

HEADWAY

IN WAR-TIME

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MESSAGE FROM LORD CECIL

AGAIN we are at war. How has this happened? If the policy which the League of Nations Union has recommended had been consistently and courageously followed we should not now find ourselves in this position.

No one doubts that the European peoples hate war. Peace is for every country the greatest of national interests. Our statesmen say so as regards Britain in almost every peroration on foreign affairs. Yes, but do we really mean it? Do we indeed believe that peace is more important to us even than our trade or territory? Are we prepared to run the same risks and make the same sacrifices in order to secure peace that we are ready to make for the integrity of our Empire?

A few months ago I should have felt constrained, in the light of our recent history, to answer the question in the negative. But our present resistance to German aggression is a great encouragement to those who think as the League of Nations Union does about the way to ensure peace. For the invasion of Poland is only the occasion of our fight against Germany. German aggression on that country was the proverbial last straw. We had watched Germany and her friends, in the Far East, in Abyssinia, in Austria, in Czechoslovakia, acting unblushingly on the maxim—"Might is Right." We had tried remonstrance, we had offered mediation, we had even tried "appeasement"—the policy of giving up a part in order to save the rest—a policy, let it be said, which very rarely succeeds. After trying all these expedients we were driven at last to the alternative of either accepting the domination of the German idea or resisting it with all our power. I rejoice with all my heart that we chose resistance.

In that policy I firmly believe we shall succeed. I do not base that opinion on merely technical considerations, such as our overwhelming sea power, our great and growing strength in the air, the perfection of our machinery for economic warfare. For I have no claim to pose as an expert in such matters. But it does not require expert knowledge to see the enormous pre-

ponderance of world opinion in our favour. On our side we have the people of every European country, of the whole of America, and of by far the greater part of Asia. In the end it is the verdict of public opinion that decides these great international controversies. A great military genius like Napoleon may for the time be successful, but even he is ultimately overborne by it; and I see no signs of any comparable military figures in Germany. At the best she has a highly organised military machine with a very docile people to work it.

We have therefore grounds for reasonable hope; certainly none for arrogant self-confidence. We are fighting, as we believe, for a great cause—the cause of freedom and justice. And we must never lose sight of these ultimate aims. Do not let us repeat the follies of 1919. Do not let us again believe that all we have to do is to destroy Hitler and Hitlerism—the counterpart of the Kaiser and Prussian militarism. The war will have been fought in vain unless it leads to the foundation of a new and stable international order, the substitution of law and reason for violence and outrage. Even now it is not too soon for all of us to think about what we shall press for after the war. We want to see a Peace based on the equal rights of all peoples; on the sanctity of international treaties; on the reduction and limitation of national armaments by international agreement; on the acceptance of the doctrine that aggression is an international crime; and on adequate machinery for its repression by force if necessary. If violence is to be ruled out as the means of redressing grievances we must evidently set up alternative procedure for the purpose, by negotiation, arbitration, and mediation. Finally, we must work for the unity of mankind not only in matters of trade and commerce, but still more in those conceptions of moral and intellectual progress which are embodied, however imperfectly, in the great structure of Christian civilisation. In a word, we must return to the conceptions on which the League of Nations was founded.

September 28.

CECIL.

EDITORIAL

THE LEAGUE LIVES

SO the disaster has happened. Again the Great Powers, including our own country, are at war in Europe, and the killing may extend to the ends of the earth.

What of the League now?

The League's opponents say to us: "Well, your precious League is surely stone dead at last. It has been tried, fully and fairly; and now, has it not proved impotent? Is it not virtually ignored?"

What shall we, members of the L.N.U., reply? What shall we do?

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Firstly, we must recognise frankly that the League whose primary purpose was to prevent such disasters, has not merely failed, it has not even been used, to prevent this war. After the successive errors and betrayals to which Lord Lytton's article on page 7 refers, not a single Government has thought fit to call upon the League to consider action in accordance with Article XI of the Covenant "to safeguard the peace of nations." The Assembly should have met this September; now, it is indefinitely postponed. The League should have passed judgment on the aggression; now, it is merely notified by the British Government (and this is better than silence) that in the British view Germany has committed aggression. The British, French and Polish Governments should have been acting with the League's authority behind them, in resisting this flagrant aggression; but now the British Government, in notifying the League that Britain is at war, has referred solely to our obligations resulting from our alliance with Poland, without a word about obligations resulting from our Covenant. Four years ago, the British Foreign Secretary was declaring, with the approval of the whole British Commonwealth, that "the League stands, and my country stands with it . . . for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression"; but now, our Government has just told the League (in a note about the British adhesion to the Optional Clause) that "the position to-day shows clearly that the Covenant has, in the present instance, completely broken down in practice, that the whole machinery for the preservation of peace has collapsed, and that the conditions in which His Majesty's Government accepted the Optional Clause no longer exist."

And now the smaller Members of the League, instead of withholding aid from the aggressor, are all concerned—naturally enough in the circumstances—with preserving their neutrality at all costs. No good blinking these unwelcome facts.

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Does this mean that the League system has been fairly tried and proved wanting? No, it does not. That is the great lie that we of the L.N.U. have to scotch.

Does it mean that the Covenant was fundamentally at fault? In particular, must the principle of collective defence against aggression, coupled with collective action to build up an acceptable peace, be abandoned? On the contrary, it is now more clear than ever that these principles are sound, but that we must work out better means of applying them. As Dr. Murray's article shows, this will involve further curtailments of national sovereignty.

Our job now is to defeat the present aggression and end the war in such a way as will afford the best chance of building a new and better League, with the help of the German people amongst others. When that day of rebuilding comes—when at last we take down the mourning black from our windows—we shall find that all the elements of the Covenant, though they may now be insufficient in some respects, are still indispensable.

* * *

Is there anything for the League to do now, under war conditions? Yes, certainly. Firstly, as the L.N.U. Executive urged in a recent resolution, the Assembly should meet, if not at Geneva then elsewhere. Secondly, the Assembly should pass judgment on the aggression that occasioned the British and French intervention. Our Government ought to inform the world, through the Assembly, of the international purposes for which we have gone to war as a united nation. The Government ought to declare, too, that whilst the principle of collective defence is unhappily inoperative at present, we do not regard it as discredited or permanently abandoned, and that we shall labour to establish it securely as soon as conditions permit. To do that is not simply a service to the League; it is most important for our own cause in this war.

No British Government will be able to enlist the whole-hearted sympathy of the democratic peoples of the Dominions, America and Scandinavia unless it satisfies them that British power will in truth be used not "as an instrument of national policy," or for imperialist aims, but as a contribution to the defence of a cause wider than Britain's—a cause which is theirs as well as ours. And, we may add, the British Empire now has to face the problem that India's wholehearted co-operation will not be won unless that India which passionately demands democratic freedom as well as world order is convinced that the British Government will respond adequately to its demand.

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Lastly, even if the League's provisions for collective restraint of aggression have to remain in abeyance for the present, there is no good reason why its peace-building services should not continue over a wide field. Why shouldn't the League offer its impartial aid to the neutrals who have to safeguard themselves against war diseases, and have to deal with war problems such as the treatment of refugees and prisoners? Could not the League offer certain services impartially to the belligerents? Why should not the Secretariat prepare factual studies for the use of the peace conference? The League could do a good deal even now, if it avoids the ruinous mistake of allowing its Secretariat to be cut to the bone in the name of "economy."

Yes, the League lives; much injured, but still far the best foundation for the great peace-making that must follow the war. Let us not be defeatist about this League. But let us not be content with old slogans or act as if we were blind diehard defenders of the Ark of the Covenant of 1920. The League must not only live but grow and change radically if it is to serve the needs of the much-changed and much-wounded world that will emerge from this ordeal.

THE UNION CARRIES ON

OUR Union must and will carry on. We cannot relax our effort, even in this difficult time. No good merely saying "I told you so"; though in truth our argument has been tragically vindicated. We have before us the most important work the Union has ever had to tackle.

The work is extremely difficult. Our finances depend, now more than ever, upon the contributions of Branches and of the many smaller contributors, rather than upon the large gifts of a few. And so our financial prospects must cause us great anxiety. To be on the safe side we have left the large and costly office at 15, Grosvenor Crescent, and have been fortunate in finding premises, adequate for present needs, at 60, St. Martin's Lane, W.C.2. With bitter regret we have had to suspend the engagements of many members of the staff, including some who have devotedly served the Union for 20 years. We cannot at present maintain the Regional Representatives whose work has been so great a source of the Union's strength.

It is an encouragement that so large a percentage of

Branches all over the country are not only keeping themselves in being but are putting themselves on a war footing with the definite intention of doing as much work as they can. Membership is being maintained, as we know from the fact that every post brings to Headquarters a steady flow of receipt counterfoils and requests for fresh receipt books. Nor are our urgent financial needs forgotten. Donations received have ranged from £1 upwards, and one branch added to its generous gift of £50 a loan of the same amount.

Many of the meetings and conferences arranged will have to be altered in character, or be cancelled owing to war conditions; but, as will be seen from the article in this issue, we have the cordial backing of the Ministry of Information in encouraging Branches to do everything possible to avoid cancelling or curtailing their programmes.

The Union's journal must now be much smaller than the old *Headway*; but we feel sure that subscribers will excuse this unavoidable change. This is an interim number, produced under special difficulties.

WHAT BRANCHES AND MEMBERS CAN DO

SOME reduction of the Union's activities is inevitable because of financial pressure and the restrictions of war time. But we must keep the Union in being and, to that end, Branches are urged to preserve their existence, keep up the interest of their members and collect their subscriptions, and maintain and spread public interest in Organised Peace. Already newspapers are smaller, and this reduction of the amount of the written word necessitates our relying still more on the spoken word. Public meetings should be held so far as the regulations of the Local Government and A.R.P. authorities will allow. As in the past, Headquarters will do its best to provide speakers, so far as travelling restrictions will allow. But whether there are public meetings or not, there should be conferences in private houses for discussion and study. A large Branch can constitute several such study groups. Each group should have a leader or sometimes more than one. A beginning might well be made at once with a discussion on the policy sketched in the article on page 4. Later on, Headquarters hope to issue a series of leaflets analysing important questions to discuss, with short bibliographies.

There are two ways in which individual members of the Union can help. We all find in our daily intercourse with friends and acquaintances that talk about the war and matters connected with it is inevitable. This provides each one of us with an opportunity of spreading information about what the Union stands for and enlisting support for it. And secondly, do not wait to be asked for your subscription. "Black-out" arrangements make it much more difficult for collectors to call. Thus members will give more effective help by sending

their subscriptions as soon as they become due either to their Branch Secretary or collector, or direct to the Secretary of the Union at the new headquarters at 60, St. Martin's Lane, London, W.C.2. This will not only help the collectors, but will lessen the chances of delay or interruption in the sending out of *HEADWAY*.

I hope and trust that our members will realise the vital necessity of keeping alive what for lack of a better word we may call the "League spirit,"—the conviction that civilised man can get rid of war as he has got rid of slavery and cannibalism—and a resolute determination, undeterred by one initial failure, to do all that goodwill and practical thinking can do to save our children and grandchildren from this devilish and insane thing.

GILBERT MURRAY.

ST. PAUL'S CATHEDRAL

A SERVICE OF INTERCESSION

AND

ADDRESS BY THE DEAN

Saturday, November 4th,

at 2.30 p.m.

PEACE AIMS

By DR. GILBERT MURRAY

THE L.N.U. was born amid the passions of the World War, and its first task was to see that those passions did not blind the people. The two societies from which it sprang were formed for a definite three-fold purpose:

(1) To study the various schemes then current for creating among the civilised nations some authoritative society or league to maintain the rule of law between them and make obsolete the institution of war.

(2) To secure the whole-hearted acceptance by the British people of the principle of such a "League of Nations."

(3) To secure that such a "League of Nations" should be established as an essential part of the peace settlement.

In these three aims we were successful. The League itself proved an undoubted benefit to mankind, and, though in political matters it never had that constant support from all its members which would have ensured success, did maintain the peace of Europe for fifteen years.

Now war has come again; war between the same chief adversaries and on the same issue. This nation, in the words of the King,—

"is called with its allies to meet the challenge of a principle which, were it to prevail, would be fatal to any civilised order in the world."

The principle may be defined as a claim to utterly unrestricted sovereignty; making every national government the sole judge of its own actions, and free to seek its supposed interests with no consideration for the law or the rights of others.

The task of the L.N.U. remains as vitally important as before. The first attempt to create a peaceful world order has not succeeded. Immediate success in so great an enterprise was hardly to be expected. We must see that our second attempt is, as far as possible, free from the errors and the disturbing influences which wrecked the first.

It is now our clear duty:

(1) to study afresh the same problem as in 1918; realising that the world which then was challenged to "Learn or Perish" has now had valuable experiences by which to learn; and utilising that knowledge of the detailed working, successful and unsuccessful, of the League, the Court and the International Labour Office, which members of the L.N.U. now possess.

(2) To confirm the determination of the British people, faithful to its best ideals and harbouring no thoughts of revenge or national aggrandisement, to endure whatever ordeals the war may bring to us until the issue is decided aright. For if Hitler wins the hopes of humanity are lost.

(3) To make sure that, when the time for settlement comes, those in charge of British policy are prepared with a clear plan for constructive and unvindictive Peace. It is not the Union's business to draw up a Peace Treaty, and even for the Government any such attempt would be premature. "Let not him that girdeth on his harness speak as he that putteth it off." In particular, the intervention of Russia introduces new and unknown factors into the political outlook. But it is good for us from the outset to

think out the broad principles for which we are asking men to face death.

(1) Our object in going to war was to stop aggression, and notably to restore, as far as is possible, the lost independence of the recent victims of aggression.

(2) We desire a lasting peace, based on justice, good faith and international co-operation.

(3) We reject any idea of "destroying Germany" or keeping her in a permanently disabled condition. Equality of right for all civilised states must be our fixed principle.

(4) We cannot acquiesce in a recrudescence of the old World Anarchy, or even a continuance of the remains of it that now exist. An International Organisation is therefore essential. The existing League of Nations is a precious achievement. It has been well described as "the one good result of the World War," and has done much, not directly but indirectly, to limit that national sovereignty which is the root cause of World Anarchy. How much further it may be possible to carry this limitation is a practical question which can only be settled at the Peace Conference. If, for example, it were possible to form, inside some general organisation such as the League, some closer organisation for Europe or parts of Europe, as M. Briand and others have suggested, it would solve immense difficulties.

(5) The supremacy of Law founded on Justice must be accepted as the fundamental principle of international relations. Anything else is anarchy.

From this fundamental principle follow most of the provisions laid down in the Covenant, e.g.:

(a) All international differences which cannot be settled by negotiation must be submitted to some kind of "third-party judgment," i.e. to judicial decision, arbitration, or authoritative mediation.

(b) The use of force must, in general terms, be restricted to action in resistance to aggression and subject to the approval of the international authority. (Special cases may be difficult, as recognised in the Treaty of Locarno, Article 4, 3.)

(c) In a law-abiding world, competition in armaments is a monstrosity. National armaments must be subject to reduction and limitation by an international authority, which must also be ready to protect a state which has limited its armaments from any which has not done so.

(d) Each of the States Members of the International Community must be ready to take its fair share in preventing and stopping aggression.

(6) The above principles are already implicit in the Covenant, but could be stated more clearly and effectively. The L.N.U. has proposed amendments making more effective the provisions for the prevention of a threatened war (Art. XI), the stopping of an actual war (Art. XVI) and the correction by agreement of genuine international grievances (Art. XIX).

(a) One of the disappointments of the Covenant was the absence of any international method for dealing with economic disputes. Restrictions on trade, access to raw

materials, migration and settlement cannot be regarded as strictly domestic matters, since obviously they affect the parties restricted as well as those who restrict. It seems clear that, if some control over international commerce is accepted as necessary, such control ought to be exercised in the interest of the whole community of nations and not by each nation separately against the rest. This is a matter of first-rate importance. The principle is clear, but the problem of its application needs careful thought.

(b) The same is true of the Colonial Question. The principle of the "Sacred Trust," that territories inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves should be administered for the well-being and development of those peoples themselves, must be the main guide in all future colonial policy. The problem is how to combine this principle with that of equality of right for all civilised nations. The welfare of the Africans, for example, must

not be made an item in the haggling of European diplomacy, and international administration has never worked well.

(c) No redivision of European frontiers can avoid leaving alien Minorities inside certain countries. The only true solution would be one which would make frontiers in Europe matter as little as those between France and Belgium, or the U.S.A. and Canada. Short of that, the protection afforded by the existing Minorities Treaties should be extended to all countries and made genuinely effective. In a few cases transfer of populations may be practicable.

(d) The whole of the constructive and non-political work of the League and the I.L.O. has, in spite of unfavourable conditions, grown in range and efficiency in a way which suggests vast possibilities of beneficent future development. The recent report of the Bruce Commission on this point should serve as a guide.

WHAT TO DO ABOUT MEETINGS

DON'T cancel the meetings you have arranged if you can possibly help it.

Some meetings, of course, will have to be cancelled or altered, owing to difficulties about getting halls and speakers under war conditions. But don't assume that meetings cannot and should not be held.

The only meetings which are banned by the Home Office are those for purposes of entertainment or sport and for which a fee is paid. A special authorisation is required for such meetings.

We are assured that the avowed purpose of the Ministry of Information is to maintain fully the democratic right of voluntary organisations (such as the L.N.U.) to do educational work in the field of politics and international affairs. The Director of Home Publicity at the Ministry of Information has issued a circular from which we quote the following:—

"From information that has reached us it would appear that many adult educational activities carried out under the auspices of Educational Authorities, Voluntary Societies and different organisations have either been cancelled or much curtailed.

"I am writing to all those principally concerned to ask their co-operation in maintaining as active a programme as is possible under war-time conditions.

"We attach great importance to the normal con-

tinuation of all types of classes and lectures, however small the group. It is also essential that there should be a widespread understanding of the origins and causes of the war, of the political background of the various countries in Europe, the U.S.A. and the Far East.

"The citizens of this country must know why we are fighting, and lectures are one of the best methods of achieving this.

"The Ministry of Information does not wish to impose any special curriculum or lecturer, and feels that this matter is best left to the direction of those normally undertaking this work."

So go ahead with the meetings you have planned if you possibly can. If any difficulties arise with the local police authorities, consult the Chief Regional Information Officer in your area.

The police are, of course, concerned to see that halls where meetings are held conform to the regulations about lighting, exits, etc.

If you cannot manage meetings in the evening, at the normal time, why not try a meeting on Sunday, or Saturday, afternoon? If you cannot arrange big meetings, try small ones; have discussion groups. Train your own local speakers. Members of the Executive and others who have been accustomed to speak at L.N.U. meetings will, of course, be less free to get about and speak than they were under peace-time conditions; but many of them have already assured us that they will carry out their speaking engagements as far as they possibly can.

WHERE STANDS DEMOCRACY?

FABIAN LECTURES, 1939.

Conway Hall, Red Lion Square, W.C.1
SATURDAYS, at 2.15 p.m.

Oct. 21. LASKI—Government in Wartime.
" 28. CROSSMAN—Nationalist and Racial Ideas.
Nov. 4. FYFE—Propaganda and Repression.
" 11. BARNES—Indian and Colonial Peoples.
" 18. COLE—Decline of Capitalist Enterprise.
" 25. ZILLIACUS—War and Preparations for Peace.

COURSE TICKETS 15/-, 10/-, 6/-; SINGLE LECTURES 3/6, 2/6, 1/6.

Apply: FABIAN SOCIETY, 11, DARTMOUTH ST., S.W.1.

CALENDAR OF AGGRESSION

We recommend, to readers of HEADWAY who have not seen it already, the "Calendar of Aggression" published in *The Times* on September 26. This series of extracts from Hitler's speeches, setting out in his own words the pledges which he has successively broken, is now obtainable in pamphlet form from the publishers, *The Times*, Printing House Square, E.C.4. The price is 1d. each (1½d. post free), and there are reductions for quantity.

WHY THE UNION MUST STILL BE ACTIVE

By SIR NORMAN ANGELL

ALMOST every day since the war started I have had, from members of the League of Nations Union, letters which could be roughly divided into two classes. The first run broadly along these lines:—

Had the principles for which the Union has stood been honestly applied by our Government during the last seven or eight years, this war would never have arisen. It is the outcome of their incompetence or bad faith. How, therefore, can you urge us to support them in the prosecution of a war which is directly due to their bad policy, and trust them to make a peace, when their whole conduct reveals an incapacity to understand the fundamental principles of any workable peace?

And the other group of letters run something like this:—

Now that war has come, there is only one thing that should concern us: How to win it. Nothing else really matters. If we can destroy Hitlerism and prove that aggression cannot succeed, we shall get peace. Unless we win we shall get no peace. To discuss now matters upon which there is disagreement, like the League of Nations and its possible reform or revival, is merely to dissipate energy and attention which ought to be directed at the one object of victory.

I suggest that both these positions, however sincere, are wrong headed.

Let us agree, if you will, that this war has arisen because the course which we of the Union have urged in and out of season for so long was abandoned; that it has come because Britain and France failed to apply early, instead of far too late, the principles for which we are now supposed to be fighting. Suppose we assume all that to be true. Nevertheless, the one supreme fact we have to face now is that the war is here; and we have to decide what we who fought against the policy which produced it are to do. It is a fact. What is to be our attitude towards it?

Are we to retire into monastic seclusion, watching from ivory towers the follies of the world do their evil worst? We cannot do that. There is something worse than complacency in such an attitude.

Hundreds of thousands of our people, possibly millions, are about to die; for victory. That victory can be used ill, as the last victory was used, so that the children of the men who died for it have to travel the road of agony and torment which their fathers trod. Or it can be used well, as the last victory might have been, as some British victories of the past have been—in Québec, in South Africa. The soldiers cannot determine how the gift which they bring will be used by the peace-makers, the governments, the statesmen, the politicians. The soldiers present us with an instrument which only governments, the electorates who make and unmake governments and politicians, can use. Whether at the next peace settlement governments and politicians are to make the kind of mistakes made in 1919 and (much more importantly) in the years following, will depend upon whether we civilians who form the electorates can be

brought to see the nature of those mistakes, and how in the future we may do better.

This cannot be left until the war is over, until the few weeks or months that will intervene between the armistice and the peace-making. The right settlement, and the persuasion of the public that it is the right settlement, is far too difficult for that. Indeed, the peace-making will go on during the war—is going on in a sense at this moment. We are already asking, are bound to ask, what sort of *modus vivendi* might we be able to establish with Russia, or with Italy, or Japan. What price is it worth while paying for their alliance or neutrality? The answer to that question affects profoundly the peace terms, will possibly determine the whole nature of the peace; whether it is to be of the old kind or a better kind. It raises the question of what we really want, what we are fighting for, and what price we are prepared to pay for the things which we deem of prime importance. Our Government, both by what it does—its Ministry of Information, its elaborate propaganda system, its British Council and the rest—and by what it continues to say, testifies to the supreme importance it attaches to public understanding of the issues involved in the war. The task of the Union is and always has been (however badly we may have performed it) to clarify those issues, to the end that the right policy for peace may emerge and may be applied. It is a task of infinite difficulty, infinitely baffling. We have hardly begun it when we reach broad agreement as to what the right policy is. For then we have to persuade the public—cabinets, politicians and their supporters—that it is the right policy. And that is by far the more difficult side of the job.

For some of us it is a job that has long ante-dated the creation of the Union, and the League. And our success has not been very apparent. Now only is the general public beginning to perceive and act upon truths which seemed to some of us quite self-evident a good deal more than a quarter of a century since. But if progress is slow, there is progress; and happily a certain Law of Acceleration operates in the domain of ideas. It took palaeolithic man a hundred thousand years to discover that if he tied his hand-flint to the end of a stick and made it an axe he had a much more efficient instrument. But—biologically—the same kind of man, with the same kind of grey matter in his skull and blood in his veins, was able to advance in a little more than one-thousandth part of that time to the whole vast range of invention involved in the use of steam and electricity.

It may well be that the first twenty years of the Union's life will prove the hardest, so far as the conquest of the public mind is concerned; that men will now turn more readily to the principles which we have advocated.

In any case, it is not possible to preserve any moral or spiritual health if, feeling that those about us may be drifting into errors involving infinite misery and suffering, we just turn aside as if the issue were not our affair. If only for our own peace of mind, some effort must be made so that, if it should befall that the next settlement is not very different from the last, there shall be peace at least in our own consciences.

ANOTHER CHANCE

By LORD LYTTON

WHAT use do we intend to make of our victory if we win this war? How did we misuse the twenty years of peace which followed the last war? Can we do better if we get another chance?

It is usual for people to-day to lay all the blame for the present war on the Treaty of Versailles. Young people who are not old enough to remember the conditions in which that Treaty was made, and older ones who would probably find it difficult to pass an examination in its actual terms, join in denouncing it as iniquitous, unjust, oppressive, etc. What is too often forgotten is that many of the features of that Treaty which are most resented by the defeated countries on which it was imposed were not drafted vindictively to punish our enemies, but in a spirit of high idealism, to secure the liberation and independence of peoples whose national existence had hitherto been suppressed. When Hitler complains that none of Germany's grievances have been remedied by negotiation and that therefore he was obliged to use force, he forgets how many of the German grievances arising out of the Treaty have in fact been settled:—Reparations, disarmament, the Saar, the Rhineland. The financial and disarmament clauses of the Treaty have been removed, and Germany's position as the equal of the most powerful nations in the world was secured. The only thing which has not been done, and never could be done by negotiation, is the conversion of the Treaty of Versailles from an idealistic treaty imposed by the victorious Allies upon a defeated Germany into a vindictive treaty imposed by a victorious Germany upon all the smaller States which owe their existence to her defeat. One of the latest denouncers of the Treaty of Versailles is Signor Mussolini, but I have not noticed that among the iniquities of that Treaty he has included the severance of a large slice of Austrian territory inhabited by a German-speaking population and its inclusion in the Kingdom of Italy. Mussolini's only complaint is that his country did not get a large enough share of the spoils out of the last war!

The Versailles Treaty may not have been the wisest treaty that could have been devised for the purpose of ensuring a durable peace, but at least it compares favourably with any treaty which a victorious Germany would have imposed upon a defeated enemy, and it did contain what no other treaty of the kind has ever contained before—a provision for the rectification of its terms as and when these were generally admitted to be unjust, unfair, or out-of-date. The responsibility for the present war rests not with the men who made peace at the end of the last war, but with those who have failed to use the instrument for the preservation of peace which the framers of the Treaty placed in their hands, and have therefore become involved in another war twenty years later. It is necessary to remember this when we are thinking about what we shall do with our next victory if the chance is given to us again.

One advantage we shall have over the Allies who fought and won the last war. We have no partners in the present war who will have to be rewarded at the expense of the enemy which they may have helped us to defeat. Neither Britain nor France have anything to gain from the war,

except their own safety and that of others on whose behalf they are fighting. That applies to our present position. If we obtain other allies in the course of the war, I hope that their help will not be secured by promises, the fulfilment of which would render more difficult the establishment of acceptable and durable conditions of peace. We ought, then, if we can keep free from such entanglements as we got into during the last war, to be able to keep before our eyes from the very beginning the kind of settlement we shall try to achieve—always bearing in mind that its object must be the avoidance of another war.

For this purpose some form of world organisation is absolutely necessary, and that involves some limitation of National Sovereignty. Let me explain what is meant by that. It is not possible in any civilised community to-day for an individual to decide for himself what injury to his person, his honour, or his property has been inflicted by another and to determine the measure and nature of the reprisal for such injury. In such matters the sovereign right of the individual in civil life has been surrendered. The guardianship of the State through the police, the law courts and Parliament has been accepted in its place. Consequently, fighting between individuals has disappeared. Men are not allowed to carry arms, and duelling or brawling are equally punishable. In the international world, States take the place of individuals in the social world, but the relationship between States to-day is still the primitive one existing between beasts in the jungle, except in so far as this anarchy has been modified by such means as the League of Nations Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. The doctrine of unrestricted National Sovereignty implies that each State claims to be a law unto itself: the stronger ones can bully and oppress, the weaker ones have to go to the wall. So long as every State claims this right to be the sole judge of the merits of its quarrels with another State, wars will continue. Diplomacy, alliances, treaties, may preserve peace for a time, but sooner or later war will break out again, and wars will never again be fought by armies and navies alone. The air arm has, in important respects, abolished frontiers, and modern war makes no distinction between the soldier and the civilian. Now that war has become such a terrible scourge both for those who take part in it and even for neutrals, it is certain that the peoples of Europe will insist upon some co-operation to get rid of it, whatever their Governments may do. What form the world organisation may take, and what degree of limitation of this National Sovereignty the States of the world may accept, cannot be decided except by an international conference. Great Britain and France, even if victorious in the war, could not impose their wishes upon Europe, still less upon the whole world. All that we can say—and in my opinion we should say this from the beginning, and go on saying it all through the war—is that, if victorious, we shall be prepared to examine carefully with other States the reasons why the League of Nations has not been more effectively used either for the prevention of war or for the redress of grievances and that, without trying to apportion blame or responsibility for the past, we shall try to secure the agreement of all States, including

our late enemies in the war, to a new world organisation aimed at the suppression of war and the settlement of disputes by third-party judgment.

A friend said to me the other day, "I hope you don't think that we—that is to say, Britain—have any responsibility for this war." That we have the chief responsibility I do not of course suggest, but I cannot claim that we have no responsibility. The men who made the peace gave us an instrument for its maintenance. As lately as 1935 our present Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, said it was "the only instrument" by which peace could be maintained. Of all the Great Powers which either helped to frame the Covenant of the League of Nations in the first instance or which subsequently accepted it by becoming members of the League, there is not one which has not been guilty of some sin of commission against it, and all the States, great and small alike, must share responsibility for the sins of omission of the whole League. The United States was the first to reject the Covenant of which her President had been the principal author, and in the twenty years that have followed, Japan, Germany, Italy, Russia, have all in turn committed definite acts of aggression on other States whose integrity they were pledged to defend. Britain and France also have committed acts which were inconsistent with their Covenant obligations—Britain when she signed a naval treaty with Germany altering the terms of the Treaty of Versailles without reference to the other signatories of that Treaty, and

France when her Foreign Minister, M. Laval, tried to buy the friendship of Italy at the expense of Abyssinia. Poland, the victim of aggression to-day, was herself an aggressor both against Lithuania when she seized Vilna in 1920 and against Czechoslovakia last year, when she did to that State in her hour of defeat precisely what Russia is doing to her now. If we are to be truthful we must admit that in these last twenty years all the States of Europe "have gone out of the way—the way of peace they have not known, none has been righteous, no, not one."

It will be necessary, therefore, when the next chance is given to us, in all humility and without reproaches as to the past, to try to make a better use of the organisation we may create for the preservation of peace. One condition at least the lesson of the past has shown to be necessary. Whatever Covenant, Treaty, Formula, or Constitution we may accept for the purpose, we must make certain that we all understand what it means and that the meaning is the same for each.

In conclusion let me sum up what I have tried to indicate as our war aims. Our first war aim is to win the war. We should accept no peace offers which either recognise as permanent the fruits of aggression or which fail to remove the danger of further aggression. When we have secured victory, we should use it for the sole purpose of creating in Europe such conditions as all nations, whether they have been neutral or enemies in the war, will freely join in trying to maintain.

CHINA AND THE WAR

IN this hour of agony for the Polish people and deep anxiety for ourselves, it must not be forgotten that for more than two years the Chinese people also have been heroically facing an aggressor enormously superior in war material. Japan, the enemy of peace and freedom in the East, has been using the same ruthless tactics in China as have the invaders in Poland, indiscriminately killing thousands of innocent and defenceless women and children by bombing open towns and villages. The Japanese policy, like that of the Nazis, cares nothing for international law and honourable relations between nations.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in his latest statement of the Chinese Government's policy to the People's National Council, has stressed the unity of purpose and

interests between China's war of national resistance and that in which we are now engaged.

"The Sino-Japanese problem," he declares, "is a world problem. The underlying cause of the present war in Europe is traceable to the Japanese invasion of China, which upset international peace and order. In resisting Japan, China is not only preserving her own national independence but is also helping to maintain international justice.

"World peace is far distant so long as our conflict with Japan is not terminated."

The European situation gives no reason or excuse for deserting China. We can now say to China, as Chinese leaders have often said to us, "Our struggle is your struggle also."

TO ENGLAND IN 1732

"WE are now in an Age when Liberty is once again in its Ascendant. And we are ourselves the happy Nation, who not only enjoy it at home, but by our Greatness and Power give Life and Vigour to it abroad; and are the Head and Chief of the European League, founded on this Common Cause. Nor can it, I presume, be justly feared that we should lose this noble Ardour; or faint under the glorious Toil."

LORD SHAFTESBURY,
in MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES.