FABIAN SOCIETY 

....................................................... 


Working for 
common 
security 

Nick Butler, Len Scott, David Ward, 
Jonathon Worthington 

....................................................... 



FABIAN TRAGr 533 2 1 0003258 0 TELEPEN 

1111 I11 Ill

Working for 

BLPES 

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common security 

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1 Arms control and the superpowers 1 

2 The challenge for NATO 5 

3 The challenge for Labour 13 

4 Changing NATO strategy 16 

5 Meeting Britain's defence needs 22 

6 Conclusion 24 

This pamphlet like all 
publications of the 
Fabian Society represents 
not the collective 
view of the Society but 
only the views of the 
individuals who 
prepared it. The 
responsibility of the

Nick Butler is Treasurer of the Fabian Society and was the Labour Party 

Society is limited to

candidate for Lincoln at the 1987 general election. 

approving the publica-
Len Scott is a former adviser to Denis Healey. 

tions it issues as worthy 
for consideration within

David Ward is an adviser to John Smith MP and was the Labour Party 

the labour movement.

candidate for Chelsea at the 1987 general election. He was co-author (with 
.loan Lestor) of Beyond Band Aid: charity is not not enough, Fabian Tract 

Design: Thny Garrett 

520. 
January 1989 
Jonathon Worthington is a former adviser to Labour's front-bench defence 

ISBN 0 7163 0533 X 

team. 
ISSN 0307 7523 

During the preparation of this study the authors benefited from many useful 
discussions with among others, senior diplomats from the American, French, 

Printed by The College 
East German, West German and Soviet Embassies, the British Atlantic 

Hill Press Limited (TU), 
Committee, Meg Beresford and Bruce Kent of the Campaign for Nuclear 

London & Worthing. 
Disarmament, Malcolm Chalmers, Lord Carrington and staff at NATO, and the 

Published by the Fabian 
Western European Union. The authors would like to put on record our 

Society, 11 Dartmouth 
appreciation to all of the above for assisting us in our work. 

Street, London SWlH 9BN 


Arms control and the 

superpowers 

Not since the Second World War have the 
United States and the USSR enjoyed such 
a constructive relationship as exists today. 
After decades of hostility between the 
superpowers, the INF Treaty and START 
offer the potential for further progress 1n 
East-West relations and arms control. 

S
S
ince the first Reagan/Gorbachev summit meeting in Geneva 
in 1985, the superpowers have engaged in a process of 
negotiation and 'detente' resulting in an unprecedented 
agreement to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. 
Further arms control talks and negotiations on regional conflicts are 
continuing which, if successful, would radically reduce the sources 
of instability and tension between the East and the West. The 1990s 
offer the prospect of an end to the Cold War. 

The warming of superpower relations is today more intense than 
previous periods of so-called detente. Both the US and USSR are not 
just attempting to reduce tension. They are working towards a 
normalisation of relations in which superpower summits and negotiations 
are commonplace rather than exceptional. Mr Georgy Arbatov, 
the leading Soviet academic expert on East-West relations, recently 
commented, "Previously our goals were more limited ...Now we have 
the possibility to move towards demilitarisation in Soviet-American 
relations, to remove the infrastructure of the Cold War.' ' 

The INF agreement to scrap American Cruise and Pershing 11 and 
Russian SS20 missiles is the first tangible achievement of the improvement 
in superpower relations. The treaty eliminates all land-based 
medium range (between 500 and 5,500 kilometres) missiles worldwide 
and establishes important means of verification including on-site 
inspection. Furthermore the Soviet Union has accepted substantial 
assymetrical weapon cuts; removing 1,836 missiles against 867 by the 
United States. These are significant breakthroughs but the INF agreement 
remains a modest first step in nuclear disarmament. 

The total nuclear stockpile of the superpowers still exceeds 50,000 
warheads carried by an array of short, medium and long-range weapon 

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systems. Some 4,000 nuclear weapons (mostly short-range 'battlefield' 
devices) will remain in Westem Europe. Although the INF treaty scraps 
land-based medium-range weapons, similar missiles can still be 
deployed at sea and by air. Meanwhile the US and the USSR each retain 
huge quantities of long-range intercontinental, 'strategic' weapons. 

Thlks are now underway to reduce this arsenal of strategic nuclear 
weapons. At the Reylqavik summit in October 1986 President Reagan 
and Mr Gorbachev spoke of the objective in ten years of ''eliminating 
all ballistic missiles from the face of the earth''. This extraordinary proposal 
has subsequently given way to a more limited suggestion, made 
at the Geneva summit in 1985, to make deep cuts. 

The Strategic Arms Reductions Thlks (START) seek to make a significant 
cut (by up to 50 per cent) over five years in strategic warheads 
and missiles with a range of beyond 5,000 kilometres. Both the US and 
the USSR have accepted the proposal in principle and are committed 
to cut their offensive strategic nuclear forces to 6,000 warheads and 
1,600 launchers. The current talks are tackling issues of verification 
and how the cuts would be divided between land-based, sea-launched 
and air-launched missiles. 

After decades of hostility between the US and the USSR, the INF 
treaty and START offer the potential for further progress in East-West 
relations and arms control. If START succeeds, new talks may commence 
to achieve a further 50 per cent reduction of the remaining 
arsenal of long-range missiles. 

Conventional Stability Thlks (CST) are being launched in Vienna 
to consider crucial disarmament negotiations between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact covering conventional weapons and forces from the 
Atlantic to the Ural mountains in western Russia. Mr Gorbachev's 
historic announcement of unilateral cuts in the levels of Soviet troops 
and tanks at the United Nations in December 1988 has provided a 
powerful impetus to these crucial negotiations. Hopes of progress 
towards a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons are also 
being cautiously advanced. Thday, in contrast to many years of stalemate, 
the prospects for substantial achievements in arms control and 
disarmament are better than ever before. 

Economic incentives 

Optimism about the future evolution of superpower relations is based 
on the widely acknowledged perception that both the US and the USSR 
have a vested interest in defusing the Cold War. The staggering costs 
of the arms race, and the problems of sustaining the global role of a 
superpower, bedevil the decision makers in Moscow and Washington. 
Increasingly both the USSR and the US are being forced to address 
major difficultie in their own economies. Domestic imperatives are 


a major driving force behind the new era of disarmament talks. 

The early years of the administration of President R<mald Reagan 
witnessed a massive $2 trillion military build-up. The Congress, 
stimulated by the Republican's hawkish rhetoric about the Soviet "evil 
empire'', authorised the Pentagon's spending spree. Between 1979 and 
1984 US defence spending rose by 42 per cent in real terms. 

But during the second term of the Reagan Presidency the defence 
budget excesses became unsustainable. Planned increases in military 
expenditure for 1989 have been cut. Meanwhile in Congress legislators 
are increasingly demanding that the US trim its contribution to NATO 
amidst renewed rows about 'burden-sharing' and accusations that the 
European members of the Alliance are paying too little to meet the 
costs of their own defence. 

With major economic problems now facing the United States, it 
is likely that the defence budget will be reduced. Many American 
analysts and politicians believe that whilst US military strength has 
grown, the country's industrial and financial base has been seriously 
weakened. The legacy of 'Reaganomics', staggering deficits in visible 
trade and the world's largest foreign debt, cannot be squared with 
massive defence expenditure. Domestic concerns about underinvestment 
in industry, loss of competitiveness and dependence on 
foreign investors to finance the current account deficit, will force the 
administration of newly-elected President George Bush to review 
America's military commitments at home and abroad. 

Illustrating this new trend in thinking has been the buoyant 
American sales of the book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers by 
Professor Paul Kennedy (Unwin Hyman, 1988). Arguing that the US 
is suffering the impact of "imperial overstretch", Professor Kennedy 
claims that the country's declining relative economic strength can no 
longer s~stain the global foreign and military commitments of the 
typical superpower. ''The fundmental grand-strategical dilemma 
remains," Kennedy writes, "the United States today has roughly the 
same massive array of military obligations across the globe as it had 
a quarter of a century ago, when its share of world GNP, manufacturing 
production, military spending and armed forces personnel were so 
much larger than they are now." 

Kennedy's thesis of "imperial overstretch" can be usefully applied 
to the Soviet Union. Although analysts dispute the methods of 
calculation, the amount of GNP devoted by the USSR to defence is 
substantially higher than that of the United States. The UK Government 
estimates a figure of 15 per cent of GNP compared to 6.5 per cent in 
the US. Given the poor performance of the Soviet economy and its 
backwardness, compared to the major Western indu~'.rialised countries, 
defence expenditure on this scale is an intolerable burden. 

For Mr Gorbachev economic modernisation is the centrepiece of 

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perestroika his revolutionary programme of reform which aims to 
tackle the stagnant bureaucratic inheritance of the Brezhnev era. 
Speaking at the 27th Communist Party Congress in 1986 he admitted 
that, ''Acceleration of the country's socio-economic development is the 
key to all our problems; immediate and long term, economic and social, 
political and ideological, internal and external". Clearly progress in 
arms control, limiting the costly technological race with the United 
States and lowering general defence requirements would be an 
enormous help to Gorbachev's plan to revitalise the Soviet economy. 

Gorbachev's 'new thinking' 

Flowing from the demands of perestroika Mr Gorbachev has introduced 
'new thinking' into the evolution of Soviet foreign policy. The changes 
are profound and a major shift away from the attitudes that have 
fostered 40 years of tension between East and West. Mr Gorbachev 
has rejected the doctrine of permanent struggle between the communit 
and capitalist camps. 

Speaking on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik 
Revolution in November 1987, he emphasised that ''for all the profound 
contradictions of the contemporary world . .. it is interrelated, 
interdependent and integral". Mr Gorbachev has called for "a 
comprehensive system of international security" and " reasonable 
sufficiency" in the level of Soviet military forces based only on a 
defensive rather than offensive capability. Concrete evidence of this 
radical shift has been provided by Mr Gorbachev in his speech to the 
UN General Assembly in New York. 

lndeed a distinct feature of Mr Gorbachev's 'new thinking' has been 
the willingness of the Soviet Union to play a much greater role within 
the United Nations. The USSR has offered to pay $245 million in past 
obligations to the organisation and, in particular, has accepted and 
encouraged United Nations peacekeeping initiatives in a range of 
regional conflicts in, for example, the Middle East and Southern Africa. 
Of course, the most radical foreign policy shift has been the withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, and in the spirit ofgl.asrwst the admission that Soviet 
forces have paid a heavy price in casualties since their occupation of 
the country in 1979. 

Clearly the new dynamism of Soviet foreign policy has been a 
crucial catalyst for the recent progress in arms control. Paradoxically, 
'new thinking' by President Reagan about the role of nuclear 
deterrence may also have contributed to the renewed interest in 
disarmament. For the Reagan administration, despite its hawkish 
aspirations, riously undermined the credibility of nuclear deterrence. 


The challenge for NATO 


The Soviet Union has seized the initiative 
in putting forward proposals for arms 
reductions. NATO must respond by 
modernising its strategy rather than its 
weapons systems. 

I
I
n March 1983 President Reagan introduced his proposals for a 

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and warned that nuclear 

threats of mutual suicide could not be expected to preserve 

peace much longer. His plans for a space-based 'defensive shield' 
against incoming nuclear missiles have proved both costly and overoptimistic. 
Nevertheless the President's use of anti-nuclear rhetoric 
to defend SDI contradicts and weakens NA1D's nuclear-war-fighting 
strategies of deterrence. 

As a result of Mr Reagan's vision of ''a world without nuclear 
weapons''-expressed both at the Reykjavik summit and in his formulation 
of SDI-the former US President can take some of the credit for 
further weakening public tolerance of nuclear weapons. Mr Gorbachev, 
however, having taken the lead in promoting new disarmament 
inititatives, has earned for himself the image of peace-maker. 

In contrast to the Brezhnev years, the Soviet Union is now putting 
forward a stream of proposals for arms reduction. In January 1986 Mr 
Gorbachev outlined a plan for the phased removal of all nuclear 
weapons by the year 2000. Under his leadership, the Soviets have 
conceded major demands of the West in accepting the INF treaty; set-
aside their anxieties about SDI to allow progress in the START talks; 
and are pressing for the total elimination of short-range battlefield 
nuclear weapons. Mr Gorbachev has, also, offered to negotiate 
assymetrical cuts in the conventional forces of both sides. 

NA1D's response to Gorbachev's arms control agenda has been 
cautious and confused. Rather than take the lead in further disarmament 
talks to test the sincerity of the Soviet proposals, NA1D has 
scrambled to defend its remaining arsenals of nuclear and conventional 
forces. As a result the cohesion of the Alliance has been severely tested 
with major disagreements emerging over plans to modernise battlefield 
nuclear weapons deployed along NA1D's central front in West Germany. 
The efforts to update these short-range nuclear devices, and 
compensate for the loss of the medium-range missiles, cut across the 
spirit, though not the letter, of the INF treaty. 

2 


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NATO's dilemma 

The rigidity of NATO's posture stems from a marked reluctance to 
modernise the organisation's military doctrine and strategy. NATO's 
ministers find it easier to update weapon systems rather than their 
own systems of thought. NATO's task is to defend its members in 
Western Europe from the prospect (however remote) of an invasion 
by the Warsaw Pact. The Alliance's central front is the 550 mile inner-
German border which is defended by a mix of both conventional and 
nuclear forces. However, NATO's excessive dependence on nuclear 
weapons to deter a Soviet conventional attack has become increasingly 
incredible, dangerous and contradictory. 

Until the early 1960s NATO relied on the 'tripwire' strategy of 
'massive retaliation' against any Warsaw Pact invasion. When the 
Soviets became capable of mounting a successful strike against US 
territory NATO's strategy became fatally flawed. Th restore deterrence 
a new doctrine, 'flexible response' was established in 1967. It is based 
on the threat of escalation through NATO's triad of conventional forces, 
short and medium-range nuclear weapons, and finally long~range 
intercontinental missiles "which provide the ultimate deterrent". 
Although initially relying on conventional forces to repel an invasion 
the strategy threatens first use of nuclear weapons to halt a successful 
Soviet advance. 

Twenty years after its adoption NATO's military doctrine has 
become dangerously obsolete. Just as strategic parity undermined 
'massive retaliation' so sub-strategic parity in short-and medium-range 
nuclear weapons has undermined 'flexible response'. It is based on the 
incredible notion that NATO could control the escalation from conventional 
to nuclear warfare. 

As the American analyst Morton Halperin has argued: "NATO 
doctrine is that we will fight with conventional weapons until we are 
losing, then we will fight with tactical weapons until we are losing, 
and then we will blow up the world" (quoted by John Baylis, 
International Affairs, Winter 87 /8). Even if the Soviets were 
overwhelming the Alliance's conventional forces it is hard to imagine 
how nuclear weapons could be used to gain military advantage. The 
Chemobyl disaster has shown the havoc that is caused by even a limited 
release of nuclear radiation. NATO commanders know that use of a 
small number of short-range devices would devastate the field of battle 
and the fighting troops of both sides. 

Denis Healey, Defence Minister in the 1960s, argues that ''few of 
those concerned still believe that in practice it would be possible to 
control a nuclear war once it had started at any level, particularly since 
the electromagnetic pulses emitted by the first explosions might black 
out the battlefield, making command and control impossible. So, since 


any nuclear fighting might rapidly escalate to a general strategic 
exchange, Washington's readiness to authorise first use in time remains 
as uncertain as ever" (Foreign Affairs, Spring 1987). 

The last point raised by Denis Healey highlights a crucial weakness 
in flexible response. The strategy relies upon the belief that Washington 
would authorise use of its strategic nuclear forces to halt a conventional 
Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe. But the launching of 
intercontinental missiles from the US would expose America's territory 
and population to the risk of a retaliatory Soviet nuclear strike. 

Doubt persists that any President would be prepared to accept such 
an enormous risk, and would refrain from using NATO's 'ultimate 
deterrent' even given a major Soviet conventional attack in Europe. 
The former US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger have both warned Europe not to rely on the 
American nuclear guarantee. Recently, President Reagan's proposals 
at Reykjavik and the SDI have exacerbated fears about the reliability 
of the so-called US 'nuclear umbrella'. 

The INF treaty has deepened these anxieties on the European right 
since the US medium-range missiles were supposed to provide crucial 
steps in the escalatory ladder from conventional to nuclear forces 
envisaged by flexible response. Their removal has again worried some 
NATO traditionalists who fear that the US is becoming decoupled from 
the Alliance. But a deep contradiction lies at the heart of the doctrine 
of flexible response. 

Each step Washington takes to recouple its nuclear guarantee tends 
to lower the point at which nuclear weapons might be used. Being a 
lesser risk to US territory such weapons become more credible as an 
instrument of nuclear war-fighting, which in turn makes the risk of 
such a war in Europe more likely. So extended deterrence to retain 
its credibility requires seemingly 'usable' US weapons in Europe. But 
these deployments (like, for example, the Cruise and Pershing missile) 
only increase the feasability of, and fears amongst Europeans of a 
nuclear holocaust in the centre of their continent. This contradiction, 
built into the strategy of flexible response, constantly strains the 
cohesion of NATO. (For an interesting elaboration of this problem see 
chapter 8 of Democracy and Deterrence by Philip Bobbitt, Macmillan 
1988.) 

The latest subject of European anxiety is the modernisation of 
NATO's stock of short-range (below 500 kilometres) nuclear weapons. 
In 1983 at a meeting in Montebello, Canada, defence ministers began 
to consider updating NATO's battlefield nuclear forces. Especially 
controversial is the plan to replace the Lance missile. Currently 690 
of these warheads are in Europe with a range of 125 kilometres. But 
the replacement systems being proposed by NATO would extend the 
range of the missiles as much as 450 kilometres-close to the bottom 

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limit of the INF treaty. Critics of the modernisation plan argue that 
NATO is using the Montebello decision as a cover to compensate for 
the loss of medium-range weapons resulting from the INF agreement. 

The strains of NATO's modernisation are most acute in West 
Germany. Given the short range of these battlefield devices they would 
be used along the border between West and East Germany. Not 
surprisingly German public opinion is strongly against weapons which 
could cause a nuclear war confined to the two German states. This 
anxiety has been succinctly expressed by Mr Volker Ruehe, foreign 
affairs spokesman of the ruling CDU Party, "The shorter the range, 
the deader the German". All major political parties in West Germany 
are either against, or highly cautious about, modernisation and would 
prefer new negotiations to limit or remove short-range systems. 

The Soviets have offered talks on the elimination of all battlefield 
nuclear weapons but NATO is reluctant to negotiate. Its stance is both 
puzzling and disappointing. The Soviets have a significant superiority 
in short-range missiles and their removal would again meet Western 
demands for assymetrical cuts by the Warsaw Pact. But NATO fears 
that without short-range nuclear systems the threat of step-by-step 
escalation would disappear. Once again the nuclear dependency of 
NATO's flexible response is inhibiting progress in arms reduction. So 
whilst Mr Gorbachev takes the lead in disarmament, and gains another 
propaganda victory, NATO begins an anguished debate about 
modernisation. 

Even more disturbing is the ill-disguised attempt to compensate 
for the INF treaty. Some NATO members are eager to fill the gap created 
by the removal of all land-based medium-range missiles. They are 
considering the deployment of sea-launched Cruise missiles on surface 
ships and submarines in the European theatre. Another option would 
be to station an increased number of nuclear-armed American Flll 
bombers (possibly armed with Cruise missiles) at their existing bases 
in Britain. 

These 'adjustments' and the modernisation plans for short-range 
weapons are yet another attempt to restore the waning credibility of 
flexible response. They would make a mockery of the much-heralded 
INF treaty and risk twisting the arms race into a new upward spiral. 
In their 1988 Strategic Survey, the influential International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) has warned against modernisation proposals 
which "smack more of 'war-fighting' than deterrence" and comments 
that steps by NATO to compensate for the INF treaty risks provoking 
a countervailing response by the Soviet Union. 

It remains to be seen if the IISS's warnings will be heeded. At the 
NATO Summit in March 1988 the major dispute over modernisation 
was fudged and the Heads of State agreed a statement reiterating the 
strategy of flexible response and the major role of nuclear weapons 


"which will be kept up to date where necessary". Critics believe, 
however, that NATO's doctrine and military strategy needs a complete 
overhaul. Central to such a policy review would be a fundamental 
reappraisal of flexible response. 

Sceptism about NATO's strategy comes from the most unlikely 
sources. In 1984, for example, a report prepared by senior retired UK 
civil servants and military commanders (including Sir Frank Cooper, 
ex-Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence) concluded that 
flexible response needed to be replaced. The authors argued that "The 
concept of controlled step-by-step escalation is impractical nonsense 
in an unpredictable and chaotic situation'' (Diminishing the Nuclear 
Threat, British Atlantic Committee Report, 1984). 

NATO and the military balance 

According to NATO's received wisdom, nuclear weapons are an integral 
requirement of Western defences because of the overwhelming 
superiority of the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. The 
Alliance's own conventional strength, it is argued, is inadequate to 
deter Soviet aggression without recourse to the threat of escalation 
to nuclear war. But the assumption that NATO conventional defences 
are insufficient to halt a Warsaw Pact invasion is highly questionable. 

Accurate comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels is 
notoriously difficult to achieve; different weapon systems are not easily 
compared and many subjectivejudgements have to be made. However, 
the most authoritative, and widely accepted, assessment of the balance 
is published annually by the IISS. 

Their 1988-89 edition of The Military Balance confirms the Warsaw 
Pact's clear numerical advantage in ground and air forces in Europe, 
particularly in total numbers of tanks, artillery and air defence fighters, 
whilst NATO is ahead in anti-tank missiles, armed helicopters and 
ground attack aircraft. In most of these areas NATO forces tend to be 
qualitatively superior. The two sides are roughly equal in the size of 
their armies but even the Pentagon readily concedes NATO superiority 
in naval forces. 

If the IISS is correct there is scope for NATO to cut its nuclear 
arsenals and shift both military strategy and spending in favour of 
conventional defence. Recently, NATO has emphasised the need to 
strengthen its non-nuclear forces and sought to increase the budget 
contributions of member states. But NATO's insistence that nuclear 
weapons are the chief guarantor of Western security serves only to 
erode the arguments for increased reliance on conventional forces. 

The best path to achieve a more stable balance of conventional 
forces between East and West is through arms control and restructuring 
of forces into defensive postures. Mr Gorbachev has already suggested 

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a three-step plan offering, first, a detailed exchange of data on the 
conventional armaments and troop units deployed by NAID and the 
Warsaw Pact between the Atlantic and the Ural mountains; secondly, 
reductions in troop levels from the forces of both sides in Europe; and 
lastly, talks about reorganising the remaining forces into a 'defensive' 
posture incapable of mounting a short-warning surprise attack. The 
Soviet Union has followed up these proposals with the unilateral cuts 
announced in December 1988. 

These initiatives are a useful starting point for the CST. In Vienna 
NAID will insist on broadening the proposals to include further 
reductions in tanks and artillery in which the Warsaw Pact has an 
advantage over NAID. The complexities of negotiating conventional 
arms reductions are immense. Fourteen years of fruitless dialogue at 
the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions' (MBFR) talks bear witness to 
the problems. Nevertheless the unprecedented changes in the Soviet 
Union and the far-reaching nature of Mr Gorbachev's recent proposals 
offer the chance of real progress. 

But even without significant progress in conventional disarmament, 
NAID could massively reduce its reliance on nuclear weaporis. The 
emergence of new conventional technologies, which improve the 
lethality of munitions, and their systems of communication, control 
and targetry, are shifting the military balance. Of course the 
conventional forces available to the Alliance must be capable of 
deterring a Warsaw Pact invasion. But current NAID defence budgets 
already provide the resources to do so.Indeed, given the planned for 
cuts in Soviet offensive forces announced by Mr Gorbachev, it should 
be possible for NAID to accept significant reductions in the defence 
budgets of both the US and Europe. 

NATO reform and minimal deterrence 

The case for a radical change in NAID strategy has been argued by 
Robert McNamara in his book Blundering Into Disaster (Pantheon 
Books 1987). He proposes that "we accept that nuclear warheads are 
not weapons-that they have no military use whatsoever except to 
deter one's opponent from their use-and that we base all our military 
plans, our defense budgets, our weapons development and deployment 
programs, and our arms negotiations on that proposition''. 

McNamara bases his argument on the following three facts, which 
he believes are being accepted in "a slow discernible movement": 

• 
" NAID's existing plans for initiating the use of nuclear weapons, 
if implemented, are far more likely to destroy Europe than to defend 
it"; 

• 
"whatever deterrent value remains in NAID's nuclear strategy is 
eroding rapidly and is purchased at heavy cost"; 

• 
"the strength, and hence the deterrent capability, of NATO's 
conventional forces can be increased substantially within realistic 
political and financial constraints.'' 
The ultimate goal for McNamara is a state of minimal deterrence 
involving a huge cut in nuclear arsenals. He envisages the Soviet Union 
and the US maintaining a nuclear force that would be no larger than 
"was needed to deter a nuclear attack by the other". The number of 
warheads needed by each superpower, he estimates would not exceed 
"a few hundred, say five hundred at most ...With tactical nuclear 
forces (short & medium range) to be eliminated entirely and the 
strategic forces having five hundred or fewer warheads, the present 
inventory of fifty thousand weapons could be cut to no more than one 
thousand''. 

McNamara hopes to achieve this new strategy of 'minimal 
deterrence' as " rapidly as an Alliance consensus can be formed ". In 
the meantime, he and other senior former US officials, including 
McGeorge Bundy, and George Kennan, have called on NATO to adopt 
a policy of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons; to halt modernisation plans 
for nuclear systems and rely on conventional forces to meet any 
conventional threat. 

Other proposals to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons include 
the withdrawal of short-range systems from the NATO-Warsaw Pact 
border. The Palme Commission Report Common Security (Pan Books 
1982), for example, called for a "battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free-zone" 
covering 150 kilometres on either side of the inner-German border. The 
report's suggestion was combined with the proposal to achieve a rough 
parity of conventional forces based on the idea of common security. 
This doctrine argues that security cannot be attained through military 
advantage. It can only be gained through the renunciation of 
threatening military postures and restructuring of forces to "the lowest 
possible level of armaments". Mr Gorbachev's recent talk of 
"reasonable sufficiency" in Soviet defences encouragingly echoes the 
ideas expressed in Common Security. 

Both the Palme Commission and NATO reformists like Robert 
McNamara have been accused of proposing to make Europe safe for 
conventional war. But is there a Soviet threat? 

Few believe that the Soviet Union is planning or wants to attack 
Western Europe. Although the Warsaw Pact possesses a formidable 
military capability there is absolutely no evidence that it has any 
intention of launching an invasion of Western Europe. NATO planners 
match their military requirements to the Pact's capabilities, but NATO's 
intelligence officers have never warned of an imminent Soviet strike 
across the West German border. 

The Alliance continues to base the core of its military strategy 

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around the most unlikely of imaginable circumstances, and makes a 
worst case assessment of Soviet strategic objectives based on 
simplistic and questionable assumptions. The Kremlin, we are told, 
wants to push the United States out of Europe, dividing the Alliance 
and leaving the continent exposed to Russian domination. 

An intellectually-defensible case can be made for the exact 
opposite. This thesis suggests that the Soviet Union is seeking to defend 
the status quo-the post-war settlement of a divided Europe with a 
clear Soviet sphere of influence over its neighbours-and is content 
with the American role in Europe for two major reasons. They hope 
that Washington's potential for global adventurism will be partially 
restrained by the alliance with Europe. Secondly, they believe that US 
withdrawal from the alliance with Europe could undermine the postwar 
boundaries probably leading to the re-unification of Germany. The 
latter prospect would be viewed with alarm by the Kremlin rekindling 
bitter wartime memories, and fears of a united German state with 
political and economic power to rival that of the Soviet Union. 

The debate about Soviet intentions is as old as the Cold War itself 
and will never be satisfactorily resolved. But, today, few would dispute 
that the Soviet Union is at a watershed. Mr Gorbachev seems willing 
to bury the antagonistic foreign policy concepts of past Kremlin leaders 
and has offered disarmament proposals which at least partially meet 
Western concerns about the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities. NATO, 
in turn, must recognise Warsaw Pact fears about the West and 
acknowledge the legitimate defence interests of the Soviet Union. The 
new phase of East-West detente started in the late 1980s has begun 
to overcome decades of mistrust and mutual suspicion. 

Gorbachev's 'new thinking' and perestroika are changing 
perceptions of both the Soviet Union and the Cold War. In the 1990s 
the military doctrines of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact could rely 
on the idea of common security rather than the threat of nuclear 
holocaust. The arsenals of nuclear missiles may be dramatically 
reduced, and conventional forces structured defensively. 

The challenge for NATO is to adapt its military structure and 
doctrine to meet the changing security environment of the next decade. 
If NATO can formulate its own version of 'new thinking' and 
perestroika, the arms control opportunities that are in prospect will 
be easier to achieve. At present, however, NATO leaders are on the 
defensive, prisoners of old dogma and the strategy of flexible response. 
The NATO hawks, lead by Mrs Thatcher, are desperate to modernise, 
and strengthen their nuclear forces post-INF. But this bellicose posture, 
which alienates public opinion and divides the Alliance, is 
anachronistic. Out of touch with the growing movement toward nonnuclear 
defence and the need for common security. 


The challenge for 
Labour 

In the 1990s the Labour Party could turn 
defence and security issues to its 
advantage. But it must overcome the 
sterile arguments that in the 1980s have 
masqueraded as serious discussions of 
British defence policy. 

N
N
o subject seems more emotionally charged or politically 
loaded. Yet defence policy-the strategy and resources 
required to guarantee national and common security-is 
the most inadequately discussed issue in contemporary 
British politics. The polarised struggle between so-called multilateral 
and unilateral nuclear disarmament has almost completely overwhelmed 
the real defence policy debate. 
Today in both the conventional and nuclear spheres new opportunities 
exist to achieve arms reductions and promote common security. 
The reliance by both East and West on massive nuclear forces lacks 
credibility and the pressure for substantial cuts in nuclear arsenals is 
unprecedented. But these trends which have already been anticipated 
by the Labour Party's non-nuclear defence policy are little understood 
or discussed either within the Party or the general public. Abstract 
arguments about how to get rid of nuclear weapons obscures the winning 
of arguments against nuclear dependence. 

The current two-year Policy Review is a welcome opportunity both 
to modernise Labour Party policy and promote public debate about 
Britain's defence needs in the 1990s and beyond. The modernisation 
of policy is suspected by some as an attempt to jettison the strategy 
of non-nuclear defence. This pamphlet does not argue for such a drastic 
change in the Party's defence policy. 

The tide is turning in favour of non-nuclear defence as both the 
morality and practicality of nuclear deterrence is increasingly questioned. 
The point of principle-our rejection of nuclear weapons-is 
not at issue. The challenge for the Policy Review is to provide a political 
framework for non-nuclear defence that is practical and plausible for 
the 1990s. The task will be easier if a ceasefire is declared in the trench 
warfare between unilateralists and multilateralists. 

3 


FABIAN 

TRACT 533 

PAGE THIRTEEN 


............. 


FABIAN 
TRACT 533 
PAGE FOURTEEN 

Reconciling the arguments 

The arguments that have raged in the Labour Party can be reconciled. 
Unilateral and multilateral disarmament are not mutually exclusive. 
Each is a step or a series of steps in arms reduction which can be made 
compatible and reinforcing. During the recent INF negotiations, for 
example, a unilateral gesture to remove Pershing lA missiles by West 
Germany clinched the otherwise multilateral deal between the USA 
and the USSR. 

Support for unilateral disarmament notably in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s grew out of frustration with the absence of any successful 
multilateral talks. A unilateralist, it used to be said, was a multilateralist 
that meant it. In the late 1980s the modest breakthrough achieved by 
the INF agreement has re-established the political credibility of the 
multilateral approach. The argument that independent action by 
Britain would act as a catalyst to break the negotiating stalemate 
between the superpowers no longer applies. 

The recent progress in arms control need not prevent independent 
steps of disarmament. Unilateral arms reduction, however, mustsatisfy 
a common sense criterion; that such actions will enhance, and not 
hinder, existing disarmament talks. Labour must aim to maximise the 
effect of independent action; to work for reciprocal reductions by other 
nations. The impact of a country's renunciation of its own nuclear 
forces is powerful and important. Tho powerful and too important not 
to be thoughtfully timed to benefit: and stimulate further nuclear arms 
reduction. 

For some unilateralists any relationship to a process of negotiation 
is unacceptable. The moral disquiet experienced by many about 
possession of nuclear weapons is elevated by some into an absolute 
point of principle. It is argued that if it is wrong to possess nuclear 
weapons then all forms of multilateral negotiation involve unacceptable 
moral compromise. The weapons are still available for use during the 
negotiations and the talks may fail. On grounds of moral belief the 
weapons must be scrapped and any form of negotiation with other 
nations is irrelevant. This stance implies that there is but one 'pure' 
form of disarmament-unilateralism. But such defiant moral vanity 
is blind to the imperative need for international as opposed to merely 
national nuclear disarmament. 

History, geography and the system of alliances that developed after 
the Second World War have bound together the security interests of 
Britain with many other nations. The nuclear threat has taken root 
within this international system and can only be resolved by agreements 
between nations. The scope for independent steps of nuclear 
disarmament is circumscribed by this political reality. 

Unilateral action by Britain alone will not bring about a non-nuclear 


world. It is yet another post-imperial delusion to assume that this 
country alone can stop the superpowers' nuclear rivalry. Britain's 
contribution to nuclear disarmament will be significant but modest; 
it would be even more significant and less modest if it were used to 
augment international arms control. 

Britain possesses its own nuclear weapons and acts as host for 
others owned by the United States and assigned to NA1D. In advancing 
a non-nuclear defence strategy the Labour Party is seeking to end these 
nuclear roles, but also to change NA1D's doctrine of flexible response, 
and work to achieve a non-nuclear world. These are ambitious goals 
and the timetable and negotiating strategy used to achieve our policy 
objectives must be flexible. There is scope for unilateral action, 
multilateral negotiation and bilateral agreements. 

Independent steps are clearly easier with those weapons under 
the sovereign control of the British Government. Scrapping Polaris and 
cancelling Trident are decisions which would not fundamentally affect 
the functioning of the NA1D Alliance. (They would, however, be 
relevant to the calculations of the current START negotiators.) In 
contrast, ending the nuclear role of the Flll bombers stationed in 
Britain impinges directly on NA1D policy and its member states. 

International negotiations and the apparent tedium of diplomacy 
are facts of life we cannot ignore. The Labour Party wants to have a 
non-nuclear world not merely a non-nuclear Britain. Achievement of 
the latter whilst the remainder of Europe is still covered with thousands 
of nuclear arms will do little to improve the security of Britain or 
remove the nuclear threat. If war occurred in Europe the effects of 
a nuclear exchange would devastate Britain too. In working to achieve 
a non-nuclear defence of Britain, the Labour Party must not lose sight 
of our wider goals in Europe and the world. 

In the next decade this country could play an important role in 
sustaining the disarmament process already begun by the·usA and the 
USSR. But the Labour Party's defence policy must be adapted to take 
full advantage of the events, national and international, that have 
occurred in the late 1980s. ln key respects, circumstances have changed 
which challenge assumptions and opportunities that were applicable 
at the time of the last general election. 

Labour's existing defence policy must be reconsidered against these 
major developments. The Trident nuclear missile system will be 
partially deployed, the START negotiations may be progressing to a 
second stage, and the defence budget will be severely strained. The 
Policy Review will have to explain Labour's proposals for the reform 
of NA1D strategy; outline the future of the Flll nuclear bombers based 
in Britain, the battlefield weapons deployed in Germany, and the 
Trident and Polaris missile systems; and consider how the Party will 
meet the costs of Britain's conventional defences. 

F ABIAN 

TRACT 533 

PAGE FIFTEEN 


4~~:::;i~~~ ~!~ve~e~~tegy 


F ABIAN 

T RACT 533 

PAGE SIXTEEN 

membership of the Alliance is 
unacceptable. But this ignores the scope 
for change in NAW strategy and cannot 
form the basis of the Labour's approach. 

W
W
orking within NATO is neither an apologia nor a 
prescription for " pliant Atlanticist self-submission" in 
E P Thompson's phrase. Non-alignment is a prescription 
for the disruption of the disarmament process. British 
withdrawal from NATO would destabilise the Alliance, further increase 
the American role in the defence of Western Europe, and dissipate the 
political forces necessary to engage constructively with the Soviet 
Union. As a national policy it would marginalise British influence in 
those areas of defence and foreign policy where the need for a positive 
and progressive direction has never been greater. 

Working within NATO for radical strategic reform must be a major 
priority for the next Labour government. Both superpowers, of course, 
will continue to retain nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, and 
NATO will have a nuclear strategy for as long as the Warsaw Pact does. 
But the Labour Party can take the lead in encouraging reform of NATO 
strategy, and further reductions in nuclear weapons. 

The security of Europe and the wider superpower disarmament 
process would benefit if NATO could radically reform its strategic 
doctrine of flexible response. The Labour Party has joined with others 
in calling for no-first use of nuclear weapons and sought to lengthen 
the 'nuclear fuse' by means of battlefield nuclear weapon-free-zones. 

In government Labour would be well placed to argue the case for 
change within NATO. Our membership and commitment to NATO give 
Britain a powerful voice and influence within the structures of the 
Alliance. With our sister parties and governments of the Socialist 
International, a Labour administration could decisively influence NATO 
policy and the arms control agenda in the 1990s. 

In West Germany, for example, there is widespread support across 
the political spectrum for further talks to remove battlefield nuclear 
systems, and deep reluctance to pursue the nuclear weapons 
modernisation plans favoured by Mrs Thatcher. West Germany plays 
a pivotal role within the Alliance and would face the most immediate 
threat if conflict occurred between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 

The Social Democratic Party (SPD) has joined with the Labour Party 


in calling for adoption of 'no first use' and for the creation of a nuclear-
free corridor along the inner-German border. By working closely with 
the SPD Labour's policy objectives and the common security of Europe 
can be greatly enhanced. 

Tackling the battlefield systems 

Reductions in short-range battlefield systems in both East and West 
Germany are clearly a matter of urgency. These weapons, consisting 
of nuclear artillery and Lance missiles, are already the subject of 
controversial modernisation plans. But as instruments of deterrence 
they have the least credibility and the earliest military use, threatening 
an uncontrolled nuclear exchange in the centre of Europe. Based 
forward along the West German border, these weapons are at risk from 
a successful Warsaw Pact conventional assault and would pose a 'use 
them or lost them' dilemma for NAW commanders. 

The Soviet Union has already proposed the total elimination of 
battlefield nuclear weapons-the so-called third zero. But NAW has 
deliberately pushed the issue to the bottom of the current agenda of 
arms control. Despite West German anxieties, Mrs Thatcher has 
vociferously argued for the modernisation of these weapons and is 
blocking discussion of their removal. In government in the 1990s both 
Labour and the SPD could spearhead the reduction of short-range 
nuclear systems in Europe. 

However, progress in de-nuclearising the inner-German border 
requires careful negotiation both between the East and West as well 
as within NAID. We, also, want acceptance of 'no first use' of nuclear 
weapons. These proposals, which are essential for common security, 
would mark a significant shift away from flexible response and 
dependence on nuclear weapons. But they cannot be achieved without 
hard bargaining among our allies in Europe. Negotiation is inevitable 
if we are seriously intent on changing NAID policy. 

Negotiation will also be required to facilitate the withdrawal of 
nuclear arms from the American Flll bombers based in Britain. Their 
removal must be secured without detriment to the objective of 
obtaining agreement on battlefield weapons in Germany, or acceptance 
of 'no first use'. There is a real risk that, without having first gained 
agreement with our allies, action by Britain over the Fllls would force 
redeployment elsewhere in Western Europe and postpone other 
significant steps of arms control. 

Perversely Britain's attempt to remove nuclear arms from its soil 
could delay reductions of other weapons systems in Europe. Our allies 
in NAID, including those countries sympathetic to the goals of nonnuclear 
defence, would be plunged into domestic arguments about 
finding bases for nuclear-armed Fllls. Progress in negotiating the 

FABIAN 

TRACT 533 

PAGE SEVENTEEN 


FABIAN 

TRACT 533 

PAGE EIGHTEEN 

removal of short-range systems in East and West Germany would be 
jeopardised. The interests of common security in Europe require 
negotiation when we seek withdrawal of the Fills' nuclear arms. 

A commitment to negotiate does not weaken the case against these 
British-based nuclear bombers. There is a strong argument that the 
Fills should no longer be used in a nuclear role. At present their 
nuclear capacity inhibits use in conventionally-armed support for naval 
and land forces. Ending the dual capability of the Fllis would enhance 
NATO's conventional deterrence and lessen the risk of nuclear 
exchange through mistaken identity. There is now a risk that the Soviets 
might assume that conventionally-armed Fllls threaten a nuclear 
attack. 

Nevertheless ending the nuclear role of the Fills is one among a 
number of our policy objectives for NATO. The negotiations to reach 
any, or all, of these goals will not be helped by the adoption of inflexible 
deadlines. The goal of reforming NATO and working for common 
security is too important for the Labour Party to throw in the towel 
if the negotiations are long and hard. 

The future of Polaris and Trident 

With the Fills the obligation to negotiate flows directly from our 
membership of NATO and our existing commitments to the defence 
of Western Europe. These constraints clearly have less influence over 
decisions about the 'British independent deterrent'. Although 
'committed to NATO', this country's strategic nuclear force of four 
Polaris submarines remains under the ultimate control of the Briti~h 
Government. They are not an integral part of NATO forces, but merely 
an addition to the existing strategic nuclear arms made available to 
the Alliance by the United States. Although obviously a step of 
significance to both NATO and the United States, Britain's 
abandonment of its own strategic forces would be an independent 
decision by a sovereign government. 

Opponents of Britain's nuclear capability believe it is both 
unnecessary and incredible. Unnecessary, since NATO, insofar as it must 
meet the Soviet nuclear threat, already has nuclear weapons supplied 
by the United States. Incredible, as it is inconceivable that Britain could 
use its strategic force independently. 

Field Marshal Lord Carver's frequently quoted speech is a powerful 
statement of scepticism about the purpose of the British bomb. ''I have 
never heard or read a scenario which I would consider realistic in which 
it would be considered to be right or reasonable for the Prime Minister 
or Government of this country to order the firing of our independent 
strategic force at a time when the Americans were not prepared to 
fire theirs .. .' ' (House of Lords, I8 December I979). 


The case against retention of Britain's strategic nuclear weapons 
also includes specific concerns arising from the plan to replace Polaris 
with Trident. Firstly, the Trident D5 is capable of carrying up to eight 
warheads against just two or three in each Polaris missile. This extra 
warhead capacity clearly offers the potential for a dramatic escalation 
in Britain's nuclear capability. 

Secondly, to an even greater extent than Polaris, the Trident system 
will be dependent on the continued goodwill of the United States. At 
present the Polaris weapons are maintained at Coulport in Scotland. 
However, Trident missiles will be obtained from America, drawn from 
a shared 'pool' of weapons stored at a base in Kings Bay, Georgia. 

Finally, Trident will cost about £10 billion. The impact of the 
programme on the defence budget has forced a sharp squeeze on 
expenditure on Britain's conventional forces. 

During the 1987 election campaign the Labour Party placed 
considerable emphasis on the costs of the Trident programme. The 
Party argued in favour of switching the money saved from the 
cancellation of Trident to modernise and equip our conventional forces. 
This line of argument has been overtaken by events. By 1991 
expenditure on the Trident programme will have peaked. About 70 
per cent of the capital costs will have been incurred or committed. 
One submarine hull will have been completed, the second will be about 
80 per cent built and the third just starting construction. Immediate 
cancellation of the fourth submarine hull, assuming a Labour victory 
at the next election, will not release massive resources for the 
conventional defence budget-probably only £2 billion. 

Despite the fact of diminished revenue from the cancellation of 
Trident, the arguments against Britain's possession of a strategic 
nuclear capability retain their force. Neither Polaris nor Trident are 
necessary to guarantee Britain's security. Indeed the retention of this 
country's nuclear capability has little or nothing to do with defence 
policy. Possession of the bomb has always been justified as a foreign 
policy priority vital to guarantee Britain's status abroad. As Britain's 
imperial past receded we have tried to compensate our lost 
international authority by purchasing the 'power' of nuclear capability. 

Our nuclear capability, however, has proved a feeble weapon of 
international diplomacy. Regardless of the delusions of nuclear 
grandeur fostered by Mrs Thatcher it has not provided access to the 
superpower talks at Reykjavik or Geneva. Although Britain's strategic 
nuclear force has become a powerful source of domestic political 
controversy, the protagonists on both sides of the argument readily 
grant too much importance to the British bomb. 

Nevertheless in its Policy Review the Labour Party must again set 
out its proposals for the future of Polaris and Trident. By 1994 the first 
Trident boat is scheduled to enter service and gradually the Polaris 

F ABIAN 

TRACT 533 

PAGE NINETEEN 


F ABIAN 
TRACT 533 
PAGE TWENTY 

submarines are expected to be replaced. Given the objective of 
achieving a non-nuclear defence policy the Labour Party will be seeking 
to dismantle Britain's strategic nuclear force. The challenge for the 
Party is to place the objective of withdrawal of Trident and Polaris in 
a practical political framework. 

Our aim must be to ensure that nuclear weapon reductions in 
Britain benefit nuclear disarmament internationally (by applying the 
'enhancement' criterion discussed earlier). A Labour government will 
have to consider the best means to advance the on-going international 
process of disarmament. As we enter the 1990s, options are available 
which can ensure that action by Britain will positively contribute to 
global reductions in nuclear arms. 

A Labour government could offer to include our strategic nuclear 
force within the START talks. Unlike Mrs Thatcher, who seems 
determined to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely, Labour shares Mr 
Gorbachev's objective of a world free from nuclear weapons. By 
offering to count Trident and Polaris into the talks, Labour would be 
able to add to the total number of strategic weapons eliminated as a 
result of STARI', and give a European perspective to negotiationS which 
at present are confined to the superpowers. 

But a decision to contribute to the START process would require 
acceptance of the constraints that are inherent in arms negotiations. 
Flexibility in the timing and phasing of the withdrawal of our strategic 
nuclear force would be inevitable. At the very least our decisions about 
Trident and Polaris must be constructively influential on these crucial 
superpower negotiations. It would be absurd if independent action by 
Britain 'jogged the elbows' of the negotiators in Geneva. Arms control 
is a painstaking process, and clearly no responsible government would 
wish to jeopardise a successful conclusion to the START negotiations. 

Alternatively a Labour government can independently engage in 
bilateral talks with the Soviet Union. The withdrawal of Britain's 
strategic nuclear force could deliver a reciprocal reduction on their 
part. This would be a result worth working and waiting for. The Soviets 
have offered reciprocal reductions in the past (in 1984 and 1986) and 
further bilateral talks are a practical option which can be developed 
before the next general election. 

But neither participating in START nor working for a reciprocal 
reduction by the Soviet Union imply that possession of a strategic 
nuclear force is essential for the defence and security of Britain. The 
justification for such initiatives is that they would give added value 
to British withdrawal of Trident and Polaris. They do not compromise 
the determination of a Labour government to work for a nuclear-free 
world and an end to Britain's strategic nuclear force. 

Opponents of the Labour Party's non-nuclear defence policy complain 
that tht:! objective of withdrawal of the British bomb would 


remove any incentive for the Soviets to strike a reciprocal deal or make 
additional concessions through START. The Kremlin, it is argued, 
merely has to wait to gain a windfall of one-sided arms reduction. On 
the contrary, the Soviets will have powerful incentives to respond. If 
they fail to reciprocate, the integrity of Mr Gorbachev's disarmament 
proposals will be tainted. 

Negative signals would be conveyed not just to London but also 
to the START talks and throughout the Western Alliance. A hard-line 
Soviet response would inevitably impact on the defence policy of a 
Labour administration and ensure that its eagerness to pursue further 
steps of disarmament and reform of NATO strategy would be dissipated. 

Some argue that the loss of Trident and Polaris would be 
unsatisfactory regardless of the response of the Soviet Union. They 
are concerned that our strategic nuclear capability will come to an end 
whilst Russia's equivalent forces will be merely reduced. These 
advocates of the British bomb really believe that this country must 
always retain strategic nuclear weapons so long as the Soviet Union 
possesses them; an argument which undermines the collective security 
that remains the raison d'etre of NATO. Some hawks even imply that 
Britain should retain a nuclear capability in perpetuity. But such a 
nationalistic posture will be hard to sustain indefinitely. 

If the START talks make good progress and enter a second phase, 
the superpowers will expect to negotiate reductions in the British and 
French strategic nuclear forces. Britain's dependence on the US as 
supplier of the Trident missile ensures that even Mrs Thatcher's 
Government will be powerless to prevent a superpower agreement for 
further weapon reductions-including the British and French systems. 
The outcome of START could result in a world in which only the 
superpowers retain (hopefully very modest) strategic nuclear arsenals. 
Under these circumstances Britain will confront a Soviet nuclear 
capability but our defence will unambiguously depend on NATO. 

A further line of criticism accuses the Labour Party of accepting 
the protection of the American nuclear capability whilst refusing to 
shoulder a comparable responsibility ourselves. But NATO does not 
expect or require every member state to possess its own nuclear 
capability. Only the United States, France, and Britain, out of a total 
membership of 16 countries maintain their own nuclear forces. 

The Labour Party understands that Britain's security depends on 
NATO and the collective efforts of its membership. Neither Polaris or 
Trident are of crucial significance to Britain's contribution to the 
Alliance. Indeed they serve only to obscure the more fundamental role 
of our conventional forces in the defence of Western Europe. 
Withdrawal of our strategic nuclear force will break the spell that 
prevents this country from embracing a credible defence policy for 
Britain in the next decade and beyond. 

FABIAN 

TRACT 533 

PAGE TWENTY·ONE 


5Meeting Britain's 
defence needs 


FABIAN 
TRACT 533 
PAGE TWENTY-TWO 

The challenge facing British defence policy 
in the years ahead will be to match our 
military commitments to the available 
expenditure. A major review of Britain's 
defence priorities is urgently required. 

A 
A
bout 20 per cent of government spending, some £19 billion, 
is accounted for by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). But the 
burden of our strategic commitments and the need to 
re-equip and modernise our land, sea and air forces is 
placing the defence budget under great strain. 

During the last general election the Labour Party illustrated the 
expenditure constraints which have been exacerbated by the Thry 
government's determination to purchase Trident. The Party warned, 
for example, about cuts of about 30 per cent in spending on new 
military equipment, and the Government's difficulty in meeting their 
own target for a fleet of 50 frigates and destroyers. 

In the 1990s, with the bulk of the Trident paid for, the defence 
budget will be facing even greater stress. Defence spending has declined 
by almost eight per cent over the last four years. By 1989-90 the 
percentage of GDP allocated to the MoD will have fallen to four per 
cent compared with five per cent in 1985-86. A comprehensive review 
of Britain's defence commitments is inevitable because of these 
budgetary constraints. 

At present Britain's defence policy is based on: 

• 
the defence of the United Kingdom; 
• 
a major contribution to the defence of the North-East Atlantic; 
• 
the maintenance of the British Army on the Rhine and a tactical 
air force for the defence of Central Europe; 
• 
an intervention capability beyond NA1D 'Out of Area' (such as the 
Armilla Patrol in the Gulf); 
• 
the maintenance of a strategic nuclear force; 
• 
the military presence in the Falkland Islands. 
Since the Second World War, British defence policy has consistently 
embraced more military capabilities than the country can afford. The 
most recent attempt at a major defence review in 1981 was pre-empted 
by the Falklands War. Subsequently the Government has avoided a new 


review rather than face the political embarrassment of axing any of 
its existing military commitments. 

But the resulting expenditure squeeze is eroding Britain's 
conventional defence capabilities. An Army officer writing in March 
1987 complained that lack of resources ''are making it increasingly 
difficult for commanders at all levels to train their formations and units 
to the highest standard required to maintain a credible deterrence''. 
Citing lack of spares, fuel and ammunition, he warned that, "we are 
neglecting our conventional defence in spite of ministerial comments 
to the contrary" (The Times, 5 March 1987). 

The basis of a new review must be Britain's NA1D responsibilities. 
Conventional land, sea and air forces are the centrepiece of our contribution 
to the collective security of Britain and the NA1D area. These 
must take priority within the defence budget. 

The next Labour government will make only modest savings if it 
withdraws our strategic nuclear force. The curtailment of the 'Out of 
Area' role (in favour of United Nations peace-keeping exercises), and 
a negotiated solution to the security of the Falkland Islands, could also 
release some additional funds. But even assuming a better use of scarce 
resources the pressure to sustain expenditure at present levels will 
remain. This pressure will exist despite the encouraging progress in 
nuclear arms control. Success in the sphere of nuclear disarmament 
places even greater emphasis on conventional defences. 

Furthermore the United States is pressing for increased military 
spending by the European members of NA1D. The traditional 'burden 
sharing' concerns of Washington are being intensified by the Federal 
budget crisis. Western Europe faces an unpleasant choice of responding 
to the American demand for more spending now, or waiting for 
Congress to withdraw US troops from Europe, which would force 
increased spending later. Since Britain is already NA1D's third highest 
contributor direct pressure to increase our defence budget will be less 
intense than on other European members of NA1D. 

The best hope to ease the burden of defence expenditure will be 
through conventional disarmament. The Conventional Stability Talks 
are about to tackle reductions in conventional forces. Mr Gorbachev's 
unilateral cuts announced at the UN in December last year are an 
encouraging first step. In the light of the cuts in Soviet conventional 
forces, it should be possible for reciprocal reductions in NA1D's 
conventional forces. Although it will be some time before the 
negotiations bear fruit it should then be possible to reduce defence 
spending in Britain. 

FABIAN 

TRACT 533 

PAGE TWENTY-THREE 


6 


F ABIAN 
TRACT 533 
PAGE TWENTY·FOUR 

Conclusion 

The defence of Britain will be best 
achieved through a strategy of common 
security. Britain must work constructively 
to lessen NA'ID's heavy dependence on 
nuclear weapons, and reform the strategic 
doctrine of 'flexible response'. 

T
T
his pamphlet, as a contribution to Labour's Policy Review, sets 
out a political framework through which the next Labour 
government can work towards the goal of common security. It 
is not a fully comprehensive review of Britain's defence policy. 
Such a task is beyond the scope of a publication of this size. However, 
the report does highlight the key defence issues and opportunities that 
will face a Labour government in the decade ahead. 

It proposes a strategy for nuclear disarmament which embraces 
both independent action and negotiation within NA'ID. It stresses that 
a Labour government must ensure that the key tasks of our 
conventional forces on land, sea and air are adequately fulfilled; but 
recognises that with progress in conventional disarmament the defence 
burden can be reduced. These are proposals around which the Labour 
Party can unite. 

If the Labour Party can conquer its internal arguments it will 
overturn the Conservative's dominance of the defence policy debate. 
It can place its proposals for common security within a wider 
framework of foreign policy and those global concerns, for development 
in the Third World and environmental protection, that are vastly more 
important to humanity than the rivalry between the superpowers. 

This opportunity is too important to be squandered through the 
internal arguments that have dogged the evolution of the Labour 
Party's defence policy. For too long the whole subject has been treated 
like a political football. Some members of the Labour Party, whilst 
candidly disclaiming detailed knowledge of defence policy, are happy 
to use the issues of disarmament as a barometer for the struggle 
between the so-called left and right. But as the trend of nuclear 
disarmament gathers pace so the arguments about how to disarm 
become daily more irrelevant. The gunfire between so-called 
unilateralists and multilateralists silences a defence policy debate that 
the Labour Party can win. 


CHANGING TAX: HOW 
THE TAX SYSTEM WORKS 
AND HOW TO CHANGE IT 


John Hills 

Changing Tax demystifies a crucial area of public policy. lt looks at all the major elements 
of the tax system, including: income tax and NI, inheritance and wealth taxes, alcohol 
and tobacco, company tax and VAT, rates and the poll tax, tax and social security, the 
treatment of couples, how the rich and poor have fared since 1979 and how the tax 
system fits together. Accessibility is enhanced by the use of helpful colour graphics 
throughout. 

Changing Tax shows that Britain has never been one of the most heavily taxed nations, 
that the overall tax burden is now a higher proportion of GNP than in 1978/79 (the burden 
has simply been shifted from the well-off to the less well-off), and that recent cuts in 
direct taxation have been entirely paid for by cuts in the relative value of benefits. 

Changing Tax also presents options for reforms that would lead to a fairer distribution 
of income and wealth. 

Aimed primarily at the general reader, Changing Tax is also an authoritative introductory 
textbook for A level students and first year undergraduates. 

''An ideal introduction for every student of taxation and income distribution'' 

Professor David Piachaud, LSE 

"An extremely clear guide to the challenges facing would-be tax reformers" 

Professor Mervyn King, co-author of 'The British Tax System' 

64 pages 0 946744 14 9 A4 illustrated 

Published: January 1989 paperback £6.95 

ORDER FORM (cash with order please) 

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513 The consumer case for socialism Martin Smith £1 .50 

514 Equality and quality: a socialist plan for education Giles Radice £1 .50 

515 Labour and youth: the missing generation J. Mann & P. Woolas £1 .50 

516 Market socialism: whose choice? edlanForbes £1.50 

518 An investment bank for the UK D. Turner & C. Williams £1.50 

520 Beyond Band Aid: charity is not enough J. Lestor&D. Warg £1.50 

521 Labour's next moves forward Tom Sawyer et al £2.00 

522 Conviction politics: a plan for penal policy Stephen Shaw £1 .50 

523 The politics of prosperity Charles Leadbeater £1 .50 

524 Can governments manage the economy? Jim Tomlinson £1.50 

525 Bringing common sense to the Common Market DavidMartin £2.00 

526 The future ofindustrial democracy WilliamMcCarthy £1.50 

527 Case for equality MargaretDrabble £1.00 

528 Making the City work D. Goodhart & C. Grant £2.00 

529 Life begins at 40: in defence ofthe NHS Robin Cook £1 .50 

530 Socialism, merit and efficiency JohnLloyd et al £1.50 

531 Citizenship, rights and socialism RaynwndPlant £1.50 

532 Labour can still win MartinLinton £1.50 

Catalogue ofFabian pamphlets inprint, 1884-1988, 70p including postage 

Research Series 
348 Criminal trials: the search for truth Tom Sargant & Peter Hill £2.00 
349 Women, trade unions and political parties Cynthia Cockburn £2.00 
350 The debt crisis: the Third World and British banks M. Marcel & G. Palma £2.00 
351 From local administration to community government J. Stewart & G. Stoker £2.00 

Young Fabian Pamphlet 
51 Can socialism be popular? M. Jacobs, N. Lawson, S. -A. Lomas, J. Peretti £1 .50 

........................................................................ 


Books available from the Fabian Society 

100 Years of Fabian Socialism eds D. Terrins & P. Whitehead paper £2.50 

A New A-Z oflncome & Wealth (Fabian Society, 1988) Thomas Stark paper £1.95 

Educate, Agitate, Organize-lOO years ofFabian Socialism (Methuen, 1984) Patricia Pugh 
cased £16.00 paper £9.95 
Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought (Gower, 1984) ed BenPimlott cased £19.50 paper £9.50 
Citrine's ABC ofChairmanship (NCLC, 1982) eds M. Cannell & N. Citrine paper £3.50 

........................................................................ 


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Working for common security 

T
T
his pamphlet, as a contribution to the Labour 
Party's Policy Review, sets out a political framework 
through which the next Labour government can 
work towards the goal of common security. It 
examines the recent developments in East-West 
relations and arms control, and the implications for 
Britain's defence. 

The authors explore the emerging relationship 
between the superpowers and their mutual interest in 
further steps of both nuclear and conventional disarmament. 
They argue against NATO's excessive 
dependence on nuclear weapons and recommend 
radical reform of the doctrine of 'flexible response'. In 
its place a strategy of 'common security' is proposed 
based on conventional forces and the gradual 
elimination of the nuclear arsenals of both NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. 

Within this international context, the pamphlet 
considers the Labour Party's defence policy. The 
arguments between so-called 'unilateralists' and 
'multilateralists' are reappraised and key issues such 
as NATO reform, the future of Polaris and Trident, and 
defence expenditure are reviewed. The authors offer a 
political framework to advance Labour's existing 
objectives of a non-nuclear defence strategy and 
radical reform of NATO to achieve common security. 

And they call for an end to the Labour Party's internal 
arguments that have prevented the evolution of its 
defence policy. If the Conservative dominance of the 
defence issue could be overcome, a debate would be 
opened-which the Labour Party could win. 

The Fabian Society 
The Fabian Society 
exists to further socialist 
education and research. 
Its members are 
thoughtful socialists who 
wish to discuss the 
essential questions of 
democratic socialism and 
relate them to practical 
plans for building 
socialism in a changing 
world. Beyond this the 
Society has no collective 
policy. It is affiliated to 
the Labour Party. 
Anyone who is not 
ineligible for 
membership of the 
Labour Party is eligible 
for full membership; 
others may become 
associate members. For 
membership and 
publications details 
write to: John Willman, 
General Secretary, 
Fabian Society, 
11 Dartmouth Street, 
London SWlH 9BN. 

£1.50