fabian tract 420 
labour in Asia: a new 
chapter?

Colin Jackson 1 introduction 1 
Michael Lipton 2 Labour & British economic 

policy towards Asia 4 
Wolf Mendl 3 Japan and Britain 16 
Richard Harris 4 a Labour Britain and China 25 
Roderick MacFarquhar 5 Labour and South Asia 32 
John Tusa 6 South East Asia 37 
Martin Bernal 7 Labour, Indo-China and 

the US war 44 

this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only the 
view of the individuals who prepared it. The responsibility of 
the Society is limited to approving publications it issues 
as worthy of consideration within the Labour movement. 
Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London SW1 H 9BN. 
March 1973 ISBN 7163 0420 1 


1. introduction 
Colin Jackson 

This Fabian pamphlet is concerned with 
the policy of the next Labour governmentin relation to the peoples of Asia. In 
separate chapters the main areas are 
covered, the Indian sub-continent, South 
East Asia, Indo-China, Japan and the 
Peoples' Republic of China. In a relatively 
brief survey covering the most 
populous continent in the world, inevitably 
some of the smaller territories, such 
as Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma and Korea, 
have had to be left out. Concerningdivided Korea, certainly Labour in Britain 
has everything to gain by proclaiming 
outright support for a policy of reconciliation 
between the North and the 
South. For the ending of the cold war in 
this area can greatly assist the further improvement 
of relations between China 
and Japan and the scaling down of arms 
totals in the Far East. 

Perceptive critics may enquire why, also, 
there is no reference to the ussR in Asia ; 
in particular, it may be asked what is the 
Fabian attitude towards the Sino/Sovietdispute, along the eastern frontier of 
Asia? I was in China in August 1960 
when the Soviet technicians aiding China 
were withdrawn in a way specifically designed 
to harm Mao's economic plans. 
Almost everything that has happenedsince then has confirmed my opinion that 
the greatest single likelihood of a majorconflict in the last quarter of the 20th 
::entury lies in the field of Sino ISoviet relations. 
In the face of an impending battle 
of the juggernauts there is not much the 
rest of the world can do except, in every 
fashion, avoid the temptation of tryingco play Moscow off against Peking. Lab-
Jur in the Commonwealth, in Europe and 

n its relations with America can be the 
;hampion of those opposed to a cynical 
:livide and rule policy. For if a nuclear 
vvar were to come on the roof of the 
vvor!d, then who knows which way the 
;vind would blow? In this context, 
::Oabians should express themselves clearly 
n backing the new Australasian Labour 
~overnments' condemnation of French 
mclear testing in the Pacific. 

fhe six separate chapters by six different 
mthors inevitably vary in style and ap,
roach. Even in a pamphlet published by 


the Fabian Society there has had to be a 
good deal of background information 
supplied! This comes out in a particularly 
valuable way in the papers on Japan and 
China, as does the need to retain the 
capacity to look through the other end 
of the telescope. As Richard Harris says 
" we cannot understand Britain's relations 
with China without first understandingChina's relations with Britain." Then we 
have a fair measure of polemic in these 
papers. Fabians always need a little 
vitriol ; we can sometimes be so reasonable 
as to send ourselves off to sleep!
There is no danger of this in Michael 
Lipton's chapter on Labour and Economic 
Policy towards Asia. In diplomacytoo I think he has invented a new phrase 
"court fig-leaf-makers." 

policy recommendations 

In this introduction there is no intention 
to try and " sum up " ; the chapters on 
each territory or topic speak and arguefor themselves. The following recommendations 
for Labour in Asia are 
simply based upon a quarter of a century 
of one person's moving and talkingaround the continent, starting from the 
time of Attlee's great triumph with the 
granting of independence to India (laying, 
as our government did then, the foundation 
of the modern Commonwealth). 

First, we must never again repeat the kind 
of disastrous policy pursued by the Lab-
our government between 1965 and 1970 
in relation to Vietnam. At that time manyof Labour's leaders completely misunderstood 
the nature of Ho Chi Mhin's leadership 
in Hanoi. There will be Labour 
members of parliament who can remember 
meetings of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party when Michael Stewart seemed unwilling, 
or unable, to distinguish between 
the governments of East Germany and 
North Vietnam. A socialist administration 
in Britain appeared to many as Lyndon 
Johnson's "poodle." As Martin Bernal 
points out, Labour at the universities in 
Britain between 1965 and 1970 was torpedoed 
by number ten Downing Street. 
France could speak out against the atrocities 
of Vietnam, so could Sweden, but 


the Labour government almost went out 
of its way to apologise for Washington'sactivities. All the talk about negotiations 
behind the scenes impressed precious few 
in Europe, Asia or America. The administration 
in Washington scarcely disguised 
what it thought of this policy. It is one of 
the tragedies of Labour in office, as it is 
with the Democrats, that they often have 
to appear more conservative than the 
Conservatives in order not to be smeared 
by the right as "soft on communism." 

Then serious attention needs to be taken 
of the warning note issued by Michael 
Lipton in his chapter on Labour Economic 
Policy in Asia when he writes " if it 
matters to the Labour Party to persuadeserious socialist academics to join the debate 
about its third world policies, it 
could start by ending the pretence, recognising 
that the period 1964 to 1970 was a 
developmental disaster, and outliningclear policies to do better next time, policies 
it can adhere to in office." It was encouraging, 
last September, to see Harold 
Wilson writing in the first edition of the 
Fabian Society's new monthly journal, 
Third World, that "there was a good deal 
of frustration, even disillusion with Lab-
our's record on aid and developmentwhile in office between 1964 and 1970. 
This was more than shared by the cabinet 
and many Labour ministers." 

There is also a lesson to be learned bythe Fabian Society and the Labour Party,
from the two chapters on China and 
Japan. Both Richard Harris and Wolf 
Mend! stress that Peking and Tokyo will 
be looking, in the 'seventies, at a Labour 
government in Britain as a part of Europe.
China supports the EEC since it represents 
a balancing force between the usA and the 
Soviet Union. Wolf Mend! writing on 
Anglo-Japanese relations says "the principal 
point of contact between Britain and 
Japan during the next few years will be 
in economic relations, particularly through 
the EEC." It is for Fabians and socialists 
in the United Kingdom to note that,
whatever individual members may think, 
a major portion of Asia is planning its 
relations with Britain in the next decade 
on the premise that the British Isles will 
be within and not without Europe. 

In addition to these specific comments on 
Labour in Asia in the 'seventies in terms 
of areas and economics, there is a deepand more fundamental point that needs 
to be noted about the attitude of socialist 

Britain towards the two billion people of 
Asia. It seems that in many ways we are 
just not interested any more. We are in 
danger of becoming little Englanders,
mainly concerned about meat prices in ,
Europe. The Labour Party's horizons 
have contracted from India to Africa, and 
now for some they seem mainly concerned 
in keeping out of Europe. Left 
wingers in the past, like Kingsley Martin 
and Stafford Cripps, even pleasant old 
cynics like Malcolm Muggeridge, developed 
a passionate care for India and its 
people through the development of an 
intimate knowledge of that country and 
through enjoying lasting personal friendships 
with its leaders. Where are the 
present day equivalents of those personal 
ties? India and Pakistan were the only 
major Commonwealth countries that 
Harold Wilson failed to visit in his six 
years as prime minister. Between 1964 and 
1970, the parliamentary party only became 
interested in Vietnam when us involvement 
in the war developed. For someone 
like myself with seven visits to that 
country in 20 years I found it irksome to 
be in the position of either being used by 
a few who just wanted to attack the 
Labour administration, or to be con-, 
sidered eccentric in my criticisms, coming 
as they did from someone tliought to be 
" sound!" With honourable exceptionslike Tam Dalyell in parliament, and 
Dorothy Woodman in the Fabian Society, 
our left wing in Britain knows little and 
seems to care slightly less about the 
aspiring hundred million people of 
Indonesia. 

Surely now is the time, although very late 
in the day, for the Labour Party, and the 
Fabian Society in particular, to visit once 
more and learn in detail about half the 
peoples of the world. We have had some 
encouraging beginnings such as RoyJenkins in Bangladesh, Tony Benn in 
China, and the National Executive Committee 
of the Labour Party deciding to 
visit North and South Vietnam. As a 
Society, however, we are not producing 


in anything like sufficient numbers a new 
generation of socialists, concerned and 
informed about the economic and social 
affairs of Asia. Our volunteer agencies, it 
is true, have taken a number of Young 
Fabians to villages in South East Asia. 
In addition, the Labour Party in its future 
commitments should launch a major pro-
for return visits, for mainland 
'-'"""'"'"' learning English, for Indonesians 
at our technical institutes, and for doctors 
from Bangladesh in our teaching hospitals. 
There will, of course, be some who will 
say that British concern in Asia, aparttrade, went out with the empire. 
These Fabians will point to Sweden as 
the new image to mirror, with its concern 
for industrial relations, welfare for the 
aged, decent housing ; but these new 
stone age Fabians might also notice that 
Sweden has the best record for overseas 
aid. Today young Swedes are in Bot-
swana ; Stockholm is forthright in its 
policy over Vietnam. The question is 
whether the Labour Party will get back 
its interest and sense of vision concerning 
the future of Asia. 
3 
in anything like sufficient numbers a new 
generation of socialists, concerned and 
informed about the economic and social 
affairs of Asia. Our volunteer agencies, it 
is true, have taken a number of Young 
Fabians to villages in South East Asia. 
In addition, the Labour Party in its future 
commitments should launch a major pro-
for return visits, for mainland 
'-'"""'"'"' learning English, for Indonesians 
at our technical institutes, and for doctors 
from Bangladesh in our teaching hospitals. 
There will, of course, be some who will 
say that British concern in Asia, aparttrade, went out with the empire. 
These Fabians will point to Sweden as 
the new image to mirror, with its concern 
for industrial relations, welfare for the 
aged, decent housing ; but these new 
stone age Fabians might also notice that 
Sweden has the best record for overseas 
aid. Today young Swedes are in Bot-
swana ; Stockholm is forthright in its 
policy over Vietnam. The question is 
whether the Labour Party will get back 
its interest and sense of vision concerning 
the future of Asia. 
3 

2. Labour & British economic 
policy towards Asia 
Michael Lipton 

Asia, more than any other continent, is a 
geographical fiction. To treat as a homogeneous 
entity India, China, Japan and 
Kuwait would be absurd. This discussion 
concentrates on the less developed regions 
of South and South East Asia. West 
Asia, a wealthy, military unstable and 
highly inegalitarian region that naturallymakes full bargaining use of its oil assets, 
in fact presents wholly different problems, 
whether to socialists or indeed to Britons. 

By "economic policy " will be understood 
governmental actions which affect international 
movements of goods and services, 
and of factors of production:
policies affecting foreign trade, aid, and 
the movement of private capital and of 
skilled and unskilled workers. Direct 
policies to affect such dealings between 
Britain and Asia will be emphasised. The 
historical record does not suggest that 
British governments can improve their 
economic relations with Asia by simply 
emphasising British growth or efficiency 
or equality, though improvements here 
are probably necessary conditions for a 
better climate in which aid and trade 
policies can operate. Indeed, the " balance 
of payments " excuse for Labour's record 
in this field can be easily disposed of. 
Exports to Asia were as neglected as 
imports from Asia; and when our balance 
of payments improved other excuses for 
the dismal aid performance took over. 

If " economic policy towards Asia " can 
be fairly narrowly interpreted in some 
ways, "British" cannot. To consider 
British economic behaviour, recent or 
prospective, without reference to the 
European Economic Community (EEC)
would be meaningless. In consideringfuture options for a Labour government,
it is assumed that we remain a full member. 

The hardest word in the above title is 
"Labour." It is not too hard to define a UK 
economic policy towards the poor countries 
of Asia that would best serve 
British interests ; or a democratic socialist 
one, that would best help in the relief of 
poverty and the advancement of self 
reliant development. These two sorts of 
policy would conflict at some points, 
notably regarding Britain's tax treatment 

of the less developmentally beneficial 
forms of private foreign investment ; but 
they would overlap much more often,
especially, for example, in the mutual 
freeing of trade and improved allocation 
of aid. It is in that large area of overlapbetween democratic socialist and British 
concerns that a Labour economic policy 
towards Asia should, in future, be sought. 

past discredit: 
future vacuum 

Unfortunately, the record of the Labour 
governments of 1964 to 1970, on foreigneconomic policy towards poor countries, 
and most especially towards those of Asia, 
makes it difficult to embark upon such a 
search with an easy conscience. It is not 
just the Labour Party's taste for pragmatism 
that has rendered it today, as 
never before, so short of serious ongoing 
policy research, and indeed policy. Serious 
scholars will not use up scarce time and 
professional capacity by knowingly producing 
for a party of opposition fig leaves 
of international morality and rationality,
that experience has proved to be discarded 
in office. It is because of the stark 
contrast between the years 1962 to 1964 
(with their soft words and hard thought)
and the unhappy policy record of 1964 to 
1970 (a contrast followed by more soft 
soap since the 1970 election) that manysocialist academics have stopped working 
seriously in or through the Labour Party.
This applies to near as well as far left. 

The two leading economists who, in the 
Ministry of Overseas Development (ooM), 
headed what was supposed to be the main 
thrust of Labour's research for action to 
improve relations between Britain and the 
third world, Paul Streeten and DudleySeers, are as genuinely libertarian and 
democratic socialists as can be found. 
Their conclusion regarding Labour's 
actual and potential record towards poor 
countries makes sad reading; but it explains 
the reluctance of academics again 
to act as court fig-leaf-makers. "On the 
whole, Labour's record was discreditable. 
If the Conservatives . . . had won the 
1964 election, they would [probably] have 
continued to expand [aid], because the 
cuts were due more to Labour political 


priorities than to economic difficulties. 

[We doubt that, unless] Labour had ... 

made the decisive move towards an immi


gration policy with racial and anti· 

developmental overtones ... the Conser


vatives [would] have done so ... One 

even wonders whether Smith would have 

tried his breakaway (or have succeeded 

so completely) if the Conservatives had 

been in power . . . Setting up an inde


pendent ministry is merely an empty 

gesture [unless there is real] support

within the government for its policies ... 

When it comes to the pinch, Labour is 

really very parochial." (Dudley Seers and 

Paul Streeten, " Overseas development

policies," in William Beckerman (editor) 

The Labour government's economic 

record: 1964-70, Duckworth, 1972, pages 

150 to 152. The whole piece is essential 

reading for socialists ; a damning and 

disgusted indictment by two experts

ideally placed to know the facts and 

deeply sympathetic to what had been 

presented, before the 1964 election, as 

being official Labour Party policy.) 

Now a week is a short time in Academe, 
but even doddering dons can remember 
the period 1962 to 1964, the committees 
of the Labour Party and the Fabian 
Society, the pious statements of goodwillby political leaders, the decent resolutions 
and the detailed promises. They also 
remember the policies of 1964 to 1970: a 
20 per cent fall in Britain's real aid ; a 
trade policy which was restrictionist towards 
imports from poor countries and 
neglectful of exports to them ; the active 
support for British uranium mining, by 
Rio Tinto Zinc, in Namibia (South West 
·Africa) combined with Labour's stubborn 
persistence in double-taxing British capital 
in India which it was agreed was of 
mutual benefit ; the dishonouring of 
British passports, held by "KenyanAsians," on the socialist grounds that 
their bearers lacked white skins. The 
·academics remember that the Labour 
leadership, which claimed to value their 
idealism (at least it sought their time on 
policy committees and recruited them into 
the civil service), in practice, preferred 
Concorde to aid ; in practice preferred the 
short run interests of a handful of textile 
workers in marginal constituencies to the 

common interests of poor British housewives 
and desperately poor Indian weavers 
; and in practice preferred to retreat 
before racists rather than to work out a 
reasoned immigration policy. 

It must be emphasised that the academic 
left has no right to be upset because its 
advice was not taken ; only because its 
ideals were exploited and ignored. Academic 
analysts (unlike party conferences, 
which the Labour government equallyneglected) have no-prescriptive right to 
help form policy; but both socialist 
academics and other party members can 
vote with their feet. If exploited and 
abused by the Labour leadership, they 
can simply withdraw. Massively, academics 
have done so; hence, in part, the 
policy vacuum. I am sorry if these harsh 
words give offence, but I should like to 
see a democratic socialist party in power 
in Britain (not just to improve British 
economic policy towards Asia) and these 
facts must be absorbed, if such a party is 
ever again to command the active interest 
of idealistic people with special expertise 
in the analysis of policy. 

Labour in opposition 

What can be done about this? It will not 
help for Labour in opposition to espousepolicies, extremely favourable to the third 
world, diametrically opposed to its behaviour 
in office. On southern Africa, 
support for whisky-drinking-guerillas,
from the safety of opposition, will not 
erase the memory of support for uranium 
mining and processing in Namibia, while 
in office. In opposition, Labour has 
argued, in terms of high moral indignation, 
that Britain should be represented at 
UNCTAD III by the Overseas Development 
Administration (onA) and not by the 
Board of Trade ; that ODA should be 
strengthened ; that Indian democracy and 
Bangladeshi claims should be preferred to 
Punjabi military theocracy ; and that firm 
commitments should be made to the 
Pearson aid targets. (Like its Conservative 
successor, the 1966 to 1970 Labour 
governments were prepared to accept the 
meaningless target of 1 per cent of Gross 
National Product (GNP) for "net flows of 


financial resources from the UK to poorcountries." The more meaningful Pearson 
target [0.7 per cent of GNP as net 
inter-governmental aid by 1975] was not 
accepted by Labour or Conservative 
governments, but only by Labour in opposition, 
if one believes them.) Alas, each 
of these policies flatly contradicts what 
Labour did in office. If it matters to 
the Labour Party to persuade serious socialist 
academics to join the debate about its 
third world policies, it could start byending the pretence, recognising that the 
period 1964 to 1970 was a developmentaldisaster, and outlining clear policies to do 
better: policies .it can adhere to in office. 

Labour in office 

Labour in office seemed eager to sacrifice 
a decent relationship between the UK and 
the third world to almost anything: to 
civil service preferences (the decision to 
suspend aid to one of the few clearlysocialist recipients, Tanzania, because she 
refused to pay pensions to her former 
colonisers); to Labour "Greater Britain-
ism " (Concorde before aid); to Labour 
" little Englandism " (textile voters in 
Dundee and Blackburn); even to the 
sheer " uncaring adhocery" of Wilson's 
hit-and-run attack on India in the "Lahore 
speech." (Harold Wilson now blames 
his one-sided off-the-cuff condemnation 
of India upon an unnamed civil servant. 
The interesting thing is that the primeminister did not feel, know or care enoughabout India to sense the bias or to discover 
the facts. His offensive cancellation 
[to meet some little local difficulty now 
long forgotten] of his proposed visit to 
this enormous socialist democracy is a 
further indication of the real situation.) 
Unless the past is at least partially recognised 
and better things made likely, academics 
with ideals will not again waste 
their time. Their talents, such as they are, 
are required not to form figleaf economic 
policy towards Asia, but to analyse how 
the Labour Party can be radically transformed 
into an anti-poverty party on a 
world scale ; if it cannot be transformed, 
people to whom starvation and infant 
mortality matter will increasingly cease 
to work within it, Most of us have no 

wish to participate in personal argumentswithin the party, but Roy Jenkins' speech 
at Musselburgh on 17 May, 1972 is so far 
the only serious step towards a decent 
Labour policy on development. Unfortunately, 
even this speech showed little regret 
over Labour's (including Roy Jenkins's) 
past record, and its concern for world poverty 
finds no echo on the front benches. 

Even the Whig establishment is often more 
permeable by decency than the Labour 
" idealists " when in power. During the 
near-famine in Bihar in 1967, India's 
prospects of importing extra food depended 
critically upon Britain's preparedness 
to accept a delay in the repaymentof a £19 million debt. At that time, J 
found that ten minutes spent in briefing 
a man before a television discussion, and 
five minutes with a Christian knight at the 
Treasury, were worth more than hours 
with our ·' sorry chaps there's the balance 
of payments " men of power in the 
Labour Party. Do they care? Of over a 
hundred members of the government, not 
one resigned over Mr. Callaghan's decision 
to invalidate Britain's pledges to the 
Kenyan Asians in 1968. Presumably the 
passports in their pockets had not been 
devalued. The party card in mine had. 

Adequate economic performance is the 
key issue for the poor countries of South 
Asia, which dominate the continent in 
terms of population. Certainly it is critical 
for the prospects of Asian democracy.
With progressive us withdrawal from the 
continent, Britain in EEC could play an 
important part. However, she will do so 
only with a policy and an ethic that look 
beyond next week. If Labour maintains 
the fiction that all was well from 1964 to 
1970, and that more of the committees 
and talk-talk of 1962 to 1964 could help 
now, no such policy or ethic can emerge. 

Asian economic 
perform a nee 

Analysis of British economic policy towards 
a region needs to consider that 
region's own performance, resources and 
national goals. As for resources, the massive 
populations of South Asia are still 
70 to 80 per cent dependent upon agricul



ture; some of them. not~bly in parts of 
India, are finding industrial jobs. National 
goals, in democratic and authoritarian 
states alike, invariably include more 
growth and less inequality. What of the 
performance? Overall economic "success 
" in Asia was apparently reflected in 
growth rates of real Gross Domestic 
Profit (GOP) per person, which accelerated 
from 2.3 per cent per year during the 
'fifties to 3.0 per cent during the 'sixties. 
During that period real GOP per head per 
year grew most rapidly in West Asia 

(5.3 per cent). Most of the big poorcountries of South Asia did less well, however 
(India 1.5 per cent, Indonesia 0.8 per 
cent, Pakistan 2.5 per cent, Philippines 2.3 
per cent, South Korea 6.5 per cent. Thailand 
4.8 per cent and Turkey 2.8 per cent).
Still, even a "poor" performer like India 
has raised per capita income by 40 per 
cent in the last two decades (probably 
more than in the previous two millenia)
and, typically of the region, almost 90 
per cent of the investment costs have been 
borne by Indian savings, as against foreign 
private or aid capital. 
Yet frustration in the poor countries of 
South Asia has been increased, not decreased, 
by this rapid growth. This is not 
because their people have experienced a 
"revolution of rising expectations," but 
because the benefits of growth within 
Asia's less developed countries have goneoverwhelmingly to the better off (often including 
the tiny minority of workers within 
the unionised modern industrial sector). 
With few exceptions (an odd group which 
includes Taiwan and mainland China)
observation and statistics indicate that 
little if any increase in welfare has 
"rubbed off" onto the poor. notably the 
rural poor. The 70 per cent of the population 
dependent upon agriculture have 
normally got barely 20 per cent of development 
investment. Their iob chances 
have sharplv worsened. partly under the 
influence of inappropriate technologiesfrom the West that replace labour rather 
than complement it. These technologieshave come via trade (tractors before fertilisers). 
private investment. and even aid. 
The ioh situation has been worsened bymisplaced imitation of western educational 
(or rather schooling) technology. 

A jobless urban clerisy is matched by a 
growing mass of villagers both joblessand landless ; the best of both groups are 
increasingly mobile towards the "greatwens." Ceylon's abortive insurrection in 
April 1971 was merely the first sign of the 
incipient power of such a situation to 
generate violence, jn the form of pointlessanarchy rather than of social revolution. 

The Indian sub-continent is, today, in a 
mood recalling Britain in 1963 or 1964 or 
(alarmingly) Ceylon in 1970, a mood of 
exaggerated radical euphoria. In India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, arguably democratic-
socialist regimes have aroused high 
.radical expectations, especially of land 
reform. Yet the ruling parties rely heavily 
upon cash from big landlords and industrialists. 
Indira Gandhi, Sheik Mujib and 
President Bhutto have at most five years 
(perhaps only two or three) to "deliver 
the goods," not as overall growth, but as 
substantial and sustained increases in mass 
living standards, especially via land reform. 
If they fail, they will be replaced, 
just possibly peacefully and democratically. 
It is in both British and socialist 
interests that they should succeed. Their 
main single prQ9lem is perhaps exemplified 
by the fact that in the period 1961 to 
1971 , while Asia's per capita income grew 
at the rate of 3 per cent per year, its 
food output per head grew not at all. 
While an enormous boon to large wheat 
farmers, the " green revolution " has in 
its total impact barely counterbalanced 
population explosion and land exhaustion. 

Asian policy for a Labour 
Britain: trade and aid 

Most of Asia has suffered " growth without 
jobs " ; without much spread of extra 
welfare to the really poor. Given their 
great need (it is likely that many millions 
of Indian and Bangladeshi babies are now 
being irreversibly condemned to a lifetime 
of subnormality by undernutrition 
in their formative years) this is of basic 
human concern. What are the lessons for 
British economic policy towards the 
region? Much the most important are in 
the field of trade. A major cause of joblessness 
in most poor Asian countries is 
lack of foreign exchange to import raw 


materials (cotton, ball-bearings, fertilisers)
for their underemployed workers and 
equipment to use. We, as well as they, 
could gain by a big expansion in our 
purchases from them, thus providing the 
foreign exchange they need to buy inputsfrom us. For, despite occasional unemployment 
caused by mismanagement of 
domestic demand, both Britain and the 
EEC suffer from chronic labour shortage, 
likely to increase as people opt for more 
leisure and, incidentally, as the total of 
British public holidays edges up towards 
European levels. There will thus be enormous 
and growing gains to Britain and 
EEC from progressively freer entry for the 
labour-intensive products of Asia. In 
Lancashire, since 1951, the workers displaced 
by imports from poor countries 
have swiftly found much more productivejobs elsewhere. While long-term barter 
deals are a perfectly sensible way to increase 
trade, there are many areas where 
planned liberalisation is possible, and in 
these Labour should seek to free entry. 

Given present EEC policy, the most formidable 
problem will be to persuade our 
partners to open the enlarged European 
market to less developed countries' agri cultural 
surplus. The poor growth performance 
of Asian agriculture is partly 
due to the lack of just those incentives 
that improved access to a European market 
might provide: there are substantial 
food surplus countries in South Asia. both 
actual (rice from Burma and Thailand) 
and potential (wheat from Pakistan), 
which could earn plenty of foreign exchange 
by sales to the EEC. As a member. 
the UK should press hard for some version 
of the Mansholt plan to replace price 
support by income guarantees, and increasingly 
to persuade farm workers to 
change jobs-to obtain employment in 
those industries where the EEC is reallycompetitive. With a policy of full employment, 
imaginative use of the EuropeanSocial Fund, and a major expansion of 
purposive state action to re-employ farm 
workers, a community agricultural policy. 
liberalised (at least) towards the third 
world, is not a pipe-dream. European farm 
workers willing to rise at four o'clock on 
a January morning and milk the cows are, 
in the long run , far Jess credible. 

The second area where trade liberalisation 
could assist South Asia is that of processed 
foods. The EEC has carefully excluded 
these from the so called "generalised" 
preferences extended in such grudging 
measure to some manufactured exports 
of some less developed countries. 
Now Great Britain has entered the EEC 
the smaller Commonwealth countries of 
Asia, in particular, will suffer as they find 
Commonwealth preferences in the British 
market progressively replaced by preferences 
against them-mainly in favour of 
high cost French and Italian food processers, 
and to some extent in favour of 
EEC companies operating in relativelywealthy states in Francophone Africa, 
especially French companies in Gabon, 
Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Against this 
proposed increase in discrimination 
against the really poor, there has been 
hardly a murmur from the Labour Party, 
either when negotiating entry or when 
repudiating it; both parties, however, 
have been sedulously concerned for 
British sugar-producing companies operating 
in less poor third-world mini-states. 

The third area in which Britain, in or out 
of the EEC, could contribute at once to 
domestic efficiency and Asian development 
is that of textiles. In this most important 
field (jute and cotton textiles still 
dominate the Indian subcontinent's manufactured 
exports) Labour's policy was 
both restrictionist and perversely selective 
; thus Anthony Crosland announced 
a policy that effectively replaced one set 
of restrictive arrangements relativelyfavourable to poorer producers in South 
Asia (quotas and Commonwealth preference) 
by tariff arrangements favourable 
mainly to Portugal. This nearly destroyed 
the Indo-British trade treaty. In December 
1971, however, the Tories reprieved 
it, at the last second, though only bytariff and quota arrangements seriously 
damaging other poor countries in order 
to protect inefficient British producersagainst the British housewife's search for 
cheaper clothing. If Britain tried now to 
liberalise textile imports, she would find 
powerful support, both in Brussels and in 
some sectors of European industry itself. 
Similar arguments apply in lesser degree 
to footwear and furniture. 


The final area of possible trade freeing is 
perhaps a little more futuristic. By 1980, 
India, at least, will have begun to follow 
Japan, Taiwan and Hongkong into the 
export of labour-intensive light electronic 
equipment. By then EEC countries should 
be increasingly moving out of such fields, 
as the USA has already begun to do. Instead 
of absurdly begging Japan (andTaiwan and India?) not to sell us excellent 
cheap radiograms and television sets, 
we should welcome them, in exchangefor freer access to Asian markets for 
exported machinery to produce them, 
which will for several decades be made 
more cheaply and efficiently in highlydeveloped countries. The time to prepare' 
for the domestic policies and international 
bargains of the 'eighties is now. 

That brings us to the first of three points, 
relevant to rich I poor relations, and crucial 
for Labour's economic policy towards 
Asia. At the third United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD III), held in Santiago in Chile 
in May 1972, the Indians in particulargrew visibly tired of champagne partieswith rich delegates from poor countries, 
and the pseudo-concessions and flowerydishonesty of delegates from rich countries. 
Britain may actually have benefited 
from the British Conservative attitude, 
Ted Scrooge rather than Uriah Wilson. 
(Consider the truly Heepish balance-ofpayments 
excuse for low aid repeatedlyproffered from 1964 to 1970. "We are in 
the position of a man who has got into 
debt by overspending. He is still living 
comfortably, is exerting himself no more 
than he did, and expects his income and 
consumption to rise ; but the fact is he 
is in debt. What a fortunate opportunity 
. for reducing his modest annual subscription 
to Oxfam!" [T. Wilson, cited in 
Seers and Streeten, loc cit, page 127.]) 

Asian countries will increasingly abandon 
the search for verbal hypocrisies (such as, 
" generalised preferences for the less developed 
countries' manufactured exports")
in exchange for hard bargaining for trade 
advantages. Labour should warmly encourage 
this bilateral process ; a future 
Labour government could well do so, if it 
were prepared, as the last one was not, to 

stamp on some of the thicker planks at 
the Board of Trade, and to point out that 
freer trade helps improve the use of 
British resources, transfers income from 
inefficient industrialists to poor housewives, 
and is not a " concession " to less 
developed countries but an exchange of 
advantages with them. Certainly deals 
between the EEC and poor countries need 
make no obeisance to the great god of 
universality. The USA, by its retreat into 
" fortress America " in its relations with 
the third world, has forfeited both the 
power and the right to press its objections 
to bilateral trading arrangements between 
the EEC and the less developed countries. 

The recent Gadarene rush to protectionism 
by us labour shows that domestic 
policies of full employment are needed to 
get the trade unions to co-operate with 
measures liberalising imports-of-labourintensive products from poor countries. 
Any future Labour government must, 
sooner or later, persuade the unions to 
accept, in exchange for really substantial 
income redistribution, a genuine and, if 
necessary, compulsory incomes policy ; no 
exchange rate ingenuities can validate, or 
morally justify, planning for everythingexcept incomes. (Thomas Balogh, Labour 
and inflation, Fabian Tract number 403, 
October 1970, price 40p.) (This attitude 
towards economic planning might be described 
as "Labour Powellism," for Mr. 
Powell advocates " controls on nothing 
except blacks "). Such hard bargainingwith the unions probably cannot be compounded 
by confrontations on Asian 
imports, unless trade unionists are reasonably 
sure they will gain from the employmentjredistributionjliberalisation 
package. 
That should be easy to ensure, even 
within the EEC, for freer trade means an 
overall gain to the liberalising nation, or 
group, as its employed resources are 
switched to more efficient uses. The European 
Social Fund (ESF) was created specifically 
to re-locate workers and businesses 
damaged by freer trade, but it has, in 
practice, confined its mandate to cases 
where the freeing was caused by lower 
barriers within the EEC. If the ESF is to be 
more than a fairly rich man's fund within 
a very rich man's club, it must be _extended 
to cover generous compensatiOn, 


retraining and resettlement for those 
damaged by freer trade with the really 
poor countries of Africa and South Asia 
(the oil-rich of West Asia and the semi-
developed of Latin America have a far 
lower priority). 

There is one final, political consideration 
regarding Labour's options for freeingtrade within an enlarged EEC. Althoughthe inward-looking, aid-tying, neo-colonising 
forces still prevail, British pressures 
towards radical liberalisation of the EEC's 
trade policy would not lack powerfulallies. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, till recently 
the commissioner responsible, is a known 
supporter, and is particularly concerned 
with the community's lack of an Asian 
policy (a defect he expects the UK to 
remedy!) In May 1972 Dr. Sicco Mansholt, 
the then chairman of the Europeancommission, was both moved and 
shocked, as a social democrat, by the rich 
world's selfish intransigence at Santiago. 
Nor is the impact of cheaper processed 
foods, or cheaper jute backings, on general 
living costs lost upon Europe's retailers 
and carpet makers, or housewives and 
politicians. A shrewd marriage of idealism 
and self-interest, with the British Labour 
Party as the broker, is quite possible. 

The idealism of pre-electoral hypocrisy, 
and the self-interest of Dundee jute next 
week, will scarcely do. Tables I and II (see 
pages 11 and 12) show the truly shocking 
extent to which Labour in office allowed 
our trade relations with Asia (especially 
" non-oil Asia ") to decay. The real value 
of British imports from India was almost 
halved between 1963 and 1970 ; exports 
fared even worse. This casts an odd light 
on the suggestion that British diplomats 
should concentrate in North West Europe 
and North America. In 1970 India, China,
Pakistan and Indonesia, over 45 per cent 
of the world's people, supplied le~s than 
2 per cent of British imports, and bought 
less than 3 per cent of her exports, considerably 
worse in both respects than when 
Labour took office. In the 'sixties Labour 
Europeanism meant neglect of trade with 
the wretched of the earth. In the 'seventies 
and 'eighties will it be Labour anti-Europeanism 
that blinds the party to their and 
our shared interests in freer world trade? 

Trade is much more important than aid, 
especially to the poor countries of Asia, 
whose net aid receipts per person are far 
less than in Africa or _Latin America, 

covering barely 10 ·per cent of investment. 
Characteristically, the 1964 to 1970 
Labour governments left trade wholly to 
the myopic protectionism of the Board of 
Trade, putting only aid matters under the 
nominal control of the ooM with its 20 
(initially) starry-eyed economists and 
statisticians. Even in the aid field, however, 
it soon became clear that their 
function was to legitimise a dwindling UK 
aid effort (see Table III on page 12). These 
figures once again present a dismal picture. 
The real value of net aid transfers 
from Britain to poor countries fell by 
over a fifth during Labour's term of 
office. On a continental basis Asia did 
rather better, but this disguises redistributions 
of British aid within the continent, 
away from India and Pakistan and towards 
the wealthier and more immediately 
" strategic " countries of South East Asia. 
The real value of net aid transfers from 
the UK to India and Pakistan (including 
the Indus basin scheme) fell by 19.7 per 
cent during Labour's term of office ; and 
1970 was a " good " year ! The bias towards 
small countries is not confined to 
Asia (as Nigeria's low allocation in Table 
III shows), nor indeed to Britain's aid 
programme. On top of a drastic cut · in 
real aid, however, and since Britain grew 
substantially richer during this period(once it had overcome a balance of payments 
problem not notably exacerbated 
by aid), this record was discreditable to 
Britain and most damaging to South Asia. 

The aid performance was not wholly bad. 
After 1965 the Labour government considerably 
softened the terms of new loans 
to India, though it remains irrational that 
only Africa appears. to qualify for substantial 
British grant aid. Some aspects of 
" double tying " of aid (to both specific 
purposes and to procurement in Britain) 
were also eased. The proportion of direct 
self -aid to donor dependencies, still over 
30 per cent for France and over 10 per 
cent for Holland, was small and declining, 
and direct "aid" to donor companies (of 
the type exposed in Franco-Gabonais relations 
when the world-bank publicly 


refused a loan in 1971) ~emained, in 
Britain's case, rather rare. Moreover, if in 
1970 the grant element of British gross aid 
had fallen to only 0.36 per cent of her 
GNP, that was still more than the USA, 
West Germany, Japan or Italy, and more 
than the average for all western donors. 
A steady and substantial decline in British 
aid was, however, hardly what one had 
expected in 1964. Labour's verbal commit


ments to Pearson targets, for aid plusprivate investment while in office but for 
real a1d while in opposition, fail to persuade 
those who should know best that 
" at the first sight of another economic 
crisis .. . another George Brown [would 
not convince] the cabinet that a ceilingshould be set to such electorally unprofitable 
expenditures." (Seers and 
Streeten, fo e cit, page 133.) 

TABLE I 
UK IMPORTS FROM MAJOR ASIAN SUPPLIERS, 1962 TO 1970, IN£ MILLIONS 

country 1962 1963 1964 1967 1970 1970* 
India 136 142 141 126 106 83 
Pakistan 29 28 27 33 35 27 
Ceylon 42 42 42 40 37 29 
Malaysia 38 33 } 28 47 37

53

Singapore 16 17 18 34 27 
Hongkong 56 70 81 90 128 100 
Israel 17 20 22 32 45 35 
Iraq 53 62 80 24 19 15 
Saudi Arabia 21 13 12 63 104 81 
Iran 35 35 40 137 76 59 
Japan 54 54 75 91 134 105 
China 23 18 25 30 34 27 

total UK imports 4628 4983 5696 6437 9052 7063 
import price index 99 103 107 109 132 

TABLE II 
UK EXPORTS TO MAJOR ASIAN BUYERS, 1962 TO 1970, IN £ MILLIONS 
country 1962 1963 1964 1967 1970 1970* 

India 120 139 130 84 73 56 
Pakistan 43 42 45 52 49 38 
CeylonMalaysiaSingaporeHongkongIsrael 
25 
51 
36 
49 
37 
23 
49 
39 
56 
46 
} 
20 
86 
58 
54 
21 
43 
36 
63 
50 
19 
60 
62 
99 
96 
15 
46 
47 
76 
73 
Iraq
·Saudi Arabia 
21 
9 
18 
10 
20 
14 
17 
16 
24 
35 
18 
27 
Iran 29 28 28 43 66 50 
Thailand 15 15 18 22 32 24 
JapanPhilippinesChina 
46 
1 0 
9 
53 
12 
13 
61 
12 
18 
88 
26 
39 
148 
25 
45 
113 
96 
34 
total UK exportsexport price index 
4062 
lUI 
4365 
104 
4565 
106 
5230 
114 
8663 
136 
6166 

Source: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics 1971, pages 243 and 247 to 250; prices : 
1961 = 100. The last column is in 1963 prices but using a very crude deflator (1970 
transactions times 1963 price index, divided by 1970 price index). 


In aid above all, it seems almost frivolous 
to analyse the effects of alternative policy 
improvements by the Labour Party. As 
usual, the party generates decent, if imperfectly 
articulated, policies in opposition 
; the trouble is that it abandoned 
them in office. The task then becomes, if 
one is a realist, the design of an aid 
programme that the Labour leadership 
can be expected to keep to when the 
weather is rough. Such a programmecould, with forethought, be better than 
last time ; it would certainly be less good 

than recent NEC statements or conference 
resolutions imply. Few things are more 
damaging to poor countries than highexpectations of aid improvements that 
are dashed. Integrated plans are thrown 
into chaos ; spare capacity mounts ; confidence 
in planning (and in politicians)
dwindles ; and external relations are 
placed at the mercy of opportunist foreign 
moneylenders (or governments) who are 
prepared, at a price, to enable the governments 
that the us or Britain has let down 
to meet their international obligations. 

TABLE III 
BRITISH AID DISBURSEMENTS, 1964 TO 1970 IN MILLIONS OF POUNDS 

countryf region 1964 1965 1969 1970 1970 
(1964 prices*) 

gross net gross net gross net gross net gross net 
aid transfert aid transfer aid transfer aid transfer aid transfer 

America: Cwlth 8.0 6.7 6.2 4.2 15.7 11.7 18.5 14.0 14.0 10.6 
non-Cwlth 3.4 ----0.7 2.7 -2.7 3.5 0.8 2.0 -2.2 1.5 -1.7 
Africa: Cwlth 72.1 63.0 71.1 61.8 61.0 40.6 58.7 36.6 44.4 27.2 
(Nigeria)
(Kenya)
(Malawi)
non-Cwlth 
4.3 
14.3 
10.3 
7.1 
1.7 
12.7 
10.0 
2.9 
9.6 
16.7 
10.1 
10.9 
7.4 
14.7 
9.8 
6.8 
5.6 
10.8 
7.2 
2.1 
1.2 
6.5 
6.1 
1.4 
11.0 
11.1 
7.7 
2.6 
6.2 
6.4 
6.6 
1.6 
8.3 
8.4 
5.8 
2.0 
4.7 
4.8 
5.0 
1.2 
Asia: Cwlth 52.9 37.9 46.5 26.9 61.5 33.2 74.7 51.5 56.6 39.0 
(India)
(Pakistan)
(Indian basin) 
(Malaysia)
(Singapore)
non-Cwlth 
35.1 
10.1 
2.6 
3.9 
0.1 
2.5 
24.5 
7.4 
2.6 
2.8 
0.1 
2.5 
27.8 
9.9 
3.7 
4.2 
0.5 
2.6 
13.2 
6.7 
3.7 
3.2 
0.3 
2.6 
33.9 
11.2 
2.1 
4.0 
5.5 
6.3 
12.2 
8.2 
2.1 
1.5 
5.0 
6.2 
44.8 
10.6 
6.5 
7.9 
6.3 
29.2 
7.4 
3.2 
7.6 
5.4 
33.9 
8.0 
4.9 
6.0 
4.8 
22.1 
5.6 
2.4 
5.8 
4.1 
Oceania: Cwlth 2.4 2.1 3.2 3.1 7.8 7.6 8.3 8.1 6.3 6.1 
Europe, Middle 
East : Cwlth 13.3 12.8 17.0 16.4 4.9 4.2 8.8 8.0 6.7 6.1 
Aden, 
South Arabia 6.0 5.6 9.4 9.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Malta 6.7 6.6 5.6 5.4 4.0 3.5 7.4 6.7 5.6 5.1 
non-Cwlth 7.1 2.9 10.9 6.8 6.6 5.1 7.8 5.7 5.9 4.3 

total 
bilateral aid 175.5 136.1 176.2 126.2 179.1 123.6 193.9 142.5 146.8 107.9 
total aid 191.3 154.9 194.9 144.9 210.8 155.4 213.8 162.4 161.9 123.0 

manufactured 
export prices* 106 109 130 140 

Sources : ODM, British Aid Stalistics 1964 to 1968, HMSO, 1969, pages 14 and 24 to 33 ; 
FCO(ODA), British Aid Statistics 1966 to 1970, HMSO, 1971, pages 15 and 26 to 33; cso, 
Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1971, page 243. Notes: t =gross aid minus capital repayments 
equals net aid; net aid minus interest repayments equals net transfer. *=pricesof manufactured exports used as deflator, 1961 =I00. 


Not all the aid disappointments of 1964 

to 1970 were Labour's fault. In particular, 

on three issues (term of aid-loans, tying 

to procurement in the UK, and monetary

reform linked to aid) British efforts at 

liberalisation were frustrated by others ; 

but much can still be done, even unilater


ally, by the UK on all three issues. If we 

cannot persuade other donors to agree

multilaterally to untie aid, we can try,

first, to incorporate built-in devices to 

prevent loss of export revenues by any of 

a group of donors untying jointly, as 

ingeniously suggested in the Pearson 

report (Partners in development, op cit, 

pages 191 to 193); second, introduce 

"price policing," as repeatedly suggested

by the USA-the damage from aid tying

lies in the fact that it raises the price of 

tied goods by about 20 per cent to the 

recipients (M. ul-Haq, "Tied credits: a 

quantitative analysis," in J. Adler [editor],

Capital movements and economic de


velopment, lEA-Manhattan, 1968); and 

third, instruct aid negotiators about the 

real costs and benefits of tied aid, especi


ally if it comprises loans rather than 

grants, when its true net value to the 

recipient can very easily become negative.

(This fact seldom fails to surprise even 

experienced negotiators at the " study

seminars " run by the Institute of De


velopment Studies at Sussex University. 

If the commercial rate of interest is 10 

per cent and aid is given in the form of a 

ten year credit at 8 per cent, the true aid 

is only the (discounted value of) the 2 

per cent yearly interest rebate. This can 

easily be outweighed by, say, a 50 to 20 

per cent excess charge on the imports ; by 

not an unusually big excess for, say, Italy.) 


All these policies could be adopted by all 
. OECD donors, or by EEC donors alone, or 
(except for the first suggestion, and at a 


pinch) by the UK alone. 

As for the terms of recent aid loans, 
notably interest rates and grace periods, 
both Labour and Conservative governments 
have been relatively liberal. The 
difficulty in going much further (in which 
there is a strong British self-interest, 
because our aid loans are at a greater risk 
of default than those of many countries) 
i~ that. if British aid loans are transferred 

at lower interest rates while us or West 
German aid, or straight commercial 
credits, remain costly, then British generosity 
can be represented as making possible, 
and indeed financing, the meannesses 
of other rich donors or even the 
extortionate rates of commercial lenders. 

One method, which has the advantage of 
leaving the choice to the recipient while 
reducing the risk of default, is to have a 
wide range of loan types, of which quite 
a number could be offered to any particular 
recipient, who would be able to 
" trade " softness against size of loan 
within the limits of credit-worthiness. For 
example, a high-risk recipient might be 
offered £10 million, at 2 per cent or £12 
million at 2.5 per cent (or any combination); 
a low-risk recipient, £12 million at 
3 per cent or £15 million at 4 per cent (or 
a combination, such as, £6 million at 3 
per cent and £7.5 million at 4 per cent). 

The increase of the poor country's choice, 
in the aid field, might seem to conflict 
with the most important of ali aid goals 
for a Labour government ; to raise the 
amount of UK and world aid that goes to 
help really poor people to help themselves. 
One the one hand, the UK (especiallyunder Labour) should clearly seek to 
follow Sweden, Holland and Canada in 
switching aid massively away from heavyindustry, where it creates few jobs and 
much capital, often providing profits to 
nationals of rich countries, towards small 
farming, population control, and improvement 
of urban slum conditions ; on 
the other hand, surely this is the affair of 
the recipient government? Britain's policy 
here can be simply adumbrated. We 
should judge the usefulness of projects and 
programmes before giving aid, not the 
moral worth of recipient nations afterwards. 
"Performance criteria," by which 
further aid is showered on those who have 
been successful or lucky in attaining what 
donors view as the goals of developmen~. 
are in practice arbitrary, paternal, unfair 
and probably unenforceable. The a.lternative 
method, developed at ODM dun~g the 
Labour government, is the conversion ~f 
standard criteria of benefit/ cost analysis 
into a manual to decide if a particularproject, proposed for aid, passes the test. 


While the latter may sound a bit mechanical, 
it is far better than any alternative 
so far devised. The really bad bits of UK 
aid (airports and half-empty hotels in 
countries without prospects for foreigntourism , giant and half-idle steel mills and 
heavy electricals concerns, tractors where 
they create not output but unemployment) 
are caused by prestige considerations, by 
the wish to help otherwise doomed 
regimes, or above all, by British lame 
ducks. These persuade the Department of 
Trade and Industry (on) to break their 
addled eggs upon the heads of poorcountries. The DTI swings the noxious 
products into place with strings of " tied 
aid", threaded with little difficultythrough the political near-vacuum at ODA. 
The manual (any manual) is a valuable 
safeguard against the generals, the 
hoteliers, the pseudo-politicisers and the 
lame ducks ; but any remotely socialist 
administration would want to see the 
manual so amended as to give heavy 
preference to projects whose benefits go 
to poor people, and whose local costs are 
borne by rich people. Such amendment is 
entirely possible. There is little doubt that 
" egalitarian " amendments to UK aid 
would benefit the big countries of South 
Asia. Per capita income is lower there than 

in most African countries receiving British 
aid, and the governments are more committed 
to equalisation. 

A UK aid programme making benefits to 
poor people an explicit criterion for project 
aid (and, as would be implied, redefined 
the term " project " more widely, for 
instance to include crop storage schemes 
for numerous small farmers, or transitional 
cash to cover the foreign exchange 
requirements of food imports to replace 
temporary production losses during re-
distributive land reform) would certainly 
shift support to the Indian, Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani planners, away from the 
capital-city-builders of Malawi and the 
wealthy and ingenious naval landlords of 
Malta. The need to prevent UK aid from 
being diverted into disguised export promotion 
around the relatively wealthy and 
still largely anti-egalitarian dictatorships 
of South America, to the disadvantage of 
the poor of Asia and Africa alike, has 
been brought out clearly by Roy Jenkins. 

British aid evaluators should judge projects 
and programmes, not countries ; and 
by criteria that value the passage towards 
self-reliant, equalising and high-employment 
economies, not by ill-defined, short-
term and changeable " adhocery " about 
British interests. Certainly major increases 
in aid will be needed to achieve 
such aims against the forces of inertia. 
Certainly, too, one essential goal is the 
avoidance of aid diversion to today's 
European Development Fund (EDF) ; 
currently scheduled to gobble up some 
12 to 15 per cent of our aid programme 
by 1980, largely in order to supportFrench companies in French nee-colonies. 
Once again, a Labour government seeking 
radical change in EDF would have powerful 
allies, both on the commission and in 
the industries and governments of those 
EEC members who resent giving aid to 
France. All this needs to be set in the 
context of a socialist aid policy, however ; 
one oriented towards helping poor peopleachieve adequate incomes and self-reliance. 
Neither ecological fears of growth, 
nor neuroses about being thought neocolonialist, 
could divert a decent Labour 
Party from developing such a policy. 

conclusions 

Private capital flows are of relatively little 
importance between the UK and South 
Asia, though in Malaysia they play a 
major role. All four countries of " the 
subcontinent" have set out a fairly clear 
line : new overseas private capital is 
barred from some sectors, welcome in 
others but on generally unattractive terms, 
permitted to repatriate profits but not 
capital, and encouraged to combine with 
local private or public enterprise, preferably 
with a minority foreign stake, 
amounting in effect to a sale of technology 
plus initial managerial skills. Even at 
independence, in 1947. barely 5 per cent 
of Indian non-agricultural capital was 
in fact foreign owned ; consequently, given 
this relatively advanced state of indigenous 
enterprise, these are natural preferences, 
especially in view of the substantial 
outflow of foreign exchange probablyassociated with the body of private foreign 
capital, old and new, in the region. The 


effects of UK policy on these flows, and of 
the flows themselves, on poor Asian 
countries are probably marginal, with the 
possible exception of capital movements 
to " export processing zones " like those 
of Kerala, West Malaysia and Taiwan. 
Certainly Labour should negotiate' agreements 
to remove double taxation arrangements 
that negate the efforts of poorAsian countries to attract certain types of 
capital from Great Britain, via tax incen


: tives. Paul Streeten has argued persuasively 
for a "link" between monetary reform and 
aid, for example by issuing, in the first 
instance, most or all Special DrawingRights (soRs) to poor countries. I have 
doubts, not about the desirability of this, 
but about its priority. First, poor countries 
will buy in the cheapest market with their 
extra liquidity; that will not be the developed 
country with liquidity problems of 
its own, since these are caused largely by 
export uncompetitiveness. Second, both 
aid and unorthodox liquidity have powerful 
enemies; why unite them? Above all, 
monetary ingenuities, like ecological ones, 
divert scarce reforming zeal away from 
really vital issues, as the fate of Bryanand the us populists reveals. Should not 
UNCTAD, and those in rich and poor countries 
who wish to help " the wretched of 
the earth," concentrate on the issues of 
aid, trade and domestic and international 
income distribution that keep them 
wretched, rather than on the near-veil of 
near-money? 

No discussion of the diversion of scarce 
reforming zeal could be complete without 
examining international migration. The 
unfortunate conduct of the Labour cabinet 
towards non-white holders of British passaBove 
all over the " Kenyan 
'-"'~""'~ " in 1968, has used up enormous 
quantities of diplomatic time and energy 
ever since 1965. ("Probably the most 
shameful measure that Labour members 
have ever been asked by their whips to 
support." The Times leader. 27 February. 
1968.) Reginald Maud! ing (who spoke of 
"patrials." but who did admit "KenyanAsians ") and the courage of Edward 
Heath and Robert Carr on the issue of 
Ugandan Asians (tardily and halfheartedly 
backed by the Labour Party)
have done something to repair the dam


age (although the changes in immigration 
policy announced in January 1973 
will probably put back the clock still 
farther). Nevertheless, it remains British 
policy to take from the poor countries 
only the workers that they need and have 
expensively trained: doctors not dustmen, 
despite our shortage of both. This not 
only constitutes anti-aid (a drain of some 
£5 million per year to Britain from India 
alone, in training costs, mainly of doctors) 
but, in addition, it worsens inequality 
within poor countries, by making doctors 
but not dustmen scarcer. A high priority 
in policy towards poor nations, not just 
for a Labour government but for anydecent government, is to make British 
immigration policy genuinely colour blind 
again. Public racism in Britain has been a 
problem only when fanned by racist (or 
more often cowardly) political leadership. 
It is strongly arguable that Britain needs 
only a small number of immigrants yearly, 
but not that they should almost all come 
from Eire, or (if from Asia) be doctors 
or engineers and I or Jive in ghettoes. 

Labour's policy-making in 1962-4 was 
marked by great, overt and cheap goodwill 
towards poor countries. Many liberal, 
radical and socialist academics were taken 

in, and sucked in, first to policy research, 
then to the civil service, In practice UK 
trade policy neglected and damaged poor 
countries. The ODM, overtly created as a 
spokesman for the third world, was compelled, 
academics and all, to preside over 
the slashing of the aid programme because 
of balance-of-payments considerations 
that were largely pretexts. Immigrationpolicy represented steady retreat before 
racists. The intellectual left will not gothrough that charade again. Serious and 
attainable goals, in a Labour Party committed 
to a real rather than a verbal war 
on world poverty, and honestly led , could 
restore the mood of 1964 with a sounder 
foundation. The party's "little Englanders-" 
and "greater Britons" will be able 
to decide whether all those pointy-heads 
are worth a few Concordes, and colour 
television sets, and votes from racists, and 
smiles from inefficient, but ennobled, textile 
producers. Probably not ; but no 
decency, no pointy-heads, and no pointy-
heads, no policy. 


3. Japan and Britain 
Wolf Mendl 

In 1945 General MacArthur referred to 
the Pacific Ocean as an " Anglo-Saxon 
lake." He would have done better to have 
called it an American lake. At the end of 
the second world war the British returned 
to their possessions in the region and 
apparently resumed their old position of 
influence while Japan was eliminated 
from the scene. However, appearancesveiled the true state of affairs. British 
power was not restored to what was 
thought to have been its pre-war importance 
but continued to decline rapidly ; a 
process which had begun before the first 
world war. Japan's disappearance from 
the international scene was only temporary. 
The energy and ambition of the 
Japanese people and the evolution of 
world politics combined to restore its 
importance in the region and the world 
at large. Today, Britain's influence in the 
Pacific area can only be marginal, whereas 
Japan is one of its four major states 
and has become an economic world 
power. 

A similar gap between appearances and 
reality may be observed in popular attitudes 
since the war. The British public of 
1945, fed on the horrors of war, had an 
image of the Japanese as monkey faced 
little people with protruding teeth, who 
were capable of unspeakable atrocities 
and inhumanities. This picture has gradually 
faded from popular memory, and 
with the passage of time Japan became a 
kind of blank in the public mind. Now the 
Japanese have returned to our consciousness: 
neat little men with spectacles,
dressed in dark suits, carrying briefcases; 
ferocious competitors beneath their mild 
and well mannered exterior. The image is 
nourished by a popular press that repeatshoary legends about unfair competition 
from sweated labour, shoddy products 
and Japanese imitation of the West. In 
contrast, the Japanese image of ·Britain 
has been far more flattering. The Japanesehave retained their traditional and respectful 
curiosity about our culture and their 
eagerness to learn about it. Some of the 
respect for Britain has gone in recent 
years and has been replaced by puzzlement. 
not unmixed with condescension, 
as to how we can manage to get ourselves 

repeatedly into such economic crises. 

The task of the Labour Party must surelybe to promote a better popular understanding 
of Japan, to dispel a series of 
myths and prejudice, and thus to lay the 
foundations on which a Labour government 
can pursue a realistic and 
constructive policy towards Japan. Byitself, Britain may not be able to do 
much to influence Japanese policy, which 
will be governed by economic strategyand relations with the major powers in 
the Pacific. However, through membership 
of the European Economic Community 
we might exercise a significantthough indirect influence upon Japan. 

mainsprings and direction 
of Japan's foreign policy 

In a period of rapid change, when it is 
impossible to predict accurately the new 
pattern of international relations which 
will emerge, Japan, like most countries, 
is forced to re-examine the premises of its 
foreign policy. The Japanese will find this 
a particularly difficult task for two reasons: 
in modern times their policy has 
been essentially reactive, constantly seeking 
to adjust to a changing environment ; 
second, the process by which policy is 
made almost excludes clarity and decisiveness. 
Japan's basic interest has been to 
retain the cohesion and vigour of a 
national society which has regardedforeigners as embarrassing intruders and 
has rejected foreign influence unless it 
could be incorporated into the native 
culture. It can therefore be argued that the 
expansionist and militarist policies of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were originally as much a response 
to pressures which seemed to threaten the 
national identity as were the seclusionist 
policies of the earlier Tokugawa period. 

In attempting to adjust to the confrontation 
between the United States and the 
communist powers in the post-war world, 
success-ive Japanese governments have 
sought to preserve the nation by relying 
on the United States for protection against 
external threat and building a strong 
economy with sufficient police and military 
power to ensure internal stability and 
security. The Japanese never saw themselves 
as wholly passive partners of the 


United States, indeed there is evidence 
that they deliberately worked their way 
towards a more or less equal partnership 
through the series of post-war treaties 
with America. (See Martin E. Weinstein, 

Japan's postwar defense policy, 1947-1968. 

New York, Columbia University, Press, 
1971 ; page 106.) Nevertheless, they did 
not think of themselves as playing an 
active and influential part in world affairs. 
This anti-power ideology has dominated 
Japanese thinking in the last 20 years. 

Thus, with security assured by the 
American alliance, Japanese relations with 
other countries have been largely governed 
by economic interests. In the past 
ten years or so the Americans have urged 
the Japanese to play a role more appropriate 
to a wealthy and powerful countryand, in particular, to assume greater responsibility 
for regional development and 
security. Although it has always been 
emphasised that this role meant the promotion 
of economic and social progress 
through substantial economic and technical 
assistance programmes, the promptings 
had strong political and even 
military undertones, given the American 
pre-occupation with the containment of 
communism. The Japanese shared American 
concern over the expansion of Chinese 
and Russian power in Asia and the 
Pacific but they were less enthusiastic 
about the ideological content of American 
policy and avoided too much indentification 
with their anti-communist crusade. 

Now that the United States is ceasing to 
stress ideology, the Japanese are, paradoxically, 
becoming uneasy about their 
relations with America. After having been 
told for so long that they must assume 
their international responsibilities, the 
·Japanese are seriously thinking about it, 
but are no longer quite sure that the only 
or even the best way to do so is within 
f the context of a close alliance with the 
United States. In spite of repeated official 
· statements to the contrary, American 
actions, such as the unheralded approach 
to China or the abrupt postponement of 
Henry Kissinger's trip to Japan in April
· 1972, not to mention the economic 
measures (which affected Japan more than 
any other country), seem to indicate that 

the United States is entering into a new 
game with the Soviet Union and China 
in which the alliance with Japan is only 
one element in the complex of trans-
Pacific relations and no longer the cornerstone 
of American policy. 

Given the competing and conflictinginterests of Japan's elite groups, we are 
likely to see a continued hesitancy and 
caution m the general trend of Japan'sforeign policy, in spite of the dramatic 
turnabout over China within less than 
seven months (from the statement byTakeo Fukuda, foreign minister in the 
Eisaku Sato government, before the 
budget committee of the House of Representatives 
on 6 March, 1972 to the publication 
of the Chou-Tanaka communique 
on 29 September, 1972). The bureaucrats 
of the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) and the foreign and finance 
ministers, the industrial and commercial 
interests linked to powerful politicians 
of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party, all have varying influence in shaping 
policy. So, for example, the leaders 
of big business played a major part and 
often took the initiative in negotiating the 
reparation agreements in South East Asia. 
(Chitoshi Yanaga, Big business in Japanese 
politics. New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1968 ; pages 202 to 228.)
On the other hand, the foreign ministry 
formulated China policy in the absence 
of any consensus within the Liberal 
Democratic Party, until Kakuei Tanaka 
over ruled the cautious bureaucrats in the 
summer of 1972. (Haruhiko Fukui, Partyin power : the Japanese Liberal Democrats 
and policy making. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 
1970; page 262.) Again, when it comes to 
trade with North Korea, the MITI and the 
foreign ministry may have diametrically 
opposed views. (Mainichi Daily News and 
The Japan Times, November 1971.) 

Issues of foreign policy are used by the 
opposition parties and anti-mainstream 
factions of the Liberal Democratic Party 
as sticks with which to beat the government, 
but rarely are they the stuff with 
which elections are won. Yet publicopinion plays an important part in setting 
the limits within which the policy makers 


dare move. So far, Japan's economic 
success has been gratifying to the status 
conscious Japanese, but it has broughtwith it no substantial demands for an 
aggressive and independent foreign policy. 

Even the opposition parties are abandon· 
ing their heavy and often ideologically 
slanted emphasis on foreign policy and 
turning more and more to domestic bread 
and butter issues to win the support of 
those who feel deprived of the benefits 
of the nation's prosperity. After failingto rouse the populace over the extension 
of the us/Japan mutual security treaty in 
1970 and the Okinawa reversion agreement 
in 1971-72, the extreme radicals are 
concentrating their efforts upon the internal 
problems of the universities and 
the impact of industrial development on 
the rural districts. 

In sum, the confused clash of conflictinginterests and the requirements of consensus 
usually end in an attitude of procrastination. 
When there is a sudden and 
fundamental shift, as over relations with 
China, it is due both to the characteristics 
of Japanese decision making and to the 
need for speedy reaction to a changinginternational environment. The Japanesedithered for many years between the desire 
to develop relations with the People's 
Republic of China independently of the 
United States and the wish not to disturb 
their close alliance with the Americans. 

Under the impact of Nixon's China and 
economic policies, the strong current of 
public opinion which had been running 
for some time in favour of improvedrelations with Peking became a torrent 
and enabled Kakuei Tanaka to pull off a 
coup that satisfied the feelings of most 
Japanese. It enhanced his personal reputation 
and appeared to solve a pressingproblem in foreign policy. Once the 
euphoria has passed, the problems and 
friction stemming from the new relationship 
with China will revive the conflicting 
pulls among the power groups. Within 
this setting, Japan's foreign policy is likely 
to remain an enigma to the Japanese as 
well as to· the rest of us. Nonetheless, two 
basic elements in Japan's contemporary 
position offer clues about policy directions. 

First, Japan belongs to the highly industrialised 
and technologically advanced 
group of countries and greatly influences 
their mutual relationships. The Japanese 
have a considerable share of responsibility 
for the present instability in the international 
monetary system because theyhave managed their economy without due 
regard for its impact on the international 
system. This is not to deny that the crisis 
originated in the American balance of 
payments deficit ; a direct consequence of 
stresses and strains within the American 
economy. However, the Japanese failure 
to think in a wider international context 
was demonstrated by the decision to 
impose tight fiscal and monetary measures 
in 1969. The measures were taken out of 
fear of unfettered inflation and its impact 
on exports, even though they had been 
increasing at a significant rate for some 
years. The effect was to produce even 
more substantial increases in the Japanese 
balance of payments surplus with its 
attendant disruptive impact upon the 
international monetary system. Similarly, 
the protectionist policies of the government 
have invited the kind of retaliation 
elsewhere which is threatening Japanese 
exports. Hence, the world wide importance 
of Japan's economy will either increase 
the friction between Japan and 
other countries or will lead Japan to 
assume a more positive international role. 

The other basic element is provided by 
Japan's special relationship with her more 
immediate neighbours. Relations with 
each of the two communist giants posetheir attractions and dangers. The rivalrybetween them and the triangular relationship 
that is developing between them 
and the United States tempts each to 
court Japan and offers it the opportunity 
to play off one against the other. Russia 
tempts Japan with economic bait in the 
form of Siberia's natural resources. The 
Chinese, too, are interested in Japanesetechnology and may. one day, want to 
have a share of Japan's capital and technical 
resources for their own development. 

These flirtations might flatter the Japanese 
but there are considerable obstacles in the 
way before they can be expected to yield 
results. With Russia there is the vexed 


question of the northern territories and 
the long history of friction and hostility. between the two countries, to which must 
be added earlier unfortunate experienceswith attempts at economic co-operation. 
(The Japan Times, 12 November, 1971.) 
. With China, the legacy of the past and 
. the potential for ecenomic rivalry in South 
East Asia, including the exploitation of 
oil and natural gas in the East China Sea, 
create problems which could inhibit the 
· development of closer relations. Taiwan, 
which was always assumed to be the majorproblem in Sino-Japanese relations, has 
ceased to be an issue by the stroke of a 
pen; at least for the time being. The 
Japanese economic stake in the island 
might well become a source of friction 
between Taipei and Tokyo as well as 
between Peking and Tokyo. However, it 
represents only a very small proportion of 
Japanese overseas investments. (The two 
way trade with Taiwan accounts for about 

2.5 per cent of Japan's total foreigntrade; roughly the same proportion as 
Japan's trade with mainland China. 
Japanese investments in Taiwan total 
between $150 and $200 million out of an 
estimated total overseas investment of 
about $3,500 million.) 
It is the clash of interests on China's 
periphery that raises the greatest dangers. 
Nor are Japanese interests confined to the 
non-communist states, as recent official 
moves in establishing contact with Mongolia 
and North Vietnam and unofficial 
moves towards better relations with North 
Korea have shown. Since the 'sixties there 
has been substantial Japanese economic 
penetration of most of the non-communist 
states of South East Asia. Some countries 
of the region are major sources of raw 

.material. For instance, in 1970 more than 
37 per cent of Indonesia's exports went to 
Japan with timber and petroleum making 
up 85 per cent of the total. 

Others are valuable markets and offer investment 
opportunities for industries 
which are driven from Japan by high 
labour costs and environmental problems. 
Finally, the fact that more than 85 per 
cent of Japan's oil comes from the Middle 
and passes through the Straits of 

Malacca gives the region a major strategic 

importance, so that it can be maintained 
that " of the great powers, only Japan has 
vital interests there." (Strategic Survey, 
1971. London, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1972; pages 59 and 60.)
All this is not to ignore the substantial 
and increasing scale of economic and technical 
assistance provided by Japan; much 
of it, however, has been geared in the 
past to the needs of Japan's economy. 

Perhaps the most thorny problem concerns 
South Korea, for the Japanese have 
not only substantial economic stakes here 
but this is the area where they are most 
sensitive over the requirements of their 
security. Such defence thinking as there 
has been since the mid-'fifties has focused 
upon contingency planning in the event of 
the outbreak of hostilities in the peninsula. 
A complete American withdrawal from 
Korea might unloose great pressure in 
Japan to assume a more positive stance 
over the defence of South Korea. These 
considerations may seem academic in the 
light of the contemporary easing of relationships 
between the two rival governments. 
Moreover, Japan might want to 
further the rapprochement by takingvarious diplomatic initiatives. Nevertheless, 
its ties with the Republic of Korea 
are such that any sudden increase of 
tension would force it to support the 
government in Seoul. 

Taking into account Japan's world wide 
economic interests, its stakes in the smaller 
countries of South East Asia, important 
as they may be, are not such as to make 
it likely that Japan would want to intervene 
politically (not to mention militarily) 
in that region during the next few years. 

What is more difficult to assess is the 
effect on some of these countries, particularly 
Taiwan and the Republic of 
Korea of their economic dependence on 
Japan.' (The United States is the principal 
trading partner of Taiwan and South 
Korea, but Japan has by far the largest 
share of their imports. Thus, 38.1 per cer:t 
of Taiwan's imports came from Japan m 
1970 as compared with 30.3 per cent from 
the us. Korea took 43 per cent of its 
imports from Japan in the same year, as 
compared with 21 per cent from the us. 


Given the basic features of Japan's position 
vis-a-vis the world economy and its 
neighbours, several factors are likely to 
influence its policy in the next few years. 
First, there is the attempt to come to terms 
with a new sense of " aloneness." The 
feeling of neglect and isolation has been 
very marked recently as a result of the 
ham handed way in which the Americans 
managed their relations with Japan. It 
may be exaggerated and certainly there 
have been loud protestations that passingirritations will not interfere with a policy 
firmly anchored in the American alliance ; 
but things will never be the same again. 
The Americans will not be wholly trusted. 
National security policy, with its dependence 
on American strategic power, is 
unlikely to be changed in the near future, 
if only because of domestic inhibitions in 
the way of nuclear armament. A policy of 
neutrality might have some appeal but is 
less meaningful in a world where the 
pattern of rigid alliance structures and the 
confrontation of blocs is dissolving. It is 
even less likely that Japan would be prepared 
to or could enter into a new alliance 
relationship with either Russia or China. 
Thus, while operating under the cover of 
the formal association with the United 
States, Japan will probe cautiously in all 
directions and generally seek to keep its 
options open. Neither the political structure, 
which makes it almost impossible for 
a leader of the vision and drive of an 
Adenauer or a de Gaulle to appear, nor 
the policy making process, nor the state 
of public opinion provide the mainspring 
for a dynamic foreign policy today or in 
the foreseeable future. 

economic interests 

Japan's chief concern will be to safeguard 
its economic interests. This is the 
second factor and it provides the· key to 
the direction of Japanese policy. How far 
will the Japanese be successful in controlling 
their phenomenal rate of growth? A 
start has been made but the momentum 
behind the giant economy is so great that 
it will require a determined, systematic 
and sustained effort to restructure it. 
There is some hope that this may come 
about. For instance, one notices a marked 

shift from heavy to knowledge intensive 
industry. In the meanwhile, the impact of 
the economy on external relations will be 
felt in the need to meet an expandingdemand for energy and raw materials. A 
major emphasis here is on the diversification 
of sources of supply, and investment 
policy will be governed by the wish 
to avoid excessive dependence on one or 
two suppliers. In trade the problem of 
rising tariff walls is going to be met by a 
far more determined investment policy in 
European countries as well as in the third 
world, so that Japanese industry may slipbehind the barriers. 

The appalling cost of economic expansion 
in terms of pollution, of social injustice 
and the deteriorating quality of life is all 
too obvious. Pressure is mounting for substantial 
investment in social overhead 
capital. It could be that a less desirable 
pressure may make itself felt to spend an 
increasing amount of the national product 
on defence. That will depend upon the 
evolution of the international environment. 
Perhaps the most hopeful sign is 
that an increasing number of people (not 
only the young and the radical) are askingwhat is the point of this drive for economic 
growth and expansion and whether 
it is right for a country of Japan's size to 
gobble up such a large proportion of the 
world's limited resources. Whether this 
questioning will be translated into positive 
policies by Japan's bureaucrats, business 
leaders and politicians is a moot point.
Moreover, disenchantment with the value 
of amassing economic wealth raises the 
question what new values will take its 
place, and here the field is wide open. 
To the political and economic factors one 
must add the strong and peculiarlyJapanese concern with the country's image 
and status in the world. This national self 
consciousness has its origins in the cultural 
homogeneity of Japanese society and 
in the tradition of group conformity and 
thinking. In the post-war period the 
Japanese have been content to be regarded 
as a sort of economic miracle nation. 
Now that the image has become somewhat 
tarnished, national sensitivity could become 
acute, especially if China involves 
itself more and more actively in the 
international system. Attitudes towards 


China have long been ambivalent. Profound 
admiration for the home of East 
Asian culture and civilisation has been 
mixed with contempt for China's weakness 
and incapacity in the face of the 
western onslaught. Historically, the 
, Japanese have never fully accepted the 

1 
superiority of the Chinese emperor and in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century they reversed the Chinese order of 
things and regarded themselves as China's 
"elder brother," determined to rescue his 
" junior " from the domination of the 
western powers. Since the end of the 
second world war, guilt and shame have 
been added to these sentiments. 

The post-war generation is not encumbered 
by such sentimental baggage and 
can afford to be more strictly pragmatic 
and detached, an attitude made easier by 
very little direct contact with China. 
Nevertheless, a concern with the image of 
their country is still an important element 
in Japanese thinking and it manifests 
itself in various forms ; public opinion 
polls in foreign countries to measure the 
rate of Japan's popularity, talk about a 
permanent seat on the UN security council, 
tremendous emphasis on prestige events 
like the Olympic Games and Expo' 70. 
It is easy to exaggerate the importance of 
the psychological factor but it is significant 
in such a status conscious people. 

Anglo-Japanese relations 

The principal point of contact between 
Britain and Japan during the next few 
years will be in economic relations, particularly 
through EEC. In addition, there 
are a number of specific areas where 
. British and Japanese interests overlap.
One is Japan's considerable commercial 
interests in Britain's colony, Hongkong. 
(In 1970, Japan was fourth in the list of 
1 countries receiving exports from HongKong, coming after the United States, the 
UK and West Germany. and taking only 
4 per cent of the total. However, it topped 
the list for re-exports, taking 20 per cent. 
Japan also headed the list of countries 
from which the colony took its imports, 
accounting for 24 per cent of the total. 
China came next with 16 per cent.) Both 

compete in the world's markets but they 
also have some interests in common, such 
as ensuring the uninterrupted supply of 
oil from the Middle East and preserving 
the freedom of the seas for international 
commence. Taken as a whole, this is not 
very promising material for the prescription 
of a coherent policy for Labour. In 
thinking about relations with Japan, the 
party must first decide on its policy in two 
crucial areas: the third world and the 
European Community. The issues involving 
the first are discussed by Michael 
Lipton in chapter 2. The issues involving 
the EEC concern the external economic 
policy which Labour wants the community 
to pursue. Once these guidelines 
are defined, then it is likely that policy 
specifically directed towards Japan will 
fall into place. Nonetheless, it may be 
useful to make some specific comments 
about Anglo-Japanese relationships. 

In the light of Japan's great economic 
power and of the terrible lessons of the 
past, the main emphasis of a Labour 
government's policy towards Japan should 
be to encourage and strengthen a slowly 
awakening sense of international responsibility 
among the Japanese and, correspondingly, 
to make sure that they do 
not feel deliberately isolated and discriminated 
against by the rest of the 
world and therefore are not drawn too 
deeply into national introspection. It 
might find a new responsiveness to such 
a policy among the more international 
minded and pragmatic post-war generation, 
which is beginning to occupy key 
positions in Japanese society. There are 
many ways in which this policy could be 
implemented in the economic field. Perhaps 
the most important area of concern 
should be the development of a sound 
pattern of relationships between Japanand the EEC at a time when they are 
frustrated in their relations with the us. 

Japanese investment in European manufacturing 
industries is growing rapidlyand will bring with it increasing cooperation 
with multi-national enterprises. 
This raises the question whether the 
large Japanese concerns may eventually 
turn into multi-national corporations. The 
traditional objectives of Japanese man



agement stand in the way of such a development. 
On the other hand, it could be 
an important step towards integratingJapanese economic activities into the 
world economy. While the development 
of genuine multi-national co-operationand partnership is to be welcomed as a 
counter to an excessively nationalistic 
emphasis in the economic sphere, it 
brings with it the dangers of activities on 
a world scale, regardless of the public 
interest, that may serve to strengthen the 
undesirable division of the world into rich 
and poor camps. The British Labour and 
trade union movement should pay more 
attention to the problem of controllingthe operations of giant international corporations. 
Eventually, its interests in this 
field may coincide with those of the 
Japanese labour movement. Therefore, 
greater efforts should be made to establish 
links with the Japanese left in preparation 
for effective co-operation in the future. 

Any attempt to work more closely with 
Japanese socialists and trade unionists 
presents particular difficulties. One has 
the choice of three parties that claim to 
be "socialist." Of these, the JapaneseSocialist Party (JSP) is by far the largest. 
In the recent election it has made upsome of the ground lost in 1969, but it is 
still far from being a credible alternative 
to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) (see Table IV opposite). The JapanCommunist Party (JCP) made the most 
spectacular advance in December 1972 
and almost tripled its representation in 
the lower house of the Diet in which it is 
now the third largest party. The success 
of the communists may be attributed to 
the muting of their ideological position 
and the presentation of a more" Japaneseface," that is concern with bread and 
butter issues and the acceptance of some 
degree of armament in pursuit of an 
independent national policy. The Democratic 
Socialist Party (DSP), althoughoriginally a breakaway group from the 
JSP, has become a centre party. In addition, 
there are two major trade union 
federations: The general council of 
trade unions (Sohyo) and the all Japanlabour federation (Domei). Sohyo is the 
most important and supports the JSP. 
Domei backs the DSP. 

Normally, one would probably rule out 
any co-operation with the JCP, but recent 
trends in local and national politics maypoint to an eventual JSP I JCP alliance not 
unlike the socialist/ communist alliance in 
France. On the other hand, the DSP is 
probably too far to the right for many 
Labour supporters. That leaves the JSP as 
the most likely "partner" in international 
collaboration. There are several problems 
in working effectively with it. The partyhas no experience of office other than one 
disastrous year in a coalition government 
from 1947 to 1948. Its position hitherto 
has been marked by a doctrinaire Marxism 
which does not appeal greatly to the 
pragmatic Japanese electorate. However, 
things may be changing in this respect and 
there are some indications of a toningdown of the emphasis on ideologicalpurity. Like all Japanese parties, the JSP 
is faction ridden and the balance between 
the factions largely determines the party's 
policy. Finally, in spite of the profession 
of lofty principles, it has shown little 
grasp of the problems of international 
politics. In this the socialists reflect the 
general difficulty that most Japanese have 
of "thinking internationally." (For an 
interesting study of the foreign policy of 
the JSP, see J. A. A. Stockwin, The 
Japanese Socialist Party and neutralism. 

Melbourne University Press, 1968.) 

All in all, it is reasonable to assume that 
Labour in office within the next few years 
will have to deal with a governmentformed by the Liberal Democratic Party. 
Given this limitation and those imposed 
upon a Labour government operatingwithin the EEC, efforts should be made to 
develop a significant relationship with 
Japan in the field of aid to the third 
world. Such a policy would have two 
facets; economic and technical assistance 
and the restructuring of the world trade 
system so as to favour the developingcountries. The Japanese government is 
seeking ways in which to convert surplus 
foreign exchange balances so that they 
may not merely increase Japan's prosperity 
but enhance its prestige and influence. 
Generous aid policies are one 
method by which to achieve this end. 
Fairer and more liberal trading policies 
are another. Japanese national self interest 


would thus be linked to humanitarian 
considerations which take into account 
the interests of the world at large. Could 
a Labour government take the initiative in 
fostering a relationship with Japan which 
would be of benefit to the third world by 

, 
encouraging it to support new and more 
generous policies in UNCTAD and GATT? 
Michael Lipton's chapter throws doubts 
on its capacity to do so in view of 
Labour's appalling record in the past.
Such a policy would require a determination 
on the part of the British government 
to hammer out concrete ways in which to 
make real the professions of noble ideals 
and aspirations. It also calls for determination 
in persuading Japan to cooperate 
in this endeavour. 

In other areas there is probably little or 
nothing that we can do to encourageJapan to play a full part in world affairs 
which would also satisfy Japanese amourpropre. 
The obvious status symbol which 
it might be tempted to acquire is a nuclear 
armoury. The decision to take up the 
option will be dictated by domestic pressures, 
the assessment of the needs of 
national security and, possibly most 
important, the answer to the questionwhether Japan can occupy a respectedplace in the world without them. It is 
likely that on balance the Japanese maydecide that the most rational course would 
be to remain a potential nuclear weapons 
state. Whatever the ultimate decision, 
history does not repeat itself and a great 
deal of talk about the revival of Japanesemilitarism has no foundation in facts. lt 

is fanned by Japan's enemies, partly out 
of genuine fear born from bitter experience 
in the past, and partly to create 
difficulties for Japan abroad and foster 
dissension at home. The structure of the 
pre-war Japanese state has disappearedand it is most unlikely that the militarycould ever regain their ascendancy over 
national policy-making or harness a 
fanatical loyalty to the emperor's person 
as head of a family state. Moreover, it is 
inconceivable that the type of militaryexpansion that marked the 'thirties and 
'forties could take place in today's world. 

This is not to say that Japan has now 
become a liberal democracy in the western 
sense. The abolition of the emperor system 
has not been replaced by an inner 
directed individualism. Instead, fragmented 
social groups have become the 
focus of the Japanese search for identification. 
(See Takeshi Ishida, Japanesesociety. New York, Random House, 1971; 
pages 30 and 31.) The three diamonds of 
Mitsubishi rather than the rising sun maysatisfy that need today, but one wonders 
for how long. Japan is still very much a 
closed society. Outwardly it could hardly 
be more open and welcoming; but once 
the stranger tries to become a part of it 
he will meet incredulity if not opposition. 
For most Japanese it simply cannot be 
done. Language and lack of familiaritywith the cultural background are obvious 
hurdles; but even when they are overcome 
as in the case of Koreans longresid~nt in Japan, the barriers are still 
there. The Japanese may feel more com-

TABLE IV 
RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE PARTIES IN THE LOWER HOUSE 1960-1972 

. party Nov. 1960 Nov. 1963 Jan. 1967 Dec. 1969 Dec. 1972 

LDP 296 283 277 288 271 
JSP 145 144 140 90 118 
JCP 3 5 5 14 38 
Komeito* 25 47 29 
DSP 17 23 30 31 19 
Indep.-J 6 12 9 16 16 

*Did not stand in the elections of 1960 and 1963. t The Independents usually align 
themselves with the LDP. (Source: Le Monde, 12 December, 1972). It should be noted, 
however, that the LDP's share of the popular vote has declined steadily in e"_'e_ry electi?n 
since 1960 and that in 1972 the combined total vote for all the oppos1t10n part1es 
exceeded that for the LDP. (The Japan Times Weekly, 6 January, 1973.) 


fortable that way, but this attitude corresponds 
ill with the extent of their involvement 
with the rest of the world. It 
shows itself in the single minded economic 
drive and the total exclusiveness of the 
Japanese abroad that arouse suspicionand hostility among people wherever they 
operate. Japan's constructive participation 
in the international system will dependlargely upon the success with which the 
gap can be bridged. 

One way of meeting the challenge is to 
do something about the abysmal ignorance 
of Japan in this country. Knowledge 
is presently confined to some businessmen, 
a handful of academics, a few journalists 
and those who have immersed themselves 
in one or other of the more exotic aspects 
of traditional Japanese culture. Because 
of the distance which separates our two 
countries and the great differences in 
language and patterns of social behaviour, 
a more determined effort is needed in 
establishing contact between ordinarypeople than when doing the same thingwith Americans and Europeans. The objective 
should be to spread a much wider 
and genuine interest and critical appreciation 
of our respective countries than can 
be achieved through the glossy handouts 
of embassy information departments, 
tourism, or satisfying cultural · curiosity. 

More money should be spent on promoting 
relations between the young, students, 
trade unionists and professional people 
from both countries. British Council 
scholarships are greatly coveted in Japan 
but there are too few of them. The scheme 
is usually available to mature people who 
are already established in their field. Such 
persons are often too set in their habits 
and ways of thinking to benefit greatly 
from an exchange other than in their 
narrow professional sphere. Given the 
prosperity of their country, Japaneseexperts should be able to find money for 
studying abroad. Indeed, the government 
has recently set up a fund for cultural 
exchange programmes, but it is mainlyintended for the United States and South 
East Asia. The young would find it less 
easy to tap such resources in a countrywhere age and status still count for a 
great deal. Public funds should therefore 

be used for bringing people in their late 
teens to this country for a couple of yearsin a school or college. At that age they 
have greater flexibility, are not wedded to 
a career and are not so concerned with 
personal status and success. They also 
have more open minds. The experienceof their stay in Britain might help them 
to become nationally less self-conscious 
and exclusive. 

When there is a shortage of immediate 
issues in formulating policy towards another 
country, it is easy to fall back on 
the general need to promote mutual 
understanding. In the case of Britain and 
Japan this may be a preliminary to more 
concrete co-operation. It is worth the 
effort. 


4. a Labour Britain and China 
Richard Harris 


We cannot understand Britain's relations 
with China without first understandingChina's present and past view of her own 
relations with Britain. Of all countries in 
the world China is the most exceptional 
case in having lived for a thousand years 
or more in one world and having the 
adjustment to a different world imposed 
upon her." Yes, yes," some will say," but 
this is surely now an old story, of little 
relevance to the Marxist revolutionaries 
who are governing China today ; " but 
this is not so. Britain's relations with 
China over the past century are much 
more vividly present in the minds of 
China's current rulers than they have been 
in those of any post-war British government, 
Labour or Conservative. 

The men who eri1erged from 22 years of 
intermittent civil war in the hinterland of 
China to take over the country in 1949 
had no experience of international relations, 
with comparatively rare exceptions 
such as Chou En-lai who represented the 
communists in Chungking and Nankingduring the unstable periods of truce 
between the two parties during that intermittent 
civil war. Moreover, Chiang Kaishek's 
Kuomintang Party was scarcely any 
more experienced in the world of diplomacy, 
since the only governments that had 
mattered to them among the few with 
which they had had diplomatic relations 
in the 'thirties were the United States. 
Britain, France and others against whom 
they were agitating to restore China's 
sovereign rights. China had no diplomaticrelations with her neighbours, since, in all 
Asia, only Japan and Thailand were free 
to have such relations; all the rest were 
under colonial rule, or were at the veryleast dominated in their international ties 
. by one or other of the major powers. 

Japan had begun her aggressive moves 
against China with the 21 demands of 
1915, while Thailand refused to have anyrelations with China at all, lest the 
presence of a Chinese diplomatic mission 
should stir up her large overseas Chinese 
community. In a very precise sense, therefore, 
1949 brought China into a new 
world of diplomatic relations after the 
final sloughing off of a semi-colonial 
period. 

Long before the revolution a view of this 
period of domination by imperialism had 
been formulated, which was shared by all 
Chinese. China had suffered at the hands 
of western imperialists and it was the 
task of a new government of China to 
liberate the country, unify it, advance its 
economy and its technology to equal its 
western intruders, to rebuild its military 
strength (so that the country could never 
again be despoiled) and to face the world 
once again with pride and confidence. 
These aims had persisted for half a century. 
They were as much the objective of 
the communists as they had been of 
Chiang Kai-shek's government; indeed, 
the communists would never have come 
to power had they not seemed as nationalists 
to be the more determined and the 
more capable of the two parties. Powerful 
emotions were aroused by that centuryfrom which China was recovering. It was 
a century graphically accounted for. China 
had lost control over many parts of her 
territory; had had to cede other large 
areas to neighbouring powers, notablyRussia ; had lost the more or Jess equabletributary relations that had marked the 
old Chinese world; and had had to suffer 
adjustments to her frontiers wherever the 
coionial authorities butted on to the outer 
fringes of Chinese authority, whether this 
was exercised directly from Peking or 
through a government, such as Tibet's, 
which was answerable on major constitutional 
questions to the imperial court. 

This era of China's weakness had been a 
cause of the utmost humiliation for a 
proud culture, believing itself to be 
supreme, and for so many centuries inviolate 
in that belief. The resentment that 
had built up in China towards the end of 
the nineteenth century had fuelled 
Chinese nationalism. Only a figure in 
many ways as unrepresentative of Chinese 
emotions as Sun Yat-sen could have led 
countries like Britain to form a view of 
Chinese nationalism that under rated its 
real potency to such an extent. The 
British, and others, were far too slow in 
acknowledging its force, and often tended 
to be only patronising in their response.
Such feelings dominated the Chiang Kaishek 
government and led to the tardycession (while they were all under 


Japanese occupation during the war) of 
the foreign, though in great part British,
rights in the treaty ports. Not until 194 7,
when the legation quarter in Peking was 
handed back to Chinese administration, 
was the last _act performed in this return 
of sovereign rights over her own territory. 

The communists marched into Peking two 
years later with a strong nationalist resentment 
reinforced by their doctrine of 
anti-imperialism. If anything, their claims 
to territory were rather more modest than 
their angry pride might have suggested. 
At that time the immediate priorities were 
the recovery of territories regarded as 
part of China, but not yet under their 
control. Tibet was brought back into the 
family by a mixture of force and bargaining 
; Hongkong could wait until Chinese 
relations with Britain had become clear ; 
Taiwan was the outstanding issue in an 
incompleted civil war, not only because 
Chiang Kai-shek and his government had 
sought refuge there, but because the 
cession of the island to Japan in 1895 
still rankled in Chinese minds. Calculations 
about particular territories are less 
important, however, than a proper understanding 
of the Chinese attitude, then and 

now. Many countries that have recognised 
the Peking government have misread this 
attitude. In essence it is one of startingafresh, of obliterating the past, not bywriting it off but by renegotiation. Territory 
may be written off but not the fact 
of an unequal treaty. Witness the impassebetween China and Russia where the 
Chinese have said that there is no question 
of reclaiming the territory north of the 
Amur River that was ceded in 1858 and 
1860, but insist that they want to reestablish 
a new frontier by substituting an 
equal for an unequal treaty. What the 
Chinese want, in effect, is some kind of 
admission that they were wronged and 
that a new basis of equality can only be 
arrived at by a new agreement. Much 
could be said about the springs of this 
Chinese attitude and its divergence from 
western ideas of international law. In 
explaining China's attitude one must not 
be always taken as trying to justify it ; 
but this concept of renegotiation, as a 
means of obliterating past shame, is relevant 
for our dealings with the Chinese. 

There is no doubt that the restoration of 
lost territories and the attainment of a 
unified, independent China loomed far 
more in Chinese minds in 1949 than anyrelations beyond their own borders. The 
one, indeed, should ideally precede the 
other, so that a new era in China's international 
relations might have been 
launched only by a China unified and 
absolutely independent. Only a few 
months might have been necessary to 
complete the task of unifying China after 
the new government was set up in Peking 
on 1 October, 1949. An attack on Taiwan 

planned for the spring of 1950 had to be 
postponed when the troops training in the 
use of landing craft on Wusih Lake near 
Shanghai contracted schistosomiasis in 
such number that it was impossible to go 
on. The assault was postponed until the 
autumn. Meanwhile the Korean War intervened 
in June in circumstances quite 
unforeseen by the Chinese. President Truman's 
action of putting the American 
Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Strait to 
oppose any Chinese landing on the island 
was both a surprise and a shock to the 
momentum of the new government. It 
immediately aroused their latent fears of 
counter-revolutionary military action, confirmed 
their beliefs about the nature of 
imperialism, and transformed their expectations 
of facing the world as an unchallengeably 
unified country. 

Communist achievement 
internationally 


It would be difficult to over est1mate the 
diversionary effect of President Truman's 
action on Chinese thinking about the outside 
world. Ever since 1950 the goal of a 
unified China has been frustrated. The 
restoration of Taiwan to Chinese rule has 
been the outstanding unfulfilled task of 
China's revolutionary nationalism. Instead 
of glorying in a united and independent 
China, facing the world with 
satisfaction and with pride in achievement, 
the leaders in Peking have had to 
suffer the continued humiliation of a 
rival government, no less proclaiming itself 
to be China, and, until 1971, with its 
claims ratified by a seat in the UN securitycouncil. Of course, time has worn awaythe first smarting disappointment of 1950. 


Yet the question of the legitimacy of a 
new regime runs so insistently through 
Chinese history that we should not under 
estimate by how much China's purposes 
have been diverted and thwarted by what 
happened in 1950. Taiwan has been a 
motive in the background of all China's 
international action since that date, and 
remains so today. For 20 years the 
Chinese have given unremitting thought 
to circumventing the unassailable American 
power thrust in 1950 into their uncompleted 
and entirely Chinese civil war. 
President Nixon's recent visit to Peking 
was, from Chairman Mao's point of view,
the culmination of those years of wrestling 
with a solution for the Taiwan issue. 
Taiwan remains the most tangible, the 
most painful to China, of all problems 
raised by the American relationship ; 
concessions of some kind over Taiwan 
had to be foreseen even before President 
Nixon could be invited. 

Many people, and rightly so, think of 
China as a revolutionary power, carrying 
its anti-imperialism, its anti-revisionism 
among communists, its endless battle 
against reaction into all its international 
attitudes. Such doctrines have certainly 
dominated Mao Tse-tung's thinking. Yet 
even he is first and foremost a Chinese 
nationalist, as sensitive as any of his 
countrymen to the injustices that China 
suffered at the hands of western powers 
in the past, and which China has not always 
escaped since the present government 
came to power. Did John Foster 
Dulles's refusal to shake hands with Chou 
En-lai at Geneva in 1954 not rankle? Has 
not the hypocritical morality of the 
United Nations motion declaring China 
to be an aggressor in Korea not left a 
. scar, when China recalls how often in the 
past the western countries most concerned 
have found their national securitythreatened when a small neighbour was 
embroiled in war? Are not the opinionsfreely expressed on all sides as to how 
Taiwan should be settled, a matter we 
should regard as insulting if some part of 
British territory were similarly subject to 
international comment? The simplest prescription 
for any soundly based relations 
with China must be for Britain to understand 
the Chinese outlook, even if it does 

not always find it well founded. The sense 
of ill treatment, the wish to expunge the 
past, the emphasis on the ideas of reciprocity 
and renegotiation, still colour her 
thinking about international relations, 
especially with a power such as Britain. 

There has never been any mystery about 
China's first priority in international relations. 
This has been her own security. 
It seems necessary to emphasise this, since 
so many people have been easily misled 
by China's public statements of supportfor this or that revolutionary cause. At 
all times over the Vietnam war, for 
example, China's first concern has been 
for her own security lest the war should 
spill over into an attack upon China. 
Korea left a mark that will not soon disappear 
from China's view of any conflicts 
in contiguous countries. After all, at 
the time of Korea, China had a real intimation 
of possible American intervention 
aimed at the overthrow of the new 
regime. Though that fear has been 
diffused, and almost demolished, since 
Richard Nixon's visit to Peking, it still 
governs Chinese caution. If one recalls 
how, in the early 'fifties, American policy 
makers thought of the Peking government 
as entirely unrepresentative, even as a 
regime foisted upon China by Soviet 
power, China's behaviour in retrospectlooks exceptionally restrained . By now 
perhaps the acceptable view in Washington 
is that China is most anxious to avoid 
war in any circumstances. 

China's conscious reflections on her international 
relations with the world (beyond 
the American ·imperialist threat, on the 
one hand, and her dubious Russian ties, 
on the other) may not therefore have begun 
until 1953 when Stalin's death and 
the Korean armistice gave them more 
elbow room. It was then that peaceful coexistence 
was adopted as a slogan and the 
possibilities of settlements by negotiation 
were gratifyingly discovered to be possible 
at the Geneva conference of 1954. 
Britain and France were then prepared to 
stand out against Foster Dulles. How 
much more might have been gained, and 
how much stronger Britain's influence 
might have been in China. if we had only 
been equally resolute in rejecting the con



tainment of China inaugurated and implied 
by the SEATO treaty. Unfortunately 
there tended then, and perhaps still today, 
to be two views_ of China in the foreign 
office ; what one might call the Peking 
view in contrast to the South East Asian 
view fixed, in the 'fifties, on the commissioner 
general's office in Singapore.
Until recently this South East Asian view 
was always the stronger, with the placard 
labelled "subversion " always on display. 

The Chinese, however, pursued their coexistence 
theme despite SEATO, and at 
Bandung in 1955 Chou En-lai won over 
several Asian leaders. By 1958, however, 
the Chinese emphasis had swung awayfrom co-existence to a prime interest in 
world revolution. Thereafter the Sino-
Soviet dispute began to dominate Chinese 
behaviour and all China's accumulated 
resentment over Russian behaviour was 
vented upon Khrushchev. The failure to 
acknowledge Mao as the leading political 
thinker of the communist world after 
Stalin's death led to embittered ideological 
battles. For ten years China's international 
relations were clouded by the atmosphere 
of struggle engendered between an anti-
imperialist and hopefully anti-American 
third world. with the no Jess despicablerevisionists in Russia as competitors with 
China for the leadership of that world. 
The turbulence of the cultural revolution 
in China prolonged these difficulties. lt 
brought out displays of Chinese xenophobia 
that recalled the nineteenth century. 
Although international opinion had 
slowly been moving towards admittingChina's claims to a rightful international 
status, in particular over the Chinese seat 
in the UN security council, it was not until 
the cultural revolution had ended that 
co-existence could once again be pressed. 
However, this time it was from China's 
side that a much more experienced and 
tolerant view of the world was expressed. 
The revolutionary hopes of the third 
world were quietly jettisoned, except for 
some individual cases. Now China could 
concentrate upon her relations with 
governments and if, to promote these, it 
was necessary to admit past excesses, then 
China would do so; witness Chou En-lai's 
apology and reparation for the assault 
upon the UK diplomatic mission in 1967. 

The Chinese have not foregone an ideological 
view of the world in which they 
pursue their policy of co-existence ; but 
it is noticeable that relations of powerhave more often than in the past taken 
precedence over ideology. Much of this 
change followed the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968; for one thingsuch an attack opened up the possibility 
of some similar assault or pre-emptivestrike against China, and it made the East 
European scene more than ever one in 
which crushed or repressed nationalism 
was subject to the priority of Soviet 
interest. Where the Americans had been 
the worst of the two super powers in their 
intervention against revolutionary movements, 
now it was the Russians who 
seemed to the Chinese to be even more 
guilty of interference with governmentswhose independence should be respected. 
After a dangerous moment of crisis in 
China's relations with the Soviet Union 
had passed, in 1969 talks between the two 
governments were started and nominally 
still continue. The tension has not 
Je~sened by much, especially when the 
Chinese perceived the steady Russian reinforcement 
of their border throughout1970 and 1971 ; but the Chinese have 
gone a long way towards securing their 
position by their opening to the United 
States. Richard Nixon's visit to Peking in 
February 1972 was not arrived at without 
deep thought by the Chinese from the 
time of the new president's election. Once 
the Chinese were convinced that American 
withdrawal from Vietnam was in 
progress and would be irrevocable, they 
were prepared to encourage approaches. 

Their world position was also much enhanced 
by their election to the UN in 
October 1971, on terms acceptable to 
them. Furthermore, the election of 
Kakuei Tanaka, rather than his opponent 
Takeo Fukuda, to the leadership of the 
Japanese governing Liberal Democratic 
Party, in July 1972, gave the Chinese an 
opening which they took with great speed. 
Within three months Kakuei Tanaka had 
visited Peking and signed a joint communique, 
over recognition and Taiwan, 
that was much more comforting to both 
sides than the one Richard Nixon had 
signed in Shanghai in February. These 


international changes brought China fully 
into a quadrilateral of power in which 
any future move by any one power would 
necessarily influence the relations of the 
rest to some degree. Russia, China, Japan 
and the United States had their meeting 
point in North East Asia and China would 
r now be absorbed into this new situation. 


Over the past year we have seen by how 
much China's interest in developing relations 
with America has made a peace in 
Vietnam more urgent and desirable. For 
all Richard Nixon's twists and turns over 
Vietnam, and for all China's backing for 
their age old neighbour, the Chinese, 
nevertheless, showed no signs of allowingevents in Vietnam to force them off their 
course in relations with the Americans. 
On the one hand, · this made the Chinese 
look upon South East Asia as an area of 

Ino great urgency until the Vietnam war 
was finally ended and a settlement worked 
out; on the other, it made the Chinese 
look to see what pressures exist to restrain 
Russian power at the other end of the 
Eurasian land mass. This is the context 
in which the Chinese now see their relations 
with western Europe, and consequently 
with Britain. 

Britain's relations with 
China 


There is no doubt that Britain alone could 
not have the importance for China that 
~he briefly had in the first few years of the 
new regime. That Britain should have had 
a diplomatic mission (albeit on sufferance, 
as a mission " negotiating " diplomaticrelations with China) in Peking at the 
time the Korean War broke out, and 
should have kept it there throughout, even 
. though British troops were included in 
. the UN forces in Korea, gave Britain. at 
that time, a modifying role at a period of 
1great tension. At Geneva in 1954, agreement 
would never have been reached but 
for Anthony Eden's determination and his 
refusal to accept the outright hostility to 
China of John Foster Dulles. Thus Britain 
acquired a reputation among the Chinese 
as the major western power in direct contact 
with them. Despite our acquiescencein the SEATO treaty the Chinese continued 
for some time to regard Britain as a force 

for peaceful co-existence and as a potential 
mediator between China and America. 
In 1958 this hope was rejected when 
Britain joined the Americans in intervening 
to prevent changes of government 
in Jordan and Lebanon. China, at that 
time, was moving away from co-existence 
as a priority to an interest in revolution 
in the third world and in the developing 
Sino-Soviet dispute. Britain began to be 
written off by the Chinese as a countrytoo readily beholden to the Americans to 
take a firm line on anything that concerned 
China; and with De Gaulle's return 
to power in France a new European 
champion of independence from the 
American line began to emerge. 

In recent years Britain's uncomplaining 
acceptance of American policy in Vietnam 
finally severed any remaining respect 
that survived from the earlier period.
Moreover. in the new period of direct 
global dealings with major powers, backed 
by the fact that she is now a permanent 
member of the security council, China no 
longer needs a friend such as Britain 
promised to be in the 'fifties. Nevertheless, 
Britain's past in China, good or bad, is 
such that it remains fixed in the Chinese 
mind; and China's current view of 
Europe has given Britain a renewed importance. 
The current official doctrine in 
Peking sees the world as divided between 
the domination of the two super powers, 
the us and the ussR, and the revolutionary 
third world. Hitherto, western European 
countries have been occupying a doubtful 
intermediate position in this formulation : 
but with the growth of the EEC and the 
adherence of Great Britain and others, the 
Chinese see emerging a power bloc strong 
enough to be independent of the super 
powers. and likely to follow its own policy, 

As a member of the EEC, therefore, 
Britain has acquired a new importance to 
China. She will now be in a partnership 
likely to resist us influence; and 
within the partnership, the Chinese estimate, 
Britain will be of greater importance 
as a power. However, it is as well 
to remember the reasons for her importance 
to China. The events that seemed 
significant to China in the development of 
their relations with Britain were, first, 


Edward Heath's victory in June 1970, 
since a Conservative government promised 
to be rather more independent of the 
Americans than Labour had been in the 
preceding six years; and, second , the 
dismissal of 105 Soviet officials from 
Britain on charges of spying in September 
1971 , a confirmation that in standing up 
to the Russians a Conservative government 
had also shown itself to be the more 
firm and thus the more welcome to China. 
In particular, Edward Heath's determination 
to take Britain into the EEC would, 
in China's view, give that body a stiffening 
that it had seemed to be losing, especially 
with French moves towards a detente with 
the Soviet Union marked by exchange 
visits between Pompidou and Brezhnev. 

In this perspective the Chinese have been 
happy to improve their relations with 
Britain. The agreement to exchange ambassadors 
was at last reached 22 years 
after Britain's original recognition of the 
new government. A visit by Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home, in October 1972, was a 
reminder of how very rare had been any 
previous visit to China by any British 
ministers whatsoever in this century. The 
visit by Denis Healey followed appropriately 
from the Labour side. In return 
badminton teams, students from China 
and China's trade minister have led the 
way in a flow of visitors to Britain. There 
may be limits to such mutual exchanges. 
China is more accessible and more interested 
now than four or five years ago. So 
long as we accept the importance China 
now accords to Britain as being an aspect 
of China's view of the European scene, 
relations are likely to be friendly. Can 
much more than that now be forecast ? 
It is hard to say. The era of Chairman 
Mao Tse-tung is coming to its end and 
we do not know what changes we shall 
see when that time comes. One mightpoint, however, to China's record at the 
UN as a mark of China's involvement in 
the role of peace making. Though firm in 
its principles, the Chinese attitude is by 
no means obstructive. This is an area 
where Britain and her EEC partners, might 
look sympathetically in the future to 
China's instincts for peaceful change, 
despite the past record of support for 
guerrilla and revolutionary movements. 

The moment is not one when any striking 
British initiative towards China can be 
urged. The recent initiatives have been 
Chinese and they are likely to remain so 
while Chinese concern with Russia and 
Chinese hopes of improved relations with 
America dominate their thinking. One 
should not, of course, forget cultural exchanges 
in a year when a Chinese exhibition 
is to be held at Burlington House 
and there is talk of a visit to China by a 
British orchestra. Such exchanges are 
often the meaningless false coin of communiques 
between communist and non-
communist countries. At this stage in 
China's evolution this may be much less 
true. The Chinese have -taken up the studyof English again to a degree not known 
since the present government came to 
power in 1949. Some kind of encouragement 
and interest in this developmentmight include help with teachers and 
teaching methods. Beyond this Britain can 
make no dramatic moves. 

Hongkong and Taiwan 

At the United Nations, in March 1972, 
the Chinese delegation asked for Hongkong 
and Macao to be removed from the 
list of colonial territories whose freedom 
was a matter of concern to the UN. The 
territories were not colonies, said the 
Chinese, but were both part of China. 
The Chinese explained that they would 
deal with the problem these territories 
presented in an appropriate way when 
conditions were ripe. When might this 
time come and what way might be appropriate? 
The probability is that Hongkong 
will remain secondary in Chinese 
eyes to Taiwan. That island is of much 
more concern to Chinese nationalism 
while, by contrast, Hongkong under British 
administration has been something of 
an asset to China, not merely economically 
but politically too, during periods of 
tension in the region provoked by the 
Korean and Vietnamese wars. 

The political asset of a neutral Hongkong 
could now decline and the economic advantages 
to China of the British presence 
there would not stand in the way of its 
return once Taiwan has been restored in 


some form to Peking's sovereignty. That 
process may take some time. A tenuous 
·process of negotiation might follow the 
death of Chiang Kai-shek and end in 
some kind of autonomy for the island in 
which Peking's sovereign status would be 
acknowledged. After that had happened 
Hongkong's status might seem open to 
question by China, and the likelihood 
would be that they would demand its 
retrocession by Britain. It would be 
foolish for Britain to oppose this (and, 
one imagines, very difficult too) in face of 
a world opinion that would find Hongkong's 
survival under a colonial government 
an anachronism. If such a requestfrom China had not been made before 
the lease on the "new territories" is due 
to fall in, in 1997, it is obvious that Hongkong 
could then not survive separately, 
without that part of the hinterland on 
which the greater part of its modern in, 
dustry is now sited. Indeed, if the end of 
Hongkong under British rule were envisaged 
in 1997 the probability is that a 
sharp decline in investment would so 
severely damage the capitalist forces that 
sustain Hongkong that a negotiated return 
of the territory to China would come 
some time before 1997. For the moment, 
neither of these possibilities is imminent. 

This does not mean that a Labour government 
should not look closely into 
Hongkong's administration. There is 
much that could be improved in ways 
that would make its Chinese population 
much less resentful of their condition. 
This is not so much a matter of changes · 
in some democratic process as better 
communication between government and 
people ; a more effective representation 
of Chinese opinion, real Chinese opinion 
rather than the opinion of superannuated 
·and unrepresentative figures in executive 
and advisory bodies. Over and above this, 
there is need for an improvement in labour 
relations and social conditions. 

Britain's stated position over Ta·iwan is 
the only sensible one ; that the island is 
China's business and must be settled between 
Peking and any government that 
exists in Taiwan. The people of the island 
are Chinese. Their economy has been 
booming in the last decade or more. The 

government in Peking seems likely to take 
such factors into account in their policy. 
Nor are they likely to be in any hurry to 
reach a final settlement now that they are 
seated in the UN and now that the number 
of countries recognising the government 
in Taiwan as the government of 
China have dwindled to a handful. The 
contentious issues are gradually beingdrained away. It would be foolish for any 
British government to look to anythingother than a peacefully negotiated settlement 
when circumstances are ripe. 

trade 

The China trade has been a mirage for 
almost two centuries, and it still attracts 
attention by virtue of the country's size 
and potential. The fact must be faced, 
nevertheless, that China has never been a 
great trading nation and shows few signs 
as yet of ever becoming one. The advocacy 
of self reliance in economic development 
is not likely to be reversed, although 
it may be modified in a post-Maoist era. 
The Chinese have not gone all out to expand 
their exports. nor do they look like 
being larger importers. British aircraft for 
China are a good thing, but they are not 
enough to bring Britain's trade with 
China far from its low place on the list of 
Britain's trading partners. The plan this 
year for the exhibition of British industrial 
technology and other ways of keeping 
before interested Chinese Britain's 
capacity as an exporter are all to the 
good ; there is a past reputation to be 
built on and kept burnished. Another 
move, however, could be to press for the 
removal of restrictions on trade with 
China. There is no longer any excuse for 
imposing more restraint on China's imports 
from us than those we impose on 
the Russians ; since China is no threat to 
Britain it would, if anything, be proper 
to give China the greater advantage. 


5. Labour and South Asia 
Roderick MacFarquhar 

The peaceful handover of power to independent 
governments in India, Pakistan 
and Ceylon remains one of the greatachievements of the first post-war Labour 
government, a triumph of good sense and 
moderation on both sides. No Briton can 
be complacent about the division of the 
Jndian sub-continent which led immediately 
to massive movements of populations 
and hundreds of thousands of deaths 
in communal rioting. Kashmir became the 
scene of fighting, remained an open sore 
and was the cause of the Indo-Pakistani 
war of 1965. In 1971, the East Pakistani 
uprising and renewed warfare led to the 
dismemberment of Pakistan. The Mountbatten 
settlement had not survived a 
quarter of a century, In facf, from the 
start no-one was happy about the settlement. 
Yet this did not prevent the postwar 
Labour government establishingcordial relations with Indian and Pakistani 
leaders. The Labour Party's long record 
of support for the independence movement 
helped, and there were personal ties 
between leaders on both sides. Mutual 
sympathy was strong enough for both 
India and Pakistan, followed in 1948 by 
newly independent Ceylon, to decide to 
remain in the Commonwealth. These three 
countries became the cornerstone of the 
multi-racial Commonwealth; indeed without 
their adherence it is doubtful if there 
would have been any non-white members. 

second Labour government 

The second post-war Labour government 
came to power four months after the 
death of Jawaharlal Nehru. Had he lived 
for another few years, Labour's relations 
with the most important country of South 
Asia might have been happier. Nehru 
could have educated the new Labour 
leaders, most of whom were ignorant of 
the affairs of the sub-continent. His successor, 
La! Shastri, was un-westernised 
and the Labour front bench were unable 
to appreciate his qualities. Harold Wilson 
did show that he recognised the importance 
of India by sending his friend John 
Freeman there as high commissioner and 
the British premier was helped by Arthur 
Bottomley to play a useful role in mediating 
the Rann of Kutch crisis in the first 

half of 1965 ; but when full scale war 
broke out in August, Harold Wilson's 
prompt assignment of blame to India lost 
Britain its neutral status, and the Soviet 
Union was able to assume the role of 
honest broker. Harold Wilson's intervention 
did not even gain Britain any particular 
advantage with Pakistan which looked 
for support to America and China. Wider 
developments also affected Britain's relations 
with South Asia during the 1964 to 
1970 Labour administration. The decisions 
to withdraw from East of Suez and to seek 
entry into the EEC, while sensible in themselves, 
inevitably diminished British interest 
in the Asian members of the Commonwealth. 
The merger of the Foreign Office 
and the Commonwealth Relations Office 
in 1968 symbolised the psychological 
changes taking place. It was hardly surprising 
that as Britain was struck by successive 
economic crises it was the Labour 
Party's idealistic objectives in the field of 
aid to the third world that were sacrificed 
first. By the end of its term of office, the 
Labour government's relations with South 
Asia were in the doldrums. 

third Labour government 

When the third post-war Labour government 
comes to office, Britain will be a 
member of the EEC. If we assume that, 
whatever renegotiation may take place, 
Britain remains a member, should Labour 
simply accept our deepening commitment 
to Europe and allow our interest in the 
non-white Commonwealth to continue to 
decline? Clearly not. It should be 
Labour's objective to help divert a signjficant 
portion of the immense wealth of the 
enlarged EEC towards reducing the gapbetween rich and poor nations. We should 
attempt to win for Commonwealth coun-. 
tries the kind of advantages secured by 
France for her ex-colonies; and to persuade 
the EEC to do better than that. South 
Asia contains not only the most populous 
area of the Commonwealth, but also some 
of the poorest people in the world. In anyrethinking of and recommitment to enlightened 
trade and aid policies towards 
the third world (and this applies whether 
Britain is in or out of the EEC) South Asia 
must be the focus of our attention. 


There is a second good reason for Labour 
to pay particular attention to South Asia. 
For the first time since the end of the Raj, 
all the independent governments of the 
region have been democratically elected 
and are (in some sense of the word)
socialist. The men and women who lead 
those governments first learnt about 
democracy and socialism under the British 
and in greater or lesser degree from the 
British Labour movement. They have 
maintained their commitment to those 

ideals under conditions of immense difficulty. 
Some of them may not survive in 
office until another Labour governmentis in power; but the Labour Party, in or 
out of office, surely ought to do whatever: 
little it can to help preserve a democratic 
socialist option in South Asia. 

India today 

In India today, the prospects for demo· 
cratic socialism are stronger than at anytime since independence. Indira Gandhi 
has managed to divest herself of the older, 
conservative Congress party leaders and 
though the party divided in the process, 
her section of it has emerged dominant. 
Indeed, Indira Gandhi's personal power is 
greater than that of her father at the 
height of his premiership. Her victories in 
a number of state elections in 1972, com· 
ing after (and helped by) India's defeat of 
Pakistan, mean that she is in a position to 
press forward with " socialistic " policieswithout much fear of domestic opposition 
or foreign distraction. After the year of 
the refugees (during which it seemed that 
she would be unable to translate her 1971 
election victory into action) she is now 
expected to deliver. 

the green revolution 

The mood of national self confidence induced 
by victory in war was briefly buttressed 
by the favourable food situation. 
India had had five good agricultural years 
and one of the world's leading experts, 
Wolf Ladejinsky, declared she was "on 
the threshold of self sufficiency at current 
levels of consumption and purchasingpower." However, India, like China, 

Russia and many other countries, had a 
bad year in 1972. Drought brought the 
danger of starvation to 25 or 30 million 
people ; the crops of some 50 or 60 million 
people were affected. Clearly, it may still 
take time to step over the threshold. The 
·· green revolution " is not only far from 
complete; it has also further polarisedthe Indian countryside. Only a small number 
of rich farmers contribute to and 
benefit from the rise in productivity. The 
rectification of this imbalance is Mrs. 
Gandhi's gravest problem. However, the 
more immediate threat to her government 
may lie in the cities, among the millions 
of unemployed. Even if the industrial 
sector of the economy can be got moving 
faster, the unemployed will remain in substantial 
numbers for years and could be 
stirred up by her opponents. The Calcutta 
Congress youth leader, who organised the 
electoral rout of the left communists in 
West Bengal, in 1972, gave Indira Gandhi 
five years to solve the problem of youthunemployment; if she fails , he and his 
" red guards " will take matters into their 
own hands. This may be the rhetoric of 
radical youth , but the pressure is surely on. 

Pakistan today 

The situation in Pakistan will not be clear 
for some time yet. President Bhutto was 
the overwhelming choice of West Pakistani 
electors in 1970, but he still has to 
manoeuvre carefully to maintain popular 
support while coming to terms with defeat. 
He has stumped the country, urging 
realism about Bangladesh, but has met 
with scant success. He clearly wishes to 
prevent the army playing politics again 
and arrested Yahya Khan; but he felt 
obliged to appoint as his chief of staff, 
General Tikka Khan (who was most notorious 
for his ruthless policies in East 
Pakistan in the early months of 1971)
presumaoly to reduce the possibility of a 
cqup by the discredited generals. ~nother 
major problem is the preservatiOn of 
national unity against possible attempts 
by Baluchis or Pathans to emulate the 
Bengalis. President Bhutto has . made_ a 
number of concessions to them, mcludmg 
a compromise on the new constitution, 
but he has still not won them over. 


Finally, he has to satisfy the demands of 
his supporters for a more just and egalitarian 
society; under Ayub, Pakistan went 
for growth with some success, but the 
proceeds were not shared out among the 
population in general and this failure was 
largely responsible for Ayub's fall. President 
Bhutto has declared war on the 
richest 22 families (of which his, contrary 
to popular misconception, is not one) as a 
dramatic symbol of his determination to 
reduce the disparities between rich and 
poor. In practice, however, his measures 
have been less radical than many expected. 

sub-continental relations 

The president's blend of rhetoric and 
realism has carried him through his first 
year in office, and may continue to sustain 
him if he can provide an acceptable postwar 
settlement. At his summit conference 
with Indira Gandhi in Simla in June and 
July 1972, President Bhutto took the first 
steps. The agreement to renounce force 
was plain good sense for a truncated 
Pakistan, even if it effectively ended the 
dream of taking Indian Kashmir. The 
cease fire line in Kashmir was finallyagreed in December and this opened the 
way for the mutual withdrawal of forces 
across international boundaries that was 
agreed at Simla. The delay may have been 
caused in part by President Bhutto's inability, 
due to domestic opposition, to 
follow up the Simla breakthrough byrecognising Bangladesh. This in turn 
meant that the major point of contention 
between India and Pakistan (the 93,000 
Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian 
hands) could not be resolved. The three 
countries of the sub-continent are caughtin a vicious circle. Until President Bhutto 
recognises Bangladesh, Tndia will not return 
the prisoners of war. Until India returns 
the prisoners of war, President 
Bhutto will not allow the several hundred 
thousand Bengalis marooned in Pakistan 
a chance to return home ; those Bengalis 
include a significant number of civil servants 
who would be of great use in the 
reconstruction of Bangladesh. Moreover, 
until the prisoners are returned, Pakistan, 
with China's help, will continue to block 
Bangladesh's entry into the UN. 

There are two further complicating factors 
; war crimes trials and the Biharis. 
In the autumn of 1972, Bangladesh held 
its first trials at which a former governorof East Pakistan was sentenced to life 
imprisonment; Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
may well ask India to extradite other 
Pakistani prisoners for trial. If war crimes 
trials are held on a large scale, President 
Bhutto may find it even more difficult to 
obtain popular agreement for the recognition 
of Bangladesh; while if he does 
not recognise the new state, Sheikh Mujib 
may find it necessary to satisfy his people's 
demands for retribution. The Biharis are 
in a sense outside this whole complicated 
inter-relationship ; everyone would probably 
like to forget about them. The 
Bangladeshis want to get rid of these 
Pakistani sympathisers; but President 
Bhutto would find it very difficult to gethis people to accept an influx of over half 
a million refugees with no real links with 
Pakistan, other than shared hostility to the 
Bengalis. What is certain is that the Bihari 
problem is only soluble in a climate of 
reconciliation between Islamabad and 
Dacca. This might enable a significantproportion of the Biharis to stay on in 
Bangladesh with Pakistan accepting the 
remainder over a period of t.ime. 

Bangladesh today 

Although President Bhutto is the South 
Asian leader who is most visibly on the 
hot seat, in fact the problems of the 
Bangladeshi prime minister are even 
greater. At least in Pakistan the fabric of 
the pre-war state remains; in Bangladesh, 
Sheikh Mujib is struggling to create a new 
nation and rebuild a devastated economy. 

A high proportion of the trained men 
who might have helped him do this are 
either dead or in Pakistan. His Awami 
League is experienced in opposition, but 
not in administration, and in their first 
year in office many of his colleaguesproved themselves both inefficient and 
corrupt. Sheikh Mujib's most importantasset is his personal charisma, his national 
role as father figure ; but it is a wasting 
commodity. Expectations have been 
aroused, but cannot be swiftly satisfied. 


His extreme left wing opponents will try 
to exploit the mounting frustration , some 
of them by contesting Bangladesh's first 
election, scheduled for March 1973, 
others by opposing the governmentguerrilla style. The major problems of 
Bangladesh, rural poverty and urban unemployment, 
are replicas of those elsewhere 
on the sub-continent. The difference 
is that they will have to be solved more 
rapidly than elsewhere because Bengalis 
assume liberation should bring tangible 
benefits and many of them still retain the 
weapons with which to act if the benefits 
are not forthcoming. Wholesale national isation 
has been very popular, but, as in 
Pakistan, it will not by itself quietdemands. 

Ceylon today 

The kind of situation which could conceivably 
confront Sheikh Mujib is shown 
by the example of Ceylon. Mrs. Bandaranaike's 
United Front was elected to office 
in May 1970 on a thoroughly radical pro-
gramme and an impressive parliamentary 
~~i.ority with which to carry it out. She 
JOJtlated steps (now completed) to change 
the dominion of Ceylon into the independent 
republic of Sri Lanka. Senior civil 
servants were replaced with UF supporters.
Workers councils were started, worker 

were appointed, Radicalism in 
foreign affairs was displayed by such 
moves as expulsion of the peace corps and 
the recognition of North Korea and North 
Vietnam. Despite these measures, the · 
Bandaranaike United Front (embracingTrotskyists and Moscow oriented communists) 
was almost overthrown within a 
year by a youthful "Che Guevarist style " 
msurgency. It was only saved by foreign 
'military assistance, and one outcome was 
the expulsion of the newly arrived North 
Korean mission who supplied the inmrgents 
with arms. The Guevarist hard 
;ore did not believe in parliamentary 

to start with, but it obtained 
.vider support because of the government's 
'ailure to provide employment and conrol 
the cost of living. The suppression of 
he rebellion has given Mrs. Bandaranaike 
L breathing space, but as elsewhere in 
)outh Asia, time is short. 

Unemployment, nsmg prices, large di~parities 
in incomes, slow economic 
growth ; the problems have a familiar 
ring and it seems presumptuous for us to 
think we might be able to help the nations 
of South Asia. That we can is due in partto the disparities in wealth between Britain 
and South Asia, and Michael Lipton discusses 
(elsewhere in chapter 2) how we 
should use our relative riches to benefit the 
third world as well as ourselves. 

a role for British Labour 

Without doubt Bangladesh is, economically, 
_the country in the area most desperately 
10 need of help. Appropriate spokesmen 
from the Parliamentary Labour Party 
and experts from Transport House should 
sit down with Bangladeshi diplomats and 
work out a long range assistance pro-
gramme that this country could realisti cally 
embark upon. Comments should be 
invited from informed people, such as 
Oxfam officials, who have worked in 
Bangladesh. The final document should 
be the basis of sustained parliamentary 
action while we are in opposition and 
resolute government action when we are 
returned to power. Second, all the governments 
in the area should be consulted on 
the precise aid, trade and domestic economic 
policies they would like to see 
Britain pursuing so as to help their development. 
This would supplement the 
calculations we can make for ourselves, 
and it would introduce an element of cooperation 
and commitment to help ensure 
that the policies would be implemented. 

I believe that Britain has a role to play in 
South Asia for reasons other than our 
greater wealth. Our long involvement in 
the area has meant that a great deal of 
mutual affection persists, despite the many 
disagreements between us. Virtually all 
the members of the elites in all four 
countries of South Asia, who are over 
the age of 40, are familiar with the 
British and things British. English is still 
the lingua franca between these four 
countries and even within them, amongthe educated. None of these factors should 
lead us to assume a special relationship ; 
it was a thoroughly. British educated 


elite that concluded the Indo-Soviet treaty 
to give Indira Gandhi the diplomaticbacking to pursue her policies on the subcontinent 
in 1971 . Yet ties do exist that 
South Asians do not have with other 
countries ; the trouble is that their leaders 
know more about us than we know about 
them. Even lack of knowledge is not our 
main .failing ; that can easily be remedied 
by intelligent reading. What is required 
is a renewal of perception. We have to rediscover 
South Asia or else we shall 
always be lumbered with our nostalgia.
This could best be achieved by the despatch 
to South Asia of a group of parliamentary 
front benchers and trade union 
leaders on the lines of the 1954 Labour 
Party mission to China. It should spend 
about five weeks in the area, two in India 
and one each in the other three countries ; 
more time in all four countries would be 
desirable, but it is unlikely that it would 
be spared. The mission, apart from 
making an on the spot appraisal, would 
underline to South Asian governmentsthe commitment of the Labour movement 
to " third world policy " in general and 
the relief of poverty in South Asia in particular. 
It would emphasise, too, the common 
interests of all five governments in 
creating social democratic societies, and 
seek to find out if this link could be the 

basis of even closer co-operation. 

Such a mission could, first, explore the 
possibility of Pakistan rejoining the Commonwealth. 
If and when President Bhutto 
recognises Bangladesh, there would be no 
diplomatic problems to prevent a future 
Labour government inviting Pakistan to 
rejoin the Commonwealth. The objectwould be to reforge an important link in 
a new context of rekindled Labour interest 
in South Asia. Second, it could explore 
Indian thinking on signing treaties like the 
Indo-Soviet one with the UK and USA. 
Indira Gandhi is clearly concerned to preserve 
the appearance, as well as the actuality, 
of Indian diplomatic independence ; 
the Indo-Soviet treaty had been on offer 
for a couple of years before India's worries 
about Sino-American backing for Pakistan 
during the 1971 crisis led the Indian 
premier to agree to sign it. Mrs. Gandhi 
might welcome the opportunity formally 
to demonstrate India's desire to maintain 

a neutral stance between blocs. There are 
some indications that the Soviet Union 
would welcome other countries signingsuch treaties with India as part of a 
general move towards the elimination of 
force in international relations in Asia, 
even though Moscow was well aware that 
such would not be the effect of the signature 
of the Indo-Soviet treaty. It should 
perhaps be emphasised that Labour policywould not be to eradicate Soviet influence 
in India and Bangladesh ; such an effort 
would be unlikely to succeed and anyway 
Soviet economic aid to the area is to be 
welcomed. However, the Labour Partydoes surely have an interest in helping the 
growth of democratic socialism in Asia. 

Fourth, it could explore with the sheikh 
how a future Labour government might 
help him demonstrate his diplomatic independence. 
The sheikh is already being 
accused of substituting the domination of 
New Delhi for that of Islamabad. The 
Indians are well aware of the dangers to 
the sheikh of appearing to be their puppet 
and are endeavouring to avoid lendingsubstance to such charges ; but inevitablyBangladesh will rely heavily upon India 
for economic and technical assistance. 
The sheikh might therefore welcome some 
formal treaty relationship with the UK to 
prove his independence ; a long range aiel 
programme would also help in this regard. 
Finally, it could explore with Mrs. 
Bandaranaike the question of the nationalisation 
of British owned tea estates. There 
is strong feeling within the United Front 
coalition that nationalisation is desirable, 
but would be economically harmful. The 
Labour mission could examine whether 
a Labour government could facilitate 
nationalisation without loss of efficiency. 

A future Labour government should offer 
to subsidise the despatch of teachers of 
English in large numbers to any country 
in South Asia that would be interested. 
The Labour movement should encourage 
the development of links between British 
unions and Labour controlled munici· 
palities or districts with their oppositenumbers in South Asia. A future Labour 
government should offer to subsidise a 
greater number of visits to this coun.tryby South Asians in various walks of hfe. 


6. south east Asia 
John Tusa 
To a Fabian eye, the political landscape 
of South East Asia scarc~ly offers a heart 
warming view, one to which Labour 
readers would react with instinctive sym-
pathy. Reading from the north down-
wards it includes (for the purposes of this 
survey) Thailand, run by a right wing 
military junta ; Malaysia, where multi-
racialism has given way to enlightenedcommunalism ; Singapore, where the 
posture is socialist but the practiceauthoritarian ; and Indonesia, where the 
democracy is guided by the military. A 
glance east only adds to the discomfort, 
for in the Philippines a raucous but 
reasonably free local version of American 
" pork barrel " politics has been taken 
over by its leading exponent, President 
Marcos, in the unlikely name of reform. 
The immediate reaction may be one of 
distaste, combined with the calculation 
that since the Labour voice will find it 
hard to make itself heard in such com-
pany, it should devote itself to more fruit-
ful pastures, co-operating with govern-
ments whose goals are shared and with 
whom common action is at least possible; 
but there are serious objections to this. In 
the first place ·it ignores the sheer com-
plexity and variety of the region, which 
' as forced different governments to pro-
duce such a variety of political solutions. 
ff the solutions are not socialist, the least 
:he outsider can do is to try and find out 
why, before dismissing them as invalid 
deologically and therefore unworthy of 
1is support. Second, however "reformed" 
.he next Labour government is as a result 
Jf the experience of the 'sixties, it will not 
, tbandon either the tradition of bi-parti-
;anship in foreign policy, or the basic ap-
Jroach of a " country oriented " policy 
_hat bi-partisanship implies ; it may be 
;hifted towards " ideologically oriented " 
Jr "development oriented" policies, but 
he traditional approach of forming rela-
ions with actual governments will not 
ranish. It is as well to know what those 
~overnments are like and where co-opera-
ion is possible. Third, if a future Labour 
;overnment were to set its prioritiestrictly according to the criterion of sup-
lOTting those countries with approved de-
relopment goals, it would invite the 
harge of neo-colonialism, even if its in-
tention was only to introduce principle 
into foreign relations. Last, a reaction of 
distaste overlooks the realities of inter-
national life ; South East Asia will not be 
a stable area in the coming years and its 
instability will often command the atten-
tion of the world. The issues raised 
(whether communal in Malaysia, strategic 
in Thailand and Singapore, develop-
mental in Indonesia) will be more than 
local. Any British government will need 
a set of policies for such contingencies. 
What a Labour government needs to do is 
to ask how far its reactions would vary 
from the orthodox line in this area. To 
suggest those orthodox lines, however, re-
quires a brief sketch of the situation in 
each of the countries under discussion. 
Malaysia 
Since Malaysia returned to parliamentary 
rule in February 1971, after a period of 
parli-amentary suspension following the 
racial riots of May 1969, the country has 
enjoyed a degree of stability that few pre-
dicted. The price of that stabil-ity has been 
restriction of speech on so called " sensi-
tive issues " relating to the rights of the 
various races making up Malaysia. These 
rights were previously entrenched in the 
constitution, but even that had failed to 
place them beyond public questioning ; 
indeed, they were at the centre of political 
debate, and a highly inflammatory centre 
it turned out to be. The decision to re-
strict discussion of " sensitive issues " was 
finally accepted by parliament ·in Febru-
ary 1971 , partly because it was a condi-
tion of continued parli-amentary activity, 
but also because Chinese and Malaysrealised that years of harping on them 
had produced only tension, and not re-
solution. The second main change of 
direction in February 1971 involved a 
frank acceptance that Malaysia's pro-
blems were communal, and that satisfac-
tion of the needs of each community was 
the only way to get communal harmony. 
Prior to the 1969 riots, political discus-
sion in Malaysia had been shaped, or dis-
torted, by a subtle hypocrisy. Every partyclaimed that its appeal was a multi-racial 
one. Yet the ruling alliance was composed 
6. south east Asia 
John Tusa 
To a Fabian eye, the political landscape 
of South East Asia scarc~ly offers a heart 
warming view, one to which Labour 
readers would react with instinctive sym-
pathy. Reading from the north down-
wards it includes (for the purposes of this 
survey) Thailand, run by a right wing 
military junta ; Malaysia, where multi-
racialism has given way to enlightenedcommunalism ; Singapore, where the 
posture is socialist but the practiceauthoritarian ; and Indonesia, where the 
democracy is guided by the military. A 
glance east only adds to the discomfort, 
for in the Philippines a raucous but 
reasonably free local version of American 
" pork barrel " politics has been taken 
over by its leading exponent, President 
Marcos, in the unlikely name of reform. 
The immediate reaction may be one of 
distaste, combined with the calculation 
that since the Labour voice will find it 
hard to make itself heard in such com-
pany, it should devote itself to more fruit-
ful pastures, co-operating with govern-
ments whose goals are shared and with 
whom common action is at least possible; 
but there are serious objections to this. In 
the first place ·it ignores the sheer com-
plexity and variety of the region, which 
' as forced different governments to pro-
duce such a variety of political solutions. 
ff the solutions are not socialist, the least 
:he outsider can do is to try and find out 
why, before dismissing them as invalid 
deologically and therefore unworthy of 
1is support. Second, however "reformed" 
.he next Labour government is as a result 
Jf the experience of the 'sixties, it will not 
, tbandon either the tradition of bi-parti-
;anship in foreign policy, or the basic ap-
Jroach of a " country oriented " policy 
_hat bi-partisanship implies ; it may be 
;hifted towards " ideologically oriented " 
Jr "development oriented" policies, but 
he traditional approach of forming rela-
ions with actual governments will not 
ranish. It is as well to know what those 
~overnments are like and where co-opera-
ion is possible. Third, if a future Labour 
;overnment were to set its prioritiestrictly according to the criterion of sup-
lOTting those countries with approved de-
relopment goals, it would invite the 
harge of neo-colonialism, even if its in-
tention was only to introduce principle 
into foreign relations. Last, a reaction of 
distaste overlooks the realities of inter-
national life ; South East Asia will not be 
a stable area in the coming years and its 
instability will often command the atten-
tion of the world. The issues raised 
(whether communal in Malaysia, strategic 
in Thailand and Singapore, develop-
mental in Indonesia) will be more than 
local. Any British government will need 
a set of policies for such contingencies. 
What a Labour government needs to do is 
to ask how far its reactions would vary 
from the orthodox line in this area. To 
suggest those orthodox lines, however, re-
quires a brief sketch of the situation in 
each of the countries under discussion. 
Malaysia 
Since Malaysia returned to parliamentary 
rule in February 1971, after a period of 
parli-amentary suspension following the 
racial riots of May 1969, the country has 
enjoyed a degree of stability that few pre-
dicted. The price of that stabil-ity has been 
restriction of speech on so called " sensi-
tive issues " relating to the rights of the 
various races making up Malaysia. These 
rights were previously entrenched in the 
constitution, but even that had failed to 
place them beyond public questioning ; 
indeed, they were at the centre of political 
debate, and a highly inflammatory centre 
it turned out to be. The decision to re-
strict discussion of " sensitive issues " was 
finally accepted by parliament ·in Febru-
ary 1971 , partly because it was a condi-
tion of continued parli-amentary activity, 
but also because Chinese and Malaysrealised that years of harping on them 
had produced only tension, and not re-
solution. The second main change of 
direction in February 1971 involved a 
frank acceptance that Malaysia's pro-
blems were communal, and that satisfac-
tion of the needs of each community was 
the only way to get communal harmony. 
Prior to the 1969 riots, political discus-
sion in Malaysia had been shaped, or dis-
torted, by a subtle hypocrisy. Every partyclaimed that its appeal was a multi-racial 
one. Yet the ruling alliance was composed 

of three allied communal parties, which 
left it open to the repeated opposition 
charge that it could hardly be multi-racial 
since its foundations were communal. Its 
own freedom of action was in turn 
limited by its insistence on multi-racialism 
; for it could never openly meet the 
demands of one community, however justified 
or necessary, without appearing to 
betray its own principles. The oppositionparties, especially those like the socialist 
Democratic Action Party which attracted 
mainly Chinese support, would then be 
accused by the alliance of being racially 
chauvinistic, regardless of their stated 
socialist and multi-racial principles. The 
upshot of these exchanges was to prevent 
either effective multi-racialism, because 
anyone claiming to pursue it was accused 
of hypocrisy, or the proper protection of 
the interests of the racial communities, 
yet this was probably the only basis for 
effective political action which could ultimately 
lead to genuine multi-racialism. 

To accept that the terms of political discussion, 
which had been common for over 
a decade, were no longer valid was a bold 
decision, and it says a great deal for the 
realism and maturity of both the government 
of Tun Abdul Razak and the leading 
opposition figures that they understood 
the need for the change. As a result, 
special economic provisions for the advancement 
of Malays in the new five year 
plan have been accepted as in the interests 
of the nation as a whole. The Chinese 
in turn have been assured that Malay advancement 
will not take place at their 
expense. In this new atmosphere too, the 
long argument about the speed at which 
Malay will be introduced into schools and 
universities as the medium of instruction 
has died away. When the use of Malay as 
the national language could be interpreted 
as a method of introducing Malay domination, 
it was understandably feated and 
fought by the Chinese. Now that the relative 
backwardness of the Malays has been 
accepted as a political fact, a measure like 
increasing the use of Malay, which helps 
Malays without seriously hinderingChinese (for whom Malay is a simplelanguage to master) seems just. even 
though. on the surface. it seems to favour 
one race in a multiracial society. 

Compromise has spread into the field of 
parliamentary politics. The leading Malay 
party, the United Malay National Organisation 
(UMNO), has formed a series of 
coalitions with opposition parties which 
have demonstrated their strength in particular 
areas, or with particular racial 
groups. The most striking example of this 
was the decision to ally itself with the 
orthodox Muslim Malay Party, which had 
greater Malay backing at the last election 
even than UMNO itself, and UMNO is the 
leading element in the ruling Alliance 
Party. These moves can be interpreted in 
various ways. UMNO may be looking for 
allies, in particular areas and in all the 
communities, who are more effective than · 
its traditional partners in the alliance. It 
may be part of a positive feeling that a 
party strong enough to rule in a state as 
important as Penang should not be denied 
a share in the federal government. However, 
it may be an opportunist move to 
stifle criticism by enveloping critics in the 
blanket of the government coalition, and 
so reduce debate over the new politicalbargain struck between the communities 
in 1971. If this is undesirable in itself, it 
only emphasises the genuine difficulties 
facing the Razak government in a situation 
where the Chinese are fewer in numbers 
than Malays but superior in wealth. 

Most British governments would support 
the Razak government, or any like 
minded successor, on grounds of sentiment 
and history ; a Labour governmentmight also wish to do so as part of its pro-
Commonwealth reaction against Europe. 
It could argue that economics (the size of 
the British investment in tin and rubber) 
and humanitarianism (the fear of another 
racial cataclysm) point in the same direction. 
The Labour reaction must be that 
any government honestly attempting t_o 
provide justice for all the races m 
Malaysia deserves support. At the present 
time, the Razak government can arguethat its policy is aiming to do exactlythat. British technical aid could have a 
useful part to play in helping the government 
in Kuala Lumpur in its bafflingtask of raising the living standard of the 
Malays and their general capacity to 
meet the modern world without uprooting 
them from the environment in which 


all their cultural valut:s flourish. The clash 
between culture and economics, between 
a sense of community and the capacityfor enterprise, between tradition and 
modernity, exists particularly sharply in 
Ma~a~sia, but not only in Malaysia. Anysoc1ahst must want to see it resolved in 
such a way that the human values are not 
sacrificed. To find a solution and to avoid 
racial conflict on the way is a policy that 
any Labour government should endorse. 

Tun Abdul Razak's foreign policy is also 
soundly based. Immediately after becoming 
prime minister in 1970, he put forward 
a plan for the neutralisation of 
South East Asia, insisting that China 
must be a guarantor of any such project. 
H was an abrupt change of direction for 
1 government which under his predeces>
or, the amiable Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
had followed foreign policies of the most 
~onventional, pro-western, anti-communist 
kind. It began a policy of growing con-
acts with China which have benefitted 
Malaysia and promoted the hope of peacen the region after final American with:
irawal. Some contacts have been more 
;ymbolic than anything else, such as the 
~isit of a Hongkong communist Chinese 
1ance troop to raise funds for flood relief. 
)thers have been of practical help to 
Malaysia, such as substantial Chinese 
mrchases of rubber. Tun Abdul Razak 
1as pressed ahead with his neutralisation 
>lans in discussions with his immediate 
teighbours in the Association of South 
::ast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The reactions 
>f Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and 
he Philippines to a neutralisation, with 
~hina as one of its guarantors, have been 
. s varied as the politics of the countries 
hemselves. It has not stopped them from 
.liscussing the proposal, however ; and 
hey have done so without prompting 
rom great outsiders. They are realistic 
nough, especially Lee Kuan Yew, to 
mderstand the need to recognise the 
~gitimate rights of great powers in the 
rea ; but these rights should not become 
1ore important than the interests of the 
egion. 'Yhe discussions are a long way 
rom a " regional solution to a regionalroblem " ; they can only go further in 
1e aftermath of the Vietnam war. The 
ilct that they have got as far as they 

have is due to Tun Abdul Razak, and it is 
an initiative which deserves British encouragement. 


Singapore 

As far as relations with China are concerned, 
Malaysia's neighbour and former 
partner in federation, Singapore, is content 
to follow a passive policy. Bearingin mind the tensions between Malays and 
Chinese, for Singapore to form close ties 
with Peking (supposing Lee Kuan Yew 
thought it desirable) might be taken as 
racially and politically provocative by its 
Malay neighbours. Once the way has been 
trodden by either Kuala Lumpur or Djakarta 
or both, then Singapore will follow, 
but not until then. This prudent decision 
is one of the few occasions that Lee Kuan 
Yew has chosen to acknowledge the sensitivities 
of his neighbours rather than arguebreezily that they ought not to exist. This 
trait in his character is familiar to his 
many friends and admirers in the Labour 
Party. Due to that familiarity, Lee Kuan 
Yew has had an immunity from criticism, 
within the party, which his actions hardly 
warrant. Would, for instance, a less 
accepted socialist have been able to treat 

the unions, press, students and parliamentary 
opposition in the way they have 
been treated in Singapore without attracting 
hostile notice? Lee Kuan Yew's counter 
to criticism is trenchant and forthright. 
The opposition have played into his 
hands by acting and speaking in an irresponsible 
way. The incontestable perils of 
Singapore's situation, Lee would argue, 
cannot be handled with kid gloves . 

Lee's difficulties are centred upon the 
creation and maintenance of economic 
and political independence for quite a 
small, overcrowded, friendless island state, 
whose only resource is the driving ingenuity 
and determination of its people. Confrontation 
by Indonesia in the early 'sixties 
decimated the traditional barter trade; 
separation from Malaysia threatened 
equally vital trading links with southern 
Malaysia ; Britain's decision to withdraw 
its bases from east of Suez hurt Singapore 
more than anyone else, and the face 
saving Tory defence policy has in no way 


altered Singapore's task of having to replace 
the quarter of its total GNP that British 
military and associated spending provided. 
Despite financial assistance from 
Britain to help with the transition, the 
main credit for passing through it successfully 
must be Singapore's. The rapid expansion 
of industrial activity to the pointthat labour has to be imported is a result 
of well applied governmental energy. 

Do these exceptional circumstances and 
the government's success in overcoming 
them justify the benevolent and incorruptpaternalism of Lee Kuan Yew and his 
cabinet? Domestically, they can point to 
substantial achievements in housing, education, 
and the creation of job opportunities 
for a population kept in check by an 
effective birth control programme. Agriculture 
is obviously not a major economic 
contributor given the island's size and its 
overcrowding ; nor can industrialisation 
ever provide the answer given the small 
actual size of the population. Lee Kuan 
Yew has chosen to develop Singapore as 
a .regional service and ideas centre, as the 
only economic way out. It requires emphasis 
on technological skills, solutions, 
orthodoxy and reliability. Experimentsand deviation are unwelcome. The solution 
is logical and understandable in the 
circumstances. Its emphasis on self help, 
its hard headedness, its large streak of 
puritanism, to say nothing of its success, 
may commend it to large sections of the 
Labour Party. If that is the case, a future 
Labour government will feel that it wants 
to help its fellow socialist by encouraging 
more private British investment in the 
island than there has been in the past. 

However, British interests coincide with 
Singapore's very dir.ectly at another level. 
The Malacca Straits which run chaotically 
and narrowly between Malaysia, 
Singapore ·and Indonesia are an international 
waterway of the greatest strategic 
and commercial significance. Lately a 
combination of nationalism (all three 
states' territorial waters converge there) 
and the increasing size of super tankers, 
some of which only just scrape through 
the channel, have turned the question of 
responsibility for the channel into an international 
one. Indonesia and Malaysia 

have suggested the straits are territorial 
waters, a claim merely noted by Singapore 
who could hardly concede it if it 
were actively pressed. Nor could anynation with commercial maritime interests, 
such as Britain, concede the claim 

without the most stringent guarantees of 
free passage. In this, British and Singaporean 
interests stand side by side ; but, 
more important, the British should try to 
ensure that the controversy never reaches 
the stage of a crisis. Indonesian and 
Malaysian fears about the dangers of 
overcrowding in .the straits and the possible 
environmental damage caused by a 
large oil leak from a super tanker collision 
are perfectly justified. It should be · 
a British interest to see that the technical 
problems arising from safe and regulatedpassage through a major waterway should 
be solved amicably among those involved. 

This potential confrontation in the 
Malacca Straits is only a symptom of a 
wider political one, concerning Singapore's 
sometimes most uneasy links with 
its Malay neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
With Malaysia, the suspicion and 
tension is so overt and paranoid, and fortunately 
so seldom translated into 
threatening action, that it can be largely 
discounted. With Indonesia, relations are 
outwardly good if hardly enthusiastic; 
but Indonesia feels no special obligation 
to Singapore, its historic trading position, 
its economic difficulties, or to past sentiment. 
Already its plans for bonded warehouse 
ports, and for a large refining 
entrepot and tourist complex on an island 
in the archipelago facing Singapore show 
scant concern for her interests. Malaysia's 
recent decision to route all trade with 
China through its own state trading 
agency rather than through merchants in 
Singapore ·is another blow to the island's 
prosperity. There are two dangers here : 
one, that simple economic self interest in 
both Malaysia and Indonesia will steadily 
undercut Singapore's economic position ; 
two, that this unconscious anti-Singaporean 
activity will become conscious, 
with one Malay neighbour reinforcing the 
economic depradations of the other and 
leading to serious regional conflict of a 
racial kind, a kind that Lee Kuan Yew 
has often speculated about, with the Sin



gaporeans cast in the role of the Israelis 
and the Malays as the Arabs. Britain's 
greatest contribution to Singapore's future 
.could be an awareness of this danger and 
a readiness to act as honest broker in anyemergency between the three neighbours. 
Indonesia 
Playing this role would only be possible 
if Britain at the time commanded the con-
fidence of all three governments, notablythe Indonesians. Fortunately, this is less 
difficult than it might sound. Under Presi-
dent Suharto, memories of confrontation 
vanished, and relations between Bri-
tain and Indonesia are expressed by the 
statistic that Indonesia is the largest non-
Commonwealth recipient of British aid. 
Domestically, the five year plan, which 
in 1973-4, aims to lay a solid base 
for economic progress, relying on recon-
struction of agriculture, both peasant and 
estates, before branching out into any-
thing more ambitious. It is a cautious ap-
proach, earning increasing dividends. 
[ndonesia's expansion of oil productionmay have attracted the world's attention 
but the real sign of its economic priorities 
is its concentration upon agriculture. The 
Suharto government's sense of priorities 
· other directions are also remarkablyDalanced. Although a government of 
~enerals, it is not a simple military gov-
~rnment. The key economic ministries are 
1eld by civilians, whose policy recom-
nendations have the president's support. 
rhe elections held recently, for national 
md regional assemblies, were the first in 
17 years. Though firmly " guided " byhe government to reach the approved 
··esult, Indonesians themselves are said to 
'eel that the link between government and 
:overned is stronger and more legitimatehan it has ever been before. Finally, the 
nilitary are unusual in their reluctance, 
:ither to build up the armed forces, or to 
·ommit themselves to large equipment 
1rogrammes, which, it could be argued, 
.re vital now that the irrelevantly sophis-
icated equipment sold to President 
;ukarno by the Soviet Union has de-
eriorated to the point of total collapse. 
41 
In sum, the Suharto regime shows itself 
to be moderately nationalistic, gradualist 
in politics, and pragmatic in economics . 
While accepting American aid, it has not 
sold out to American policies. Indonesia's 
caution in its contacts with China reflect 
the legacy of the attempted 1965 com-
munist coup rather than American in-
spired hostility. Indonesians now believe 
that their great natural resources and their 
population will make them the dominant 
nation in the region in the 'eighties. If that 
is the case, can Britain afford to neglect 
it? Politically, socialists will feel uneasy 
in the company of the Suharto govern-
ment so long as up to 60,000 (the number 
could be far larger) political prisoners re-
main gaoled in the aftermath of the 
attempted 1965 communist coup. Politic-
ally too, the evolution of the representa-
tive structures, from ones whose character 
is determined by the military junta to 
ones with real independence, will be 
watched with close attention. Within 
these bounds, however, a Labour govern-
ment could reasonably decide that two 
areas of Indonesian development, in par-
ticular, would repay British interest. First, 
for a country chronically short of trained 
administrators, the biggest bottle neck 
exists in the knowledge of English ; 
foreign university places cannot be taken 
up because of language deficiencies. Bri-
tish aid for language teaching throughoutthe education system could prove invalu-
able. Second, British agricultural equip-
ment suitable for small farmers would 
strengthen that sector of the economy on 
which the government has realisticallyplaced most emphasis. Help of this kind 
endorses sectors of Indonesia's develop-
ment strategy, without tying the donor 
to the government's political strategy. 
Thailand 
Thailand is the problem child of the 
region, a country ruled by military I_TJen 
with military minds and military soluttons 
for most problems. These solutions have 
proved largely ineffective with the result 
that Thailand is a strong candidate for 
the next victim of externally inspired in-
surgency. Tf this turns out to be the case, 
it will not be hecause of some unstop-
gaporeans cast in the role of the Israelis 
and the Malays as the Arabs. Britain's 
greatest contribution to Singapore's future 
.could be an awareness of this danger and 
a readiness to act as honest broker in anyemergency between the three neighbours. 
Indonesia 
Playing this role would only be possible 
if Britain at the time commanded the con-
fidence of all three governments, notablythe Indonesians. Fortunately, this is less 
difficult than it might sound. Under Presi-
dent Suharto, memories of confrontation 
vanished, and relations between Bri-
tain and Indonesia are expressed by the 
statistic that Indonesia is the largest non-
Commonwealth recipient of British aid. 
Domestically, the five year plan, which 
in 1973-4, aims to lay a solid base 
for economic progress, relying on recon-
struction of agriculture, both peasant and 
estates, before branching out into any-
thing more ambitious. It is a cautious ap-
proach, earning increasing dividends. 
[ndonesia's expansion of oil productionmay have attracted the world's attention 
but the real sign of its economic priorities 
is its concentration upon agriculture. The 
Suharto government's sense of priorities 
· other directions are also remarkablyDalanced. Although a government of 
~enerals, it is not a simple military gov-
~rnment. The key economic ministries are 
1eld by civilians, whose policy recom-
nendations have the president's support. 
rhe elections held recently, for national 
md regional assemblies, were the first in 
17 years. Though firmly " guided " byhe government to reach the approved 
··esult, Indonesians themselves are said to 
'eel that the link between government and 
:overned is stronger and more legitimatehan it has ever been before. Finally, the 
nilitary are unusual in their reluctance, 
:ither to build up the armed forces, or to 
·ommit themselves to large equipment 
1rogrammes, which, it could be argued, 
.re vital now that the irrelevantly sophis-
icated equipment sold to President 
;ukarno by the Soviet Union has de-
eriorated to the point of total collapse. 
41 
In sum, the Suharto regime shows itself 
to be moderately nationalistic, gradualist 
in politics, and pragmatic in economics . 
While accepting American aid, it has not 
sold out to American policies. Indonesia's 
caution in its contacts with China reflect 
the legacy of the attempted 1965 com-
munist coup rather than American in-
spired hostility. Indonesians now believe 
that their great natural resources and their 
population will make them the dominant 
nation in the region in the 'eighties. If that 
is the case, can Britain afford to neglect 
it? Politically, socialists will feel uneasy 
in the company of the Suharto govern-
ment so long as up to 60,000 (the number 
could be far larger) political prisoners re-
main gaoled in the aftermath of the 
attempted 1965 communist coup. Politic-
ally too, the evolution of the representa-
tive structures, from ones whose character 
is determined by the military junta to 
ones with real independence, will be 
watched with close attention. Within 
these bounds, however, a Labour govern-
ment could reasonably decide that two 
areas of Indonesian development, in par-
ticular, would repay British interest. First, 
for a country chronically short of trained 
administrators, the biggest bottle neck 
exists in the knowledge of English ; 
foreign university places cannot be taken 
up because of language deficiencies. Bri-
tish aid for language teaching throughoutthe education system could prove invalu-
able. Second, British agricultural equip-
ment suitable for small farmers would 
strengthen that sector of the economy on 
which the government has realisticallyplaced most emphasis. Help of this kind 
endorses sectors of Indonesia's develop-
ment strategy, without tying the donor 
to the government's political strategy. 
Thailand 
Thailand is the problem child of the 
region, a country ruled by military I_TJen 
with military minds and military soluttons 
for most problems. These solutions have 
proved largely ineffective with the result 
that Thailand is a strong candidate for 
the next victim of externally inspired in-
surgency. Tf this turns out to be the case, 
it will not be hecause of some unstop-

pable communist wave ongmating from 
Hanoi (though there are ripples) but far 
more because of the inadequate policies 
of the Thai government. Excluding the 
short lived experiment with limited parliamentary 
government, which the 
generals terminated in November 1971,
the Thai government has been dominated 
in spirit and reality by military men for 
well over a decade. During that time, they 
deliberately abandoned Thailand's traditional 
policy of trimming and accommodating 
to the prevailing forces in the 
region. They chose to commit the country 
wholeheartedly to the American view of 
events in Indo-China, sending troops to 
fight in South Vietnam and allowing a 
network of us air bases to be set up from 
which B-52s regularly attacked targets in 
Laos and the two Vietnams. Inevitably, 
this attracted a degree of hostility f.rom 
North Vietnam and China which ideological 
differences alone would scarcely 
have generated. 

For centuries the Thais and Vietnamese 
have accepted a mutual stand off line 
down the Mekong valley, each respecting 
the other's sensitivities about penetration 
of the regions beyond. The American 
bombing of Indo-China from Thailand 
can only be seen as a gross violation of a 
tacit but vital historical understanding. 
North Vietnamese encouragement of the 
Lao speaking insurgents in North East 
Thailand can scarcely be wondered at. If 
nothing else it is understandable as an 
attempt, totally unsuccessful, to restrict 
the utility of the American bases. Thailand, 
its vulnerable Mekong border notwithstanding, 
could have lived with these 
consequences of its dangerously unbalanced 
foreign policy had its domestic 
policies been more imaginative. The 
country's strength (its unity based on the 
centralising appeal of the monarchy) is 
also its weakness ; the government is incredibly 
Bangkok oriented. Regional disaffection 
can easily be fomented by communist 
agitation. Both in the North and 
the North East, scenes of the two majorcommunist insurrections, the government's 
lack of imagination, its failure to 
guide development or military pro-
grammes in a sensitive political form have 
been directly attributable to the short


comings of the Bangkok based view. In 
Indonesia, political and economic development 
have occurred side by side in 
an indigenous way. In Thailand, the economic 
boom was the unhealthy by-product 
of the attachment to the United 
States, while the tentative return to representative 
government was cut off before 
it could achieve anything. Consequently, 
Thailand faces growing insurrection, 
economic slowdown, and poorrelations with her powerful neighbours, 
China and North Vietnam. It is a highprice to pay for loyalty to America. 

Apart from the curious occasion of the 
royal visit to Thailand in February 1972, · 
ties between Britain and the South East 
Asian monarchy are limited. Whether 
Britain has any role to play in Thai 
foreign policies in the future depends on 
Thai reaction to the ending of the Indo-
China war. There are two theories as to 
what may happen. One holds that Thailand 
is being built up as the real American bastion 
in Asia. Evidence in its favour includes 
the sudden reversal of the previous 
slow American withdrawal from Thailand 
in the middle of 1972, and the fact that as 
air units were withdrawn from South 
Vietnam they were transferred round the 
corner to Thailand. It would be endorsed 
both by the present Thai leaders and byLee Kuan Yew, who regards the five 
power defence force in Singapore as only 
a "long stop " (his words) should the 
American wicket keeper in Thailand decide 
to go back to the pavilion. The alternative 
view (held it seems by Dr. K:issinger) 
sees the us presence in Thailand as 
an insurance for the observance of the 
ceasefire agreement elsewhere and as reassurance 
for the Thais that their reward 
for loyalty will not be abrupt desertion. 
In the event of the former, then Thailand 
can only expect increased tension within 
and without. With a process of steadyAmerican disengagement, then the Thais 
can be expected to return to their traditional 
policies of accommodation with 
their neighbours, that others (such as 
Burma, Malaysia and Pakistan) have all 
shown is possible. Whatever happens, the 
most important duty fq_r a British Labour 
government is not to be misled about the 
causes of insurgency in Thailand nor to 


adopt a mistaken policy of support for 
the junta because they are pro-western.
Their interests lie first and lastJ with themselves, 
and British reaction to them 
should be formulated on that assumption. 

conclusions 

Britain no longer has great influence in the 
area ; but historical and commercial ties 
give it a position where it has interests 
and where its voice can be heard. That 
voice should back the main drift of poli:
ies already defined by some of the coun.
ries concerned ; a policy of regional independence 
from great power interven.
ion, with due acknowledgement of the 
nterests of the great powers ; a policy

hat might end in neutralisation by com-
non consent. It should also be in a posiion 
to act where Britain is directly intOlved. 
This may not sound a glamorous 
Jolicy ; but it would be in Britain's inter:
st ; and it is a practical alternative to a 
JOlicy of passively waiting for inevitable 
iominoes to fall. For a Labour governnent, 
-in particular, the region may coninue 
to fall short of the best socialist 
deals. However, socialism varies as the 
raditions in which it develops vary, and 
here are enough good governmental inentions 
in the area to deserve attention 
tnd support. In the last analysis, it will 
Jccupy an important part of the intertational 
stage for some years to come ; it 
:annat be overlooked. 


7. Labour, Indo-China 
and the US war 
Martin Bernal 

Should the Labour Party or even a 
Labour government have a policy on 
Indo-China? The region has a population 
of less than 50 million, its short term 
economic potential is small and what 
external trade it may have after the war 
is likely to be with its traditional partner, 
France. Politically, however, Indo-China 
has a symbolic significance which forces 
even second rank powers to take uppositions on it. From 1964 to 1970 the 
Labour government did this by giving full 
moral support to the American military 
effort there. This stance is widely known 
and must be taken into account when 
considering any future policy. Naturally, 
any new policy must be largely shaped 
by the situation in Indo-China itself, and 
to understand this some analysis of the 
past is necessary. There is now general 
agreement in liberal and left wing circles 
that America's initial commitment of 
military force to Vietnam was a mistake 
and that her direct involvement in Indo-
China should have ended long ago. However, 
major differences still exist in these 
circles as to the nature of President 
Nixon's policies in the area and hence 
on what attitude the Labour Party should 

take towards them. 

In the autumn of 1968 President Johnson 
agreed to stop bombing the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRY or North 
Vietnam) and to begin four party negotiations 
in Paris. At this point leaders of 
the DRV and the National Liberation 
Front (NLF) came to the conclusion that 
the withdrawal of American troops was 
inevitable. They estimated that negotiations 
to end the war would shatter the 
morale of the us army, which was already 
tlemoralised, and that us public opinion 
would not tolerate American casualties 
for much longer. Believing that it wa 
not worth fighting forces that would soon 
be gone, the Vietnamese leaders decided 
to withdraw most of their regular troops 
from South Vietnam and to demobilise 
many of their local forces. (Averell Hariman 
, the chief us negotiator at the time, 
has repeatedly stated that mainforce units 
were withdrawn north of the 17th parallel 
in the autumn of 1968. See, for instance, 
the article by his assistant, Daniel David


son, New York Times, 6 May, 1972.) 

As a consequence of this withdrawal, 
between 1969 and 1971, American forces 
were able to extend their military control 
to almost the whole of South Vietnam. 
Taking advantage of this situation, 
Americans and officials of the Republic 
of Vietnam (South Vietnam) tried to 
destroy the political organisation of the 
National Liberation Front. According to 
figures issued in Saigon, over 40,000 people 
were killed and many more were arrested 
in police action under the "phoenixprogramme." (See, Vietnam 1967 to 1971: 
towards peace and prosperity. The figuresshould be compared with the two or three 
thousand killed during the notorious 
"blood bath" over land reform in North 
Vietnam in 1956. See D. Gareth Porter, 
The myth of the blood bath: North Viet-
nam's land reform reconsidered, Cornell. 
This figure of 40,000 does not include 
the tens of thousands killed by American 
bombardment in the " speedy express " 
campaign that took place over the same 
period. See the article by· Kevin Buckley 
in Newsweek, 19 June, 1972). This pro-
gramme was set up and financed byAmerican officials, on the basis of their 
analysis that the essence of revolutionary 
guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam was 
organisation. (Douglas Pike, Vietcong: the 
organisation and techniques of the Natiollal 
Liberation Front of South Viet/tam : 

Cambridge, Mass.. 1966.) Thus, if one 
destroyed the "Vietcong infrastructure" 
the movement would die. In fact, though 
organisation is important, if the whole 
rural population is mobilised, as it is in 
Vietnam, it is relatively easy to rebuild an 
organisation in a very short period. (For 
a description of this proccess of rapidorganisation after a period of harsh 
persecution, see Jeffrey Race, War comes 
to Long An: revolutionary conflict in a 
Vietnamese province; Berkeley, 1972.) 

However, given the fundamental optim~
sm and faith in technology of the 
American middle class and the resiliance 
of its public relations, the military and 
police "successes" indeed allowed the us 
government to believe that " the Tet 
offensive had been a political victory for 
the Vietcong, but a military disaster for 
them." (A cliche current in Saigon during 
1971). The exposure of its forces had 


allowed American fire power to destroy 
them, and the urbanisation caused by fire 
power had deprived them of a political 
or recruiting base. According to this 
analysis, there was no longer any internal 
threat to South Vietnam. Thus, where it 
had previously been impossible to win 
with American ground forces, it now be-
;ame possible to win without them ; but 
American troops had to be withdrawn as 
slowly as they and us public opinion 
would allow, in order to "buy time" for 
·' Vietnamisation." It was also to " buy 
:ime " and to stop any outside threat to 
~outh Vietnam that the Central Informa-
.ion Agency (CIA) helped to overthrow the 
~overnment of Cambodia, and us and 
~outh Vietnamese troops invaded it, to 
.vipe out NLF bases and to stop supplies. 
For detailed evidence on this, see the 
uticles by T. D. Allman in The Guard-
·an, 14 and 18 August and 18 September,
971. See also Daniel Roy in Le Monde 
''Jiplomatique, April 1970.) This move 
.vas a military and political disaster for 
'lixon. The NLF gave their weapons to 
md provided training for the Cambodian 
'ront, against the new pro-Americanegime under Lon N ol. The Front was 
hus able to prevent the regime from 
~aining control of the North and East 
tnd the Central South of the country and 
iouth Vietnamese and American troopslad to be diverted to defend those few 
.reas it could hold. Political reaction to 
he invasion inside America forced Nixon 
o withdraw the us troops from Cambodia 
nd to begin withdrawal from Vietnam. 
)espite these set backs and the bloodyiasco of the South Vietnamese invasion 
>f Laos, in early 1971 , President Nixon 
eems to have been confident in his policy 
1f "Vietnamisation." This concept was 
nuch more limited than has sometimes 
>een supposed. It was that, given superb 
veapons, communications and transport,
vith American advisers at every level, 
;outh Vietnamese forces could stand up 
o every attack for an hour or so before 
\merican air power arrived. (A South 
fietnamese colonel describing a battle 
.fter the ceasefire, said that without 
\.merican air cover, "I am like a man 
ighting with only one arm." His forces 
rere overwhelmed. The Daily Telegraph, 
45 
31 January, 1973). It was for this reason 
that administration spokesmen talked of 
the us " retaining a residual force of 
40 to 60,000 men, even after American 
troops had been withdrawn. (See, for 
instance the statement by Melvin Laird 
reported in the New York Times, 14 
April, 1971). In this way, although the 
" enemy " could never be beaten, their 
actions could be severely limited and 
Vietnam could become what successive us 
administrations have wanted it to become 
ever since 1962, a "forgotten war." 
In the summer of 1971, in this state of 
confidence, President Nixon tried to make 
the Vietnamese recognise the strength of 
his position. Disregarding the formal 
machinery in Paris, he used Henry Kis-
singer to transmit his terms, which were 
for a " two track" military and political 
settlement. The first part of the plan was 
for a "ceasefire in place" and an ex-
change of prisoners. After this a political 
settlement could be negotiated between 
the Vietnamese parties. The only conces-
sion offered was that President Thieu 
should resign some time ·before the elec-
tion and the military and civil apparatus 
of Vietnam would remain intact. Further-
more, since 1969, large numbers of South 
Vietnamese soldiers had been transferred 
to the police and there was no doubt that 
police activity against Thieu's opponentswould continue after a ceasefire. As the 
area militarily controlled by the Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government (PRG) 
was negligible a " ceasefire in place " at 
this time simply meant surrender. Thus 
the Vietnamese maintained their previous 
negotiating positions, arguing that militaryand political problems could only be 
solved simultaneously by the formation 
of a provisional coalition government,
composed of the National Liberation 
Front, supporters of President Thieu, and 
neutrals, to supervise elections. 
After Easter 1972, the us position and 
the .administration's view of it were shat-
tered by the revolutionary offensive. The 
proto-type of the automatic battlefield 
was overrun in 72 hours, while majorattacks were launched at Loc Ninh and in 
the Central Highlands. With the main 
South Vietnamese forces drawn away, the 
allowed American fire power to destroy 
them, and the urbanisation caused by fire 
power had deprived them of a political 
or recruiting base. According to this 
analysis, there was no longer any internal 
threat to South Vietnam. Thus, where it 
had previously been impossible to win 
with American ground forces, it now be-
;ame possible to win without them ; but 
American troops had to be withdrawn as 
slowly as they and us public opinion 
would allow, in order to "buy time" for 
·' Vietnamisation." It was also to " buy 
:ime " and to stop any outside threat to 
~outh Vietnam that the Central Informa-
.ion Agency (CIA) helped to overthrow the 
~overnment of Cambodia, and us and 
~outh Vietnamese troops invaded it, to 
.vipe out NLF bases and to stop supplies. 
For detailed evidence on this, see the 
uticles by T. D. Allman in The Guard-
·an, 14 and 18 August and 18 September,
971. See also Daniel Roy in Le Monde 
''Jiplomatique, April 1970.) This move 
.vas a military and political disaster for 
'lixon. The NLF gave their weapons to 
md provided training for the Cambodian 
'ront, against the new pro-Americanegime under Lon N ol. The Front was 
hus able to prevent the regime from 
~aining control of the North and East 
tnd the Central South of the country and 
iouth Vietnamese and American troopslad to be diverted to defend those few 
.reas it could hold. Political reaction to 
he invasion inside America forced Nixon 
o withdraw the us troops from Cambodia 
nd to begin withdrawal from Vietnam. 
)espite these set backs and the bloodyiasco of the South Vietnamese invasion 
>f Laos, in early 1971 , President Nixon 
eems to have been confident in his policy 
1f "Vietnamisation." This concept was 
nuch more limited than has sometimes 
>een supposed. It was that, given superb 
veapons, communications and transport,
vith American advisers at every level, 
;outh Vietnamese forces could stand up 
o every attack for an hour or so before 
\merican air power arrived. (A South 
fietnamese colonel describing a battle 
.fter the ceasefire, said that without 
\.merican air cover, "I am like a man 
ighting with only one arm." His forces 
rere overwhelmed. The Daily Telegraph, 
45 
31 January, 1973). It was for this reason 
that administration spokesmen talked of 
the us " retaining a residual force of 
40 to 60,000 men, even after American 
troops had been withdrawn. (See, for 
instance the statement by Melvin Laird 
reported in the New York Times, 14 
April, 1971). In this way, although the 
" enemy " could never be beaten, their 
actions could be severely limited and 
Vietnam could become what successive us 
administrations have wanted it to become 
ever since 1962, a "forgotten war." 
In the summer of 1971, in this state of 
confidence, President Nixon tried to make 
the Vietnamese recognise the strength of 
his position. Disregarding the formal 
machinery in Paris, he used Henry Kis-
singer to transmit his terms, which were 
for a " two track" military and political 
settlement. The first part of the plan was 
for a "ceasefire in place" and an ex-
change of prisoners. After this a political 
settlement could be negotiated between 
the Vietnamese parties. The only conces-
sion offered was that President Thieu 
should resign some time ·before the elec-
tion and the military and civil apparatus 
of Vietnam would remain intact. Further-
more, since 1969, large numbers of South 
Vietnamese soldiers had been transferred 
to the police and there was no doubt that 
police activity against Thieu's opponentswould continue after a ceasefire. As the 
area militarily controlled by the Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government (PRG) 
was negligible a " ceasefire in place " at 
this time simply meant surrender. Thus 
the Vietnamese maintained their previous 
negotiating positions, arguing that militaryand political problems could only be 
solved simultaneously by the formation 
of a provisional coalition government,
composed of the National Liberation 
Front, supporters of President Thieu, and 
neutrals, to supervise elections. 
After Easter 1972, the us position and 
the .administration's view of it were shat-
tered by the revolutionary offensive. The 
proto-type of the automatic battlefield 
was overrun in 72 hours, while majorattacks were launched at Loc Ninh and in 
the Central Highlands. With the main 
South Vietnamese forces drawn away, the 

NLF was able to re-organise, and uprisings 

took place throughout the country. "Viet


namisation " had failed. South Vietnam


ese forces were unable to hold for the 

requisite time. (Thieu himself has admit-

t~d that without American air support,

h1s troops could not have resisted the 

enemy offensive. See his interview with 

Oriana Fallaci in the New Republic

quoted in Le Monde, 16 January, 1973.) 

However, the us airforce remained capable 
of bombing any town, village or 
hamlet held by the NLF. It was for this 
reason that thousands o( peasants fled to 
the cities. (During the summer of 1972, 
the whole province of Quang Tri was 
declared a "free fire zone." Thus anysign of life in an area containing more 
than 100,000 inhabitants was liable to be 
bombarded.) As capture of a town meant 
its obliteration, the NLF generally avoided 
doing so. Instead, they preferred to seize 
parts of a town beseiging the South Vietnamese 
garrison and creating a situation 
in which the confusion of battle lines 
made it difficult to use air power effectively. 
This strategy had the additional 
advantage of encouraging relief forces to 
set out for the town on predictable routes 
along which ambushes had been prepared. 
Their goal was not to capture the cities 
but to tie down and destroy the South 
Vietnamese army and in this they had 
considerable success, heavily damagingsix divisions and demoralising the whole 
army. (See Elliott, op cit, pages 20 and 21.)
For a time it even seemed possible that 
Saigon itself could fall. In this situation, 
on 25 May, Nixon repeated his negotia-· 
ting terms of the previous year. With the 
PRG occupying large areas of South Vietnam 
the "ceasefire in place" was now a 
very different proposition. Pressure from 
the Democrats made some diplomaticinitiative essential, but it is unlikely that 
the consequences of its acceptance cannot 
have been worked out, for it seemed very 
unlikely that the PRG would accept, when 
strong, the terms refused when weak. 

President Nixon's other reaction to the 
Easter offensive was to extend and 
intensify the bombing of North Vietnam 
and to mine its harbours. (Bombing of the 
North was first resumed in May 1970. It 

was heavy in March 1971 when the writer 
was in the country. In November the 
Lavelle raids began.) In J969 the us 
government agencies concerned had been 
asked what the military effects of such 
actions would be. (Despite the need for 
many contingency plans this would have 
been a strange question to ask if the us 
had really been determined to withdraw 
from Indo-China. See, " National security 
study memorandum, number I," as reprinted 
in The New York Review of 
Books ; 1 June, 1972; pages 16 to 17.)
The state and defence departments had 
answered that they would have no short 
term effects on the military capacity of 
North Vietnam, but that in the long run 
it might weaken it. The CIA reported that · 
the moves would have no short or long 
term military effect at all (ibid). Ruling 
out pique, if Nixon's purpose was not 
military it can only have been political , to 
warn and punish North Vietnam for its 
involvement in the offensive, and more 
important, to demonstrate to the Vietnamese 
that their allies, Russia and China, 
could not or would not do anything to 
help them. In this there is no doubt that 
Nixon was successful. By playing the 
Soviets and Chinese off against each other. 
both appear to have been brought to a 
state .in which they wanted to believe in 
America's peaceful intentions. They became 
prepared to accept Henry Kissinger's 
assurances that Nixon's only desire was to 
save face by leaving Thieu in power for 
a decent interval after the us withdrawal. 
After that the Vietnamese could settle 
their own differences. The messa~e was 
certainly passed on to Hanoi. (HenceNorth Vietnam's concern about "American 
perfidy" when talking to the Chinese. 
Edgar Snow. The long revolution, London 
1972. page 185.) 

In September 1972 this diplomatic situation, 
and the military stalemate brought 
about by the American capacity to 
obliterate any centre of population held 
by the NLF, made a new initiative necessary. 
On 3 October. the Vietnamese completely 
changed their negotiating terms. 
Giving up their demand for the immediate 
establishment of a coalition government. 
they now accepted Nixon's " two track ·: 
position of a ccasefire and exchange of 


risoners followed by a political settle-
lent. However, the huge territorial gains 
aade during the offt:,nsive had completelyhanged the nature of a ceasefire, from 
surrender to a partition of power.
'urthermore, the heavy casualties inflicted 
ver the summer had punctured " Vietamisation" 
and the South Vietnamese 
rmy was back where it had been in 1968. 
lespite Richard Nixon's huge electoral 
:ad, the verbal similarities between his 
revious proposals and the new terms. 
oupled with the possibility that the Vietamese 
might follow his example and 
ublicise secret talks, made this an offer 
1at it was impossible to refuse. FurthertOre, 
the fact that the Vietnamese had 
1anged their terms made him believe that 
was his bombing and mining that had 
1ade them do so. (See the statement byfilliam Sullivan, the state department 
tan on Henry Kissinger's staff, lnterational 
Herald Tribune, 30 JanuaryH3.) Thus, although he believed that the 
ew terms migh"t provide the basis for 
satisfactory settlement, that is, one that 
ould leave Thieu in power indefinitely, 
~ clearly believed that drawing out the 

·ons beyond the elections and 
certing more pressure on Hanoi would 
~ necessary to achieve this. (See his reeated 
statement, "we will not be stameded 
into the wrong settlement." New 
·ork Times, 30 October, 1972.) 

here were two further reasons for del ay. 
he first was that the negotiations had 
ade it clear that the release of American 
·isoners depended on the abandonment 
' the plans for a " residual force " of 
mericans giving logistic and tactical air 
tpport to the South Vietnamese army. 
h.erefore, there had to be a crash pro·
amme to build up the South's airforce. 
· an effort to replace it. In material terms 
. e build up has been extraordinary and 
e South Vietnamese airforce is now the 
ird largest in the world. To maintain 
is it has been necessary to replace us 
rvicemen with American civilians work-
g on private contract. (Time, 5 Februy, 
1973 : pages 13 to 15.) The second 
ason for delay was to allow Thieu to 
msolidate his political position. Since 
ay 1972. the South Vietnamese police 
. d intensified their policy of arresting 

anyone suspected of being opposed to 
Thieu. Those taken into custody \-\'ere 
mainly neutralist ; supporters of the NLF 
would be unknown to the authorities or 
dead. After October arrests became even 
more frequent until between 100,000 and 
300,000 prisoners were held, often in 
horrible conditions. (Newsweek, gives the 
figure as 145,000. Amnesty International 
has mentioned a much higher total.) 

Thus, though negot1at10ns progressed 
rapidly, Nixon postponed signature of the 
agreement. On 26 October, 1972, frustrated 
by his procrastination, the government of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRY) made the negotiations and the terms 
of the new agreement public. AlthoughNixon did not create this situation, he 
was prepared to use it; and the belief 
that "peace was at hand," as Henry Kissinger 
put it, certainly helped Nixon to 
his massive election victory. The publishedterms, accepted by Dr. Kissinger as substantially 
correct, can be summarised 
under the following nine heads. (1) Recognition 
of the unity and independence of 
Vietnam. (2) A ceasefire in place, withdrawal 
of all American and allied troops 
within 60 days and no further introduction 
of troops or military supplies (other 
than replacements) into the two zones of 
South Vietnam. (3) Release of all prisoners. 
(4) Elections to be held throughoutSouth Vietnam, to be organised by an 
administrative structure composed of 
officials of the Provisional RevolutionaryGovernment (PRG), the Thieu government 
(RVN) and neutrals ; these structures would 
exist on all levels (province district and 
village). (5) The re-unification of Vietnam 
would be carried out peacefully and 
gradually. (6) There would be four party 
(DRV, PRG, RVN and us) joint military 
commissioners to supervise the ceasefire 
throughout South Vietnam. A two party 
(PRG, RVN) commission would also be set 
up. An international commission consisting 
of Canada, Poland, Indonesia and 
Hungary would be set up, and an 'international 
conference would be convened in 
30 days. (7) Laos and Cambodia would 
settle their problems without outside interference. 
(8) There would be us aid for 
Indo-China after the war. (9) The agreement 
should be strictly implemented . 


After his election, Richard Nixon tried to 
gain better terms. In this he was helpedby Thieu. The latter, closer to the groundthan Nixon, had some idea of his political 
and military weakness. (See his interview 
with Oriana Fallaci, quoted in Newsweek, 
22 January, 1973 ; page II.) He objectedto any limitation of his military power in 
South Vietnam, and througfiout the 
autumn he reiterated his desire to kill 
every communist in the South. (New York 
Times, October 1972. His rhetoric contrasts 
strongly with that of the NLF, which 
stressed harmony and reconciliation.)
During the next two months the revisions 
which were pressed, with more or less insistence, 
were the following (under the 
original heads). (I) That the demilitarised 
zone below the 17th parallel be recognised. 

(2) That at least some "North Vietnamese" 
troops be withdrawn as the foreign troops 
leave. (3) That only American prisoners 
be released. (4) That the tripartite administrative 
structure should only exist in 
one place, and that it should be made ineffective. 
(6) That the Vietnamese joint 
military commission should be playeddown and the international central commission 
should be enlarged and strengthened. 
(7) That there should be a simultaneous 
ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia. 
Some of these suggested revisions (such 
as the last) were simply introduced as 
delaying tactics. Others were probablymaximum demands over which the us 
administration was prepared to haggle. 
Nevertheless, the intention seems to have 
been to transform the original agreement . . 
In late November, in order to gain some 
or all of these revisions, Nixon instructed 
Henry Kissinger to threaten to bomb the 
cities of North Vietnam, if the DRY refused 
to " negotiate seriously." The Vietnamese 
response was to evacuate women 
and children from Hanoi and Haiphong.
(Time, 1 January, 1973.) On 18 December, 
1972, bombing north of the 20th parallel 
was resumed and for the first time B52's 
were used to " carpet bomb " sections of 
Hanoi and Haiphong. Because of the 
evacuation, however, casualties were relatively 
low, with just over 2,000 killed. 
(This is approximately the number killed 
in the North Vietnamese "bloodbath," 
reports of which so terrified Mr. Nixon.) 

Richard Nixon prefers striking at Christmas, 
when Congress is not in session, 
students are not at college, the media are 
particularly trivial and most people are 
concerned with their families. (In 1971 he 
bombed between Christmas and the new 
year.) Mr. Nixon also seems to have borrowed 
many techniques from behavioural 
psychology, in particular, that of dazingyour subjects by sudden changes of positive 
and negative stimuli. 

For a while, protest in the us was muted. 
(After Vice-President Agnew's attacks on 
them, the media in the us have paid far 
less attention to anti-war demonstrations 
and strikes. For instance, there were very . 
nearly as many campus movements against 
the mining of Haiphong as there had been 
against the invasion of Cambodia two 
years earlier; but, while the sensational 
press stressed the former, it neglected the 
latter for fear of being charged with irresponsibility. 
Thus, reports of muted reaction 
should be treated with caution.)
World opinion was less restrained. Many 
heads of government and hundreds of 
political and religious leaders joined a 
chorus of condemnation. Some of this 
must have been anticipated and discounted, 
though its extent must have been 
surprising. Less expected, and more important, 
was the loss during the ten days of 
bombing of 80 aircraft, including more 
than 30 B52's, about a fifth of the fleet 
available. (The North Vietnamese figures 
are used here because the Pentagon Papers 
have revealed that in the past these have 
been closer to reality than those issued at 
the time by the us.) North Vietnamese 
officials now estimate that a further 30 
B52's crashed outside their territory or 
have been rendered unusable (personalcommunication). In this case, two fifths 
of the 159 serviceable B52's in South East 
Asia were out of action. Apart from their 
immediate effect, these losses appear to 
have begun a period of doubt and qu~stioning 
within the airforce, the last effective 
us service. (See, for example, Newsweek, 
22 January, 1973, page 33.) 

Nixon's intention in ordering the bombing 
had been to impress the Vietnamese with 
his ability to disregard the " moral " 
forces inhibiting him and to bomb them 


nto " talking seriously ; " that is, into 
.ccepting his revisions of the October 
greement. (Dr. Kiss(nger has denied that 
his was their intention. See his cBs interiew 
with Marvin Kalb on BBC, 2 Febuary, 
1973. However, the repeated statenents 
from North Vietnam calling on the 
JS to sign the agreement as it stood, and 
he direction of the revisions actuallynade, make it clear that he was lying.) 
~he un-anticipated loss of planes and the 
xtent of world protest limited the effeciveness 
of this message, and Nixon's cesation 
of the bombing at the end of 
>ecember was inevitable, although there 
; no reason to suppose that it had ever 
1een planned for anything longer than a 
hort term operation. Nevertheless, its 
tck of success forced Nixon into an 
greement more or less along the lines set 
mt in October. The only significant points 
e gained were the following (under the 
riginal headings). (1) Reference to the 
emilitarised zone, which had not been 
entioned in October. However, as at 
}eneva, it was made clear that it was in 

o way to be considered as a political or 
erritorial boundary and that it was merely 
provisional military demarcation line 
nd that Vietnam was one nation, with 
overeignty, unity and territorial integrity. 
l) All American military and civilian 
risoners to be released but only the 
1ilitary NLF prisoners to go free. Unlike 
1e October agreement, it did not call for 
1e liberation of hundreds of thousands 
f political prisoners in the South. 
: hanges on this article are obscured by 
1e fact that, according to Henry Kis


nger's version of the October agreement, 
1ese prisoners were not to be released.) 

January the settlement was signed 

a ceasefire was proclaimed for 27 
However, the NLF, whose only 
been the destruction of any area 

took advantage of the last 24 hours 
the truce to seize large and signifiareas, 
particularly along roads, 

that they could not all be 
ombed. Apart from gaining more popu.
tion, their aim seems to have been to 
ut the Thieu forces into a positionhere they needed to pass through PRG 
, thus forcing him to accept at least 
al freedom of movement between the 

two zones. (The protocol to article 3A 
specifically enjoined this.) This is a concession 
that Thieu's government is extremely 
unwilling to grant. One theme 
running through its statements and actions 
is its fear of contact with the enemy.
There is the refusal to allow refugees to 
return to their homes in the other zone, 
fear of a joint military commission and 
the hermetic sealing off of the DRY and 
PRG representatives in the major cities. 
Therefore, the South Vietnamese armyfinds these obstacles along its lines of 
communication intolerable and in the days 
after the " ceasefire " attacks upon them 
have continued and there is little reason 
to suppose that they will cease. (See The 
Times, 30 January, 1973 , for what its 
correspondent considers a " typical case.")
However, they have and will have no 
backing from the Americans in this. One 
of the ways in which the DRY's diplomatic 
efforts have been successful is that it has 
raised American public hopes for the 
release of us prisoners so high that anyfurther delay would be intolerable. It is 
therefore politically imperative for Nixon 
to extract them, and to do this the ceasefire 
must be in some sort of working order 
for the 60 days specified for their release. 
This leads to extremely correct relations 
between the North and the us, as opposed 
to those between the South and the PRG. 

Without the Americans there are limits to 
what the South Vietnamese army can 
achieve militarily. However, as militarycontrol is necessary for the Thieu regimeand any relaxation is a threat to it, it 
seems likely that it will continue to bomb 
and shell the villages beyond its control. 
Despite these breaches of the ceasefire, it 
is probable that the DRY and the PRG will 
feel constrained to work within the agreement. 
Their motives for this will be their 
belief in the corrosive effects of " peace " 
upon the Thieu government and that the 
passage of time and the involvement of 
the powers at the international conference 
will ·make it more difficult for the us to 
resume the use of air power in Vietnam. 
Thus it is likely that the American prisoners 
will be released within the 60 daysprescribed It is after that, that the war is 
likely to flare up ; but any predictions on 
this depend upon an analysis of motives. 


Economic and political power holders in 
the United States have been deeply divided 
about the Vietnam issue, ever since 1968. 
In very crude terms it can be said that 
Wall Street and the East Coast establishment 
have been for a withdrawal, while 
the newer, industrial groups in the South 
West and Florida have been for a continuation 
of the war and the high " defence 
" spending associated with it. 

The balance between the two forces is so 
fine, that even a change of view by the 
president could result in a fundamental 
shift of policy. There are two basic 
interpretations of Richard Nixon's character: 
one that he is a complete opportunist 
; the other that he is a man of 
conservative principle. As far as Indo-
China was concerned, the distinction was 
relatively unimportant until last Easter. It 
seems clear that he believed that he could 
withdraw American troops as opportunity 
dictated, and, at the same time, with 
Vietnamisation and American air power 
he could stand by his ally in a principled 
way. As Averett Harriman put it last 
May: "this administration has never 
accepted the concept of a neutral nonaligned 
South, nor has it given up its 
futile attempt to maintain a pro-American 
government in Saigon." (Quoted in The 
Guardian, 10 May, 1972.) 

Since then the divergence between opportunism 
and principle has become wider. 
However, with his superb political skill , 
especially his technique of making simultaneous 
moves in opposite directions, he . 
has managed to blur the two lines. Thus, 
it is possible to construct two plausibleexplanations for his policies. The first is 
that he is trying to withdraw and that his 
bellicose words and deeds are merely 
attempts to save face and thus create a 
" credible " America, capable of playinga constructive role in a stable world. The 
second explanation is that, as he sees us 
" honour " vitally involved in the war, he 
intends to maintain us power in Indo-
China and that withdrawals and conciliatory 
gestures are merely admissions of 
necessary constraints, such as the inability 
to use us ground forces or the need to 
extricate us prisoners. In American terms 
the two policy lines are described as, first, 

giving a " decent interval " between the 
us departure and the fall of Thieu ; and, 
second, giving him a " decent chance " of 
survival, that is keeping him in power. 

The second explanation of his policiesseems more cpnvincing. If Richard Nixon 
had been a mere opportunist he would 
have signed the agreement before the 
election. The backlash would have been 
negligible, and the gains would almost 
certainly have given him a Republican . 
Congress. The huge gifts of American aircraft 
to South Vietnam, and the provision 
of at least 5,000 us civilian advisers, are 
difficult to explain as mere face savers, 
even though Thieu's protests might have 
been embarrassing. Furthermore, there has 
been the massive re-introduction of the 
Vietnamese speaking employees of the 
state department and of the CIA. (NewYork Times, 1 November, 1972, and 
personal communication from Frances 
Fitzgerald.) Other CIA agents have been 
trying to persuade Vietnamese abroad to 
work with them in a post-ceasefire situation. 
There have even been reports of 
plans for the reintroduction of the Green 
Berets "for humanitarian purposes." 

These indications suggest that the us is 
trying to turn the clock back to the early 
'sixties and recreate " special warfare " or 
" counter-insurgency." This policy resulted 
in the death of thousands, but militarily 
and politically it was a disaster, and 
it is certain to fail if tried again, and it is 
probable that us officials admit this possibility. 
It is for this contingency (that is, 
if it looks as if Thieu were going to fall 
because of political or military pressure) 
that the extraordinary concentration of 
American military power in South East 
Asia is available. 

Looked at in this way, one can make 
sense of a series of otherwise inexplicable 
statements made this year. Both President 
Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have said that 
the us would be legally allowed to resume 
bombing if there were "blatant violations" 
of the ceasfire. Still more frightening was 
the statement by Uwe Clemens, the new 
under secretary of defence, that the us 
" could not rule out the use of nuclear 
weapons in Vietnam." (The Daily Tele



;aP_h, January 1973.) Furthermore, the 
,hnstmas bombing can be seen not merely 
s an attempt to get better terms but also 
s a " signal " to " the other side " that 
us is prepared to brave world dis-
if her interests in Indo-China 
re seriously threatened. 
f one accepts this interpretation of 
olixon's aims, one can make some general 
redict!ons. First, that, while us prisoners 
re bemg released, America will try to 
1ake the South Vietnamese government 
bid~ by the terms of the agreement, and 
will play down what it believes to be 
iolations by the NLF. After that, it will 
e more tolerant of the South's breaches 
f the truce and will be loud in con-
emning those of " the other side." If 
1rge scale fighting were to break out and 
e ~outh Vietnamese army were !~sing 
as It. would be almost certain to do),
1ere IS a very real danger that American 
ombing would resume, either covertlyn a small scale or overtly in heavy but 
rief strikes, which would be over before 
rorld opinion had time to condemn them. 
'he likelihood of this sequence of events 
1ould be sufficient to stop any rejoicing 
r talk of the end of the war. 
. abour's policies 
,ny consideration of the Labour Party's 
resent or future policies must take the 
ast into account. The Labour govern-
tent's uncritical support for the Ameri-
ms in Vietnam has been harmful to 
ritain and disastrous for the Labour 
arty. In Asia (including Japan) and the 
~st of the third world, the politically 
ware see the war in Indo-China as the 
~itome of the conflict between rich and 
owerful white powers and poor non-
bite ones. For them, it is a struggle 
etween men and machines or between 
oral and material forces. The govern-
ents of South Korea, Thailand and the 
hlllipines were induced to give some help 
' the us effort, and there was some 
}litical support for it from the rulers of 
[alaysia and Singapore. However, in 
ese countries the official line on the 
me was not stressed and it appears to 
tve been unpopular. 
51 
In the rest of the third world, govern-
ments al!-d public opinion appear to have 
been umted against us policies in Indo-
China. The pitch of this opposition varies 
with ~he intensity of the fighting, and 
there IS no reason to suppose that it will 
disappear before the end of the war. 
Thus, the British government's close 
association with the American war effort 
has re-inforced the view of Britain as an 
irremediably colonialist and racialist 
country, an image from which the French, 
Dutch and Italians have been able to 
escape, despite their continued economic 
influence in their former colonies. It is 
not suggested that disassociation by the 
Labour Party or even a Labour govern-
ment would transform this situation, but 
it would clearly be a step in the right 
direction. For the Labour Party the dis-
advantage of the policy of support for the 
Americans has been still more important. 
First, it was a constant reminder of the 
parliamentary leadership's disregard for 
conference decisions. In 1970, though not 
an issue on which votes were won or lost, 
it was a significant factor in the disillusion 
of party workers. However, the chief 
damage the policy has done to the partyhas been the destruction of its youthmovement, particularly in the universities . 
It is now difficult to remember that 
during the 'fifties and early 'sixties, 
Labour clubs were a major force on the 
student left, and that radical groups like 
CND saw their movements as within the 
Labour Party. The destruction of the 
Labour youth movement took place be-
tween 1965 and 1968 when Vietnam was 
the issue. Since then it has been replaced 
by other causes, but the leadership's fail-
ure to turn sharply away from the 
Stewart/Brown line is still an extremelyeffective deterrent to the large number of 
young socialists who might well join a 
" decent " Labour Party. For eight years 
it has not been respectable for students on 
the left to be active in university Labour 
clubs, let alone move on into national 
politics. Those who do are despised as 
careerists. There is no evidence on this,
but one strongly suspects that the quality 
of graduates moving into Labour politicsdropped disastrously after 1965. 
;aP_h, January 1973.) Furthermore, the 
,hnstmas bombing can be seen not merely 
s an attempt to get better terms but also 
s a " signal " to " the other side " that 
us is prepared to brave world dis-
if her interests in Indo-China 
re seriously threatened. 
f one accepts this interpretation of 
olixon's aims, one can make some general 
redict!ons. First, that, while us prisoners 
re bemg released, America will try to 
1ake the South Vietnamese government 
bid~ by the terms of the agreement, and 
will play down what it believes to be 
iolations by the NLF. After that, it will 
e more tolerant of the South's breaches 
f the truce and will be loud in con-
emning those of " the other side." If 
1rge scale fighting were to break out and 
e ~outh Vietnamese army were !~sing 
as It. would be almost certain to do),
1ere IS a very real danger that American 
ombing would resume, either covertlyn a small scale or overtly in heavy but 
rief strikes, which would be over before 
rorld opinion had time to condemn them. 
'he likelihood of this sequence of events 
1ould be sufficient to stop any rejoicing 
r talk of the end of the war. 
. abour's policies 
,ny consideration of the Labour Party's 
resent or future policies must take the 
ast into account. The Labour govern-
tent's uncritical support for the Ameri-
ms in Vietnam has been harmful to 
ritain and disastrous for the Labour 
arty. In Asia (including Japan) and the 
~st of the third world, the politically 
ware see the war in Indo-China as the 
~itome of the conflict between rich and 
owerful white powers and poor non-
bite ones. For them, it is a struggle 
etween men and machines or between 
oral and material forces. The govern-
ents of South Korea, Thailand and the 
hlllipines were induced to give some help 
' the us effort, and there was some 
}litical support for it from the rulers of 
[alaysia and Singapore. However, in 
ese countries the official line on the 
me was not stressed and it appears to 
tve been unpopular. 
51 
In the rest of the third world, govern-
ments al!-d public opinion appear to have 
been umted against us policies in Indo-
China. The pitch of this opposition varies 
with ~he intensity of the fighting, and 
there IS no reason to suppose that it will 
disappear before the end of the war. 
Thus, the British government's close 
association with the American war effort 
has re-inforced the view of Britain as an 
irremediably colonialist and racialist 
country, an image from which the French, 
Dutch and Italians have been able to 
escape, despite their continued economic 
influence in their former colonies. It is 
not suggested that disassociation by the 
Labour Party or even a Labour govern-
ment would transform this situation, but 
it would clearly be a step in the right 
direction. For the Labour Party the dis-
advantage of the policy of support for the 
Americans has been still more important. 
First, it was a constant reminder of the 
parliamentary leadership's disregard for 
conference decisions. In 1970, though not 
an issue on which votes were won or lost, 
it was a significant factor in the disillusion 
of party workers. However, the chief 
damage the policy has done to the partyhas been the destruction of its youthmovement, particularly in the universities . 
It is now difficult to remember that 
during the 'fifties and early 'sixties, 
Labour clubs were a major force on the 
student left, and that radical groups like 
CND saw their movements as within the 
Labour Party. The destruction of the 
Labour youth movement took place be-
tween 1965 and 1968 when Vietnam was 
the issue. Since then it has been replaced 
by other causes, but the leadership's fail-
ure to turn sharply away from the 
Stewart/Brown line is still an extremelyeffective deterrent to the large number of 
young socialists who might well join a 
" decent " Labour Party. For eight years 
it has not been respectable for students on 
the left to be active in university Labour 
clubs, let alone move on into national 
politics. Those who do are despised as 
careerists. There is no evidence on this,
but one strongly suspects that the quality 
of graduates moving into Labour politicsdropped disastrously after 1965. 

Recent statements by party leaders, 
especially since the Christmas bombing,
have helped the situation to some extent 
but not nearly enough. Roy Jenkins' 
splendid open letter to Edward Heath, and 
Harold Wilson's more equivocal letter, 
make it appear that they are now in a 
position reached by Peregrine Worsthorn 
in 1968; that is, they believe that the 
original aim of saving South Vietnam 
was a noble one taken on out of altruism 
by the United States. However, the means 
needed to achieve this have been disproportionate 
and that it is wrong " to 
save" people by destroying them. This 
analysis does not come to grips with the 
essential nature of the situation, that the 
basic aims were wrong. It was wrong to 
prop up the French fighting a colonialist 
war. It was wrong to create a client state 
made up of men who had collaborated 
with the Japanese and French. It was 
wrong to arm them and train them in 
warfare, police work and torture. It was 
wrong to prevent the elections called for 
by the Geneva agreements ... Until the 
Labour leadership realise this there is no 
hope of their appeasing left wing criticism. 
If, when Nixon resumes the bombing ot 
Vietnam (as seems very likely), Labour 
leaders protest against it, they will have 
the backing of the whole movement. To 
generate enthusiastic support from youngpeople, however, they will have to make 
a clear cut break with the past. To do 
this the Labour Party should pledge that 
a future Labour government would make 
the following amendments to earlier policy. 
(1) Recognise the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam, thus bringing Britain into 
line with Australia, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland. (2) Treat South 
Vietnam along the lines set out in the 
Paris agreement, as a territory divided 
into two zones of ~;qual legitimacy. (3) 
Support efforts to achieve and maintain 
an effective ceasefire. (4) Support attempts 
to reach a ceasefire in Laos. (5) ·Follow 
France and Sweden in minimising diplomatic 
representation in Phnom Penh. (6) 
Be prepared to give government aid to 
any of the five territories in Indo-China, 
but only after the cessation of fighting.

(7) Firmly condemn any further bombingby the United States, regardless of anyostensible provocation. 
These pledges would represent a majorbreak with previous Labour policies, and 
they would be greeted with horror by the 
American administration. However, the 
risk they would entail for any future 
Labour government would be relatively 
slight. Looked at in retrospect, it now 
seems that from 1965 to 1968 the dangers 
following from us disapproval were 
exagerated. There is every reason to suppose 
that, had Britain defied the us on 
this issue, the latter would still have 
backed sterling or helped maintain sanctions 
against Rhodesia, because it was in 
her interest to do so. During this period 
France and Sweden withstood President 
Johnson's rage. There is no doubt that 
President Nixon is even more vindictive. 
On the other hand, the United States is 
now far weaker economically and 
morally. Furthermore, there is safety in 
numbers. The United States cannot concentrate 
her fury upon Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, India, 
France and Britain. For Britain, and for 
the Labour Party in particular, the disadvantages 
of American hostility would 
be far outweighed by the advantages of 
making a clean break with the disastrous 
policies of the past. 


1abian society 
he Fabian Society exists to further 
lcialist education and research. It is 
1Iiliated to the Labour Party, both nation-
y and locally, and \embraces all shades 
ESocialist opinion within its ranks-left,
ght and centre. 
ince 1884 the Fabian Society has enrolled 
toughtful socialists who are prepared to 
iscuss the essential questions of demo-
·atic socialism and relate them to prac-
cal plans for building socialism in a 
11anging world. 
eyond this the Society has no collective 
olicy. It puts forward no resolutions of 
political character, but it is not an organ-
ation of armchair socialists. Its members 
·e active in their Labour Parties, Trade 
·mons and Co-operatives. They are rep-
:sentative of the labour movement, prac-
:al people concerned to study and dis-
Iss problems that matter. 
he Society is organised nationally and 
cally. The national Society, directed by 
1 elected Executive Committee, publishes 
tmphlets, and holds schools and con-
rences of many kinds. Local Societies-
. ere are one hundred of them-are self 
lverning and are lively centres of dis-
•ssion and also undertake research. 
quiries about membership should be 
nt to the General Secretary, Fabian 
lciety, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, 
IV1H 9BN; telephone 01-930 3077. 
(>Ver design by Dick Leadbetter. Printed 
• Civic Press Limited (ro), Civic Street, 
lasgow G4 9RH. 
the authors 
Colin Jackson is a writer, lecturer and 
broadcaster on foreign affairs, with 
special emphasis on Asian developments. 
He was member of parliament for Brig-
house and Spenborough from 1964 to 
1970. He is vice-chairman of the Fabian 
Society's International and Common-
wealth Bureau. 
Martin Bernal is a fellow of King's Col-
lege, Cambridge. He is now doing research 
on modern Chinese history, has travelled 
in the Far East, including trips to Cam-
bodia and North and South Vietnam. He 
was a member of the Labour Party from 
1957 to 1965; he resigned after Michael 
Stewart's speech on Vietnam to the 
Oxford Union. 
Richard Harris was born in China in 1914, 
and lived there until 1928. He returned 
to China on war service in 1945, served 
with the British Embassy in China from 
1947 to 1950 and has been, since then, on 
the staff of The Times as a correspondent 
in the Far East and since 1955 as specialist 
on Asian affairs in London. 
Michael Lipton is a professorial fellow. at 
the Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex. His major interests 
lie in agricultural development ~nd the 
economic relationships between ncb and 
poor countries. 
Roderick MacFarquhar is research fellow 
on China at Chatham House. Brought up 
in India and Pakistan, he has made a 
number of TV films for the BBC in the 
· sub-continent. He is, in addition, prospec-
tive parliamentary candidate for Belper. 
Dr. Wolf Mendl is a history gr~duate ?f 
Cambridge. After teaching history !n 
Yorkshire he worked for the Qu~kers m 
the field of international relations in 
France and Japan. He is now reader in 
war studies at King's College, London. 
John·Tusa worked for the BBC first as a 
staff producer and now as a freelance 
broadcaster, especially in .the fiel~ ?f 
current affairs. His main mterest IS m 
South East Asian affairs on which he has 
written frequently for the Fabian journal 
Venture and its successor, Third World. 
1abian society 
he Fabian Society exists to further 
lcialist education and research. It is 
1Iiliated to the Labour Party, both nation-
y and locally, and \embraces all shades 
ESocialist opinion within its ranks-left,
ght and centre. 
ince 1884 the Fabian Society has enrolled 
toughtful socialists who are prepared to 
iscuss the essential questions of demo-
·atic socialism and relate them to prac-
cal plans for building socialism in a 
11anging world. 
eyond this the Society has no collective 
olicy. It puts forward no resolutions of 
political character, but it is not an organ-
ation of armchair socialists. Its members 
·e active in their Labour Parties, Trade 
·mons and Co-operatives. They are rep-
:sentative of the labour movement, prac-
:al people concerned to study and dis-
Iss problems that matter. 
he Society is organised nationally and 
cally. The national Society, directed by 
1 elected Executive Committee, publishes 
tmphlets, and holds schools and con-
rences of many kinds. Local Societies-
. ere are one hundred of them-are self 
lverning and are lively centres of dis-
•ssion and also undertake research. 
quiries about membership should be 
nt to the General Secretary, Fabian 
lciety, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, 
IV1H 9BN; telephone 01-930 3077. 
(>Ver design by Dick Leadbetter. Printed 
• Civic Press Limited (ro), Civic Street, 
lasgow G4 9RH. 
the authors 
Colin Jackson is a writer, lecturer and 
broadcaster on foreign affairs, with 
special emphasis on Asian developments. 
He was member of parliament for Brig-
house and Spenborough from 1964 to 
1970. He is vice-chairman of the Fabian 
Society's International and Common-
wealth Bureau. 
Martin Bernal is a fellow of King's Col-
lege, Cambridge. He is now doing research 
on modern Chinese history, has travelled 
in the Far East, including trips to Cam-
bodia and North and South Vietnam. He 
was a member of the Labour Party from 
1957 to 1965; he resigned after Michael 
Stewart's speech on Vietnam to the 
Oxford Union. 
Richard Harris was born in China in 1914, 
and lived there until 1928. He returned 
to China on war service in 1945, served 
with the British Embassy in China from 
1947 to 1950 and has been, since then, on 
the staff of The Times as a correspondent 
in the Far East and since 1955 as specialist 
on Asian affairs in London. 
Michael Lipton is a professorial fellow. at 
the Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex. His major interests 
lie in agricultural development ~nd the 
economic relationships between ncb and 
poor countries. 
Roderick MacFarquhar is research fellow 
on China at Chatham House. Brought up 
in India and Pakistan, he has made a 
number of TV films for the BBC in the 
· sub-continent. He is, in addition, prospec-
tive parliamentary candidate for Belper. 
Dr. Wolf Mendl is a history gr~duate ?f 
Cambridge. After teaching history !n 
Yorkshire he worked for the Qu~kers m 
the field of international relations in 
France and Japan. He is now reader in 
war studies at King's College, London. 
John·Tusa worked for the BBC first as a 
staff producer and now as a freelance 
broadcaster, especially in .the fiel~ ?f 
current affairs. His main mterest IS m 
South East Asian affairs on which he has 
written frequently for the Fabian journal 
Venture and its successor, Third World. 

recent fabian pamphlets 


research series 

Elizabeth Hostels for the mentally disordered 1 

Isla Calder Our children's teachers 30pColin Crouch, Stephen Mennell The universities: pressures and prospects 45p 
Russell Lansbury Swedish social democracy 25p 
James Bellini British entry: Labour's nemesis 25p 
James Goudie Councils and the Housing Finance Act 30p 
Tony Klug Middle East conflict: a tale of two peoples 40p 

291 David Stephen 
292 John Gyford, Stephen Haseler 
297 Della Adam Nevitt 
298 Jim Skinner 
299 S. F. Kissin 
300 Christopher Foster 
301 Kees Maxey 
302 Arthur Gillette 
303 Felicity Bolton, Jennie Laishley 
304 Tessa Blackstone 
305 0. Kahn-Freund, Bob Hepple 
306 Nicholas Deakin (ed) 
307 Paul Singh 
308 Peter Coffey, John Presley 

Immigration and race relations 
Social democracy: beyond revisionism 
Fair deal for householders 
Collective bargaining and inequality 
Communists: all revisionists now? 
Public enterprise 
From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe 
Cuba's educational revolution 
Education for a multi-racial Britain 
First schools of the future 
Laws against strikes 
Immigrants in EuropeGuyana: socialism in a plural society 
Europe: towards a monetary union 


tracts 


404 
406 
408 

409 

410 
411 
412 
413 
414 
415 
416 
417 

Anthony Crosland 
Giles Radice, J. 0 . N. Vickers 
Eric Deakins 
Wayland Kennet and others 
Anthony Crosland 
Dennis Marsden 
Jeremy Bray 
Michael Stewart 
ten Fabian task forces 
Evan Luard 
an informal group 
Trevor Fisk, Ken Jones 

A democratic Britain 
The industrial relations bill 
EEC problems for British agriculture 
Sovereignty and multina~ional companiesTowards a Labour housing policy 
Politicians, equality and comprehensivesThe politics of the environment 
Labour and the economy: a socialist strategy 
Towards a radical agenda 
The United Nations in a new era 

powers : a fresh start 

books 


R. H. S. Crossman and others 
Margaret Cole 
Brian Abel-Smith and others 
B. Lapping and G. Radice (eds) 
Peter Townsend and others 
Peter Townsend and others 
George Cunningham (ed) 
P. Townsend and N. Bosanquet (eds) 
New Fabian EssaysThe story of Fabian socialism 
Socialism and affluence 
More power to the peopleSocial services for all? 
The fifth social service 
Britain and the world in the 1970s 
Labour and inequality