fabian tract 389 
Europe: what next? 

contents 1 introduction 1 
2 alternatives based on EEC 4 
3 possibilities involving EFTA 9 
4 a north Atlantic trade area 14 
5 conclusions 18 


this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only the 
view of the individuals who prepared it. The responsibility of 
the Society is limited to approving the publications which it 
issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour movement. 
Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street London SW1. 
February 1969 SBN 7163 0389 2 


introduction 
This pamphlet is written at a time when 
:he second British application for mem-
oership of the European Economic Com-
nunity (EEC), together with similar ap-
olications from Ireland, Denmark and 
'-lorway, is still technically "on the 
a" of the council of ministers of 
community. But the President of 
France has publicly made it clear that 
has several stringent conditions to be 
met by Britain before he will even coun-
cenance the opening of negotiations ; 
>ince these conditions are practically im-
I I-I\.J'~"l.Ul<> for Britain to meet, at least in 
che near future, and since evidently the 
;ommunity requires unanimity among its 
members on the issue of opening nego-
ciations, it appears that the British appli-
~ation has proved abortive. The British 
Government, however, has refused to 
withdraw the application from the 
agenda of the council of ministers, where 
it continues to have a high priority for 
discussion ; but the Government's imme-
diate policy towards the EEC has yet to 
be made clear to the British public who, 
in many ways, are tending to lose their 
enthusiasm for the topic. Already there 
is growing discussion about possiblealternative courses of action for Britain 
to follow, and this pamphlet attempts to 
review and assess those possibilities, on 
'the assumption that Britain is denied full 
membership of EEC within the foresee-
able future. 
Within Britain there is still vocal con-
troversy over the value for this countryof EEC membership. The present pam-
phlet is in no way intended as a contri-
bution to the debate for or against EEC 
membership, and neither of the authors 
wish to express any opinion here on the 
mbject. Indeed, we hold dissimilar views 
on this great question. But we are both 
very conscious of the policy vacuum 
which appears to have existed in Britain 
in 1963 after the failure of the first round 
of negotiations for British membership 
of EEC, and we are concerned that the 
prolonged aimlessness of that periodshould not recur. We therefore see an 
urgent need for consideration of all con-
structive alternative policies to immedi-
ate EEC membership for Britain, and of 
the benefits likely to be gained from 
those alternatives, in the light of the ob-
jectives claimed for full membership. 
Of the various alternative strategies there 
is first the possibility of Britain's be-
coming an associated EEC member, either 
by herself or in the company of other 
countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), the "Outer Seven". 
Such associated status, "embodying reci-
procal rights and obligations, joint actions 
and special procedures", is allowed for 
under article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, 
which is the constitution of EEC, but such 
an agreement must have the unanimous 
support of the EEC council of ministers. 
Secondly, it has been suggested that for 
the present Britain should continue to act 
on the assumption that she will eventu-
ally be a full EEC member. There are 
two distinct variants of this policy, one 
involving harmonisation of British in-
ternal policies, for example, on agricul-
tural support or purchase tax, with pre-
sent and future EEC practice, and the 
other simply using every opportunity to 
keep the issue of British entry alive with-
out committing Britain to irreversible 
changes in the meantime. Both these poli-
cies assume that Britain must eventuallybecome a full EEC member on terms 
agreeable to the six. And each of these 
policies would make it essential for Bri-
tain in the meantime not to take anyother initiatives which might make it 
more difficult for EEC membership even-
tually to be negotiated. 
Related to, but distinct from, the policies 
of "harmonisation" and "keeping the 
issue alive" is the possibility of some in-
termediate arrangement being devised 
between the EEC or certain EEC members 
and the countries who have made appli-
cation for membership. Suggestions for 
such an arrangement came from various 
sources on the continent during 1968, but 
the most publicised of these was the Bene-
lux plan put forward by the governments 
of the three Low Countries. Other sugges-
tions of this nature have come from Italy 
and from talks between the French and 
German leaders. It is not easy to gener-
alise about all these proposals, and it is 
not at present clear how far they give 
introduction 
This pamphlet is written at a time when 
:he second British application for mem-
oership of the European Economic Com-
nunity (EEC), together with similar ap-
olications from Ireland, Denmark and 
'-lorway, is still technically "on the 
a" of the council of ministers of 
community. But the President of 
France has publicly made it clear that 
has several stringent conditions to be 
met by Britain before he will even coun-
cenance the opening of negotiations ; 
>ince these conditions are practically im-
I I-I\.J'~"l.Ul<> for Britain to meet, at least in 
che near future, and since evidently the 
;ommunity requires unanimity among its 
members on the issue of opening nego-
ciations, it appears that the British appli-
~ation has proved abortive. The British 
Government, however, has refused to 
withdraw the application from the 
agenda of the council of ministers, where 
it continues to have a high priority for 
discussion ; but the Government's imme-
diate policy towards the EEC has yet to 
be made clear to the British public who, 
in many ways, are tending to lose their 
enthusiasm for the topic. Already there 
is growing discussion about possiblealternative courses of action for Britain 
to follow, and this pamphlet attempts to 
review and assess those possibilities, on 
'the assumption that Britain is denied full 
membership of EEC within the foresee-
able future. 
Within Britain there is still vocal con-
troversy over the value for this countryof EEC membership. The present pam-
phlet is in no way intended as a contri-
bution to the debate for or against EEC 
membership, and neither of the authors 
wish to express any opinion here on the 
mbject. Indeed, we hold dissimilar views 
on this great question. But we are both 
very conscious of the policy vacuum 
which appears to have existed in Britain 
in 1963 after the failure of the first round 
of negotiations for British membership 
of EEC, and we are concerned that the 
prolonged aimlessness of that periodshould not recur. We therefore see an 
urgent need for consideration of all con-
structive alternative policies to immedi-
ate EEC membership for Britain, and of 
the benefits likely to be gained from 
those alternatives, in the light of the ob-
jectives claimed for full membership. 
Of the various alternative strategies there 
is first the possibility of Britain's be-
coming an associated EEC member, either 
by herself or in the company of other 
countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), the "Outer Seven". 
Such associated status, "embodying reci-
procal rights and obligations, joint actions 
and special procedures", is allowed for 
under article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, 
which is the constitution of EEC, but such 
an agreement must have the unanimous 
support of the EEC council of ministers. 
Secondly, it has been suggested that for 
the present Britain should continue to act 
on the assumption that she will eventu-
ally be a full EEC member. There are 
two distinct variants of this policy, one 
involving harmonisation of British in-
ternal policies, for example, on agricul-
tural support or purchase tax, with pre-
sent and future EEC practice, and the 
other simply using every opportunity to 
keep the issue of British entry alive with-
out committing Britain to irreversible 
changes in the meantime. Both these poli-
cies assume that Britain must eventuallybecome a full EEC member on terms 
agreeable to the six. And each of these 
policies would make it essential for Bri-
tain in the meantime not to take anyother initiatives which might make it 
more difficult for EEC membership even-
tually to be negotiated. 
Related to, but distinct from, the policies 
of "harmonisation" and "keeping the 
issue alive" is the possibility of some in-
termediate arrangement being devised 
between the EEC or certain EEC members 
and the countries who have made appli-
cation for membership. Suggestions for 
such an arrangement came from various 
sources on the continent during 1968, but 
the most publicised of these was the Bene-
lux plan put forward by the governments 
of the three Low Countries. Other sugges-
tions of this nature have come from Italy 
and from talks between the French and 
German leaders. It is not easy to gener-
alise about all these proposals, and it is 
not at present clear how far they give 

guarantees of full eventual EEC membership 
for the candidate countries. In the 
present confused atmosphere there is 
much that has to be explored further 
about these arrangements, and the prospects 
of their implementation may vary 
from time to time as discussions continue. 
Nonetheless, this kind of strategyis a serious one for Britain to consider, 
and must therefore be included in this 
list of alternative strategies to immediate 
EEC membership. 

Fifthly, there are the various alternative 
strategies which would involve Britain 
more closely in the organisation of EFfA, 
which was itself born as an alternative 
to the free trade area closely related 
to the Common Market as originally intended 
by the architects of the Treaty of 
Rome. There are several ways in which 
EFfA could be developed, possibly by extending 
membership to other countries 
(perhaps to those of eastern Europe),
possibly by adding new economic sections 
to the Stockholm Convention such 
as a common agricultural policy or a 
common external tariff, or possibly by 
increasing political cohesion within EFfA. 

Finally, a much publicised alternative to 
membership of EEC would be the introduction 
of a North Atlantic Free Trade 
Area (NAFrA). This suggestion has appeared 
in several forms, but nearlyalways involves an economic grouping of 
all EFfA countries, the United States and 
Canada. Some variants of this strategy 
would include part or all of the Commonwealth, 
others the countries of EEC, 
and still others miscellaneous countries, 
geographically scattered, such as Japan. 

These then are the six types of alternative 
policy to immediate British membership 
of EEC which we intend to consider, 
and in later sections each of them will 
be given more detailed description and 
discussion. We shall attempt some evaluation 
of the six strategies as they are 
described, and particularly in the conclusion, 
with the purpose of outliningpractical and beneficial directions which 
Britain could now follow. The overriding 
factor on which these evaluations will be 
based is how far each alternative policy 

can help secure for Britain the benefits 
which it is claimed membership would!' 
bring. Before these assessments can be 
made, we need to state the main advantages 
claimed for EEC membership. 

advantages claimed 
for membership of EEC 

In the first place there is the overriding · 
economic advantage which is envisagedas resulting from being part of the community. 
Essentially, the economic argument 
is that Britain must become partof a much larger, integrated economic 
unit unless her position relative to the 
major modern powers is to continue to 
decline. Only through being part of such 
an economic grouping can our industryfind the major home markets that it 
needs to meet a steady expansion of output, 
and only by expanding the scopeof our "internal" economy can the country 
become Iess vulnerable to any ill 
winds of world trade. The stimulus of 
competition within the wider free market 
could provide British industry with the 
necessary will to be far more enterprisingand innovating than of late. As a corollary 
to this argument in favour of closer 
economic and industrial co-operation is 
the argument in favour of Britain's participation 
in a technological community, 
thereby enjoying advantages of modern 
technology which are possible only in 
larger economic blocs. 

But the economic advantages of membership 
of an international grouping cannot 
be separated ultimately from the political 
factors which are also advanced in 
favour of Britain's membership of EEC. 
It is our conviction that the politicalarguments for joining EEC carry much 
more weight with the British Government 
than do the economic arguments. 
Indeed, if it is accepted that the balance 
of economic advantage and disadvantagecould tilt either way, the political factors 
are likely to assume great importance, 
the more so because Britain's long 
desired economic recovery may make less 
vital the economic case for British entry. 
Participation in the community would inevitably 
involve yielding some of Britain's 
political sovereignty, i.e. the power 


, decide for ourselves about important 
atures of our national life. Many,ople believe that the trend to large, 
gional economic and political blocs in 
e world is inevitable, and indeed neces-
ry, if our political institutions are to 
ep pace with the technical advances 
:inging different parts of the world con-
antly into closer communication. There 
·e strongly held convictions, within 
ritain as elsewhere, that the nation-state 
a dangerous unit from the past, and 
tat the safety of the future depends on 
te breaking down of political barriers 
1d the establishment of international 
1thority and international co-operation. 
his internationalist argument leads 
,any people in practical terms to the 
ew that Britain should begin by relax-
,g the barriers between herself and her 
~arest neighbours, those of continental 
urope; so they say that, with EEC 
ready in existence, Britain's most effec-
ve contribution to international har-
tony would be to join the community1d then seek to extend it farther. To 
,me internationalists, EEC is therefore a 
step along the road to world gov-
·nment. 
hese two main lines of argument, with 
teir necessary corollaries in terms of 
chnology, defence and culture, form 
te basic case put forward in favour of 
ritish membership of EEC. In this pam-
1let we make no attempt to test the 
llidity of these arguments or to discuss 
hether or not the advantages claimed 
•r Britain would be so beneficial. Fur-
termore, we are not concerned here 
ith the arguments which are used 
~ainst British membership of EEC, how-
rer forceful and apposite those argu-
ents may be. The economic and poli-
;al claims made in favour of British 
embership of EEC have been briefly de-
ribed here in order to serve as yard-
icks by which the six possible alterna-
•e strategies can be evaluated. 
, decide for ourselves about important 
atures of our national life. Many,ople believe that the trend to large, 
gional economic and political blocs in 
e world is inevitable, and indeed neces-
ry, if our political institutions are to 
ep pace with the technical advances 
:inging different parts of the world con-
antly into closer communication. There 
·e strongly held convictions, within 
ritain as elsewhere, that the nation-state 
a dangerous unit from the past, and 
tat the safety of the future depends on 
te breaking down of political barriers 
1d the establishment of international 
1thority and international co-operation. 
his internationalist argument leads 
,any people in practical terms to the 
ew that Britain should begin by relax-
,g the barriers between herself and her 
~arest neighbours, those of continental 
urope; so they say that, with EEC 
ready in existence, Britain's most effec-
ve contribution to international har-
tony would be to join the community1d then seek to extend it farther. To 
,me internationalists, EEC is therefore a 
step along the road to world gov-
·nment. 
hese two main lines of argument, with 
teir necessary corollaries in terms of 
chnology, defence and culture, form 
te basic case put forward in favour of 
ritish membership of EEC. In this pam-
1let we make no attempt to test the 
llidity of these arguments or to discuss 
hether or not the advantages claimed 
•r Britain would be so beneficial. Fur-
termore, we are not concerned here 
ith the arguments which are used 
~ainst British membership of EEC, how-
rer forceful and apposite those argu-
ents may be. The economic and poli-
;al claims made in favour of British 
embership of EEC have been briefly de-
ribed here in order to serve as yard-
icks by which the six possible alterna-
•e strategies can be evaluated. 

2 . alternatives based on EEC 
ASSOCIATE 
MEMBERSHIP OF EEC 

During the press conference mDecember, 
1967, when General de Gaulle announced 
his alleged "veto" of the second 
British application for EEC membership, 
he referred to the possibility of some 
form of association between Britain and 
EEC which would avoid what he considered 
to be the disruptive effects of British 
full membership. He did not elaborate 
further on this suggestion nor was it 
taken up officially anywhere else, largely 
because the immediate reaction of the 
British Government was to emphasisethat Britain is interested only in full EEC 
membership or nothing at all. 

In the light of more recent events, however, 
it has become apparent that Britain 
has little to gain, so far as EEC is concerned, 
from her attitude of "all or 
nothing", and it could be important to 
seek clarification and expansion of the 
French President's suggestion, if only to 
see exactly what he had in mind. Presumably 
such a form of association 
would involve other EFTA countries besides 
Britain, and there are signs that 
they are growing a little impatient with 
the British "all or nothing" attitude. They 
may even take initiative towards EEC bythemselves if Britain continues to dally, 
or they may decide to pursue the aim of 
closer economic unity between themselves. 


Moreover, when one turns in the Treatyof Rome to the ection concerning association 
agreements, it is clear that wide 
flexibility is permissible on this question. 
For article 238 of the treaty contains 
the word : "The community may conclude 
with a third country, a union of 
tate or an international organisation, 
agreement creating an as ociation embodying 
reciprocal right and obligations, 
joint actions and pecial procedures. Such 
agreement hall be concluded by the 
council acting by mean of a unanimou 
vote and after con ulting the assembly". 

As tanley Henig, MP, ha pointed out, in 
the magazine Encounter (March 1968, 

pp60-64), this article of the Rome Treaty"provides only the loosest framework, in 
which the detailed arrangements can be 
varied according to circumstances". One 
thing, however, is clear, namely that 
associate members have no voting rights 
in EEC affairs, and consequently have no 
say in the development of political cohesion 
within the community. Such an 
arrangement, if permanent, would secure 
none of the political benefits which would 
come with full British membership of 
EEC, and we are therefore bound to conclude 
that a policy of permanent associated 
status is not an attractive one 
Britain. 

However, as Mr. Henig goes on to say 
it might be possible to negotiate an 
agreement of association which the Government 
hopes would lead eventually to 
full British membership of EEC, 
of course new negotiations would 
to be held at that stage. There is 
cient flexibility in article 238 for 
inclusion in an association agreement of 
a promise that negotiations for full membership 
would be opened at a later stage. 
Such a promise might be sufficient to 
meet British requirements, but on the 
other hand it might still prove impossible 
for the French to support, and of 
course unanimity is essential in reaching 
any association agreement. Still, there 
could be no harm in exploring farther 
how the French would react to the principle 
of such an arrangement. 


What is more, the flexibility of the 
article on association is its weakness as 
well as its strength, for it can lead to 
interminable manoeuvres and confusion 
in negotiations, as has happened in the 
talks with Austria, which have now gone 
on for three years and are no nearer 

ettlement. On the other hand, Greece 
and Turkey are now fully fledged as EE 
associate member , and may eventually 
become full members. 

So much of the issue of Briti h a ociate 
membership of EEC rest on imponderable 
factor that it is impossible to ayat pre ent what uch member hip might 
entail and where it might lead. In thi< 
situation Britain might do well to ma 


Lrther soundings as to what the details 
' an association agreement might be, 
trticularly with regard to a promise for 
~ening later negotiations on full mem-
~rship. But it is clear that a permanentTangement of only associate status 
ould fall far short of what Britain has 
~en trying to achieve in her two appli-
ltions for full membership. 
keeping 
e issue alive" 
ollowing the failure of the EEC coun-
1 of ministers in December 1967 to 
~ree about proceeding with Britain's 
embership application, the Government 
1s persistently used every means of 
!eping the issue of British entry to the 
:.c alive and a subject of discussion 
nong the six. Whether or not this pol-
y turns out to involve harmonisation 
: British domestic policies with present 
1d future EEC practice, the policy as-
Lmes that ultimately the British appli-
ttion must succeed. Such a policy would 
~ justified provided, among other things, 
tat our chances of eventual success are 
Jod, where the importance of "even-
, tal" depends on the time scale we are 
;ing. For the purposes of this discus-
on we mean by "eventual" no more 
tan ten years ahead. On this time scale 
JW should we rate our chances of entry? 
ne obvious point is that, the more 
>tablished the EEC becomes, the more it 
ill become set in its ways with vested 
tterests and the more difficulty it will 
1d in making concessions to help Bri-
in adapt her agricultural policy and 
>reign trade to the community systems. 
his is particularly true of alterations 
tat would be needed in the community's 
~ricultural .policy to safeguard the posi-
on of British producers of pigmeat and 
tilk, and to protect New Zealand lamb 
1d dairy products and sugar from the 
aribbean and Mauritius. We are assum-
g that a British government, particu-
rly a Labour government, would insist 
1 such safeguards before accepting1try into the EEC. 
no less important point to consider is 
te position of the French President ; his 
resent unpopularity with those who ad-
vocate Britain's immediate membershipof the EEC suggests that he is widely seen 
as the major obstacle in our .path. But 
it is more likely that General de Gaulle's 
views on Britain and Europe are shared 
by his party generally than it is that his 
policy is likely to be reversed when he 
ceases to be President. It may be argued 
that this point is irrelevant since the Pre-
sident's successor may well be someone 
representative of the left in French poli-
tics and favourable to British entry, like 
M. Mitterand, although this seems less 
likely after the French election results 
of June 1968. However, it is impossible 
to tell how effective the Federation of 
the Left would be as a government, for 
it has so far been unable to agree on a 
common foreign policy and might there-
fore find difficulty in agreeing on a com-
mon attitude to the question of Britain's 
membership. We should also bear in 
mind that France under a different Pre-
sident might be in a weaker position on 
the European stage ; Germany would 
then be even stronger within the EEC and 
might not necessarily wish to entertain 
the prospect of a rival such as Britain. 
It is therefore not self evident that the 
departure of General de Gaulle will 
make British membership of the EEC a 
foregone conclusion. Indeed, whether or 
not the General remains in power, one 
further objection by France is that Bri-
tain is not fully "European" so long as 
she has close links with the USA and non-
European defence commitments. In spiteof last year's defence cuts, withdrawal 
from Singapore will not be completed 
until the end of 1971, by which time the 
Conservative opposition hopes to be in 
power, and they are comitted to retain· 
ing our military presence in the Far East. 
In any event Britain will still have obli-
gations to SEATO and to CENTO . So far as 
our links with the USA are concerned, the 
Government has repeatedly avowed its 
belief in the North Atlantic partnership 
between the USA and Western Europe. 
Since most of our foreign and economic 
policy depends on the maintenance of 
such links, we do not envisage a British 
government breaking them as the priceof British entry into EEC. 
Lrther soundings as to what the details 
' an association agreement might be, 
trticularly with regard to a promise for 
~ening later negotiations on full mem-
~rship. But it is clear that a permanentTangement of only associate status 
ould fall far short of what Britain has 
~en trying to achieve in her two appli-
ltions for full membership. 
keeping 
e issue alive" 
ollowing the failure of the EEC coun-
1 of ministers in December 1967 to 
~ree about proceeding with Britain's 
embership application, the Government 
1s persistently used every means of 
!eping the issue of British entry to the 
:.c alive and a subject of discussion 
nong the six. Whether or not this pol-
y turns out to involve harmonisation 
: British domestic policies with present 
1d future EEC practice, the policy as-
Lmes that ultimately the British appli-
ttion must succeed. Such a policy would 
~ justified provided, among other things, 
tat our chances of eventual success are 
Jod, where the importance of "even-
, tal" depends on the time scale we are 
;ing. For the purposes of this discus-
on we mean by "eventual" no more 
tan ten years ahead. On this time scale 
JW should we rate our chances of entry? 
ne obvious point is that, the more 
>tablished the EEC becomes, the more it 
ill become set in its ways with vested 
tterests and the more difficulty it will 
1d in making concessions to help Bri-
in adapt her agricultural policy and 
>reign trade to the community systems. 
his is particularly true of alterations 
tat would be needed in the community's 
~ricultural .policy to safeguard the posi-
on of British producers of pigmeat and 
tilk, and to protect New Zealand lamb 
1d dairy products and sugar from the 
aribbean and Mauritius. We are assum-
g that a British government, particu-
rly a Labour government, would insist 
1 such safeguards before accepting1try into the EEC. 
no less important point to consider is 
te position of the French President ; his 
resent unpopularity with those who ad-
vocate Britain's immediate membershipof the EEC suggests that he is widely seen 
as the major obstacle in our .path. But 
it is more likely that General de Gaulle's 
views on Britain and Europe are shared 
by his party generally than it is that his 
policy is likely to be reversed when he 
ceases to be President. It may be argued 
that this point is irrelevant since the Pre-
sident's successor may well be someone 
representative of the left in French poli-
tics and favourable to British entry, like 
M. Mitterand, although this seems less 
likely after the French election results 
of June 1968. However, it is impossible 
to tell how effective the Federation of 
the Left would be as a government, for 
it has so far been unable to agree on a 
common foreign policy and might there-
fore find difficulty in agreeing on a com-
mon attitude to the question of Britain's 
membership. We should also bear in 
mind that France under a different Pre-
sident might be in a weaker position on 
the European stage ; Germany would 
then be even stronger within the EEC and 
might not necessarily wish to entertain 
the prospect of a rival such as Britain. 
It is therefore not self evident that the 
departure of General de Gaulle will 
make British membership of the EEC a 
foregone conclusion. Indeed, whether or 
not the General remains in power, one 
further objection by France is that Bri-
tain is not fully "European" so long as 
she has close links with the USA and non-
European defence commitments. In spiteof last year's defence cuts, withdrawal 
from Singapore will not be completed 
until the end of 1971, by which time the 
Conservative opposition hopes to be in 
power, and they are comitted to retain· 
ing our military presence in the Far East. 
In any event Britain will still have obli-
gations to SEATO and to CENTO . So far as 
our links with the USA are concerned, the 
Government has repeatedly avowed its 
belief in the North Atlantic partnership 
between the USA and Western Europe. 
Since most of our foreign and economic 
policy depends on the maintenance of 
such links, we do not envisage a British 
government breaking them as the priceof British entry into EEC. 

Again, there is likely to be continuing 
objection to Britain's membership on the 
grounds that Britain's methods of approach 
to problems are different from 
those in the EEC member states. One has 
only to look at our constitutional, legal 
and political structures to appreciate this 
point. Although the relative positions of 
Britain and the EEC in those respects maychange in the next ten years there is no 
guarantee of their drawing more closelytogether and so this objection to British 
membership may remain. 

All these factors may well continue 
throughout the next decade to give EEC 
members grounds for opposing Britain's 
admission. There is therefore no certainty 
of a successful outcome to a British 
policy of persistently seeking EEC 
membership, irrespective of what such a 
policy might involve for Britain in the 
meantime. Turning to consider the short 
term implications of such a .policy, we 
see that they clearly fall into two categories, 
depending on whether or not the 
Government wishes to pursue a gradualharmonisation with EEC practices or not. 
(Other obvious policies, such as strengthening 
the British economy, which would 
remove one possible objection to British 
entry, are essential for Britain irrespective 
of policies towards Europe-although 
some pessimists suggest that the 
British economy cannot be genuinelystrengthened unless Britain is part of a 
larger economic unit like EEC.) If harmonisation 
is to be attempted, the most 
obvious measures to be carried out will 
involve reconstructing agricultural support 
and trade and the system of indirect 
taxation. However, there is no 
benefit in making drastic changes to British 
agricultural and trading policies if 
there are to be no compensating advantages 
arising from EEC membership at the 
same time. When we examine other areas 
of our national life which are potentially 
in conflict with the implications of EEC 
membership, such as our system of common 
law and our immigration policy, 
the changes involved would be extremely 
radical and unlikely to be acceptable 
to the British people except perhaps 
as the key to a glorious future leading 
a united Europe. 

Moreover the British Government's atti· 
tude to the idea of harmonising henceforth 
with the community way of life 
was set out clearly by the Foreign Secre· 
tary at the Western European Union 
meeting in January 1968, when he said 
that Britain could not accept the idea 
that it should take unilateral steps to 
adjust the British economy to the eventuality 
of EEC membership without knowing 
for certain that Britain would ultimately 
be admitted. But from the arguments 
given earlier we conclude that no 
such guarantee is likely to be forthcom· 
ing from EEC members so that these incompatible 
positions make the strategyof harmonisation unfeasible. 

We therefore turn to consider what initi· 
atives the British government could be 
taking in the interim period on the inter· 
national scene which might facilitate 
eventual entry into EEC, initiatives which 
do not hinder Britain's freedom of action 
in other directions and do not impose 
any great sacrifice on Britain without ad· 
vantage in return. The most likely fields 
of policy to be explored in this connec· 
tion concern defence and technology.
In the first place, the countries of western 
Europe, since the second world war, 
have had the common defence need of 
deterring totalitarian communism ; this 
common need has been expressed in 
practical terms through the organisationsof NATO and WEU. A more specificallyEuropean, and a more integrated supra 
national defence organisation was attempted 
in the form of the EuropeanDefence Community, but progress with 
this was halted in 1954 when the French 
parliament failed to ratify the arrangement, 
chiefly because of the lack of British 
participation. The situation is now 
rather ironically reversed, with the hint 
on the part of the French that they might 
withdraw from NATO in 1969 when the 
binding parts of the original 1949 treaty 
expire, while the British Government, in 
the words of the Supplementary Defence 
White Paper of July 1968, maintain that: 
"In Defence, as in every other field, the 
first and fundamental assumption on 
which the Government believes that Britain 
must base her future policy is the 
need for closer unity in Europe." 


o these ends the present British Govern-
ent has earmarked a greater contribu-
::m towards the forces of NATO, namely"mobile task force" of men, ships and 
rcraft. There is, consequently, great 
ope for further British negotiationsith members of EEC on these issues of 
>llective defence requirements--quiteJart from any considerations involved 
the Treaty of Rome-and these con-
. cts are very likely to help a rapport!tween Britain and Europe, thus facili-
ting possible future British entry to EEC. 
he only snag in this argument is that, 
st as France is the one EEC member 
.Jt of step on the question of British 
embership of EEC, so too France is out 
' step on the questions of collective 
orth Atlantic defence. That being the 
Lse, one wonders how far co-operationdefence, while very necessary and 
udable in itself, can help overcome the 
a! stumbling blocks to British member-
lip of EEC. 
[ore hopeful progress has been achieved 
the realm of technological co-opera-
Jn between Britain and western Europ-
m countries, although there remains vir-
ally unbounded scope for future de-
~lopments in this field. For one thing, 
common defence commitments are 
·awn up, then the physical means of 
·ocuring those commitments, i.e., the 
m-nuclear weapons which would make 
' the deterrent, will need to be pro-
lced and constantly developed in the 
~ht of new technological research. Con-
quently, defence co-operation could 
ad quite naturally to technological co-
Jeration. But openings for joint techno-
gical ventures occur in many other 
:lds of government policy, in civil avia-
m and other transport, in fuel and 
>wer (particularly in the peaceful uses 
· nuclear energy and the building of 
1clear reactor generators) and in tele-
>mmunications. Indeed, all the work of 
e British Ministry of Technology cries 
l1t for co-operation on an international 
ale. And, of course, so far as Western 
1rope is concerned, such co-operationould be bound to help foster better 
utual understanding, in particular lead-
g Britain into an easier relationshipith EEC countries on which British EEC 
membership could be more fi·rmly based. 
Whether this is enough to overcome the 
French problem is a matter almost 
wholly for conjecture. Indeed, it is quitelikely that the French, seeing the ad-
vantages for themselves of technological 
co-operation with Britain, will continue 
with such a programme without anythought of its relevance to EEC. Similarly,
from the British point of view it would 
be advantageous to enter into such co-
operation even if we had definitely made 
up our minds not to seek EEC member-
ship. Technological co-operation, and in-
deed new defence co-operation, while 
helpful in fostering contacts and rapportbetween Britain and EEC members, is 
therefore only peripheral to the issue of 
British EEC membership. 
The policy of "keeping the issue alive 
without harmonisation" is therefore more 
a policy of attitudes rather than a pro-
gramme of detailed practicalities. The 
success of the policy depends in large 
measure on the considerations described 
earlier, while the effect of any accom-
panying measures would be beneficial 
whether the overall policy is successful 
or not. 
other recent proposals 
During January 1968 the three Benelux 
states produced a plan, subsequently ap-
proved at a WEU meeting, for a confer-
ence of all EEC members and the four 
candidate governments to discuss means 
of further co-operation outside the scopeof the Treaty of Rome. The plan also 
envisaged consultations between as many 
western European states as possible on 
political issues. It is not yet clear which 
line would find more favour with Britain, 
the wider political approach or the nar-
rower concentration on items of legaland technological co-operation. What is 
clear, however, is that the Benelux pro-
posals represent the first recognition by 
any EEC members that economic and 
political divisions in western Europe can 
be healed only by goodwill on both 
sides. Until this plan was put forward, 
EEC countries appeared to take the view 
o these ends the present British Govern-
ent has earmarked a greater contribu-
::m towards the forces of NATO, namely"mobile task force" of men, ships and 
rcraft. There is, consequently, great 
ope for further British negotiationsith members of EEC on these issues of 
>llective defence requirements--quiteJart from any considerations involved 
the Treaty of Rome-and these con-
. cts are very likely to help a rapport!tween Britain and Europe, thus facili-
ting possible future British entry to EEC. 
he only snag in this argument is that, 
st as France is the one EEC member 
.Jt of step on the question of British 
embership of EEC, so too France is out 
' step on the questions of collective 
orth Atlantic defence. That being the 
Lse, one wonders how far co-operationdefence, while very necessary and 
udable in itself, can help overcome the 
a! stumbling blocks to British member-
lip of EEC. 
[ore hopeful progress has been achieved 
the realm of technological co-opera-
Jn between Britain and western Europ-
m countries, although there remains vir-
ally unbounded scope for future de-
~lopments in this field. For one thing, 
common defence commitments are 
·awn up, then the physical means of 
·ocuring those commitments, i.e., the 
m-nuclear weapons which would make 
' the deterrent, will need to be pro-
lced and constantly developed in the 
~ht of new technological research. Con-
quently, defence co-operation could 
ad quite naturally to technological co-
Jeration. But openings for joint techno-
gical ventures occur in many other 
:lds of government policy, in civil avia-
m and other transport, in fuel and 
>wer (particularly in the peaceful uses 
· nuclear energy and the building of 
1clear reactor generators) and in tele-
>mmunications. Indeed, all the work of 
e British Ministry of Technology cries 
l1t for co-operation on an international 
ale. And, of course, so far as Western 
1rope is concerned, such co-operationould be bound to help foster better 
utual understanding, in particular lead-
g Britain into an easier relationshipith EEC countries on which British EEC 
membership could be more fi·rmly based. 
Whether this is enough to overcome the 
French problem is a matter almost 
wholly for conjecture. Indeed, it is quitelikely that the French, seeing the ad-
vantages for themselves of technological 
co-operation with Britain, will continue 
with such a programme without anythought of its relevance to EEC. Similarly,
from the British point of view it would 
be advantageous to enter into such co-
operation even if we had definitely made 
up our minds not to seek EEC member-
ship. Technological co-operation, and in-
deed new defence co-operation, while 
helpful in fostering contacts and rapportbetween Britain and EEC members, is 
therefore only peripheral to the issue of 
British EEC membership. 
The policy of "keeping the issue alive 
without harmonisation" is therefore more 
a policy of attitudes rather than a pro-
gramme of detailed practicalities. The 
success of the policy depends in large 
measure on the considerations described 
earlier, while the effect of any accom-
panying measures would be beneficial 
whether the overall policy is successful 
or not. 
other recent proposals 
During January 1968 the three Benelux 
states produced a plan, subsequently ap-
proved at a WEU meeting, for a confer-
ence of all EEC members and the four 
candidate governments to discuss means 
of further co-operation outside the scopeof the Treaty of Rome. The plan also 
envisaged consultations between as many 
western European states as possible on 
political issues. It is not yet clear which 
line would find more favour with Britain, 
the wider political approach or the nar-
rower concentration on items of legaland technological co-operation. What is 
clear, however, is that the Benelux pro-
posals represent the first recognition by 
any EEC members that economic and 
political divisions in western Europe can 
be healed only by goodwill on both 
sides. Until this plan was put forward, 
EEC countries appeared to take the view 

that no form of co-operation outside the 
confines of the Treaty of Rome was 
worthwhile. The Benelux plan is therefore 
to be welcomed for the spirit it 
shows, although there is some dangerthat its effect will be lost in the welter 
of debate which has surrounded it and 
similar proposals since their enunciation. 

One such set of proposals emanated from 
the meeting during February 1968, between 
the West German Chancellor and 
the French President, a meeting which 
disappointed those who were hoping that 
German pressure would force France to 
reconsider her opposition to immediate 
British membership of EEC. French 
economic weakness following their recent 
internal crisis may enable the West Germans 
to press them to accept a more 
promising attitude towards the candidate 
count·ries ; although the French in their 
weakness may be even more reluctant to 
subject themselves to new international 
competition. The February meeting did, 
however, result in some clarification of 
the French attitude to an arrangementbetween the community and candidate 
countries, so that the Scandinavian states 
have been encouraged to discuss their 
own attitudes to such an arrangement.
Britain's policy of seeking full EEC membership 
(or a guarantee of eventual membership) 
on an "all or nothing" basis 
could result in some EFrA members' 
making their own trading arrangements 
with the EEC without Britain, and so 
weakening EFrA. 

With regard to all these proposals currently 
under discussion, the Government 
has nothing to lose by exploring, as far 
as possible, what exactly the proposals 
entail and what !S their likelihood of 
success. However, nc.ne of these proposals 
is likely to be seriously enttrtained 
by the Gow rnPtent unless it offers the 
definite prospect of full EEC membershipfor Britain. In no way should Britain 
allow EEC members to keep her on a 
string. 


3. possibilities
involving EFTA 
Vhen we talk of EFrA as an alternative 
) full membership of EEC, we are not 
.1ggesting that the strengthening of EFrA 
1ill bring with it the same advantages as 
ave been claimed for full membership 
f EEC. We are trying to point to ways 
1 which EFrA could be strengthened so 
1at the impact of those disadvantages 
:emming from Britain's exclusion from 
EC is reduced. We shall therefore examle 
the basis on which EFrA operates,
1ggest possibilities for further develop-
lent and attempt to evaluate them by 
omparison with the advantages claimed 
Jr EEC membership. 

'he nature and scope of EFrA are dened 
in the Convention of Stockholm, 
gned by Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
ortugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
Tnited Kingdom in January 1960. Article 

sets out the objectives of the associaon 
which include inter alia a sustained 
xpansion of economic activity in each 
1ember state, fair trading competition 
nd the development and expansion of 
•orld trade. Article 30 adds that memer 
states intend to pursue economic and 
nancial policies so as to promote the 
bjectives of the association. The main 
tethod chosen to achieve these ob~
ctives was the creation of a free 
·ade area in industrial goods between 
te members. In March 1961 Finland 
gned an agreement with the association 
·hich, in effect, made her the eighthtember. 

ITA is a free trade area of 100 million 
eople, with no internal tariffs or quantative 
restrictions on industrial products. 
1 addition, the association recognises 
te importance of removing non-tariff 
u riers to trade which, following the 
.ennedy round, are likely to emerge as 
te major obstacles to further trade ex:
msion. The association tries to prevent 
>ea! charges causing discrimination beveen 
home produced goods and those 
·am other member states. To ensure 
tir competition for all EFrA producers,
is recognised that the association will 
:tve to examine such government polies 
as aids to domestic producers, buy.
g policies of nationalised industries and 
gislation dealing with restrictive prac


tices and trading specifications. 

In the same way as EEC, EFrA has also 
been concerned that none of its members 
should discriminate against nationals of 
other members. In pursuance of this 
policy the association has stipulated that 
nationals of all member states should be 
treated equally with respect to the establishment 
and operation of economic enterprises 
in the interests of free competition. 
Moreover, unl.ike EEC, EFrA has, as 
a clear objective, the promotion of full 
employment (Article 2(a)) ; indeed, an 
appreciable rise in unemployment caused 
by increasing imports of a commodityfrom other members of EFrA is a factor 
allowing the member concerned to impose 
tempora·ry quantitative restrictions. 

On the question of trade with third 
countries, i.e. non-members, EFrA allows 
each member to fix its own tariffs, but in 
addition, the association has power to 
negotiate trade arrangements on behalf 
of all members ; these can take the form 
of accession or association (Article 41). 
Furthermore, the effect of EFrA rules,

i.e. the "process" criterion, is to allow 
many imports from third countries which 
are used in EFrA manufactured products 
to participate in the benefits of an industrial 
free trade area. 
Equally important is the pragmatic approach 
adopted by the association to 
achieve its objectives. " It has remained a 
belief in EFrA that it is not fruitful to 
attempt to solve all possible problems in 
advance, rather than attempting to anticipate 
all future contingencies the 
writers of the convention were content 
to indicate the procedure by which problems 
could be dealt with as they arose 
and by which the association itself could 
be adapted to changing needs and circumstances" 
(T. Jantzen, The operationof a free trade area) . This flexibility is 
seen, for example, in the operation of 
the EFrA Council : there is no fixed limit 
to the scope of its powers although its 
decisions are binding on member states. 
Decisions involving increased obligations 
fm members must be unanimous; other 
decisions relating to complaints or the 
relaxation of obligations are by majority 


vote. It should be emphasised, however, 
that the creation of a superstate is in 
no way an objective of EFTA; indeed, 
there is provision for member states to 
withdraw from the association by giving 
12 months' notice. EFTA is based on a 
belief that the way to overcome economic 
nationalism is by free trade and cooperation 
instead of by building up a 
large supranational unit to which member 
states will ultimately be subordinate. 

Having examined the basis on which 
EFTA operates, we now proceed to explore 
the possibilities of its further development. 
There appear to be three general 
areas for such exploration: one involving 
closer economic ties between 
members, including agricultural co-operation 
; the second involving greater political 
cohesion within the association ; and 
the third involving stronger links with 
countries outside EFTA. 

When considering closer economic ties 
between members, a significant possibility 
would be to give the market protectionagainst competition from third countries 
by the adoption of a common external 
tariff as in EEC. This idea has not been 
acceptable to EFTA members so far because 
the concept of a customs union 
runs counter to the free trade objectiveswhich were responsible for the inauguration 
of the association in 1960. It will be 
recalled that talks between non EEC and 
EEC members broke down prior to 1960, 
because the non EEC members were concerned 
far more with international trade 
expansion than with a common tradingpolicy towards third countries. Againstthis background, proposals for a common 
external tariff for EFTA, even on industrial 
goods, are unlikely to meet approval 
unless there has been a fundamental 
change of heart by EFTA members 
on the question of a common trade 
policy towards the rest of the world. 
This might therefore be a matter for discussion 
within EFTA. 

In such discussions, much would depend 
on the attitude of, and the lead given by, 
the British Government. To suggest copying 
the CET and its protective mechanism 
of various levies, as established by EEC, 

could seriously prejudice the chances of 
continuing world trade expansion and 
is unlikely to be acceptable to EFTA 
members. We hope that any such discussions 
would take account of the tariff 
levels as they will stand after the Kennedy 
round reductions. It may be pos· 
sible to fit a common external tariff, certainly 
for industrial products, at the 
lowest level within EFTA instead of at the 
arithmetic average of members' existing 
tariffs, as within EEC. This could be considered 
a further positive step towards 
international free trade. 

Another possibility for strengthening 
EFTA economically would be to achieve 
closer co-operation on agricultural trade 
and development. Under Article 21 of 
the convention (which excludes agricultural 
goods from the free trade provisions) 
the council of EFTA does have 
power to amend both the article itself 
and also the list of products, mainly agricultural, 
which are exempt from the general 
provision relating to industrial 
goods. By taking either of these courses 
of action the council could declare a free 
trade area in agricultural goods; although 
such a drastic step is unlikely to 
take place in the foreseeable future. Under 
Article 22, furthermore, the members 
recognise that their agricultural policies 
are designed "(a) to promote increased 
productivity and the rational and economic 
development of production; (b) to 
provide a -reasonable degree of market 
stability and adequate supplies to consumers 
at reasonable prices; and (c) to 
ensure an adequate standard of living to 
persons engaged in agriculture". Theyhave to pay due regard to the interests 
of other members in the export of agricultural 
goods. One objective of the 
association is "to facilitate an expansion 
of (agricultural) trade which will provide 
reasonable reciprocity to member states 
whose economies depend to a great extent 
on exports of agricultural goods." 

Another way of expanding agricultural 
trade within EFTA is by bilateral trading 
agreements between members. This 
method has been used on occasion to 
provide duty free access for agricultural 
exports to a particular member. Such 


agreements remain in force for as long 
iS the convention ; many tariff provis.
ons in them apply to other member 
;tates not parties to these agreements but 
~xporting the goods in question. As a 
·esult of these measures and the general 
~xpansion in world trade there has been 
1 steady growth of intra EPTA agricul:
ural trade by 50 per cent from 1961 to 

.1966. However, this expansion has been 
;lower than the expansion of trade in 
ndustrial goods, which probably shows 
:he scope existing for further agricul:
ural co-operation in the association. 

Since 1964 there has been an annual review 
within EFTA of its t·rade in agriculmral 
goods, with a view to securing fur:
her expansion. The successive reviews 
1ave been primarily concerned to elucidate 
the facts about agricultural policy 
and production in each member state, no 
easy task because of the variety and ingenuity 
of the methods used by governments 
to protect their farmers from the 
effects of overseas competition and to ensure 
them a reasonable standard of living. 
The 1967 review offered a cautious 
assessment of the situation, pointing out 
that the attainment of a better overall 
balance between production and consumption 
within EFTA would depend on 
the agricultural and import policies of 
member states like Britain, who are largeimporters of agricultural goods. Since 
pressure is growing within Britain for 
import saving policies in food, the onlyhope for a major expansion in EFTA 
agricultural trade would appear to be if 
Denmark agreed to take more industrial 
exports from Britain to remedy what is 
:1t present a very one sided balance of 
trade between the two countries. 

lt may be asked why EEC should have 
been able to adopt a common agricultural 
policy and yet EFTA has not done 
so. There are two main reasons for the 
situation. Firstly, EFTA is not nearly as 
>elf sufficient in agricultural production 
as is EEC. Moreover EFTA's pattern of 
agricultural production and trade is more 
diverse than that of EEC, a larger proportion 
of the association's imports and exports 
being with third countries. Secondly, 
it is recognised that to aim at agri


cultural self sufficiency would disrupttraditional patterns of agricultural trade 
with third countries ; this is what has 
happened as a result of the EEC system of 
variable import levies. Furthermore, a 
uniform price level for each commodityof agricultural production within EFTA 
(as the EEC has done) would encourage 
production expansion over and above the 
degree of self sufficiency desired. This 
would lead to the very problems of over 
production which are beginning to cause 
difficulties within EEC. The solution adopted 
there-massive export subsidies-
merely injects these difficulties into world 
agricultural trade. Internationa-l irresponsibility 
of this kind is not what we would 
wish to see emerge from any expansion 
in the agricultural trade of EFTA. 

Where EFTA can help itself and the cause 
of world agricultural trade is by extending 
the concept of commodity agreements 
between members to embrace third 
countries dependent on agricultural exports 
to Europe. The idea of international 
commodity agreements is not new, 
but little has been done to put it into 
practice. However, after the comparative 
success of the Kennedy round in lowering 
tariffs on industrial goods, there is 
likely to be greater pressure by those 
countries exporting agricultural products 
at world market prices for some agreement 
on the regulation of this international 
trade. The 1968 UNCTAD meeting 
was concerned with this problem. It is 
within EFTA's power to take a lead at 
future conferences by offering to negotiate 
international commodity agreements 
for meat and dairy products, limiting or 
eliminating export subsidies, negotiating 
international prices and regularising food 
aid to underdeveloped countries ; such a 
step might force the EEC also to consider 
revising its present archaic agriculturalpolicies. If some kind of international 
order can be made out of the presentjungle of international agricultural trade, 
EFTA will benefit by the increased earning 
power of underdeveloped countries 
leading to a general expansion of trade 

between rich and poor countries. 

Having considered the economic possibilities 
of strengthening EFTA, we now 


12 
turn to the question of political develop-
ments within the association. EFfA is at 
present an economic association ; it has 
no political content, nor is there any pos-
sibility of its developing into a super-
state which many people, including the 
British Government, want from EEC 
membership. Within the association, how-
ever, there exist two groupings-namelythe Nordic council and the meeting of 
EFrA parliamentarians-which provide 
some measure of political consultation 
and co-operation between certain mem-
ber states. 
There is nothing new about the idea of 
co-operation between the four Scandi-
navian states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and Finland). In 1907 members of their 
parliaments set up the Northern Inter-
parliamentary Union as a private organ-
isation. Later moves to formalise the 
links between the states gained strength, 
and even before the second world war 
there was growing official recognitionthat the long experience of co-operationin the region should be embodied in a 
permanent organisation. There were set-
backs during the war of 1939-45 and in 
the early stages of the cold war, mainly 
because of Finland's tortuous relation-
ship with the USSR and because of the 
split over membership of NATO . Never-
theless the movement to political co-oper-
ation was renewed in those spheres where 
all four states had common interests. As 
an historian of the movement has putit: " . . . the age long relationships be-
tween Denmark and Norway and be-
tween Sweden and Finland, left indelible 
marks on the languages, government, 
legislation, administration of justice, 
social life and literature .. . Unbreakable 
bonds had been tied, similarities and con-
formities established. The spirit of soli-
darity created over long and importantperiods is still very much alive and con-
stitutes a valuable foundation for the 
present day endeavours of Scandinavian 
co-operation " (F . Wendt, The N ordic 
Council and co-operation in Scandina-
via) . All four countries have a compas-
sionate respect for human rights which 
underlies their modern and progressive 
social legislation. They have developedtheir democratic systems on similar lines 
and have placed great emphasis on in-
dividual social security. They have also 
enjoyed political stability. 
After the second world war there was 
growing co-operation at official level to 
deal with social problems, legislation, 
cultural affairs, communications and 
economic co-operation. In 1952 these. 
arrangements were formalised when the 
Nordic Council was set up, Iceland also 
joining in. It consists of representatives 
of the five governments and MPS elected 
by the parliaments in proportion to partystrengths. Its deliberations are recognised 
as sufficiently important for the primeministers and foreign ministers regularly 
to attend its meetings, which are held 
annually, although ministerial meetings 
take place more often. The council can 
deal with any matters relating to two m 
more of the five countries. Its role is 
consultative but none the less valuable. 
Its working methods are similar to those 
employed in EFrA, the emphasis being on 
flexibility. It is a practical body for deal-
ing with current problems, co-ordinating 
existing forms of Scandinavian co-opera-
tion and ensuring that the respective par-
liaments give more attention to such 
matters. A further development expected 
in the near future is the institution of a 
secretariat. The council has been able to 
negotiate a convention introducing a 
common labour market, enabling work-
ers to take up jobs in the territory of anymember, and a social security conven-
tion. Since 1966, EFrA and the Nordic 
Council have held meetings to revie\\ 
work they are both doing. An EFfA ob· 
server now attends the full meetings oJ 
the council and reports back to EFfA 
council. 
The question for our consideration h 
whether Britain can and should join in 
this work, either by promoting links be·· 
tween herself and the Nordic Council 01 
by taking steps to set up a similar 
of body that would include all EFf}
members, i.e., can the example of tht 
Nordic Council be used as a basis foi 
strengthening political cohesion withir 
EFfA, and ultimately within Europe a~ 
a whole ? We are of the opinion that thi~ 
is a very real and desirable possibility, tc 
12 
turn to the question of political develop-
ments within the association. EFfA is at 
present an economic association ; it has 
no political content, nor is there any pos-
sibility of its developing into a super-
state which many people, including the 
British Government, want from EEC 
membership. Within the association, how-
ever, there exist two groupings-namelythe Nordic council and the meeting of 
EFrA parliamentarians-which provide 
some measure of political consultation 
and co-operation between certain mem-
ber states. 
There is nothing new about the idea of 
co-operation between the four Scandi-
navian states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and Finland). In 1907 members of their 
parliaments set up the Northern Inter-
parliamentary Union as a private organ-
isation. Later moves to formalise the 
links between the states gained strength, 
and even before the second world war 
there was growing official recognitionthat the long experience of co-operationin the region should be embodied in a 
permanent organisation. There were set-
backs during the war of 1939-45 and in 
the early stages of the cold war, mainly 
because of Finland's tortuous relation-
ship with the USSR and because of the 
split over membership of NATO . Never-
theless the movement to political co-oper-
ation was renewed in those spheres where 
all four states had common interests. As 
an historian of the movement has putit: " . . . the age long relationships be-
tween Denmark and Norway and be-
tween Sweden and Finland, left indelible 
marks on the languages, government, 
legislation, administration of justice, 
social life and literature .. . Unbreakable 
bonds had been tied, similarities and con-
formities established. The spirit of soli-
darity created over long and importantperiods is still very much alive and con-
stitutes a valuable foundation for the 
present day endeavours of Scandinavian 
co-operation " (F . Wendt, The N ordic 
Council and co-operation in Scandina-
via) . All four countries have a compas-
sionate respect for human rights which 
underlies their modern and progressive 
social legislation. They have developedtheir democratic systems on similar lines 
and have placed great emphasis on in-
dividual social security. They have also 
enjoyed political stability. 
After the second world war there was 
growing co-operation at official level to 
deal with social problems, legislation, 
cultural affairs, communications and 
economic co-operation. In 1952 these. 
arrangements were formalised when the 
Nordic Council was set up, Iceland also 
joining in. It consists of representatives 
of the five governments and MPS elected 
by the parliaments in proportion to partystrengths. Its deliberations are recognised 
as sufficiently important for the primeministers and foreign ministers regularly 
to attend its meetings, which are held 
annually, although ministerial meetings 
take place more often. The council can 
deal with any matters relating to two m 
more of the five countries. Its role is 
consultative but none the less valuable. 
Its working methods are similar to those 
employed in EFrA, the emphasis being on 
flexibility. It is a practical body for deal-
ing with current problems, co-ordinating 
existing forms of Scandinavian co-opera-
tion and ensuring that the respective par-
liaments give more attention to such 
matters. A further development expected 
in the near future is the institution of a 
secretariat. The council has been able to 
negotiate a convention introducing a 
common labour market, enabling work-
ers to take up jobs in the territory of anymember, and a social security conven-
tion. Since 1966, EFrA and the Nordic 
Council have held meetings to revie\\ 
work they are both doing. An EFfA ob· 
server now attends the full meetings oJ 
the council and reports back to EFfA 
council. 
The question for our consideration h 
whether Britain can and should join in 
this work, either by promoting links be·· 
tween herself and the Nordic Council 01 
by taking steps to set up a similar 
of body that would include all EFf}
members, i.e., can the example of tht 
Nordic Council be used as a basis foi 
strengthening political cohesion withir 
EFfA, and ultimately within Europe a~ 
a whole ? We are of the opinion that thi~ 
is a very real and desirable possibility, tc 

e made easier because Britain has much 
t common with the Scandinavian coun


•ies, politically, socially and culturally. 
/hether Britain should initiate discus-
ons with a view to her attending meettgs 
of the Nordic Council and particiating 
in the work of that body, or 
•hether she should aim to set up a simitr, 
but wider, body covering EFI'A counies 
is a matter for diplomatic consulttions. 
Because of close traditional ties 
ashrined in the Nordic Council, it seems 
·iser for Britain to aim at setting up
new body. Such an organisation would 
ave no shortage of tasks, for instance, 
t seeking closer co-ordination of policies 
f social welfare, employment and taxaon. 
Co-operation of this kind would be 
aluable in itself, but is unlikely to prolde 
a firm basis for future politicalnity. 

he second political grouping within 
FTA is the meeting of EFI'A parliamentrians. 
This consists of MPS from EFI'A 
.ates meeting regularly to review EFI'A 
!fairs and European integration. It is an 
nofficial forum for the exchange of 
iews on European problems and could 
e the means for ensuring that much 
reater attention is given to EFI'A affairs 
t the parliaments of the EFI'A countries . 
.t their meeting in September 1967 the 
arliamentarians agreed that eo-operaon 
within EFI'A should be extended. If 
ur suggestion for a development based 
n the Nordic Council or a similar body 
·ere adopted, the EFI'A parliamentariansteeting might well become part of the 
ew grouping. 

le turn finally to consider ways of 
rengthening links between EFI'A and 
ther countries, both economically and 
olitically. EFI'A could expand in either 
f two ways ; by the addition of new 
tembers or associates, or by merging 
te association into a larger free trade 
:ea. The question of new members 
'mes down to the basic issue of tradingJd other relationships between Eastern 
Jd Western Europe, since there are few 
restern European countries which are 
Jt members of EFI'A or EEC. If expanon 
of EFI'A's market within Europe is 
~siraple, it must come from the develop


ment of links with eastern Europeanstates. Because EFI'A is a flexible assiciation, 
it has some chance of attracting 
eastern European states into its orbit. 
This could take the form of trading links 
leading to closer contact and the break-
ing-down of ba-rriers between east and 
west Europe. Already negotiations are in 
progress for a trading agreement between 
EFTA and Jugoslavia. In addition EFI'A 
could take the political lead by inviting 
members of eastern European parliaments 
to attend regular joint meetings 
with MPS from EFI'A states. With the 
growing pressure for more democratic 
practices in eastern Europe the scope for 
co-operation between Eiii'A and some of 
those countries could be very wide and 
should certainly be explored. 


4. a north Atlantic trade are 
The other main general strategy which 
has been proposed as an alternative to 
immediate EEC membership for Britain is 
a free trade area straddling the North 
Atlantic ocean, an arrangement conveniently 
described as NAFTA. Most supporters 
of the idea of NAFTA include in this 
economic grouping the United States, 
Canada and all the countries of EFTA, 
so that in some respects the NAFTA strategy 
can be regarded as a developmentof EFTA. 

The proposals for NAFTA resemble the 
present practice of EFTA insofar as they 
are entirely trade proposals and would 
create a loose economic association of 
the member states without that degreeof political integration which is an essential 
part of the framework of EEC. But, 
of course, the NAFTA idea involves far 
more than just a European viewpoint-
indeed some variants of the idea would 
embrace also Australia, New Zealand 
and Japan-and consequently the "third 
force" argument for closer Europeanintegration, namely that a united Europewould be a balancing force between the 
USA and USSR, forms no part of the case 
for NAFTA. On the contrary, in fact, any 
NAFTA arrangement would bring a large 
part of western Europe-sometimes the 
NAFTA concept is taken to embrace EEC 
also-far more closely into the American 
economic o·rbit than was the case even 
with the Marshall plan and lease lend. 

It is therefore not surprising that manyof the suggestions for NAFTA have originated 
from the United States, where it is 
seen as a further development of the 
various proposals for a free trade area 
between the United States and Canada. 
The most celebrated American exponentof the NAFTA concept is the liberal Republican 
Senator for New York State, 
hcob Javits, who came out in strong 
support of a NAFTA arrangement in a 
Washington speech in August 1965, on 
which he elaborated in London the following 
November. A key sentence from 
Senator Javits' London speech is that he 
regarded this alternative policy for the 
U nited States as "a proposal for a treatyof free trade and economic co-operation 
with the UK, other EEC and EFTA nations, 

Canada, New Zealand and Australia, 
and other industrialised countries of the 
OEDC which agree to adhere to the new 
rules of trade of the free trade area." 
Senator Javits envisaged a transitional 
period of twenty years in which the industrialised 
members of NAFTA would 
achieve f.ree trade in manufactured 
goods, and in which associated developing 
countries would retain protection for 
new industries. He also suggested that, in 
view of Britain's recurrent economic dif· 
ficulties, at first there should be specialAmerican financial support for Britain in 
the form of official encouragement to use 
long term private capital for British in· 
dustrial modernisation. 

Senator Javits' proposals had in fact been 
foreshadowed in 1962 by Senator Paul 
Douglas of Illinois and, on this side of 
the Atlantic, by J ames Meade, Professor 
of Political Economy of Cambridge Uni· 
versity, who put forward this suggestion, 
as a possible alternative to be pursued in 
the event of our first EEC application fail· 
ing; and, in 1964, by Professor Bertil 
Ohlin, then leader of the Swedish oppo· 
sition, who regarded it as a plan to be 
implemented should the Kennedy round 
negotiations end in deadlock. But their 
main proposals were clearly positive and 
can be regarded as forerunners of the 
more detailed ideas put forwa·rd by Sena· 
tor Javits. 

The same development has been con· 
tinued on a far more detailed level b)
the Atlantic Trade Study Group set Uf 
in London as an independent and non· 
party group, sponsoring "a program~! 
of studies on the implication for Britan 
of taking part in the open ended, Atlan 
tic based, free trade area". The first o 
these studies, carried out by Maxwel 
Stamp Associates and published in No 
vem ber 1967, is a general analysis of th1• 
background of the proposals for a NAFf1 
arrangement and of its implications f~ 
British industry. The appearance of tht 
study has been publicised by a numbe 
of British politicians who have generall" 
been antagonistic towards British mem 
bership of EEC, notably Douglas Jay, ex 
President of the Board of Trade. Indeec 
an all party group of these politician 


~ ended a conference during February58, held at the Centre for International 
!1dies in New York University, to dis-
ss NAFTA proposals and, no doubt, to 
Lre ideas on how steps might be taken 
implement them. The venue for this 
~nt again emphasises that the predom-
nt backing for the NAFTA idea comes 
1m America. 
"e report of the Maxwell Stamp study1tains a mass of economic and trade 
tistics comparing Britain, the United 
, ttes, EFTA, EEC and other countries, on 
.ich are based projections as to what 
: trade creating and trade diverting 
1ects of NAFTA could be for Britain. 
' 1ile the study acknowledges that British 
lustry in NAFTA would be brought more 
enly face to face with American corn· 
:ition, the effects of this are not always:en into account in the statistical fore-
;ts, for example, when it is assumed 
~4) that British trade with EFTA would 
t be directly affected by American 
'llpetition in those countries. In the 
er sections of the report, there is a 
tistical breakdown for particular com-
>dities, indicating the possible effects of 
FTA on individual British industries. Of 
Jrse the development of NAFTA would 
highly likely to attract further Ameri-
1 investment into this country, whether 
not this were given official financial 
:ouragement. 
fore attempting to evaluate the NAFTA 
ategy as an alternative for Britain to 
mediate membership of EEC, we must 
;t consider how far the development of 
FTA is likely to "get off the ground" 
any case. The willingness of Britain 
d other EFTA countries to enter a NAFTA 
teme will depend very largely on the 
~ree of success achieved by the pro-
nents of NAFTA, although the presentitish Government has up to now re-
ted NAFTA as a viable alternative to 
:: membership. It seems to us, how-
~r. that the first obstacle to the launch-
: of NAFTA lies with the Americans 
:mselves, for at the present time of 
•rld economic stringency the American 
Jple are not in a free trading mood, 
d even the recommendations of the 
:nnedy round of tariff cuts have had a 
rough passage through Congress. It is 
difficult to say how far men like Senator 
Javits and ex-Senator Douglas carry in-
fluence in the appropriate political circles 
in the us, although it is clear that con-
siderable support from American indus-
try is behind them. Furthermore, the sup-
porters of NAFTA almost all include the 
EEC countries as members, sooner or 
later, of the association, which no doubt 
is intended to give Britain and the other 
EFTA countries the impression that mem-
bership of NAFTA is not to be regarded 
as precluding membership of EEC. But it 
is very unlikely that the countries of EEC, 
constrained by the prevailing French 
anti-Anglo Saxon feeling and inspired by 
the "third force" theory, will want to 
have official trade links with the us with-
in NAFTA. All these considerations then 
make the development of NAFTA, even in 
its initial stages, beset with difficulties. 
Assuming that NAFTA came into existence, 
including at least the us, Canada, Britain 
and the other present members of EFTA, 
it would certainly be the largest free 
trading unit in the world, both in terms 
of population and gross production. Of 
course, some of the trading advantagesto be obtained from NAFTA will result in 
any case from the Kennedy round. But 
Britain inside NAFTA would be part of an 
enormous market with incomparable op· 
portunities for industrial expansion and 
modernisation. Whether these opportuni·
ties became practical possibilities or not 
would depend on how far British indus-
try could meet and surpass the challenge 
of us competition in every part of that 
market, including Britain. More likelythan not, British manufacturers would 
have to specialise in certain products for 
which we have the competitive advantage 
over the Americans, although these 
would include only few of the "glamourproducts" of modern technology. In the 
words of Lord Gladwyn, speaking in the 
House of Lords on 2 November, 1967 : 
"As a broad generalisation we should 
find ourselves making the trouser buttons 
while the Americans made the comput-
ers. But would that matter, because we 
should be part of a large and prosperouscommunity, and it might make us, col-
lectively. a great force in the world." 
~ ended a conference during February58, held at the Centre for International 
!1dies in New York University, to dis-
ss NAFTA proposals and, no doubt, to 
Lre ideas on how steps might be taken 
implement them. The venue for this 
~nt again emphasises that the predom-
nt backing for the NAFTA idea comes 
1m America. 
"e report of the Maxwell Stamp study1tains a mass of economic and trade 
tistics comparing Britain, the United 
, ttes, EFTA, EEC and other countries, on 
.ich are based projections as to what 
: trade creating and trade diverting 
1ects of NAFTA could be for Britain. 
' 1ile the study acknowledges that British 
lustry in NAFTA would be brought more 
enly face to face with American corn· 
:ition, the effects of this are not always:en into account in the statistical fore-
;ts, for example, when it is assumed 
~4) that British trade with EFTA would 
t be directly affected by American 
'llpetition in those countries. In the 
er sections of the report, there is a 
tistical breakdown for particular com-
>dities, indicating the possible effects of 
FTA on individual British industries. Of 
Jrse the development of NAFTA would 
highly likely to attract further Ameri-
1 investment into this country, whether 
not this were given official financial 
:ouragement. 
fore attempting to evaluate the NAFTA 
ategy as an alternative for Britain to 
mediate membership of EEC, we must 
;t consider how far the development of 
FTA is likely to "get off the ground" 
any case. The willingness of Britain 
d other EFTA countries to enter a NAFTA 
teme will depend very largely on the 
~ree of success achieved by the pro-
nents of NAFTA, although the presentitish Government has up to now re-
ted NAFTA as a viable alternative to 
:: membership. It seems to us, how-
~r. that the first obstacle to the launch-
: of NAFTA lies with the Americans 
:mselves, for at the present time of 
•rld economic stringency the American 
Jple are not in a free trading mood, 
d even the recommendations of the 
:nnedy round of tariff cuts have had a 
rough passage through Congress. It is 
difficult to say how far men like Senator 
Javits and ex-Senator Douglas carry in-
fluence in the appropriate political circles 
in the us, although it is clear that con-
siderable support from American indus-
try is behind them. Furthermore, the sup-
porters of NAFTA almost all include the 
EEC countries as members, sooner or 
later, of the association, which no doubt 
is intended to give Britain and the other 
EFTA countries the impression that mem-
bership of NAFTA is not to be regarded 
as precluding membership of EEC. But it 
is very unlikely that the countries of EEC, 
constrained by the prevailing French 
anti-Anglo Saxon feeling and inspired by 
the "third force" theory, will want to 
have official trade links with the us with-
in NAFTA. All these considerations then 
make the development of NAFTA, even in 
its initial stages, beset with difficulties. 
Assuming that NAFTA came into existence, 
including at least the us, Canada, Britain 
and the other present members of EFTA, 
it would certainly be the largest free 
trading unit in the world, both in terms 
of population and gross production. Of 
course, some of the trading advantagesto be obtained from NAFTA will result in 
any case from the Kennedy round. But 
Britain inside NAFTA would be part of an 
enormous market with incomparable op· 
portunities for industrial expansion and 
modernisation. Whether these opportuni·
ties became practical possibilities or not 
would depend on how far British indus-
try could meet and surpass the challenge 
of us competition in every part of that 
market, including Britain. More likelythan not, British manufacturers would 
have to specialise in certain products for 
which we have the competitive advantage 
over the Americans, although these 
would include only few of the "glamourproducts" of modern technology. In the 
words of Lord Gladwyn, speaking in the 
House of Lords on 2 November, 1967 : 
"As a broad generalisation we should 
find ourselves making the trouser buttons 
while the Americans made the comput-
ers. But would that matter, because we 
should be part of a large and prosperouscommunity, and it might make us, col-
lectively. a great force in the world." 

16 
The commanding heights of NAFfA's 
economy would largely be in American 
hands, which is clearly the reason for so 
much American support for the scheme. 
Moreover, it is wrong to assume that 
NAFfA would be a closely integrated and 
cohesive economic unit, at least for a 
very long time, as the distances between 
different parts of NAFfA would make it 
far more like the old British Empire than 
the developing EEC. In such a loose, scat-
tered economic unit, it would be easyfor divergencies between the standards 
of living in different parts of the asso-
ciation to grow rather than diminish. 
There would be little possibility of re-
versing such a tendency, short of destroy-
ing NAFfA, so long as NAFfA has no poli-
tical content, and all the suporters of 
NAFfA are deliberately excluding from 
their proposals any means of politicalco-ordination. 
Consequently, any political results which 
might arise from NAFfA would be caused 
only indirectly, from the growth of free 
trade and the removal of non-tariff trad-
ing discriminations within individual 
countries. In time, this might necessitate 
political negotiations within NAFfA on 
such problems as movement of labour or 
harmonisation of social security systems. 
But from its beginning, NAFfA would 
make each member nation less able to 
control its own economic policy. This 
might not be a serious disadvantage poli-
tically if the other members of NAFfA 
had similar political outlooks to our own, 
or if no member of NAFfA had predom-
inant political power compared with the 
others, but with the us within NAPTA 
neither of these conditions would hold. 
[ndeed, the whole of NAI'TA would be un-
der the influence of undiluted, American-
style capitalism, overshadowing the char-
acteristics of social democracy and pub-
lic enterprise at present common to Bri-
tain and other EFfA countries. The scopeof British political action is alreadylargely dominated in practice by consid-
erations of American policy, and NAFfA 
would inevitably exaggerate this tend-
ency. 
Apart from these indirect, and negative, 
political consequences of free trade 
throughout NAFfA, the proposed schemr 
deliberately avoids all attempts to estab 
!ish common political institutions cover 
ing member countries; NAFfA is con 
ceived as an alternative to supranationalism. Short of Britain's becoming part o 
the us, this country would have no poli 
tical representation at the centre o 
NAFfA, which could be nowhere bu 
Washington. Because NAFfA would in 
valve no formal political co-operation be 
tween member countries and no estab. 
lishment of supranational institutions, . 
would be regarded by few internationa 
ists as an important step of progress tc 
wa·rds world government. The lack of 
political authority within NAFfA woul 
cause difficulties if ever a link-up wit 
EEC were attempted. 
Furthermore, the fact that NAFfA woul 
include the us would present an almo 
total barrier to closer links betwee 
NAFfA countries and eastern Europe; ir; 
deed, one wonders what would happe 
to the trading positions of Austria a 
Finland under NAFfA. In this way it aJ 
pears that, far f•rom being a unifyirforce between European nations, NAFJ 
would lead to an even more rigid divi 
ion of Europe with nearly complepolarisation between American capitalis 
and Soviet collectivism. Nor, too, is 
clear whether NAFfA would help bridJ 
or widen the gulf between the developr 
and underdeveloped nations of the worl 
and in some respects it could be regardras a club of all the Ticher, industrialisr 
western nations to the exclusion 
others. Such an impression would be ve 
difficult to dispel, even by the applicatirof some of the suggestions on this poi 
made by David Wall in a further Atla 
tic Trade Study pamphlet (The thi 
world challenge, January 1968). Thus t 
political effects of NAFfA, as at pres~ 
conceived, would be undesirable, be· 
within the association and in its relatic 
ship with other nations, particularly th~ 
of eastern Europe and the Afro-Asr 
group. 
There are numerous signs that NAF 
is going to be discussed widely in Brit 
political circles in the near future, for ' 
Atlantic Trade Study Group, with 
16 
The commanding heights of NAFfA's 
economy would largely be in American 
hands, which is clearly the reason for so 
much American support for the scheme. 
Moreover, it is wrong to assume that 
NAFfA would be a closely integrated and 
cohesive economic unit, at least for a 
very long time, as the distances between 
different parts of NAFfA would make it 
far more like the old British Empire than 
the developing EEC. In such a loose, scat-
tered economic unit, it would be easyfor divergencies between the standards 
of living in different parts of the asso-
ciation to grow rather than diminish. 
There would be little possibility of re-
versing such a tendency, short of destroy-
ing NAFfA, so long as NAFfA has no poli-
tical content, and all the suporters of 
NAFfA are deliberately excluding from 
their proposals any means of politicalco-ordination. 
Consequently, any political results which 
might arise from NAFfA would be caused 
only indirectly, from the growth of free 
trade and the removal of non-tariff trad-
ing discriminations within individual 
countries. In time, this might necessitate 
political negotiations within NAFfA on 
such problems as movement of labour or 
harmonisation of social security systems. 
But from its beginning, NAFfA would 
make each member nation less able to 
control its own economic policy. This 
might not be a serious disadvantage poli-
tically if the other members of NAFfA 
had similar political outlooks to our own, 
or if no member of NAFfA had predom-
inant political power compared with the 
others, but with the us within NAPTA 
neither of these conditions would hold. 
[ndeed, the whole of NAI'TA would be un-
der the influence of undiluted, American-
style capitalism, overshadowing the char-
acteristics of social democracy and pub-
lic enterprise at present common to Bri-
tain and other EFfA countries. The scopeof British political action is alreadylargely dominated in practice by consid-
erations of American policy, and NAFfA 
would inevitably exaggerate this tend-
ency. 
Apart from these indirect, and negative, 
political consequences of free trade 
throughout NAFfA, the proposed schemr 
deliberately avoids all attempts to estab 
!ish common political institutions cover 
ing member countries; NAFfA is con 
ceived as an alternative to supranationalism. Short of Britain's becoming part o 
the us, this country would have no poli 
tical representation at the centre o 
NAFfA, which could be nowhere bu 
Washington. Because NAFfA would in 
valve no formal political co-operation be 
tween member countries and no estab. 
lishment of supranational institutions, . 
would be regarded by few internationa 
ists as an important step of progress tc 
wa·rds world government. The lack of 
political authority within NAFfA woul 
cause difficulties if ever a link-up wit 
EEC were attempted. 
Furthermore, the fact that NAFfA woul 
include the us would present an almo 
total barrier to closer links betwee 
NAFfA countries and eastern Europe; ir; 
deed, one wonders what would happe 
to the trading positions of Austria a 
Finland under NAFfA. In this way it aJ 
pears that, far f•rom being a unifyirforce between European nations, NAFJ 
would lead to an even more rigid divi 
ion of Europe with nearly complepolarisation between American capitalis 
and Soviet collectivism. Nor, too, is 
clear whether NAFfA would help bridJ 
or widen the gulf between the developr 
and underdeveloped nations of the worl 
and in some respects it could be regardras a club of all the Ticher, industrialisr 
western nations to the exclusion 
others. Such an impression would be ve 
difficult to dispel, even by the applicatirof some of the suggestions on this poi 
made by David Wall in a further Atla 
tic Trade Study pamphlet (The thi 
world challenge, January 1968). Thus t 
political effects of NAFfA, as at pres~ 
conceived, would be undesirable, be· 
within the association and in its relatic 
ship with other nations, particularly th~ 
of eastern Europe and the Afro-Asr 
group. 
There are numerous signs that NAF 
is going to be discussed widely in Brit 
political circles in the near future, for ' 
Atlantic Trade Study Group, with 

;tinguished committee, is bound to 
mmand attention. It is likely that manyliticians, of different parties, will 
oouse the NAFrA idea as a clear altertive 
to Common Market membership, 
1ich many of them have opposedhemently and long. Indeed, there is a 
11 danger that the discussion may be-
me a contest between the rival suprters 
of NAFrA and EEC, despite the 
::ts that EEC membership does not apar 
to be readily available and that the 
FTA concept allows for eventual in-
Ision of the EEC countries. But the 
tin objection to such a debating con:
t is that it would convey the false imession 
that no alternative exists other 
m these two. And as we have been at 
ins to point out, there are other 
ernatives, possibly better ones, for 
itain to consider. 


5. conclusions 
Having considered the six generalstrategies which arise as possible alternatives 
to full and immediate British membership 
of EEC, we now tackle the question 
of what strategy ought now to be 
pursued by the British Government. In 
this we are more conscious of the feasibility 
of the respective strategies in terms 
of practical politics, both with regard 
to the attitudes of other governments and 
how far each strategy could be based on 
existing institutions and arrangements. 
Of the various possible strategies, four involve 
Britain's relationship with EEC 
countries, whereas the other two would 
require a deliberate move by Britain in a 
direction quite apart from EEC. These 
two sets of strategies are mutually exclusive, 
at least in the foreseeable future, 
so the Government must make an earlychoice (the earlier the better) between 
European policies which involve EEC and 
those which do not. Otherwise an atmosphere 
of public apathy and confusion 
will prevail, both within Britain and 
among our friends elsewhere, which will 
do nothing but ha·rm to British interests. 

At present it appears that the EEC countries 
still cannot agree on what arrangements 
they should aim to make with Britain 
and the other candidate countries ; 
possibly the French feel that it is in their 
interests to keep Britain "indefinitely on 
a string". It may therefore be impossiblefor Britain to obtain, in the near future, 
the precise information which she needs 
to have if she is to pursue one of the 
policies leading to eventual full membership, 
or other formal arrangements, with 
EEC countries. However great may be the 
economic and political advantages to be 
gained by Britain from any of the four 
strategies involving EEC, it is pointless to 
continue with any of those strategieswhen any one of the six members of EEC 
is in long term opposition to us. 

It seems indisputable that the present 
French government, even when faced 
with the economic problems arising from 
the troubles of the early summer of 
1968, will continue to oppose British participation 
in any formal way with EEC 
for as long as President de Gaulle occupies 
the Elysee Palace ; nor will official 

French attitudes necessarily change when 
he has gone, for both on the :right and 
left of French politics there are stronginfluences against British attachment to 
EEC. Unless there is some unexpectedchange in official French attitudes, all 
policies designed to lead Britain into fu11 
or associated membership of EEC are 
"non-starters". Any attempt to harmonise 
British policies with EEC practice would 
be foolhardy in the absence of a firm 
guarantee of eventual full British membership 
of EEC. Furthermore, most aspects 
of British-EEC co-operation outside 
the provisions of the Treaty of Rome 
can and should be pursued regardless 
of our overall European strategy. So we 
cannot see any benefit for ·Britain at this 
stage in continuing actively to pursue the 
goal of British EEC membership in view 
of the lasting intransigence· of the French. 

We do not, on the other hand, see 
great benefit for Britain at this stage in 
going ahead with plans for a NAFTA 
arrangement, for there would be greatdifficulty in getting NAFTA "off the 
ground", in starting from scratch with 
an organisation of unprecendented size 
and complexity. The initiative for NAFTA 
must necessarily come from the us government, 
which so far has shown no 
more than passing interest in the project, 
and we think it would be pointless for 
the Government to act until there is an 
official move by the new American administration. 


The remaining alternative is for Britain 
to work for the further development and 
expansion of EFTA . This association has 
been in existence for eight years and has 
achieved most of what it set out originally 
to achieve; and EFTA's empiricalapproach to problems commends itself to 
us as a factor enabling further possibledevelopment along lines welcome to Britain, 
who shares with most other EFTA . 
countries similar traditions of social de· 
mocracy and egalitarianism. Suggestions 
for developing EFTA include co-ordinated 
trading policies with third countries, co· 
ordinated agricultural policies, strongei 
political links based on the Nordic Coun· 
cil and the EFTA parliamentarians' meet· 
ing, and the extension of EFTA member· 


;hip, possibly to include eastern Europ-
:an countries. In terms of practical poli-
.ics, however, there is, at present, little 
:nthusiasm among EFrA members in gen-
:ral for these measures : among other 
ings, only Denmark seems interested in 
nore agricultural co-operation, Britain 
1erself would be adversely affected byncreased trade with Iceland, and events 
n eastern Europe during the summer of 
1968 have shown that the situation there 
s not as flexible as might earlier have 
Jeen supposed. 
Despite the difficulties, this is the most 
::>romising of the strategies and we hope 
:he Government will make every effort to 
:urther the expansion and development)f EFrA as the best available alternative 
:o full British membership of the Europ-
:an Economic Community. 
;hip, possibly to include eastern Europ-
:an countries. In terms of practical poli-
.ics, however, there is, at present, little 
:nthusiasm among EFrA members in gen-
:ral for these measures : among other 
ings, only Denmark seems interested in 
nore agricultural co-operation, Britain 
1erself would be adversely affected byncreased trade with Iceland, and events 
n eastern Europe during the summer of 
1968 have shown that the situation there 
s not as flexible as might earlier have 
Jeen supposed. 
Despite the difficulties, this is the most 
::>romising of the strategies and we hope 
:he Government will make every effort to 
:urther the expansion and development)f EFrA as the best available alternative 
:o full British membership of the Europ-
:an Economic Community. 

membership 


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abian society 


lfhe Fabian Society exists to further 
socialist education and research. lt is 
affiliated to the Labour Party, both nationally 
and locally, and embraces all 
shades of Socialist opinion within its 
ranks-left, right and centre. 

Since 1884 the Fabian Society has enrolled 
thoughtful socialists who are prepared 
to discuss the essential questions 
of democratic socialism and relate them 
to practical plans for building socialism 
in a changing world. 

Beyond this the Society has no collectiw 
policy. It puts forward no resolutions oL 
a political character, but it is not an 
organisation of armchair socialists. Its 
members are active in their Labou. 
Parties, Trade Unions and Co-operatives. 
They are representative of the labour 
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the authors 

Eric Deakins is a senior executive with 
an agricultural marketing firm . After 
fighting three PaTliamentary elections, he 
is now prospective Labour candidate for 
West Walthamstow. He has written two 
books: a novel as yet unpublished, and 
A faith to fight for (Gollancz). 

Edmund Marshall is a mathematician 
employed in industrial operations research 
by an international company. He 
contested the last two general elections 
as a Liberal at Louth. His political allegiance 
moved to Labour in the Autumn 
of 1966. He is now national Treasurer of 
the Christian Socialist Movement. 

Cover design and typography by Geoffrey 
Cannon. Printed by The Walrus 
Press Ltd. (ru) 769 Harrow Road, Sud-
bury, Wembley, Middlesex. 

SBN 7163 0389 2 


recent fabian pamphlets 


research series 

233 Frederick Singleton 

Aothony Topbam Workers' control in Yu~o~ta via 3~ 
252 Peter Mittler The mental health services 3s 
257 K. Jones, J. Golding Productivity bargaining 4s 6d 
262 ed A. Lester, N. Deakin Policies for racial equality 4s 6d 
263 Geoffrey Robinson Europe: problems of negotiation 4s 6d 
26S Arthur Blenkinsop Enjoying the Countryside 2s 6d 
267 a Fabian group Britain and the developing world 3s 6d 
268 M. Rendel and others Equality for women Ss 
269 Andrew Boyd The two Irelands 3s 6d 
270 J. Edmonds, G . Radice Low pay 2s 6d 
271 Jonathan Boswell Can Labour master the private sector? 4s 

272 . Ben Whitaker Participation and poverty 2s 6d 
273 Society of Labour 
Lawyers Justice for all 8s 
274 Peter Archer Human rights 3s 

tracts 

-~


321 Audrey Harvey Casualties of the welfare state 3s6d 
323 Richard M. Titmuss The irresponsible society 2s 6d 
353 Brian Abel-Smith Freedom in the welfare state ls 6d 
355 a Fabian group The administrators 4s 
361 L. J. Sharpe Why local democracy 3s 6d 
364 D . Downes, F. Flower Educating for uncertainty 2s 6d 
366 Norman Ross Workshop bargaining: a new approach 3s 6d 
373 a Fabian group The trade unions: on to 1980 · 2s 6d 
374 Brigid Brophy Religious education in state schools 2s6d 
377 Rigas Doganis A national airport plan 2s 6d 
379 Rex Winsbury Government and the press 4s 
380 Jeremy Tunstall Fish: an antiquated industry 3s 
381 J. Bowers, H. Lind Europe: the price is too high 3s 6d 
386 N. Brown and others Defence in a new setting 3s 6d 
387 David Collard The new right : a critique 2s 6d 
388 Oliver Stutchbury The cas~ for cap!tal taxes 4s 

young fabian pamphlets

'f -How-ard Glennerster, 

Richard Pryke The public schools 3s 6d 

14 a study group The youth employment service 3s 6d 

tS D. Keene and others The adult criminal 3s 6d 

16 Bruce Lloyd Energy policy 4s 

17 D . Atkinson and others Students today Ss 

books 

Bernard Sbaw and others Fabian essays (sixth edition) cased 30s 
Marga·ret Cole The story of Fabian socialism paper 1Ss 
Brian Abel-Smith and others Socialism and affluence paper 10s 
Brian Lapping and Giles More power to the people (Young paper 21s 
Radice (eds) Fabian essays on democracy in Britain) cased 30s 
Peter Townsend and others Social services for all? paper 12s 6d