· 
search indicates that this idea~l politica'l 
party is middle of the road, beholden to 
no powerful group, effective, united, 
rel•iable, moderate and exciting, and one 
whi·ch pays attention to pubJ,ic opinion. 
Labour can approximate more closely to 
many, but not a:ll, of these 'images in 
power. Then we are more powerful, we 
are forced to he more middle of the 
road, shoold be 'less beholden to interests 
and can project ourselves 'better for 
success in government. This makes the 
party more effective, more rel·iable and 
beHer able to keep its promises. We can 
use every puH of status in a way which 
isn't open in the less respectable climate 
of opposition. Then we alienate suppoPt 
by appearing divided, more extreme, 
ineffective, unreliable-even impotent.
TTaditionaUy, we have ·taken every advantage 
'of these opportunities. So in 1979 
we lost power •because the difficulties of 
our situation were such as to prevent us 
from us·ing the advantages of office to 
win sufficient new ·suppor-t at a time 
when the Tories were adding substantially 
to theirs. 

where we lost support 

The survey which tells us what motiva-tes 
the autonomous electors involves such 
deep psychological perception that it wi.Jl 
never be carried -out, unless pollstersqualify in psychology and carry couches 
with them. Yet the evidence gives indicati'ons. 
Blections are about choosing a 
government. The fading of the traditional 
ci'ass altegiance strengthens the impor


tance of governmental factors. Those set 
loose from class constrlllints wiH view 
parties primarily in terms -of therr effectiveness 
as governments. Assessments will 
be a broad impression, conditi'oned byperceptions of the government's achievements 
and failures and .by government'seffect on lives and well being. Credibility 
and ability to deliver ·are a priori the 
central parts. Labour's •lea:d in the poHsin 1978 was a recognition that ·things were 
at last •going better if not well. The 
improvement was precarrous and hardlyenough to say that the government was 
actually delivering, yet it was a ·turningpoint. The strikes and the a:ppll!rent collapse 
of the relationship with the unions 
shattered the 'i'rnage. Pay policy had a·lso 
been popular. Its coll'apse magnified the 
government's own. As soon as groupslike the Ford workers began to break it 
and the feel·ing developed that executives 
and others were getting round it, paypolicy became unrfair. With the defeat of 
sanctions it di,ed, however much ministers 
might have pretended otherwise. 

Labour could no longer dei·iver -on inflat
·ion ·or anything else. The governmenthad neither a dear way out nor the 
political strength to carry ·it. Confidence 
disintegrated. All the ·crucial indicators 
began to go downhiJ.l. 

The Conservative posters had it right, a 
year to'o early. Labour wasn't working. 
Peopl•e got fed up of us and our rfailures. 
Yet they went into the poHing booth 
with their eyes open. They were overwhelmed 
by Tory pohci·es ·and when 
GaHup asked how much confidence they 

INDICATORS FROM GALLUP, 1978-79 
Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Api 

economic situation ahead 
improveI deteriorate + 4 -8 -25 -20 -10 -34 -21 -14 
prices-incomes policy 
will/wiN not work -9 -11 -17 -13 -41 -29 -31) 
has govt held wages too 
firmly I not enough -10 4 -15 9 -20 -30 -33 
approve/ disapprovegovt's record to da:te -8 + 2 + 3 7 -18 -40 -29 -17 
govt are/ are not handling 
economic situation 
correctly -13 0 0 -11 -25 -37 -35 


had in the Conservatives to deal wisely 
with Britain's problems, 41 per cent said 
" a moderate " or " very great" confidence, 
but 54 per cent had "little", 
"very little" or "none". However, certain 
things were still expected from them : 
that direct taxes would be reduced, union 
power would be reduced and that law 
and order would lbe jmproved. This puts 
them in an exposed situation. The expectati-
ons aroused win be difficult to fulfil. 

Yet these are self imposed shackles outweighed 
by the rweights Labour runs 
with. From moving with the public feeling 
in the early sixties, we a-re now 
seriously out of ki'lter with the mood of 
the times. In part, this represents long 
standing attitudes and prejudices which 
are continuously underlined ·and fostered 
by the press. More danger'ously, it represents 
a reaction against aspects of 
Labour's achievements coming from the 
beneficiaries of the system. 

supporting the unpopular 

La1bour is the party of the welfare state. 
Yet the British emerge, both in general 
surveys and ·in a 1977 survey for the 
EEC Commission, as more complacentthan most about their own well being,
less likely to see poverty and much more 
inclined than other countries to attribute 
it to individua'l !failures such as •laziness 
or drink. Scroungers are a 1bigger preoccupation 
than either the .genu·ine unempl•
oyed or the much more numerous 
and expensive tax evaders. The British 
are more inclined than any other European 
·country to feel that the authorities 
are doing too much about poverty. No·t 
all hearts beat as warmly as Labour's and 
anyone who has canvassed extensively 
know~ that a high proportion of com-
p•laints about social security come not 
from the wealthy, but from widows angry 
at the taxes they pay (because o'f their 
pensions), from the ·childless resentingchild benefits and its recipiellJts resen:ting 
the l'os·s Olf chi,[d tMC al·lowance, from pensioners 
complaining about their pensions, 
about unions, strikes and all the other 
symptoms ·af a modern rworld, from the 
skilled angry over differentials and .forom 

the low paid albout scroungers. The 
chorus of grumbling seemed to gwwwith the level of spending. Gossip has 
always been lthe best Tory propaganda.
Studies of relative deprivation show why. 
We compare ourselves with those about 
us. We view the system in terms of 
anecdotes and examples immediate to us. 

Labour was keeping public spending high. 
The public believes in cutting spending, 
particularly on "waste " and civil servants. 
Ca~backs in the numbers of this 
group were popular at a time when publicservice jobs •a'lone were absorbing the 
expanding labour force. Asked to attribute 
blame for Britain's difficulties, 
people point at unions first and government 
second. Even at the height of •the 
oil crisis, unions had been more blamed 
than Ara:bs. Thirty years of "s,top-go" are 
a little beyond public comprehension. So 
Britain's situation is blamed on thingscloser to hand, on restr·ictive practices 
and laziness, most-ly on the part of others. 
Coping with a crisis 'bY a mixture of 
Keynes and the ·Corporate state is difficult 
when a lange proportion of the public 
thinks it is better tackled by the work 
ethic or the whip. 

Labour is sympa·thetic to sl'ate intervention 
and state enterprise. Public opinion 
is hostile to 'both. Nationalisation's 
popularity was at an all .time -low three 
years ago but it has hardly improved 
much since. Semantics do make a difference 
since only 19 per cent want "more 
nationalisation" but 35 per cent will 
accept "more public ownership". Yet 
both are minority enthusiasms. The onlyexception is North Sea gas and oil where 
a 1974 NOP survey showed a very even 
division of opinion, and MORI has shown 
35 per cent for nationa.Jisation o,f uil and 
40 per cent for nationalisa1ion of gaswith 50 per .cent against (apparently few 
realising gas i~'> nationalised already). The 
public are critica•l 'Of state industry, perhaps 
tbec<ause of their own experienceswith the s'bate utilities. They are sympathetic 
to private enterprise and its 
mythologies of -initiative and enterprise. 
Labour is 'liberal and humanitarian. 

Public attitudes are authoritarian, sympathetic 
to the police and hostile both 


to demonstrators and radicals in general.
The egalitarian ethic is hardly endea·ring 
either. People recognise the realities of 
olass yet ·there is no leveHing instinct, 
unless a ·lack of enthusiasm for car 
workers be seen as such. The genera•! 
attitude to weaHh is toleran!t even, for 
those with the Daily Express syndrome,
deferentia·!. The well publicised plight of 
the rich, strug.gling along on a few 
score thousand is viewed sympa·thetically. 
The maoj·ority v·iew is that taxes on the 
higher paid should be cut, that reductions 
encourage initiative and that taxes 
are too high in Britain. Even a wealth 
tax which would apply to only a tiny 
minority still produced an even division 
of 40 per cent for, 41 per cent against. 

Only in two fields did Labour have anyreal advantage ; spending on pensions, 
health service and education is popular.
Also the public is prepared Ito acceptcollective sacrifice in the face of economic 
difficulties, prefers genendi·sed cuts in 
living standards to unemployment, and 
favours incomes policy. However, in· 
comes policy has to be seen Vo be "fair". 

With these two exceptions, the tide of 
opinion runs against La:bour. Recognising 
•this means either trying to changethe olimate or adjust our policies. A 
gap between Lalbour policies and lthe 
views of both party voters and the public 
was wide in the 1960s. After 1974 it 
opened further. By 1979 nearly aH ToryParty policies had majority support. Some 
had it among Labour voters. This was 
not surprising since the policies were 
formulated with an eye to popurlarity.
What was surpris'ing was that Labour 
positions received little support. Some 
did not even get a majority amongLabour voters. Examples come from the 
policies put to the electors by Gallup, 
MORT and NOP are shown opposite. 

The only Labour pol•icy to emerge with 
any semblance of popularity was government 
help to ·industry. Even then people 
do not seem to have felt that it was 
uniquely Labour's. On most others, the 
Conservatives not only had overwhelm· 
ing support but on seconda·ry picketing, 

ATTITUDES TO PARTY 

POLICIES (%) 
good bad 
idea idea 

or or 
support oppose 

harsher sentences to com· 
bat violence and vandal-ism 97 2 
ban secondary picketingcompulsory secret ballots 
before strikes 
86 
81 
9 
8 
use troops to provide a basic 
service in strikes i·n key 
industries 78 17 
death penalty justifiedpolice should use whatever 
f·orce necessary to maintain 
law and order 
77 
76 
21 
22 
seN council· houses 
to tenants 75 19 
introduce laws to ~imit 
power ofrus 
bring back grammar schools 
stop socia·l security bene'fi·ts 
to strikers' ,families 
increase defence spending 
encourage private medicine 
a·longside NHS 
cut top income tax rate .for 
people with ba:rgeincomesreduce government invest· 
ment and loans to industrygive trade unions seats on 
boards ·of companiesfee pay-ing schools should 
be ajbo1i·shed 
abolish House of Lords 
74 
60 
53 
53 
51 
50 
42 
38 
24 
20 
19 
21 
35 
37 
33 
32 
45 
46 
67 
47 
nationalise banks 10 67 

the dearth penalty, council house sales and 
power of trade unions they won similar 
support from Labour voters. 

This made it more difficu'H to sell Labour 
and oppose Tory policies. Public attitudes 
are not immutable : individua-l tugs at 
the heart strings can undermine 'broad 
attitudes on welfare and imm1gration.
Conviction and hard perS'Ilasion do make 
an impJa.ct. Yet the pattern of opinionis reinforced by medila. more concerned 
with reflecting opinion than leading it. 
Thi·s tilts the whole d~a:te againstLabour. Even the settled loya:Hies of a

1

partisan alignment are not irmmutable 


and those who disagree with the policiesof the party they find themseJ.·ves supporting 
are cross-pressured. \Such intellectual 
adultery is often the prelude to 
divorce. More importantly, the climate 
of opinion makes Labour's job in appealing 
to autonpmous electors difficu>lt. The 
Liberals have a head start. Asked in the 
BBC survey whether they would vote 
Liberal if they thought that Liberals 
could win a lot more seats, 36 per cent 
thought it "probable" or "fairly 1·ikely ". 
The Liberals are a deeply i·rrespons'i'bleparty. Yet they 'have an attractive leader, 
appear idealistic beoaruse they''fe not 
tarred with the fa~aures and compromises 
of power and are well qua'li'fied as catchalls 
because their inteHectual ecc1ecticism 
amounts to total opportunism. 

a deal with the Liberals? 

The prospects for a La!bour Piarty consigned 
to oppositi•on where it has usually 
done badly, unable to appeal to the 
autonomous groups whose support 'it has 
to win and 6acing 1a major challenge from 
resurgent Liberals are far from rosy. In 
West Germany the socia~ democrats 
responded to a very similar problem in 
two ways. They moved to the middle of 
the .road, modifying policy, toning down 
ideology and becoming a much less 
socialist and electorally more attractive 
party. The other approach was openbecause of proporitiona'l represen~ation 
which allowed them to fmm a semipermanent 
aHiance with the middle party, 
the Free Demoora'ts. 

In Britain only the first approach (modifying 
our policies to appea1 to the 
autonomous voters) ~is open to us. The 
second strategy (grabbing groups unlikely 
to vote Labour by working with a partyfor which they will vo'te) is more difficult 
in a "fkst past the post " electoral 
system. Normally li'H we can hope for 
is that the system syphons increased 
Liberal votes inbo waste. In 1979 it to·ok 
40,000 votes to elect a ComerY~ative, 
43,000 to elect a Labour MP and 392,000 
to elect •a Liberal. Our ina!bil'ity to appeal 
to the autonomous voters was partial'lycompensated by the faot that a lot of 

those VIQtes flowed down the drain. Next 
time the ConserV'atives wiU probablysuffer substantially from the Liberal resurgence. 


The fact that so many people are prepared 
to waste their votes is a distress'ing 
symprom of the sca·le of discontent with 
major parties. However it suggests a 
a strategy which uses the inadequaciesof the "first pa·st the post " system in 
our favour. In 1979 the Liberals did well 
in holding their vote, particularly 'in sea·ts 
where they had a real prospect. It is 
therefore open to us to use this as the 
basis for a deaL In reJturn for .an agreement 
to work with and support a Labour 
Government, we have the negotiatingcoin of our abi'lity to withdraw Labour 
candidates in, say, 30 seats in which the 
Liberals are a threat to lthe Tories. Local 
Labour parties would have to lbe persuaded 
that th!is was in the interests of 
the p•arty but they would see the difficulty 
they face in ho•lding their voters, manyof whom are now voting Liberal anyway 
to keep out the Tories. The decis'ion 
would throw many, but not all, of these 
seats to the Libera>Js, dea.J a body lblow 
to the Conservatives and open up the 
prospect of power f'or Labour. Proportional 
representation wou'ld be a permanent 
open door to the Liberals. This 
strategy is renewable. Iif we are not satisfied 
with the agreement we oan revoke 
it next election and 'festor·e our candidates. 
The approach is bold but does 
liltt'le harm to us and may well open the 
pa~h to power. 

learning our lessons 

No section of the party could derive 
much comfort from the rise and fal1 'Of 
·the fifth Labour Governmenlt. The left 
could not say with any credibility that 
even full socialism would have provided 
the economic growth that was so conspicuously 
la•cking. Thei·r preoccupaVi·on, 
even in the mo·re realistic alternarive 
straltegy, was stiH with controL Nor could 
they claim that a more vigorous egalitarianism 
could have been carried throughwithout increasing the a•lready considerable 
howls of protest. They would have 


had difficulty in saying tha·t higher public 
!>pending could have been sustained , 
given the prevailing hostililty to tax, or 
that the incomes po1icy had been unnecessary. 
The ·left is traditionally weak unless 
it has strong union backing. Most union 
leaders had been involved in a cosy con spimcy 
with the government. Those who 
had broken ranks could hardly be said 
to have benefited the cause. The left 
could assert that " Socialism tJias never 
been tried " but the same is true of 
Esperanto. There had certainly been no 
burning demand on the d-oorstep f'Or its 
policies. Defeat had come despite a 
vigorous •and enthusiastic rank and file 
campaign ·and with 1irtle electoral apathy. 

The more orthodox mainstream of the 
party had drlifted into a system of thoughtand action which was broadly corporatist, 
bui·lding up alt all levels the boards, the 
quangos and the machinery of integration, 
and deciding policy and runningthe economy in continuous consultation 
with the unions. Such a strategy was as 
inevitable as it was desirable. It was not 
popul•ar, because the uni·ons were not 
popular. One 1977 survey gave Ja·ck 
Jones more power than the Prime Minister; 
another gave unions more say in 
Lalbour policies than cabinet, MPS and the 
National Executive comlbined. That the 
unions should stay out of politics and 
not even be linked with Labour were 
majority beliefs. Many in the Labour 
J>!arty considered that the rise in union 
membership woU'ld make them more 
acceptable. In fact it coincided with a 
further decline in their a·lready low 
standi·ng. Wider opinion is not onlyhostile l'o militants but also opposed to 
the dosed shop, restri'ctive practices and 
many kinds of strikes. The public thi-nk 
that union leadership is not representative 
of the rank and file, possibly beoause 
unions are "controHed by exltremi·sl's and 
militants". In working with the unions, 
-the Labour Government made their unpopularity 
worse and 1'ook much of it on 
its own shoulders. It also placed itself 
in an exposed situation. Unions are 
inevitably Jekyl'i (committed to br·oad 
social policies) and Hy-de (dedicated to 
the secti·onal interest which is their 
their immediate raison d'etre). When this 

schi:z.ophrenia became acule, as in 1979, 
Labour suffered both ways. 

The dilemma posed by our union tie 
changes in opposition. The unions come 
to the fore as the only organised entity 
able to carry on a posi·tive (•and necessary) 
resistance to Conservative policies 
and we work under a "heads we lose ; 
ta·ils we don't win " of gui·lt byassociation. 

The dominant school of thought in the 
P'arty, the ~oci•al democrats, could derive 
even •less comfort. What was appar·ently 
on trial in 1979 was their own policies. 
What was rejected was a system which 
aU •schools of social democracy, traditionalists, 
corporatist's, revisionists and 
mani'festoists had cooperated vo build. 
Where i-t h:ad failed was the a·rea in which 
they either had, or seemed to have, no 
answers. 

the lack of growth 

The key weakness was -=-iluret_o__

a-fa.,.,--_ soive 
the problem of economic growth. Social 
democracy needs growth to ease the pains 
-of redis:tribution, finance the surplus for 
increased public spending and spreadfairly the benefi·ts of increasing affluence. 
Yet there was an intellectual fai•lure -in 
prescribing how to get the g-rowth which 
would do all this. Cros·land and others 
tended to assume that problem was 
~argely solved. Keynesian economic man·
agement would ·guarantee •it. It didn't. 
What Crosland was to point ~o as a 
disappointment in the record of the 
fourth Labour Government pr·oved a 
disaster in the 1974-79 fifth. There were 
good reasons for this, and no one else 
did opartioula·rly well ei·ther. Yet inlernati
·onal oomp•arisons are not the strongpoint of unforgiving electors and growth 
was the central pilla·r of the edifice. The 
table on page 13 shows natural growthcomparisons. 

197•8 was •a good year yet the bulk of 
this growth went into imports; manufactuPing 
output went up 1 per cent, 
imports 13 per cent. It came too late. 
Th•ough competitors didn~ grow much 


ECONOMIC GROWI'H (%)

(per capit'a GDP) 
year to Brit France Ger Japan USA 
(965-77 2.1 4.5 3.4 8.1 3.1 
1972 2.0 5.0 3.0 7.8 4.8 
1973 7.6 4.5 4.4 8.4 4.6 
1974 -1.5 2.6 0.4 -1.7 -2.0 
1975 -1.7 -0.3 -1.5 0.2 -2.0 
1976 3.5 4.4 5.6 5.3 4.9 
1977 1.7 2.6 2.7 4.4 4.0 
1978 3.1 2.6 3.5 4.7 4.0 

either, they were stil·l paving the way 
for a better future by improving productivity 
while we were more inclined 
to cushion failure. 

Failure to grow explains Labour's failure. 
We are the party of public spending. The 
incoming government had commitments 
to increa·se spending in areas vi~al to 
social democrabs. In a·ddition, it had to 
accept burdens more oppressive than 
those shouldered by any government. 

The increased cost of unemploymentimposed a burden of £8-9 biflion in lost 
production, lost growth, lost tax and 
lost benefits. Pensi·ons were put up and 
kept up and there were two miUi1on more 
old age pensioners. Had both unemployment 
•and the numbers of penSiioners been 
at the level af 1964-5, the total tax 
burden would have been £3,400 mil'lio-n 
a year •less by 1979. Moreover the depression 
forced the government to acceptheavy burdens ·of aid to industry, the 
regions, jobs and speci-al schemes for 
young people at a time when industry, 
because of its declining profitability, was 
clamouring for a diminished tax burden. 
The result was an increasing income tax 
burden which growth didn't 1alleviate. By 
1977-8, spending wa-s running at £244 

per head for soci,a'i security, £150 for 
educati·on and £123 for health. This produced 
a tax pressure •on those cr.uoial 
electoral groups which the Conservatives 
set ·out to recruit. The pres·sure was rein forced 
by inflat-ion, allev-iated onlyby the indexation of allowances in the 
Rooker-Wise amendment. The worker 
with two children under eleven and, in 
the last coiumn, the skilled worker with 
a working wife and nQ children, are 
shown in the table with ·the tax and the 
proportion payable -after the budget each 
year. 

Where the average produouion worker in 
France was paying 1.4 per cent af his 
inoome ·in income tax and in Germany11 per cent, the figure for Britain was 
20 per cent. In domestic terms, inft,ation 
combined with tax to produce a decline 
in real take home pay for some of our 
period. Inflati·on and the Labour Government 
meant pain. Our emphasis on the 
" sooial wage" was no answer. Concepts 
have less impact than holes in paypackets. Skilled workers clearly felt that 
they were paying •in more than they were 
getting out. So did working couples, even 
those getting chi-ld henefi•t. The benefit, 
which was not in itself as popular as 
Labour believed it to be, transferred 
money to the wife, who appeared to show 
little grati·tude for it, from the husband 
whose tax burden was increased by the 
loss of his -all-owances. 1'he result was 
that tax was a major rea•son for Labour's 
defeat. 

The .problems posed by fa·ilure to growwent deeper. Not all the burden of spending 
could be financed through ~axation. 
The borrowing requirement rose to unprecedented 
levels. It was hi-gh in everyadvanced country but Britain's was rela-

WAGES AND TAX, 1969 TO 1978 
skiHed unskilled working couple 
av wage(£) tax (£) % av wage(£) tax(£) % av wage(£) tax(£) % 

1969 27.64 4.13 14 19.47 1.51 7 39.75 6.68 17 
1972 36.53 4.81 13 26.68 1.84 7 54.83 8.63 16 
1975 57.60 11.38 19 43.97 6.61 15 91.79 21.16 23 
1976 66.28 12.73 19 52.23 7.81 14 106.89 25.16 24 
1977 73.17 12.97 17 57.17 7.53 13 127.48 24.25 21 
1978 83.06 15.25 17 65.00 9.29 13 133.09 25.62 19 


tively higher than most. This increased 
the importance of that malign philosophy, 
monetaPism. Whatever the views 
·of Labour's Trea·sury ministers ·on this 
philosophy, any government which was 
borrowing •a:t Labour's rate w.as bound 
to pay Iip service to the prevailing orthodoxy 
in the financirul •and even international 
circles ·on which it was made 
dependent. Since monetarism Vliews symptoms 
as if they are causes and treats 
them in such a way as ·to make t'he causes 
worse, it dictated high interest rates. In 
1977-9, German official discount .rates 
were 3 to 4 per cent, Japanese 3.5 to 

4.5 per cent, and Dutch 4.5 to 7 per cent. 
Br·itain's Minimum Lending Ra·te went 
up from 7 to 10 per cent and then to 
13 per cent, a sure formula for curtailinginvestment and keeping the pound over-
V'alued. This hindered export prospects 
and nipped the 1976-7 recovery in the 
bud. Monetarism •also meant deflation. 
In 1978 Denis Healey brought in a mildly 
expansionary budget. Thi•s was promptlytorpedoed by the City in an investment 
strike. Interest rates had to 'be put up to 
sell gilts, undercutting ·the who1e impact 
of the budget. 
Incomes pO'licy never ·got a fruir chance. 
As a means of achieving fair shares and 
avoiding the dominance of the biggestmuscle, incomes policy is central to social 
democmcy. Labour's became a technique 
for cutting living standards by holdingincomes below the rate of infla·bion. When 
this deprived it of union coopemtion, the 
government had no alternative hut to 
persevere. Eventually too many peoplerealised and the pol•icy col'lapsed. 

The last consequence of failure to grow 
was the exacerbation of social tensi·ons. 
It turned us into a grumbling, jea·lous 
society, focussing our discontents ·on each 
other •and our asp1irations against each 
Qther. A stagnant society is introverted 
and inbred with each seotion bitter 
against the others because each improves 
itself not as the cake grows but at someone 
else's expense. If there was one 
explanation of both Labour's defeat and 
many of the unpleasant aspects of Britain 
in 1979, the failure to grow provides it. 


2. the road to 1984 
Oppositions do not win elections. The 
challenge is to. rise to the occasion and 
not to undermine prospects by division 
and disunity. Yet our success dependslargely on the performance of the Con· 
servative Government. The policies on 
which they came to power wiH not work: 
if they do we wi'il find it necessary to 
abandon an<i to rethink large sections 
of our own policy. Tax cuts stimulate 
imports and speculation, not investment 
and growth. Free markets expmt jobs. 
Indirect taxes h:it the poor and stimulate 
wage demands : these are truths we know 
·bO be self evident. The burden of decl·ine 
will be carried mainly by the poor, the 
increased number of unemployed and 

the declining regions. 

The government will ·retreat to the bunker 
of blame to invoke scroungers, strikers, 
militants, immigrants, relbel AHAS or reds 
under any available bed as the causes 
·of its own misfortunes. This governmenthas gone a long way to shorten its own 
honeymoon. As it en<is, the main burden 
·df resistance falls not on the Parl•i·amentary 
Labour Party but on the unions. 
Yet they must exercise their power to 
resist defensively, to protect their members, 
not attack the .government on a 
wide fwnt or at every opportunity. 

Meanwhile, the party has to set its house 
in order and begin re-shaping 1·ts policies, 
reviving ·its organisation and rekindlingits enthusi·asm. The wares will have to 
be set out one 'by ·one so that an attractive 
alternative oan be projected. Yet 
there is ·the advantage that i·f the debate 
is carried openly and conscientiously, it 
can be turned into a virtue, pointing to 
a party hauling itself up 'by its bootstraps 
and involving the maximum numbers not 
in a sectional exercise but in defining the 
kind of Hrita:in we want to see and the 
way we want to build it. 1'he final outcome 
will he a party and a set of poli·cies 
to guide Britain in the 80s. 

the party machine 

Two decades ago the W.i•lson reportdescribed Labour's machine as a penny

•farthing in the age of jet propulsi·on. 
Since then we have seen the advent of 
the rocket and a wheel has fa'ilen off 
the bike. Individual party membershiphas declined to a fi.gure which can hardlybe more than a quarter million, one third 
of the figure in the 50s, one sixth of the 
Tory party's and the lowest ratio of 
members to electors .of •any social democratic 
party in Europe. The ma·chine has 
become less professional. The Nationa1 
Executive is more preoccup.ied with 
pol·icy and the power struggle which 
accompanies it than with shaping an 
efficient machine. Transport House is 
less efficient than in the fifties. Understaffed 
and overstressed, it nul·lifies its 
own best efforts by lack of directi·on and 
the incompetance and poor quahty which 
spring from low pay. The number of 
full time ·agents has fallen to hartf its 
1970 level and now hovers just below 
eighty. The chance to remedy aH this 
through the implementation ·of the 
Houghton Committee proposals for state 
ai<i to the political parties was shunted 
into a siding when Labour had the chance 
to implement it. The Conservatives are 
even less l·ikely to introduce such aid. 

Without reform, Labour has little prospect 
of .fighting back. We need a machine 
which works and whose activities don't 
generate counter~productive difficulties 
and embarrassments. It won't be the kind 
of mass party which people assume 
existed in the good old days, with a'il the 
enthusiasm of the Paris Commune for 
one night a month. The days of the mass 
party with mass involvement are gone. 

A modern party has to enlist the largest 
possible numbers for that minimum 
involvement and token identification 
which are all that can be hoped fr0r in 
an age of te'ily-democracy. It has to feed 
them as weJil as he fueled by them. The 
mass membership, the unions and other 
newer sources of finance have to provide 
the steady flow of funds to support an 
efficient machine steered and run by professionals, 
a machine which can win 
elections, propagate the word and provide 
·the Par:Jiamentary P·arty with that 
efficient backing and support which it has 
not had since the fifri·es. The party outsride 
Parliament is the PLP's support and 


idenltilty. The two must work togetherand be mutually supportive. 

We need not attempt the kind ·of fundamental 
reforms which is urged by those 
who advocate cutting the union tie, or 
getting rid of the block vote. We must 
limit ourselves to bringing the party up 
to date instead of fighting a 16th century 
religious war in a 19th century machine. 
Overseas parties and some of the more 
vi·gorous British pressure groups provide 
healthy models. In an age ·of professionaol 
fund raising, propaganda and organisation 
men, both the skiHs and the techniques 
.are available. They need onlymobilisation; this entails a sense of purpose 
as much as money. Perversely, we 
focus the debate on entirely the wrongissues. The argument has concent!'ated 
either on party democracy which divides 
the rank and file 'O'r ·on a conflict between 
Parliamentary leadership and National 
Executive which is really a strugg·le over 
power and policy. Rather h!ce rel·atives 
struggling to control the faltering hand 
of .an expiring grandmother and guideit .towards the will, some puNing it to 
the ·left, others to the right and a few 
trying to remove the pen. 

Unlike the T·ory Cent11al Office which 
works to the leader with the research 
department fueling the Parliamentary 
Party, Transport House is wntro!Jed bythe National Executive and serves the 
outside party whilst atso having to support 
.and help the Parliamenll:ary P·artyand to work with the leader. So the 
tensions come out at all levels. The 
General Secretary can be buffelted like 
a shuttlecock despite his efforts to maintain 
sanily. Some are keener on fo:llo wing 
their idealogical preoonception·s than 
they a•re ·in helping a Parliamentary Partywhich has a less fundamentalist role. 
There is a continuous s'trugg·le over party 
politicals and publications which some 
think should be more concerned with 
preaching soci·alism ·than wi'th putting the 
v'iews of the government or opposition. 
If we keep conference's control of policy, 
it must be operated in a different and 
more rewarding .fashion. It means recognising 
the independence of the PLP but 
bringing it, and the outside organisation, 

together in a reconstructed National Executive. 
Transport House could then be 
run by a supremo, a powerful leader not 
a .party bureaucrat. He will operate !'ike 
a managing director to his board with 
two assistants, •One responsible for policy 
areas, the other for organisat1ion, both 
working to him and through him to the 
NEC and the PLP. 

Party organisation is too serious a matter 
to be left to ~the present mixture of 
amateurs and idealogues. Had it been left 
to the polilticians, it would have done 
better, since their lives depend on it. The 
organisation exists to provide the most 
efficient electoral machine and to sustain 
Labour by a two way osmosis-a fi·ow 01f 
streng,th, ideas and sustenance to and 
from the roots. Unfortunately, it has 
become an allterna·Vive source of powerfor those disgruntled with the current 
Parli·amentary ·leadership. The pr·ocess 
involves the party in a continuous controversy 
which is discrediting and damaging. 
Individual MPS are put ·into a state 
of friction: wi·th sedVions of their local 
parties. Individual candidates and parties 
can !become 'an electoral embarassment. 
The whole process is a distraction from 
the real job of building up a st11ong,
heaFthy and active mass party. Bitterness 
and p·ers·onal confrontaltions make bad 
recruiting ·sergeants. 

reforming the national 
executive 

The answer first .is a recognition that the 
National Executive is the fuH time custodian 
af the soul of ·the extra P.arliamen'tary 
Par1ty and .the bridge between 
it and the PLP, not a forum for an 
alienated minority in the PLP to displaythe purity of their principles. Rea~l democracy 
requi·res that the constituencyseotion be genuinely represen~a'tive of 
the rank and file, not MPS moonlighting.
Members of Parli·ament should therefore 
be ine.Jigible for election to the NEe, 
Parliamentary representation being restricted 
to a subs1tant'ial grO'Up elected by 
and answering to the ParliamentaryParty. Simil·ady, there should 'be a Labour 
counciUors' section elected by Labour 
counciHors and a wom'en's section 


I 7 

genuinely representa-tive ,af women and 
elected lby the women1s sections. Above 
this, aot'ing informally :to keep 't:he whole 
Labour movement more intimately in 
touch, there ,is scope for a Counc<il of 
Labour. This would bring together a 
tiny number o.f th,e top union men (senior 
officials 'too busy and too powerful to 
be involved wiVh the NEe), lthe leader and 
depulty leader ~and perhaps two nominees 
each from the PLP and the NEC and one 
from the cooperative movement. This 
could regular.ise the vaiuable work of 
the Trade Union-Labour Party L'iaison 
Committee. Its main importance 'is to 
cemenlt the pers,onal and infmmal links 
and keep the whole movement marchingin sitep in a way nothing now does. 

Reforms at the centre should be supplemented 
by a restoration of lthe proscribedlist ~to guarantee that no one connected 
with organisalti'ons whose dbjectives conflict 
With those of social democracy, or 
whose acts d1scredit it, can be a member 
CJif the party. This rubric would strike 
with equal impartiality at Militant and 
the Social Democraltic AHiance, both of 
whom worship wt their own shrines not 
our broad church. No one who bel'ieves 
in free 'speech can quil>ble with the right 
of these groups to propagate their views. 
To do so wi,thin the Labour Party and 
at the expense of its policies, i1ts princip,
les and the health of its machine is 
another maHer. This does not undermine 
the oase for the broad left. We will work 
uogether at t'imes and in ways chosen by 
us, not imposed on us in the way death 
watch 'beetles impose a certain pa,tternof action, usu01Hy coHapse, on the decaying 
fabric of o<ther venerable buildings. 

Democracy and idealogioal purity are 
being confused. The party needs democracy. 
It must have fair and democratic 
election of the leader by the PLP and 
confirmation by conference. lit must have 
democraric, and secret, election of opposiuion 
spokesmen and of the cabinet by 
lthe PLP with ~he leader aHocating portfnlios. 
It needs fair and open selection 
and confirmaHon of its MPS and oounciUors. 
AH this must be done on the basis 
of maximum involvement, not control 
by a clique. A reasonalble inibal safe


guard is to set mmtmum membershiplevels, either as an absolute figure or as 
a percentage of the panty's vote, befme 
any such .processes as re-selecti-on can go 
ahead. They must then be carried out as a 
genuine expressinn ,of Labour opinionlocally, initiallly by throwing selection and 
re-selection open to all paid up memlbers 
in the constituency, and, as membershiprises, adopting the primary system for 
selection and requiring a full ballot of 
members for re-selection. This achieves 
three vital purposes. It stops domination 
by a coterie which can, in ~;afe seats with 
minu'te memberships, make our radical 
party the last refuge of the rotten 
borough. J,t ensures the widest possible 
involvement and, indeed, uses participation 
to recruit for the party. It loads the 
odds in 'Sel,ection towards the abl'e and 
attracbve candidate who can appea.J to 
a wide electorate rather than towards 
skiH at manipulating the :ideological! preconceptions 
for the few who sit it out 
at interminabl-e committees. Once a candidate 
wins the seat, it encourages the 
party to be loyal and pushes him to the 
kind o-f continuous dialogue which will 
keep him in touch and them contented. 
Most party members want the gratification 
of being involved and consul'ted, not 
the power to pull puppet strings. 

party conference 

Finally, real democracy means givingconference and the rank and file a 
genuine part in the pwcess of policyformula1tion on the basis of proper procedures. 
The present situat'ion where 
resolutions 'With a two thirds majoritygo into the party programme is deficient. 
It .is cumbersome, depending on the 
block vote. It is undemocratic and inefficient 
since most hands are tied before 
the subject is even discussed, often bydecisions taken long ago and in far awaycircumstances. It is irresponsibl'e, witness 
the 1976 commitment to nationalise banks 
and insurance which was never casted, 
never evaluated for ,its electoral appeal 
and hardly in the realm of praoticalpolitics. It is unpredictable, depending 
on the haphazard passage of resolut'ions 
throu,gh the vagaries of the card vote 
after a harrasse'd, rambling and diffuse 


discussion in which views are declaimed 
'but issues never argued. Conference can 
only have a real .influence on policy if 
it funcVi·ons efficiently. This means thart 
policy resolutions coming up from the 
constituencies should first pass throughthe filter ·of revivi'fied regional conferences 
held shortly before the annual conference. 
This process would both cut down the 
numbers rand also guarantee a sensible 
process of predi·gestion •so that conference 
can focus on essenhals and app'ly itself 
more seriously to its decisions. ThliS tradi:
tionaJ process needs ~o 'be supplemented 
'by a more •serious policy dialogue. In 
power, this should be achieved by debating 
year by year the polici·es and prob· 
!ems of two departments, With replies by 
ministers. In opposition, conference can 
be made the last stage .otf a l·ong process 
of poNcy preparation in which policy 
groups, made up of elected members of 
the PLP and NEC, rank and file represen· 
ta:tives and outside ·experts nominated by 
the leader and co·opted by the committee 
draw up outline poJicy reports. These 
should then be discussed and modified 
by the Parliamentary Labour Party and 
finally accepted or rejected by the con· 

ference after debate. This procedure 
guarantees the widest possible involve· 
ment. It allows conlference to apply itse~
f to broad areas of policy. It makes 
the whole procedure open. We have a 
huge policy problem before us. We mayas well make a virtue of it. 

Effective democracy and widespreadinvolvement are recruiting agents. We 
need many others if we are to rebuild 
numbers which now compare badly with 
say Vhe 800,000 German Social Democrats, 
or .the 700,000 members o'f the 
SPO in Austria. Membership and money 
are chicken and egg. The first requ'ire· 
ment is numbers. In many safe seats the 
party is represented by ageing and micro· 
scopic oJriques. The range runs from tens 
to thousands. In the 1977 Gallup surveyof local parties, 3 per cent had 1 to 99 
members, 9 per cent had 100 to 249 
members, 32 per cent had 250 to 499 
members, 18 per cent had 500 to 799 
members and 23 per cent had 800 to 
l ,000. Only 4 per cent had more than 
1,000. The average of 700 members was 

100 up on the Fabian Society evidence 
and 200 on the Houghton figure. These 
pathetic figures need to be built up. To 
'bring up the numbers to-and improveon-the current 'best figures, rwe will need 
central membership records, preferably 
on computer to facilitate mailings which 
could include specia·l quarterly issues of 
Labour Weekly. For this purpose, a two 
tier membership might well be desirable 
with an associate membership enrolled 
from the " Fors " on our canvass records. 
These records oan easiJy be mobi·hsed for 
recruitment purposes instead of being 
comp'iled and then forgotten. Their fee 
of 50p would be the equiva'lent of a 
charitable donati·on, yet one which provides 
some measure of identification, and 
an annua·l mailing. The ·f.ull membership, 
bringing all the delights of participation, 
should be set at £2 ; any more would 
harden the elitist trend bu'i.!t into a dying 
party. 

Less frequent, and less boring, meetings 
would keep members as would greateremphasis on the social side of a·cvivities. 
Labour clubs, bingos, youth groups, discos 
all pose problems. Yet they do bring 
our people together and provide a focus 
in a way mere poli·Vical activity never 
oan. The social formula has worked for 
the Conservatives. h can work for us. 
We must make an aJ.J out effort to in· 
crease membership. This could take the 
form of an annua'l membership drive, a 
special month with incentives to branches 
and constituencies who enroll the most 
new members, and national membership 
canv•asses by paid recruiters working on 
a commission basis. Since local members 
have often given up recruitment, onlycentral •intervention will now remedy the 
deficiency. 

professionalism in a 
voluntary organisation 

An ·emphasis on professionalism wiU 
probably run counter to the ethos of a 
party which prefers bungling amateurism 
because it is "sincere". Yet profes·
sionalism is the only way forward for 
a mass party .in an age when involvement 
is less intense. A modern party is its 
professional backlbone. We need pmfes



sional membership recruiting, professional 
fund raising techniques-particularlyraffles and Jotteries on a nationa.J basis 
-professional organisation and stagingof events, festivals and Labour Fairs. 
More controversially, we need the professional 
skiHs of the public relations men, 
the television and the advertising workers, 
making .a concerted effort between elections 
~and in campaigns to present the 
party in the best possible light. We prefer 
to present our truth ungarnished. This 
usuaHy means in the least appetising form 
and in most discordant p·ossible fashion. 
Professional sk1iHs are available to Labour 
on an unpaid volunteer 'basis. They need 
orrly to be mobilised and integrated in· 
stead of being intermittently insulted and 
generally neglected. 

This use of professional skiHs extends 
into two other areas. Labour needs special 
efforts .and professional! skills in pmpaganda. 
A party which has to combat not 
only the prevailing climate of oipinion but 
a hosti·le press cons·tan11y reinforcing that 
climate has to prepare itself for a longterm persuasive effort. This involves far 
more than a smaLl circulation Labour 
Weekly and occasional indigestible pamphlets. 
Broadsheets setting out Labour 
policy, attractively written and presented, 
must become a regular feature, widely 
circulated through the party and the 
unions. Regular pamphlets must be provided 
on specific issues and problems.
The party needs a quarterly forum for 
ideas and discussion. Most of all, it 
needs to turn Labour Weekly into a 
mass circulation organ of opinion, becoming 
more pop, circulating through unions, 
party and regu-lar sales and setting out 
to appeal to the broad mass audience 
which is .Jed by the unkindly lights of 
the Sun and the Star. The dream of a 
national Labour daily is a-lmost certainly 
gone forever. Yet there is scope, and 
probably finance, for Labour {ocal papers 
in the rich provinciat market. There is 
also one last unfilled gap in the media 
market for a weelcly magaZJine of issues 
which would combine a native Newsweek 
with the old Picture Post approach. 

Labour has always assumed that it has 
an intuitive right to speak for the work


ing class. No amount of confrontation 
with the facts, even the rather brutal ones 
of 1979, wibl dispel! this assumption.
More modern ,parties see the need for 
objective ~in!formation of the type forthcoming 
from surveys of opinion. In 1978 
such surveys provided early warnings of 
the changing pred,ilections of the skilled 
worker, of the growing feeling for a 
1978 election, of Labour's weak points. 
They can also provide much information 
about specific groups, and reactions to 
policies, individual issues and even the 
party generally. Yet poUing needs to be 
done regularly to warn of trends and to 
allow the party to develop the skms and 
the habits of dealing with the information. 
This does not mean adopting the 
Tory approach of formulating policiesjust because they are popular, though 
·in a democracy popularity has to be a 
major ,argument in favour of a policyand certainly not one against 'it. Rather 
the informat,ion is used as a chart of the 
territory through which the party has to 
-treck. Polls bring knowledge of which 
subjects to tackle head on, which chmds 
to strike, 'Which issues to push home and 
which to avoid, which policies will seJ.I 
and which won't. Labour is as much in 
the merchandising business as the makers 
biologbcal ArieL There is Jittle point in 
con.fus'ing bad merchandising w:ith highprinciple. 


3. perfecting the policy 
Because we are an inherently divided 
party we have always handled policybadly. It is a symbol to be fought over 
and a key to the soul of the party rather 
than to Number 10. The competitionundermines and diminishes the product. 
Last time pol•icy preparation was more 
reminiscent of the burial of Sir John 
Moore at Corrunna than a great partyoutlining a glittering prospect. Usuallywe trade slogans and blood and the whole 
process gives every possi'ble hostage to 
fortune. Some o'f them, such as national· 
isation of the fifty largest companies or 
the banks, become better kn•own than 
the eventual product. 

The Conservatives handle policy processes 
better. They recognise that polit'ics 
is about power and policy is a stepping 
stone to grasp it. Policy review and re· 
search under Lord Butler tran~formed 
the ·party, a necessary prelude to the 1951 
victory. Even the less >eerebral Thatcher 
era demonstrated a real skiH in harmonising 
policy, presentation and electoral 
stance. We should take a leaf from their 
book. Policy is a means of present•i ng an 
attractive face to the worJd, recrui·ting 
support and showing that we have solutions 
to the problems •of the time. It can 
hardly carry the enormous symbolicimportance which is hung on it. No one 
can ·lay down a detailed route map to 
the New Jerusalem. We are not in anycase an ideological party being a coalition 
of O!bjeotives not ideologies. Indeed the 
Conservatives are now the idealogical 
party. Nor can policy bow to everyfashion. It has to concen·trate on serious 
answers to basic problems rather than 
the fashionable trends. We have to be 
concerned with emerging problems from 

the micro-chip and new technologies to 
the low energy society. Yet these problems 
need ·long thought and research not 
glib answers or the pathetic throwing up 
of hands which uses them as excuses for 
not tackling other problems. Our pre· 
occupation must be with the rea·l problems 
of unemployment, low wages,
growth. 

Mo t approaches to Labour policy are 
strong on diagnosis, weak on prescription. 
The present is no exception. Policy 

can't spring fuHy armed from the head 
of one man, or one executive. We are 
thinking ·on a four year time scale. At 
this stage we can only rfocus ·on the policy 
process which must be a dynamic one, 
absorbing the thought, energies and ideas 
of the whole movement, and on the basic 
requirement~. We have to update our 
traditional rupproaches to build a better, 
freer and more equal society. This means 
recogni~ing the reaction which has taken 
place •li'gainst monoliths and the deadening, 
money absorbing, burea:ucracies they 
have spawned. We must recognise the 
problems of sca:le and the need for 
intimacy and involv·ement. We need to 
mobilise the dynamic forces in society 
whether they be economic, sociarl or 
simple self help. Government has to work 
with them, tap thf'ir energies for broader 
~ocial purposes and help them to produce 
.a genuine partnership which 
mobilises energy and commitment. This 
recognises that the state cannot do everything, 
provide everything ·or control 
everything. 

These are general prescriptions but 
policy .formulation must also be carried 
out with the sales market constantly in 
mind. Policy has to enthuse the party. It 
must be attracl'ive, enabling us to reach 
out to the autonomous voters. It must 
pr•ovide a guide to government. The levels 
are also time stages. Pa·rty basics come 
first to satisfy the mnk and file and allow 
the press's ritual indignart·ion to become 
boring. Electoral appeal has to be timed 
to prevent either purloining of clothes 
or accusations of last minute gimmickry.
The strategies fm power need worJ<ling 
out but only partial unveil·ing. The 
second aspect is important as a Jure, not 
a bribe. We are a party of the people.
This gives us the re~ponsibility to listen 
to what they want and formulate policy 
which will be acceptable, popular, even 
popuhst. Relevant policies will do wha.t 
Conservrutives did in 1979 : reach out to 
the autonomous voters, to groups who 
may have been drifing away or who have 
pressing probl·ems with which we can 
offer help. Policy is the binding agent 
f-or a coalition strong enough to topplethe Tory majority, allowing us to recruit 
the support they alienate instead of its 


drifting into the futility of Liberal or 
SNP V'Oting. The third level is the most 
difficult. Lt involves basic decisions, identifying 
Britain's problems and formulating 
stra•tegies to deal with them. Some of the 
policies whi·ch emerge wi.U produce controversy 
within the party and bitter attack 
from outside. Th.is has •to be faced. We 
must aim for the credit of being the 
paTty with the answers, yet claim it 
through the inner oonfidence of knowing 
we have worked out our priorities, not 
by proclaiming every detail from the 
r.oofuops. So .thi·s pO'licy has to be unveiled 
in gener.al terms not in its minutiae. 
We don't want to be encumbered with 
detail. Yet nothing could be more 
dangerous than to go naked into the 
cabinet chamber as we did by ducking 
.the problem of sterl'ing before 1964 or 
those of imports .and de-industrialisation 
before 1974. Both subsequent governments 
paid a terrible price for these 
failures. Our supporters wil.J want to 
know that they aren't going to have to 

pay it again. 

policy foundations 

The first level of policy concentrates on 
socia:list basics. Equality wiJ.l be cons
·iderably battered aJf•ter a few years of 
Toryism and in need of reassert-ion, provided 
that this time we understand that 
the squeaking pips must be those which 
can really bear the pressure. This means 
wealth which is stil·l far too unevenlydistributed, ·Cli!Pital which still bears t'O'o 
smal·l a share of the weight of taxation 
and bus.jness where the state has taken 
on to itself too 1blig a role in usin:g ·the 
tax system to compensate for the long 

•term decline in profi.tability. We must 
spread rhe tax net. A wealth tax is a 
vital commitment. The list of other 
appmaches is a l·ong one including the 
proscription of trusts designed to getround capital taxes, an assessment of 
transfer taxes on the amount received 
not the fortune dispersed, taxation of the 
unearned increment of house and land 
values (above an indexed amount) and, 
ahove a.Jl, a simplified inoome tax system 
designed to shift the burden upwards, to 
tax fringe benefits as earnings and to cut 
down on a tax allowance welfare state 
which evades taxes and diverts moneyinto forms of savings not all of wh·ich 
are in vhe nat•ional interest. 

The •traditional ,policy of public ownership 
must play a part because the modern 
staJte has to be a massive provider of 
aid and capital and should participateto the extent to which it contri•butes. The 
state can still exercise adequate generalcontrol over large companies and multinal'ionals 
so nationa·lisation is unnecessary. 
Yet the state's doctor role dictates 
intervention. We must commit ourselves 
to •take back every;thing sold by the Conservatives. 
We must restore a strengthened 
NationaJ Enterprise Board acting not as 
the casualty dearing station of capital'ismbut as .the organ •through which the state 
builds up a portfolio of investments 
partly or sometimes whol:ly owned. It 
must function as part of the planningframework by identilfying problems such 
as aTea·s where import substitution is 
possi'ble, or areas foT new development.
Ebther cooperating with private capital 
or creating state entet1prises, it must deal 
with such problems. The state has to 
take risks, if necessary to the extent of 
creating new organisations to competewith existing monopolies or industries 
'failing the country. The NEB will expand 
direct influence th'fough state directors 
on boards and through strengthened 
sector working parties fitting into a 
national plan. It must provide an important 
new source of finance independent 
of the stock market so as to encouragecompanies to look •to long term profitand market share ra.ther than the short 

term "profitability" which a stock market 
obsessed business community has 
.traditional.Jy looked to. 

There is also a strong case for a Junior 
League NEB. We already have an em'bryo 
body. It needs to 'be .larger in scale and 
national in scope with offices in everycity and region. Small and new firms 
face particular problems no.t only of 
getting finance but of knowing how to 
set about it, so the Small EnterpriseBoard (sEB) wiJ.l provide aid, advice and 
capital for small firms and for new ideas 
and projects. Government would have to 


be prepared to take risks. Yet the benefit 
can 'be considerable. So can the flexi bility 
of using new pattern of ownershipand .control in this area. Through the 
SEB and the Cooperative DevelopmentAgency, aH kinds of cooperative and 
applied idealism can be encouraged to 
get off the ground and grow-a more 
sens-ible way of giving Britain a diversity 
of owner·shi,p than the foredoomed cooperative 
fai·lmes of 1974-6. Investing in 
succe&S is a slogan the tate could well 
heed. Sharing that success is an approach 
which should come naturally to socialists. 
A further preoccupa•tion o'f the rank and 
file is with democracy. This entai·ls emphasis 
on democracy at work throughworker participation. Participation has 
public support (69 per cent) thoughBuHock type •reform (at 40 .per cent) doe·S 
not. Democracy ·is wider than •the work 
place. 1t involves democratic structures 
in the neigh'bourhood, in the school and 
college, in the health service, in public 
utilitie and in the regions. Devolution 
may be dead as an extraordinary conces 
ion to Scotland. Yet the basic principle 
of shif.ting government and decision 
making out of Landon and bringing them 
closer to the people will remain with us. 
So will the need to u e this principle to 
provide democratic control of the great 
public monol·iths like the heal~h scrvi c 
and the uti! ities. Th·i is the way to give 
people more control over their own lives 
and to shift some of the burden from 
an ovenworked Parliament to provincialassemblies, and from an overloaded 

bureaucracy to smal·ler more lively and 
more local onganisa·tion . The regions of 
England, like Scotland and Wa:les, are 
natural forums for government and 
democracy. We wiH need to be readywith a dear and agreed policy on devolution 
when the impact of Tory policyproduces the inevitable resurgence of 
regional and Scotti h discontents which 
will otherwi e regeneraote the . NP. 

people's party, 
people's policies 

The econd level is the broa<l a,ppeal to 
the wider electorate. This populist strand 
is al·ien to elitist sociali ts who think 
they know what is good for the people. 

For a people's party, Labour has been 
strangely squeamish aibout populism. 

When the Tories made a populist initiative 
on immigration, we qu-ickly and 
righbly condemned it. For a party which 
had already retreated f.rom its principles 
on thi·S issue as far as we had, not to 
have taken a firm stand then would have 
been •to abandon both self-respect and 
the immigrant vote. Yet squeamishness 
and the Boy Scout instincts of a section 
of the party prevented us from exploiting 
and encouraging the real feeling which 
exists against the Common Market. A 
similar del-icacy inhibited us on Japanese 
imports, which took j-obs, and on a 
defence burden, much of which we 
generously assumed to defend German 
wi·th a standard of living dou'b-le ours 
from a threat many of us didn't bel·ieve 
existed. Our unease with populist stirrings 
also prevented us from atltempting new 
initiatives on Northern Ireland whose 
politicians all responded with due gratitude 
to Lalbour's rejection of its own 
instincts and interest by bringing the 
government down. 

The Tories exploi•t populist issues effectively. 
They a:re certain, under Mrs 
Thatcher, to .take a much more openlypopulist line. Yet we react with lectures. 

I can explain to anxious electo.rs why I 
think hanging is a moral issue and won't 
in any case stop murders. Yet I have no 
principles opposed to law and order. The 
people I represell't, the old and the working 
class, sutTer most from vandalism, 
hooliganiSim and disorder. They are the 
mo t anxious on ·the issue and we need 
to be ·ready with relevant policies. We 
woke up too late to the intense bitternes 
of the self-employed and small businessman 
who see them elves, with some 
jus•tice, as an oppressed and ignoredminority. Even then we did too little, 
concentrating our effonts on the smaller 
firms not the reaJ httle man who struggles 
on his own. Finally, on council houses, 
we ignored for far too long the simmering 
disconten•t at the management practices 
and atti-tudes and were .particul•arly 
shortsighted over sales. The principle is 
right. We must strive to allow it by more 


building not just blankly oppose it. A 
party of ·the people cannot afford the 
luxury of believing .that the people's 
instincts are always ·or even often wrong. 

A populist strategy involves assessingwhere we can make headway. Then a 
calculated balance has to be drawn between 
the gains and the risks to principle 
and party unity. "Tnoaps ou,t " is 
popular. Hostil<ity to a situation which 
is intractable and to Northern Irish 
politicians concerned only to exp.loit it 
has almost certainly eclipsed feel.ings o.f 
common destiny or lingering imperialist 
sentiment. A major push trOwards the 
Irish dimension, an agreement with the 
Republic for joint invrOlvement and a 
commitment to staged withdrawal are all 
significant goals to aim at. 

The other issue is the Common Market 
where a slight majority now favours 
withdrawal, though this ·is not yet st•nong 
enough to carry the policy in a referendum. 
Hootiiity will grow as the burden 
becomes more oppressive. So before the 
Tory dog is driven into the Labour 
manger, we must drain the issue and 
mobilise it by a oommibment to allowing 
the people to speak ag·a·in a decade after 
the first misguided decision. Since the 
majoritly of the party outside, possibly 
a majority in Parliament, is anti-market, 
such a commitment would seem to be a 
minimal deference to democracy. 

On the "Jaw-and-order-vandalism" syndrome, 
the Conserv·atives have sbolen the 
advantage. That is no reason for hostility 
to the police, or for ignoring those initiatives 
which we can take by communityservice, youth volunteer organisation and 
team efforts 'by young people to give them 
an involvement ·in the community. Instead 
of throwing money and social workers 

a.t problems, we need more flexible 
organisations which will involve the 
energies of those most affected : of 
young people, parents and the vandals 
themselves. The people know what the 
problem is: boredom, alienation and 
lack of invo~vernent. 
A popuHst approach brings us to the bigbang theory of elections. Labour poli


ticians have f,ought shy of simple policies 
with broad appeal since the collapse of 
Gaitskell's I 959 commitment to heaven 
on the cheap. The Conservatives have 
'been less inhibited. In 1974 they trundled 
out the mortgage rilite. In 1979 they were 
more skilful. Stra-tegy was carefuolly calculated 
and trial balloons test marketed. 
They then dTopped the embarra.ssingissues such as ·immigration or the unnecessary 
·ones such as extra help to first time 
buyers and they ooncentra,ted on council 
houses and ,the biggest bribe in British 
political history-tax cuts large enough 
to transform attitudes. Nor have our 
oorufreres overseas been inhibited. Swedsh 
Social Democmts p·ioneered the technique 
with the post war offer of four weeks 
holiday with pay. The New Zealand 
La:bour Party used it to s·ome effeat with 
the £I 00 tax rebate of I 957 ; the French 
Socia!list Party made good use of the 
comrnibment to boost SMIC (the national 
minimum wage). Similar simple catchalls 
are well justified here !Provided they 
advance our bas·ic s·ocialist purposes. 

Test marketing is essential but candidates 
for the "A" list could include a 
reduction in the 'basic working week, 
earlier voluntary retiTement, a nationa·l 
basic wage pegged at an attractive level, 
paid sab'baticals from w.ork and, most 
attractive and necessary of all, longerholidays. The present entitlement is 
minima-l and chaotic. A 'bold insistence 
on five weeks seems fair. 

populism and publicexpenditure 

One final a;spect of the populist approach 
is increased spending, particularly in 
areas wi,th consideralble support such as 
educati·on and the healtt:h service, 1to mo.re 
than make up for Tory cufuacks. It must 
be eked out with imagination. Some of 
our bl1anket ,provisions in the sociai wage 
have not <mly not spread expendi.turetoo widely but haven't proved electorally 
a-ttractive. There is a case for not increasing 
all unive11sal benoots but hold· 
ing some to allow concentration on real 
need. Combining simplification of benefits, 
a genuine benefit passport and the 
introduction of a natiana'l minimum wage 


should allow such concentration. Our 
instinctive aversion to ·the means test is 
an inhibiting factor. But the cost of 
universal bene/fits in an inflationaTy period 
is a real electoral difficulty. Concentration 
and increased discretionary powers 
are the ways round this. 

In educa.tion, re-assertion of the comprehensive 
.p r i n c i p J e, discrimination 
against the private sector, steady expansion 
of further education will remain 
our basic strategies. Yet they wiH have 
to 'be implemented with greater flair and 
imagina.tion. Thi's means a greater willingness 
to experiment with new structures 
and new organisations, provided they fit 
in with our basic objectives and do not 
throw the whole system into new turmoil. 

The comprehensive principle has to be 
universal. Yet new comprehensives don't 
have to be big and impersonal educati•
onal factories. Sixth form co!Jeges don't 
have to be a rarity. ParentJs don't have 
to be confined to the minimum involvement 
which the PTA allows. The grounding 
in basics need not be so inadequatethat our graffiti are now the most 
ii'literate in Europe. 

If the educational system is producing 
a continu•ous chorus of complaint from 
parents and employers about standards, 
lack of discupline, literacy, the gulf between 
the disciplines of work and the 
freer relaxed atmosphere of school, and 
a ·lack of interest in the more demanding 
and responsible jobs, then it is the 
school system which must change. Its 
purpose is to educate, but for the world. 
If the wodd isn't happy with the product, 
then some compromise between the 
aspirations of the educationa.lists and the 
more practical objectives of parents and 
employers is essential. The gap between 
school and work is far too sharp and 
a time of youth unemployment aHows the 
latitude to spread the work and ease the 
transition. There is a strong case for 
inCilining the school curriculum more towards 
the relevant, the ,practical and the 
work orientated and away fr.om an 
academic preoccupa.ti•on which offers a 
lot to those who intend to go into further 
education but can a.lienate those who 
don't and who resent it as irrelevant. 

The big expansion will rea-lly come in 
further education. Our prime need is to 
make education a continuing experience 
not something cut off at an arbitrarilydefined a.ge. BriUain has a future not onlyas the educa.tional workshop of the world 
but as its finishing school, providinghigher education of all kinds, at the 
appropriate cost to those who can afford 
it, as a major aid commitment with the-se 
who can't. Within Bfli•tain, it hlas a vital 
role in enriching blighted lives, educating 
for change and training for new skills 
and horizons. It will also provide the 
openings and the new satisfactions which 
will be v·ital in a world of increased 
leisure. Sabbaticals from work and the 
joys of education of interests and of ideas 
can be opened to a much wider range of 
the .popuLation by expansion in university 
and college education, ~eeping coHeges 
open to cater for work release and 
retirement cour·ses, for management training 
and for summer schools for all, and 
supplementing the Open Uni·versity by 
a College of the Air. This would offer 
courses for the sake of interest not as 
building blocks for a status aJSpiration.
This can use the media for teaching but 
tie in with polytechnics and technical 
coUeges for tutorials and supervision-The 
time has come for the next surge forward 
in media based educati•on. 

Our general approach has to be one of 
seeing education as a satisfaction, a right 
and a source of excitement and joy, not 
.something to be doled out in compulsory 
quantities so that it ends up sneered at 
by the young and envied by the middle 
ruged. Britain has never attached the same 
importance to education as our competitor 
countries. We have let peopleleave school earlier, sent fewer on to 
university and trained our workers only 
to the ·level appropriate t•o hewers of 
wood and drawers of water so that theyhave been slung on the scrap heap to 
fend for themselves when such manlyjobs are no longer available. We have 
reaped the rewards in a lack of skills 
and involvement, a sullen unresponsivepublic, a hostility to aspirati•on and improvement 
and a vand<tl·ism and alienation 
which speaks of a sick, bored 
country, not the better wor:ld we sought 


to offer. No society which hopes to com· 
pete, to offer its people a f.uU life and 
to survive .the ri.gours of ·enforced leisure 
and the decline of work can survive if it 
continues to wallow in its own ignorance. 

electoral perceptions 

Electoral appeal ·suggests emphasis on 
o~her a·spects ·Of social·ist thought which 
wiH beoome increasing.ly important. One 
is the social market, the use of the powerof the state to endorse competition in 
~he market place and •redress the weak. 
nesses, distortion and overcharging pro·
duced 'by monopoy or oligopoly, private 
or 1public. The Tor-ies pose as the partyof competition yet their allies are bigbusiness and every J.ocal Conservative 
as.socia:tion is a clique of local market 
manilpulat•ors. We are the real party of 
competition because we represent the 
consumer, the only unorganised section 
of society and one which needs the st<l!te 
as fr,iend, advocate and ,protector. 

We are seen as the party o<f the state 
monoliths but must eme11ge as the par.ty 
of diversity, pluralism, decentmlisation 
and small scal-e by presenting the human 
face of social·ism. This means an emphasis 
on competition and a deliberate policy 
of fragmenting the overlarge and encouraging 
the smalL Anti-trust has aJwaysbeen a stwng populist battle cry in the 
United States. It could be here if carried 
out by a party and by institutions designed 
.to put the case against monopoyand market dominance whether in 
business or the .professions. This inv.olves 
a revived Price Commission with a far 
more vigor.ous approach, actually forcing 
reductions of prices. We also need a 
trust busting office of Fair Trading and 
M•onopolies Commis&ion roUed into one 
institution, acting .on its own initiative 
to tilt the balance a~gainst size and market 
dominance. 

unions, nationalised industries 
and individual rights 

Sacred cows cannot escape. On anydefinition, power blocks inolude the 
unions. No party can be serious about 

the wider issue unless it establishes its 
credentials by creating an industrial relations 
counterpart of these agencies, of 
competition and consumer pmtection.
This should be an Employment Commission 
(manned by former union officials 
and academic experts with employer and 
rank and file representation) workingmf·ormally to deal with abuses by both 
un:ions and employers, and tackle questions 
of dema11cation and o'f individual 
rights. It should offer help, advice and, 
if necessary, finance .to unions to reform 
themselves and improve their efficiencyand .their pr.ocedures. This guarantees a 
more satisfied and better served me'Inbership 
a·s well as the a'bility to deal with 
the employers on more equa·l terms. 

Nationalised industries and 'local government 
are our other sacred cow. AU too 
many of the frustrations of .ordinary life 
come not from oppression but from the 
cumbersome inefficiency of .gas hoards, 
water authorities, counci.J housing depart· 
ment and public utilities. Waiting weeks 
for one man to come and do one part of 
a job and then go away .to send •someone 
else to do the rest, or months to 
have damp dealt with, are bad arguments 
for socialism. We mu&t strengthen consumer 
rights against public bodies and 
pursue a positively critical appr.oach .to 
the monolith themselves, forcing reform, 
de-centralisation and smaller units. The 
dbject is to !personalise their relationship 
with .their consumers and improve their 
business efficiency. 

The whole appr.oach has .to be rounded 
off by a commitment to ri.ghts. A national 
machinery ,for rights is remote. We need 
l•ocal machinery and a local focus. MPS 
can testify from their own surgery work 
how inadequate a large section of the 
populati.on !feel .themselves to !be in their 
dealings with authority. Consumer advice 
centres and law centres have shown the 
way for a national network of People's 
Centres too oom'bine legal services, consumer 
advice and the kind of functions 
performed by the Citizens Advice 
Bureaux. 

The state ha:s to have a friendly face. 
It can earn this by helping people to 


help themselves. We have to be willing 
to decide what the state can and cannot 
do and .bo aoct in the second area byencouraging s·eLf-help. '"Dhis means offering 
advice and technical skills and supplementing 
money raised locally for 
neighibourhood purposes so as to helplocal •groups with the cost of play •groups, 
youth gr·oups, community centres, tennis 
courts, sports faci·lities, provision 01f local 
services and aH the other things which 
either get squeezed .out in development 
plans or monopolised -by private groups.
There would have to he &ome built in 
system •of discrimination in favour o-f the 
poorer areas (so that it .does not justbecome a middle class 'benefit system)
but this approach would still provide a 
rrew dimension of activity. It would 
mobilise community politics and com· 
munity concern 'f•or a genuine purposeand put the state at the disposa·l of local 
enthusiasms, local interests and l,ocal 
involvements. 

Finally, the helping hand also comes into 
housing through greater encouragement 
and better financial incentives to groupefforts, to hous'ing associations, to self· 
build schemes and to helping youngpeople to buy their own homes whether 
council, rented or private, and whether 
as •groups or individuals. Housing co· 
operatives are a form of s•ocialism too. 

Since help needs to be concentrated on 
the -old, who need new accommodation 
for their changing circumstances, and 
on the first time buyer, we should restrict 
mortgage relief to divert effor.t t•o these 
groups. Help also needs concentrating 
on the inner cities. This •could be done 
by state lending through a state bank of 
the merged Giro and Trustee SavingsBank. We could easily pr-ovide substantial 
lump sums for house deposits by a!l<ow· 
ing capitalising the child 'benefit fur 
several years ahead so as to finance initial 
house purchases. After four years of 
rocketing rprjces and monetarist follies 
with the interest rate, housing wil·l be 
sadly in need ·of new ideas and new 
initiatives. Simple helpful proposals will 
be electorally popular and are initiallynecessary if we are to break the Iong 
term trend .to stagnation -in housing. 

The central strand of policy is the attempt 
to grapple with the state of the British 
economy. The -basic problem now is a 
failure to compete, ·resul·ting in a doolining 
&hare of world trade and a rapidincrease in imports leading to de-industrialisation 
and the loss of jobs in manufacturing 
industry at a t1me when our 
labour force is expanding. 

beyond 1984 

A party which p-rescribes polici-es must 
fir<St diagnose causes. Nationally we have 
tended .to persona•lise blame, putting our 
problems down to indolence, •greed, •l-ack 
of drive and obher assumed national 
failings. The result is a rampant national 
inferiority complex, which takes the 
fmm of an endless media preocclllpation 
with •failure and a nati-onal chorus of 
self denigration. The real explanation is 
more prosaic. The British economy has 
rrever been run for growth. Shackled by 
a balance of payments cons·tlraint, it has 
seen every go cycle run immediately into 
stop as the pound was threatened and 
the deficit rose. With a currency usually 
overvalued, sometimes drastically so, 
industry ha·s never had the same long 
term ·imperative as those economies 
pushed by undervalued currencies ·into 
exports. There, as exporting industry 
grew and became more profitable it 
attra·cted new investment. This in turn 
produced productivity, grow.th ·and an 
improved competitive posLti·on leading to 
a virtuous cycle which we never even 
entered. Now with highly developed and 
massive exporting machines fa•cing us, 
and new competitors coming along, we 
may he too Jate in .time, too small in 
scale and too handicapped by an even 
more overvalued currency ever .to getback .into the big game. The Nonth Sea 
oil which was to have been, and still 
could be, a cushion allowing expansionwithout running into the rbalance of payments 
constraint may, in :these c1rcumstances, 
be a disadvanta,ge. It pushes the 
value of .the currency to -rurtifi·cial highs. 
It aHows us to go -on financing the flood 
of imports without the threat of ruin. 
Our problem is to •reverse the trends, rebuild 
the economy a.nd secUJ::e the growth 


essential to Laibour policies. Grow.th may 
be considered -old hat, or a pipe dream 
in today's world. It may produce protests 
from the ecology lobby. The counter 
arguments are contradictory and there 
is no point in repeating Crosland's re· 
buttal of the no gmw.th arguments. A 
party concerned to provide a better life 
for its people has to re~pond to their 
a,spirations by securing gl'owbh and a 
climate o.f buoyancy and expansion.
Growth and .full employment do more 
than all the nationalisation the left could 
want -or all the tax cuts the <fight could 
muster to produce a happier, better and 
a more sooial·ist s•ociety. Growth is the 
answer to .the problem of de-industria·lisa· 
tion; far Iess ser.ious in .the expanding 
economies. It is what the electorate wants. 

back to growth 

How then do we get growbh? Even with 
a nati•onal character ·transformed bysermons f.rom .the car, the new dynamism 
and drive produced by incentiv·e giving 
tax cuts, all the 'bottleneck-removing of 
the sector working 1parties and all the 
new investment advocated by everyone 
except investors, economic br-ansformation 
cannot come a!bout when ou•r 
currency is overvalued jn a competitiveworld. Nor can it c0il11e •When our 
domesltic market is penetrated 'by imports 
to ~Such an extent that coUapse of further 
industries is a more real prospect .than 
triumphant resurgence. The prophecies 
aJre gloomy. fn our enforced period on 
the sidehnes whil·e a foredoomed eXJperiment 
homeward p.lods its weary way, we 
must work out our a~ternatives in the 
hope that they won1t be necessary and 
the cer.tain knowledge that they w.iH. 

The si'tuation is proba,bly too far gone 
for the •old soluti ns Ito work. We must 
therefore apply ourselves to alternatives 
that wilL They wiH centre on importmanagement, ,the euphemism for a po.Jicywhich combines steady and progressivedevaluation of sterling with control of 
impo!its. The former gives exporters a 
long term advantage and an jncentive to 
invest and grow. The latter protects the 
domestic market through direC't controls. 

These can take various forms, working 
either on specific sectors contr·olled by 
·levy or by quotas (whi·ch are auctioned 
to the highest bidder) or on a country by 
country basis. Both strategies provide a 
healthier home market on which investment 
and growth are conditi·onal. A 
growing 'body of opinion holds 1that ·One 
nr other of the measures is necessarybut they .tend to he viewed as alternatives. 
However, it is .senseless for the 
proponents ·of one school to a!ttack bhose 
of .the other. Both wiH probably be necessary. 
Controls work on ·only one side 
of the equati•on (the domestic market 
which has always been ·of central importance 
to Br1tish 'ind usotry), devalurution 
works on bo'th by making •eX!ports more 
profitable. An in:dustry which ·is as conditioned 
to defeatism as ours may need 
both crutches rather than one. 

The anguments against both, or either. 
course are many. They wiH be strenuously 
put. Retaliation is possible !though unlikely 
in vi·ew of the deficits we run with 
many of the countries we a·re directingthe measures at. In any case our aim 'is 
not to roU back lthe tide altogether but 
to stop the increase. A self-interested 
approach •will olearly be dismp1tive in 
the Common Market. Yet the market 
imposes ·on us protectionism in agriculture 
whi·ch su~ts them not us. If it doesn't 
reform 'in a way more .favourable to our 
interests by expanding ·regional policyand introducing a Common EnergyPol icy, then not only will the burden of 
member hip (already larger .than the 
benefilts ·Oif the oil) become •too onerous 
to bear, <but public opinion wi·ll demand 
our depa:r.ture. If it does refo·rm, a 
differen<t situation prevails. The basis of 
membership has always been sel.f-interest. 
Our self-interest now dictates a strategy 
whi·ch may 'be temporarily disruptive blllt 
will certainly be less so than Britain 
becoming a scrounger nation. The car 
industry is a problem. Yet we have a 
sotrong negotiatilllg position and are in 
fact making ourselves more attractive to 
in vestrrnen t. 

The theoretical .arguments against protection 
paU beside the pressing practical 
reality. There is no alternaJtive in an 


economy whioh is steadi-ly worsening,
except increased unemployment, itself the 
crudest form of impont control. For a 
brief period we have the base on which 
to rebuild our national strength. We will 
have to shelve ·temporar.ily the interna· 
tiona·lism which has 'brought us to our 
present plight. 

problems of policiesfor growth 

T<he real problems come in the ooncomiltant 
·pohcies. The temporary squeeze 
on olivi•ng standards ·w·ill be manageableonly on the 'basis of an incomes policy 
to which we are already ideologicallypredisposed since the party of fair shares 
and planning can't believe in .the law 
of the jungle on earnings. For the first 
time it will :be part of a plan committed 
to ·improving Jivi•ng standards in a wav 
the unions will be predisposed to aocept. 
We should ta·rt .preparing the agreementwith them now :based on an incomes 
policy combined with price and dividend 
control. We should, therefore, begin wo·rk 
on a new soci·al contract •to pave the way 
for power and show we can work with 
·the unions. The concordat must, however, 
be seen to be ·on our .terms. 

Planning, too, comes into its own with 
a sustained commitment to growth.
Through the planni·ng 1framework we 
decide what kind of growth we want, 
a-llocate priorities a-nd -then encourage 
-the flow of investment and the •removal 
of obstacles whi,ch 1wiH •get .it. Planning 
is now politi•cally pract-ica!ble thr·ough the 
a:bili-ty, which oi.l confers, to work toward 
targets instead of jettisoning the 
plan at .the 'first hostile winds. It requires 
a tripartite central planning council of 
government, employer and unions, setting 
targets ·with sector councils supervising 
industry targets and coordinating its 
activities so as to grow and invest. This 
will be a framework w.ith new strengthand au~hority and the wholehearted backing 
of government. The plan must also 
be sustained by a commitment to keepthe constructi-on industry growing steadily 
without those savage and disproportionate 
cut backs whi·ch have pJayed such 
havoc with industry, with our citie~. 

with housing and with groWibh generally.
Cons,truction is the key rto 'l."esha:ping our 
tired, jaded British environment. It makes 
fewer demands on imports than other 
expanding industries. Its potential as a 
powerful drive motor for the economy 
has never been fulfilled. Yet it has been 
treated in the 70s in the same shortsighted, 
destructive fashion as the motor 
industry was in the 50s and 60s. 

Import management, incomes policy ·and 
commitment 'to a plan are poli·cies to be 
thrashed out -and agreed w~thin the party 
rather than set out in detail. Each has 
problems which have to be honestly discussed. 
A broad agreement ·on the need 
for the strategy and the outline of its 
implementation are the essen,tials. To 
proclaim the detai-l could be counter 
productive. Preparing ourselves is the 
essential. 

What is the alternative to 1these poli-cies? 
GroWith is still paramount. It won't come 
au'tomati'cally and tax and !borrowing are 
p a i n f u l alternatives. This concerted 
strategy provides the only real hope of 
securing it. T h o u g h the individual 
elements have always been part of 
Labour thinking, some-like planning and 
incomes policy-have been tr.ied and 
failed. However, the mistakes which produced 
the previous failures are all too 
clear. The policies have never been combined, 
implemented with an emphasis on 
national sel:f-interest or pu£\'iueJd in determined 
fashion !through the Scylla of 
Sterling and the Charylbdis •of ~he Balance 
of Payments. Strong as :the theoreti-cal 
arguments against may be the s-trategyoffers a rare prospect of reviving our 
battered na•tional pride. Growth throughthis policy can give the British .people 
something both .pa·rties have fought shy 
af offering : a sense of purpose. We have 
been nervous about ruppeal·ing to nationalism. 
Yet as the party whi1ch speaksfor the mass of the people, those who 
can't export their capital or seek refuge 
overseas, we are the only real party of 
the nation. We must emerge as suoh. 


4. conclusion 
The tempta~tion after a defeat like 1979 
is to carry on as ·before: much the same 
mix of policies, much the same styleof >leadership, muah the same generalapproach. The struggle agai•nst a ToryGovernment as reactionary and shortsighted 
as :this •can lbe a, ·total commitment. 
Those involved .drift into the assumption 
.that the struggle is aU important and 
~hat the pu'blic is watching. Reform and 
reconstruction are dis.traoting. 

a party under threat 

This cour.se is unacce;pta~ble. We are a 
party under threat. The mass party is 
a~twphyiong. Our pol.i·cies have never been 
adjusted to a new situation. The prolonged 
!failure to produce .the growthwithout which many of our aims are 
impossible and lthe feeling •that a Labour 
Government cannot " dehver" undermines 
our efforts. The changing e·lectoral 
situation threatens to relegate us to .third 
division north status. It could also make 
the Liberals, who •revive anyway once a 
Tory Government is ensconced, m•ore 
aUractive to the autonomous voters who 
mis.trust Labour pol·icies and programmes. 

Those who do not accept .this diagnosis 
may argue thalt regeneration is unnecessary. 
The Thatcher .government will do 
our work f'Or us. So it may. No one can 
assess the impact of headSJtrong folly. 
Yet, however low our assessments of .the 
the ca.lilbre and intellect of the Conservative 
leadership, ·and these es·tima~es are 
more a product of a sense of rea1ity than 
of lack of charirt:y, lt:he Tory Party has a 
strong sense of self -preservation which 
should .prevent them from merely re· 
Tunning 1970-74. The Tory leaders surely 
know better than to walk off ~he cliff 
aga·in. 

Labour's inferiority complex ·li!S a partyis such that we take masochistic pleasure 
·in seeing ourselves as the emergencydoct·or ·Service of 1the economy, righteous 
men brought in to deal \\lith orises and 
give a moral }ead, senlt packing when the 
peop•le return to .traditional Gods and 
squander the .fruits of our prudence. 
This pr·ovides a comforting sense of moral 

superiority. For a pra~,;tJca:l party with 
a clarm •to change society, 'it is no substitute 
for real power, held for a longperiod. For our voters, those who 
doggedly and .thanklessly turn out for 
Labour time. aJf.ter time in the hope of 
·bettermg. theJr lot, those who don'1t getsuch an rrnprovement 'because their party1s !too pre-occupied with crises, those who 
then have .to put up wi·th Tory poli•cies 
which inevitaJbly hht them harder than 
most, for these people it is an abdication 
of responsibility. 

preparing ourselves for 
victory

We have~d:--_______·__elv_es_for

a---cutytopPep_are-our_s-____

the long haul. Prescription is easy. There's 
a manifesto in most Labour Party members' 
heads. The real difficulties are 
securing agreement, getting ·Ohange in a 
pa·rty machine as conservative as <mrs 
and seHing the policy to the electorate. 
Agreement may lbe easier than is generaHy 
assumed. Lett and right are united on 
the need for reform in lbdth policy and 
organisation. To sit back, poJish the 
pur.ity ·Of ·OUr principles and a:wait the 
inevitable collapse of capitalism is.n't 
pr·actical polici•cs. The .tradiltional argument 
o1f left versus right is langely irrelevant 
to Britain's fundamental .probl·ems. 
Neither ~he immediate implementation of 
Clause Four nor the sudden advenlt of 
total equality would change rt:he basic 
facts of our competitive situation. Because 
these fa,cts are starker people may 
'be prepared to accept what :had prev
·iously !been un'thinka•ble. Agreementwi•thin the party is another matter. A 
small party like •the Liberals ~s a li.ghtyacht, able to .tack freely but liable a•lso 
to be !blown with every passing wind {)fopini·on. The result is unreliaibililty and 
inconsistency. A great party has the 
reverse problem. Like a supertanker i•ts 
inertia a·nd lack of manoeuverabj}j.ty 
mean that course changes are sJ.ow and 
require long preparation. Given .the size 
of the Tory majority, we have a longperiod at our disposa-l. Given our nature, 
we need ~o concentrate on the practicable, 
relevant policies. The aim is to win. 

A wider electoral acceptance wi-ll follow 


once we have reformed and preparedourselves. Making a vir.tue of necessityand publ'icly devoting ourselves to a 
period of re-think and reconstructi'On 
shows the seriousness of our intentions. 
lnvolv.ing as wide a rpopula'tion and as 
broad a .participation as possilble in this 
task shows our concern with what is 
acceptable -and relevant. Carrying the 
whole process through over a long periodbecomes a system ot persuading a·nd 
uniting ourselves. This .i.s the necess·aryprelude to elling lthe .programme with 
the unity and •conv.i·ction which will carry 
the day. 

By energeticahly ev.angelising [or our new 
programme we .p·rovide ·something which 
both the rpolls and our own in&tincts tell 
us the wider public ·is looking for. There 
is alienation and antagonism. It springsfrom .the ,feeling of having been let down 
by both parties. There are doubts a·nd 
anxieties. They arise from a national 
failure of purpose and direction, a •lack 
of leadership. The peop.le do want a 
Moses, providing he is •convincing. To 
'become obsessed with 'the Tweedledum-
Tweedledee party battle, to be distracted 
by our ·own divisions, •to relapse into the 
blank fatalism ·of all too many of 
Britain's leaders ·is to ll!bdicate the primeresponsibility -of a political party. We 
have to offer a lead , a hope and a 
programme which .is relevant to the scale 
of the problems. When we feel ourselves 
to have .this, -convincing otheC<s becomes 
easy. 


recent fabian pamphlets 


research series 


327 Howard Glennerster (ed) 
331 Chris Ralph 
332 Roy Manley, Helen Hastings 
333 Nicholas Bosanquet334 Carl Wilms Wright 
335 Vincent Cable 
336 Christopher Parsons 
337 Robin Cook, Dan Smith 
338 Alan Fox 
339 Peter Archer 
340 Deepak La!! 
341 Tom Sheriff 
342 David Scott Bell 

Labour's social priont1es 55p
The picket and the law 60p
Influencing Europe 55p
Economic strategy: a new social contract 75p
Transnational corporations 75p
Import controls : the case against 70p
Finance for development or survival ? 75p
What future in NATO ? 75p
Socialism and shop floor power 60p
The role of the law officers 75p
Poverty, power and prejudice 75p
A deindustrialised Britain? 60p
Eurocommunism 80p 


tracts 


438 Anthony Crosland Social democracy in Europe 55p445 John Tilley Changing prospects for direct labour 40p446 John Gyford, Richard Baker Labour and local politics 50p448 Lisanne Radice Reforming the House of Commons SOp449 Rod Northawl, Richard Corbett Electing Europe's first pa·rliament 60p451 Dianne Hayter The labour party : crisis and prospects 60p453 Nicholas Falk Think small : enterprise and the economy 75p454 Society of Labour Lawyers Legal services for all 70p455 David Watkins Industrial common ownership 65p456 Chris Smith National pa;rks 65p457 Tom Crowe, John H. Jones The computer and society 50p458 Robert Taylor Labour and the social contract 65p459 A Fabian group Deserting the midd:l·e ground 50p460 Walter Jaehni·g Family service for mentally handicapped 
461 A Fabian Group Creating a caring community 65p462 Bryan Gould and others The .po'iitics of monetarism 60p 

young fabian pamphlets 

37 
42 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 

books 

David R. Allan 
Martin Smith 
Melvyn Westlake 
Geoff Harris 
David Elliott 
Tom Schuller 
Mark Swift 
Mark Goyder 

Socialising the company 50p
Gypsies: where now ? 40p
W arid poverty: the growing conflict 70p
A wider Europe 50p
The Lucas Aerospace workers' campaign 60p
Education through life 65p
A regional policy for Europe 70p
Socialism tomorrow: 65.p 


R. H. S. Crossman and others New Fabian Essays cased £1.75 
Brian Abel-Smith and others Socialism and affluence paper £0.60 
Peter Townsend and others The fifth social service paper £2.50 
George Cunningham (ed) Britain and the world in the 1970s cased £3.00 

can Labour win again ? 
In this pamphlet Austin Mitchell assesses the reasons for Labour's traumatic 
defeat in May 1979. He examines the evidence of the polls and concludes 
that Labour has been losing electoral ground since 1951 because of poor 
organisation, an increasingly narrow membership base and policies too 
often inappropriate to meet the needs and aspirations of the tParty's natural 
supporters. 

Austin Mitchell dismisses much of the right-left dispute within the party 
as irrelevant to the future prospects and urges less embarassment over 
advocating " populist " policies arrived at after taking due note of poll 
findings. He also advocates a much greater use of professionals to promote 
policies and organise the party. He stresses the importance of the relationship 
with the unions in opposing Tory policies and calls for reform of the 
party structure and a revived and altered Council of Labour. 

Finally the author puts forward a number of policy proposals based upon 
his analysis of 'Britain's economic prospects and the party's failures to meet 
the needs of the electorate. 

fabian society 

The Fabian Society exists to further socialist education and research. It is 
affiliated to the tabour Party, both na,tionally and locally, and embraces all 
shades of socialist opinion within its ranks -left, right and centre. 
Since 1884 the Fabian Society has enrolled thoughtful socialists who are 
prepared to discuss the essential questions of democratic socialism and 
relate them to practical plans for building socialism in a changing world. 
Beyond this the Society has no collective policy. It puts forward no resolutions 
of a political character. The Society's members are active in their 
Labour parties, trade unions and co-operatives. They are representative 
of the labour movement. practical people concerned to study and discuss 
problems that matter. 

The Society is organised nationally and locally. The national Society, 
directed by an elected Executive Committee, publishes pamphlets, and 
holds schools and conferences of many kinds. Local Societies-there are 
one hundred of them-are self governing and are lively centres of discussion 
and also undertake research. 

Cover design by Dick teadbetter Printed by Civic Press Limited (TU). 
Civic Street, Glasgow G5 9RH ,ISBN 7163 0463 5 ISSN 0307 7535