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CASE FOR THE LEAGUE RESTATED

See pages 170 & 171

CAN WE SAVE THE WORLD BY REFUSING TO FIGHT?

See pages 168 & 169

HEADWAY

A MONTHLY REVIEW OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Contributions to HEADWAY are invited from writers with special knowledge of world affairs. The opinions expressed in contributed articles are not necessarily endorsed by the paper.

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SPAIN AND THE WORLD ROUTES OF BRITAIN

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NEWS AND COMMENT

Tribute to the I.L.O.

MISS FRANCES PERKINS, United States Secretary of Labour, at Geneva:—

The United States has a firm belief in the method of democratically co-operating with modern technique of efficiency to achieve the great ends we have in view. These are, essentially stated, shorter working hours, higher average level of wages, abolition of health and accident hazards in industry, education rather than employment for children, social security effected by insurance against outstanding hazards of old age, illness unemployment, and particularly, the security represented by prevention of the very hazards against which insurance may be sought. The I.L.O. is an admirable device for further co-operation towards these ends. . . . At the present time the international character of industrial and labour problems is obvious.

Miss Perkins has been President Roosevelt's chief assistant in his gallant struggle to help the many millions of workers in America who have been plunged into misery by the great depression. Industrial difficulties are not empty words to her; she does not give her praise unearned.

World Opinion

A SUMMER survey of public opinion in all parts of Great Britain and throughout nearer Europe gives interesting results. The League has taken a knock. That is everywhere understood. But scarcely anywhere is it believed that the wound is fatal. The League idea is obstinately alive.

Thoughtful men and women in all countries have grasped the truth that our world of to-day, huddled together as Lord Allen has vividly expressed it, needs an international order. Some such system as the League, providing a centre for world contacts, an organ for world judgments, an instrument for world authority, is the only alternative to anarchy, whose ultimate victim would be civilisation itself.

The lesson of the feverish arms increases and counter-increases is too plain to be missed. Russia reduces her conscript age from 21 to 19 years; Germany extends her conscript term from one year to two; both nations feel less safe than

before. The world spends £2,000,000,000 a year on arms, and its nerve is so shaken that it trembles at a shadow.

On what the next step ought to be, views are many and diverse. Agreement seems to be growing, however, that Covenant requires little change. What is wanted is the courage to obey it. There is support for a peace conference to draw up a comprehensive treaty in which equal justice shall be done to all. During the negotiations, the nations shall pledge themselves to a collective defence against any aggressor. Afterwards, they shall be bound to defend the general settlement. These are the lines on which opinion is moving.

Peace in Our Time

LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD, in his new pamphlet, "Peace in Our Time," whose conclusions are set out on another page, with that ever-alert sense of realities which is one of his most remarkable gifts, hits the target. Declaring himself "an unrepentant pacifist" and "asking for no protection from armed force, national or collective," he insists that if the League collapses the gangster, the true militarist, will take its place. In a world where there are armaments, he says, it is not possible to eliminate collective policy for the use of military force and confine the League to the functions of conciliation.

In an armed world—especially in a world of aerial armaments—collective security is the only security left to us. But force, whilst it remains, should be exercised only under judicial authority, and no longer used anarchically by the self-judged right of disputing litigants. The two great needs of the present anxious time are: (1) that the pacifist should preach his pacifism, and develop its constructive programme, without attacking the League; and (2) that Great Britain should show how to make the collective system a living reality, both in maintaining law and expediting change by pacific means. Lord Allen sets out in detail a programme of British leadership. His proposals are on the same lines as those in the forthcoming L.N.U. pamphlet.

Spain

THE Spanish people have played a great part in history. They have many fine qualities.

They are frugal, brave, enduring, loyal. It is difficult to know them well and not to admire them and like them. In their present tragedy the common duty is to help them with sympathy and patience.

Ignorant partisanship is a crime. It is wicked, when men, women and children are dying in agony, to take sides with light hearts, to assume the truth of one set of accusations off hand and to dismiss another undeterred by a complete lack of evidence, to throw about question-begging epithets which bear no relation to the facts.

Dreadful things are being done. So much is sure. For example, the rebels massacred many hundred Government supporters in Badajoz after their capture of that town. Government supporters have put to death large numbers of rebels in Barcelona, Madrid, and elsewhere. Stories of individual atrocities, however, must be disbelieved until conclusive evidence is produced. Name, place, date, and other details are not enough; often they serve no other purpose than to win belief for a lie. The Cardinal Archbishop of Tarragona was reported at rebel headquarters to have been executed by Government militia. Actually, he left Spain at the start of the troubles and is safe in Italy. Not a few equally confident assertions will in due time be proved equally false.

The world import of what is happening in Spain does not depend on a balance struck between the outrages for which the legal government is responsible and those which their enemies have committed as champions of public order and civilisation.

Denying Britain

ANYONE who looks at the Spanish tragedy with British eyes and British memories must surely revolve anxious thoughts. Much on which the British people have long prided themselves is challenged, and the challenge is loudly applauded by self-appointed spokesmen of British opinion.

Here are some things Britons have been apt to take for granted. Soldiers should be loyal to their oaths and obey the civil power; the importation of foreign mercenaries to intimidate a nation is tyranny; the landowner has a duty to his estate and to the people who live there, and when he rack-rents the countryside and spends his receipts in absentee luxury he should be dispossessed; the State should provide that all children are taught at least to read and write; religion and a priesthood are not identical, and the domination of national life, political, social, economic, by a privileged Church is bad; freedom of speech and freedom of meeting are elementary rights: these simple propositions cannot be denied except at the cost of renouncing the British tradition. If they are all untrue, not only is the British scheme of politics, law, religion as it exists to-day funda-

mentally vicious, but the British achievement throughout the centuries is a prolonged, obstinate error.

Not by any accident the enthusiastic partisans in Britain of the Spanish Civil War are also enemies of the League.

Justice Depends on Peace

FOR the League, Spain is a topical argument. No doubt the rebels have grievances. Their resort to violence, however, prevents those grievances being examined, understood, redressed. The fog of war obscures the facts. Outrage begets outrage; blood feuds are born; wealth is destroyed. The development of Spain is thrown back a whole generation.

The method of peace allows the real issues to be seen clearly. By using it, the rebels might have convinced the world that they were not resisting (1) the break up of vast properties on which the peasants lived as serfs in utter poverty, or (2) the provision of education for all when the Church schools had left half the people unable to read or write. They might have escaped suspicion and discredit which their choice has strongly fastened upon them. At the same time, they would have spared their country a disaster.

Only the method of peace can give justice. The method of violence at the best obstructs it, at the worst denies it. The League organises the method of peace.

World Peace Congress

BETWEEN September 3 and 6 the World Peace Congress will meet in Brussels. More than 30 countries will be represented by some 2,000 delegates. The British delegation will number 500, amongst whom will be 90 representatives of the L.N.U. Viscount Cecil, the Earl of Lytton, Lord Allen of Hurtwood, Lord Dickinson, Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P., Mr. Philip Noel Baker, M.P., Mrs. Corbett-Ashby, Miss K. D. Courtney, Mr. Arnold Forster will be in the party. A special train will leave Liverpool Street at 9.30 on the morning of September 3. From Harwich a special boat will take the delegates to Zeebrugge, and a special train will complete the journey to Brussels.

The preliminary list of speakers includes many famous names. But this is an occasion on which the speakers will be less important than the popular demonstration by the Congress itself of a world-wide insistence on unthreatened peace for all peoples.

And Then What . . . ?

MR. FENNER BROCKWAY has been giving the I.L.P. Summer School advice on Colonies.

He is against handing over British territory to Nazi Germany. But if there were a war, he would be equally against fighting to defend British possessions. He would incite the subject peoples to rise against their masters.



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BRITAIN FOR THE LEAGUE

THIS month the Assembly of the League will discuss the reform of the League. Is reform desirable? If reform is desirable, what lines should it follow? On the answers given to these questions the peace of the world depends. Everywhere their vital importance is admitted.

Great Britain is specially concerned. Not because the League is a British device for the protection of selfish British interests, but because the British Commonwealth is a World Power and cannot be indifferent to anything which touches the welfare of the world. San Salvador and Siam may, perhaps, shiver in a corner, out of the storm. Britain must face the weather. Disorder on a major scale in any part of the world has an effect on the prosperity of her people and is a threat to their security. Her wisest leaders agree that she can be prosperous and safe only within a world system which provides for peaceful change, for the peaceful settlement of disputes, for common defence. In other words, the League. Mr. Baldwin has proclaimed the truth in several of those passages of insight and candour which are apt to redeem even his dullest speeches. Equally impressive has been its expression by Mr. Daffoe, of Winnipeg, through a long generation the most loyal and persuasive advocate in the Canadian West of an enlightened Imperialism, and General Smuts, of South Africa. During the past dozen years a habit has grown up in Britain of thinking about the League, or, rather, talking about it, as though it were a means by whose use British generosity, giving a great deal and getting very little, could perform on suitable occasion its accustomed good deeds in a naughty world. In fact, the League asks a great deal from Britain and offers her a very great deal in return. Should the League collapse the British Commonwealth would have a poor chance of survival.

No one credits Britain with the power to preserve her world position permanently by arms. At the moment a frivolous pretence is being made that if she doubles or trebles her defence budget she will be able to defy attack for evermore. But, of course, her arms increase is only an incident in a world arms race; other nations will reply to her just as she has replied to them, and in the end her relative strength at the highest estimate will not be much greater. In a world where the effort to establish a system of just dealing had met with utter defeat and where in consequence nations had become little better than robber bands menacing one another, Britain would everywhere be exposed to attack and would everywhere face formidable potential enemies. Since she lost her American colonies a hundred and fifty years ago Britain has never had to parry a blow whose

striker both owned the military resources and occupied the geographical vantage points needed to put the Empire in immediate peril. To-day, the old immunity, due to historical and technical causes, has gone. If Britain had to fight a second world war she would find herself facing attacks as far-flung as her possessions, and those possessions would be the reward promised themselves by her assailants. The only defence any longer adequate to world dangers, and Britain's dangers are world dangers, is world defence. Only the peace-keeping nations acting in concert are capable of providing world defence.

The alternative to world defence is a criss-cross of rival alliances. It is not isolation. The self-styled isolationists use that title when they are denouncing the League, because, they say, it involves Britain in foreign entanglements. But when they propose a policy of their own, Lord Beaverbrook begins with an Anglo-American alliance and Lord Rothermere clamours for measures to extend Fascism and avert the Communist danger. Lord Beaverbrook's suggestion is amiable and impracticable, there being no possibility of an American acceptance; Lord Rothermere's, far from amiable, is equally impracticable, British good sense affording a guarantee that it will not be adopted. They are alike, however, in confessing that if the League went rival alliances would take its place. And rival alliances would entangle Britain deeply, intimately, and perilously in the affairs of foreign nations.

In League decisions everything is open and explicit. Commitments are limited to the defence of principles commonly accepted and generally advantageous. Any suspicion that the League is a weapon forged to serve a particular hostility is prevented by a membership open to all. In a League system, honestly worked, nations know to what they are bound and where they stand.

Certainty is the best of diplomatic virtues; uncertainty is the worst of diplomatic vices. The League introduces into international relations a degree of certainty not otherwise attainable. Rival alliances, no matter how carefully they may be drawn, torment with anxiety both those who are parties to them and value them and those who are outside them and fear them. The parties cannot be sure that their allies will not drag them into alien adventures. Allies feel an undefined general obligation to support their own side. This is not a mere theoretical danger. There never was a Foreign Secretary more resolved than Lord Grey of Falldon to deal justly with all interests. At times even he had to act against justice because he could not desert his associates. The same causes would produce again the same consequences. The world outside the alliance is even deeper in the dark. It shares to the full the doubts which afflict the parties. In addition, it has to puzzle over whatever report of the bond the allies choose to publish, well aware that it is little likely to be complete. More often than not treaties of alliance contain secret clauses or are accompanied by secret agreements.

Britain can hold the British World Commonwealth by helping to hold the world together. She is not asked to do all the work; she is asked to give a lead and lend a hand. In a world which is falling in pieces, the British World Commonwealth can survive: and a world without the League would not merely fall in pieces, but dash itself into fragments.

FREE SPAIN FOR WORLD PEACE

By ELIZABETH MONROE

I DID not live six years in Spain without being fully alive to the irritation caused in the breast of every Spaniard by the foreign occupation of that Fortress," wrote Lord Clarendon to Her Majesty's representative in Madrid in the year 1870. The letter was about the "debate subject of Gibraltar," and its contents hold good to-day, for a point scarcely realised as yet by those who are watching the present conflagration in Spain is that, in the eyes of the Spanish fascists, Gibraltar is Spanish soil.

Since the revolution broke out, now nearly four weeks ago, an unobtrusive change has been going on in the tone of most of the British Press; it has been freely commented upon abroad. The side which started the outbreak began as the "rebels," but has passed quickly on from that stage to "anti-Government forces," to "anti-reds," to—in one or two extreme cases—"the patriots." The impression left with the majority of the public is that the Government forces are a set of blood-thirsty *sans-culottes*, their opponents a brave crowd whose leaders have been brought up in the hard school of the army, and who, at least, know how to behave. It is an impression chiefly created by memories of the post-war peril in Russia, and by the innate feeling that anything denounced as "anti-God" is necessarily dangerous and to be feared. Therefore "red" atrocities are poster captions and front-page news, while the handiwork of the other side is reported in small print.

Broadly speaking, the position is that four out of the five great Powers in Europe are only too ready to intervene in Spain, two on each side—France and Russia for socialism and the Government, Germany and Italy for fascism and the rebels. Had Spain been left to herself, the Left, who are, if anything, in the majority, and who hold the capital and the key positions rather as the Roundheads did against the Cavaliers, would probably have won the day. But France, fearing, and with reason, that the dictatorships with their quicker machinery would help first and fastest, and would turn the tide against the Spanish Government, proposed "the rapid adoption and immediate observance" of a non-intervention agreement.

M. Blum had difficulty in getting this proposal passed by his supporters in the Chamber; the hotheads amongst them were anxious to be up and doing, collecting munitions and funds to be sent to Madrid and Barcelona. But his Government, which is clear-sighted, had several reasons for pressing through their proposal. For one thing, as foreign help was likely to favour the insurgents, its results might be to face France with fascism on three frontiers, and with a fascist pincer, operated from the Balearic Islands and Sardinia, threatening her main artery for North African reinforcements. For another, if the European powers were to take active sides in Spain, there was a serious risk that the conflict would spread from a national to an international scale. European wars have started for less.

Yet the public in this country seems to remain supremely unaware that an identical set of arguments

applies in the case of Great Britain. The replies to M. Blum's appeal hung fire, yet the City, for instance, seemed oblivious to the threat of general war. In the middle week in August the German market, sensitive to the tenseness of the situation, experienced the worst set-back of the year, leading industrials falling by as much as seven points. The London Stock Exchange, in contrast, enjoyed "one of the most active periods for some time, most issues closing well up on the week."

(The report is from the *Financial News*, of the 15th.)

What should this country do, or hope for? In principle, non-intervention is an admirable decision. The matter is one of Spanish domestic politics, and the Spaniards should be left to fight it out. But the issue is not so simple as that. The pro-fascist Governments—Italy and Germany—have played a delaying game. On August 20th Germany has only just, Italy still has not, replied to the French appeal. Italy has countered with a proposal which is hard for democracies to swallow; non-intervention, states the Duce, must cover more than Government action. It must cover the activities of private individuals—enlistments in the Spanish forces, for instance, private subscriptions, Press campaigns and expressions of sympathy with one side or the other.

The principle, workable in totalitarian states, is the very antithesis of all the liberties which are the right of the citizen in this country and in France. The rebels have received immense help from Germany and Italy. A non-intervention agreement does not mean either (1) that the effect of such help is exhausted or (2) that no more help of a reputedly private kind will be given.

If Italy maintains her point, the problem reduces itself to this: what is it worth to Great Britain and to France to secure non-intervention in Spain?

The answer, as far as this country is concerned, is that, if Italian and German help to the insurgents continues, it either means a European struggle or a fascist victory in Spain. And if this happens, we shall be faced with fascism over the Mediterranean. Italy, expanding fast, will be delighted to secure a Spanish ally who, from both sides of the Straits, can threaten Gibraltar as she threatens Malta. The Duce will spare no effort to bring to an end British control of his exit to the open sea, and he will have no difficulty in persuading the Spaniards to his view. The balance of power in the Mediterranean will shift as it has not shifted since the seventeenth century; the new Egyptian treaty will become something of an anachronism, and the Admiralty will have good reason to hurry on with their plans for the strengthening of the station at the Cape.

Were Spain genuinely fascist-minded, one could not but accept the establishment of a fascist regime; self-determination is not yet entirely out of date. But a victory won with Italian and German help is quite another matter. And the convenience for British policy of a Government victory, won by Spaniards, in Spain cannot be overestimated.

What Must We Do To Live?

(From OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT)

Geneva, August 17

DESPITE the phrase of one delegate to the last Session of the Assembly, who said, after Abyssinia had been finally left to its fate, "It is not the Covenant, but we who have failed," the general discussion on the raising of sanctions contained several definite proposals for Covenant reform, whilst almost every delegate who spoke hinted, more or less clearly, at various ideas which his Government would like to see put into effect. As a result of this general discussion, and the feeling which it showed to exist amongst the nations represented at Geneva, a proposal made by the French Foreign Minister, M. Yvon Delbos, that all States should forward to the League their suggestions for reform, was adopted.

Up to the time of writing, only one set of proposals has reached Geneva—that of France—which does not go beyond the outlines sketched by Blum and Delbos in their Assembly speeches. However, from the speeches delivered in the Assembly, and from declarations made since by various Governments, it is possible to see on what lines reform talks will proceed when the statesmen meet in Geneva on September 17 for the opening of the 93rd Council Session and the Seventeenth Assembly.

Two points stand out from these speeches: first, the urgent cry for some universal peace organisation—whether it is the League Assembly, made universal by the entry of the United States, and the return to Geneva of Germany and Japan, or else the setting up of some sort of International Peace Conference on the lines of the proposal made two years ago by Litvinov; a year ago by De Valera; and last month by the spokesman of the Government of Chile.

Of course, all these three suggestions for a conference differ in detail, one from another, but their essence is the same—that the nations of the world should be willing to meet together and to consult immediately any circumstance arising which threatens peace.

Whether this new body is actually a new organisation or an enlarged League will not very much matter, for the second important point which has arisen in the recent revision talks is the widely held opinion that the application of sanctions—especially military sanctions—shall no longer be an obligation upon members of the League, who shall have the right to refrain from taking part in any measures against an aggressor, and up to the present it has been the sanctions obligation which has differentiated between membership of the proposed Peace Conference and Membership of the League. That distinction may now go, if Article XVI—the Sanctions Article—in its present form disappears.

In the place of sanctions a series of regional pacts may be concluded. In theory they will be accessible to all, and will be kept within the framework of the League by reason of the fact that in their application the voice of the League Council or Assembly will be heard when it comes to determining whether these pacts have been violated. This, at least is the wish of the French, as well as of most of the members of the Balkan, Little and Baltic Ententes. Ex-enemy States have given no option

so far. The neutral European States that spoke at Geneva seem willing to give the scheme their blessings, though none of them has so far expressed willingness to enter any of these pacts. Some, notably Sweden and Holland, might sign if they believed that by thus sacrificing their traditions of neutrality, which go back for over a century, they would gain increased security. In the present circumstances in Europe, security for them means British readiness to come to their rescue if they were attacked by Germany.

The other members of the League who have expressed an opinion on reform fall into two categories—the members of the British Commonwealth and the States of Latin-America.

Mr. Bruce, the delegate of Australia, said: "Nations are not prepared to commit their peoples to war for a cause which does not vitally concern their immediate national interests." From this, it follows, in the words of Mr. Massey, the Canadian representative: "We could not recognise any commitment binding us to adopt military sanctions." Several of the Latin-American speakers, notably the representatives of Chile and the Argentine, went further. If the obligations laid upon them by the Covenant to take sanctions were not removed, Chile and the Argentine would leave the League.

And that is where League reform rests for the time being. But to complete the picture it is necessary to add that several States—notably the seven European neutrals—pointed out very emphatically that no real progress could be achieved simply by drafting a new Covenant and leaving it at that. The problems of disarmament, colonial rights, trade barriers and monetary stabilisation must be tackled immediately if the final chaos were to be prevented.

THREAT OF WORLD CIVIL WAR

Geneva, August 20

The Spanish civil war has now been in progress for over a month; killing, in the most modern and the most barbarous ways which are at the disposal of up-to-date armies and African mercenaries, is in full swing, and the League is powerless to intervene. So far, all that has been heard of such a possibility is the announcement that a number of Spanish jurists—whether commissioned by the Madrid government or not is uncertain—have been considering the legal basis of an appeal.

It is bad enough that the League has not been able to put a stop to this killing. What is worse is the fact that not only is the civil war destroying Spain, but that it may also do deadly damage to the League—and what that means in terms of killing in the future can be left to the imagination.

That the civil war may damage the League is true for two reasons—first, the obvious one that if there is a Fascist Spain Britain might as well blow up Gibraltar and fill in the Suez Canal. The Mediterranean like the Baltic will become a Dictator's Sea, and in the case of the Mediterranean, the Dictator will be able to send his

warships out on to the oceans of the world to prey upon commerce. Possession of the ports of Spain by a Dictator would also mean the end of any hope that the League might have of carrying out a successful blockade as a sanctions measure—for the coasts of Spain can obviously not be blockaded in the way in which it would be possible to blockade Britain, or Italy, or even Germany.

Spain would be a Dictator's door into the world—a door which he does not now possess, and a door which could not be closed.

So much for the obvious side of the question—the less obvious one is this: if Generals Franco and Mola succeed in their attempt to replace a democratic government by a military dictatorship, they will have plenty of imitators in other countries—once it is seen that a few thousand desperate men with modern weapons can over-ride several million votes. Hitler and Mussolini triumphed against the ballot-box without much immediate slaughter. We now may be approaching a time when would-be dictators almost everywhere will be willing to risk a civil war as a means of seizing power.

The prospect of the League of Nations flourishing while several of its principal member states are caught

up in the self-destruction of civil war is clearly hopeless. Not only would the whole moral basis of the League go, but the material basis would disappear as well. What could be the chances of a collective system, an economic system, a labour system, or any other system surviving under such circumstances?

And while the League is being undermined internally by Fascism, it is being threatened as well by just the same force. The peril of the Fascist International is a very real one, and so far there is only one force mobilised on the same scale which can meet it—the Communist International. There is as yet no sign of a Democratic International, but until the League or some other organisation founds it we must sit back and watch the Spanish people, and other people, too, suffer from wars of aggression no less brutal or wicked because the aggression against them is being carried on by their fellow-countrymen.

Meanwhile there is the danger of a clash between the two internationals, a world-wide civil war between Fascism and Communism, cutting right across all ties of frontier and family, just as did the religious wars of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.

That is the horrible eventuality to be borne in mind.

Fair Field in the Colonies ^{By} C. E. W. BEAN

(Official Historian of the World War to the Australian Government)

AS Australia has not infrequently been mentioned, in HEADWAY and elsewhere, in connection with the world's colonial problem, may I be allowed to put forward the view point of at least one Australian.

Any attempt to use the League merely to save the *status quo* is certain to fail. There must be change where change is just, and one of the most obvious of present injustices is inequality in opportunities for colonisation. Whether or not colonies are profitable is beside the question; the point is that, for whatever reason, they are valued by both the "haves" and the "have-nots."

It is idle to pretend that the "haves" are solely concerned about the interests of the native inhabitants. These must be protected, but the present colonial powers are not the only authority that can protect them. For example, both equality of advantage and protection of the native interests might be ensured by handing to the League all colonies involving such trusteeship. This system was discarded at Versailles owing to the bad precedent of the Condominium of the New Hebrides; but the Condominium, an association of two jealous powers, is in reality something entirely different; real League control of colonies has never been tried, but some day assuredly it will be. One may chance a guess that the League's colonial service will then be built up by taking over the existing administrations and reinforcing them with League cadets as vacancies occur.

Such a system would not be accepted by all colonial powers to-day; but if Great Britain pledged herself to agree to it in respect of certain territories as soon as other powers did the same, a useful step would have been taken towards the final solution of the problem that has been the most frequent cause of friction. Even from

the point of view of expediency, if we are not prepared to fight another great war to keep ourselves these additions to our already overgrown Empire, surely it is better fairly and frankly to negotiate a fair settlement now, as the basis of world peace, than to hold on selfishly until we have to negotiate an angry settlement under threat of war.

But during the recent Abyssinian crisis some of your readers, who were seething with indignation at Italy's aggression in Abyssinia, suggested throwing Australia or part of it (which they were pledged by the very same agreement to protect) as a bone to land-hungry powers. To talk of "throwing open Australia" is as easy as asking for a cup of tea, but how many of those who suggest it give one thought to what it involves? Would supporters of the League envisage with satisfaction the importation into Australia of unassimilable communities, with all the racial problems that render Balkan or Palestinian affairs an international nightmare?

The League of Nations has surely found enough difficulty in the transplantation of 50,000 Assyrians to cause it to avoid the creation of such problems in the one continent that is free of them and that has consequently never seen internal war. With the example of Europe—its wars and fears of war—constantly before them, Australians are determined at any cost to retain this ideal of a continent inhabited by a single, even if composite, race. If once the door is opened to unassimilable peoples it can never again be shut; that mistake once made can never be repaired.

It is possible that some day a religious or social revolution may render feasible the assimilation of Jew with Arab, Czech with German, European with Asiatic. If Australians see that miracle worked in Europe, they may believe it possible in Australia.

The Christian Pacifist Challenge—

CAN WE SAVE THE WORLD BY REFUSING TO FIGHT?

THOU SHALT NOT KILL

SIR.—1.—There is no qualification to the Commandment "Thou shalt not kill."

2.—Jesus said in the Sermon on the Mount—the essence of Christianity—"I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also."

3.—A little later Jesus said, "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you."

4.—Sanctions may be proposed "as a means of stopping war," but a more Christian—and sensible—attitude would be to find out the cause of the aggression and try to remedy it. I would refer correspondents to the excellent drawing on the cover of your April issue.

5.—Arms and instruments of war should, of course, not be supplied to Italy. Neither should they be supplied to anyone else, including ourselves.

Leicester. CHRISTIAN PACIFIST.
NOTE: The drawing referred to is Low's cartoon on the *Haves and the Have-Nots*.

TRUST TO JUSTICE

SIR.—Mr. Fox claims in your June issue that the "Christian Pacifist" movement "owes its expansion to an unstable emotional appeal," so that its members cannot be regarded as safely won for peace. I agree that the pacifists appeal is primarily to the heart, in the sense that it is based on religious conviction, but can it not be justified also on "realist" grounds?

Pacifists suggest a more constructive approach to "the practical difficulties which obstruct the progress of internationalism" than that of converting the League into a copy of the accepted type of Great Power, which will uphold its will by its "prestige" and stand no nonsense from anyone. A writer elsewhere in your columns reminds us that the "ultimate object" of the League system "is to make worth preserving the new world order"; but it would not need preserving, as he goes on to suggest, "by collective defence" if it were really worth preserving. If at present we had such a world order, there would have been no opening for dictators who have in fact risen to power because their countries felt they had grievances. The realistic way of going to work is surely to remove the grievances—and so the *raison d'être* of the dictator's popular support—rather than to strengthen the machinery for holding the dictators in check (and incidentally help to increase that support).

I know that sanctionists would not necessarily deny that Italy, Germany and Japan have grievances, or refuse to confer with them on such subjects as the distribution of the world's natural resources and immigration restrictions—after the Reign of Law had first been vindicated. This order of procedure, the forcible restoration of "Law and Order" before the granting of equitable concessions, however necessary it may have been in connection, for instance, with the Irish Land League agitation, is, I suggest, inappropriate in "the dealings of organised peoples with one another." It may not have been only the insistence on "probationary periods" that caused Germany to leave the Disarmament Conference, but does not the repeated failure of attempts to obtain Security before Disarmament and the redress of grievances suggest that the problem might be tackled from the other end?

A certain amount of faith would of course be required, as well as the swallowing of much pride. But it is surely better to start dealing equitably with the "Have-nots" when they have become bellicose in their demands than not

"Sanctions may be proposed 'as a means of stopping war,' but a more Christian—and sensible—attitude would be to find out the cause of aggression and try to remedy it."—Christian Pacifist.

to start at all; it is better to abandon a mistaken policy in humiliating circumstances than to cling to it to save our faces; and the best way to show that our change of front was dictated not by cowardice but by goodwill would be that our offer to discuss the grievances of the world should be a comprehensive one. Such an offer would be a more positive contribution to the peace of the world than the attempt to make "power politics" collective. Expenditure on armaments is unproductive, and the diminution of international trade is harmful, whether they be due to nationalist or internationalist policies. A conference "for removing injustices which may threaten the peace of the world" would be a step in an unquestionably right direction.
Reading. G. M. STANIER.

WILL THE UNION REMAIN PACIFIC?

SIR.—After Mr. Eric H. Fox has rid himself and the Union of the "enthusiasm and labour" of the "thousands" of "Christian Pacifists," what does he propose to do next with them? Is there room anywhere in his world for "Christian Pacifists"?

He says that "It is notorious that the great Conservative Party is weakly represented," and he gives a certain reason. Another reason may be that the Conservative Party is, and always has been, essentially a War Party, and, being conservative, is slower to change than other more progressive Parties.

Upon Mr. Fox's own admission, the Union was at one time in sympathy with "Christian Pacifists," and itself derived benefits from their membership.

And "Christian Pacifists" have not changed.

Does Mr. Fox wish to change the pacific character of the Union?

Reading, Berks.

M. M. BOWEN.

NATIONAL IDOLATRY

SIR.—Discussion of this matter must go on for a long time yet, and it is important that no aspect of it should be missed.

Some of the recorded sayings of Jesus Christ are much quoted, but singularly little notice is taken of His demeanour as a citizen in the national situation of His time. His native country, conquered by Rome before He was born, had never settled contentedly under Roman occupation. Revolts were many, and the crowd, given their chance, chose "not this Man but Barabbas," not because Barabbas was a robber—no crowd is so fond as that of thieves as such—but because he had "made an insurrection," and thus was a patriotic hero.

No recorded word or act of Christ indicates interest in restoring national independence. When asked by Pilate whether He was a King, His reply, "My kingdom is not of this world, but if My kingdom were of this world, then should My servants fight," seems to be a disclaimer both of fighting as a method of gaining His ends and of the ends for which men fight, but the first only as a consequence of the second. Pilate's immediate pronouncement, "I

—and the League Answer

"If the League system fails, it will not be their solutions which will take its place, but the armed international anarchy into which the world is fast slipping back."

—Arthur Floyd.

find no fault in Him at all," can only mean that the official mind was perfectly satisfied that this was not the Man to instigate any kind of patriotic rising, such being the chief fault the Governor was concerned with. The love of Jesus for the people about Him is beyond question, but He appears to have been indifferent what government He lived under.

The same is noticeable in St. Paul after his conversion, and here it is the more striking because he had been a fervid patriot, a "Hebrew of the Hebrews." Once a Christian, there is no further sign of interest in national aspirations. He appeals to his Hebraism or his Roman citizenship simply as one or the other serves his purpose for spreading His Gospel.

I submit that, in the light of Christian example, most of us, peace-makers as well as war-makers, over-emphasise the value of "the nation." I suppose that idolatry is the ascribing of supreme and eternal values to things of temporal and secondary importance. If so, the accepted standard of national loyalty verges on the idolatrous. Perhaps this is one reason why the most earnest pacifists find it hard to see how Christian principles can be applied to the present situation. We might as well spare ourselves the trouble of debating how to bring seven or eight great rival idolatries into peaceful and harmonious relations. Christianity has nothing to say to such a proposition.

It sounds a shocking heresy to suggest that for us, or for any other people, government by foreigners, especially if accepted without the injuries and hatreds of preliminary war and the humiliation of defeat, would probably not affect our personal happiness much, and could not take from us our opportunity of living the noblest kind of life. But it is heresy against orthodox patriotism, not against Christianity. Unpalatable as the notion may be, there is no doubt that if it became at all general it would act as a great solvent. Mountains of international difficulty, which now threaten to fall on us and grind us to powder, would flow down and disappear.

Melbourne, Australia.

ELEANOR M. MOORE.

THE CASE FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

SIR.—I am obliged to your correspondents for the consideration they have given to my letter on this subject in your April number. May I reply briefly to the criticisms they jointly present?

(1) My phrase "measures of restraint," as applied to the steps to which League members are pledged under Article 16, was not a "euphemism" for "sanctions," but a clearer and more correct description. Sanctions, in the legal sense, are penalties for the breaking of a law; but the purpose of Article 16 is not to penalise an aggressor, but to stop him.

(2) What are we to think of the new argument against such action, which your correspondents put forward? It is asserted, on the authority of an un-named "Director of the British Institute of Florence," that the other countries (including our own) have for long been guilty of such economic aggression on Italy as to deprive us and them of

all moral rights to defend Abyssinia against the Italian military aggression.

I am not concerned to defend all that has been done in recent years, by this and all other countries, in the name of economic nationalism and imperialism. But the contention that any injuries which we (for example) have unintentionally caused to Italy are morally equivalent to the attack on Abyssinia, seems to me wanting in all sense of proportion.

(3) I did not suggest that Christ used physical compulsion in casting the traffickers out of the temple, and I agree it seems unlikely that He did so. But it was compulsion (spiritual if not physical) and not persuasion—which, it would seem, He knew would be useless. That is a side of the Gospel story which pacifists hardly seem to have taken sufficiently into account.

As previously explained, however, I do not think we can expect to find, or do find, in the Gospels, "chapter and verse" to decide quite explicitly the question we are considering; since our circumstances are very different from those of the people to whom Christ's teachings were very definitely addressed. They paid tribute to Cæsar (as He in effect advised); and there the matter ended. We are Cæsar, and must act according to our own best judgment and in the light of the Christian inspiration.

(4) This brings me to the writer's last point. St. Paul, it is true, wrote Ch. 13 of I. *Corinthians*. But he also, a little later, wrote that Ch. 13 of *Romans* to which I referred. This deals with the duties of rulers and deserves therefore our consideration, since we are all Rulers. The two passages are not, in my judgment, incompatible with each other, since it is the *good-will* of the Ruler which alone should cause him to take in the last resource forcible measures, which St. Paul clearly thought justified.

From this point of view, may I very briefly put the case for the Collective System of the League Covenant; not as the ultimate ideal for which Christians, and all the other people of good-will, should look; but as the best practical solution, in the present stage of the world's development, of the urgent problems of world peace and justice? Centuries ago, as I understand, this country had reached a stage when individuals were still privately armed, but were required, at the call of the Sheriff, to contribute their armed support for dealing with enemies of the common weal. That was the best system then attainable, and it led to the more national civilized order we enjoy. The League Covenant established a similar international system, under which the separate nations would, at the call of the whole League, pool their resources to prevent that armed aggression from which all the nations of the League are in fact pledged to abstain. That was the degree of international order to which the very capable framers of the Covenant hoped the world might attain. With the right leadership, I venture to think it might even now be attained. I would ask pacifists on the one hand, and advocates (like your correspondent, Mr. E. H. Fox) of a Permanent International Police Force on the other, to consider whether they are not in effect helping to prevent the successful working of the best solution of this urgent problem which at present has the last chance of being adopted. If the League system fails, it will not be their solutions which will take its place, but the armed international anarchy into which the world is fast slipping back. If, on the other hand, it is made a reality, it may lead to something better.

ARTHUR FLOYD.

Purley, Surrey.

Case for League Restated

SANCTIONS, IF CERTAIN AND EFFECTIVE, MEAN PEACE

EXTRACTS FROM A PAMPHLET ABOUT TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION

If the League did not exist and we were concerned solely with the defence of our country and were determined to profit by the lessons of the Great War and the policies which led to it, what kind of foreign policy ought we to pursue?

The answer is that we should attempt to create an alliance of a new type, a combination of States guided by what are, in fact, the principles of the Covenant. Truncated as the League is, it is precisely that sort of combination which we should have to do our best to bring into being even if our motives were only those of our own security. And even in that truncated form a League would involve—does, indeed, involve—an international situation preferable from the point of view of Britain's security, to any international situation in which such League did not exist.

That the problem is not approached from this angle more often than it is, is due to the very common and fallacious view that the League has little relation to the problem of defence; that it is perhaps a high-minded ideal which may one day be attained, but which, as a sceptic expressed it recently, "should be put into cold storage until we have made our own national defence secure." In this view the League is a method of peace quite distinct from any method of defence.

Yet, again, if our foreign policy were directed simply and purely at securing defence of our world-wide Empire, certain needs would become clear. First, we must have allies, if other nations have them. We could not face a combination of three or four great Continental States alone. We had and needed many allies in the Great War. Alliances there must be in one form or another. But if alliances are not to result in counter alliances, and finally in war, as in 1914, they must not constitute a mere assertion of preponderant power denying to the other side that right of defence by superior power we claim for ourselves. Our defence must not kill theirs. In other words, if our alliance policy is to avoid alike the catastrophes of 1914 and 1919—a world war followed by another Treaty of Versailles—then we must formulate a foreign policy, which would bring into being a combination which would in fact be a nucleus League of Nations.

The failures of the last year or two are not due to the constitutional defects of the League (constitutional and legalistic difficulties can always be raised if it is desired to find in them an excuse for delay, inaction, paralysis), but to the lack of resolution of a few Great Powers, their disinclination to accept on behalf of the League the risks which must certainly be accepted in much greater degree by any alternative method of defence, which they accept for the direct defence of their own territory, or rights, or interests.

At the root of the problem of defence by the individual power of each nation lies a profound question of right which has been inadequately realised. By the

method of each his own defender, defence and right are brought into conflict just because the stronger must deny the weaker right of defence by superior power which the former claims.

The only way out of that moral and material dilemma is by some method of collective defence: the pooling of common power behind a law or rule of conduct—like submission of disputes to third party judgment, the principle of "umpire"—which is broadly equal for all, gives equality of right to the weak as well as to the strong.

If we are prepared to see other nations or combinations become manifestly more powerful than ourselves, then our immense and sometimes feverish efforts to "keep our end up" in the matter of arms become meaningless.

Again, the fact that we are determined to maintain equality of force with others means that we reject the policy of submission, of non-resistance. If placed in the position in which we felt ourselves to be in 1914, we should once more act as we and the others acted. If attacked we should defend ourselves.

But the purpose of statesmanship should be to prevent attack, not merely repel it when it came; to combine defence with peace. For each to act on the principle of waiting until he individually is attacked before employing arms, to refuse, that is, to co-operate in the defence of others (as they co-operate in his), is to make it impossible to combine defence with peace, makes effective defence impossible indeed. (A few years after victory in the greatest war of history we are arming feverishly once more because our insecurity is as great as ever.)

The fact that we arm implies that there is danger of aggression; the purpose of arms is presumably to prevent it. But if the potential victims of aggression do not combine their defence, a strong aggressor could take them one by one and destroy the whole in detail, making individual defence futile.

If Allies are indispensable to our own defence, as they are, and we allow them to be eliminated, one by one, destroyed in detail, we destroy, in fact, our own security.

But just as plainly we incur enormous risks of unjustifiable entanglement, of finding ourselves, perhaps, in the position of supporting injustice because the injustice happens to be inflicted by a nation whose alliance is necessary to our security, unless the terms upon which we are allied are clearly defined. To say in effect to a State: "We will defend you whatever you do" is to give encouragement to its most aggressive tendencies, is to commit ourselves to defend, it may be, an aggressive policy, very bad political behaviour. A nation might become so provocative in its conduct as to make an attack upon it morally certain.

Against this danger the League of Nations form of Alliance (for the League, like all organised society for

Making Collective Defence Work

that matter, is an alliance) makes due provision. Broadly speaking, it provides that before assistance can be called for by a State it must be ready to submit its quarrel to third party judgment. In the last analysis the aggressor is that State which refuses to arbitrate, or go to court. Only by fulfilling certain rules of good political behaviour can a nation secure the benefits of the Mutual Assistance clauses of the Covenant. Only by upholding a general law or rule of conduct applicable for the defence of all States alike can we avoid alliances becoming competitive alliances leading to war. Our power must be used, not for the purpose of supporting one designated State against another, irrespective of its conduct, but for maintaining, for all alike, the right to peace, to impartial judgment of their disputes, so that the rival litigant does not, as it were, become the judge.

And this indicates a second reason for rejecting an exclusively regional conception of defence. If we are committed to the defence of one particular State or frontier and have no similar commitments with others, how can we pretend to be impartial when disputes arise? If we are pledged to the support of one of the parties to the dispute, obviously it is clearly impossible for us impartially to support the law, a given rule of conduct. There is a conflict of obligations. If we play "favourites," in President Wilson's phrase, we compel others to do likewise, and the impartial defence of justice becomes impossible.

To make it clear that this League of Nations Alliance did, indeed, offer to others the protections and advantages both political and economic it was attempting to create for itself, it should frame certain offers and proceed to certain constructive tasks in which Britain, by virtue of her position, would take a leading part. These should include:—

- (1) The calling of an International Fact Finding Commission to ascertain by expert inquiry precisely what substance there is in grievances relating to (a) raw materials; (b) movements of population; (c) Colonial outlets and markets. The presentation of the facts would thus in the first instance be separated from any proposals in respect of them. Non-League States would, of course, be invited to suggest useful lines of inquiry and to supply their quota of experts.
- (2) In the light of facts so obtained, with the co-operation that is of non-League States, any Power would be free to make such proposals as were necessary in their view to secure equality of right and treatment, what changes, in fact, including changes of frontier, were necessary to meet their grievances.
- (3) In view of the fact that such statements would reveal that what one nation sincerely regards as just, another with equal sincerity regards as unjust, those concerned should be asked clearly to state whether in the event of their differences

not being settled by direct negotiation they are prepared either to accept the principle of third party judgment in some form—arbitration, council, court—the principle of "umpires," or clearly to renounce settlement by force. Mere declarations of non-aggression of "peace," subject to the condition that the nation so affirming regards the right to be its own judge as part of the right of "defence," are worthless.

- (4) If one could thus assure (a) reality of collective action for peace as between members of the League; (b) a dragging into the light the actual facts concerning the more material of grievances; (c) assent of those concerned to the condition *sine qua non* of any system of peace, or law or order, *i.e.*, impartial judgment of dispute, there should then be issued an invitation to an International Conference to consider the measures necessary to meet the situation which the facts established by the preparatory Fact Finding Commission may have revealed.

If some distant Pacific Island of no particular value, but which is British territory, were attacked by a foreign Power, it would be defended. Our "direct" interests in it might be microscopic. But it would not add to our security or lessen our danger of war to "grade" our commitments; to allow a possibly hostile Power to assume that while we would certainly defend this or that bit of territory we might or might not defend some other. That would make peace less, not more secure. The readiness to defend any part adds to the security of the whole.

There is ample evidence that the public is much nearer than certain statesmen seem to think to seeing that a similar principle applies to the defence of the Covenant as a whole. Certain it is that there is a deep desire to preserve the League, a growing conviction that its defence is as indispensable to our own defence as is the defence of the Seychelles Islands. The feeling about the "betrayal of Abyssinia" is passionate, and behind that passion may be a realisation that "we may be the next Abyssinia."

There would not be much difficulty in securing the same support for the Covenant as for territory if the public "saw the whole picture," the "map of peace"; saw that what is in question at this moment is not this or that particular frontier, but a system of defence, of security, law, equality of right as between weak and strong.

The truth in this matter has been turned upside down by false slogans: "Sanctions Mean War." If the Italian dictator had believed that Britain would defend the Covenant precisely as we would defend Kenya, he would no more have thought of attacking the Covenant than he thinks of attacking a British Colony. It is uncertainty about Sanctions which invites war. Sanctions, if certain and effective, mean peace.

Danzig Still a Danger Spot

(By H. P. S. MATTHEWS, who has recently visited the Free City)

FOR more than six weeks the civil war in Spain and its repercussions in the international sphere have monopolised the attention of statesmen, and, as a result, the events in Danzig which made necessary the visit of Mr. Lester and Herr Greiser to Geneva in July have come to be regarded as an isolated and perhaps a not very important "incident." In the turmoil of present-day Europe one easily forgets the beating-up of an Opposition meeting, an affront to a League official and even the cocking of a snook at the members of the international press gathered in the League's Council chamber at Geneva. Yet, whilst "patriots" do battle with "reds" in Spain—or "loyalists" defend the republic against the menace of Fascism—events are moving in Danzig towards a crisis which may be of equal importance for the future of European peace.

The National Socialist Government in the Free City has clearly demonstrated its intention to have done with the Constitution of the Free City, which is expressly placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations; it is not deterred from its purpose by the solemn undertaking, given to the League Council by Herr Greiser as recently as January last, that the Constitution would in future be observed. Herr Greiser gave that undertaking at the behest of Berlin. To-day he is flagrantly ignoring it—and Berlin must bear the responsibility for this glaring breach of faith.

It is unnecessary to rehearse here all the breaches of the Constitution which have occurred since Herr Greiser gave his pledge, barely six months ago. Every one of the opposition newspapers has been banned; a number of opposition deputies have been put in protective custody, despite the immunity from arrest which every member of the Diet enjoys; all political meetings have been prohibited for a period of three months; officials, dismissed for political reasons, can no longer obtain redress, even if the courts uphold the justice of their claims; the leaders of the opposition parties no longer enjoy the protection of the police or of the law. One could prolong the list indefinitely.

Soon the British Foreign Secretary, in company with the statesmen of France and Belgium, will be seeking from the German Government pledges of its peaceful intentions. Possibly, by then, the situation in Danzig will have been regulated. If it has not, they will do well to remember Herr Greiser's promises and

the manner in which he has observed them. The Government which is thus defying the Danzig Constitution was elected in April of last year in circumstances which, as has since been proved before the High Court of Danzig, would inevitably have been held in a democratic country to render the voting invalid. Widespread terrorism was used by the Government in the course of the election campaign—in one case, as was proved in subsequent litigation, a band of Storm Troopers, not content with making havoc of the house of a member of the opposition, took two canaries, which they found there, and squeezed them to death; the ferries over the Vistula were picketed to prevent opposition literature from being distributed in the country districts to the north of the river; extensive falsification of results was proved by the fact that the number of votes cast only fell short by 300 of the total of the registered electorate, indicating that there must have been much plural voting. Yet the Nazis, though they spent something like £120,000 on an election in which they polled only a little over 130,000 votes, only secured a small majority; 42 per cent. of the electors gave their votes to the opposition parties, and it seems probable that, if the elections had been held with the proper democratic safeguards, the Nazis would have failed to secure even a bare majority.

For some nine months an election petition, calling for the examination of the manner in which the voting was conducted and for the holding of new elections, has been before the League of Nations. In January last, in view of Herr Greiser's undertakings, the League agreed to postpone consideration of this petition pending their fulfilment. Now the time has come to take up the matter again and see to it that justice is done in Danzig.

Both sides in Danzig are agreed that, if the suppression of the liberties of the Free City is carried through successfully, the next stage will be the re-incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. The *Danziger Vorposten*, official organ of the National Socialist Party, appears each day with the slogan, in heavy type, "Back to the Reich." If Poland agrees to the

re-incorporation of Danzig in Germany, her port of Gdynia will be within ten miles of the German frontier, and Germany will be able to destroy it with artillery fire without moving a man; Germany will have a stranglehold over the two ports through which passes 70 per cent. of Poland's foreign trade.

THE AUSTRALIAN L.N.U.



The National conference of the Australian League of Nations Union in Session. From the left: Messrs. H. Vaughan (South Australia), F. Alexander (Western Australia), Miss C. A. Duncan (Victoria), Mr. K. E. McGill and Sir Francis Anderson (N.S.W.), Messrs. P. M. Hamilton (Queensland), F. E. Barraclough (N.S.W.), R. G. Watt (National Secretary), Sir Robert Garran (Chairman), Judge Foster (Victoria) and Mr. W. A. Woods (Tasmania).

III.—How To Get Low Tariffs

By J. E. MEADE, Lecturer in Economics, Hertford College, Oxford

IN the last article I outlined the main obstacles in the way of Free Trade.

First, a country may be unwilling to reduce its tariffs in return for a tariff concession by another country, if the latter country is free to offset that concession by a depreciation of its currency; but at the same time the latter country may be justifiably unwilling to agree to stabilise its currency permanently, since this would remove its freedom to determine its internal monetary policy.

Secondly, the existence of the "most-favoured-nation" clause enables countries without giving any concessions themselves to share the advantages of tariff agreements between other countries.

Can these difficulties be surmounted?

First and foremost, each country in which costs are at all rigid must be free to adopt an appropriate internal monetary policy to prevent the prices offered for its commodities from falling out of line with its costs. In fact, the concentration of all countries upon policies of internal monetary expansion as soon as unemployment appears, and of internal monetary contraction as soon as a boom develops, would constitute a most useful form of international economic co-operation. It would remove the main cause of fluctuations in exchange rates; for rapid changes in the exchange rate between two currencies are most likely to occur when one country is successfully preventing rapid fluctuations in its money prices and incomes, while such price changes are occurring unchecked in other countries, so that adjustment between them must come by exchange fluctuations.

Secondly, countries might agree to temporary stabilisation of their exchange rates at levels which could be periodically revised. For example, England and France might stabilise their exchange rate at a level at which it was considered that the normal items of payment between them would balance. Both countries should then adopt the internal policy which they considered most appropriate. If, however, the exchange rate had not been fixed at the correct level, or if some change subsequently took place which reduced the French demand for English goods, England would steadily lose gold or other reserves of money to France. In these circumstances—but in these circumstances alone—England should be free to depreciate the value of the pound by an amount which was considered necessary to balance the normal payments between England and France. Some international body, such as the Bank for International Settlements, should be given the task of determining when and to what extent a revision of exchange rates was justified on these principles.

To make such a scheme workable some control must be exercised over the speculative movement of money from one currency to another. For if it is expected that the pound will at the next revision be depreciated in terms of the franc, people with pounds will purchase francs simply in order to sell francs for pounds after the revision. Such speculation would

cause the Bank of England to lose reserves of gold or of foreign money and might make it difficult for England to adopt the proper internal monetary policy, or for any international body to judge the correct extent of any necessary revision of exchange rates. This difficulty can be met in many ways. A balance of francs and a balance of pounds can be held by the English Treasury in an Exchange Equalisation Fund, and as speculators sell pounds for francs, those in control of the fund can offset this by selling francs for pounds. Or, preferably, an International Exchange Equalisation Fund, in which balances of many different currencies are held, might be operated by the Bank for International Settlements, which could sell francs for pounds as speculators sold pounds for francs; in this case the loss or gain made by such a fund would be shared among all the participating countries. Or the Central Bank in each country might directly monopolise and control all dealings in foreign exchange. Such action would be unobjectionable provided that the Central Bank allowed the purchase and sale of foreign money in unlimited quantities at the ruling rate of exchange for the finance of imports and exports and, in fact, for all purposes other than the speculative movement of money from one currency to another.

If some such monetary agreement were reached no currency could be depreciated solely in order to expand the market for one country's goods at the expense of another. At the same time, in no circumstances would a country have to abandon its internal monetary policy because of international reactions; and if any country reduced its tariffs it would be free to depreciate its exchange if, but only if, its tariff reductions caused an excess of imports over exports. In these circumstances an international conference for the universal reduction of tariffs might become practical politics.

If a universal agreement could not be reached, agreements among a more limited number of countries would be possible if the "most-favoured-nation" clause were appropriately modified. A limited number of countries might form a Low Tariff Group and agree to impose (e.g.) no quotas and no tariffs above 10 per cent. on each other's goods. In their commercial agreements with all countries outside the Low Tariff Group they could include a "most-favoured-nation" clause, modified to mean that they would extend to the country concerned treatment as favourable as they extended to any other country outside the Group. Further, any country should be free to join and obtain the advantages of the Group on exactly the same conditions, i.e., if it levied no tariffs above 10 per cent. and imposed no quotas on the goods of any member of the Group.

An economic conference to build up a system of co-operation on these lines would have a real chance of success. But without some monetary agreement, which both removed the fear of competitive exchange depreciation and yet left countries free to choose their internal monetary policies, no important agreements to reduce tariffs can be expected.

LORD LUGARD RESIGNS

By
FREDA WHITE

LORD LUGARD has resigned from the Mandates Commission of the League. He has said that he wants to make way for a younger man. Indeed, thirteen years of that service is a long spell. Thirteen years of bumpy P.L.M. trains, of hotel meals, of stuffy secretariat rooms, of Italian, French and Norwegian English. Fourteen mandatory reports a year, documents whose commissions are as prolonged as their contents; fourteen weary mandatory representatives to question on those commissions. For reward, the confidence of such governors as want to do their jobs, and the dislike of Colonial Ministers, few of whom have any fancy for expert examination of their policies. By now, a fair number of people know that the Mandates Commission is the best of the League bodies. Not so many are aware how much that repute owes to Lord Lugard.

The Commission is fortunate in its constitution, for its members may not be in Government employ, and therefore may be impartial. So most of them are, except on the subject of Palestine. There justice seems to be beyond human capacity, and the members divide into pro-Jews and pro-Arabs like their fellow-mortals; a compromise between the parties resulting none the less in some shrewd observations. But the technical independence of the Commission would have done it little good had it been peevishly theoretic, or uncritically servile. Any committee is only a collection of people,

and this, with few exceptions, is an intelligent and honest collection. Lord Lugard has been their indisputable leader. Not because he talked very much—there are far more loquacious members. But because he talked sense. How often, reading the minutes, one laughs with satisfaction at one of his questions or comments, penetrating, moderate, dead on the point. And that appositeness denotes a quality which if it seems like sense, is not the common kind. It means a mind whose working is so true that it reaches its conclusions with no apparent effort.

Lord Lugard has principles held with the authority of a man who has put them into practice and seen them work. He did not invent the word "trusteeship," but, for Africa, he invented its methods; and they still are valid, in government based upon native institutions and the inalienability of native land. Inflexible in mandatory principle, flexible in thought, just in sense of values, he fulfils the ancient ideal of the soldier turned sage. Good soldiers are seldom good thinkers, but when they are they make fine governors, being trained in service and unafraid to command.

Greatness is not an analyzable thing. Taken one by one, its qualities might be those of any able man. Ability nests in every hedgerow, but statesmanship is a rare bird, seen only once or twice in a generation. It is statesmanship which Lord Lugard has given at Geneva to the service of the subject peoples.

The Gangster Will Win If . . .

By LORD ALLEN
OF HURTWOOD

THE League is crippled and has suffered a series of shattering blows. And yet nearly fifty countries still want to believe in it, and still want to use it—if only some great nation would restore their faith and call it into life. Those fifty nations and their citizens are like the man in the Bible story who cried, "Lord, I believe. Help thou my unbelief."

It may be asked, now that I have set down these proposals and pleaded for their publication in a comprehensive declaration: "Will the British public stand for all this?" My answer is that our public will certainly accept, but only on two assumptions and on no others:—

1. That the electors see a clear picture of the whole intention. For them it is the small and isolated proposal which is bewildering. The British elector, like the French peasant, even though he still believes in armaments, yet hates to think of fighting or using those arms. The British public will not march for Memel, Austria, or any other isolated area or incident, so long as there is no final settlement. They will prefer to draw back even into the terrible danger of armed isolation rather than become entangled in separate incidents. But the British public, so long as they continue to retain a belief in armaments, will join in a general and effective defence of law and justice, if once the whole plan is put to them in clear and workmanlike fashion, ensuring their own safety as well as that of other nations. The public will not refuse commitments to protect an agreed settlement. But they will refuse entanglements that arise from there being no settlement.

2. The second assumption is that every other European country shall engage itself to do the same, and by joint preparation from now onwards prove that it means to honour its intentions. That is why I have pleaded for this clear and comprehensive plan. It will have two good results.

It will test the *bona fides* of other nations as it will test our own. Let all European nations be invited to join on equal terms. If any one refuses, let the others collaborate without the dissident. Let the individual citizen become as sure of the reliability of the collective system as he has been of the old out-of-date system of national defence, and he will protect the one as he has protected the other. And then indeed he will not need to fight at all, for once this system has become predictable, no nation will dare to break the law; and there will be no more war.

If the League crumbles away or is shorn of its power, the alternative will be an unholy alliance between the pacifist and the armed isolationist—a grim result in a world of good intentions. The public will appear for quite contradictory reasons to be against war. The pacifist will interpret this war-weariness to mean that he has won the heart of his fellow-citizens; but the final result will be a ghastly travesty of anything he intended. The League—the only form of real security—will have perished between the upper millstone of pacifism and the lower millstone of military preparedness for war in isolation. The victor will not be the pacifist when the new threat of war comes. The victor will be the Fascist, the gangster, the true militarist, who, once the League has disappeared or been reduced to meaningless functions will play upon the public's confused emotions of fear and terror and hatred. . . . The arms race will hurl us over the precipice; and the opportunity to remove the causes of war and to bend our energy to using the economic good fortune of the modern world for our common advantage will be destroyed—and with it the lives of our children.—(From "Peace in Our Time." Chatto & Windus. Price 6d.)

READERS' VIEWS

(Letters for publication are only invited subject to curtailment if rendered necessary by exigencies of space.)

SHOULD MEMBERSHIP CONTINUE?

SIR,—I find myself in very strong agreement with your correspondents, Mr. Edmund Durham and Dr. Richard Kay, who contribute letters in the current number of HEADWAY. Like the former I have been a member of the L.N.U. since its foundation, like the latter I am extremely doubtful whether I can remain a member any longer. The League has failed, as Mr. Durham says, because no Government has been willing to make the sacrifices and take the risks necessary to make it succeed, and each has preferred its own fancied immediate interests to those of the whole community of nations.

With regard to Dr. Kay's letter, I have felt from the very outset of the Abyssinian dispute that to allow Italy to remain a member of the League simply makes the League nonsense. How can a publicly condemned criminal remain a judge? I was responsible for a motion at the Council Meeting of the L.N.U., which was carried by an overwhelming majority, that the British Government should be urged to propose the expulsion of Italy from the League. Of course, no such step has been taken or is likely to be taken. How can one, then, remain a member of an institution designed to support a League which, largely through the cowardice of our own Government, stands before the world as an organised hypocrisy?

I should like to add that I am in entire disagreement with a sentence in Dr. Garnett's *pronunciamiento*. He says, "Our Union is more concerned with far-reaching principles than with immediate policies." In my view it is partly because the Union has been too contented with enouncing general principles and its members have not sufficiently understood how those principles apply to particular cases that the Union has not had the effect on the policy of Governments which we should desire.

Yours faithfully,

Abingdon, Berks.

J. L. ETTY.

A NEED FOR PUBLIC OPINION

SIR,—The *Daily Mail*, as you must know, has been taunting the League of Nations Union over its unconcern for stricken Spain. I thought, otherwise, it might have criticised a leading member, Dr. Noel Baker, M.P., for having "staged the Cheshire Cat," in this case making the terrorist "Red Cat" disappear into the "meek lamb" of Madrid Liberals!

Unfortunately, there seems to be no National Public Opinion in Spain, as there is such in France. It may be necessary then to work for a *federal* Spain, where, as in the case of the Swiss Federal Republic, there is at least a vigorous *regional* public opinion. Of course, the L.N.U. is not concerned with the *internal* politics of the members of the League. All the same, it might facilitate friendly discussions as to a workable scheme of internal appeasement. Perhaps even the Marxian Communists will despair when they see the Anarchist Clubs far more powerful than the Communist Clubs! Four centuries of unreal national unity have led to this sorry disintegrative upheaval. It is time that good folk should begin to think things out anew.

Horton Vicarage,

RICHARD DE BARY.

Wimborne, Dorset.

ITALY AND RAW MATERIALS

SIR,—Under the heading "Christianity and the Use of Force," a group of persons, headed by a Mr. J. W. Cowling, wrote a letter in your June number, from which I take the following extract:—

"Various countries, including Great Britain, have put obstacles in the way of Italy's economic life. Italy's inability to obtain adequate supplies of cotton for her textile industry is but one instance of many."

Everyone in the cotton trade knows that Italians can buy cotton in the leading producing countries on the same terms and conditions as spinners of other nations. Producers are willing to sell to any nationality willing to pay the true market value.

I have been in business as an importer of raw materials for nearly 40 years, and can assure your readers that to-day there is as much healthy competition with Italians, and others, on whose behalf the same mis-statement is made, as there ever has been.

When I have challenged speakers at meetings to give some proof of these mischievous statements, the only answer that has been forthcoming is that the low rate of exchange of the buyers' country has made the purchases more onerous to them than it is to us. If that is the true nature of this supposed grievance, what has Great Britain to do with it? If the Brazilian or Peruvian cotton planters prefer to sell for sterling, rather than for liras, it is simply because the sterling produces more milreis in Brazil or Sols in Peru than the liras would.

So many members of the L. of N. Union are desirous of seeing a really true explanation of this supposed grievance, which has the appearance of being utterly imaginary to merchants and other engaged in international trade, it would be useful if your paper would collect some authoritative data and publish it, data that is free from obvious mis-statements.—Yours, J. LIONEL BARBER.

M. V. "Reina Del Pacifico."
near Callao.

JUSTICE REMAINS

SIR,—It seems unlikely that the enemies of Collective Security will persuade our people to leave the League—their attitude resembles that of a community saying: "Our fire-fighting apparatus proved too weak to overcome the last fire; let us scrap it forthwith, and leave everyone to deal with outbreaks of fire his own way!"

Such a policy means going back to 1914, in 1936, after wireless and air travel have brought the nations closer together, and made every country vulnerable to aerial attack.

Turning from these opponents of the League to those who support Collective Security, but feel the League's failure, I would direct consideration to two points: (1) The penalty of aggression was not known till such aggression took place: even then "Sanctions" were added little by little.

Now the penalty for any crime is settled *beforehand*—the murderer is left in no doubt as to the price he must pay—and here is need for reform, bringing the League's procedure into line with law inside a nation.

An aggressor should know before he starts his crime that at once he becomes an international enemy with whom no commercial dealings will be made till his penalty is paid.

The aggressor is a world outlaw!

The object of Sanctions is to deter aggression; and secondly, to prevent such aggressor from benefiting by his crime.

Going back to the law in any land, time does not wear out justice, nor alter the relation of criminal to nation. For instance, if a burglar gets away with property, and eludes the police, there is not a suggestion made that he should be received back, retaining his stolen goods.

In years to come Collective Security and International Justice will be the crown of National Security and National Justice—but in our generation pilgrims are needed to make the Ideal become the Practical. (Rev.) B. T. ROSSON.

Durweston Rectory, Blandford, Dorset.

The Writer's World

No. 21

September, 1936

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BLOCK LETTERS

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