fabian tract 365 

.. 

Britain and South-East Asia 

contents 1 the cost 1 
2 Vietnam's nationalist communism 3 
3 
4 
reconstructing a federation? 
Indonesia 
6 
1 2 
5 towards a settlement 17 

<f.?r IGI(I t !G ) 



this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only the • 
views of the individuals who prepared it. The responsibility 
of the Society is limited to approving the publications which 
it issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour movement. 
Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London SW1 
January 1966 


1. the cost 
When the Prime Minister said in a speech 
in London in December 1964 that Britain 
must play "a positive role east of 
Suez", he also revealed figures showing 
that a total of 50,000 men in uniform 
from this country were committed to the 
Asian theatre of operations. 

By the end of 1965 this total had risen 
to 65,000, this representing a,n escalation 
in British military manpower of 30 per 
cent in a year. This raises questions of 
financial prudence and strategic wisdom, 
quite apart from any moral or diplomaticissues. The real cost of this massive military 
operation may never be preciselyestablished because, as was noted by the 
Select Committee on Estimates in July1964, the Treasury and the Defence 
Ministry have not provided the accounting 
procedures that would make this 
feasible. But the Prime Minister did not 
demur at the tentative figure put forward 
by the Labour MP for Ashton-under-
Lyne, Robert Sheldon, when he asked in 
the House of Commons: "The directlyattributable cost of our forces east of 
Suez is £320 millions a year. This includes 
overheads which, if added, would produce 
a figure of hardly less than £500 
millions. Is my Rt. Hon. friend aware 
that in the present economic situation 
this high level of expenditure is totallyunacceptable? " (Hansard, 1 June 1965). 
There followed an exchange with various 
MPS that was ended by a final statement 
from Mr Wilson. The surprising-and 
significant-thing was that the Prime 
Minister made no attempt to shoot down 
Mr Sheldon's estimate and, indeed, confirmed 
it. He said: "At the moment we 
have accumulated a total of roles, a total 
of commitments, a total of in-built costs 
adding up to the figures my hon. friend 
the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne mentioned, 
which are far beyond the reasonable 
economic capacity of the country". 

And Mr Wilson went on to say that the 
purpose of the defence review would be 
to go into all these figures. 

But any analysis which deals only in 
logistics cannot answer the vital question: 
what should be Britain's role in 
Asia in the second half of the twentieth 

c~ntury_? It should be, at the very least, 
dtsturbmg to realise that our nearest 
neighbours in Western Europe-who maya_lso b~ our sharpest commercial competitors 
m the export markets of Asia-
have decided on a role that is clearly 
very different from our own. The fact 
that the richest nation on earth plans to 
have 300,000 armed men in Vietnam 
should not blind us to the possibility that 
we, as Europeans, still recovering economically 
from a great war, may have 
national interests that diverge from those 
of Washington. 

If we look again at the figures available 
from Whitehall, we find that the Treasurydescribed the British fighting man, in 
terms of the strain imposed on the 
economy and the balance of payments, 
as "probably the most highly capitalised 
part of the economy, in the sense of having 
most equipment per man, on a scale 
not unlike oil refineries or electric powerstations". 

Increase 

The Treasury reports that the cost of 
maintaining and equipping each serviceman 
came to £5,075 in 1964 and that this 
figure has been rising annually by 10.4 
per cent for the past five years. Multiply 
this per capita cost by 65,000 and you 
get £329,875,000-a sum remarkablysimilar to that produced by Mr Sheldon's 
researches, although his total was obtained 
quite another way. And taking the Treasury's 
own "escalation factor" of 10.4 
per cent it is reasonable to assume that 
if things continue as they are, Britain's 
military bill east of Suez will rise byanother £33 millions during 1966. But 
that is the lowest possible estimate. It 
seems much more likely that the cost 
right now is running at a rate of something 
between £500 and £600 millions 
per annum-much of it a direct burden 
on our balance of payments and the 
strength of sterling. 

In the circumstances it is reasonable to 
ask if Britain's taxpayers are gettingvalue for money, and to direct this question 
not to the Defence Ministry but to 


the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations 
Office and 10 Downing Street. For 
if the military budget of France east of 
Suez is zero, and West Germany's is 
zero, Switzerland zero, Sweden zero and 
all the rest zero, then we must convince 
ourselves that £600 millions is buying us 
something truly worthwhile. We do, after 
all, live in a coldly competitive world 
and it is not a law of immutable nature 
that Sandys' Folly should automatically 
become a responsibility of his successors. 

If the Americans are prepared to expendlimitless blood and treasure in Vietnam 
because of their "domino" theory, we 
might remind ourselves of three things: 

1. They are very rich. 
2. They are inexperienced in Asia. 
3. They are arguing by metaphor. 
300 years 

Britain, with three centuries of skill in 
dealing with black people in the imperial 
era, has executed a brilliant devolution 
of power by granting liberty to 730 million 
Asians, Africans and West Indians 
in the space of 18 years. But the goodwill 
thus earned is now jeopardised bythe presence of the white man in Asia, 
in uniform, killing Asians. Some of them 
are British, some are Americans, Australians 
or New Zealanders who have Britain's 
full diplomatic backing. It is understandable 
enough, perhaps, how we 
arrived at this position. But it is the purpose 
of this pamphlet to question it, and 
ask if there should not be urgent steps 
to change things. 

The man who was elected first Secretary-
General of the Commonwealth, Arnold 
Smith, who has served as a Canadian 
ambassador both in Africa and in the 
Soviet Union, has recently declared that 
"The division of humanity between the 
white and other races, which coincides 
too closely for comfort with the division 
between the affluent industrialised 
peoples and the poor underdevelopedpeoples, is the most difficult and poten


tially dangerous problem in the world". 

It might be not only cheaper, but wiser, 
to recognise that President Ho Chi Minh 
may be a communist but that he has 
also been a Vietnam nationalist ever 
since he presented a petition for self-
determination after the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919. 

In South-East Asia, we are being placed 
in a false position. It appears to some 
Asians at least that white men in uniforms 
are trying to kill ideas by the use 
of expensive machines. This is not to 
suggest that Britain should abandon her 
Asian friends, or her responsibilities. But 
she must face the realities of the explosive 
force of nationalism in Asia today. 
It was G. K . Chesterton who once 
defined a patriot as a man who is not 
satisfied with the state of affairs in his 
country. This pamphlet is by patriots. 


2. Vietnam's nationalist 
•

commun1sm 


Today Vietnam is at war. The countryis divided. Foreign powers attempt to 
control the lives of the people. But nothing 
it seems ever really happens for the 
first time to Vietnam. In 111 BC the Red 
River Delta area of North Vietnam was 
annexed by China and there followed a 
thousand ;:ears of existence within the 
Chinese Empire. But the Vietnamese do 
not give up lightly, and in AD 939, in the 
last of the ten rebellions against the rule 
of China since AD 39 the country gained 
its independence while recognising the 
suzerainty of Peking. This Vietnamese 
state in time overthrew the kingdom of 
Champa in Southern Vietnam. After 
three centuries of missionary activities 
beginning in the seventeen century, the 
French had by the 1890s gained control 
of all of Indo-China. 

never accepted 

French rule, however, was never accepted 
in Vietnam to the extent it was in Laos 
and Cambodia. Nationalist activity was 
widespread after the Japanese victory 
over Russia in 1905. In 1925 the Association 
of Revolutionary Vietnamese 
Youth was founded by Ho Chi Minh. 
The Vietminh had been founded in 1941 
in China. They formally removed French 
sovereignty on 9 March 1945. 

When World War II ended a politicaland military vacuum existed in Vietnam. 
The Japanese collapsed, but the French 
could not at once send in forces to reestablish 
their colonial rule. In the north, 
in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh quickly asserted 
his authority. The guerrilla fightersagainst the Japanese formed the precarious 
frame-work of a revolutionary 
government. In Southern Vietnam, the 
adherents of Ho Chi Minh were una:ble 
to prevail. The Japanese had armed the 
religious sects and these struggled for 
authority in the Mekong Estuary and 
frustrated the efforts of the Vietminh to 
take over in Saigon. Under the protective 
shield of British troops commanded byGeneral Gracey, the French militaryforces were able to establish a precarious 
hold over the South. One of the great 
question marks over post-war Far Eas


tern politics is what would have happened 
if Ho Chi Minh had been able 
from the beginning to gain effective hold 
over all Vietnam? Certainly, much of 
the misery of the last 20 years would 
have been avoided. The regime would 
have been a communist one, but manythousands of lives would have been 
saved. Politically, Vietnam's long term 
revolution would not have been likely 
to accept the domination of China. Vietnam 
might well have been the Yugoslavia 
of the Far East. 

Even so, conflict was not inevitable when 
the French returned to Indo-China. On 
6 March 1946, an agreement was signed 
at Hanoi between the French consul in 
Tonking, and Ho Chi Minh. The Vietnamese 
agreed not to oppose the return 
of the French army to the North and 
France recognised the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam as a "free state 
with its own government, parliament and 
finances". The following months however 
saw suspicion increasing between 
France, determined, in spite of declarations 
to the contrary, to reassert her 
complete control, and Ho Chi Minh 
resolved to build his own revolutionaryregime. Following clashes in Haiphong,
the French bombarded the city on 23 
November 1946, causing heavy losses of 
life. On the night of 19 December, the 
Vietrninh launched a general attack on 
the French garrison in Hanoi, and the 
long war between France and the Vietminh 
began. 

Paris drafted hundreds of thousands of 
troops as the war broadened in scale. 
The French aim was to wear down the 
Vietminh. But in fact, the reverse happened. 
The final chapter of this tragedy 
saw France pouring troops into Dien 
Bien Phu. The object was to establish a 
firm French base in the midst of Vietrninh 
territory. As the Vietminh bombarded 
the French troops from the surrounding 
hills, the fortress became a trap. The 
long attempt by France to regain Vietnam 
was over. The day Dien Bien Phu 
fell, the Geneva Conference began. 

The Geneva Conference was attended by 
delegates of the United Kingdom and the 



USSR (joint chairmen), France, the 
United States, the Chinese People's 
Republic, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
and delegates from the Vietminh forces. 
The Conference ended on 21 July 1954, 
after agreement had been concluded for 
the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam. Amongst the terms 
of the agreement was the provision that 
no military base under the control of a 
foreign state would be established in 
either zone. The agreement further said 
"the two parties shall ensure that the 
zones assigned, do not adhere to anymilitary alliance and are not used for 
the resumption of further hostilities or 
to further an aggressive policy". In an 
accompanying declaration it was stated 
that "In order to ensure that sufficient 
progress in the restoration of peace has 
been made and that all the necessaryconditions obtain for free expression of 
the national will, General Elections shall 
be held in July 1956, under the supervision 
of an international commission". 
The Americans and South Vietname~e 
neither signed nor adhered to the declaration. 
The International Commission 
consisted of Canada, Poland, and India 
as chairman. 

But the elections provided for in the 
Geneva agreement never took place. In 
November 1954 General Lawton Collins 
arrived in Vietnam as the special envoy 
of President Eisenhower. Later, at the 
request of the South Vietnamese Premier, 
Dr Diem, Collins assumed full responsibility 
for the organisation and trainingof South Vietnamese armed forces. 

war prospects 

So almost from the moment that the 
Geneva Agreement was signed, the prospects 
of new war opened up. Neither Dr 
Diem nor the United States accepted the 
underlying concept of the Geneva Conference, 
namely that the Ho Chi Minh 
regime had come to stay. The Dulles 
cold war approach dominated Washington 
thinking. Fear of China and Russia 
made it impossible for the American 
Government to look at Hanoi as other 
than a dangerous Communist puppet. 

At the same time, hopes of a successful 
and viable South Vietnam regime being 
established quickly faded. South Vietnam, 
following the Geneva Conference, rapidly 
moved under the personal control ,of the 
Diem family. On 26 October 1955, the 
Republic of Vietnam was proclaimedwith Dr Diem as its President. No 
attempt was made to create a democratic 
society. Corruption was widespread and 
the secret police made sure that peopleexpressing views contrary to the Diem 
regime were eliminated often in violent 
fashion from political life in South Vietnam. 
The Diem regime also represented 
an appalling waste of talent. Many youngVietnamese trained at American universities 
returned hoping to play their partin a democratic society. They quicklyfound however, that Diem wanted tight 
obedience, not youthful initiative. As 
President Diem became increasingly isolated 
and the financial and politicalabuses of his family mounted, it became 
only a question of time before he was 
overthrown . Dr Diem and his brother 
were murdered in November 1963 and 
since then, rapidly changing militaryjuntas have dominated the country. 

Ho's regime 

North Vietnam has been governed by Ho 
Chi Minh and his colleagues with all the 
rigours of a communist regime. For centuries 
the North had relied on the South 
for much of its food. Supplies from the 
South used to amount to 300,000 tons of 
rice a year. Since partition, the Ho Chi 
Minh regime has made a desperate 
attempt at self-sufficiency, but with a 
population now increased to 14 million, 
the pressure on food supplies continues 
to be acute. More than 300,000 people 
have been moved from the Red River 
Delta into the mountainous regions of 
the north and west in an attempt to 
relieve the population pressure. Soviet 
bloc aid to North Vietnam has totalled 
£300,000,000. Russian anti-aircraft missiles 
defend Hanoi. Yet Ho Chi Minh 
and his leaders still retain their control 
of the armed forces. The North Vietnamese 
regular army of 200,000 men appear 
well-disciplined ; and reports suggest that 


many thousand of these forces have 
moved south along the Ho Chi Minh 
trail to join the Vietcong fighting for 
mastery below the seventeenth parallel. 

One of the most remarkable aspects of 
the Vietnamese crisis is that nobody has 
ever suggested that Ho Chi Minh has 
been maintained in power as a Russian or 
Chinese puppet. There is an atmosphereof grim austerity in North Vietnam. The 
government in Hanoi makes no attempt 
to curry favour. Yet because Ho Chi 
Minh is recognised as a nationalist as 
well as a communist, there is respect. 
Certainly, the corruption and chaos of 
the South are absent. 

South Vietnam 

.----:-----:----c:----~ 

If there is control and austerity in the 
North, no one can be sure about South 
Vietnam. Saigon today is a vast citywithout any clear government. But the 
millionaires in Saigon and the twin city 
of Cholon keep their money in Geneva 
and Hong Kong and few doubt that theywill flee when the Americans leave. The 
Buddhists in South Vietnam remain an 
enigma. In general they adopt an attitude 
of edgy neutrality. It is reported that 
some Buddhist priests are in regular contact 
with the Vietcong. For the Catholic 
population, the murder of Dr Diem 
meant the death of their protector. Manyof the hundreds of thousands who moved 
down from the North certainly dread the 
rule of Ho Chi Minh. Yet with no viable 
alternative in sight, the main mood in 
South Vietnam today is of massive 
disillusion. 

In the countryside, it is not clear justwhere the true loyalties lie. What is certain 
is that the vast majority of the population 
of the Mekong Estuary are just 
weary of a war that has gone on for 22 
years. They know no name in the cities 
now that Diem is dead, whom they can 
regard as a rival or alternative leader to 
Ho Chi Minh. 

The Vietcong have been ruthless in their 
operations. Boys of 14 and 15 have been 
pressed into guerrilla war. The South 

Vietnamese government, for its part,
applies conscription. But the peasants in 
South Vietnam can hardly be expected to 
respond to appeals for loyalty from Saigon 
when the South Vietnamese armyand the Americans after brief exercises 
of "pacification" in an area move on to 
leave the farmers to the Vietcong. 

Militarily there is a stalemate in Vietnam. 
The South Vietnamese army has a target 
figure of 650,000. American militaryforces have been built up to a massive 
total. But the morale of the South Vietnamese 
forces is low, with desertion rates 
reported to be high. The Vietcong in the 
South, although stiffened by North Vietnam 
regulars, cannot be described as 
"remote control" puppets. It would seem 
that a large_ proportion of them are 
nationalists first and communists second . 
The United States forces have no intelligence 
system that can provide an effective 
basis for combatting Vietcong activities. 
On the Cambodian frontier, 7,000 
miles of navigable waters provide an 
ideal operation area for the Vietcong. 
Their forces hide in the marshes. The 
few roads are mined or broken up by 

the guerrillas. 

The us heavy bombing of targets in both 
North and South has revived the confidence 
of some of the civilian population 
in Saigon. But there is no evidence that 
it has stopped the movement southwards 
of mortars, rockets and small arms flowing 
from North Vietnam to the Vietcong. 

It is clear that the United States is now 
committed to a major military involvement 
of a possible long duration. The 
us can hold massive bases and certain 
major cities such as Saigon. But' any 
political alternative to the Vietcong in 
the rest of the country is not yet visible. 
At the same time, the Vietcong cannot 
challenge the Americans in the head-on 
clash. So they are denied entry into the 
vital third phase of their campaign, namely 
the open warfare, that carried the Vietminh 
to triumph over the French at Dien 
Bien Phu. The stalemate appears complete. 
Some way to get the parties from 
the battlefield to the conference table has 
to be found. 


3. reconstructing a 
federation? 

When Tunku Abdul Rahman publiclydeclared his support for a federation of 
Malaya, Singapore and the British Borneo 
colonies of Sarawak and Sabah, it 
seemed an ingenious solution to a variety 
of problems. For Malaya, it would reduce 
the possibility of a communist 
take-over in Singapore, while the non Chinese 
peoples of Borneo would counterbalance-
so it was argued-the numerical 
weight of Singapore Chinese, and 
so broadly preserve the existing racial 
balance found in Malaya. For Lee Kuan 
Yew, Singapore's Chinese and socialist 
Prime Minister, it provided a larger and 
more stable unit within which his volatile 
island would be governed. For Sarawak 
and Sabah, it offered independence manyyears earlier than was otherwise conceivable. 
For Britain, it disposed of some 
awkward colonial legacies, and guaranteed 
the military base in Singapore. 

Although this solution seemed tidyenough, it involved one major miscalculation, 
and the signatories later acted as 
if they were labouring under two misapprehensions. 
Taken together, these 
resulted in the break-up of the Malaysian 
federation in its original form. 

The miscalculation concerned the supposed 
balancing role that the Borneo 
territories were to play on the side of 
the Malays vis-a-vis the Chinese. In 
Malaya, the Malays were narrowly in 
the majority over aiJ other races com-
bined-the Chinese being easily the 
second largest group. Singapore, however, 
contained five times as manyChinese as Malays. By visualising all the 
so-caiJed indigenous peoples of Borneo 
as on the Malay side of the racial equation, 
the Malays foresaw a retention of 
their numerical superiority over the 
Chinese-though Malays as such no 
longer made up half the total population. 
Unfortunately, this theory took little 
account of the racial feelings of the 
peoples concerned. For many of the indigenous 
peoples in Borneo were traditionally 
hostile to Malays, and were 
concerned with establishing their own 
distinctness from them. Thus the Malays 
were soon to find that while they made 
up approximately 40 per cent of the 

total population of Malaysia, the remaining 
60 per cent had in common a feeling 
of being non-Malay. This feeling became 
a prime issue in the arguments about 
the nature of the new state. 

The first of the two misapprehensionscentred on the actual political position 
of Singapore inside Malaysia. Constitutionally, 
the picture was clear: Malayahad 104 seats in the Federal Parliament; 
Sarawak-with a population of about 
800,000-had 24 ; and Sabah-with about 
500,000 people-had 16. Singapore, however, 
with a population of It million, 
was given only 15 seats. But in exchange 
for this reduced representation at the 
centre, Singapore retained control of 
education, language and the use of 60 
per cent of her own revenue. One implication 
of this apportionment of seats was 
clear. The three other states of Malaysia 
could never outvote the representativesof mainland Malaya, unless inroads 
could be made into traditional Malayand conservative Chinese support there. 
But was there a significant corollary to 
this constitutional position? Was Singapore 
regarded by the Malays as beingless in the federation than the other 
states? And did this partial exclusion 
extend to participation in federal politics? 
Certainly, when Lee Kuan Yew did 
intervene, at an early stage, in federal 
elections on the Malayan mainland, 
bitter resentment was caused. That resentment 
led ultimately to Singapore'sexpulsion. 

Malay v Chinese 

The second misapprehension concerned 
the nature of the new state. Was it to be 
mainland Malaya writ large, or was it to 
be something quite new? In Malaya,
political power was in the hands of the 
Malays ; the Chinese held the economic 
power and were graduaiJy acquiring citizenship 
and the vote. Malay leaders saw 
the symbols of Malay nationality-theirlanguage, their dress, some of their customs, 
their protected economic position 
-as equally paramount in the new and 
larger federation. Others, notably Lee 
Kuan Yew, Singapore's Prime Minister, 


held that since non-Malays 
\ 
were in the 
majority, Malaysian-i.e. multi-racialconsiderations 
had to be uppermost. No 
one den~d that Malay as the national 
language was desirable, or suggested that 
Malays should not have safeguards in 
the face of the economically more 
advanced Chinese ; but these measures, 
according to Lee, were to ensure equality, 
not to guarantee the establishment of 
Malay hegemony. In taking this line, Lee 
Kuan Yew incurred frequent charges of 
Chinese chauvinism, and of racial hostility 
against the Malays, charges which 
he immediately returned. 

It was not long before these disputes took 
concrete form in political action. Before 
the Singapore elections of September1963, the electoral balance there between 
Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party(PAP) and the communist Barisan Socialis 
was very delicate. In order to giveLee a free hand in fighting the Barisan, 
the ruling Alliance party on the mainland 
agreed not to send Federal ministers to 
campaign in these elections (although the 
Singapore Malay branch of the Alliance 
did contest three seats). Lee used this 
concession well, and won nearly two-
thirds of the seats. In return for this 
abstention on the part of the Alliance, 
it is said that Lee Kuan Yew agreed that 
his party would not intervene in the 
Federal elections on the mainland which 
were due to be held in April 1964. He 
and his supporters deny that any such 
agreement was made or broken. The PAP 
did intervene; it stood in nine mainland 
Malayan constituencies. But it won only 
one of them. 

Why did Lee intervene on the mainland? 
Perhaps because he saw the MalayanChinese Association (MCA)-one of the 
constituent parties in the Alliance-as 
especially vulnerable to his attack. If so, 
then the PAP might replace them as the 
party of the mainland Chinese, and so 
achieve federal power. Perhaps because, 
as he claimed later, Lee Kuan Yew saw 
that the conservative leaders of the MCA 
held little appeal for radical Chinese 
youth, and feared that such a political 
vacuum would be exploited by communists. 
It is hard to believe though that 

one of Lee's motives was not the sheer 
attraction of a bid for power. 

intervention 

Why in turn, did the mainland Alliance 
object to Lee's intervention in the 1964 
elections? First, and most simply, because 
this bid showed that Lee's intention 
was to get power at federal level. 
Just as in the Malay states the Chinese 
had been given freedom of economic 
opportunity but little power in politics. 
so Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore had 
been offered the prospect of Singapore'sbecoming the New York of Malaysia.
But Lee's reaction seems to have been 
that he would not remain the ruler of a 
small island, however wealthy. What was 
economic power without the political 
power that should flow from it? 
Secondly, Lee Kuan Yew's electoral 
appeal-socialist, multi-racial, anti-traditional-
threatened all the assumptions of 
the Malay leaders about the pattern of 
the new federation. Thirdly, the Malayan 
Chinese Association, provider of most of 
the mainland Alliance's funds, realised 
the direct threat posed by the PAP to their 
own position. The MCA leaders demanded 
action from the Tunku, who for his own 
reasons as well, took Lee's apparentlyineffective intervention very seriously. 

In the months that followed, ideologytook over. Was the old pattern of politics 
in mainland Malaya-a pattern based 
primarily on appeal to the separateracial communities-to be the pattern of 
Malaysia? Did the racial communities 
need to be reassured that governmentwas non-racial by having their own parties? 
Or had the time come, as Lee Kuan 
Yew insisted, for parties to make their 
appeal to economic and non-communal 
solidarities, on the grounds that they 
were more relevant, and less easily exploitable 
by racialist appeals? In his 
vigorous advocacy of non-communalism,
Lee appeared to the Malays to be nibbling 
at their traditional loyalties, and so 
trying to undermine the position of the 
Alliance. For example, Lee asked what 
was to be the significance of the introduction 
of Malay as the national lan



guage in 1967. Was this to be by general 
acceptance, or was it to be a veiled instrument 
for implementing Malay hegemony? 
By asking this question he was 
accused of attacking Malay rights, which 
he had agreed to respect when Malaysia 
was constituted. 

Sarawak's hopes 

The final rupture between Kuala Lumpurand Singapore may have been precipitated 
when Lee called a Malaysian Solidarity 
Convention in the early summer 
of 1965, consisting of opposition leaders 
from every state of the Federation, including 
Sarawak and Sabah. This meant 
first that Lee Kuan Yew was the 
acknowledged head of an embryonicfederal opposition ; and secondly, that 
he had made his political appeal effective 
in the Borneo territories. But as both 
Sarawak and Sabah had voted solidlyfor the Alliance at the elections, wha.t 
sort of appeal could Lee make? Whydid his politics exercise any attraction 
in Borneo at all? The answer lies in the 
nature of the hopes generated in both 
Sarawak and Sabah when Malaysia was 
created, and the extent to which those 
hopes had or had not been fulfilled. 

Sarawak's hopes were political and economic. 
Self-government and independence 
were to be accompanied by economic 
development on a scale which 
Sarawak by itself, or even under a benevolent 
colonial administration, could not 
afford. Singapore's trade and industry,
Malaya's rubber and tin earnings, 
Malaya's experience in rural development-
all pointed to plentiful development 
aid for Sarawak. In return, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman's Alliance Party (consisting 
of a dominant Malay party, with 
lesser Chinese and Indian parties) expected 
co-operation in the federal parliament. 
Sarawak, whose experience of 
organised politics dates back only to 
1959, not only adopted Malaya's pattern 
of party organisation but assumed the 
same name-the Sarawak Alliance. The 
only sizeable party not to join the 
Alliance was the largely Chinese-thoughavowedly non-communal-and commu


nist infiltrated Sarawak United People'sParty (SUPP) . In indirect elections on a 
universal adult suffrage in 1963, the Sarawak 
Alliance won a clear majority in 
the State, and added 20 out of Sarawak's 
24 federal seats to the Malayan Alliance 
in Kuala Lumpur. 

But discontent about the failure to realise 
rapid economic growth soon appeared.
No doubt in relation to the time since 
federation-less than two years at the 
time-such grievances were unreasonable. 
The government could point to the problems 
involved in developing such a 
country as Sarawak: a mere 800,000 
people living in an area as large as Singapore 
and Malaya combined ; 300 miles 
of road for a country 500 miles long ; 
few natural resources in a countrysidestill largely impenetrable jungle. Malaysian 
leaders could also claim that the full 
weight of development aid could onlybe felt after the first Malaysian Development 
Plan was begun in 1966. The opposition, 
however, and others in Sarawak, 
alleged that the discontent sprang not 
from unreasonable hopes, but from 
exaggerated promises made before 
federation in order to get agreement to 
it. They pointed out above all the failure 
to provide free primary education at 
federation, a broken promise raised and 
resented by members of all parties. In 
fact that single issue was held to be 
symptomatic of Kuala Lumpur's generallack of sensitivity to the feelings of 
people in Borneo, an insensitivity which 
extended to the replacement of British 
civil servants by Malayans rather than 
by locals. Some fear that it may lead to 
an attempt to impose the national language 
(Malay) on Sarawak in 1967. Constitutionally 
Sarawak has the right to 
retain English as its official languageuntil the State Assembly decides otherwise. 
But as education is a federal matter, 
it is felt that free primary education may 
only be granted if Malay becomes the 
medium of instruction. 

Such grievances are nursed not onlyagainst the Federal government, but 
against the State government of StephenKalong Ningkan. He is accused of failing 
to stand up to the Federal govern



ment and failing to express the feelings 
of Sarawak sufficiently strongly. The 
very docility of the state government, so 
acceptable -._.to Kuala Lumpur, creates 
resentment against both. It could also 
damage both. The SUPP claims that the 
system of indirect elections-direct at 
local level, with local councillors acting 
as an electoral college-misrepresentedtheir actual support on the ground. They 
assert that when direct elec~ions do take 
place, and they must before 1969, their 
chance of forming part of the state 
government is considerable. This at present 
remote threat is sufficiently real to 
prevent the Malayan Alliance from 
regarding 20 Sarawak votes as automatically 
theirs. 

hindered 

But the SUPP is hindered by two things. 
Firstly, the restrictions placed on political 
activity as a result of Confrontation 
are so great that the SUPP, led by moderates, 
has voluntarily called a virtual political 
truce. Secondly, the Clandestine 
Communist Organisation (cco), consisting 
of Chinese farmers and traders west of 
Sibu in the Rejang delta and south of 
Kuching, has infiltrated the SUPP heavily 
at local level. This threat to security from 
disaffected Chinese farmers has grown 
greater. At first it could be kept in check 
by Special Branch surveillance ; then it 
called for the rounding up of several 
thousand Chinese, their interrogation in 
detention centres, and their resettlement 
in communities where -as in the 
Malayan Emergency-they were less 
isolated and vulnerable to pressure from 
communist or Indonesian agents. So 
whatever the political character of the 
SUPP leadership, they clearly have a 
problem of organisation and discipline 
on their hands, the more so since the cco 
made a point of infiltrating the supp'scampaign directed to the native peoples 
of Sarawak. As far as these-<.:hieflyIbans, Dayaks and Melanaus-are concerned, 
neither the SUPP nor the cco 
appears to have impinged seriously on 
their awareness or their allegiance. But 
then who has? It can be argued that the 
transistor radio, local headmen, friendly 

British and well-meaning Malay troops 
have all turned the natives' attention 
towards the new Federation. But the 
arm of the government is not long. Often 
British troops are regarded as actuallybeing the government. There are cases of 
tribes blaming Confrontat·ion on to 
federation. There is a disturbing feeling 
that the natives are a political tabula 
rasa, and while no one claims that they 
are anything but anti-Indonesian, it is 
apparent that their allegiance has not 
yet been obtained by the new Malaysia. 

determination 

This will probably only occur when a 
Sarawak government appears to state 
Sarawak's claims strongly enough-perhaps 
in new constitutional relationship 
to the centre-and when the federal 
government's expressed determination 
to develop Sarawak in the first Malaysian 
Plan begins to take effect. No 
one disputes that the 300 million Malay 
dollars allotted for that purpose is anything 
but generous or adequate. But 
while the Chief Minister personally 
announces Minor Rural Works-footpaths, 
footbridges-totalling a few thousand 
Malayan dollars, and so long as 
Confrontation stretches the available resources, 
the advantages of the Federation 
are not immediately obvious. 

These advantages must seem even less 
apparent now that Singapore has left 
Malaysia. It was one thing to be in a 
federation ruled by Malays, but which 
nevertheless had at least one strong nonMa'lay 
leader-Lee Kuan Yew. It was 
one thing under those conditions to playdown local sentiment in the interest of 
the larger unit. It must seem quite another 
now when the interests of one partof the Federation-mainland Malaya-
have prevailed so powerfully. It would 
seem inevitable that Sarawak's demands 
for proper attention to its local needs 
will be voiced with increasing vigour, if 
there is the right leader to do so. 

In Sabah there was until recently a leader 
capa:ble of playing such a role. He was 
the Federal Minister for Sabah Affairs, 


10 

' 

Donald Stephens. Since Stephens was 
largely responsible for bringing Sabah 
into Federation, he was an obvious 
choice for the post of first Chief Minister. 
But this appointment took place in 
the context of a more complicated political 
deal. Since Stephens had the most 
important post, and since his party-
UPKO, the party of the native Kadazuns 
-was only as strong as the party of the 
indigenous Muslim peoples (usNo), usNo 
was given the post of Head of State. 

The Chinese party in the Sabah Alliance 

(SANAP) took the job of Deputy Chief 

Minister, but the subordinate position of 

SANAP and of its appointee, Peter Lo, was 

never in dispute. What was in dispute 

was the relationship between Tun Mus


tapha, the Head of State, and Donald 

Stephens. Tun Mustapha claimed that he 

should have been involved in political

decisions, and that Stephens was exceed


ing his powers. Stephens replied that 

Tun Mustapha was only a figurehead

anyway. By the summer of 1964 Sabah 

was in the middle of a full scale political 

crisis, which was solved by promoting 

Stephens upstairs into the largely nomi


nal job of Federal Minister for Sabah 

Affairs, and by putting the representative 

of the smallest party-Peter Lo-into the 

most important job, that of Chief Minis


ter. Stephens' reaction was simple. As a 

member of the Federal government he 

gave it his loyalty and support. But with


in Sabah itself he could be more demand


ing. He claimed that the power struggle 

between UPKO and USNO could only be 

settled by the holding of elections, which 

were due in early 1966. Either the 

Alliance of the three parties could con


test these elections as a single party

rather than as a coalition of three ; in 

which case Stephens was confident that 

he could dominate such a unified party. 

Alternatively, the three parties could 

compete in the election amicably, shar


ing out the senior posts afterwards 

strictly according to electoral results. 

Failing agreement on this, the three par


ties would fight the election on a "winner 

takes all" basis. 

In suggesting such a plan, Stephens was 
serving notice that he wanted political 

power in Sabah. He resented the close 
ties between USNO and the Malay partof the mainland Alliance. He blamed the 
Federal government for its part in resolving 
the Sabah crisis in favour of USNO. 
He criticised USNO and the new Chief 
Minister for ruling Sabah in a way that 
was too deferential to the Federal 
government. Stephens in short was standing 
up for Sabah's rights within the 
federation, and those rights he said, had 
to be respected if Sabah was to remain 
contented. Unlike Sarawak, Sabah has 
no fears over either education or the 
imposition of an alien langauge, for 
Malay has always been a lingua franca. 
But local fears of federal domination 
spring from the issue of the replacement 
of British civil servants by Malayansrather than by Sabahans. Furthermore 
Sabah's acute labour shortage means that 
a large influx of outside labour might 
swamp the native peoples. Although30,000 Indonesians already work on 
plantations in the south, although Filipino 
labour seeps in unofficially in the 
east, and although half Sabah's rubber 
stood untapped in 1964 because of the 
labour shortage, Sabahan feeling for 
their separate identity within the Federation 
makes them liable to disregard the 
clear call of economic need. It was over 
such issues that Stephens felt he could 
regain power in Sabah. 

opposition 

When the Malaysian Solidarity Convention 
met in the summer of 1965, the 
situation throughout the Federation was 
not one that the Federal governmentcould afford to ignore. There was sufficient 
opposition to the Alliance parties 
in both Sabah and Sarawak for Lee Kuan 
Yew's establishment as leader of a substantial 
federal opposition to be possible. 
He appeared to be campaigning against 
the Alliance in every section of the 
Federation . Rebuffed in elections on the 
mainland he had found allies elsewhere. 
The political threat to Malay dominance 
was now real, and the demands from 
Malay and Chinese leaders for action 
against Lee could not be ignored. Some 
wanted more drastic action than others; 


the attractions of acting against Lee personally 
and thus capturing Singapore must 
have seemed strong. But the fact that Lee 
was not arrested and that Singapore was 
released from its links instead is probably 
the only cheering part of the collapse 
of the original federation. 

no threat 

For the mainland Alliance party, Singapore's 
expulsion has undoubtedly settled 
one short-term question. There is now 
no political threat to the maintenance of 
Alliance power. The Tunku read the riot 
act in Borneo, and Donald Stephens first 
resigned as Federal Minister for Sabah 
Affairs in protest against Singapore'sdeparture, and shortly afterwards retired 
from politics altogether. 

But many uncomfortable questions have 
been raised. Since the Borneo territories 
were introduced as a counter balance to 
Singapore, what are they now counter 
balancing? While it may have been worth 
while incurring confrontation for the 
sake of the original Federation, is it 
worth doing so for the rump? How 
should Malaysia react to Singapore'sexternal policies, particularly towards 
Indonesia? And what are the feelings of 
the e.Hiance leaders as they see a resurgence 
of communist activity in Singapore's 
trade unions and university? The 
feelings of Lee Kuan Yew and his ministers 
can be imagined. At all costs the 
internal security position in Singapore 
must not deteriorate. To prevent this the 
British military base could serve a purpose, 
besides providing a substantial 
amount of foreign exchange for the 
rather hard pressed Singapore economy. 
If the employment situation did deteriorate 
then the political situation would be 
much harder to hold. But in their efforts 
to improve their economic prospects, the 
Singapore leaders have to overcome the 
pinpricks of an incipient trade war with 
the Federation, and to make a trickypolitical decision over resuming the barter 
trade with Indonesia in some shape 
or form. Perhaps the restorarion of the 
original Federation of Malaysia, which 
all Singapore's leaders insist is their long 

term aim, may come about sooner than 
is generally expected, especially if some 
wider settlement of the now very irrelevant 
Confrontation policy follows in the 
wake of Indonesia's internal changes. In 
the long term both Tunku Abdul Rah-
man and Lee Kuan Yew may see that 
their original instinct in merging was 
the correct one. 


4. Indonesia 
The relevance of Indonesia was never 
more convincingly illustrated than on 30 
September 1965 when a coup not onlyimmediately overturned the internal 
balance of power, but changed the pattern 
of Southeast Asia, undermined the 
Peking-Djakarta axis and exploded the 
myth of Afro-Asian unity. 

Among the newly independent countries 
(Indonesia won her independence only 
in 1949) none has been so nation-conscious 
as Indonesia. The strength of 
Sukarno has rested primarily on the fact 
that he has been a unifying force, giving 
for the first time a sense of nationhood 
to different peoples in many islands which 
under colonial rule were kept separate 
and were unevenly developed. This explosive 
nationalism was already among 
Indonesian leaders when Japan still 
occupied the country. "We will establish 
an Indonesian national state," Sukarno 
told a group of Indonesian leaders 
brought together by the Japanese in JunP 
1945 to form a constitution for an independent 
Indonesia. "This is what we must 
all aim at," he said, "the setting up of 
our National State upon the unity of one 
Indonesian land from the tip of Sumatra 
right to Irian". He entered a caveat to 
which time has increasingly given point;
"But, undoubtedly there is a danger involved 
in this principle of nationalism. 
The danger is that men will possiblysharpen nationalism until it becomes 
chauvinism, and think of 'Indonesia 
ueber Alles' . . .. We must proceed towards 
the unity of the world .... We 
have not only to establish the state of 
Indonesia Merkeka, but we also have to 
proceed towards the family of nations". 

nationalism 

Throughout the life of this young Republic 
nationalism has overshadowed all other 
political emotions ; even the communist 
movement which grew rapidly in the past 
ten years had to tailor its doctrine to 
give the semblance of an Indonesian 
identity. Indonesians did not win independence 
until after defeating two military 
actions by the Dutch ex-rulers. They 
had to wait until 1963 before West Irian 

part of the Netherlands East lndies as 
much as Java or Sumatra, was recognised 
as within Indonesian jurisdiction. This 
period of uncompleted independenceembittered Sukarno, whose impassioned 
oratory made West Irian into a nationwide 
campaign and an international issue. 
Political activities were dissipated,
nationalism was reinforced, and especially 
in the last stages of the campaign, the 
country's economy was noticeablyweakened. 

development 

Economic development was slow and 
uneven. Indeed, had Indonesia not had 
such natural riches, the country would 
have been virtually bankrupt. Yet one 
ideal has been achieved-a national 
identity. When all criticism, and a lot of 
it is justified, is made of President 
Sukarno, his fiercest enemy cannot denythat he has made Indonesia conscious 
of being one nation. This new unit has 
thrust itself into councils of the United 
Nations; it seeks the support of the Muslim 
world and is unquestionably one of 
the big five among the Afro-Asian-Latin-
American nations. 

Indonesia first adopted western parliamentary 
democracy, with a multiplicityof political parties as in Holland. Some 
of them merely reflected the personalviews and interests of a small group of 
people ; the most important politicalleaders of this period-Hatta, Sjahrirand Natsir, were all western-educated, 
with views similar to those of the Fabian 
Society; they were evolutionary, not 
revolutionary. With considerable success 
they carried out schemes of post-warrehabilitation, restored and extended 
communications and built up a non-party 
civil service. Most notably, they extended 
health services, education in every field, 
but especially Eecondary schools, and 
universities. Such organisations as 
Unesco, Unicef, the British Council, 
Usis, and later the Colombo Plan facilitated 
rapid growth among people desperately 
anxious to learn. This was a 
liberal period ; the press was free ; the 
judiciary and an expanding civil service 


were to a considerable degree free from 
political pressure. 

This period of constitutional democracy 
following approximately western patterns 
did not satisfy the more nationalist elements 
in Indonesian political life, including 
the President who wanted Indonesianisation. 
The success of the PNI (Nationalist 
Party) in the 1954 elections strengthened 
his position. He became more 
actively political, while the position of 
Hatta and, more striking, that of Sjahrir,
was weakened. Extremes won, within the 
PNI itself, as well as within the Masjumi 
which was soon supplanted by the Nahdataul 
Ulama. The PKI (CommunistParty) began to live down the unpopularity 
it had earned for itself in the 
Madium rebellion of 1948. Expressed in 
numbers, the PNI topped the poll in 1955, 
gaining 57 seats; the PKI jumped from 
17 to 39 seats ; the Nahdatul Ulama from 
8 to 45; the Socialists dropped from 14 
to 5. Sukarno's star was now in the 
ascendant ; the success of the Bandung 
Conference in 1955 added to its lustre. 

guided democracy 

Sukarno had consistently stood for an 
Indonesian pattern of society for the rule 
of the combined forces of nationalism, 
religion and communism. Parliamentary 
democracy was breaking down ; challenge 
came from the army, from groups outside 
Java which resisted the Javacentrism 
so characteristic of earlier Dutch 
colonial days. A younger generationwhich was revolutionary in outlook saw 
the rapid advance towards an industriallyviable and an increasingly prosperoussociety in China. Sukarno himself was 
impressed on his first visits to China and 
the Soviet Union in 1956. On his return 
he explained, "I do not want to become 
a dictator. I am really a democrat. What 
I would like to see in this Indonesia of 
ours is guided democracy-democracywith leadership, but still democracy". 

There was no one to challenge Sukarno 
in February 1957 when his idea of 
"guided democracy" was accepted, and 
a National Council formed in which all 

parties, the communists included, could 
co-operate. This national front idea was 
enthusiastically supported by the PNI and 
the PKI. The army did not function as a 
political party, but its acquiescence was 
essential. Its position was formally established 
a year later when a serious rebellion, 
helped and armed from outside, 
threatened the country's independence. 
The causes of the rebellion were varied ; 
personal rivalries always so near the surface 
in Indonesian politics ; growing dissatisfaction 
with Sukarno and the disproportionate 
emphasis placed on Java 
in economic as well as in political spheres 
of interest. The CIA demonstrably played 
a part, calculating that Sukarno would 
be overthrown. But the opposite happened; 
Sukarno's position was strengthened 
by the reinforcement of national 
unity. Equally important and with far-
reaching effects, the army emerged as a 
decisive force and General Nasution a 
widely known and impressive leader. 

The year 1958 effectively ended the short 
experiment of trying to integrate western 
civilian and parliamentary rule within 
the Indonesian pattern of society. In 1959 
Sukarno, whose political leadership was 
unchallenged, abolished the 1950 constitution 
and returned to the presidentialcabinet of 1945. Parliament was dissolved 
by presidential decree. Only ten political 
parties were allowed. They did not include 
the moderate religious party, the 
Masjumi, nor the Indonesian Socialist 
Party, both of which had lost a greatdeal of prestige by their equivocal policy 
during the 1958 rebellion. Henceforth, 
functional groups, the armed forces and 
the three main parties, the PNI, the NU 
and the PKI, were the expression of 
guided democracy. 

NASAKOM 

But power remained concentrated in the 
hands of Sukarno, who held the country 
together in a uniquely Indonesian pattern 
based on the formula NASAKOM ; N as 
(Nationalism), A (Agama, or religion),
Kom (communism). It was, in effect, the 
same formula Sukarno adopted in 1927 
when he first appeared on the political 

, 

scene and was one of the founders of 
the Nationalist Party. It suited the PNI. 
It gave expression to Islam and therefore 
satisfied the Nahdatul Ulama (an extreme 
Muslim party) and it provided a platform 
on which the PKI could build a 
mass party. Sukarno did not equate communism 
with the PKI, but under the able 
leadership of D . N. Aidit, the PKI ostensibly 
supported Sukarno, and by active 
organisation outmanoeuvred the PNI in 
its appeal to nationalism. The main challenge 
to the PKI came from the army, 
whose Commander-in-Chief, General 
Nasution acquired considerable political 
influence after his successful handling of 
the rebellion. The PKI increasingly provided 
an outlet for political activities. 
The army provided discipline. Sukarno, 
bewitching the masses with unendingslogans, played the PKI off against the 
Army, Aidit against Nasution. Both men 
also needed Sukarno. 

foreign policy 

This internal struggle fw power was 
obscured by a foreign policy to which 
all groups could subscribe. At first the 
emphasis was on non-alignment. The 
Bandung Conference in 1955 gave much 
prestige to Indonesia among African and 
Asian countries who were represented. 
The growing influence of China and 
American strategy in Asia, notably over 
Vietnam, have overtaken the non-alignment 
idea. 

Sukarno characteristically formulated an 
idea which seemed to him to fit more 
aptly into the world picture. He saw the 
world divided, not between the rich and 
the poor, communist and non-communist, 
white and non-white races, but between 
the new emerging forces and the old 
established forces. In his IndependenceDay speech on 17 August 1963 he explained, 
"The New Emerging Forces are 
composed of the Asian nations, the African 
nations, the Latin American nations, 
the nations of the socialist (communist) 
forces, the progressive groups in 
the capitalist countries ... at least 2,000 
million people on the earth!" The appealof this slogan may prove to have an 

appeal to politically interested peoplesin under-developed countries for whom 
cold war and ideological struggle within 
the communist world have little immediate 
significance. Neither Peking nor 
Moscow found it difficult to weave the 
idea into their propaganda patterns. It 
fitted into Indonesia's confrontation 
policy carried recklessly to the point of 
withdrawal from the United Nations. It 
was skilfully manipulated by Peking, with 
which Indonesia was on extremely close 
terms until the recent coup. It provided 
an Indonesian twist to the largest and 
best-organised communist party outside 
communist countries. 

nee-colonialism 

Neo-colonialism provides an economic 
diversion in an economy which would 
have made any less naturally wealthy 
country bankrupt many years ago. The 
Indonesians also combine resilience of 
character with vast resources many of 
them not only underdeveloped, but unexplored. 
In the first years of independence, 
the economy was primarily in 
Dutch and Chinese hands. After 1957, a 
policy of Indonesian isation resulted in 
the taking over of the Dutch estates and 
restrictions on Chinese traders. But 
foreign aid continued ; by the end of 
1962, American non-military aid amounted 
to us $223,000,000 and advance us 
$400,000,000 in loans over a 12-yearperiod. The only country with financial 
resources which provided large-scalefinancial aid to Indonesian economy in 
1964 was the United States. This help 
was forfeited when Sukarno launched 
his confrontation policy against Malaysia. 

The story does not end there. Although 
fighting a guerrilla war with Britain, 
Indonesian relations with Holland started 
a new chapter in November 1963 with a 
trade agreement, which was followed 
throughout 1964 by increasing trade as 
well as cultural contacts and the 
exchange of many missions in both these 
fields. One result was that during the 
first nine months of 1964 Dutch importsfrom Indonesia amounted to 236,000,000 
Guilders, i.e. 63 per cent about the level 


of the same period in 1963. Dutch 
exports amounted to 31,000,000 Guilders, 

i.e. 41 per cent above the level of the 
same period in 1963. This is Indonesia's 
most important contact with the West, 
but gradually, where there are no colonial 
problems involved (she sees Singaproe 
as a British colonial involvement)
relations with Western powers are built 
on a new basis. This applies particularly 
to West Germany. 
Malaysia provided the main target for 
Indonesia's campaign against neo-colonialism. 
Indonesians can scarcely fear 
Malaysia as such, but use contradictoryarguments such as that Malaysia is part of 
Anglo-American encirclement of Southeast 
Asia, a strategical shield for Australia 
and New Zealand, a safeguardagainst the assumed expansion of a hostile 
China. While there is a strong case 
to be made for some regional grouping 
in South-east Asia-and Indonesia was 
responsible for the Maphilindo idea-
the sequence of events in the formation 
of Malaysia was used by Sukarno to 
justify his confrontation policy. At the 
same time Confrontation coincided with 
the needs of internal struggle ; it gave a 
theoretical reason for modern well-
equipped armed forces ; it strengthenedthe PKI ; it underlined Sukarno's neocolonialist 
propaganda themes ; it has 
been vigorously used by Peking and Moscow 
to prove that imperialism remains 
an active enemy of newly independent 
nations ; it encouraged ideas of a Greater 
Indonesia. It is a fantastic drain on Indonesia's 
economy making her more and 
more dependent on China and the Soviet 
Union, both of which countries project 
their aid as being in the cause of self-

reliance. 

unpopular 

The "crush Malaysia" campaign developed 
its own momentum, but in the 
absence of any military success, it became 
less and less popular except amongthe PKI members who saw it in political, 
rather than military terms. For the same 
reason, only China and Pakistan gave it 
propaganda support. Until 30 September 

coup, Indonesia's confrontation policy 
was pushing the country into China's 
strategic orbit and isolating her, even 
among Afro-Asian nations. Britain's 
exclusively military approach towards 
Indonesia only served to confirm communist 
propaganda. Yet it was clear 
that as long as this area of the world 
was conceived primarily in strategic 
terms, no real stability could be 
achieved. 

the coup 

The 30 September coup transformed the 
situation overnight, both in internal and 
external affairs. Firstly it has affected the 
position of President Sukamo. The supremacy 
of the "Supreme Leader of the 
Revolution" was dramatically challenged;
his attitude towards the coup, organised 
by the head of the Presidential Guard, 
remains unclear. His silence during the 
days following the coup, his failure to 
attend the funeral of six murdered 
generals and his unwillingness to criticise 
the Air Force and Naval leaders or 
the PKI-all these incidents have cut 
down the size of Sukarno so drasticallythat it is unlikely he can regain his position. 
Secondly, the role of the Army has 
become the major factor in Indonesia. 
General Nasution may still find Sukarno's 
diminished appeal valuable in maintaining 
the country's unity, but the 
General's influence was demonstrated 
when Sukarno had to drop Pranoto as 
Chief of Staff and appoint his own 
nominee, Suharto. Again, Sukarno has 
opposed a ruthless purge of the armed 
forces and the civil administration, but 
on 25 October Nasution broadcast an 
appeal urging officers to ensure the 
elimination of PKI members and those 
who had supported the September coup. 
Sukarno had to suspend Air Force 
officers, members of the National Front, 
Members of Parliament and several members 
of the Supreme Advisory Council, 
while his right hand Minister Subandrio 
was relieved of his post as head of 
Internal Security and Intelligence. Sukarno, 
though a spectator, still remains the 
leader, with sufficent authority to call 
together all the provincial governors and 


leaders of the armed forces throughoutthe country. He still adheres to his 
NASAKOM policy but maintains that the 
Kom does not stand for the PKI, that 
communism must be accepted as a political 
fact of life in internal as in external 
affairs. He has not yet agreed to ban 
the PKI. Thirdly, there is the role of the 
PKI. The degree to which it was involved 
in the coup remains unclear. The assumption 
was widespread that it had trained 
military, as well as political cadres, ready 
to attempt a final showdown with the 
Army, its one serious rival. But this challenge 
was generally considered unlikely 
as long as Sukarno was the SupremeLeader of the Revolution and life-President. 
Thus, it would seem unlikely that 
the coup of 30 September-now called 
GESTAPU, an abbreviation of Gerakan 
September tiga pulu-was directly planned 
by the PKI. It had the support of 
some PKI groups, and editorial support, 
the following day, in the PKI newspaper. 

Had it proved successful, the PKI was 
undoubtedly in the strongest position to 
exploit it. When the coup proved abortive, 
and the Army moved in to suppressit, thousands of PKI members rushed to 
dissociate themselves from the party.
Further, the fanatical behaviour of 
women members of the PKI in torturing 
to death six top generals, cast a new 
light on the methods which might be 
adopted by communists in their struggle 
for power. 

army 

At the same time, the anti-PKI campaign 
organised by the Army might easily 
cause concern and General Nasution 
has already been warned by PKI members 
in Central and East Java that if he goes 
too far they will be driven to supportAidit, though they had nothing to do 
with the coup and were opposed to such 
action. Also President Sukarno has not 
yet decided whether the PKI should be 
banned. 

Neither the Army nor the PKI is prepared 
for civil war. The communists are 
not ready. Nasution realises its dangers. 

There remains the importance of extreme 
religious groups whose fanaticism can 
easily be underestimated. One of the most 
unfortunate aspects of President Sukar-, 
no's attitude to political problems was 
his appeal to hatred ; "crush India" ; 
"crush Malaysia" ; "crush China" ; 
"crush Britain"-all these rallying cries 
followed his initial "crush Holland" and 
encourage violence. There is the danger 
today that religious groups, led by extremists 
of the Nahdatul Ulama, and 
brought up on such slogans, will endanger 
Indonesia's stability. In this atmosphere, 
the anti-Chinese feeling, latent in 
Indonesian political and economic life, 
has once again found expression. This is 
a traditional feeling, independent of who 
is in power in China. Events in 1959 
culminating in widespread anti-Chinese 
riots illustrate its dangers. Relations with 
the People's Republic of China are 
already strained. 

The 30 September coup has changedIndonesia's role in the Afro-Asian world 
from that of an aggressive leader against 
neo-colonialism to being a passive spectator. 
An Indonesian pro-Peking policy, 
with which Subandrio was so closelyassociated, is no longer a determinant in 
Asian affairs. The confrontation of 
Malaysia is not likely to be a priority,
either politically or militarily. This would 
seem to be a moment when Britain must 
rethink her attitude towards Indonesia. 
Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, may 
have had this in mind when, in Tokyo, 
on 21 October, he offered the hand of 
friendship to any Indonesian government 
which wants to end the confrontation with 
Malaysia and "live on proper terms" 
with its neighbours. Any such government, 
he said, "will find that we are very 
willing to be on friendly terms with 
them". Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Dr 
Subandrio, responded to this gesture and, 
at the beginning of December, he said 
that his country would not refuse a 
chance to discuss with Britain the confrontation 
of Malaysia. 


5. towards a settlement 
We must beware of "South-east Asia": 
it is a western term without meaning for 
the countries of the area. The area has 
no unity. Any stable and permanentsettlement must be based on the religious, 
ethnic and cultural affinities that are 
meaningful. Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines is one such area ; Thailand, 
Laos and Cambodia-plus Burma-
makes a Buddhist zone; Vietnam is the 
odd man out which explains a good deal. 
Much confusion has followed French 
rule straddling a cultural divide between 
Vietnam on the one hand, Laos and 
Cambodia on the other. 
aspirations 
The aim mustbeto use popular aspira-
tions and nationalist impulses to support 
a settlement. It is a mistake to think 
these countries will bow down to China 
thinking they have no choice but to do 
so once western power is removed. They 
were not under Chinese domination as 
small, tribute-paying countries in the 
past and they need not be now. Nor is 
there any evidence of China seeking to 
impose such domination. The idea that 
the overseas Chinese should be used to 
further revolution was soon dropped by 
Peking-if, indeed, it was ever enter-
tained. Of late, China's concern has been 
to keep these governments in line in sup-
port of an Afro-Asian policy for an 
anti-imperialist front to isolate the 
United States, and to dismiss the Rus-
sians. China has been more concerned 
to keep their international allegiencethan to subvert them internally-Paki-
stan is a good example of this policy. 
Thus the basic Chinese attitude to the 
area still seems to be defensive, ready to 
coexist with neutralists, seeking above all 
the withdrawal of American powerwhich it fears. Chinese support for revo-
lution-as in Vietnam-is in accordance 
with their current world policy. But they 
would much prefer to see such revolu-
tions happening in Latin America or 
Africa than near their borders. It cannot 
be too often reiterated that events in 
Vietnam have proceeded in accordance 
with the internal necessities of Vietnam 
ever since the Vietminh was formed 
under Ho Chi Minh's leadership in 1941. 
At no time has China been the leader or 
the dictator of events there. 
While this has begun to be an acceptable 
opinion in Washington, it was not in Mr 
Dulles' day when the "domino theory" 
was the basic assumption on which policy 
was founded ; and unfortunately the 
containment of China in this sense still 
underlies American policy in Vietnam. 
According to this theory the advent of 
communists to power all over Vietnam-
following on the success of communism 
in China-would lead to communist 
success in Cambodia and Laos, then in 
Thailand, then in Malaysia and so on ; 
even India would find its flanks turned. 
contiguity 
Did this idea arise m President Eisen-
hower's mind on the assumption that 
communism in China had been a result 
of contiguity with Russia, and commu-
nism in Vietnam had been due to con-
tiguity with China-like some tidal 
waters flowing through dykes succes-
sively breached? The assumption of 
course is wrong about the causes of com-
munism in China and wrong about the 
causes of communism in Vietnam. 
Chinese communism was hamperedrather than promo1:ed by Stalin duringits crucial struggle for power. Vietna-
mese communism always kept China, the 
hereditary enemy, at arm's length and 
was primarily nurtured on indigenousVietnamese nationalist, anti-colonialist 
emotion. Indeed, the nonsense of the 
domino theory could not have been more 
exposed than in Indonesia where the 
native growth of communist strength-
until its arrest by recent events-was 
far greater and far more potentiallydangerous than a communist gainresulting from an American withdrawal 
in Vietnam. 
Among many barriers to the growth of 
communist power in South-east Asia two 
may be mentioned. The first is nationa-
lism which-as we have just seen in 
Indonesia-reaots against too insistent a 
5. towards a settlement 
We must beware of "South-east Asia": 
it is a western term without meaning for 
the countries of the area. The area has 
no unity. Any stable and permanentsettlement must be based on the religious, 
ethnic and cultural affinities that are 
meaningful. Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines is one such area ; Thailand, 
Laos and Cambodia-plus Burma-
makes a Buddhist zone; Vietnam is the 
odd man out which explains a good deal. 
Much confusion has followed French 
rule straddling a cultural divide between 
Vietnam on the one hand, Laos and 
Cambodia on the other. 
aspirations 
The aim mustbeto use popular aspira-
tions and nationalist impulses to support 
a settlement. It is a mistake to think 
these countries will bow down to China 
thinking they have no choice but to do 
so once western power is removed. They 
were not under Chinese domination as 
small, tribute-paying countries in the 
past and they need not be now. Nor is 
there any evidence of China seeking to 
impose such domination. The idea that 
the overseas Chinese should be used to 
further revolution was soon dropped by 
Peking-if, indeed, it was ever enter-
tained. Of late, China's concern has been 
to keep these governments in line in sup-
port of an Afro-Asian policy for an 
anti-imperialist front to isolate the 
United States, and to dismiss the Rus-
sians. China has been more concerned 
to keep their international allegiencethan to subvert them internally-Paki-
stan is a good example of this policy. 
Thus the basic Chinese attitude to the 
area still seems to be defensive, ready to 
coexist with neutralists, seeking above all 
the withdrawal of American powerwhich it fears. Chinese support for revo-
lution-as in Vietnam-is in accordance 
with their current world policy. But they 
would much prefer to see such revolu-
tions happening in Latin America or 
Africa than near their borders. It cannot 
be too often reiterated that events in 
Vietnam have proceeded in accordance 
with the internal necessities of Vietnam 
ever since the Vietminh was formed 
under Ho Chi Minh's leadership in 1941. 
At no time has China been the leader or 
the dictator of events there. 
While this has begun to be an acceptable 
opinion in Washington, it was not in Mr 
Dulles' day when the "domino theory" 
was the basic assumption on which policy 
was founded ; and unfortunately the 
containment of China in this sense still 
underlies American policy in Vietnam. 
According to this theory the advent of 
communists to power all over Vietnam-
following on the success of communism 
in China-would lead to communist 
success in Cambodia and Laos, then in 
Thailand, then in Malaysia and so on ; 
even India would find its flanks turned. 
contiguity 
Did this idea arise m President Eisen-
hower's mind on the assumption that 
communism in China had been a result 
of contiguity with Russia, and commu-
nism in Vietnam had been due to con-
tiguity with China-like some tidal 
waters flowing through dykes succes-
sively breached? The assumption of 
course is wrong about the causes of com-
munism in China and wrong about the 
causes of communism in Vietnam. 
Chinese communism was hamperedrather than promo1:ed by Stalin duringits crucial struggle for power. Vietna-
mese communism always kept China, the 
hereditary enemy, at arm's length and 
was primarily nurtured on indigenousVietnamese nationalist, anti-colonialist 
emotion. Indeed, the nonsense of the 
domino theory could not have been more 
exposed than in Indonesia where the 
native growth of communist strength-
until its arrest by recent events-was 
far greater and far more potentiallydangerous than a communist gainresulting from an American withdrawal 
in Vietnam. 
Among many barriers to the growth of 
communist power in South-east Asia two 
may be mentioned. The first is nationa-
lism which-as we have just seen in 
Indonesia-reaots against too insistent a 

communist force, especially when that 
force seems to be linked with China. The 
second-paradoxical because of its weak-
ness-is the tolerant, casual, unexacting 
Buddhist culture common to Laos, Cambodia, 
Thailand and Burma ; a culture 
that does not take kindly to discipline,
that relishes myth and magic, that is 
unlikely to produce in sufficient number 
the hard, dedicated types of human 
being on which communist success 
depends. In this sense it is utterly unlike 
Vietnam which is so close in its culture 
and political thinking to China. It is true 
that Vietnamese communist activity is 
still strong in Laos and was attempted in 
Cambodia, but far from supporting the 
domino theory this fact only illustrates 
the much more potent inheritance of history. 
There was a long period of rivalrybetween Thailand and Vietnam in pastcenturies, when these expanding powers 
were competing for domination over 
Cambodia and Laos. Vietnamese influence 
was furthered under French rule 
by the immigration of Vietnamese into 
Cambodia and Laos which suited French 
convenience. Hence the belief of the Vietnamese 
that they were the natural leaders 
of nationalist opposition to French rule 
in all three territories, and the continuing 
belief in this revolutionary role held 
by Ho Chi Minh. This will mean that a 
vital part of any settlement in Vietnam 
should include an agreed Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Laos and from anyinfluence in Cambodia, with an undertaking 
not to interfere in those countries. 

In considering a settlement, certain points 
about Vietnam must be emphasised. 
There was no agreement in Geneva in 
1954 to set up a separate state in South 
Vietnam except as a temporary measure. 
To install an anti-communist like NgoDinh Diem-which the Americans did-
was bound to lead to eventual trouble. 
His refusal to consider elections or to 
engage in any kind of dialogue with the 
North was in itself certain to arouse 
reaction among sympathisers of the Vietminh 
in the South. 

The full -scale commitment of American 
troops offers an improvement in the 
military situation but could lead to even 

greater eventual deterioration in the political 
situation. The Vietcong, who may 
have to retreat and go more slowly, will 
now find it easier to treat the war as an 
anti-foreign one. On the other hand, their 
attempts in early 1965 to win a speedymilitary victory have obviously failed 
and, in the process, conscription and 
taxation of the population in the rural 
areas they control, have reduced their 
appeal. 

A turn of the tide for the Americans does 
not mean that the Vietcong can be 
obliterated as a revolutionary movement, 
nor could any alternative movement or 
government hoping to have any popular 
appeal be brought into being under the 
wing of the Americans. The aim therefore 
must still be a negotiated end to the 
war. 

blocked 

Hitherto, negotiations have been blocked 
because each side-North Vietnam and 
the Americans-have proposed terms 
unacceptable to the other. While Hanoi 
will have to give up its demand for a 
total American withdrawal as a preliminary 
to negotiations, there are certain 
principles for a settlement that the 
Americans must be willing to accept.
These are : the admission of the Vietcong 
as a negotiating element; the establishment 
of a coalition government in the 
South that is friendly to the North and 
that envisages reunification by agreement 
; an American withdrawal which 
guarantees that American military power 
will not be used to interfere with the 
steps to such an agreement. 

If American policy still thinks in terms 
of the domino theory and a permanently 
guaranteed non-communist South Vietnam, 
it will only be sowing the seeds of 
more trouble in the future. The most 
valuable asset the Americans need to 
bargain for is time---'both for their own 
disengagement and the survival for as 
long as possible of a separate government 
in the South. But this separate survival 
should not be an end in itself. The 
eventual re-unification of Vietnam is one 


of the conditions of stability in the area 
and might well contribute significantly to 
it. 

The expulsion of Singapore from 
Malaysia has called in question the concept 
on which the Federation was based. 
For the moment Indonesia is continuingits confrontation though we may see 
some change when a settled governmentfinally emerges in that country. Sabah 
and Sarawak are now likely to demand 
much more autonomy in the federation 
-something comparable to what Singapore 
enjoyed. Nevertheless for these two 
Borneo states, there is no alternative 
more attractive than remaining in the 
Federation. And for Singapore too the 
long-term aim must be to restore the 
original idea. 

flexible 

The truth is that racial antagonismcompnsmg 
religion, linguistic and cultural 
factors--can arise in Malaya as it 
has in the wider federation . There are 
limits to what British policy can do to 
soften the abrasive aspects of nation 
building-witness recent events in India 
and Pakistan. This means that British 
policy may have to be much more flexible 
than it has been. It must certainlyaim at withdrawing its forces from the 
area if any possibility of doing so arises. 
Singapore's emergence as a separate state 
within the Afro-Asian fold may well offer 
fresh opportunity for manoeuvre. The 
Indonesians should at worst tire of a 
confrontation policy that never had anytangible aims. 

Indonesian policies have all been putinto question by the coup of 30 September 
1965 and the subsequent conflict in 
the upper ranks of government. At what 
point in the spectrum from left to rightthe Indonesian government will eventually 
come to rest is still hard to tell, 
but there is no doubt that the chances 
of reaching a settlement with Indonesia 
over the confrontation of Malaysia are 
better than they were. After two yearsthe advantages of the policy to Indonesia 
are shown to be negligible ; even 

such little support as Indonesia had in 
the Afro-Asian world is now likely to 
ebb away. 

In the approach to a settlement the proposed 
"Maphilindo" confederation of 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia 
should not be rejected merely because it 
was President Sukarno's idea. The Philippines, 
after centuries of severance from 
Asian ties, has lately been easing itself 
towards some kind of affiliation. The 
area has ethnic, linguistic, religious and 
cultural affinities just as has the Buddhist 
group already mentioned. 

Some iniative from Britain will nevertheless 
be necessary if only because Britain 
is so deeply committed at the moment 
to the defence of Malaysia. A more subtle 
awareness of the political possibilities 
in the area will also have to be shown 
by the Malaysian government; it is not 
enough to define Indonesian confrontation 
simply as a facet of communist 
enterprise against which Malaysia stands 
out as a western champion. 

Finally, the broad lines of British policy 
in the area are now open to reappraisal. 
The eviction of Singapore from the 
Malaysian Federation, coupled with the 
new turn of events in Indonesia more 
than ever demands a redefinition of 
Britain's "East of Suez" policy. Just what 
does Britain's "presence" in South-East 
Asia seek to achieve and how can that 
presence be made most effective-if 
presence in any military sense is required 
at all? 

Overlaying these questions there is a 
larger but no less urgent question: is it 
justifiable that a country which recognised 
China in 1950 and has differed at 
all times with the Americans over their 
China policy, should nevertheless, without 
reference to this difference accept a 
subordinate role in South-East Asia in 
the containment of China? Can we go 
on "containing" China while we ourselves 
admit that China's rights are denied to 
her? Can we evolve a sensible policy, 
attuned to the realities of South-East 
Asia, if it is seen as part of a prolongation 
of the cold war in the Far East? 



fabian society 


The Fabian Society exists to further 
socialist education and research. It is 
affiliated to the Labour Party, both nationally 
and locally, and embraces all 
shades of Socialist opinion within its 
ranks-right, left and centre. 

Since 1884 the Fabian Society has enrolled 
thoughtful socialists who are prepared 
to discuss the essential questions 
of democratic socialism and relate them 
to practical plans for building socialism 
in a changing world. 

Beyond this the Society has no collective 
policy. It puts forward no resolutions 
of a political character, but it is 
not an organisation of armchair socialists. 
Its members are active in their 
Labour Parties, Trade Unions and Cooperatives. 
They are representative of 
the labour movement, practical people 
concerned to study and discuss problems 
that matter. 

The Society is organised nationally and 
locally. The national Society, directed 
by an elected Executive Committee, publishes 
pamphlets, and holds schools and 
conferences of many kinds. Local Societies 
-there are some 80 of them -are 
self governing and are lively centres of 
discussion and also undertake research. 

Enquiries about membership should be 
sent to the General Secretary, Fabian 
Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, 
SW I ; telephone Whitehall 3077. 

·the authors 

This pamphlet is the result of the work 
of a group of Fabians with special knowledge 
of South-East Asia. The views expressed 
have received general agreement, 
although no individual member of the 
group necessarily accepts all the conclusions 
of the pamphlet. 

Cover design, and typography, by Geoffrey 
Cannon. Printed by David Neil and 
Co., Dorking. 


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