fabian tract 426 
adm.nistrative reform: 
the next step 

contents 1 lntroductaon 

2 proposaIs for reform 

3 summary of 

recommendations 


{ 

{ 


this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Societ~ 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only thE 
view of the individuals who prepared it. The responsibility o 
the Society is limited to approving publications it issue 
as worthy of consideration within the Labour movemen1 
Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London SW1 H 9BN 
November 1973 ISBN 7163 0426 f 


1. introduction 
Many changes in the management and 
machinery of government have been proposed 
in the last few years. The 
Committee on the Civil Service (theFulton Committee) sat from 1966 to 1968 
and produced a report (Cmnd 3638, June, 
1968) which recommended a number of 
important reforms, mainly in the fields 
of personnel management, planning and 
' managerial accountability, some of which 
appeared to accepted by the Labour 
Government. Since then, the Conservative 
Government has introduced changes,

• mainly 
in forms of departmental organisation, 
in pursuit of its " new style of 
government." In this pamphlet we 
examine the purpose and effect of the 
most important of these developments
. and suggest 
some directions for future 
reform. 

However, our concern is not only with 
administrative efficiency and effectiveness 
but also with the need in a democracy to 
make the activities of central adminii 
stration as open as possible to publicdebate. Last year's Franks Committee 
· Report (Departmental Committee on 
· section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, 1911. 

Report, Cmnd 5104, September, 1972) 
· dealt with aspects of this question. 

THE FRANKS REPORT 

. One of the conclusions of the Fulton 
Committee was that the administrative 

. process was surrounded by too much 
secrecy (Committee on the Civil Service, 
vol 1, para 277). It pointed to the advantages 
from greater openness which it 
believed would improve the quality of 
decisions and proposed an enquiry into 
the ending of unnecessary secrecy and a 
review of the Official Secrets Act. Following 
on this the Franks Committee was set 
up and reported in September 1972. 

A particular problem with secrets lies in 
their multiplying nature: one secret pro. 
duces another. They have a penumbra
around them producing a wider area of 
lesser secrets which themselves have to be 
protected. The result is that there is so 
much . that is secret, confidential or restricted 
that Ministers have frequently 


been unsure what is public knowledge and 
what is not. Given the all-embracing 
nature of section 2 of the Official Secrets 
Act, which throws a blanket of securityover all operations of the Civil Service, a 
change in the law has become essential. 
Repeatedly in the House of Commons 
and elsewhere present and past governments 
have protested their desire for 
openness. In a memorandum submitted 
by the First Division Association to the 
Franks Committee (op cit, vol 1, p 217) 
this body representing top administrators 
in the Civil Service " strongly favoured 
openness." It is often puzzling that so 
many speak in favour of openness and yetthere is still such excessive concern with 
secrecy. We believe that the main requirement 
for secrecy comes from within the 
Civil Service itself. As a result of it theyare better able to control events ; outside 
influences matter less and decisions can 
be unhurried. The public too, can be prepared 
by judicious leaks prior to the 
eventual announcement. Information 
officers within the Civil Service are 
anxious to carry out what they call a 
"prime task" (ibid. vol 2, p 231) of 
conveying official information on a non-
attributable basis to members of the press. 
So long as basic information is restricted 
to the Civil Service then only they are able 
to decide on the particular issue under 
consideration. To control'this information 
is to control the argument and so to J. 
control the decision. 

There are two main kinds of secrecy. The 
secrecy of government's actions and 
intentions and the secrecy of the infor·
mation it has concerning the affairs of 
· individuals in such matters as taxation,
social security and employment. In the 
· case of information concerning individuals 
security is essential. On the other hand, in 
i our view much of the security surrounding 
government's actions and intentions is not 
necessary. It is indicative of the disappointing 
nature of the Franks Report 
. that the argument for openness put in the 
first paragraph is the tepid, even patronis, 
ing, comment that " the concern of 
. democratic governments is that infor


mation is widely diffused for this enables 
citizens to play a part in controlling their 
common affairs." 


The Report is a defence of private 
argument and deliberation by civil servants 
and the selection as Chairman of an 
ex-Permanent Secretary probably, as Mr 
Sam Brittan has commented, helped in the 
production of a report the Civil Service 
wanted. In it there is even an attempt to 
defend the present system by claiming how 
large is the amount of information given 
by Government and stating that section 2 
of the Official Secrets Act is not " the 
most restrictive law in any democracy " 
since some of the Commonwealth 
countries have similar laws (ibid, report, 
para 84). 

One of the persistent themes runningthrough the Franks Report is the fear of 
a lowering of the quality of Government 
(ibid report, para 182) associated with the 
loss of frank discussion within the Civil 
Service (ibid, report, para 177). What is 
not weighed against this is the gainobtainable by informed discussion in a 
democracy where all talents may be 
available for comment and criticism. As 
the Report says " the governing factor in 
considering the need for protection is the 
seriousness of the damage that a leak 
would cause rather than the likelihood of 
leakage" (ibid, report para 185). The 
difference in view between the Franks 
Committee and ourselves is that we 
believe that the danger caused by leaks 
other than in the fields of defence and 
personal privacy are usually less than the 
gain that would be attainable from a wider 
and better informed discussion of the 
issues. 

The problem of the discussion of secrecyis that one's view of secrecy determines · 
the conclusion. If one believes, as manycivil servants do, '"that a calm discussion 
of problems relatively free from outside 
pressures is more important than the contribution 
an informed society can make 
to the discussion then the damage done to 
Government by leaks is large. The Franks 
Committee decided this at an early stage 
and its conclusions inevitably followed. 
This Committee should have started byaccepting that the existing level of secrecywas intolerable, it should have illustrated 
the consequences of this level and should 
have pointed to the areas where much 

greater openness was necessary. Professor 
Wade, Professor of English Law at 
Oxford University, in his memorandum 
to the Committee, wished to see not onlythe ending of the Official Secrets Act but 
wanted it replaced with legislation which 
would positively assist the public to 
obtain information about government. He 
quoted President Johnson's remark when 
signing the America Act: "A democracyworks best when the people have all the 
information that the security of the 
nation permits." Professor Wade suggested 
an Act of Parliament which should lay 
down the principle of " the public's right 
to know" (ibid, vol 2, p 241) and that 
unreasonable refusal of information to 
someone seeking it should be a case of 
" maladministration " which could be 
investigated by the Parliamentary Commissioner 
or some other body. 

We support legislation on these lines and · 
believe that it should apply not only to 
central government but to all publicbodies. 


2. proposals for reform 
THE MINISTER AND HIS 
ADVISERS 

A minister inherit a department which 
ha a rna ive policy momentum ( r 
.inertia) of its own and a body of civil 
servants who are inevitably concerned to 
r maintain it. A minister who tries to intro-
r duce a change in the direction of policy is 
therefore faced with well argued submissions 
as to the difficulties which are 
likely to arise if he pursues the matter. 

l-Ie may feel · dedicated to a pursuit of 
means of resolving these difficulties, and 
he will not be opposed if he is, but usually 
he can devote much less time and effort to 

attempting to change the department'sdirection than to dealing with the pressure 
of day to day case work and crises. Even 

· a powerful minister has difficulty in takingon the Civil Service and arguing throughhis ideas for change except on a verylimited number of issues. The minister 
therefore requires assistance to combat 
the arguments against change. This 
assistance must be provided by people of 
t.echnical authority, who understand the 
minister's mind and who are dedicated to 
seeing his policies through. 

Any solution to this problem must copewith the inescapable fact that in any 
government there are both weak and 
transient ministers. Weak ministers are 
frequently appointed because of a need 
to recognise their status in the party,
·because they represent a particular point 
'of view, or power group, within the party 
or because they have faithfully served the 
Prime Minister in some past internal 
crisis. They may be representative of a 
region or even an age group. Given the 
number of MPs of the government partythis places a considerable restriction on 
the choice of ministers. 

, Transient ministers also weaken the performance 
of a government. Ministerial 
lives are usually very short and their effective 
period in office is reduced by the time 
they take 'to learn the job and the period 
in which they are expecting a change. All 
this requires that any system or structure 
within a department for presentinghoi e to a minister for decision has t 

pr vide for alternatives which can be 

examined and selected by a strong mini


ster as well as provide advice to a minister 

who is not so well able to argue to a 

nclu ion o many of the daily matter 

which will come before him . 

We shall consider the use of a ministerial 
cabinet of personal advisers, the use of 
junior ministers and the development of 
closer links between the Civil Service and 
future ministers. 

personal advisers 

The Fulton Committee proposed that in 
most departments there should be senior 
policy advisers who should lead planning 
units and should not be below DeputySecretary in rank. (Committee on the 
Civil Service, vol 1, para 182.) A policy 
adviser should have direct and unrestricted 
access to the minister and 
should be free to determine after consultation 
with, and subject only to the 
approval of, the minister what problems 
his planning unit should tackle. On 
occasions he might be appointed by the 
minister from outside the Service to givea new impetus to its forward thinking but 
more often he would be a career civil 
servant with long experience and expert 
knowledge of the field covered by the 
department. 

A number of commentators on this 
recommendation doubted the wisdom of 
an arrangement whereby an appointeewith responsibility for departmental long 
term planning reported not to the official 
head of the department but to the minister. 
Such an arrangement would have the 
disadvantage, so often encountered in 
corporate planning systems, of formallyseparating long term planning from the 
management of day to day operations. On 
the other hand, we believe in the value of 
'personal advisers to ministers, selected by 
them and usually brought in by them 
from outside the Service. In our view 
these should be short-term appointments, 
filled by people who are specialists in 
important aspects of the work of departments 
and who are sympathetic to the 
view and aim of the minister. They 


4 


I I 
should not have large staffs, or be concerned 
with the management of the planning 
processes of departments~ but should 
act as ministerial confidants, capable of 
acting as "sounding boards" for ministers' 
ideas, drafting policy papers and 
producing inputs to the department's long 
term planning system. 

These " in and outers " could providevaluable ministerial support. There is 
always the risk, of course, either that theywould be resisted or shut out by departmental 
officials or that they would be 
absorbed by the department and unable 
to give the minister detached advice. In 
our view, as long as their role is defined 
and understood and their appointment is 
temporary, they could meet the needs of 
ministers for an alternative view and 
could strengthen his department's skills 
in policy evaluation and analysis. 

junior ministers 

In our view, the potentialities of juniorministers in departments are rarely used 
to the full. The practice now in giantdepartments (for example, in the Department 
of Trade and Industry) is to divide 
responsibility between several ministers 
but we believe they need to be considered 
as part of a team with junior ministers 
generally being given greater responsibilities 
in, for example, the direction of 
particular areas of management and 
policy review and in working with civil 
servant · in the proce of policy f rmulation. 


the civil service and the 
opposition 

A recurring feature of recent governments 
ha been that governments are obligedradically to change the directi n f th ir 
policie after ab ut two year · in power. 

hi , of course, is most blatantly obvious 
in the case of the pre ent government but 
it was also true of the last Labour 
Government. It i at about the two year 
mark that a government comes face to 
face with the realities of its economic, 
indu trial and s cial environm nt and has 

to re-examine those policies produced with 
a greater regard to ideology than to their 
practicability. The country pays a heavy 
price for educating its governments. In 
our view, one reason for this is that there 
is very little contact between opposition 
leaders and the Civil Service. ~An opposition 
and their policy forming committees 
should have the opportunity to test out 
their ideas on policy and, particularly, on 
how to implement policy in discussions 
with senior civil servants. This need not, 
and indeed ought not, to blunt anyopposition's reforming zeal. Such an 
arrangement would be valuable both to 
the future Ministers of a radical government 
and to the civil servants who would 
be serving them. ~ 

A PRIME MINISTER'S 
DEPARTMENT 

There are strong arguments for the 
establishment of a Prime Minister's 
Department, concerned with carrying out 
studies of major strategic policy issues 
and with the highest level of efficiencystudies within the Civil Service. The 
argument that this places too much powerin the hands of the Prime Minister can be 
met by greatly strengthening existingcountervailing agencies. The Select Committees 
on Expenditure should be supported 
by full time paid expert ad~isers 
and with access to all the information they 
require properly to challenge departments, 
including the Prime Minister's Department. 
For years, select committees have 
been denied both. Later in this pamphlet 
we advocate a radical strengthening of the 

cope, authority and independence of the 
Exchequer and Audit Department. Our 
rec mmendation f r greater p nne in 
g v rnment w uld 1 . erve thi end. 

efficiency studies 

The Fulton Committee recommended the 
e tablishment of a Civil Service Department 
to undertake the central management 
of the Civil Service and to be " in a 
po ition to fight, and to be seen to be 
fighting, the Treasury on behalf of the 
Service" (ibid, para 252). The new 
partm nt mbined th " pay an 1 


nanagement " side of the Treasury and 
he Civil Service Commission and was 
teaded by a permanent secretaryles.ignated Head of the Home Civil 
)ervice. The Prime Minister is ultimately 
·esponsible for the Department. It con:
ists of divisions concerned with personnel 
.ervices, selection, pay and grading and 
nanagement services (that is, management 
:onsultancy). 

)ince its formation, the management serrices 
divisions of the department have 
~rown in size and status, much as the 
;:;ulton Committee envisaged, and now 
1ndertake efficiency studies at a higherevel than their predecessors in the 
freasury. Rather than being primarily 

·;oncerned with studies of clerical 
~fficiency, the Department's management:ervices groups now undertake " managenent 
reviews " or -organisation studies of 
iizeable units of departments (for 
~x:ample, the Central Office of Infer-
nation, the Prison Department) and have 
~reatly increased their competence in such 
treas as management by objectives, the 
Jehavioural sciences, operational research 
and the development of large scale data 
Jrocessing and information systems. How~
ver, these services are usually provided 
LO departments on request. Inevitably, the 
most progressive departments request 
:hem while some departmental backwaters 
:tre never subjected to expert scrutiny or 
:tdvice. 

[n a later section of this report we 
xiticise the "establishments concept" in 
:he Civil Service which treats efficiency 
;tudie , manpower cost contr 1 and per;
onnel managen1ent a a ing1e functi n 
1nd we adv cate their separati n. 

fhi argument applie to the Civil Service 
Department and in our view it should be 
~econ tituted as a Department of Per;
onnel-as Harold Laski propo ed thirty 
vears ago (H. J. Laski in Passed to youPlease by J. P. W. Mallalien, Gollancz, 
1942)-while the management services 
clivision should pass to a Prime Minister's 
Department where they would carry the 
weight they require to have an impact on 
the least progressive managerial elements 
in government. They should al o continue 

to provide their services on request and 
carry out research and development in 
management techniques of wide applicability. 


policy studies 

One of the innovations of the present 
Government has been the creation of a 
Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS). This 
unit has been set up in the Cabinet Office 
under Lord Rothschild to work for 
Ministers collectively and is under the 
supervision of the Prime Minister. Its 
task is to relate individual departmental 
policies to the government's strategy as a 
whole and to see that the implications of 
alternative courses of action are fully considered. 
It appears that it carries out 
studies of policy issues which involve 
more than one department or which 
involve basic questions of government 
strategy and provides an alternative and 
objective view to that of the Treasuryand other departments. Such issues have 
been Concorde, regional policy, government 
support for the computer industry 
and the organisation and managementof government research and developmentprojects. 

In general, there seems to be a need for 
a body such as the CPRS, particularly if 
it is under the wing of the Prime Minister 
and can resist Treasury dominance. It is 
more likely to be effective if it is constituted 
as part of a Prime Minister's 
Department. It can present the Prime 
Minister with alternative arguments from 
those he receives from interested depart· 
ments and can relate the policies and 
pending plans being pushed by departments 
to overall government plans. 

Opponents of the arrangement point to 
the way in which it strengthens the Prime 
Minister's position at the expense of other 
ministers and acts as a strong influence 
for the centralisation of power. In our 
view, the presence of such a body can act 
as a much needed stimulus to departments 
to improve the quality of the analytical 
justification for their expenditure plans 
and provided its field is restricted to cross 
departmental i sues and major national 


issue departmental p wer need not 
necessarily be undermined. 

POLICY PLANNING 

ince the Plowden Report of 1961 (Reportof the Committee on the Control of 
Public Expenditure, Cmnd 1342, July,
1961), the Civil Service has operated the 
Public Expenditure Survey, a five yearplanning system which relates spending 
programmes to prospective re ources. 

Every year, departments submit five year 
plans to the Treasury, distinguishingbetween expenditures to which they are 
committed by past decisions and 
additional programmes which could be 
undertaken if more resources were made 
available. The Public Expenditure Survey 
Committee of officials prepares a reportshowing the costs of present and alternative 
policies and this is submitted to 
ministers together with the Treasury'smedium term assessment of the economy. 

Since December 1969 the Public Expenditure 
Survey has been published, showing 
p~anned expenditure under functional 
headings (for example, law and order, 
defence, health and welfare) for the past 
year and for five years forward together 
with elements of the medium term 
economic assessment. 

Though the public expenditure survey was 
a vast improvement on what passed for 
national expenditure planning before it 
was introduced, ~ the system is not 
now advanced by international standards. 

It is inadequately supported by research, 
analysis and evaluation and does not 
provide a suitable base of information for 
the consideration of the costs and benefits 
of alternative courses of action nor for 
the consideration of the interactions 
between the plans of different departments 
and the production of an overall government 
strategy. The present government 
has therefore introduced two developments 
aimed at improving the system: 
the CPRS referred to in the last section and 
a procedure called Programme Analy is 
and Review (PAR). 

.PAR_ i a modest atte1npt t improve the 
policy research and analysis processes of 
departments. It is distantly related to the 
Programme Planning and Budgeting 

y tern (PPBS) introduced by Robert McNamara 
in the u Department of Defence 
in 1961 and since extended throughout us 
government and introduced in manyforeign governments and some British 
local authorities. PPBS involves classifying 
all departmental spending into pro-
grammes, that is categories which display 
the aims of the expenditure (for example, 
the ~~duction of drug dependency, the 
prov1s10n of recreation opportunities,
craft training for the unemployed, the 
rehabilitation of run down areas) as 
distinct from the traditional division of 
expenditure into votes, sub-heads and 
items of expenditure. It then involves the 
measurement of the effectiveness or 
impact of current expenditure and compares 
this with the apparent needs of the 
community as a whole and of specificgroups (the elderly, one parent families, 
the long term unemployed) in each pro-
gramme or sub-programme area. The next 
stage is to consider which programmes 
require high priority action and what 
measures could be taken to close the gap 
between the present level of provision and 
the need. This involves substantial analyti-· 
cal eff,ort, particularly in programmesselected as "key issues," aimed at findingthe most cost effective route to closing the 
gap. The political decision maker selects 
key issues, est:ablishes programmepriorities and objectives and these are 
translated into long term plans and first 
year budgets for submission to the 
Treasury, the Cabinet and the Legislature. 
The Cabinet or the Treasury usually has 
an evaluation body, analogous to the CPRS, 
to vet the submissions of depart1nentsand to carry out the analysis of supra-
departmental issues. PPBS has run into 
innumerable troubles in Washington but 
currently is the subject of much development 
work which promises to create a 
very valuable advance in public expenditure 
planning and control, with useful 
lessons for British government. 

The initial failures of PPBS in American 
central government are attributable to the 
attempt to force it upon department and 


agencies in a very short time, to too great 
an emphasis upon quantification and too 
little upon reliable analysis, to over-laying 
it on the existing systems ·of budgeting and 
appropriation without adequately con·
..sidering the scope for rationalising the 
two systems and to Congressional suspicion 
of changes in the forms in which 
the Executive displayed expenditure (John 
Garrett, "Creaks in the us Model," 
Financial Times, 29 September, 1970). 

Later developments have aimed at 
improving the quality of analysis by concentrating 
upon few issues and at improving 
the link between planning and 
management so that a single fund of 
information can be used for definingobjectives, programmes and pians, for 
seeking appropriations from the Legislature 
and for n1easuring managerial performance. 
A similar line of developmentin British government would require a 
massive reform in the accounting and 
information systems in departments. 
PAR i apparently a procedure akin to the 
i sue analysis equence of PPBS : an area 
of departmental expenditure is chosen for 
examination and a report on its apparent 
results and value is produced by the 
department for a Cabinet committee. Anychanges which are approved as a result 
of the report are fed into the next cycle 
of the public expenditure survey. Given 
the pre ent state of n1anagement inforn1ation 
and the availability of analyticaltaff within department a procedure like 
PAR i about a far a department can go 
at pre ent in the systematic evaluation and 
control of expenditure but our view is that 
substantial re earch and developmentwork hould be carried ut in this field 
not only a a mean of prmnoting better 
management in department but to enable 
Parliamentary Committees to examine the 
effectiveness of departmental spending. 
The Select Committee n Procedure of 
1968-69 re ommended the introduction of 
" output budgeting " (that is, PPBS) into 
departments : "by etting out the activities 
of departments in the fom1 of oosted 
programme over a number of year , 
directed towards tated objectives, it will 
enable the House to weigh the objectives 
selected by departments against possible 
al·ternatives. Second, the development of 

output budgeting will increase the possibilities 
of assessing department'sefficiency in setting objectives and their 
measure of success in realising them and 
the information derived from costed 
programmes of objectives will be complementary 
to the projections of expenditure" 
(Select Committee on Procedure 1968-69, 
Report, para 22). The third and eighth 
reports of the Expenditure Committee in 
1971 and 1972 repeated this request " f·or 
information about the outputs which projected 
expenditures are expected to provide 
and how this provision relates to 
policy objectives " (Expenditure Committee, 
Third Report Session 1970-71 , He 
549, para 43). 

We realise that planning and control by 
programm·e will have to take different 
forms in different departments. Some pro-
gramme categories are wholly managed 
by departments from policy origination to 
output (for example, social security,
defence, prisons, immigration, customs)
while others provide res·ources which are 
managed by external organisations (e.g. 
health, police, housing, education) and 
on1e managerial units in departmentshandle a number of different programmes 
(for example, social secudty offices and 
employment exchanges). There are, therefore, 
difficulties in many areas in relating 
the programme structure to the 
n1anagement tructure. There areal o coniderable 
pr blem in mea uring the effecttvene 
of, and community needs f r, 
orne ervice . Neverthele , we believe 
that tep should be taken to displaydepartmental expenditures -in programme 
term and wherever pos ible to attach to 
the programme tructure measure of 
effectivene , measure of need and the 
analytical ba is for particular programme 
·and priorities. There hould also be reearch 
into the scope for matching the 
programme structure to the structure of 
managerial authority and accountability 
within departments, so that individual 
manager can be held accountable for pro-
gramme results. In addition, the analytical 
capability of departments require to 
be massively up-graded: the groupsemployed by departments on policyresearch and planning, on oost analyses, 
on improving the information base on 


which decisions are made are till t 
small and insufficiently integrated into the 
policy making process and the experience 
and training of senior administrators in 
quantification and ·analysis is woefullyinadequate. As Fulton's consultancy group 
said: " the top managers in the government 
service in the future ... will have 
to be able to handle more variables than 
can be expressed in the traditional essay 
by which the top echelons of the Service 
now usually analyse and judge policy 
options; they will have to think constantly 
in terms of quantification of benefit 
interms of quantified costs" (Committee 
on the Civil Service, vol 2, para 376). 

INFORMATION SYSTEMS 


Government accounting is based on the 
rules of the supply procedure which has 
not been radically altered for over 100 
years. Bids for funds are passed bydepartments to the Treasury and when 
they are agreed these are presented as 
estimates to the House of Commons. 
When the estimates are passed byPadiament they are known as votes and 
at the end of the financial year appropriation 
accounts are published showing the 
amount expended. 

The major criticisms of the supplyprocedure are : 

1. The estimating procedure is not 
sufficiently rigorous. Unlike the practice 
in a good budgetary control system, the 
spending departments and their constituent 
units are not asked to specify their 
objectives and then to justify the expenditure 
they require to achieve them but they 
simply put up a bid for funds on a simple 
incremental (last year + x per cent) basis. 
One half of the budgeting process : a 
statement of the level of performanceaimed at by the expenditure, is missing. 
2. Justification for an estimate in, for 
example, a technical area of expenditureis discussed between laymen in the department's 
Finance Division and laymen in the 
Treasury so that penetrating questions as 
to the technical arguments for the 
expenditure are rarely asked. 
he House of ommons devote ve y 
little time to the examination of estimate , 
"supply days" having become "opposition 
days " to be used for debates on 
matters of policy. The new Select 
Con1mittee on Expenditure is now 
empowered to examine the expenditure 
strategies of department and to assess 
departmental efficiency but the effectiveness 
of this arrangement will depend uponthe quality of information provided to 
them by departments. The Eighth Report. 
of the Expenditure Committee observed' 
that " we have been left in no doubt that 
the system of information necessary for1 
resource accountability does not at presentexist; this means that neither the Government 
nor Parliament nor the public can 
at present be supplied With the material 
necessary for any systematic discussion or 
evaluation " (op cit, para 8). 

4. The presentation of estimates and 
votes cannot be used to jllustrate departmental 
effi"iency or effectiveness. Evidence 
to the Select Oommittee on Procedure of 
1968-69 pointed out that: "Expenditureis not subdivided in a way which corresponds 
to managerial responsibility. The 
vote heads and sub-heads usually reveal 
nothing of the cost of organisational units 
nor of particular activities. The subdivisions 
of the vote identify departmental 
salaries and the basic salary bill of 
divisions and branches; grants and assistance 
to outside bodies and, by way of 
note, services provided by other departments 
(for instance, stationery and building 
maintenance). Though small items 
within the vote can be identified, it is not 
possible to identify the total cost of running 
large divisions, branches or regional 
or local establishments except by ad hoc 
investigation. Vote accounting also tells 
n1anagement nothing of the costs of 
operating policies or departmental functions 
on which expenditure is classified 
under different vote sub-heads (that is,
expenditure on salaries, buildings,
utilities, stationery, postage and printing, 
equipment and payments to outside 
bodies)." (John Garrett and H. R. N. 
Jamieson, " Control of public expenditure: 
The need for new managementsystems," Select Committee on Procedure, 
session 1968-69, p 169-70). The 

;a h ba i ace unting, the la k 
; rnparative data and the different form 
Jf classification of the estimates and the 
ive year expenditure urvey also greatly 
imit the usefulnes f the procedure f r 
tccurate oo t control. 

fhe qu ted evidence t the elect ' on1nrttee 
on Procedure concluded that 
' departmental expenditure control pro;
edures appear to be adequate to demon;
trate the stewardship of funds to 
~arliament but they are not supported by 
m analytical sub-structure which permits 
he use of modern management systems 
)f pl1anning and control :• (ibid). 

fhe fact is that the supply procedure does 
1ot provide information which can be 
1sed by the management of departments 
:o set objectives or to monitor its own 
Jerformance nor does it provide infornation 
by which Parliament or its comnittees 
can take a view of departmental.Jficiency or effectiveness. 

fhe Treasury and the Exchequer and 
1\.udit Department have never yet felt any 
1eed to reform it in spite of years of 
;riticism and in our view it is high time 
nassive modernisation took place. 

fhe principles behind this modernisation 
>hould be: 

l. Departmental long term spendingJlans should be displayed to the House 
.......ommons and the Select Committees as 
Ear as possible in programme terms, showing 
the capital and revenues to be devoted 
:o each programme, the objectives of each 
Jrogramme, past results against past
bjectives and the analytical justification 
Eor programme developments ; 

2.. Annual estimates, votes and approL1iation 
account should relate both to 
rogrammes and to managerial " centre " 
within departments o as to demon trate 
the accountability of departmental 
managers. In some cases programmes and 
centres will coincide, in others it will be 
worth reforming organi ati'on structures 
to make them coincide but in some cases 
this will ·require accounts in both the pro-
gramme and accountability dimensions. 

With these ref rm , wh!ich can b w rked 
t wards over some years, we c uld ee 
the emergence of an effective control 
system for departmental financial 
expenditure. 

HIVING OFF AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 


The process of merging departments has 
continued under the present government, 
which has created the Departments of 
Health and Social Security, Trade and 
Industry, the Environment and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The 
reasons for these mergers were stated at 
the vime as being to develop a single 
strategy for clearly defined objectives ; to 
resolve conflicts within the line of managenlent 
rather than by interdepartmental 
compromise; to manage large programmes 
within departmental boundaries makingpossible more effective delegation ; to 
facilitate the application of analytic techniques 
; to offer more direct identification 
to the community of Ministers and 
departments responsible for defined functions 
and to contribute more effectively to 
the government's overall strategy" (TheReorganisation of Central Government 

Cmnd 4506, October, 1970). All these are 
praiseworthy aims, but virtually impossible 
without better management information 
and planning systems. 

In our view, the merger of departn1ents 
with clo ely allied interests can make for 
jmprovements in co-ordination and a 
more systematic look at related spending 
programmes : the Department of the 
Environment is a case where benefit is 
ljkely to result. On the other hand, there 
is no evidence of much ~nergy from the 
merger of Health and Social Security and, 
on recent evidence, the range of activities 
encompassed by the Department of Trade 
and Industry appears to be too great for 
any one Mini ter to handle satisfactorily. 

accountable units of 
government 

In parallel with creation of giant departments, 
the Government has attempted a 
policy of hiving off elemenrts of departments 
as public bodies outside the Civil 


Service and setting up, within departn1ents, 
some units with delegated powers 
as "departmental agencies" or" accountable 
units of government." The Civil 
Aviation Authority has been hived off (as 
was the Post Office Corporation in 1969)
and the Supplies Division of the DOE, the 
Organisation for Defence Procurement 
and Civil Aerospace, the Property Services 
Agency, the Central Computer Agency, 
the employment services activities and the 
Professional and Executive Register of the 
Department of Empl,oyment and the 
Industrial Development Executive have 
apparently been constituted as departmental 
agencies. A national TrainingAgency is promised within the Department 
of Employment. 

The argument for hiving off is that 
autonomous public corporations, outside 
the day to day control of Ministers and 
the scrutiny of Parliament, can have 
greater freedom to manage their affairs 
without being pestered by Parliamentaryquestions and Ministers' cases and can 
develop forms of organisation and staffing 
to suit their needs rather than complywith Civil Service wide conventions. We 
can see that there could be some areas of 
almost wholly executive work (forinstance, the Mint, the dockyards, the 
Company Registrar, the Passport Office) 
for which a case could be made for hivingoff but these are largely areas which 
attract little Parliamentary interest anyway. 
If they were given greater freedom 
in their ·organisational and t·affing 
arrangements (which would have been 
facHitated by Fulton's unified gradingstructure) we do not see any great advantage 
in hiving them off but we do ee 
disadvantages in removing their activitie 
from Parliamentary scrutiny without 
replacing this by any other form of publicaccountability. Our observations on 
strengthening the State Audit are of 
relevance to this question. 

The Fulton --Committee recommended 
" that the principles of accountable 
management should be applied to the 
work of departments. Where measures of 
achievement can be established in quantitative 
or financial terms and individuals 
held responsible for output and costs, 

accounvable units should be set up " 
(Committee on the Civil Service, vol 1, 
Recommendations, para 82). Its Consultancy 
Group had suggested research into 
the scope for the establishment of 
"centres" within departments-" budgetcentres " where both costs and outputcould be measured and compared (thatis, most executive and technical activities) 
and " responsibility centres " where oosts 
could be measured but where output was 
unmeasurable (for example, most administrative, 
advisory or service activities.) 

The present government has carried this 
thinking a stage further with the idea of 
the departmental agency. In theory, at 
least, such an agency should have its own 
vote, its own personnel and finance functions 
and substantial delegated authority 
c over its spending. Its head should be an 
" accounting officer " answerable to the 
Public Accounts Committee for the 
regularity of expenditure. In practice,
only the Organisati·on for Defence Procurement 
and Civil Aerospace appears to 
have these responsibilities while the other 
departmental agencies usually appear to 
be the grouping together of allied activities. 
Moreover even in the Procurement 
and Aerospace organisation the continued 

eparation of administrative and speciali t 
staff in the kind of " parallel hierarchy " 
criticised by the Fulton Committee means 
that management accountability does not 
extend any lower than its director. 

ln our view, the key que tion in etting up 
these agencies is the extent to which 
departmental Establishment Divisions are 
willing to delegate manpower control and 
taffing matter to them. There is no ign 
at pre ent that agencie are being given 
any autonomy in this field, though without 
it no agency ould be called an . 
accountable unit. · 

However, the 1nove toward the constitu-i 
tion of accountable units, or agencies,
within departments does hold out the · 
promise of breaking down giant depart-· 
ments into units who e justification and 
performance can be crutini ed and whose . 
organisational forms and systems can be 
more accurately tailored to the needs of 
the task and of the community they serve. 


11 


f tIC \Vj1je-:;pread app1icati()ll of the dcpartl11COtaJ 
agen .y c ncepl could lead to 
at l arr:~.ngement of g nerally ~malt 
aJministrative brcu1che · constituted as 
rc"J on. ibil ity centre~ a; d (l .. nerally large 
C".l;..::uti·'e sci.. ntitlc and technical division, 
t· li1)tit L ts;d cts department, 1 agen~ies. The 
;1.:-~~~mb1y of a structure of such unit ·, 
\Vll id1 in general wr-; \ oulJ. favour, mwst 
be :1.ccompanif.'d by far bd ter forms of 

p:anning, manag >;nent ac~.-Olmting anJ 
pc:r~urrnat~ ..::c rneasuren;ent ant by a 
;T• <"..S~lVe programrne o[ training 1n 
t:/!n'.:ro.l manag... rnent pa rtk'u1ar1y for 
'\'" "' j 11't o f-') [f

1 ..... .. , ..... ~ ~:\.~ .... 

-
--.1."'..... o~

u~ 

~ . ,.., a c I~· ' i 
·1he ComptrdferG ,.r,:;ra1 of the-k eceipt 
'~nd (. '~ue of lier Majesty's Exchequer 
a.!1d Auditor General of the Public 
A c... Lnts (Comp Toller a~1d Auditor 
Gener21~ or CAG) ex:::tmines and reports on 
:.:·t · L ppropriatic'n 1\ccou!1ts of Departmer;
ts 
. 
. .He i1eads the Exchequer ar'd Audit 

Department o£ OVPr 400 officials. I-Tis 
n:p~Jr::~; are suhrr.itt-ed to the Public 
:·'\.svntf't Cor.:1mitke rPAC) wi:.jch can 
er.q L:ire in t any m~tter nn vhj_;h the CAG 
.::::.~ n1~H.le observ:~ri~Jn ·, summvning 
oflicia1s for e. pbn2..tior.s. 

Tb ; original purp se of these arrangements 
' as to hold c ffi ·ia s accountable for 
rhe ".regularity" of~. penditure: that i , to 
('nsurc that i.t wa pr operly authori.sed ancJ 
~-:counted. for. Over the years, he has also 
becon1e concerned with pursuing evider,ce 
vf \ ·a~te and extr2. ·:igance and in thL 
.:-rca. t"., has ren ' red val:Jable sen·ice. for 
i iL t~•nc,~. in the n1atter ~~ f c!ero: p<tce ·~un


t :··acting. 

I r 'h 1 1

•

rJov.rever, ll .: autnor;ty. scope anc 
ex.p:;rt;.::,c of the Ex~he-iucr and Audit 
Dcpa:trnent fCJtls 2. ve1·y Jonb \vay sh· rt of 

U:o..;,c of o ther ~tate audi : ·~1£S in the v·A 
.t :i._~ \Vesten · Eu'·ope. C. L. Normanton 
hc.s point~<l l)Ut, in Th~~ { ccoun tal>iiity and 
'Utdit of g()\'('(/iJ:H'/1 r ·. (fvfan chester 
t i l~!r'r-; i iy l>re':ls. ! ()(}(;), (h:n : 
Tlic.: r ·.\ ,__; i. lr.~s inc cpewlent L) f the 

·-• 1

' ~~ '..:cut I.;..._ tnan r;thcr stak ;wd itors are. 
i h :treasury prc:c-ribc.., the form of 

a ·counts ( vh icl1 we k we ~ ·I! ;tre p0rti 
cutarly uninformative), the Civi l Sen·ice 
DeJ artment decides upon the nu mh.:.r <lnd 
sla us of audit stao·. f he stale a~dltors of 
the USA, Frcnce ancl Germany have 
statutory independence in thc'ie tleld.-;. 

2. The CAG cov rs only half uf public 
expenditure (bei11g excluded from enquiryin to f )r jnst,_n 'e, the na' iona.l i<icc.l 
in lu.-lries arJd education cxpenJiture) 
while other state auditors can enquire 
joto the use and result" of virt1.1ally all 
state spending. 
3. O the r state audit,)rs ar~ cmp >we rcd to 
invc.:t:gJ.t" manag·"ri<d em ·ieilcy, orga!tisa 
jon· nd orJeratin{!' ~v. tems a~d ~o a:t :1~ 
... J 

management consultant to public 
bodies while the C \G ha~ no rowe-r to 
cons~der the manage ria l cHe...:tiv eness, 
structure and ys[etn) 01: "pc::nding 
organis:: tj ons. 

> 

4. Other state auditors cmjJhy a-:c,iuntaJ 
ts. staff qualified in pubh:-hnance 
economis ts, st~t isticia.n and ma.!l:.lgement 
~nalysL '.vhil the Exchequer :1nd t dit
L-

Department i · st:.1ITe 1 by m~mi.'ers of the 
execu~ive grades, mo~t of ·.v tom h:::.v~ 
joined the Service stn1. ;~ht from secondary 

chool. 1'J'om1anton wjnts out that 01:r 
<<Udil taff have sta.~us and careers which 
are " unquestionably :=tnd demonstrablythe lowE'st jn any maj "~.r country in th~:.: 
Westen: world." 

The re ult o[ these _h. )rt-: '111 ings t:· ! at 
we haY · no enforcement of pubtc 
acc.__.untability in tb.... sense of requiring 
the src:1de:s of public money L) account 
for the \'C:llue they obt:J.in for it. 

\Ve believe that the aud1t and im rovement 
of efficien ·y has t. take pl cc at 
.,eveJ·<Il levels. 1 cp:1rtrncnts shotlid continue 
tc have their o vn m~f11gc..ment 
sen,ices unit-l ut \Ve bdiev~ Eh;tt they 
shollld be independent of E~·t::tb . !_hmtn t 
Div;. :oc') and that they llou1c! not on-1y 
pro\ ide <'.lh·i:)ory scn·il:Cs on c\.;l l•?S\: but 
:-.lwu!d rn \ ~mt stud ·co.; o f dc;"~ Ltrtrncnt:d 
clllcicl~ ·~·y :1s dircdcd hy the [r_~r" !ll?..Tl:J t! ·mcnt 
,__1[ ;. ep r tmer't". 

lr: aJJiti n, we b:::l!ev~· th:J.t t ... e ft.:nctions 


of the Exch ·qucr <.\ll d Auc.Jil D epartmentshould be widened to induc.Je ':ltudies of 
managerial efficien.:y, organi ation and 
vrerating ystem in all penders• of 
public money \ hether in central govern-
m~·nt or out ide it and including private 
and cornme:-~.,ial organisations. It hou1d 
emp1 'Y exp ~rt and profes ionally qualificcJ 
stair an J should be totally independent 
of the Trea ury and the Civil Service 
Department. It should lmdcrtakc studies 
at the request of the Public Accounts 
Committee and other Parliamentarycommittees. 

Pt:RSO! 1NEL 

·~~ 1-\.l\l ,f..J G~. c 

!\n-la]()!-;-c~: ·(:~r the--rnembcr --o-Cthe--rt1ftol1 

Comrni t ·e c nsidered lh t preference in 

r~,.:;i·uitmc;nl , houi,i be given to graduates 

with '· relevant" qual iflcations. They L:On


•:-,idered that it a~ no longer snflkient to 
rc:ly so hL~! 'ily on the recruitment of 
O~bridgc g:-ad :atcs in history and clas. ic5 
for the highF.;st p )Sitic ns jn lhe Service. 
Con~cmporary r> roblems of governm~nt 
would "yi ld their solution · only to the 
mo:-.t concentrated a s~tilts 0f minds 
''"' l"J."'D~'1 <h ,. )I n!1 ,.. ;O'Of..OU ' a ICI •· · t~ ·n"d

'--'7. '-' Fi ..-tl '·" ··:.::J • • •n .::> f • Su :, aJ. ~;.. 

intellectn:ll d is:..:ipii'lC with the neces•n.ry 
appara~us of relevant idea . knowl~Jgc, 
n'!eth.od:~ and tech iques '' (Commit tee on 
rht-: Civil .'iervicc. vo 1, para 76). They 
'vished the Civ'l ervice to attrctct its full 
:.;hare of gradu .tes in the social .studies, 
the m athematiccJ and physical science ·, 
tile biologi(;ai sciences and jn the applied 
~1nd eng·rneer!ng sciences. This recon rn~
ndati n vV:• .. rejer..:teJ by th Labour 

/"" I 1'h l) • ... I. . "d I

uo ern...tnenc. 1 nm ... n· m1s er sa1 t,Jat 
to a ,~....1 t tb.... recommendation ''ould 
~lose to the C ivii Service Cl. verv wide field 
of possible candidates who h~~ve start d 
~.'J may in futur , start on tl1eir cho en 

u. iversity courses long before they had 
decided that they wanted to becorr e Civil 
ervants (House of ComiJzon del'ates, 21 
NovemLer, 196S, vol. 2;5, no 17. col 

) 1,.v 1) 

J1 ....(\'·1 '' ' .~-t>v _ . 

1 n our vjcw, ii is tJ be re,gretted tL~a.t the 
Gover. m . !l! 'id not give its bc1.cking to a 
prcfer... nce fu• rek:··-ance in the qualift(:
ation~.; of nc v gn-:hwte entrants to the 
_;--;rvicc. ln continuing ta itly to suppurt 

the i<.lea th at competent hi"lorians or 
<.:!' sic-ists :u ·e as v,:eU, jf not better. "uitcd 
to the t'ask. of managing a gove~nrne:1t 
' department as cr mpdent engineers, 
accountants or social scienti ts it failed to 
give due weight to the technicai c-omplexities 
of modern government. lt 
impli i .. y enc!or:cd the traditional vulur. 

\systern of the higher Civil Service in 
\\-hich rrimacy is given t ' the articulate 
layma:1 who ·an _produc~ a convincing 
synti1e ·is of the view o[ the profes"\:onaJlyl{Ua! ified stall who.are usually his inf ~rioro:_; 
in power a.nu status. If the Civil Service 
Commi.~3ion is not given a directiv.:. to 
fav·1ur aprlicant.s with profe\siona.I quaiiliLation 
relevant to the \V( rk ('f Jepartm 
nt, th2n HLir n:~. ~t.; ra·i bie~s tow1rd.
selecting the. type who ha.· al\.vays been 
~uccessful in the higher Civil c-er-vi_e in 
the past will prev~;;n t lhc development of 
a t p m anagement group with the techni.cal 
and manage ia1 cx perti e whi h the 
Fulton. Committee cnv i'.;agcd. Much 
c\·identc to Fulton poin cd to sho.'ic 
m1 ing · in. the management of deparlment:; 
resulting frnm the u.<familja.rity of 
~enior Ci v·il Se.rvant:-> with ;nanagement, . 
with the social. te -1 no! ogical and 

CC(. no 11 ic force<; at \Vor-in the community 
;;-wd \Vith met:1ocJ of assemblingand e··...-a!uating quantit--tive data. FinaUy.
the fa ilure t {~ndorse a rrefcr nee Eor 
re,evar.cc !,as hi.odercc.l t"1e d"'ve!opment 
of education ai1d train ing in public 
admini~tration in this countz-y. p2rticulad r 
at po~t-graduate Jeve1 ·. so that ti ere is no 
incentive to pro iuce, fo1 cxamp1e., 
acL:ou ntant.s, 'icienti. t·· ~ nd sociologist-
with furthe r qual ification~ in public 
admi n.iscrati n though this is the kind o. 
tL p rnan2..ge171ent ::tdre on vvhicb. depJ. ...ments 
wi t need to call in future. 

the unified grading structure 

-----~---· 


The mo~t ccntroversi;Jl ~ tbe Fulto 
Curnmittee's recomme.ndacions oncerned 
the career class structure of ~he Ci\'ii 
s~rvice. The Committee S3.\V "-n.e_d to 
replc..~.: the rnultiplicit; of cia ):'S by a 
u11if-iej or ...:.la :>le ·s structure. At t ,e tJme 
[he Committee in. ·estigared ttte Servi ~ 
there \ r.: 110 fc\\'~r th:1n f ,40t) drsliw:-t 
c-\J.s.-cs v~ CiviJ ,)en·ant.:::. The origin~t 


tlinef.(;cnth ctntur:~ di i::,ion it.t·' a 
·' higher, or " f-irst" Divi"ion consisting 
mainly of Oxbr.clge graduat s and a 
'.Lower '' Division of clerks with a tested 
kno\-vledge of reac.in6, writing an~ arithn 
~tic had expan ed into an Adminis 
ra tivc Class of c-enior officials, an 
i=,~~·.;utive CJ<:~ s \... f middle manager" ~nd 
.... cnit'r icHHJ hmior cb<; e'i of Jer.ical 
l;Jllc'..;f ·. fn addition, there we re dozens of 

J .. • I" 1

c:1(..ss(.::s oa '.I PCl on occup· tJon lC1eancrs, 
nte.•:scnger. , n1achin..... operator··, paper 
.keepers, typi. ts) or on profe sional qualiftcation 
(.. (:i~nt i: ts, archite .t ·. engi eers 
~'.nd st rveyo::~:, draught m .:n. economi. ts , 
~""' •• 1 ,.·J ,._r.·, · ,. · ,!j)•''"r" 1·1' ' ' ·· · \ r: r ·L·


..... J ... t..-\...Ji\...'-•""~ , '-• """"L\' , < •.v .• ~ t i. 

ai:y cv"ry job in tl c .Se~-.·jce was tile 
prerog~;tive of a. rarticu ar class and 
movcr.1ent ly·t;,,....~cn lhe cla ses. part!cul 
~2rlJ ;atcr;:}.lly Yvas L!~uaUy very diillcult 
Thus, a "poli~.~y" j b it1. an are3. con.::erneJ 
with. S'-l}'. fl otc v.:ay::c.. <iutomaticill!y "',vent 
t•) ~l mcml Pr ul: tile adn..ini. tr:1tive cla s, 
.:.v n jf. hi, pr~..; :i us c·r-rien~...c had nev r 
inv,, lv~d v;o rk jn_ thi · area. b cause his 
wa:~ lhe cl:Ls w!1i..:h filled all pr.ticy j bs. 

A civit engiP.e-er who dad ;-penl his·entire 
\ orking ife in the nv torwa y area cGuld 
d •)t be consi1ered f\-.r po ic~r \VO~k (.that is, 
the top job~) o:::c:ruse he was a. ted1nica1 
s )~ :iv l~st. This . Lcry \\ a rcpcat•.J. 
ll~o·Jg:.out ·;~c Civil .Jet ice. with the lay 
incn1(} i. of t~1·..: ad ;ni lratj,·e cla . ( ,ver 

1

[Vl}l-o f-. th--·~1 \J ! I. -....., l) ~CC'L"ti itl....o Llro r·ts 

.. , .' ,l, .•_'\• .. .

~ \,. L. l "'U

gradu:1ks. usuaHv 1r'-)m 0\briciL!e and 
.~omev;hat le::;~; th~n halt promc te(l from 
IhF:.' Exe(;utive Cia~:· . that i. , d ircctly 
recruited ?.S s·.::h ~o Jea\ f.:rs) filling the key 
jt_."l,~; conce!Tl(!d \\<th frwnuh tiog po.ic:r 
,"\q·:.l ,nin:~~te ·i.;~.l a dlegi·:.btive n1aiters artJ 

, £ . ,. . fi ' 1' 

.f:C

t te ~ro ·t~.s:;1J1'18ltJ' quat! Jed spcc13. 1s:: stau. 
ac-tir-::. a tb.~.ir £<1··1.-;er~ or as n1anagers 
ot put"ely te 'hPi·.:::.J activities. The rc_ul l: 
'~1'-' C th ·'t ;t \V' •·~ -'"·j.-t1J"'l h: inlO ()SSl.bl, fo,. a

•• o:.\.\1 ..,(..\. .., .l. (.' .J J". ,. ,. \., <...... '"' ] _ ._. .._ .._"" l 

profr.:3stonal to ~et 01..1~ [ rh~ prof ,s ·ion6l 
!· ierarc.:hv c.nd jr;tn t~t t! 1·ierar ·hy wher 
pG1ic:i <lrtd rhe nlli .~; 1t·c dce~sioi~s \'Vere 
tTl~l. ie and \ ·here sp .r: ding \.Fa: controlkcl. 
Ti1 arr-a11gement _~, as J.L·rmdi~ed hy the 
r~ ·1n5t,·~.tct.ion 0f eLburate organisational 

"i~ ~i, ··-'' . " ~ ., .. ' ; : "l-'1 ,... ....... • " ' • ' rt ~ "'"',... . !... ·1


u.. .. . 11ar.... ~1 .1 ..... , ... ..... 11 -._ d.._ _..._ .rueu 
al k l'f1!"' t~y r·altc l ·:_, ~'t1 aJ.ngcrne:i Con·· 
~~~1:~1~1l.:y G rm;p \OP ~-~:. vo~ ·:~ .. p 107)-


w lcr,~ '=" t.J~ p~~?.r·~-~c..l.tt t. ..... " c·y Jl"' od."~.i'\ .I r... o· ~=roL , n1

j ;1\,) , t :b 


tedu;ic, 1 w ~r·... tions. 

The frca ury attd the r:irst Division t\s)ocjati 
n (the staff a soci~1tion representingthe administrative cla s) performed casui tical 
acrobatics before th Fulton Committee 
in order to justify this arrangement. 
ltwa argued that lay 3dmini .. ratc.• rs were 
more 1ikel y to restrain expenditur"' than 
'reciali ts ; that they were 6 d a t 
co-ordinating the work of l ifiercnt 
~pecialists ; that they <-'June could set the 
vit,;w of s•.1eoia!i ts in the context oi policy 
and the macl inery of governments; that 
they had tl!.e ft uency to jmerpr''t th · 
advic of speciali:ts in a fo1m on \ h~..::h 
deci'.ions could be 1)ascd ; tl ~t the '.VO.tk ,r ~e·i~~i ·t , lcn~:.~ [itcd +"r)m crit:~ :...l 
sent iny by dd a,....hcd and intel!it;clll ~aymcn: 
th t ti1oy saved be u. e 1) ( cxrk nsivL: 
sp .ciali.. ts on non-specialist work. The 
l\ob:1agcment r-'n~u!tan y Gr up c-arefull 
y con idered tiles~; argt~men s anJ 
ca rne to the conciL!~ i n that in aJrn inistrati
·lej techni -a! areas of govarn~ ent i.H~ 
manager shoulJ us ~ally he a ;-;pe(; ialt~l 
who hau acquired trdining a'1J c:xpt:;ricnce 
i:.. the administral iv ~ proced:. re" of 
~overnment and ti at it wa -e.-,eraia! Uu.t 

t.or• po-t· should be open to .pecia. ist-.; 
with L c app ·opriatc qt.;a!trlCc ti n;; 1ibit!, 
i ara 365). 
In aJditi 1n to a. diSl.ll! ictin 7 ab: e1icc f 
'iatera.i moveJ·\{;nt, the. Fulto~l Co1rrnilt 'e 
ft."ltllld nut there were many r:b 'L' ' e.) to 
lhc upward n1o · m._nt of able people. 
There were sup ~jo.r ancl inferio; cla.s::;es 
in e .ch occu1.atiunal :1rca. Th 
a iministrative class were supported by tht~'\
ecutlve and cleric;:tl d as<:;es ; the wc,ri-::::; 
group of engine r,·, ~~rchitc:ct · .1d s:.n--· 
vcy 1rs w ere "'upported by cla.-:se · ·Jf 
echni ian· and llra nghtsmen; the -.ci~m:it:~ 
ofEce.1 cla was upported by c1as<; · of 
cxperin er~tal officers an ·I sci ~n!iflc as:~ i t-
ants. Th ugh rnovemcnt fron the d e;·i al 
t th~ executive d <tss was virtuaHy 
unretricted and fr rn the ex"·utive t -1 
i.l:~ administrative .va. c::>rnr:t.on (t ..o 1gh 
usu:.1ll/ at so 1at · an <l gr; that ·-;nty the 

C. tr If di nar_i.ly a. le progre" C ·ery hr 
in the Administrattv~ Class) ;n sptciali-t 
< reas there \YCrc many re tr·j ~ti._.ns n 
, r· ,

~ ·~


up'.,·aru n1" 'ren r::t:t . ·ur e;-,r.-.t1!p,e. '" \•:a. 
;ifll::ult for ~ver :1 n ou ·La11ding .'<rj.: ri1 
11 -r -~~~! '' J•_,__,,...,,.. ; ' n10e t , tr1 "" ' l,l ,•,

, (; ·-Q•.•·1t\.~.> I ~ ·•'-, ~ , . .....:_,'-1. 

'' '' 'l ...~ , ._, i ., reel'ir·(;"t J 'I'' ·· i-"() r T'"f'l ,. r.·l ~ ,-.,-_· '.., j r-.

(..(. """1(,. U ¥ l 1 -. ''' • -l ~ ~ ! .,... !. \. _, .L ... J.l. I. '-• ,. ,_ ...._. L '" l..J t• 


of IIJc Sci 'Ill ific Oflkcr b ..). r r motii )) I 

·)pportunlttcs vcre al·v very unevenly 
di: tribt:led: ctrccr xpectations were very 
favoura '" =or m;;:mbcrs of the adm inistrative 
a ·J s 'JC~1Lf1c cbs. cs b 1t poor fo r 
engineers an-1 hopc!e.<.,~; for accountant\ 
and social scic1 tist. . The rullon 'om rnittee's 
1\t[anagcment C n ·ultnncy G roup 
nh.-erved tl at the career expectation of 
a me nber o( the rc-earch ofT!ccr das (to 
£2,100 per <:tnnum at that time), who by 
dchnition h ... d t hav..., a. degree aprropria~ 
· to the worK-of his department. was 
.-~-, j,1f ....ic; ~c tn<'l )t <1 m mbcc or the 
a·lmi ·l i~trttlivc cl" ~ (to £4500) that the 
:1rran'"remt:r:t <·rrwlf nkc.l t a di"crimin<1ti n 
ar.,ainst e,·r c.rti·)t " ·(ihid. r; ar a 146, 8b). 

T he Trt~asury' · C'Yiclence to the F ult n 
ComrniL~e .· su~_;ge~.tcd tbat some reforn1 
in tL~ '-·.reer c1z.:ss structure W::l' require l. 
lt pro1,o,'ccl th ~ t th e ·ecutive and 
adrninis.tpt·ivt; cla:;scs sh uld be ~ombinecl 
in a v..rtk~··! (\~rg~r to give one line f 
n r xnotion f ;J,H th-1e cl of clerk to the 
t:.:p ma-=1agcrial po~~-· in dcpartme t·. This 
w~1.s very 1ittl . ditferent from ex.isti~g 
pra.~ti cc-; bec.Quse lh~re was already consider::
tbJ.e i..terchailgeab!lity between the 
cr:.o gr~cde in t 1c V(ec:utive c L.ss C~n l the 
cqi} ivah:nt P:ir.cip:d gtd.d in the admiiiitrativ~ 
da~.s . ft , J~ p oposed that th re 
sh\.)Uld -.e r.n enl:-rged gradua.t.., ent.;:-y, a 
portion of which ("roughly ec;u.ivaient in 
:-;ize to the c: sistar.t principal entry ~'--that 
is, the recruitin.:::-grjdc for [be adm:lli"
lrative ctas5) ;niuht "starred" on th 
h.. .is of: r~c·tdemi,_: r.;crJr a.. d p rfc. r nam~c 
;.:t t c sele•:t:or:. ·La.[j_c. In effect, t 1ls m..... a.nt 
the pre ·ervati;Jn of an eli te grourl of 
those ~on"t(.~,-ec1 on recntitment to be 
" r.t most abk ., with exceptionally 
fa ' >urable pr .n 1 tion pro p :..ct: and the 
rete.-tio:-1 o the administrative cla,s in 
~'.a bu rnrn~. Th Tr.~asury furth.._r pro-
i ... eel a ho~·il.t:nhl m er ~er of the adm ini~
trative \V Jt!: d c :,1e~,.;;~li. cb.:;scs ab:;v.., 
the kve1 of 1.he t ;1 of the Assi ·tant 
~\.~•:tdary sc~k ,• ueat a un ill·ed ~1ie,.1cr 
( 'ivil Sr.: ;,jt;·~, with tl., impl'c;ui( 1 ·tha: 
ti>i ~~rrapg•·:1~c:nt '\\')u1d give p.... ...;iali ·t 
th r: ·hancc to get int J jc)hs or-ri-:e~-ry 
r;~. t.:ned foi.· the a !mini.=. nlt ivc cla'is. Tl!imea;~
t ~::tat a spcciati"i: had to cl;mb his 
t;pC'ciairst c;,.eer lacl 1er t a v•~ry iligh 
l 'V~l (rot:~hly t;nL of lb: Un:..lcr-S~cretary 

·-0nly t\vo tirades hel \\ the offic.;ial IL. 
..itd 

of a department) before he could cornpete 
with admini. trators for administrative 
j )b.·. lt \ ac;; very unlikely 1at any 
spc 'iali"t v.:ould ever be your.g cnou~b, 
or Wf''uld hdv.__ had S.llfli .... ient :tdmin·i.-
trdiive experience, to he :.l{ le ·o t··-mpelc 
for those jl)b with adt:1inist1ator'> \vho 
wouIJ, o f cour ·e, ha c benefited fr m 
')re\..ial care r planning arrange:nent . )n 
ther \VOrci;.;, the 1 rc·l.SU ry !';roposed 
minimal ch8ngc. 

The Fulton -......Grn:-nir. ec WOlJ ·1 !J.:v."' none 
of .1c Trea ury'.-pnlliati Tcs and instead 
proposed ~ c( rnplcte ref )fm c-f th'· 
·· career 
tr Ictun;-. It r'".:ommend ·J that all arcer 
cla--s should be abolis} ,eel and r(;placcd 
by a unified grading stru:ture;. The con-
cent of. and responsibility attdching to, 
every'"'ivit Service job W8S to b~ ;::n3.ly_, l 
·Ling joh >/'iatuation techniqne . AL jobs 
of simil r w~.. igh~ were t be "banded " 
into gradcs anJ a pay s ale wa.: to b,, 
on truded v·:hid1 allo "'ateJ a range f 
1ayment to e:1ch gr~ cte. Thm.1)1 the p ri me 
criterion for rt -...sionir~g 8.0 indivi ual. to a 
job woulcl be ·1is e. per:enc-~nd qnalif1ca 
! ns fol u;,1;:..ertaking iL the ?.d":~ntag 
of a nniflecl grading struc~ure \' o ld be 
hat th~ earch for ~uitablc-people could 
-.:e Yvidenrd. Fo cxampit.:, c.~ pr fe_<;jonal 
a...:; ount:-.nt might be con<J·dcred fJr a 
post in a na 1•.::c clivi ion f r '" hich 
pre·,·jousjy n1y e Ct!tives and udmini


~trators 11acl l1cen consiclere(l : or an 
engi er mig 1t be con~~r "l r~d as pr je~t 
leader on ~tn ae:-o.rp:;. 'C roi·,)gramme 
in teaci o · a . cienli,,t; or a: tee 1nical 
officer might be cow;iJercd for ;-:. junior 
manage .1 nf post io a teclm!~al / 

e. ecutiYe :u~::<'t in.:;tead of t:tn e.· cutivc 
"'ffiC r. 
The re.:om:-n:-ndati. n f r the cr~~iti n of 
a un ified ·gradi nt; . tructur · ,.:as a.:::ept.;:d 
bv ~h l \ _rnment of lh <:.' cllll. [rn ;le;-,.~nta 
ion ;\.<t. put t·o :1, Joint _;o -.rrtittce of 
rhe . Jational ·.·hitle C ur~.:-il. T~s .fi r-;t 
qep was t creaL a _H·tifk<l. : u ·wrc 
tn-.:1uding aH ' \h,t a~ th, ~t .)~''"c l ......,.d 1f 
l :nde r '-se.:~ (.;t' r_· (ab) 1t -tr-r· aJ:nini· 
"t:-awr· .mC: :so pr.:\..iali ·t,) , n 1 thi\ w;.'s 
rroduc~ l in J~ nua:. 197L ·.•.-he p ;-.... 1 ~
ramme \V~s tl..:!n to rnc1ge 1.hc ~ia ·cs 
I·10l'll()nlaliy :tt t!'le A si 't8rtt se~re ·.uy 


!e':et (lk~trly () ,000 sta!t) anJ at the 
P t"in~ipaL. 1 evel (1 I nQ(', st.t -. 1'h' 

. . J ~, 1 . ft) ;s;. a " to 
LJ{; :...:ctnpkkd by carl)' 1.97'2: "on the 

ic...·.... n(:e ~0 far th ·re are grounds for 
be]i· ving thJ.t, n 8dvanc. below the level. 
Grading structure recommended by F ulton 
is te ....hnically fea"ib e" ( ...ivil Service 
, 'atinnal \Vhitley Council, Fzdton: a 
f,·anu:work for the future. 1970, p 7). 
lJnfo;tunatety, n.o such l-:dvance ha taken 
p ace C' nd it a.pp"'ars that further work on 
rl--e hor izontal m ·"rging of the clas.se has 
rc:rr:1...,nent1y stopped at the Under 
:; ...:retary level. a.-origina!ly recomntend 
.d by thrc Trea·ury. Other ste · 
ha" t ~een taken toward~ the cr~ation of 
" an vpe 'l road lo the top," fl..j r all those 

·,j '" .. ._ •,11_.,, a-l ~ •':'ln ·r. t7P •)l• '• ~J t-h, j)"'.....,_

"• · " l ..J .. ~r... v .. ,, .... ·.. ~:..;v . lt, _.~ J I.L .l.V 1~"-J 

nos "'d establishment of " opportunity 
p JS[ " for which members of more than 
Oi:e .arcer clas can h.... consider·ed ; by 
"iclteral rnovem 1l,'' that is, the p ostingof a lll(;mbcr of one class into a po t 
de igncned a beloPging lo another cbss ; 
and by arran;;ep·knts for trainin~ jnac..lrnini. trative work for those specialis.t 
who shcJW prcmt;;e for it (~Vhitley Bulletin, 
i'vt {l.Y 1971. p 79}. Ho'.Ve';c:, all thi. mean.~ 
thJ.: it i') i~t~ ly t8 b ~ a ver-y mal! ha nd 0f 

evc.:.r •i ,)t" ·11y 'lhJ ·, <n e· ,·.) ;(·~· t o;-\ V]l.[1'11 { 'j .,,

''-'\. · t • , I'·-' 1 ~ ,, t l...· ,) ~J v <~J , • J , ~ , , ,, 

its ··vay into the tt.Jr gcn..;.:ni m~nagcrnent 
r( c;cc; in dq :lrtmcnis and the odds are 
\till hea\.·ily !·"'laded in f~ vour t'~ f tie non'>
pe i<dist lay admini~Lrat• r. \{c b,.Jic;c 
lt :tt rn.)~re~,-, tov:arr.l~· tbe crtclion of ~ 
~,,,din~' '\l rnct Ire uniflt : all the way down 
l t) ivnior tw n~gc'll l (~IH: levels slwuh.l be 
n.:..,u~r ,~d anc! th.tt thi'i i ·~ es-::entia! if the 
~; :r ·v!,:~ ;:;; to .J ploy profe~·;siona l <H1d 


•; i•~:.:-.<:d i ..:t s'·ills t ~'~ lhe great e-;t .elfe.:t. 
\~r:p'. itc:.\'c bee~1 h;... :...n ln r:tti )nalic..e lh~ 
6~·~u.Cn1{ .:-.lr~: ~...·turc belnw lil.e unified h igh1'f 

c:vi: Sen'icc. T hr' clr.:ric.d, ex ,clltivc and 
;.dn; ;c;;"·ra t in; :b<)'.... ~· have b ·en rnergcd 
intu ~-n :~dminis1ca: i e grour :ts the 
Tr.-.::l Ll r_l ~>rOp()•;cd . Other dasl;es (for 
e\amp;e_ ec1r.0m!.. t" ~ 1d slati;;ticiC~nr;; are 
l(l It' ~hsnciak-l vvit:1 thic.; g:oup jn a 
"l' ,•(" \1 r'"r'"'<' •)t"V {Jl l)JI<Yh ;~ l.S fl t C., ,~--. rt., 
~ -.... ' .. ( .. '-.:-J ' J" ' -f t.) i' • ' -·.l 

\'fh :1. th:: term cet~t!gor~· signilie-. Similadyth":" ).; ien~ .ir ....: of'tl ~er cla~;~ he~-:: been mcrt-:ed 
·.:. ·:.h i•<; .tli)rlc,rti::fi; scie=1tir:tc assistant a1 tl 
t'!'" t'P11C!:la1 ~'r:l...:cr dd..,· '" in to :-1 ·..;cil'P1 i·· 
!: c ~J<)~ I i· and lhe · · :1g;n~er.-;, archil .ch 

• 1 n. I "! ,r \ cyr' r.s \ ·it! i.1cir s' 1p p ~~ rll n~~ 
technical and draugh l ·men das~es int a 
gen;'frtl professional. orl)Up. This has providctLlhc 
oprwrlunily f r a b ·ttcr career 
pro0 res ion i·n techrrical and scientific 
::tr~as for thost.: Y1 tth ability but v;i~h 
lirr.ited acac..lernic qualifications on entry. 

administration tra~rees 

---· 

The Ci il .Service Department has in~ tituted 
a new .schem .., for adminin.tration 
trainees which apparently 1neets the 
Fulton C· mmittee's objectives in this 
field. Graduat.e entry to th, Service ha.~ 
been doubl·.d (to 175) and these entrants 
have been joined in th.,_ admL i trar;oa 
tra·i ee g ale by 150 a.ble yo:.:n;; p...opL 
already in the Service. Jt j prop )Sed r.hat 
the mo t suc\.-e5sful o · the traine~s v.t1ll 
recei "' qcceler~lted promotion. Ho\veve:-, 
the Civii Service Department Report of 
1971 points out that the ·nlenlioi1 i· noc 
to diminish the attraclion o[ thr,; C\vi· 
Service .for " the most able graduates ' 
who had pr... viously entered the Adrninistrativc 
Clas!l a. Assi 'tant L rrn-:ipa s and 
vlho w _ u~d continue to a vital source 
ot supply for mnny of t!tt: top po, ts .in 
the Scr '.ice. 'vVe h pc that thi does not 
1mply th2-t Lhe sy· t"m will only iavour 
those with the quali.ficn.ti~ n<> ~nd cbflra~tcristics 
of th.e f rmer Assistant Principals. 
: l ma . do 0. given l. e r o·fu-;d of a 
preference for rele:vant qual ific.:ai ions anJ 
l'rn"ted nnilic.tlion o[ the d: 'l<ie·. 

appraisal

Tile I·u(tc)n C1\'1-;;·~ ·ttee s.tid. thai. the j~;b 
cval ualiolt ~.y -,lcl 1 :. !opted by li1~ t.,i ·jt 
Servil:v should <.kline an measure the 
"en I re:ul l" rcquirtd r; f e:tch. fJO'\t, thus 
confu~ing job c:valu~tio 1 (lh.Lt is. 
c:\tahl i<;hment of the rebti ·c worth _f 
each jof') \Vith perforntt.lflt.:C ap[·-r~~j~,tl 
(t hat i ·. the rev:ew of the effecliven"'.· · of 
,~c!1 \)!!iL·i:,J). Jt ~! ·;o sn.iri tlw.l th.:.:re houkl 
h.: Clfilll!ct! rc:vii•l\' . '". [ the r'.::!·fonn~.nce of 
in ii\·iduai t•ilici£Lh in a. :-; ':,tcm \Vh:dl 
would rt..l :1 t,_: incrc men~ lo ~·ch·(:Vemt> nts. 
T he' ( ·,v;l <-:e:·vicc Der·lrtrnent h:1.:; ta:::Kktl 
the llLCcl L)r irnrrovr:d 11 ethorl·.; ur ~t ·.fr 
<:t!Jfll'<l i\;;Jl '-"it h il-. nv:: ''l1!ll!:d rcporl fqnn 
:1nd t!H~ Jt\it (Jnh i\rrr:1i.;~ll h e\ inv) 


scheme, but ·th is sch2me appears to combine 
personal career couns....Uing and the 
identification of dovdoprnent and training 
needs with obj~u:ive setfng and performar!
ce apprai. ai, activities in industry 
which are u uaHy considered be5t handled 
separately. 

career planning 

'fEe civil Ser i---e-J:-.s_a_v._e_r_y_l_a_r_g_e__e_J_n_p-,-lo-y-er 

of technicaHy qL:alified staff and in some 
fields it is the largest employer jn the 
cGu ntry (there are "i 6,000 members nf the 
:~cienti1i~. ex.perim~;;Gtal and s~ientit.ic 
assistant gr::tdes, for exa1nple, and over 
~1.0,000 m embers of the: architectural; 
engineering, technical and draughtsmen's 
grades). vVe have pointed out that a rnajor 
~irn of the Fulton i.{epo.rt v\lds to open 
:1r the: pro.,pr::ct for such speciali. ts of a 

c: n~er \vhich le l to the highe t p :.;ts in 
gener::.l ma~;.tgcrnent in the S rvice_ VV f::. 
have long bel! ved that such :~ prospect 
w.-t uld at·r~•.d th.._ best yuung pr fessionals 
in~o th"' -Service, would ensure that the 
Se:vi·:e wo~!ld emp!oy th .... talent: of profession~
lly c; ua!ified st:-tfi to the fu ll ancl 
W011l1l bring greater technical experti~e 
into the d ·cJs:on-m,tking ::wd managerial 
prol.:esse<> 0r government. We therefore 
~cliLve th at 'ILry great attention should 
b . p;:tiJ te career and succ~s-; ion rl~ nning, 
rna nagem -n t t ri.l i .ing and development 
ior speci. li' t. nnd to creating a situation 
in wh ich th.,y ,tt.'' encouraged to develop 
~H.! mi n i-; trati vc ~Lnd man m:lnagemf.:nt 
!\ ilk 

junior sta-ff 

---------:------:--------

Thf~ Civic Servi ~1:' is also ~ very large 
e~·,1pl0yer of c!e.lical and junior office 
\Vorkers (ro~1ghly 250,000) in local and 
regional o!tir:es and in \VhitehalJ anu as 
i~c a~._ad a.-\ve can see the .introduction 
of computers vJiil not greatl_, affc;(.;t their 
1:.:.m bf'rs. Jt i;; i nc.·vi ~a le tha.t mo t workers 
engage ~ on tb coutin ~ t~sks of government 
\Yill b (·:·ganised in bur D.u.cratic 
hier~rchie_ whi~h . thoug~ effi .it·nt, have 
a de-per ·;:;na!i. :ng a.nd de8.dening tfcct 
or:. tho e wl:.:o h. -e to vtork in them. T he 
Fu1ton Com:·-qit.cce pz.id very little ati:"' n


tion to the human effects of large scalf.:. . 
organi ation on those in lowly positionsand \Ve believe that the penwnnel function 
in government hould pay great 
attention to their problem . There ~re 
modern personnel Inanagement procedu;:
es aimed at cre1.ting more n1eaningful 
and worthwhjle job : job enrichment 
and enlargement~ involvement and partidpation 
in tanagement, better comnuinication 
., fewer rules and regulations, 
greater delegation. The personnel function 
in departments should pursue them. 

establishments work 

The Fulton Committee failed adequately 
to consider the place of personnei. 
rnanagement in department . Personnel 
work i.) part of the responsibility of 
establisbmcnt ftlcers, who are also 
responsibk for organi:<-ttion, efficiency 
st:f' ice.:), accommo.dation and ot-1ice servi 
:es arh.l oft:.:!n for data p rocessing :1-nd ' 
cornptlters. A, Fulton's Consultancy 
Group p ointed out, e~tablist ment v.;o.rk jsprim::trily conc~r;-t J wi th cost contr~oJ 
and j<> the mean-by which departments. 
check their O\Vn growth in intern:tl cost~ 
\Vhich are mai rdy tho e of manpower. 

lst bl i-;ll mems Division~ hav-.. therefore 
rarely been conctrned with con5tru tive 
aspect of per.;onnel '.1\'0 r k , the development 
of th,_, individual jn .the servic.... of 
the org:.tni .:.uion, career planning and 
counselli11g, but with dev .loping a m~s. 
of jmper~onal regulattoo aimt;<l :tt )roduc
·ng eyuitab!e condili.nn of service and 
lim itin& manpower costs. Iwle~d. in tim.e. 
of manp wer restricti ns, training has 
often been Lh.... first c~ u lly. S ir \ViHiam 
Arm. trong lus given impetu.' to the 
creation of ~n erJighte.ned style of per


onnel management jn th_ Service and 
many imr.n -ements have recenJ_-taken· 
place, but in our view thjs function is 
, till .inadc:qttatd y su Jported. Jn an institution 
a la' o.1r inten. ive a.; the Civil 
.'"'ervice, v ~ry great practical benefit can 
he deri l. from system· ti pro.::>ramme.o[ 
per: o met developm...fl t r;~la~ing the 
skills z.nd potential of the indivi-lua.l. t< the 
pres ....nt and prospective e....d: of the 
department 


If personnel management is to take these 
new directions, then the concept of 
Establishments work requires a review. 
It seems to us that management and 
efficiency services do not sit well in a 
division whose central concern should be 
the development of the human resources 
of the organisation. Computer and data 
processing services belong more properly 
with a management informat'ion function 
which includes many of the activities of 
what are now Finance Divisions and 
efficiency services appear to us to require 
an independent status deriving from direct 
links with the Permanent Secretary if 
they are ever to carry out mandatoryefficiency audits of the kind which we 
believe necessary. We conclude therefore 
that each department should have a Personnel 
Division acting as a centre of 
expertise in the applied social sciences 
and concerned with the management of 
the human resources of the department, 
with personnel development and also with 
terms and conditions of service, the 
worlcing environment and welfare services. 
Only in this way can personnelmanagement in the SerVice free itself from 
the restrictive and bureaucratic image and 
attitudes of " establishments man " and 
take new initiatives in manpower development. 


Such a change would also facilitate 
·the introduction of a more supportiverelationsh'ip between line management and 
the personnel function: at present the 
Jatter assumes a controlling authoritybecause it includes a respons'ibility for the 

contr l f m np wer and efficiency. 


3. summaryof recommendations 
The Fulton Comn1ittee proposed a series 
fo reforms which started the Civil Service 
the path of improved management. 

· h pre ent vernment have introdu ed 
new reforms in the organi ation of 
departments which have generally built on 
Fulton ideas. The Franks Committee has 
al o reported with re ult which we find 
dL appointing. 

We believe that the next steps in adminitrative 
reform should now be discus ed. 

.... 

he developments we propose are: 

1. Legislation to establish the principle 
of the public's right to information about 
the policies and activities of departmentsand other public bodies with sanctions 
against the unreasonable refusal of information. 
2. Ministers should have a personalcabinet of advisers concerned with policystudies but not with the management or 
planning processes of departments. . 
3. Junior ministers should be givengreater responsibilities in the managementof departments and in policy formulation 
and review. 
4. There should be contact between 
civil servants and shadow ministers and 
opposition committees. 
5. A Prime Minister's Departmentshould be established to include the Central 
Policy Review Staff and the Management 
Services Divisions of the Civil 
Service Department. 
6. Select Committees should be 
strengthened by being empowered to call 
for whatever information they need from 
departments and to engage investigatory 
staff. 
7. The supply procedure should be 
reformed so as to display the costs and 
results of programmes and the performance 
of managerial units within departments. 
8. he departmental agency, rather 
than the hived-off public institution, 
should be the unit of managerial and public 
accounta:bility and the establishment of 
these agencies should be accompanied by 
impr ved y tern of .inf nnation and 
audit. 

9. The functions of 1the Exchequer and 
Audit Department should be expanded, 
on the l~ines of foreign state auditors, to 
cover managerial efficiency and extend to 
all organisations spending state funds. 
10. Preference should be given in Civil 
Service recruitment to graduates with 
relevant qualification , as the Fulton 
ommittee prop·osed. 

11. There should be resumption of progress 
towards the unified grading structure 
proposed by Fulton. · 
12. A review should be undertaken of 
the purpose and scope of establishments 
work in departments with a view to 
creating personnel divisions solely responsible 
for the development of human 
resources and to creating a central 
Department of Personnel concerned to 
introduce the best personnel management 
practices throughout the Service. 

fabian soc_iety 


rhe Fabian Society exists to further 
~ocialist education and research. It is 
dfiliated to the Labour Party, both nation-
illy and locally, and embraces all shades 
)f Socialist opinion within its ranks-left, 
·ight and centre. 

Since 1884 the Fabian Society has enrolled 
:houghtful socialists who are prepared to 
iiscuss the essential questions of demo""
ratic socialism and relate them to prac:
ical plans for building socialism in a 
;;hanging world. 

Beyond this the Society has no collective 
Jolicy. It puts forward no resolutions of 
11 political character, but it is not an organ·
sation of armchair socialists. Its members 
:tre active in their Labour Parties, Trade 
Unions and Co-operatives. They are rep


esentative of the labour movement, pracical 
people concerned to study and dis:;
uss problems that matter. 

The Society is organised nationally and 
locally. The national Society, directed by 
an elected Executive Committee, publishes 
pamphlets, and holds schools and conferences 
of many kinds. Local Societies~ 
there are one hundred of them-are self 
governing and are lively centres of discussion 
and also undertake research. 

Enquiries about membership should be 
sent to the General Secretary, Fabian 
Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, 
SWIH 9BN; telephone 01-930 3077. 

the authors 

John Garrett is Director of Public Services 
for an international management consultancy 
practice and specialist in planning 
and organisation studies in public administration. 
Author of ' The Management of 
Government' (Penguin, 1972). Prospective 
Labour Parliamentary candidate for 
Norwich South. 

Robert Sheldon is Member of Parliament 
for Ashton-under-Lyne since 1964. Member 
of the Committee on the Civil 
Service, 1966-68. Opposition front bench 
pokesman on Civil Service and Treasury 
matters. Chairman of the General Sub-
Committee of the Expenditure Committee 

ince 1972. 

Cover design by Dick Leadbetter. Printed 
by Civk Press Limited (Tu), Civic Street, 
Glasgow G4 9RH. 

I BN 7163 0426 0 


·recent fabian pamphlets 


research series 

297 Della Adam Nevitt Fair deal for householders 2 
300 Christopher Foster Public enterprise 3-· 
303 Felicity Bolton, Jennie Laishley Education for a multi-racial Britain 2f 
304 Tessa Blackstone First schools of the future 2:· 
305 0. Kahn-Freund, Bob Hepple Laws against strikes 8(
306 Nicholas Deakin (ed) Immigrants in Europe 41 
307 Paul Singh Guyana: socialism in a plural society 2u 
308 Peter Coffey, John Presley Europe: towards a monetary union 2~ 
309 Brian Shawler Onto a comprehensive ~mployment service 3f 
310 Jim Skinner Fair wages and public sector contracts 21 
311 Deepak Lal New economic policies for India 4 
312 Bruce Douglas-Mann The end of the private landlord 2 
313 Elizabeth Young, Brian Johnston The law of the· sea 5(' 

tracts 


399 R. H. S. Crossman 
410 Anthony Crosland 
411 Dennis Marsden 
412 Jeremy Bray415 Evan Luard 
416 an informal group417 Trevor Fisk, Ken Jones 
418 Geoffrey Hawthorn 
419 Stephen Hatch ( ed) 
420 Colin Jackson (ed) 
421 Malcolm Wicks 
422 David Lipsey423 Wayland Kennet 
424 a Fabian Group425 Peter Shore 

young fabian pamphlets 


Paying for the social services 
Towards a Labour housing policy 
Politicians, equality and comprehensivesThe politics of the environment 
The United Nations in a new era 
Emergency powers : a fresh start 
Regional development 
Population policy: a modern delusion 3 
Towards participation in local services 5 
Labour in Asia: a new chapter? 
Rented housing and social. ownership '}. 
Labour and land ,. 
Still no disarmament 
New attitudes in secondary education 
Europe: the way back 

17 
24 
Colin Crouch ( ed) 
Elizabeth Durkin 
29 
30 
Russell LansburyJames Bellini 
31 James Goudie 
32 
33 
34 
Tony KlugLarry Huffatd 
Graham Child. John Evans 

StudeQts today .. 
Hostels for the mentally disordered 
Swedish social democracy 
British entry: Labour's nemesis 
Councils and the Housing Finance Act 
Middle East conflict: a tale of two peoples 
Sweden: the myth of socialism 
Britain, Europe and the law 


.. 
books 
R. H. S. Crossman and others 
Margaret Cole 
Brian Abel-Smith and others 
Peter Townsend and others 
Peter Townsend and others 
George Cunningham ( ed) 
P. Townsend and N. Bosanquet (eds) 
New Fabian EssaysThe story of Fabian socialism 
Socialism and affluence 
Social services for all? 
The fifth social service 
Britain and the world in the 1970s 
Labour and inequality 
cased£ 
paper £• 
paper f · 
paper f.,_ 
cased t 
cased£ 
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