D 



fabian tract 433 
the making of Labour's 
foreign policy 

foreword Eric Deakins 1 
chapter 1 introductiQn 2 
2 the foreign and commonwealth 

office 5 
3 the party machinery 14 
4 conclusion 23 

this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only the 
view of the individual who prepared it. The responsibility o1 
the Society is limited to approving publications it issues 
as worthy of consideration within the Labour movement 
Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London SW1 H 9BN 
January 1975 ISBN 7163 0433 ~ 


oreword 
c 
Deakins 
'ollowing a Fabian weekend discussion in 1972 at which llaylan~Kennett read 
controversial paper on the Labour Party and foreign policy, the International and 
· :ommonwealth Bur·eau of the Fabian Society set up a working party rt:o consider 
e matter. The Working Party held many meetings during which it talked with 
rmer Labour ministers and Party' officials about formulation of foreign policy 
rithin .the Labour movem·ent when in opposition and implementation of f.oreign 
JOlicy during periods of Labour Government. 
"'his patnphlet by Rod Fielding could not have been written without the hard work 
f the members of the working party. I am personally grateful to them for giving 
o freely of their time in order to investigate a relatively unmapped area in the 
eography of the Labour Movement. The pamphlet does not of course reflect all 
b.e views of every member and at least one member disagree profoundly with 
me of it conclu ions. 
'he pamphlet's analysis is probably more important than its conclusions. As such 
: is a useful contribution to the continuing debate about Britain' relationship 
'ith .other countries and about how the Labour movement should · eek to work 
;ut and implement the policies h want . 
oreword 
c 
Deakins 
'ollowing a Fabian weekend discussion in 1972 at which llaylan~Kennett read 
controversial paper on the Labour Party and foreign policy, the International and 
· :ommonwealth Bur·eau of the Fabian Society set up a working party rt:o consider 
e matter. The Working Party held many meetings during which it talked with 
rmer Labour ministers and Party' officials about formulation of foreign policy 
rithin .the Labour movem·ent when in opposition and implementation of f.oreign 
JOlicy during periods of Labour Government. 
"'his patnphlet by Rod Fielding could not have been written without the hard work 
f the members of the working party. I am personally grateful to them for giving 
o freely of their time in order to investigate a relatively unmapped area in the 
eography of the Labour Movement. The pamphlet does not of course reflect all 
b.e views of every member and at least one member disagree profoundly with 
me of it conclu ions. 
'he pamphlet's analysis is probably more important than its conclusions. As such 
: is a useful contribution to the continuing debate about Britain' relationship 
'ith .other countries and about how the Labour movement should · eek to work 
;ut and implement the policies h want . 

1. introduction 
Internationalis-m has a significant place 
in the development of British socialism. 
From the principles first enunciated bythe Union -of Democratic Control at the 
close of the First World War to the 
National Executive Committee policy 
statement, A Foreign Policy for Labour, 
socialists from whatever quarter of the 
Labour ,Party have been anxious to pre-
scribe the conditions for a socialist world 
and Britain's place within it. 
In this evolution, the historical perspec-
tive of British socialists has suffered just 
as much as the most blimpish Tory from 
the illusion of " Pax Britannica ". British 
power ·and influence has been persistently 
overestimated, which has allowed the 
belief to persist that a Labour Go¥em-
ment with a solid majority behind it 
would be in a position to translate 
principles into practical policy, by the 
exercise of authority at the crucial junc-
tures of world politics Alongside this 
view has 1been the residual assumptionthat in some way the advent of a Labour 
Government in Britain would encourage 
other states to transform their policyalong socialist lines. The actual experi-
ence of Labour in office in handl·ing their 
foreign policy has of course contrasted 
sharply with these assumptions. Ernest 
Bevin's lament as Foreign Secretary of 
an unprecedented majority Labour Gov-
ernment that " if I had a ton more coal I 
could have a .foreign policy " has proved 
to he far ·more the actual economic con-
text in which successive Labour ForeignSecretaries have had to operate since 
1945, than that of choosing between 
alternative socialist goals. 
The limited nature of British power is 
only -one side of the question. The inter-
national system, comprising some 140 
states, is far too complex for dogmaticformulations a:bout how it should be 
organised to be in any way useful as a 
guide to policy makers. The freedom of 
action granted to any state is so mar.ginalin the international field-the super-
powers themselves have become palpably 
conscious of this-that it has of necessityto search for a common basis of agree-
ment with other states, and in the processthe modification of ideal policies is essen-
tial. In the case of Britain, this general : 
propos1t1on is underlined by her heavy 
dependence on overseas tr·ade. 
The experience of conducting external 
relations has certainly led Labour leaders 
to shift the emphasis in foreign policy 
formulat·i.on away from abstract premises 
toward a recognition of the inherent 
power structure in the internationaL 
system. The effect of this has been to 
produce an acrimonious division o£ 
opinion, when there is a Labour Govern-
n1ent, between rninisters having to face 
the facts .of international life, and the 
left wing of the party bent upon creatinga total transformation of the system. As 
Denis Healey has !Written : " Particularly 
when the L·abour Party is in office, 
foreign policy becomes the last refuge of 
utopianism ". 
This discord between a Labour Govern·· 
ment and its followers was most evident 
during Harold Wilson's administration oj1964-70. On several key issues such as 
Vietnarn, the Nigerian civil -war and, tc 
a lesser extent, in regard to Rhodesiz 
and Europe, the Labour Governmen 
found itself at odds with a large sectiOii 
of party opinion. Pa.rticularly over Viet 
nam the party hardened in its view tha 
Government policy was __excessively influ 
enced by the Foreign Office's preferenc1 
for ba·ckroom diplomacy. For its part th1 
Government appeared to lack a cohereOJ 
and integrated view as to the directi01 
its :foreign policy should take. It is tru 
that circumstances were savagely arraye1 
against it ; a deteriorating externa 
economic balance that 'Plagued it fo 
much of its period of office and whicl 
conspired to make ·it heavily dependen 
on the goodwill of the us, combined witl 
an overstretched military commitmen 
abroad. In these conditions it was obligeo 
quite apart from any predisposition o 
the part of the Prime Minister or Foreig 
Secretary, to take decisions on foreigpolicy which went aga:inst the grain c 
party opinion. A disenchanted and frus1 
rated party became increasingly critic~ 
of the Government's performance, an 
in its search for the right direction i 
foreign policy, the party predictabJ 
reverted to fundamental principle 
1. introduction 
Internationalis-m has a significant place 
in the development of British socialism. 
From the principles first enunciated bythe Union -of Democratic Control at the 
close of the First World War to the 
National Executive Committee policy 
statement, A Foreign Policy for Labour, 
socialists from whatever quarter of the 
Labour ,Party have been anxious to pre-
scribe the conditions for a socialist world 
and Britain's place within it. 
In this evolution, the historical perspec-
tive of British socialists has suffered just 
as much as the most blimpish Tory from 
the illusion of " Pax Britannica ". British 
power ·and influence has been persistently 
overestimated, which has allowed the 
belief to persist that a Labour Go¥em-
ment with a solid majority behind it 
would be in a position to translate 
principles into practical policy, by the 
exercise of authority at the crucial junc-
tures of world politics Alongside this 
view has 1been the residual assumptionthat in some way the advent of a Labour 
Government in Britain would encourage 
other states to transform their policyalong socialist lines. The actual experi-
ence of Labour in office in handl·ing their 
foreign policy has of course contrasted 
sharply with these assumptions. Ernest 
Bevin's lament as Foreign Secretary of 
an unprecedented majority Labour Gov-
ernment that " if I had a ton more coal I 
could have a .foreign policy " has proved 
to he far ·more the actual economic con-
text in which successive Labour ForeignSecretaries have had to operate since 
1945, than that of choosing between 
alternative socialist goals. 
The limited nature of British power is 
only -one side of the question. The inter-
national system, comprising some 140 
states, is far too complex for dogmaticformulations a:bout how it should be 
organised to be in any way useful as a 
guide to policy makers. The freedom of 
action granted to any state is so mar.ginalin the international field-the super-
powers themselves have become palpably 
conscious of this-that it has of necessityto search for a common basis of agree-
ment with other states, and in the processthe modification of ideal policies is essen-
tial. In the case of Britain, this general : 
propos1t1on is underlined by her heavy 
dependence on overseas tr·ade. 
The experience of conducting external 
relations has certainly led Labour leaders 
to shift the emphasis in foreign policy 
formulat·i.on away from abstract premises 
toward a recognition of the inherent 
power structure in the internationaL 
system. The effect of this has been to 
produce an acrimonious division o£ 
opinion, when there is a Labour Govern-
n1ent, between rninisters having to face 
the facts .of international life, and the 
left wing of the party bent upon creatinga total transformation of the system. As 
Denis Healey has !Written : " Particularly 
when the L·abour Party is in office, 
foreign policy becomes the last refuge of 
utopianism ". 
This discord between a Labour Govern·· 
ment and its followers was most evident 
during Harold Wilson's administration oj1964-70. On several key issues such as 
Vietnarn, the Nigerian civil -war and, tc 
a lesser extent, in regard to Rhodesiz 
and Europe, the Labour Governmen 
found itself at odds with a large sectiOii 
of party opinion. Pa.rticularly over Viet 
nam the party hardened in its view tha 
Government policy was __excessively influ 
enced by the Foreign Office's preferenc1 
for ba·ckroom diplomacy. For its part th1 
Government appeared to lack a cohereOJ 
and integrated view as to the directi01 
its :foreign policy should take. It is tru 
that circumstances were savagely arraye1 
against it ; a deteriorating externa 
economic balance that 'Plagued it fo 
much of its period of office and whicl 
conspired to make ·it heavily dependen 
on the goodwill of the us, combined witl 
an overstretched military commitmen 
abroad. In these conditions it was obligeo 
quite apart from any predisposition o 
the part of the Prime Minister or Foreig 
Secretary, to take decisions on foreigpolicy which went aga:inst the grain c 
party opinion. A disenchanted and frus1 
rated party became increasingly critic~ 
of the Government's performance, an 
in its search for the right direction i 
foreign policy, the party predictabJ 
reverted to fundamental principle 

.[he character of this continuing debate 
>etween the party leadership and the left 
wing has 'been unfortunate because it has 
~enerated an unproductive doctrinal dis-
>ute and :failed to establish a relevant set 
f guidelines for Labour's foreign policy. 
oth camps have ·become entrenched in 
he virtues of their own beliefs. The 
~roup who largely because of ministerial 
~xperience have campaigned .for a .more 
·ealistic approach to foreign affairs have 
ended to surrender ideals to the needs 
>f government, and propagating the 
mage that Labour is " fit to rule ". Once 
.his hcrppens there is to all outward 
~ppearance little to distinguish Labour 
from Conservative foreign policy. On 
he other hand, the ideologists in the 
·Jarty have often given the impression.hat they are more concerned to preserve 
.he ·integr-ity of their 'beliefs than seeinghem tested in the arena of international 
l· Jolitics. This old controversy within the 
party has become a somewhat sterile 
debate in which both sides go over their 
arts like worn out actors, having long 
w ·orgo.tten the point of the play, and the 
~xistence of the audience. Moreover, it is 
[l;n exercise that is irrelevant to the cir-
Jn ;umstances ·in which foreign policy has to 
e enacted, for the quite basic reason that 
1 discussion rubout the interpretation of 
u· fundamental prinoiples can only be con-
ducted at a theoretical level. 
fhis pamphlet is not primarily concerned 
with the question : what is socialist 
. Foreign policy ? And what principlesshould, or should not, be included in a 
woialist perspective ? It is an attempt to 
deal with the policy making machinery 
which helps to formulate Labour forejgnpolicy, with a view to showing how this 
might be better adapted to secure 
Labour's goals. Even so, it is necessaryto say a brief word about the substance 
of policy as a background against which 
. to judge the efficiency of the policymaking machinery. 
Any attempt to provide guidelines for 
Labour's foreign policy, other than in the 
form of some general statement of 
principles, must take account of Britain's 
current position in the world, and prog-
nosticate the main drHt of events in the 
3 
world throughout the 1970s. In hand 
with this, Lalbour's policy has to ·be based 
upon meshing its major tenets with the 
basic interests essential to Britain in the 
international system ; and by the nature 
of the system these interests are not con-
stant, they change and require re-inter-
pretation over time as conditions in the 
world change. For example, no British 
government, be it Labour or Conserva-
tive, can ignore the long term implicationsof the world oil crisis of 1973, following 
the action of the oil producing states, or 
remain aloof to the co-ordinated efforts 
of states to bolster the fragile world 
mQnetary system. Labour's policy has to 
exist in the clear recognition that Britain 
no longer influences world affairs on the 
grand scale. This is not to say that British 
policy no longer has a vital role to play,
only that to use her influence effectively 
her policy has to be closely associated 
with states that have oommon interests. 
Changes in British policy aJbroad such 
as those envisaged in the NEC state1nent,
A Foreign Policy for Labour, includingthe banning of certain categories of arms 
sales to South Africa, as well as systemati-
cally reducing trade with that country, 
impose their own domestic price, which 
have to 'be included in the overall 
econom·ic reckoning just as much as a 
schools buildi.Qg programme or new 
hospitals. 
There is also the tendency for interested 
groups within the party to put pressure 
on their own Government to mak~ pro-
nouncements upon issues in the inter-
national sphere where no specific British 
interest or involvement exists. It may be 
the nature of a particular internal regime, 
such as the military dictatorship in 
Greece before its abdicatiQ.n of power, 
apartheid in South A.frica, Spain's treat-
ment of .trade unionists, or the sale of 
arms to a military junta. Issues such as 
these touch the nerve centre of politicalbelief of some group or other within the 
LaJbour party. Here again gestures exact 
their own price. A particular course of 
action in foreign policy cannot be con-
fined to the political level ; nowadays it 
invariably has important consequencesfor British industry and the domestic 
economy. Moral intervention in the world 
.[he character of this continuing debate 
>etween the party leadership and the left 
wing has 'been unfortunate because it has 
~enerated an unproductive doctrinal dis-
>ute and :failed to establish a relevant set 
f guidelines for Labour's foreign policy. 
oth camps have ·become entrenched in 
he virtues of their own beliefs. The 
~roup who largely because of ministerial 
~xperience have campaigned .for a .more 
·ealistic approach to foreign affairs have 
ended to surrender ideals to the needs 
>f government, and propagating the 
mage that Labour is " fit to rule ". Once 
.his hcrppens there is to all outward 
~ppearance little to distinguish Labour 
from Conservative foreign policy. On 
he other hand, the ideologists in the 
·Jarty have often given the impression.hat they are more concerned to preserve 
.he ·integr-ity of their 'beliefs than seeinghem tested in the arena of international 
l· Jolitics. This old controversy within the 
party has become a somewhat sterile 
debate in which both sides go over their 
arts like worn out actors, having long 
w ·orgo.tten the point of the play, and the 
~xistence of the audience. Moreover, it is 
[l;n exercise that is irrelevant to the cir-
Jn ;umstances ·in which foreign policy has to 
e enacted, for the quite basic reason that 
1 discussion rubout the interpretation of 
u· fundamental prinoiples can only be con-
ducted at a theoretical level. 
fhis pamphlet is not primarily concerned 
with the question : what is socialist 
. Foreign policy ? And what principlesshould, or should not, be included in a 
woialist perspective ? It is an attempt to 
deal with the policy making machinery 
which helps to formulate Labour forejgnpolicy, with a view to showing how this 
might be better adapted to secure 
Labour's goals. Even so, it is necessaryto say a brief word about the substance 
of policy as a background against which 
. to judge the efficiency of the policymaking machinery. 
Any attempt to provide guidelines for 
Labour's foreign policy, other than in the 
form of some general statement of 
principles, must take account of Britain's 
current position in the world, and prog-
nosticate the main drHt of events in the 
3 
world throughout the 1970s. In hand 
with this, Lalbour's policy has to ·be based 
upon meshing its major tenets with the 
basic interests essential to Britain in the 
international system ; and by the nature 
of the system these interests are not con-
stant, they change and require re-inter-
pretation over time as conditions in the 
world change. For example, no British 
government, be it Labour or Conserva-
tive, can ignore the long term implicationsof the world oil crisis of 1973, following 
the action of the oil producing states, or 
remain aloof to the co-ordinated efforts 
of states to bolster the fragile world 
mQnetary system. Labour's policy has to 
exist in the clear recognition that Britain 
no longer influences world affairs on the 
grand scale. This is not to say that British 
policy no longer has a vital role to play,
only that to use her influence effectively 
her policy has to be closely associated 
with states that have oommon interests. 
Changes in British policy aJbroad such 
as those envisaged in the NEC state1nent,
A Foreign Policy for Labour, includingthe banning of certain categories of arms 
sales to South Africa, as well as systemati-
cally reducing trade with that country, 
impose their own domestic price, which 
have to 'be included in the overall 
econom·ic reckoning just as much as a 
schools buildi.Qg programme or new 
hospitals. 
There is also the tendency for interested 
groups within the party to put pressure 
on their own Government to mak~ pro-
nouncements upon issues in the inter-
national sphere where no specific British 
interest or involvement exists. It may be 
the nature of a particular internal regime, 
such as the military dictatorship in 
Greece before its abdicatiQ.n of power, 
apartheid in South A.frica, Spain's treat-
ment of .trade unionists, or the sale of 
arms to a military junta. Issues such as 
these touch the nerve centre of politicalbelief of some group or other within the 
LaJbour party. Here again gestures exact 
their own price. A particular course of 
action in foreign policy cannot be con-
fined to the political level ; nowadays it 
invariably has important consequencesfor British industry and the domestic 
economy. Moral intervention in the world 

may not only meet with disappruval by 
the Foreign Office but may cause other 
departments whose interests are involved 
to complain about the effects on British 
trade. In these circumstances, the effects 
of policy have to be carefully weighed up 
through the co-ordinated efforts of the 
other departments concerned .in conjunction 
with the Foreign Office. This is not 
to say that moral action should be ruled 
out by a LaJbour Governme~t, indeed it 
would be a sa;d outcome if this were so, 
but the anticipated gain rfrom such action 
has to ·be set alongside the cost in hard 
economic terms. 

There will ·always be the shifting sands 
of international ·behaviour that no government, 
no matter how carefully it has 
worked out its position ·beforehand, can 
foresee or respond to according to a 
political poHcy. And on these questions 
a Labour Government .must al·ways 1be 
prepared to face the charge from those 
who are apt to 1be wise after the event, 
that it has acted mistakenly. Whilst this 
is the contingent nature of a world of 
sovereign states, the .international system 
does include relatively stable features 
upon which Labour could have general 
attitudes worked out >in opposit·ion. For 
example, the party could formulate its 
views in advance on issues such as : 
alliances, policy toward the United 
Nations and other international agencies, 
aid to the third world and defence policy. 
Lastly, it cannot be too strongly emphasised 
that >it is necessary to have a policy 
carefully worked out in opposition which 
has been discussed ·and generally approrved 
~thr.oughout the par.ty. Such a 
policy could have agreed generalapproaches toward the relatively permanent 
features of the international system ; 
where radical change is envisaged the 
impl-ications of policy should be worked 
out >in some detail, ·including possible 
effects upon the domestic programme.
The value of this is underlined by the 
contrast 1between the opening months of 
Labour in office in February 1974 and 
the foreign policy of the 1964-70_La;bouradministration. In the period preceding 
1964 the party gave little attention to 
developing a major strategy in foreign 
affairs, and was preoccupied with 

economic policy, whereas between 1970 
and 1974 more thought was given to 
establishing general guidelines for foreign 1policy, culminating in A Foreign Policy 
for Labour. As a result, the general im-1 
pression of the present Labour government 
is that it has a clearer idea a;bout its • 
objectives abroad than its Labour predecessor. 


Within the compass of action outlined, 
the measure of achievement of a Labour · 
Government will be the skill with which 
it adapts its socialist philosopl_ly to 
achieve consistency between its domestic 
programme and its foreign policy objectives. 
With a clear idea ·of its objectives 
in external relations, a Labour Government 
depends upon two factors to helpcarry through its policy. First, it has to 
devote a;ttention, more so than hitherto~ 
to nurturing a basis of co-operation with . 
the whole ·of the La!bour movement. ; 
Second, it has to ensure that its policies · 
are not thwarted by the determined . 
efforts of permanent officials to maintain , 

a continuity of policy. 


the foreign and 
ommonwealth· office 
fhere is the traditional susp1c1on .wide-
pread in the LClJbour party that it is the 
=<'oreign Office which diverts a La:bour 
JOVernment from pursuing a radical 
;ourse in foreign pol·icy. This suspicion is 
wofold : the first is that the Foteign)flice itself, because ·Of ·its own inherent 
;ollective view, operates to block the 
nore openly socialist aspects of Labour's 
·oreign policy. And secondly, it is the 
'elief that a Labour Foreign Secretary, 
10 matter how clear and determined in 
'lis ideas a!bout foreign policy, eventually 
uccumbs to Foreign Office pressure. The 
'eriods of Labour Government, :far from 
Llleviating this doubt, have confirmed 
he bulk of party opinion in the view that 
ts ideals are betrayed in foreign policy. 
\!though .feeling has run very high with-
n the party on this subject little has been 
lone since 1945 to examine seriously the 
·elationship of the Foreign Office to the 
:oreign policy programme of Lrubour. 
·fhis ·is surprising 1n view of the .fact that 
:t.s early as 1925, in conducting a post-
.nortem on the 1924 minority Labour 
Jovernment, provoked by the Foreign)ffice's handling of the Zinoviev Letter, 
· he party's own International Advisory. : ommittee expressed profound mistrust 
)f the Foreign Office personnel. It went 
)n to lament: " the absence of anyone in 
ugh position in the Foreign Office or the 
iplomatic Services who even remotely1nderstood the mentality of La:bour, and 
irew attention to the absence of anyink, except for the overworked Foreign 
~ecretary and Parliamentary Secretary, 
Jetween the Foreign Office and the Party, 
tnd the lack of anyone to interpret and 
!Xecute Labour Policy throughout the 
. )ffice ". 
Without suggesting that .there is any1ecessary antithesis between Labour's 
deals and the attitude of the Foreign)ffice, the fact remains that the perman-
~nt officials occupy a central, strategic 
)OSition in the planning and execution of 
~abour's foreign policy. Any study of the 
:;oo reign Office must concern itself with 
:wo facets of the Office : the basic atti-
:udes which prevail within the Foreign)ffice establishment, and their method of 
Norking. The Foreign Office conceives its 
!unction as one of administering day to 
day external affairs, and managing rela-
tions w.ith other states in such a way as 
to disturb the balance of the international 
system as litHe as possible, in o.rder to 
minimise interference with British inter-
ests. In pursuing this major objective the 
basic guideline for the FoTeign Office is 
the protection of British .interests, and 
quite naturally it will stress the necessityof continuity of policy-of acting with 
caution and according to precedent-inorder to safeguard these interests. It is 
not .in the nature of this function to see 
policy as creating conditions for change, 
or aiming to transform the attitudes of 
other states. The preservation of the 
status quo is the overwhelming motiva-
tion of all Foreign Office personnel in 
assessing the impact •of events abroad 
upon British policy. In essence the ForeignOffice is bound to oppos-e major de-
partures from the traditional approachbecause this is seen as potentially danger-
ous to the National Interest as perceivedby Foreign Office officials. They would no 
doubt claim that it is their duty to act 
on behalf of the National Interest, be-
cause if they do not do so, there .is no 
guarantee that British interests will be 
safeguarded, certainly not by other states . 
There is also the vested int~ erest of the 
Foreign Office in the present system, 
which cannot be discounted. Majorchange in foreign policy introduced by a 
Lrubour Government carries with it the 
threat to the continued survival of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in it 
present form. All of thi leads the ForeignOffice machine to move in a very deliber-
ate, cautious, and slow manner when con-
fronted with any major proposals for 
change. In the view of one Labour Mini-
ter of State at the Foreign Office, the 
capacity of such a machine for inhibitingradical change i increased by the veryhigh intellectual and professional stand-
ard of foreign ervice officials. They are 
generally speaking, men of impressiveacademic qualifications who tudy their 
profession with great care and are usually 
very much better informed on the prin-
ciples and the detail of foreign policy 
i ues than most labour mini ter when 
they fir t arrive in office. 
Thi general dispo ition on the part of 
the foreign and 
ommonwealth· office 
fhere is the traditional susp1c1on .wide-
pread in the LClJbour party that it is the 
=<'oreign Office which diverts a La:bour 
JOVernment from pursuing a radical 
;ourse in foreign pol·icy. This suspicion is 
wofold : the first is that the Foteign)flice itself, because ·Of ·its own inherent 
;ollective view, operates to block the 
nore openly socialist aspects of Labour's 
·oreign policy. And secondly, it is the 
'elief that a Labour Foreign Secretary, 
10 matter how clear and determined in 
'lis ideas a!bout foreign policy, eventually 
uccumbs to Foreign Office pressure. The 
'eriods of Labour Government, :far from 
Llleviating this doubt, have confirmed 
he bulk of party opinion in the view that 
ts ideals are betrayed in foreign policy. 
\!though .feeling has run very high with-
n the party on this subject little has been 
lone since 1945 to examine seriously the 
·elationship of the Foreign Office to the 
:oreign policy programme of Lrubour. 
·fhis ·is surprising 1n view of the .fact that 
:t.s early as 1925, in conducting a post-
.nortem on the 1924 minority Labour 
Jovernment, provoked by the Foreign)ffice's handling of the Zinoviev Letter, 
· he party's own International Advisory. : ommittee expressed profound mistrust 
)f the Foreign Office personnel. It went 
)n to lament: " the absence of anyone in 
ugh position in the Foreign Office or the 
iplomatic Services who even remotely1nderstood the mentality of La:bour, and 
irew attention to the absence of anyink, except for the overworked Foreign 
~ecretary and Parliamentary Secretary, 
Jetween the Foreign Office and the Party, 
tnd the lack of anyone to interpret and 
!Xecute Labour Policy throughout the 
. )ffice ". 
Without suggesting that .there is any1ecessary antithesis between Labour's 
deals and the attitude of the Foreign)ffice, the fact remains that the perman-
~nt officials occupy a central, strategic 
)OSition in the planning and execution of 
~abour's foreign policy. Any study of the 
:;oo reign Office must concern itself with 
:wo facets of the Office : the basic atti-
:udes which prevail within the Foreign)ffice establishment, and their method of 
Norking. The Foreign Office conceives its 
!unction as one of administering day to 
day external affairs, and managing rela-
tions w.ith other states in such a way as 
to disturb the balance of the international 
system as litHe as possible, in o.rder to 
minimise interference with British inter-
ests. In pursuing this major objective the 
basic guideline for the FoTeign Office is 
the protection of British .interests, and 
quite naturally it will stress the necessityof continuity of policy-of acting with 
caution and according to precedent-inorder to safeguard these interests. It is 
not .in the nature of this function to see 
policy as creating conditions for change, 
or aiming to transform the attitudes of 
other states. The preservation of the 
status quo is the overwhelming motiva-
tion of all Foreign Office personnel in 
assessing the impact •of events abroad 
upon British policy. In essence the ForeignOffice is bound to oppos-e major de-
partures from the traditional approachbecause this is seen as potentially danger-
ous to the National Interest as perceivedby Foreign Office officials. They would no 
doubt claim that it is their duty to act 
on behalf of the National Interest, be-
cause if they do not do so, there .is no 
guarantee that British interests will be 
safeguarded, certainly not by other states . 
There is also the vested int~ erest of the 
Foreign Office in the present system, 
which cannot be discounted. Majorchange in foreign policy introduced by a 
Lrubour Government carries with it the 
threat to the continued survival of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in it 
present form. All of thi leads the ForeignOffice machine to move in a very deliber-
ate, cautious, and slow manner when con-
fronted with any major proposals for 
change. In the view of one Labour Mini-
ter of State at the Foreign Office, the 
capacity of such a machine for inhibitingradical change i increased by the veryhigh intellectual and professional stand-
ard of foreign ervice officials. They are 
generally speaking, men of impressiveacademic qualifications who tudy their 
profession with great care and are usually 
very much better informed on the prin-
ciples and the detail of foreign policy 
i ues than most labour mini ter when 
they fir t arrive in office. 
Thi general dispo ition on the part of 

the permanent officials is reinforced by 
the method of working in the ForeignOffice. The Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office steeped in a combined tradition of 
responsibility for the external affairs of a 
great imperial power with its own haute 
politique, places it amongst the most 
prestigious of foreign services in the 
world. Its internal organisation and 
method of operation, managed by officials 
renowned for their ·energy and skill, enable 
the Foreign Office to exert a collective 
expertise that is difficult for a Labour 
Foreign Secretary bent upon changing the 
direction of foreign policy to overcome. 
A new Labour Foreign Secretary on going 
to the Foreign Office will quickly find 
himself enmeshed in the wide and intricate 
range of decision taking. He cannot 
but be dependent on the advice offered 
by his permanent staff. Lord GeorgeBrown recounting his period at the 
Foreign Office pinpoints ~this aspect of the 
problem: " ... obviously there were vast 
areas of the world of tremendous importance 
to us and to our aUies which J 
hardly knew at all and on which I had to 
be very fully briefed. The Foreign Office 
is equipped to give the best information, 
the best of briefing on any international 
issue one cares to mention. But what 
bothered me, made as I am, was the 
thought that it was they who were deciding 
the areas I should be briefed ·tllbout, 
and I quickly became aware that, unless 
I was determined, I would inevita;bly become 
the purveyor of views alreadyformed in the Office" (George Brown, 

In my Way). 

While this is true it oversimplifies the 
question of the relationship of the minister 
to the permanent official. The problem 
chiefly resides in the fact that .the 
officiais of the Office are always able to 
produce weighty evidence for why a given 
line on policy should not be taken, which 
it is difficult for a minister on his own 
iniative to challenge. He probably has 
only his own political instinct to go on ;
the officials are ruble to cite hard factual 
evidence. The minister's choice is also 
impeded by the fact that he is confronted 
with a monolithic official policy, ·instead 
of a series of options each co.mpatible 
with the same basic political dech;ion. The 

Foreign Office policy when presented to 
the minister will have been thoroughlyprepared on its ·way up ~through the Office 
hierarchy to remove conflicts of view, so 
that by the time ·it reaches the highestlevel it has been ·impressively argued and 
documented. It takes a very strong and 
well informed minister to resist this sort 

o.f policy .formulation. Furthermore, it is 
important no.t to overlook the effect 
which the implicit technique of a va t 
bureaucracy has upon trying to keeppolicy 01bjootives clearly -in view. As one 
observer has commented : " . (the) .. consequence 
of a largely bureaucratised administration 
of foreign relations is the 
difficulty of attempting to formulate a 
coherent foreign policy ... in the sense, 
and it is a limited ense, that policies 
directed at particular goals or events are 
compatible with each other and cumulative 
in their effects. Keeping the desk . 
clean, attachment to .precedent and sta:bi-, 
lity, dealing with matters as they adse 
and 4 on their merit ' all have the effect ~ 
of inhibiting a strong, centrally directed . 
and, above all, centraHy conceived polky.
Such a policy can only be formulated 
where there is the wi1l to ride roughshod 
over administrative boundaries and factual 
detail alike. It requires either passion 
or intellectual arrogance" (D. V.ital, The 
Making of British Foreign Policy). 
There is the sense too in which 1t js the 
minister who is on trial. Given that it is 
he who wishes to change policy and the 
Office that wishes to preserve the element 
of continuity, the onus is upon the minister 
to make his case against · his officials 
who have simply to defend an ·existingpolicy. In this sense the whole climate in 
which policy is created is uncongenial,
indeed antithetical, to change. 

domestic departments 

A coherent definition of foreign policy is 
inhibited by a further consideration. 
Questions of economic policy overseas, 
involving monetary issues, trade and investment, 
and aid programmes too, each 
of which are related to domestic economic 
objectives, impinge upon the political 
aspect of policy planning. For example, 


y the end of the 1960s the Br·itish Gov-
.,rnment was spending between £20 mil-
ion and £25 million a year in the pro-
otion of exports and assisting industry 
with information on export opportuni-
.ies ; and Anthony Wedgwood Benn, 
~hilst he was Labour Minister of Tech-
ology, estimated that he was spending 
, a. bout twenty five per cent of his time on 
.nternational business. Increasingly in the 
~ onditions of the modern worJd, foreign 
olicy involves not only the Foreign and 
: ommonwealth Office and its close asso-
.-iate the Ministry of Defence, but al o 
. the Departments of Trade and Industry as 
well as the traditional influences of the 
reasury and the Bank of ngland. There 
no automatic conjunction of intere ts 
roduced from among t the e interested 
odies. he conduct of policy overseas 
..ntails a complex coordination between 
, :hese principal departments, in which the 
alance of interests may well work 
e gainst a policy designed to secure politi-
t ..,al objectives. Indeed, when .jt i seen that 
j Department 'like those of Trade and In-
du try repre ent powerful domestic in-
:erests in a way which the oreign and 
'"'ommonwealth Oftk e doe not, the voice 
f the latter is invariably not the deter-
ining one in formul ating policy abroad. 
.L\ Foreign Secretary live more in the 
.:ornpany of his civil servants than i the 
::ase with other ministers, and con e-
=tuently has less contact with fellow poli-
~ icians. Inevitably therefore, the Foreign 
ecretary will look to his permanent offi-
.-ials for the standards by which to judge 
1.is view and policies. Once this isola-
.ion of the Foreign Secretary from the 
· ulk of hi political colleague occurs it 
.,reates a situation of tension, and some-
times conflict, hetween the Foreign Secre-
tary and the Parliamentary Labour Party.
Lord George Brown has this to say about 
:1is own position as Foreign Secretary : 
" I found myself very much the target for 
ressure, attacks, even abuse, on the floor 
f the House and in the committees, both 
fficial and unofficial, which abound in 
he Commons and are .assiduou ly 
·looked after' by outside lobbyists. Very 
~ oon it became clear to me that I would 
ave to pick my own priorities, try to 
'l1 ke the right deci ion , and tick t 
7 
them " (In my Way). It is worth notinghere that George Brown, more so than 
with other LCl!bour Foreign Secretaries, 
made deliberate efforts to involve the 
party machinery in foreign policy . 
There is a continuous thread of tension 
running through the relationship of suc-
cessive Labour Foreign Secretaries to the 
Parliamentary Party, from .the accusation 
that Bevin ·was merely the mouthpiece of 
the Foreign Office in his advocacy of the 
connection with the u and the North 
Atlantic Alliance, to the charge made 
against successive holders of the office in 
the 1964-70 period that they were willing 
victim of Foreign Office pressure in sup-
porting us ~nvolvement in Vietnam. In 
his published record of the LCl!bour Gov~ 
ernment of 1964-70, Harold Wilson at 
times reveals that he was himself a ware 
of the influence of .the Foreign Office over 
Vietnam. He has said that as he entered 
the Hou e for Question T·ime in March 
1965: " George Thomson, the Minister 
of State at the Foreign Office, with strong 
Foreign Office pressure behind him, tried 
to get me to take a much more committed 
pro-American line on bombing in Viet-
nam. I refused ". And during the same 
monbh on the occasion of Michael 
tewart's visit to Washington which 
occurred at the same time as America's 
declared intention to step up the cam-
paign in Vietnam, the Prime Minister 
warned against a public statement of sup-
port ; " I was fearful that Foreign Office 
pre ure would be exerted on him to ex-
pre support ; this wa in fact unfair to 
Michael Stewart". 
In these circumstance there is a verystrong tendency for a Labour Foreignecretary to become caught up in apply-
ing exactly the same criteria as those of 
his permanent advisers when decidingi sue of policy. The political e retary to 
the Prime Minister, Marcia Williams 
(now Lady Falkender), who was in the 
unique position of being able .to observe 
the proceedings of the 1964-70 Labour 
Government at fir t hand, states that Mr 
Wilson did not always display the vigil-
ance toward Foreign Office advice which 
he felt was called for : " It is the fact 
that (Harold Wilson) doe have uch an 
y the end of the 1960s the Br·itish Gov-
.,rnment was spending between £20 mil-
ion and £25 million a year in the pro-
otion of exports and assisting industry 
with information on export opportuni-
.ies ; and Anthony Wedgwood Benn, 
~hilst he was Labour Minister of Tech-
ology, estimated that he was spending 
, a. bout twenty five per cent of his time on 
.nternational business. Increasingly in the 
~ onditions of the modern worJd, foreign 
olicy involves not only the Foreign and 
: ommonwealth Office and its close asso-
.-iate the Ministry of Defence, but al o 
. the Departments of Trade and Industry as 
well as the traditional influences of the 
reasury and the Bank of ngland. There 
no automatic conjunction of intere ts 
roduced from among t the e interested 
odies. he conduct of policy overseas 
..ntails a complex coordination between 
, :hese principal departments, in which the 
alance of interests may well work 
e gainst a policy designed to secure politi-
t ..,al objectives. Indeed, when .jt i seen that 
j Department 'like those of Trade and In-
du try repre ent powerful domestic in-
:erests in a way which the oreign and 
'"'ommonwealth Oftk e doe not, the voice 
f the latter is invariably not the deter-
ining one in formul ating policy abroad. 
.L\ Foreign Secretary live more in the 
.:ornpany of his civil servants than i the 
::ase with other ministers, and con e-
=tuently has less contact with fellow poli-
~ icians. Inevitably therefore, the Foreign 
ecretary will look to his permanent offi-
.-ials for the standards by which to judge 
1.is view and policies. Once this isola-
.ion of the Foreign Secretary from the 
· ulk of hi political colleague occurs it 
.,reates a situation of tension, and some-
times conflict, hetween the Foreign Secre-
tary and the Parliamentary Labour Party.
Lord George Brown has this to say about 
:1is own position as Foreign Secretary : 
" I found myself very much the target for 
ressure, attacks, even abuse, on the floor 
f the House and in the committees, both 
fficial and unofficial, which abound in 
he Commons and are .assiduou ly 
·looked after' by outside lobbyists. Very 
~ oon it became clear to me that I would 
ave to pick my own priorities, try to 
'l1 ke the right deci ion , and tick t 
7 
them " (In my Way). It is worth notinghere that George Brown, more so than 
with other LCl!bour Foreign Secretaries, 
made deliberate efforts to involve the 
party machinery in foreign policy . 
There is a continuous thread of tension 
running through the relationship of suc-
cessive Labour Foreign Secretaries to the 
Parliamentary Party, from .the accusation 
that Bevin ·was merely the mouthpiece of 
the Foreign Office in his advocacy of the 
connection with the u and the North 
Atlantic Alliance, to the charge made 
against successive holders of the office in 
the 1964-70 period that they were willing 
victim of Foreign Office pressure in sup-
porting us ~nvolvement in Vietnam. In 
his published record of the LCl!bour Gov~ 
ernment of 1964-70, Harold Wilson at 
times reveals that he was himself a ware 
of the influence of .the Foreign Office over 
Vietnam. He has said that as he entered 
the Hou e for Question T·ime in March 
1965: " George Thomson, the Minister 
of State at the Foreign Office, with strong 
Foreign Office pressure behind him, tried 
to get me to take a much more committed 
pro-American line on bombing in Viet-
nam. I refused ". And during the same 
monbh on the occasion of Michael 
tewart's visit to Washington which 
occurred at the same time as America's 
declared intention to step up the cam-
paign in Vietnam, the Prime Minister 
warned against a public statement of sup-
port ; " I was fearful that Foreign Office 
pre ure would be exerted on him to ex-
pre support ; this wa in fact unfair to 
Michael Stewart". 
In these circumstance there is a verystrong tendency for a Labour Foreignecretary to become caught up in apply-
ing exactly the same criteria as those of 
his permanent advisers when decidingi sue of policy. The political e retary to 
the Prime Minister, Marcia Williams 
(now Lady Falkender), who was in the 
unique position of being able .to observe 
the proceedings of the 1964-70 Labour 
Government at fir t hand, states that Mr 
Wilson did not always display the vigil-
ance toward Foreign Office advice which 
he felt was called for : " It is the fact 
that (Harold Wilson) doe have uch an 

admiration for and such a working knowledge 
of the ' System ', that he tends to 
lean over bacl.Qwards in his relationship 
towards ;it. He g·ives it the benefit of the 
doubt. He doesn't really want to arguewith it. He admires the way it is organised 
and its methods ·of working. He admires 
its efficiency and he is often myopic (l}bout 
its failings and •its shortcomings and its 
inefficiencies, and this is a great drawback" 
(Inside Number 10). 

Labour ministers who have served in the 
Foreign Office or have been closely associated 
with its work confirm nhe value of 
having •its wide ranging experience and 
expertise at their disposal, and would not 
wish to change this aspect of its function. 
Most informed observers of international 
affairs within the La-bour Party would not 
argue with this view, but would .go on to 
argue that what is ·required is some means 
of supplementing the work of the Foreign 
Office to pr-ovide the Foreign Secretary 
with an independent source of information 
and advice, and to ensure that he is 
kept in touch with party feelings. 

political advisers 

The need for this .was advocated in a 
" private programme " as part of a memorandum 
entitled The Foreign Office and 
Labour Governments drawn up by the 
International Advisory Committee of the 
party in 1925 : " This private pr-ogramme 
would consist mainly in the appointment 
of competent and trustworthy supporters 
to certain posts of great strategic importance 
at home and abroad, ·outside the Permanent 
Civil Service, and in other actions 
of a like administrative character ". 
This has remained a neglected feature of 
LaJbour's reforms for a very long time. 
Only after the experience of the 1964-70 
Labour Government did a Fabian 
Foreign Policy Group again examine the 
proposal to augment a Labour ForeignSecretary's private office rwith a political 
adviser. 

Several ways of providing political advice 
for the Foreign Secretary have been discussed. 
The pr·incipal method amongstthese was the proposal to recruit a suit


able person from within the Labour partywith appropriate expertise in international J 
affairs, to work closely with the Foreign ·

1

Secretary and advise him on the political 
context of .foreign policy. It was clear that 
close liais·on between a LaJbour Foreign 
Secretary and the party could best be 
promoted by appointing the political ad-1 
viser from amongst the staff of the Inter-~ 
national Affairs Department of Transport '(
House. The precedent for drawing upon f 
a political headquarters for advice was · 
established when Sir Alec Douglas Home .f 
appointed a political secretary from the t 
Conservative Central Office to integrate · r 
with the work of the Foreign Office dur-1ing 1970-74. 

~ 

When Labour ·returned to government in ~ 
February 1974 the Foreign Secretary \ 
moved in this direction by drawing upon ( 
the services of Tom McNally, the Head . 
of the International Affairs Department :r 
of Transport House. McNally's appoint-1 
ment was not at that time made perman-. r 
ent; initially he worked on a secondment. t 
basis which allowed him to retain his c 
position as international adviser to the 
National Executive Committee of the 1( 
party. Since Labour's victory in the ~ 
general election of October 1974, as part ~, 
of the general policy of appointing politi-l 
cal advisers, Tom McNally has been officially 
established as adviser to Jim Callaghan. 
For this policy to be a success it 
is important that the political adviser 
should integrate both with ·the work of c 
the Foreign Office and with the party. It , 
will be necessary f.or him to work in close ; 
collaboration with the permanent officials ' c 
of the Foreign Office and have access to 1 
documents and information within the 

1

Office. The coordination of views with the 

1

party has also to be maintained. To 
achieve this, .there is obvious .merit in al-. 1lowing the political adviser to continue to 

I 

advise the NBC and especially to provide ; 
for close links with the work of the In-I 1ternational Sub-Committee. At a further 

1

level it is desirable that the harmonisation 1 
of policy with the party is pursued by 
continuous contact between the politicaladviser and the head of the International 
Affairs Department of Transport House. 
It is too early to judge how successful the 
experiment ·of a political adviser is going 


:l be from the standpoint of providing the 
·'oreign Secretary with the right kind of 
olitical support. The present arrange-
ents will need to operate over the life-
. me of the present government with, 
opefully, information ·being made avail-
hie by the parties concerned-the 
'oreign Secretary, the Foreign Office, the 
olitical adviser, and the party-before it 
an be seen whether this is the best way of 
dvising the Minister and keeping him in 
'JUch with the view of the party. How-
, ver, a tentative judgment at this stage on 
e role of political advisers should be 
ade in view of the known scepticism to 
e idea by the civil service. Initial ex-
erience of a political adviser will perhaps 
. ncoura;ge the view that the Foreign Sec-
etary, together with his a:dviser, ought to 
' 1e a;ble to draw upon a wider body of 
· pertise to advise on policy formulation. 
. his could be achieved by strengthening'lle political adviser's role with a small 
'1anel of additional advisers. A team 
· 1roadly sympathetic to the aims of Lab-
. 1Ur could be recruited from amongst the 
1miversities, research institutes, such as 
·:;hatham House and the Institute of 
1 •:trategic Studies, and also those specialist 
reas of business concerned with pa-rticu-
ar aspects of international trade. The 
lrawback in having a single a:dviser is 
llat he too, as with the Foreign Secretary, 
. an become a•bsorbed into the method of 
-"oreign Office working and thus find it 
lifficult to retain an independent view 
.nd judgment whilst it is more diffi-
ult for the Foreign Office to " take 
1ver " a well concerted team. Though for 
llat very reason such a proposal would 
1robably encounter the determined op-
IOSition of the Foreign Office. 
~part from providing specialist advice on 
pecifi·c aspect of current policy, the 
nore important function of such a gr-oupvould -be to study the long term implica-
ions of implementing various parts of 
..,abour's foreign policy, and to prepare.lternative methods for achieving objec-
ives. Whichever method of policy advice 
1ecomes the established practice it is im-
IOrtant to ensure that Labour's Foreign 
~ecretary does not depend exclusively.pon the Foreign Office network, but has 
9 
outside advice available to him and con-
tinuous links with party opinion. 
It would be foolish to deny that there are 
not difficulties in the way. A principalobstacle is the reaction of the Foreign 
Office itself to the idea and how it would 
respond to having its traditional hold 
upon policy formulation encroached 
upon. The setting up o.f the Arms Control 
and Disar.mament Unit by the Labour 
Government of 1964 is indicative of the 
problem. In the view of the minister con-
cerned with this programme, it was estab-
lished only in the face of considerable 
opposition fr-om the Foreign Office. Even 
then it was progressively absorbed into 
the Foreign Office machine and eventu-
ally lost any independence that it mightever have had. An attempt to appoint a 
personal adviser to the minister on Arms 
Control and Disarma:ment from outside 
the Foreign Office was effectively de-
feated by the officials. In the case of this 
particular experiment it ·is true to say that 
its achievements were mitigated by inade-
quate political backing from above and 
insufficient sympathy with party objec-
tives in its direction. For example, the 
minister concerned was a new recruit to 
the party and without experience in the 
workings of the Labour .pa-rty, its policy 
in this field, and its general disposition 
toward disarmament questions. Whilst the 
first Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Research Unit was con-
cerned more with the issues of control 
of armaments than implementing schemes 
of disarmament. Nevertheless, -once this 
has ·been said in part explanation for its 
lack of success, in terms of its actual 
working the institutional problem of link-
ing the work of a specialist unit with the 
ma!chinery of the Foreign Office is the 
one most deserving ·of attention. 
At the same time some Labour ministers, 
including the present Foreign Secretary, 
are known to object to having theJ.r re-
lationship with their permanent officials 
damaged ·by a system of outside advisers . 
They prefer to see them integrated with 
the civil service. In their view to set a 
political adviser apart from the civil ser-
vice creates tension between the perman-
ent officials and the political adviser, 
:l be from the standpoint of providing the 
·'oreign Secretary with the right kind of 
olitical support. The present arrange-
ents will need to operate over the life-
. me of the present government with, 
opefully, information ·being made avail-
hie by the parties concerned-the 
'oreign Secretary, the Foreign Office, the 
olitical adviser, and the party-before it 
an be seen whether this is the best way of 
dvising the Minister and keeping him in 
'JUch with the view of the party. How-
, ver, a tentative judgment at this stage on 
e role of political advisers should be 
ade in view of the known scepticism to 
e idea by the civil service. Initial ex-
erience of a political adviser will perhaps 
. ncoura;ge the view that the Foreign Sec-
etary, together with his a:dviser, ought to 
' 1e a;ble to draw upon a wider body of 
· pertise to advise on policy formulation. 
. his could be achieved by strengthening'lle political adviser's role with a small 
'1anel of additional advisers. A team 
· 1roadly sympathetic to the aims of Lab-
. 1Ur could be recruited from amongst the 
1miversities, research institutes, such as 
·:;hatham House and the Institute of 
1 •:trategic Studies, and also those specialist 
reas of business concerned with pa-rticu-
ar aspects of international trade. The 
lrawback in having a single a:dviser is 
llat he too, as with the Foreign Secretary, 
. an become a•bsorbed into the method of 
-"oreign Office working and thus find it 
lifficult to retain an independent view 
.nd judgment whilst it is more diffi-
ult for the Foreign Office to " take 
1ver " a well concerted team. Though for 
llat very reason such a proposal would 
1robably encounter the determined op-
IOSition of the Foreign Office. 
~part from providing specialist advice on 
pecifi·c aspect of current policy, the 
nore important function of such a gr-oupvould -be to study the long term implica-
ions of implementing various parts of 
..,abour's foreign policy, and to prepare.lternative methods for achieving objec-
ives. Whichever method of policy advice 
1ecomes the established practice it is im-
IOrtant to ensure that Labour's Foreign 
~ecretary does not depend exclusively.pon the Foreign Office network, but has 
9 
outside advice available to him and con-
tinuous links with party opinion. 
It would be foolish to deny that there are 
not difficulties in the way. A principalobstacle is the reaction of the Foreign 
Office itself to the idea and how it would 
respond to having its traditional hold 
upon policy formulation encroached 
upon. The setting up o.f the Arms Control 
and Disar.mament Unit by the Labour 
Government of 1964 is indicative of the 
problem. In the view of the minister con-
cerned with this programme, it was estab-
lished only in the face of considerable 
opposition fr-om the Foreign Office. Even 
then it was progressively absorbed into 
the Foreign Office machine and eventu-
ally lost any independence that it mightever have had. An attempt to appoint a 
personal adviser to the minister on Arms 
Control and Disarma:ment from outside 
the Foreign Office was effectively de-
feated by the officials. In the case of this 
particular experiment it ·is true to say that 
its achievements were mitigated by inade-
quate political backing from above and 
insufficient sympathy with party objec-
tives in its direction. For example, the 
minister concerned was a new recruit to 
the party and without experience in the 
workings of the Labour .pa-rty, its policy 
in this field, and its general disposition 
toward disarmament questions. Whilst the 
first Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Research Unit was con-
cerned more with the issues of control 
of armaments than implementing schemes 
of disarmament. Nevertheless, -once this 
has ·been said in part explanation for its 
lack of success, in terms of its actual 
working the institutional problem of link-
ing the work of a specialist unit with the 
ma!chinery of the Foreign Office is the 
one most deserving ·of attention. 
At the same time some Labour ministers, 
including the present Foreign Secretary, 
are known to object to having theJ.r re-
lationship with their permanent officials 
damaged ·by a system of outside advisers . 
They prefer to see them integrated with 
the civil service. In their view to set a 
political adviser apart from the civil ser-
vice creates tension between the perman-
ent officials and the political adviser, 

which makes life difficult for the minister 
and involves him in settling differences. 
The way in which the political adviser is 
to fit into the total machinery of a:dvice 
available to the F~Heign Secretary is in 
fact the root of the difficulty of the triangular 
relationship of minister, Foreign 
Office officials and political adviser. Quite 
obviously if the role of the political adviser 
is kept separate from that of the 
Foreign Office, his advice vis-a-vis the 
permanent .officials n1ust be at discount 
because he is not in possession of the 
same information and is not familiar with 
the reasoning behind the formulation of 
views put to the minister. In this kind of 
situation, the political adviser's role will 
not oaly become increasingly ineffective 
but will al o bring him into conflict with 
the Foreign Office staff. Equally there is 
a danger in the political adviser being ? 1Jsorbed 
into the Foreign Office machinery, 
in that his independent line of com·munication 
to <the Minister would 1be lost and 
his views would become part and parcelof the Foreign Office brief. It is necessary 
to e:itabli h a funotion for the political 
adviser which is ·between these two extreme 
positions. In relation to the Foreign 
Office the political adviser should work 
in close liaison with the permanent officials 
and :be party to their deliberations, 
whilst at the same time having independent 
access for his views to the Foreign 
Secretary. 

An alternative method of providing the 
minister with a political context, which 
has received considerable attention 
amongst interested policy thinkers within 
the Labour party, is that of a ministerial 
cabinet along the lines of the French 
cabinet system. This would of course 
introduce an entirely new element into 
the present system by which foreignpolicy is conducted, by replacing the 
existing private office. A cabinet systemof top level policy a:dvisers ·brought in to 
provide the Foreign Secretary with the 
political context within which to formulate 
policy, would certainly go some way 
to allay the fears of the party about the 
influence of the Foreign Office over the 
minister. However, it would be handicapped 
initially at ~east, by not having experience 
of the actua'l mechanics of con


ducting policy, nor would it be in a position 
tq evaluate a current policy decision 1 
in ~the light of previous decisions within 
this area inside the Foreign Office. 

The formulation of foreign policy has to ' 
pos ess a basis of consistency for it to 
carry credibility in the outside world. A 
body of expert knowledge and experience · 
accumulated over a long period of being : 
responsible for the C·onduct of British · 
foreign policy, such as exi ts within the 
Foreign Office, is indispensable to anysound and viable policy. In any case, to 
introduce a ministerial cabinet systeminto the Foreign Office machinery is an 
unlikely deve1opment without it being ' 
accompanied by similar change across 
other departments of government. This 
kind ·Of fundamental examination of the 
whole machinery of government is un-. 
likely to take place in the immediate ; 
future given that a number of governmentreforms, introduced in recent Parliaments, , 
have not yet been in oreration long . 
enough for their efficacy to be fullyjudged. Such a cheme if seriou ly con. 
idered ·by a Labour Government would 
unquestionably meet wtih fierce opposition 
from within the Foreign Office, and 
the iH wiU that would ·be engendered has 
to be set against what might well be only 
a marginal gain in policy term . 

civil servants abroad 

There i one further aspect of the case 
related to Foreign Office advice and in-' 
formation. A wide section of the Labour 
party is critical about the staffing ·of British 
Embassies and Delegations overseas, 
and the kind of information conveyed bythem. There is the view that embassytaff, because they are themselves part of 
the Foreign Service with careers linked to 
the Foreign Office, transmit information 
home in a rform known to be the most 
suitable for Foreign Office purposes, but 
which is not necessarily the most relevant 
to a wider consideration of policy. In 
some instances insufficient knowledge is 
revea1led about the social structure .of the 
country represented, the state of laJbour 
relations, and the industrial set-up generally. 
Such information is not only helpful 


·rom the tandpoint of formulating policy 
n. the mo t relevant way, but i al o sig-
ificant in relation to how trading policy 
nd aid programmes should be linked to 
foreign policy. For thi reason it has been 
·ecommended that where there are known 
;en itive area greater attention hould be 
1aid Ito making political appointments a 
1mba ador and the work of embas ie 
)trengthened by the appointment of Lab-
ur Attache out ide of the ivil ervice. 
ln many ca e , the trade union are better 
laced to provide relevant inf rmation 
a. bout the industrial and p liUcal itua-
i n in ide a country than the conven-
.ional ource available to the Foreignffice. The TUC ha recently recom-
llended to the Foreign ecretary that 
; me ne with experience in Labour re-
ation hould be appointed to the British 
mba y in outh frica, and for orne 
·ime pa t has argued a imilar ca e in 
e pe ' t t pain. 
lt i · rec gnised that the inherent chara -
er f the oreign Office wor tend to 
, late it fr m de elopment at home. In 
he view f many people h wever, not 
. ; nfined t the abour Party, thi i o a-
i n i reinforced by the narr w basi of 
ecruitment t the oreign Offic . The 
opular view of th oreign Offi e i of a 
1ighly elite y tern, who e personnel re-
"lect a ery narr w et of cla value , 
with little under tanding f the live of 
rdinary m n and women. It ha been 
Je cribed by one a our critic a " ... 
nore and mor the centre of a life ab-
i lutely artifical in it method · it cere-
nonies, it i ws f the government and 
·life f tate, ". 
ll 
them. reater attenti n ha al been 
given to recruiting from among t gradu-
ate in the social sciences. These effort 
have not ub tantially changed .the ba i 
of recruitment, however, and one i 
tempted to con lude that the ForeignOffice, more succe sfully than other pro-
fe ion , manage to urr und it elf " with 
a magic which warn off the ordinary 
man from it precinct ". A Labour Gov-
ernment itself hould take positive step 
to encourage more recruit from varied 
ocial backgrounds into the erv1ce. 
Thi homogeneou ocial ba e of the 
reign Office indirectly affect the for-
mulation of Labour's foreign policy. The 
re tricted ocial outlook and social con-
tact of the per onnel of the ervice mean 
that they are far removed from any basic 
understanding of the working of the Lab-
ur Party, and of its members. The Lab-
our m vement, a a c alition of interest 
overing a wide pe trum of views a 
well a affiliated bodie such a the trade 
unions and the Cooperative Movement 
expre se itself in a complex organisa-
tional structure designed to reconcile a 
many of these intere ts a possible. A 
abour Foreign Secretary, quite apartfrom ·being formally responsible to the 
abinet and the House of Commons for 
hi policy, will al o come under the criti-
al gaze of his own Parliamentary Party, 
th EC and party conference. This is not 
a particularly edifying process from the 
viewpoint f the out ide ob erver, and 
might well seem to the pern1anent official 
in the Foreign ffice a remote and irre-
levant to the demand f foreign policy 
making. Yet it i one of the extreme para-
meter within which a abour oreignecretary ha to operate, and it i there-
f re important that the oreign Office 
tafT hould be acquainted with the e 
dem crati pro ·e e in ide the Labour 
Party. There e i t little real knowledge 
and under tanding within the oreignOffice of the politi a a piration of the 
average working la abour Party mem-
er operating at the gra ro t , who i 
e pecting re ult from a Labour overn-
ment. or example, it i t be doubted 
whether, other than at he ery top level, 
any oreign Offi e taff attend an annual 
Labour Party conf r n e hen Labour i 
·rom the tandpoint of formulating policy 
n. the mo t relevant way, but i al o sig-
ificant in relation to how trading policy 
nd aid programmes should be linked to 
foreign policy. For thi reason it has been 
·ecommended that where there are known 
;en itive area greater attention hould be 
1aid Ito making political appointments a 
1mba ador and the work of embas ie 
)trengthened by the appointment of Lab-
ur Attache out ide of the ivil ervice. 
ln many ca e , the trade union are better 
laced to provide relevant inf rmation 
a. bout the industrial and p liUcal itua-
i n in ide a country than the conven-
.ional ource available to the Foreignffice. The TUC ha recently recom-
llended to the Foreign ecretary that 
; me ne with experience in Labour re-
ation hould be appointed to the British 
mba y in outh frica, and for orne 
·ime pa t has argued a imilar ca e in 
e pe ' t t pain. 
lt i · rec gnised that the inherent chara -
er f the oreign Office wor tend to 
, late it fr m de elopment at home. In 
he view f many people h wever, not 
. ; nfined t the abour Party, thi i o a-
i n i reinforced by the narr w basi of 
ecruitment t the oreign Offic . The 
opular view of th oreign Offi e i of a 
1ighly elite y tern, who e personnel re-
"lect a ery narr w et of cla value , 
with little under tanding f the live of 
rdinary m n and women. It ha been 
Je cribed by one a our critic a " ... 
nore and mor the centre of a life ab-
i lutely artifical in it method · it cere-
nonies, it i ws f the government and 
·life f tate, ". 
ll 
them. reater attenti n ha al been 
given to recruiting from among t gradu-
ate in the social sciences. These effort 
have not ub tantially changed .the ba i 
of recruitment, however, and one i 
tempted to con lude that the ForeignOffice, more succe sfully than other pro-
fe ion , manage to urr und it elf " with 
a magic which warn off the ordinary 
man from it precinct ". A Labour Gov-
ernment itself hould take positive step 
to encourage more recruit from varied 
ocial backgrounds into the erv1ce. 
Thi homogeneou ocial ba e of the 
reign Office indirectly affect the for-
mulation of Labour's foreign policy. The 
re tricted ocial outlook and social con-
tact of the per onnel of the ervice mean 
that they are far removed from any basic 
understanding of the working of the Lab-
ur Party, and of its members. The Lab-
our m vement, a a c alition of interest 
overing a wide pe trum of views a 
well a affiliated bodie such a the trade 
unions and the Cooperative Movement 
expre se itself in a complex organisa-
tional structure designed to reconcile a 
many of these intere ts a possible. A 
abour Foreign Secretary, quite apartfrom ·being formally responsible to the 
abinet and the House of Commons for 
hi policy, will al o come under the criti-
al gaze of his own Parliamentary Party, 
th EC and party conference. This is not 
a particularly edifying process from the 
viewpoint f the out ide ob erver, and 
might well seem to the pern1anent official 
in the Foreign ffice a remote and irre-
levant to the demand f foreign policy 
making. Yet it i one of the extreme para-
meter within which a abour oreignecretary ha to operate, and it i there-
f re important that the oreign Office 
tafT hould be acquainted with the e 
dem crati pro ·e e in ide the Labour 
Party. There e i t little real knowledge 
and under tanding within the oreignOffice of the politi a a piration of the 
average working la abour Party mem-
er operating at the gra ro t , who i 
e pecting re ult from a Labour overn-
ment. or example, it i t be doubted 
whether, other than at he ery top level, 
any oreign Offi e taff attend an annual 
Labour Party conf r n e hen Labour i 

12 
in office. Ml of this is part of the clear 
need to make the Foreign Office reach 
out and become more responsive to the 
domestic environment which foreignpolicy should be designed to promote. 
So far the case has been argued in terms 
of encouraging more understanding of 
the basic nature of the Labour movement 
and its political principles. There is also 
the more direct point that the social base 
of the Foreign Office is such as to make it 
at the worst antithetical, and at the least 
indifferent, to the aspirations of L£llbour. 
Few La!bour ministers who have served at 
the Foreign Office would support the view 
that per,manent officials deliberately set 
out to block Labour's policies. Together 
with Lord George Brown, they would 
agree that the Foreign Office does not ob-
struct a Labour Forejgn Secretary who is 
clear about what he wants to do. The 
difficulty about accepting this view is that 
it has never been comprehensively put to 
the test, for no La-bour Government has 
seriously set about implementing a radi-
cal programme which has been carefully 
worked out in Opposition. The exampleswhich George Brown quotes in support 
of his claim, such as shifting Foreign 
Office personnel and reversing the bias 
within Foreign Office Minutes against de 
Gaulle and Nasser are not in themselves 
in the forefront of a socialist foreignpolicy. This apart however, it may ·be that 
there is a greater disposition within the 
Foreign Office to look seriously at maJor 
departures in policy and ,work out via-ble 
avenues of implementation, than is com-
monly realised inside the Labour Party.
The younger members of staff in the 
Foreign Office are probrubly more attuned 
to the forces of change and keen to initi-
ate fresh approaches to conventional 
issues in foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, the need to make the 
Foreign Office more responsive to the de-
mands of radical change in foreign policy 
does argue in favour of trying to ·broaden 
the base of recruitment to the Foreign 
Service along the lines ,recommended. 
And this general purpose of makjng the 
Foreign Office sensitive to Labour's aims 
would be assisted by providing different 
training for Foreign Office staff, to in-
elude -courses in foreign policy making) 
where this does not already exist, and to 
incorporate Labour's perspective of 
foreign policy. 
One of the distinguishing features of 
Labour's foreign policy compared with a; 
Conservative formulation is that of 
actively promoting change in the inter-
national system. Labour's foreign policy 
is not only directed toward safeguarding~ 
the .immediate interests of Britain but is 
also concerned with changing the inter-
national system-such as removing the 
underlying causes of tension and curbing~ 
their short term effects in the build-up of 
arms, alleviating the gross inequality be-
tween rich and poor states, and streng-
thening respect for a code of internationaL 
conduct in conformity with the charter of 
the United Nations. All of this cahls for 
long term planning, in which decisions 
taken in respect to issues in different 
regions of .the world are seen to be con-
sistent with a pattern of overall objec-' 
tives. 
The Foreign Office because of its com-
bined tradition and function is not 
equipped to handle this long term per-
spective. It has of necessity to preserve 
the continuities of policy between the 
different political emphasis of La-bour and 
Conservative governments. In turn this 
means largely concentrating on the day 
to day problems and ensuring that these 
harm British interests as little as possible. 
The kind of long .tel'I):l planning envisaged 
could best ·be undertaken by supplement~ 
ing the work of the political adviser to 
the Foreign Secretary with a research 
team together with consultants along the 
lines previously suggested. Such a team 
would be able to examine Labour's pro-
gramme in detail and see just how via-ble 
the particular p~rts of it are in the light 
of internation£111 developments. 
This consultative body could be set up on 
a full time basis and work jn close asso-
ciation with the political adviser to the 
Foreign Secretary, having access to 
Foreign Office documents, similar to that 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Unit set up in 1964. Alternatively, it 
12 
in office. Ml of this is part of the clear 
need to make the Foreign Office reach 
out and become more responsive to the 
domestic environment which foreignpolicy should be designed to promote. 
So far the case has been argued in terms 
of encouraging more understanding of 
the basic nature of the Labour movement 
and its political principles. There is also 
the more direct point that the social base 
of the Foreign Office is such as to make it 
at the worst antithetical, and at the least 
indifferent, to the aspirations of L£llbour. 
Few La!bour ministers who have served at 
the Foreign Office would support the view 
that per,manent officials deliberately set 
out to block Labour's policies. Together 
with Lord George Brown, they would 
agree that the Foreign Office does not ob-
struct a Labour Forejgn Secretary who is 
clear about what he wants to do. The 
difficulty about accepting this view is that 
it has never been comprehensively put to 
the test, for no La-bour Government has 
seriously set about implementing a radi-
cal programme which has been carefully 
worked out in Opposition. The exampleswhich George Brown quotes in support 
of his claim, such as shifting Foreign 
Office personnel and reversing the bias 
within Foreign Office Minutes against de 
Gaulle and Nasser are not in themselves 
in the forefront of a socialist foreignpolicy. This apart however, it may ·be that 
there is a greater disposition within the 
Foreign Office to look seriously at maJor 
departures in policy and ,work out via-ble 
avenues of implementation, than is com-
monly realised inside the Labour Party.
The younger members of staff in the 
Foreign Office are probrubly more attuned 
to the forces of change and keen to initi-
ate fresh approaches to conventional 
issues in foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, the need to make the 
Foreign Office more responsive to the de-
mands of radical change in foreign policy 
does argue in favour of trying to ·broaden 
the base of recruitment to the Foreign 
Service along the lines ,recommended. 
And this general purpose of makjng the 
Foreign Office sensitive to Labour's aims 
would be assisted by providing different 
training for Foreign Office staff, to in-
elude -courses in foreign policy making) 
where this does not already exist, and to 
incorporate Labour's perspective of 
foreign policy. 
One of the distinguishing features of 
Labour's foreign policy compared with a; 
Conservative formulation is that of 
actively promoting change in the inter-
national system. Labour's foreign policy 
is not only directed toward safeguarding~ 
the .immediate interests of Britain but is 
also concerned with changing the inter-
national system-such as removing the 
underlying causes of tension and curbing~ 
their short term effects in the build-up of 
arms, alleviating the gross inequality be-
tween rich and poor states, and streng-
thening respect for a code of internationaL 
conduct in conformity with the charter of 
the United Nations. All of this cahls for 
long term planning, in which decisions 
taken in respect to issues in different 
regions of .the world are seen to be con-
sistent with a pattern of overall objec-' 
tives. 
The Foreign Office because of its com-
bined tradition and function is not 
equipped to handle this long term per-
spective. It has of necessity to preserve 
the continuities of policy between the 
different political emphasis of La-bour and 
Conservative governments. In turn this 
means largely concentrating on the day 
to day problems and ensuring that these 
harm British interests as little as possible. 
The kind of long .tel'I):l planning envisaged 
could best ·be undertaken by supplement~ 
ing the work of the political adviser to 
the Foreign Secretary with a research 
team together with consultants along the 
lines previously suggested. Such a team 
would be able to examine Labour's pro-
gramme in detail and see just how via-ble 
the particular p~rts of it are in the light 
of internation£111 developments. 
This consultative body could be set up on 
a full time basis and work jn close asso-
ciation with the political adviser to the 
Foreign Secretary, having access to 
Foreign Office documents, similar to that 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Unit set up in 1964. Alternatively, it 

ould take the form of a panel of expert 
vho would be called in periodically with 
he minister and more regularly with the 
>alitical adviser to work on specific as>
ects of policy. The particular method 
dopted is in it elf secondary to the cenral 
issue of e tablishing some means of 
)ffering political advice to a Labour 

· 
::oreign ecretary in relation to long term 
>Ianning, and keeping the minister 
·lo ely in touch with the climate of party 


3. the party machinery 
Previous experience of Labour Admini-
stration suggests that poor communica-
tions between the Government and the 
party are perhaps as responsible for 
alienation between the two as any real 
differences which exist over policy. Both 
sides have been at fault in the past. With 
recent Labour Governments it should be 
said that some ministers showed a marked 
tendency to keep aloof from any arrange-
ment that would involve them in regulardiscussions with the party. This detach-
ment on the part of ministers is no doubt 
influenced by the considered need to pre-
erve the constitutional proprieties of 
office, in view of the charge made by their 
political opponents that a Labour 
Government is largely influenced, if not 
controlled, by the decision of the PartyConference. There is a]so the fact that 
ome Labour m.jnisters feel that the 
party's concern with political principles 
ha Jitt]e direct relevance to their work 
in the running of a government depart-
ment, and that therefore discu sion 
between them lead only to a futile 
doctrinal dispute. 
On the other ide, during peri ds of 
Labour rule there i the inclination on 
the part of a significant section of the 
party, including a number of the Parlia-
mentary Party, to act as if Labour were 
tHl in Opposition. Adjustment to the idea 
of Labour as a governing party, having 
to compromise points of principle in the 
face of internal and external circum-
tances, has proved particularly difficult 
for the left wing of the party. And criti-
cism of a Labour Government becomes 
sharpened amongst an important section 
of the Parliamentary Party, supported bysimilar views from the constituencies, as 
anticipated results fron1 their government 
fail to materialise. 
At the same time the party organisationhas often shown no positive desire to 
become actively involved in n1aking a 
success of Government policy. At one 
level of argument this is perhaps no more 
than the natural instinct of a democratic 
party to preserve its sense of indepen-
dence and judgment at all levels, though 
the price paid for this independence can 
.be high. Loyalties can become divided 
between the party and Government, and 
the Govermnent ·loses confidence in itself 
as it feels its support in the party drain-
ing away. There is little doubt that this 
seriously aff·ected the Labour Govern-
ment of 1966-70. At a further level, the 
disposition of the party to remain aloof 
from the work of a Labour Govern-
ment resides in the ideological premise 
of not compromising political ideals b~ 
having them tested in practical policy. Yet 
it is essential that the idealism of the 
party and the work of Government be 
brought together in a working relation-
ship between the National Executive 
Con1mittee of the party and a Labour 
Government. 
the national executive 
committee 
At the top ·level of communication, the 
role of the party through the NEC duringthe previous Labour Government of 1964-
70 appears to have been very limited. The 
impression of party officials is that th 
NEC was treated by Labour minister 
generally as simply one more group from 
amongst a whole range of pressure group 
with which the Government had to nego-
tiate, rather than the formal link with 
the party with whom constructive dis-
cussions could be held. Between 1967 and 
1970 the International Affairs Department 
of Transport House prepared n1ore thar 
500 research and position papers for th 
NEC in its discussions with the Govern· 
ment. Yet despite this enormous amoun1 
of solid work the contact apparent!) 
never formed part of a genuine dialogue 
between the Government and the NEC ir 
the formulation of policy. Quite the con· 
trary, ministers together with the ForeigOffice saw their role in these exchange1 
as one of reacting to party criticism al 
they saw fit. The Policy Coordinatior 
Committee which was set up in 1967 tc 
heal the rift between Government an 
party over the whole range of problemsdomestic and foreign, never once dis 
cussed a foreign or defence policy issw 
on the initiative of the Government side 
An NEC proposal in 1968 that the appro 
pria:te ministers should be invited to NEC 
Sub-Committees to discuss various aspect 
of party policy got off to a good §.tar 
3. the party machinery 
Previous experience of Labour Admini-
stration suggests that poor communica-
tions between the Government and the 
party are perhaps as responsible for 
alienation between the two as any real 
differences which exist over policy. Both 
sides have been at fault in the past. With 
recent Labour Governments it should be 
said that some ministers showed a marked 
tendency to keep aloof from any arrange-
ment that would involve them in regulardiscussions with the party. This detach-
ment on the part of ministers is no doubt 
influenced by the considered need to pre-
erve the constitutional proprieties of 
office, in view of the charge made by their 
political opponents that a Labour 
Government is largely influenced, if not 
controlled, by the decision of the PartyConference. There is a]so the fact that 
ome Labour m.jnisters feel that the 
party's concern with political principles 
ha Jitt]e direct relevance to their work 
in the running of a government depart-
ment, and that therefore discu sion 
between them lead only to a futile 
doctrinal dispute. 
On the other ide, during peri ds of 
Labour rule there i the inclination on 
the part of a significant section of the 
party, including a number of the Parlia-
mentary Party, to act as if Labour were 
tHl in Opposition. Adjustment to the idea 
of Labour as a governing party, having 
to compromise points of principle in the 
face of internal and external circum-
tances, has proved particularly difficult 
for the left wing of the party. And criti-
cism of a Labour Government becomes 
sharpened amongst an important section 
of the Parliamentary Party, supported bysimilar views from the constituencies, as 
anticipated results fron1 their government 
fail to materialise. 
At the same time the party organisationhas often shown no positive desire to 
become actively involved in n1aking a 
success of Government policy. At one 
level of argument this is perhaps no more 
than the natural instinct of a democratic 
party to preserve its sense of indepen-
dence and judgment at all levels, though 
the price paid for this independence can 
.be high. Loyalties can become divided 
between the party and Government, and 
the Govermnent ·loses confidence in itself 
as it feels its support in the party drain-
ing away. There is little doubt that this 
seriously aff·ected the Labour Govern-
ment of 1966-70. At a further level, the 
disposition of the party to remain aloof 
from the work of a Labour Govern-
ment resides in the ideological premise 
of not compromising political ideals b~ 
having them tested in practical policy. Yet 
it is essential that the idealism of the 
party and the work of Government be 
brought together in a working relation-
ship between the National Executive 
Con1mittee of the party and a Labour 
Government. 
the national executive 
committee 
At the top ·level of communication, the 
role of the party through the NEC duringthe previous Labour Government of 1964-
70 appears to have been very limited. The 
impression of party officials is that th 
NEC was treated by Labour minister 
generally as simply one more group from 
amongst a whole range of pressure group 
with which the Government had to nego-
tiate, rather than the formal link with 
the party with whom constructive dis-
cussions could be held. Between 1967 and 
1970 the International Affairs Department 
of Transport House prepared n1ore thar 
500 research and position papers for th 
NEC in its discussions with the Govern· 
ment. Yet despite this enormous amoun1 
of solid work the contact apparent!) 
never formed part of a genuine dialogue 
between the Government and the NEC ir 
the formulation of policy. Quite the con· 
trary, ministers together with the ForeigOffice saw their role in these exchange1 
as one of reacting to party criticism al 
they saw fit. The Policy Coordinatior 
Committee which was set up in 1967 tc 
heal the rift between Government an 
party over the whole range of problemsdomestic and foreign, never once dis 
cussed a foreign or defence policy issw 
on the initiative of the Government side 
An NEC proposal in 1968 that the appro 
pria:te ministers should be invited to NEC 
Sub-Committees to discuss various aspect 
of party policy got off to a good §.tar 

when George Thomson attended the 
rnternational Sub-Committee to discuss 
Rhodesia. There was only one such 
meeting. The Prime M.inister vetoed 
further meetings on constitut·ional 
:.rounds. Later, in 1969, a Coordinating: on1mittee of the Cabinet and the NEC 
was set up to try and establish better 
relations between Government and party ; 
this was not particularly successful 
· ecause by this time the relationship 
· etween the -two had suffered from yearsf neglect. 
2onscious efforts could, and should, be 
1a:de to ensure that there i full dis emi-
ation of information about the policies 
f a Labour Government throughout the 
oarty, and full consultation between the 
· ifferent parts of the party structure and 
he Government. Thi chain of com-
munication involves the relation hip 
between the Government and its own 
backbenchers, the Government and the 
'ffiC, and the Government and Tran portHou e, apart from the relation which 
these bodies will have between them-
elves. 
[t is obviously desirable that there should 
be a clear and close relationship between 
a Labour Foreign Secretary and the 
Lnternational Sub-C mmittee of the NEC. 
As the executive body of the party, the 
~Ec occupies the important bridge 
etween a Labour Government and the 
party at large. It should aim to interpret 
the various aspects of Government 
oolicy to the party, and equally it has 
the duty to argue continually the party's 
oint of view before Government mini-
. ters. This function cannot be per-
formed properly if there is not regular 
contact between the NEC and Labour 
, ministers. 
The experience of the prevwus Labour 
Government indicates that this close 
, ·degree of cooperation between the Inter-
national Su·b-Committee and the Foreign 
Secretary did not exist, apart from brief 
interludes. The fault was not entirely on 
the side of the Government. More than 
any other Labour Foreign Secretary,
Lord George Brown sought actively to 
~ngage the party in the policy making 
15 
of the Government. According to him he 
tried on severa:l occasions to establi h 
regular n1eetings with the International 
Sub-Committee, as well as with the 
lnterna-t·ional Affairs Department of 
Tran port House, and the TUC. He 
quickly fom1ed the opinion however that 
they did not want to becmne involved 
because consultation of this kind could 
be construed as sharing responsibi·lity, and 
this view is shared by at least one junior 
minister at the Foreign Office during this 
time. Only the Socialist Interna6onal 
expressed a de ire to con ult regularlywith George Brown during his period a 
Foreign Secretary. 
It is also claimed by orne party starr 
with experience of the working of the 
International Sub-Committee that jtcollective knowledge of international 
affairs i very limited, and that its dis-
cussions are on occasions more con -
cerned with point of party dogma than 
the true nature of international problem . 
onsequently the ommittee does n l 
have the statu and force to parallel its 
forma:l position. This picture of the Com-
mittee is given added substance by the 
fact that it often a:ppear to be capriciou 
in the manner in which it elect inter-
national issues for attention. Again it 
often conveys the impression of being 
more concerned to project is ues with an 
obvious moral appeal, than those which 
bear most heavily upon the interests of 
British policy. This of course is explainedin part by the actual composition of the 
Committee which is based on the need to 
achieve a balance of interests from within 
the Labour m·ovement, rather than nomi-
nating individuals with an interest and 
knowledge of international affairs. In any 
case the parent body, the NEC, is itself 
elected on the basis of representing the 
large formal interests within the party, 
and this process does not automatically 
produce the internationa-l expertiserequired. It is not altogether surprising 
therefore that after a time even the most 
committed La'bour Foreign Secretaryviews the International Sub-Committee as 
an intrusion to be avoided if possible, 
rather than as an important link with 
which to communicate with the party. 
when George Thomson attended the 
rnternational Sub-Committee to discuss 
Rhodesia. There was only one such 
meeting. The Prime M.inister vetoed 
further meetings on constitut·ional 
:.rounds. Later, in 1969, a Coordinating: on1mittee of the Cabinet and the NEC 
was set up to try and establish better 
relations between Government and party ; 
this was not particularly successful 
· ecause by this time the relationship 
· etween the -two had suffered from yearsf neglect. 
2onscious efforts could, and should, be 
1a:de to ensure that there i full dis emi-
ation of information about the policies 
f a Labour Government throughout the 
oarty, and full consultation between the 
· ifferent parts of the party structure and 
he Government. Thi chain of com-
munication involves the relation hip 
between the Government and its own 
backbenchers, the Government and the 
'ffiC, and the Government and Tran portHou e, apart from the relation which 
these bodies will have between them-
elves. 
[t is obviously desirable that there should 
be a clear and close relationship between 
a Labour Foreign Secretary and the 
Lnternational Sub-C mmittee of the NEC. 
As the executive body of the party, the 
~Ec occupies the important bridge 
etween a Labour Government and the 
party at large. It should aim to interpret 
the various aspects of Government 
oolicy to the party, and equally it has 
the duty to argue continually the party's 
oint of view before Government mini-
. ters. This function cannot be per-
formed properly if there is not regular 
contact between the NEC and Labour 
, ministers. 
The experience of the prevwus Labour 
Government indicates that this close 
, ·degree of cooperation between the Inter-
national Su·b-Committee and the Foreign 
Secretary did not exist, apart from brief 
interludes. The fault was not entirely on 
the side of the Government. More than 
any other Labour Foreign Secretary,
Lord George Brown sought actively to 
~ngage the party in the policy making 
15 
of the Government. According to him he 
tried on severa:l occasions to establi h 
regular n1eetings with the International 
Sub-Committee, as well as with the 
lnterna-t·ional Affairs Department of 
Tran port House, and the TUC. He 
quickly fom1ed the opinion however that 
they did not want to becmne involved 
because consultation of this kind could 
be construed as sharing responsibi·lity, and 
this view is shared by at least one junior 
minister at the Foreign Office during this 
time. Only the Socialist Interna6onal 
expressed a de ire to con ult regularlywith George Brown during his period a 
Foreign Secretary. 
It is also claimed by orne party starr 
with experience of the working of the 
International Sub-Committee that jtcollective knowledge of international 
affairs i very limited, and that its dis-
cussions are on occasions more con -
cerned with point of party dogma than 
the true nature of international problem . 
onsequently the ommittee does n l 
have the statu and force to parallel its 
forma:l position. This picture of the Com-
mittee is given added substance by the 
fact that it often a:ppear to be capriciou 
in the manner in which it elect inter-
national issues for attention. Again it 
often conveys the impression of being 
more concerned to project is ues with an 
obvious moral appeal, than those which 
bear most heavily upon the interests of 
British policy. This of course is explainedin part by the actual composition of the 
Committee which is based on the need to 
achieve a balance of interests from within 
the Labour m·ovement, rather than nomi-
nating individuals with an interest and 
knowledge of international affairs. In any 
case the parent body, the NEC, is itself 
elected on the basis of representing the 
large formal interests within the party, 
and this process does not automatically 
produce the internationa-l expertiserequired. It is not altogether surprising 
therefore that after a time even the most 
committed La'bour Foreign Secretaryviews the International Sub-Committee as 
an intrusion to be avoided if possible, 
rather than as an important link with 
which to communicate with the party. 

16 
Nevertheless, if party strife on issues of 
foreign policy is to be kept to a minimum, 
it is necessary that the work of the Inter-
national Sub-Committee should be taken 
more s·eriously, with the Committee for 
its part aiming to acquire greater inter-
national expertise. In support of this role, 
in addition to using the services of the 
International Affairs Department of 
Transport House, the Committee should 
be brought into consultation with the 
political adviser to the Foreign Secretary, 
together with the research panel. And, 
assuming that a Labour Foreign Secretary 
continues the link with the International 
Affairs Department through his political 
adviser, it is important, as suggestedearlier, that this person retains some con-
nection with the work of the Interna-
tional Sub -Committee. Furthermore, 
there should be no objection to the Com-
mittee drawing upon its own foreignpolicy advisers from amongst party sym-
pathisers in academic institutions. This 
has to some extent been the practice in 
the past through the setting up of work-
ing groups composed of staff from 
Transport House, MPs, trade unionists, 
and some academics. These groups have 
looked at particular aspects of foreign 
policy but have tended to operate in a 
rather ad hoc manner instead of being 
part of an organised and consistent pro-
gramm·e. This method of having work-
ing groups should be used more exten-
sively to keep the International Sub-
Committee briefed, which in turn can 
report to its parent body. It remains then 
for liaison between the Foreign Secre-
tary and the NEC to be put on a regular 
footing so that the views of the partyconference and the grass roots member-
ship can be regulady conveyed to the 
government. In this way the partymembership could be made to feel that 
it was playing some constructive part in 
the foreign policy process. 
Transport House 
A policy of inv.olving the party in the 
work of a Labour Government in the 
sphere of foreign policy requires that the 
International Affairs Department of 
Transport House be engaged more 
actively in the process. The reluctance of 
Transport House staff to discard their 
role as exclusive custodians of the party, 
and become involved in promoting the 
work of the Government can be over-
come if it is part of an overall pJan to 
draw the party closer to the work of a 
Labour Government. The Department is 
very well equipped to handle international 
affairs generally, and in some fields is 
better placed than the Foreign Office .to 
advise the Foreign Secretary. For 
example, as we have seen, it is often bet-
ter informed on such matters as Labour 
conditions and industrial relations in 
many countries than .the .traditional em-
bassy sources available to the ForeignOffice. A Labour Foreign Secretary in 
particular could benefit from having this 
kind of information available to him, to 
help balance the orthodox view of the 
Foreign Office and to help him develop a 
wider range of cont£lcts abroad on which 
to build policy. 
With a La.bour Foreign Secretary having 
a political adviser drawn from the st 
of Transport House it should be possible . 
to establish the closest cooperation with 
the International Affairs Department in a 
way which could be beneficial both to 
the Foreign Secretary and to the party 
headquarters. Additionally, as part of this 
process, informal links bebween the Inter-
national Affairs Department and the 
Foreign Office could be cultivated along 
the lines that George Brown encouraged 
when he was Foreign Secretary. I.f this 
were carried out Transport House would 
then be in a position to interpret Govern-
ment policy in a more informed way to 
the constituency parties, which it has not 
been able to do adequately up to now. 
By building and developing these links 
between the party machinery and a Lab-
our Government two objectives would be 
promoted. First, it would help to counter 
the isolation of a Labour Foreign Secre-
tary from the main sources of the party. 
As foreign policy is still seen as a mini-
sterial prerogative and .the impressiongiven is that Labour Foreign Secretaries 
reflect the Foreign Office view in contras 
to the bulk of the party, all methods of 
drawing the Foreign Secretary into a 
16 
Nevertheless, if party strife on issues of 
foreign policy is to be kept to a minimum, 
it is necessary that the work of the Inter-
national Sub-Committee should be taken 
more s·eriously, with the Committee for 
its part aiming to acquire greater inter-
national expertise. In support of this role, 
in addition to using the services of the 
International Affairs Department of 
Transport House, the Committee should 
be brought into consultation with the 
political adviser to the Foreign Secretary, 
together with the research panel. And, 
assuming that a Labour Foreign Secretary 
continues the link with the International 
Affairs Department through his political 
adviser, it is important, as suggestedearlier, that this person retains some con-
nection with the work of the Interna-
tional Sub -Committee. Furthermore, 
there should be no objection to the Com-
mittee drawing upon its own foreignpolicy advisers from amongst party sym-
pathisers in academic institutions. This 
has to some extent been the practice in 
the past through the setting up of work-
ing groups composed of staff from 
Transport House, MPs, trade unionists, 
and some academics. These groups have 
looked at particular aspects of foreign 
policy but have tended to operate in a 
rather ad hoc manner instead of being 
part of an organised and consistent pro-
gramm·e. This method of having work-
ing groups should be used more exten-
sively to keep the International Sub-
Committee briefed, which in turn can 
report to its parent body. It remains then 
for liaison between the Foreign Secre-
tary and the NEC to be put on a regular 
footing so that the views of the partyconference and the grass roots member-
ship can be regulady conveyed to the 
government. In this way the partymembership could be made to feel that 
it was playing some constructive part in 
the foreign policy process. 
Transport House 
A policy of inv.olving the party in the 
work of a Labour Government in the 
sphere of foreign policy requires that the 
International Affairs Department of 
Transport House be engaged more 
actively in the process. The reluctance of 
Transport House staff to discard their 
role as exclusive custodians of the party, 
and become involved in promoting the 
work of the Government can be over-
come if it is part of an overall pJan to 
draw the party closer to the work of a 
Labour Government. The Department is 
very well equipped to handle international 
affairs generally, and in some fields is 
better placed than the Foreign Office .to 
advise the Foreign Secretary. For 
example, as we have seen, it is often bet-
ter informed on such matters as Labour 
conditions and industrial relations in 
many countries than .the .traditional em-
bassy sources available to the ForeignOffice. A Labour Foreign Secretary in 
particular could benefit from having this 
kind of information available to him, to 
help balance the orthodox view of the 
Foreign Office and to help him develop a 
wider range of cont£lcts abroad on which 
to build policy. 
With a La.bour Foreign Secretary having 
a political adviser drawn from the st 
of Transport House it should be possible . 
to establish the closest cooperation with 
the International Affairs Department in a 
way which could be beneficial both to 
the Foreign Secretary and to the party 
headquarters. Additionally, as part of this 
process, informal links bebween the Inter-
national Affairs Department and the 
Foreign Office could be cultivated along 
the lines that George Brown encouraged 
when he was Foreign Secretary. I.f this 
were carried out Transport House would 
then be in a position to interpret Govern-
ment policy in a more informed way to 
the constituency parties, which it has not 
been able to do adequately up to now. 
By building and developing these links 
between the party machinery and a Lab-
our Government two objectives would be 
promoted. First, it would help to counter 
the isolation of a Labour Foreign Secre-
tary from the main sources of the party. 
As foreign policy is still seen as a mini-
sterial prerogative and .the impressiongiven is that Labour Foreign Secretaries 
reflect the Foreign Office view in contras 
to the bulk of the party, all methods of 
drawing the Foreign Secretary into a 

party context should be encouraged.
Though here again it must be said that 
the success of involving the party will 
depend as much upon the will and determination 
of the Foreign Secretary, and 
how important he judges this to be, as 
upon the initiative of the party throughTransport House. Second, the link between 
the International Affairs Department 
and the Foreign Secretary, as partof the general process of cooperation between 
Tran port Hou e and a Labour 
Government wil'l help to create a better 
understanding of the realities of foreign 
policy amongst rank and file membership. 


he Parliamentary Labour 
Party 

Foreign policy is for all practical purposes 
the monopoly of the Executive in 
Britain-that is the Cabinet. More specifically, 
whichever party is in power the 
political control of foreign policy belong 
with the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
Secretary. In large part becau e of the 
repercussions of internationwl events uponthe freedom to handle domestic policy, 
modern Prime Ministers have increasingly 
taken a close interest in foreignaffairs. They have chosen .to do this either 
by assuming virtual control over policythemselves (in Ramsey MacDonald's ca e 
becoming his own Foreign Secretary) or, 
by appointing someone oreign Secretary 
with whom they know they can closelycollaborate. In respect to Labour Cabinets 
this explain Attlee's appointment of 
Ernest Bevin a Foreign Secretary in preference 
to Hugh Dalton, the reputed Lab-
our peciali t on foreign policy at the 
time, and Harold Wil on's initial preference 
for Patrick Gordon-Walker at the 
Foreign Office until his failure to re-enter 
Parliament at a by-election ·made it impo 
ible to retain him in that post. The 
xecutiv,e hold over foreign policy is also 
underlined by the fact that probably more 
than any other democratic state, British 
foreign policy i urrounded by a veil of 

ecrecy. 

All of this is anathema to the democratic 
in tinct of the Labour Party and feeds it 
ong tanding u picion of the " closed 

politics " of the Foreign Office. Yet despite 
the fact that the party .gave much 
attention to the need to democratise 
foreign policy in its early days, it has remained 
surprisingly quiet on this issue 
during the post-second world war Labour 
Governments. There has been a lot of 
disquiet by a large element of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party over aspects of 
successive Labour Governments' foreign 
policy, but this has not crystallised into 
practical suggestions as to how Parliamentary 
control over policy might be increased. 


As early as 1917 in its Memorandum on 
War Aims, the party had expressed itself 
as being strongly in favour of "the placing 
o'f foreign policy, just as much as home 
policy, under the control of popularlyelected legis1atures ". The m-inority Lab-
our Government of 1923-24, consistent 
with this objective started .off with the 
best of intentions, with the aim of subjecting 
its foreign policy to democratic 
control ,by Parliament, but ended up with 
nothing more than the " Ponsonby rule " 
... a guarantee that internationa:l treaties 
.would be brought before the House of 
Commons. Since those days the impact of 
international events upon British domestic 
affairs has increased immeasurably, with 
a corresponding need to coordinate 
foreign policy with domestic objectivesand to bring the House of Commons more 
effectively into the process. Parliament 
has not acquired the powers concurrent 
with this development necessary 
to exercise greater control over foreignpolicy formulation, and a Labour Government 
ought seriously to undertake the 
task of Parliamentary reform in this field. 

A start could be made by putting the 
Labour household in order, beginningwith the Parliamentary Labour Party.
During previous periods of Labour Government, 
the Foreign Secretary has come 
under heavy fire from sections of his own 
backbenchers. Ernest Bevin, Michael 
Stewart and George Brown all experienced 
these attacks, especially from the 
left wing of their own ranks. In this 
sense there ha been no lack of vigilanceby the Parliamentary Party over the 
foreign policy of ucce ive abour Gov



ernments and Foreign Secretaries have 
strongly resented these " stabs in the 
back". It would be easy-too easy in fact 
to do justice to the matter-to portraythese clashes as attributable to Labour 
Foreign Secretaries having been beguiled 
by the Foreign Office. Part of the fault 
lies within the Parliamentary Party itself 
and the way it manages its own affairs 
through its Foreign Affairs Group. In the 
view of the junior minister at the ForeignOffice during the last Labour Government, 
the Foreign Affairs Group was extremely 
dilatory in its approach to foreignpolicy questions. Meetings ·Of the Group 
were not always well attended, and when 
a minister addressed them on some issue 
in foreign policy, there were a few desultory 
questions and the meetings then 
ended with no positive outcome. Clearly 
when Labour is in office, the ForeignAffairs Group's relations with Labour 
ministers at the Foreign Office needs to 
be put on a much more businesslike footing. 
There should be regular .meetings between 
Foreign Office ministers and the 
Group, and the Foreign Secretary himself 
should regard a caH to appear before the 
Group a a priority commitment. 

The Foreign Affairs Group should be 
given an altogether more seriou status 
in the whole process of foreign policy 
discussion with a Labour Government. 
This would help to counter the impression 
that some Labour Foreign Secretaries 
have had, that the Parliamentary 
Party is only interested in foreign policy 
in an episodic way when issues touch 
party principle. Yet foreign policy is very 
much a continuum in which a single event 
or issue is interlocked with a range of 
other interests. Clearly in this sense the 
Foreign Affairs Group has an importantfunction in providing the focus for the 
Parliamentary Party in its relationship to 
the foreign policy of the government. As 
a first step, efforts should ·be made to ensure 
that the Foreign Affairs Group is 
drawn from amongst MPs with a strong 
interest in international affairs, and preferably 
with some expert knowledge, so 
that the Group is a~ble to present an in-
for.med outlook on foreign policy. With 
appropriate members on it the Foreign 
Affairs Group would be in a position to 

systematically examine government policy 
and would require some standing within 
the ranks of the Parliamentary Party. 

To assist it in its work and to ·ensure that 
it is kept well informed, the ForeignAffairs Group should have opportunities 
to regularly visit the Foreign Office, the 
Department of Trade and Industry, the 
Defence Ministry and other relevant departments, 
to discuss policy questions and 
to put their view. This has happened in 
the past but such .meetings have been rare 
and those MPs who took part in them did 
not feel that much notice was taken of 
anything they said. Furthermore, if a 
policy research team is established the 
Foreign Affairs Group should have access 
to their advice and expertise as well as 
that of the political adviser to the Foreign 
Secretary. Closer llaison than ha happened 
hitherto between the Group and 
the International Affairs Department of 
Transport House should al o be encouraged. 
With the general support of 
the Parliamentary Party behind it, the 
Group could achieve an official standing 
that a Foreign Secretary would have to 
regard seriously as representative of the , 
party in the House of Commons. Finally, 
as stated previously, in order to obtain a 
concerted view on key foreign policy 
issues, it is important that there should be 
close association between the NEC and the 
Foreign Policy Group of the Parliamentary 
Party when there is a Labour Government. 
For much the same reason, 
there should be coordination between the 
NEC and the Parliamentary Labour Partyon planning Labour's foreign policy when 
the party is in Opposition. · 

Reference has a1rea·dy been made to the 
need to establish a greater degree of 
Parliamentary control over foreign policy. 
In the first place, a Select Committee on 
Foreign Affairs could be set up as bas 
been done in recent years in selected areas 
of domestic legislation. There is alreadya Select Committee on European Legislation 
in existence, but this deals specifically 
with EEC business, and unlike other 
Select Committees of the House it does 
not examine policy but serves more as a 
clearing house and points out the major 
implications of legislation emanating 


' rom Europe. The advantage of a Com-
. nittee for Foreign Affairs is that it would 
· ,e able to keep the whole range of ex-
, ~rnal affairs under review, and subjecthe more important aspects of Govem-
ent policy to close scrutiny. The Com-
"littee, representative of the whole House, 
hould be provided with adequate powers 
f inquiry and investigation. It would 
. 1ave the right to call before jt and to 
uestion ministers, civil servants and am-
;assadors, and to make recommendations 
o Parliament. As the Committee would 
learly be dealing with matters that affect 
he security of the state, there would 
eed to be some form of security clear-
.nce for members of the Committee. 
~his might be handled in the same way 
s that provided for members of the De-
ence Sub-Committee of the ExpendHure 
~ommittee. 
~he work of such a Committee could be 
\f great value in as erting :the right of the 
·louse of Commons to control and shape, oreign policy. It could be particularly 
tseful in examining the jmp1ications of 
·lolicy for the future, especially if Gov-
rnments made more information avail-
.ble to the House of Commons about 
heir foreign policy goals. Both Labour 
.nd Conservative Foreign Secretarie 
1ave expressed. their irritation at the 
tuality of debate in the House of Com-
nons on foreign policy. Yet the Com-
nons has so little part to play in the field 
f foreign policy in the present day that 
·here is insufficient inducement for MPs to 
oncentrate in this area in a serious way. 
)ne suggestion which has been made is 
hat the Government should issue an an-
mal White Paper on .foreign policy set-
'ing out the Government's :major objec-
ives for the period ahead. An immediate 
1bjection to this, of course, is that the 
nternational system is such a complex of 
1roblems with so many unforeseen ob-
tacles which are beyond the scope of any 
ingle Government to handle, that anytatement in a White Paper would either 
ommit a Government to policies that 
'vould inevitably have to be broken or it 
vould be at such a ievel of generality as 
a o negate the purpose of the exercise. All 
r 1f this is true ; but once the limited and 
g lazardous nature of the exercise is recog-
19 
nised there is some merit in having a clear 
indication of the Government's policies, 
and its listing of the priority issues in the 
form of a White Paper. This would not 
be breaking new ground entirely. The 
Dutch Government, for their part, de-
clared their intention to introduce an an -
nual White Paper on .foreign policy. 
A White Paper looking back over policy 
as well as forward would help to concen-
trate the attention of the House upon the 
relevant i sues for British policy in the 
ensuing debate. In any ca e, it has been 
the convention for the Foreign Secretary 
to make an annual statement to the House 
in which he ummari es the Government' 
policy over the pa t year in relation .t 
key world issues ; but wherea the uc-
ceeding debate has been largely con-
cerned with 1 oking ·back over the Gov-
ernment' record, a White Paper i likely 
to induce a better focus for looking to 
the future. 
In a · ciation with the publication of a 
White Paper on foreign policy the 
Foreign Office might be encouraged to set 
out its idea in particular areas of poUcy 
in the form of Green Papers. The work 
of a Select Committee on Foreign Affair 
together with the House of Commons a 
a whole would be assisted by having this 
sort of policy formulation ·made avail-
able to it. As advance ind.ication of policy 
ideas to other countrie~ has obvious 
drawbacks .for the Government in its 
conduct of external affairs, Green Papers 
would probably have to be confined to 
long term strategies in fields such as 
foreign aid, European defence and the 
United Nations. 
the Labour movement 
We have considered ways in which the 
formal party machinery together with the 
Parliamentary Party might participatemore fully in the work of a Labour Gov-
ernment and Opposition, in the field of 
foreign policy. Over and above this it is 
necessary to look at the relationshiQ be-
tween a Labo7.r Government and the 
whole of the Labour movement. This re-
lationship is in e sence the problem of 
' rom Europe. The advantage of a Com-
. nittee for Foreign Affairs is that it would 
· ,e able to keep the whole range of ex-
, ~rnal affairs under review, and subjecthe more important aspects of Govem-
ent policy to close scrutiny. The Com-
"littee, representative of the whole House, 
hould be provided with adequate powers 
f inquiry and investigation. It would 
. 1ave the right to call before jt and to 
uestion ministers, civil servants and am-
;assadors, and to make recommendations 
o Parliament. As the Committee would 
learly be dealing with matters that affect 
he security of the state, there would 
eed to be some form of security clear-
.nce for members of the Committee. 
~his might be handled in the same way 
s that provided for members of the De-
ence Sub-Committee of the ExpendHure 
~ommittee. 
~he work of such a Committee could be 
\f great value in as erting :the right of the 
·louse of Commons to control and shape, oreign policy. It could be particularly 
tseful in examining the jmp1ications of 
·lolicy for the future, especially if Gov-
rnments made more information avail-
.ble to the House of Commons about 
heir foreign policy goals. Both Labour 
.nd Conservative Foreign Secretarie 
1ave expressed. their irritation at the 
tuality of debate in the House of Com-
nons on foreign policy. Yet the Com-
nons has so little part to play in the field 
f foreign policy in the present day that 
·here is insufficient inducement for MPs to 
oncentrate in this area in a serious way. 
)ne suggestion which has been made is 
hat the Government should issue an an-
mal White Paper on .foreign policy set-
'ing out the Government's :major objec-
ives for the period ahead. An immediate 
1bjection to this, of course, is that the 
nternational system is such a complex of 
1roblems with so many unforeseen ob-
tacles which are beyond the scope of any 
ingle Government to handle, that anytatement in a White Paper would either 
ommit a Government to policies that 
'vould inevitably have to be broken or it 
vould be at such a ievel of generality as 
a o negate the purpose of the exercise. All 
r 1f this is true ; but once the limited and 
g lazardous nature of the exercise is recog-
19 
nised there is some merit in having a clear 
indication of the Government's policies, 
and its listing of the priority issues in the 
form of a White Paper. This would not 
be breaking new ground entirely. The 
Dutch Government, for their part, de-
clared their intention to introduce an an -
nual White Paper on .foreign policy. 
A White Paper looking back over policy 
as well as forward would help to concen-
trate the attention of the House upon the 
relevant i sues for British policy in the 
ensuing debate. In any ca e, it has been 
the convention for the Foreign Secretary 
to make an annual statement to the House 
in which he ummari es the Government' 
policy over the pa t year in relation .t 
key world issues ; but wherea the uc-
ceeding debate has been largely con-
cerned with 1 oking ·back over the Gov-
ernment' record, a White Paper i likely 
to induce a better focus for looking to 
the future. 
In a · ciation with the publication of a 
White Paper on foreign policy the 
Foreign Office might be encouraged to set 
out its idea in particular areas of poUcy 
in the form of Green Papers. The work 
of a Select Committee on Foreign Affair 
together with the House of Commons a 
a whole would be assisted by having this 
sort of policy formulation ·made avail-
able to it. As advance ind.ication of policy 
ideas to other countrie~ has obvious 
drawbacks .for the Government in its 
conduct of external affairs, Green Papers 
would probably have to be confined to 
long term strategies in fields such as 
foreign aid, European defence and the 
United Nations. 
the Labour movement 
We have considered ways in which the 
formal party machinery together with the 
Parliamentary Party might participatemore fully in the work of a Labour Gov-
ernment and Opposition, in the field of 
foreign policy. Over and above this it is 
necessary to look at the relationshiQ be-
tween a Labo7.r Government and the 
whole of the Labour movement. This re-
lationship is in e sence the problem of 

how to manage effectively foreign policy 
formulation, including resolutions from 
the Annual Conference, within a movement 
as diverse and democratic as the 
Labour movement. There never has been 
unity in the movement as a whole on 
major international issues. This is not 
particularly surprising in view of the fact 
that it is not only the Labour party itself 
which is involved but also other interested 
and affiliated groups. Operating on the 
periphery of the Labour movement, and 
in some cases inside, are several organised 
bodies which have included the CND, the 
World Peace Council and the Communist 
Party, all of which seek to influence 
Labour party policy. In several cases 
these bodies have operated as lobbies 
campaigning to influence opinion within 
the constituency parties as well as the 
Parliamentary Party. Their influence 
should not be exaggerated but even so 
they play some part in helping to shapethe climate of opinion in which Labour 

policy is formulated and to this extent 
they add a dimension of fragmentationwhich serves to highlight the problem of 
formulating policy which is acceptable to 
the range. of groups composing the Lab-
our movement. 

More so than with domestic affairs 
foreign policy usually becomes the concern 
of only an active, sometimes vociferous, 
minority inside the Labour party. It 
is perhaps the case that the leadership of 
the party cannot hope to do much more, 
when in Government, than secure the 
support of a sizeable element, with the 
grudging acquiescence of a sufficient 
number of others to make their policy 
viable. This is probably the price that has 
to be paid within any party based upon a 
coalition of left-of-centre interests. However, 
a dedicated minority can have an 
extremely divisive effect upon the party. 

Armed with the faith that it is the custodian 
of the party's socialist conscience, 
the minority focuses upon international 
affairs as the last refuge of socialist ideals, 
and is able on this basis to appeal to a 
larger sector of the party. Primarily for 
this ·reason, foreign policy issues have 
divided the party more intensively, and 
with greater bitterness, than the 

domestic programme; as the issues of the 
rearmament of West Germany, nuclear 
weapons and Vietnam plainly show. 

The difference of view over foreignpolicy which becomes manifest when 
Labour is ·in office is also due to what happens 
when the party is in Opposition. The 
view is still widely held that elections are 

• l 
won and lost on domest1c programmes, 
and consequently the party machine 
gears itself to formulating acceptablecompromises on this front. This argument 
maintains that, by contrast, the 
imperative of election winning is absent 
from foreign policy discussions, with the 
result that any formulation of policy is 
largely aimed at placating the small 
element in the party which organisesitself most effectively for the purpose of 
getting its views accepted at the conference 
and elsewhere. The policy tends to 
be more radical than the general climate 
of opinion in the party, and is most 
certainly in advance of opinion throughout 
the country. However, because such 
policy is thought by the leadership to be 
irrelevant to an election, it is not modified 
and once in Government the party 
leaders, and principally the ForeignSecretary, ignore such policy decisions, 
as they are found to be impracticaL This 
inevitably engenders dissatisfaction with 
the foreign policy of a Labour government 
amongst a wide spectrum of the 
party both in and outside of Parliament. 

A previous Labour Foreign Secretary has 
argued a similar view to this, pointing out 
that the party has no policy worked out 
in Opposition, and that conference decisions 
are unhelpful in this r~spect. Consequently 
Labour Foreign Secretaries have 
a clear hand. There is much truth in this 
view, and a reading ·of the last NEC statement 
A Foreign Policy for Labour, whilst 
generally a well reasoned document, does 
nevertheless reveal in places the difficulty 
of reconciling conference resolutions with 
a balanced presentation of policy. This 
is most obvious in respect to those aspects 
of policy which have obvious economic 
implications. For example, the section on 
Overseas Development in A ForeignPolicy for Labour calls for " a profound 
and radical change in the traditional 


economic, political and military re~lation 
ships 
between rich and poor countries ". 
But then in the section on trade, it is 
stated that " We do not believe that 
opening wide markets to manufactured 
goods for the poorer countries should 
put a disproportionate burden on particular 
groups of British workers ". 

As already mentioned, it may be that this 
division between Labour ministers, 
acutely aware of the limitations placed 
upon British power and influence in the 
world, and the party's ideologuesclamouring for a socialist foreign policy 

· is an inevitable political fact, reflecting 
not only a difference of view but also the 
inherent difference of function between 
the two. But even if this is accepted the 
sharper effects of this division of opinioncould be mitigated by more careful 
attention being paid to establishing a continuous 
dialogue between Government 
and party. Furthermore, this constructive 
relationship should be prepared whilst 
the party is in Opposition, by establishing 
coordination between the NEC and the 
Parliamentary Party. 

·The lesson of all this however, is that the 
party needs to take the whole subject of 
international affairs and British foreign 
policy much more seriously whilst in 
Opposition. And central to this function 
is the NEC and the party conference. Of 
course the role of the party machinery in 
Opposition cannot be entirely dissociated 
from its relationship to the Labour 
leadership. When the party is in office. 
: This relationship bears on the consti. 
tutional question which was first brought 
out into the open with the famous Attlee-
Laski feud of 1945 concerning the a:ppropriate 
role of the party in the affairs of 
a Labour Government. Labour leaders 
' have adhered closely to constitutional 
propriety in order to demonstrate that 
they are not being controlled by the 
dictates of the pa·rty. There is also the 
concern shown by Labour Shadow ministers 
and reinforced whilst in office that 
too much consultation with the Partyorganisation leads only to arid doctrinal 
confrontation. This is one side of the 
question, but it is also fair to say that 
the various parts of the party machinery 

jealously protect the independence of 
their position in relation to Government, 
and are most reluctant to enter into consultative 
arrangements which could be 
construed as sharing responsibility. As we 
have seen, various Labour ministers have 
confirmed that despite efforts by them, 
Transport House and the NEC have 
resisted overtures at cooperation. 

Jn these circumstances a degree of conflict 
is inherent in the relationship between 
a Labour Government and the topechelons of the party machine, which then 
percolates down through the party organisation 
and generates similar conflict at 
all levels. 

The constitutional position need in no 
way be breached if a positive dialogue 
between the NEC and its Sub-Committees 
and Government ministers is en'couraged.
This could develop into a constructive 
two-way process in which the NEC could, 
similarly to Bagehot's dictum, consult, 
advise and warn the Government, whilst 
the Government for its part could explain 
the reasons for its policies. The annual 
Party Conference as the principal means 
of associating the grass roots membership 
with policy formulation also calls for 
attention. The record of Labour PartyConferences in respect to foreign policy 
is a poor testament to the ability of a 
democratic party to produce informed 
and rational discussion. The Conference 
is primarHy concerned with expressing 
party unity by securing endorsement of 
the NEe's programme and the policies of 
the Government when Labour is in office . 
The whole emphasis therefore is toward 
avoiding clashes between the party and 
the leadership and, inevitably, patchwork 
formulas aimed at maximising agreement 
take precedence over the international 
circumstances in which foreign policy has 
to be enacted. 

Very few rank and file members will be 
knowledgeable about the intr.fcacies of 
foreign policy and have only the partyprogramme to guide them. It may also be 
true that foreign policy is the interest 
only of the active ieft wing of the party,
with the majority prepared to accept the 
Government's point of view. It has 


become conventional wisdom to state that 
there is a general lack of interest in 
foreign policy, based upon the view that 
there is a clear distinction between issues 
of foreign policy and domestic affairs, 
and that people are only interested in 
those matters which affect them directly 
in their everyday lives. It is questionable 
whether this division of interest was 
ever really the case, but in the present 
day with the interaction between 
domestic and foreign affairs irrcreasingly 
evident, especially in the fields of monetary 
policy, trade and technology, it is 
clearly untrue. It is incumbent upon those 
responsible for the conduct of affairs 
to show how particular facets of foreignpolicy relate to everyday issues and ultimately 
affect the quality of life at home. 
One of the merits of the NEC statement, 
A Foreign Policy for Labour, is that it 
seeks to make foreign policy objectives 
consistent with the domestic programme, 
and points clearly to the implications of 
particular policies for home affairs. 

The Party Conference could become a 
more effective instrument of control and 
influence on Labour foreign policy. To 
achieve this more time should be made 
available to debate foreign policy at the 
Conference, with more attention given to 
those parts of policy which are clearlyrelated to domestic issues, rather than 
free-ranging across the whole field. 
Assuming that a Labour Government 
goes ahead and produces a White Paper 
on foreign policy, together with Green 
Papers these could provide the parameters 
for debate at the Conference. It 
should also be made possible for the 
Foreign Secretary· when Labour is in 
office to address the Conference whether 
or not he is a member of the NEe. 

·Similarly when in Opposition the party 
should concentrate its attention uponthose aspects of policy which can realistically 
form part of its foreign policy 
objectives. One way of achieving this 
would be to have the Conference divide 
up into working parties across a range of 
legislative fields for one session. It would 
be open to constituency party delegates 
and others to select their working party, 
and the conference could then convene 

as a whole to receive reports from the 
working parties in much the same way as 
other conferences conduct their business. 
In the field of foreign policy the working 
party might take for its agenda the reports 
of study groups set up by the International 
Sub-Committee and the foreignpolicy research team if brought into existence. 
A form of procedure along these 
lines might also help to avoid the 
number of tendentious resolutions which 
the Conference has previously considered 
and passed, which serve only to generate 
antipathy between a La:bour ForeignSecretary and the party because of their 
impractical nature. I'f some of the suggestions 
made here for improving the work 
of the Conference are acted upon, it 
could have a more positive and realistic 
role in the shaping of foreign policy than 
it has had hitherto. 


conclusion 

Labour's success in pursuing a distinctly3ocialist path in its foreign policy will 
depend upon a combination of havingthoroughly prepared its position whilst in 
Opposition, displaying the necessary will 
and determination in following its policies 
in Government, and re-appraising the 
machinery of foreign policy formulation 
to make it fit the task in hand. The NEC 
tatement, A Foreign Policy for Labour, 
which forms the basis of Labour's foreignpolicy, is a valuable contribution to pointing 
the way to Britain's international role. 

n ca:Hing for a foreign policy inspired by 
" the ideals of morality, equality and 
justice ", whilst warning that " a radical 
foreign policy has its costs and consequences 
" the foreign policy statement 
shows a 'blend of idealism and realistic 
assessment. The domestic price and sacrifice 
which is entailed in the pursuit of 
socialist goals in foreign policy need to be 
fully spelt out and dearly understood at 
aH levels of the party. If resolutelyfollowed the policy outlined in A Foreign 
Policy for Labour could point to a new 
style and purpose in the direction of 
British foreign policy. 


At home and overseas circumstances are 
propitious for Labour to carve out a new 
international role for Britain. After a long 
and painful period of disentangling from 
post-imperial commitments abroad, which 
produced its own kind of national psychosis, 
Britain is now in the category of 

, middle powers with interests appropriate 
to that station. One of the achievements 
of the Labour Government of 1964-70, 
whether through force of circumstances 
or not, was that it finally reduced 
Britain's commitments overseas to a level 
n1ore commensurate with national resources. 
And despite the odd gesture, such 
as reinstating a token presence in the Far 
East, this trend was not set back by the 
Conservative Government of Edward 
Heath. In the present day a Labour government 
whilst still confronted by economic 
difficulties of gargantuan proportions, 
including the precarious balance of our 
economic position with the rest of the 
world, nevertheless has more room perhaps 
for manoeuvre in its foreign policy. 
Quite apart from her membership of the 
EEC, the logic of events have determined 

the need to focus British economic and 
defence policy primarily within Western 
Europe. To this extent the circumstances 
which led to the move in the first place 
will continue whether Britain were to 
withdraw from the Community or not, 
but in the world outside of Europe a 
Labour government has the opportunityto fashion its foreign policy in relation to 
key issues. 

It is necessary of course to recognise that 
Britain's influence is very much less in the 
modern world and as A Foreign Policy 
for Labour makes clear a Labour ForeignSecretary cannot be expected " to ride out 
like some international Don Quixote to 
tilt at every windmill ". Even so, within 
the parameters of her present position it 
is still possible for British influence to 
make itself felt within the regional context 
of Europe, and in the wider world 
through international bodies. Also, because 
Britain's interests have been circumscribed 
abroad, it is feasible for a 
Labour government, more so than before, 
to achieve foreign policy objectives compatible 
with the claims of a domestic pro-
gramme. It is precisely over this element 
of manoeuvreability in Britain's foreignpolicy that the essential difference between 
the Labour party and the Conservative 
Government of Edward Heath developed 
over British membership of the 
European Economic Community. The 
Labour Government of Harold Wilson 
basically opted for a European policy, including 
membership of the EEC, but felt 
that in negotiating the terms for entry the 
British Government was fashioning its 
relationship to the continent as a whole. 
Whereas in Opposition a iarge part of the 
Labour party quickly formed the view 
that Ted Heath was prepared to sacrifice 
British independence by submitting to almost 
any terms that the EEC, under 
French aegis, insisted upon. The European 
issue is still potentially schismatic 
for the Labour party because it does 
touch the fundamental roots of its internationalist 
sentiment. But if a balance of 
views can be maintained between the proand anti-Europeans in the party, with 
neither side prepared to commit the party 
to fratricide on the issue, there is a 
reasonable prospect that a Labour Gov



ernment will succeed in re-negotiatingBritain's membership of the EEC. 

In respect to Europe, the demise of 
French predominance in the affairs of the 
Community based upon Gaullist notions, 
and Willy Brandt's departure from the 
scene of German affairs, has ·opened up a 
fresh og_portunity to map out the future 
evolution of the EEC, and not least in respect 
to Community relations with Eastern 
Europe. A Labour Government determined 
to renegotiate terms and playits full part in European affairs is in a 
position to grasp this opportunity ; to see 
not only that British interests are safeguarded 
but also to use British influence 
to establish Labour's ideals within the 
Community. Once it becomes clear that 
the Labour government has succeeded in 
re-negotiating terms with Hs EEC partners,
it will be an opportune moment for Lab-
our to play its full par.t in Community 
affairs by sending delegates to the European 
Parliament. 

At the global level the breaking down of 
the monolithic system created by the 
superpowers during the c·old war, offer a 
much greater role for the middle range 
powers, including Britain, to take initiatives 
and work for common policies. The 
problems are many ; ranking high in the 
list is the need for industrial states to 
agree upon international policies for combating 
inflation and new machinery for 
the international monetary system, establishing 
a new set of rules for the conduct 
of trade between themselves, and adopting 
a common approach toward trade and 
aid programmes with the underdevelopedcountries. The nature of these problems 
demand that narrow views of states' interests 
must be subordinated to an international 
approach, in which Labour's 
policy has a vital role. 

The internal affairs of states in the 
modern world are becoming increasingly 
the concern of the whole international 
community. The overthrow of the dictatorship 
in Portugal and the granting of 
independence to her colonies, the voluntary 
handing over by the Greek colonels 
to a civilian government, and the moves 
by the Smith regime in Rhodesia to come 

to terms with African majority rule, cannot 
be entirely dissociated from the 
effects of collective pressure by the international 
community through the UN and 
other channels. The long standing view 
of the realists that states could continue 
with policies that the internati.onal community 
found objectionable, and remain , 
impervious to international pressures no 
1 onger coincides with the facts of life in 
the international system. Labour's ideals 
of " morality, justice and equality " in the 
relations between states are more likelyto find acceptance in the working of the 
international system than at any previous 

time. 


fabian society 


l'he Fabian Society exists to further 
socialist education and research. It is 
affiliated to the Labour Party, both nationally 
and locally, and embraces all shades 
of Socialist opinion within its ranks-left, 
right and centre. 

Since 1884 the Fabian Society has enroJled 
thoughtful socialists who are prepared to 
discuss the essential questions of democratic 
socialism and relate them to practical 
plans for building socialism in a 
changing world. 

Beyond this the Society has no collective 
policy. It puts forward no resolutions of 
a political character, but it is not an organisation 
of armchair socialists. Its members 
are active in their Labour Parties, Trade 
Unions and Co-operatives. They are representative 
of the labour movement, practical 
people concerned to study and discuss 
problems that matter. 

The Society is organised nationally and 
locally. The national Society, directed by 
: an elected Executive Committee, publishes 
pamphlets, and holds schools and conferences 
of many kinds. Local Societies-
there are one hundred of them-are self 
governing and are lively centres of dis


. cussion and also undertake research. 

Enquiries about membership should be 
sent to the General Secretary, Fabian 
Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London. 
SW1H 9BN ; telephone 01 -930 3077. 

the author 

Rodney Fielding i Head of the Department 
of Modern Studies at Trent Polytechnic 
and was formerly PrincipaiLecturer in International Studies at 
Lanchester Polytechnic. He went to 
Ruskin College, Oxford, on a Robert 
Addy Hopkinson Scholarship in 1954 and 
later graduated at the ~n international 
relations. His study of British foreignpolicy includes a Master of Philo ophy 
degree from Su sex University on the 
career of Sir Norman Angell. Rodney 
Fielding is the author of Fabian Tract 
401, A socialist foreign policy? and is 
chairman of the Coventry Fabian Society. 

Cover design by Dick Leadbetter. Printed 
by Civic Press Limited (Tu), Civic Street, 
Glasgow, G4 9RH. 

I BN 7163 0433 3 


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