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IN WAR-TIME

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THE PEACE AIMS OF THE FRENCH AND BRITISH LEAGUE OF NATIONS SOCIETIES

By the EARL OF LYTTON, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union

The League of Nations Union is pursuing a systematic study of the peace from which the world may expect justice and security against aggression. Lord Lytton writes a commentary on a first conference with the sister society in France

THE League of Nations Union is a peace organisation. Its only function in war is to work for the restoration of peace at the earliest moment which is compatible with justice to those on whose behalf we took up arms. "An immediate and just peace" is a contradiction in terms. It was the unjust invasion of Poland which caused the war, and nothing has happened in the last six months to make the Germans more disposed to repair that injustice or the Allies more disposed to condone it. A just peace is not, therefore, immediately attainable. But the longer the war continues the greater the sacrifices involved, the greater will be the tendency for feelings of hatred and resentment to cloud the purpose for which we took up arms and to leave in any settlement which may be effected the seeds of another war. It is the main object of the League of Nations Union to do what it can to prevent this happening.

In the fulfilment of this object consultation with the League of Nations Societies in allied and neutral countries is of the utmost importance. Such consultation was initiated at a conference with members of the French League of Nations Society, which took place in London on March 9 and 10. It is hoped to continue this consultation at the end of April, when a delegation from our Union will visit Paris and meet not only the French Society, but the members of the Polish and Czechoslovak Societies which are now there. Later in the summer an opportunity will be sought of consulting neutral opinion at a meeting of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies in Geneva.

A Happy Augury

The first of these discussions was very satisfactory and produced a measure of agreement which is a happy augury for future meetings. In this issue of HEADWAY will be found the English text of a statement of the joint peace aims of the two Societies, which was drawn up at the Conference. The precise wording has not yet been finally agreed with the French Society, but the substance of it represents the considered opinions which, after discussion, the two Societies desire to submit to their members and their respective Governments.

The Conference began with a general discussion of the subject. During this discussion one of the French delegates used a phrase which served as a keynote to the whole Conference: "The war," he said, "must end in a peace which is neither one of vengeance nor of illusions." Lady Gladstone urged that the statement should begin with a declaration of moral principles, and General Spears said that the only thing we could do for good Germans was to make it impossible for bad Germans to break the peace again.

The substance of this opening discussion is embodied in the first three clauses of the Preamble to the Statement. This Preamble declares that the Allies are not fighting to substitute one domination for another, but to secure for all nations peace and freedom so long as they do not threaten the peace or freedom of their neighbours. They seek a peace which shall be influenced neither by illusions nor feelings of revenge, which are alike productive of future wars. They point out that it is neither just nor moral that a State should be able to gamble on an act of aggression with the knowledge that gain will result from its success and restitution of the wrong done will not be exacted in the event of failure. To make all aggression impossible must be the object of any settlement at the end of the present war.

Armistice, Peace Treaty, General Settlement

The Statement then goes on to describe the three stages by which a durable peace settlement must be secured. First, by an Armistice in which the Allies would state the conditions on which they would consent to cease hostilities. These conditions would require the restoration of their independence to the three victims of German aggression—Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia—and establish guarantees for the enforcement of these conditions. Secondly, by a Treaty of Peace between the belligerents, which must be freely negotiated at a conference between representatives of Germany, the Allies, Poland, Austria and Czechoslovakia. And, lastly, a General Peace settlement to be negotiated at a conference attended not only by the States recently at war, but also by States which had taken no part in the

hostilities, but whose co-operation was necessary for the new world order which it was desired to establish.

The rest of the Statement is concerned with the nature of this new world order and the measures which are necessary for the prevention of aggression in the future.

Naturally it is not possible for anyone to say in advance what would be the ultimate outcome of this wider Conference, but the Statement defines what the two Societies would regard as a satisfactory outcome of it. They hope to see the restoration of the prestige and authority of the League of Nations and acceptance of the three principles of third-party judgment in international disputes, collective responsibility for resisting aggression, and the supervision by an international authority of national armaments kept within an agreed limit.

One of the subjects to which the French delegation attached special importance was the restoration of what they called "la vie collective." It was difficult to find an equivalent in English for this phrase, but it has been translated "the collective interchange of common interests between the nationals of different nations." This phrase requires a word of explanation. In the years which followed the last war one of the most hopeful means of securing international understanding and goodwill was provided by conferences between the nationals of different countries who had certain interests in common, such as labour conditions, youth, sport, science, art, literature, music, etc. All these movements which were helping to bring the peoples of the world together and promoting friendship between them were stopped by the totalitarian Governments, and in the interests of international peace it is of the utmost importance that they should be restored.

Demand for Security

Another point on which the French delegation was insistent was that security measures which were only on paper afforded an example of the illusions which they desired to avoid. They insisted, therefore, that within the League of Nations based on the Articles of the Covenant, which were only paper obligations, there must be formed a group of States which accepted the view that aggression was an international crime and were prepared to concert their policy and action in order to prevent it. On this point there was complete agreement at the Conference, and it was felt that for this purpose it would be well to build up from the already existing Anglo-French partnership which had been created during the war. This partnership, we felt, should

be made even closer, should be continued after the war, and should be open to any other State willing to enter it and concert both its policy and action in the fulfilment of its Covenant obligations. For this purpose a common Secretariat and a common General Staff were suggested. This subject will be further considered at the forthcoming conference in Paris, as also the subject of disarmament, including the abolition of national military air forces, the control by an international authority of civil aviation, and the establishment of an international military air force.

If agreement can be reached at the Paris Conference, it is hoped that a final Statement embodying the conclusions of both Conferences will be drawn up. This Statement will then be printed and will be available for discussion in study circles by all our branches.

Good Beginning Has Been Made

Although the Statement published in this issue of HEADWAY, together with the commentary with which I have accompanied it, is in the nature of an interim report, we have thought it desirable to let our members know that a good beginning has been made. It is intended only for discussion by our branches in this country, and it will not be sent to the other Societies in the Federation until after it has been completed by the second Conference in Paris. This preliminary report, therefore, must not be taken as final, and any comments or suggestions which may be received from our branches will be considered by the Executive Committee before the next Conference takes place. It would perhaps have been better to reserve even this limited publication until the document was complete, and indeed our French colleagues suggested this course. But, knowing the widespread interest which all our members have taken in this Conference, we thought it would not be fair to them to keep them entirely in the dark, and, moreover, we thought it important that they should know how large a measure of agreement had already been secured. These arguments were readily appreciated and accepted by our French colleagues. It must be clearly understood, however, that the document to which I have referred in this article is incomplete, and it is only as an instalment that we are now submitting it for the information of our branches and members.

I ought not, I think, to conclude this article without a tribute to Mr. Figgures, the newly appointed Secretary of the International Federation, who attended the Conference and whose valuable work in preparing the ground beforehand contributed largely to the success of the Conference.

ALLIED WAR AIMS

AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER OF LIBERTY, LAW AND PEACE

After the Supreme War Council of the Allies had met in London on March 28, the following official statement was issued:—

In the light of the results achieved by the agreement of December last signed by Sir John Simon and M. Paul Reynaud, and desiring to extend the scope of this agreement to all spheres affecting the interests and security of the two nations, the two Governments have agreed to the following solemn declaration:—

The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor

conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

They undertake not to discuss peace terms before reaching complete agreement on the conditions necessary to ensure to each of them an effective and lasting guarantee of their security.

Finally, they undertake to maintain, after the conclusion of peace, a community of action in all spheres for so long as may be necessary to safeguard their security and to effect the reconstruction, with the assistance of other nations, of an international order which will ensure the liberty of peoples, respect for law, and the maintenance of peace in Europe.

FINLAND'S LOSS AND ITS LESSON

By W. ARNOLD-FORSTER

SO another aggression has been suffered to succeed. After that marvellous resistance, Finland is at peace again, but so mutilated that (for the present) she is much more instantly at Russia's mercy than before. Stalin holds now such key positions that if he chooses presently to make a second bite at the cherry, as Hitler did after Munich, it will be very difficult indeed for anyone to prevent him.

And now, what is the lesson to be drawn from this tragedy, by ourselves and by the Scandinavian peoples in particular?

The main lesson, surely, was the one indicated by the General Council of our Union, at the beginning of the Russian aggression, in its Resolution of December 1, 1939. "This fresh outrage is but another example of the results of the desertion of League principles and a further proof that until those principles are re-established as the public law of nations the freedom of no country will be safe."

To-day, our Government's declared aim, and France's, is "to effect the reconstruction, with the assistance of other nations, of an international order which will ensure the liberty of peoples, respect for law, and the maintenance of peace in Europe." And the other day the British and French Governments were willing to assist Finland by sending a powerful expeditionary force, if Finland asked for this, and if Norway and Sweden allowed its passage. All very good, so far as it goes. But I hope we shall not be either complacent ourselves about this or uncomprehending in censure of the Swedes and Norwegians. Let me illustrate what I mean by reference to Mr. Chamberlain's much-applauded speech of March 19:—

"The neutrality which paralysed the action of Sweden and Norway was based on the assumption that anything was better for a small neutral country than to be involved in the war between Germany and the Allies. That, in turn, was based upon another assumption—that it was a matter of indifference to those small neutral States whether the war ended in victory for Germany or for the Allies. Until those assumptions are abandoned, and the necessary deductions are drawn from that action, the policy of those small neutral States will neither correspond to realities, nor will it be adequate to safeguard their own interests. Nothing will or can save them but determination to defend themselves and to join with others who are ready to aid them in their defence."

Well, we can all sympathise with the feeling of misery and exasperation that, no doubt, lay behind Mr. Chamberlain's words. But, frankly, I do not think the words were fair: they showed too little comprehension of the Scandinavian people's problems.

Firstly, it is neither true nor helpful to suggest that these peoples are "indifferent" about the upshot of the Allies' war with Nazi Germany: they are passionately concerned about it, for the best of reasons, and are far more united in favouring the Allied cause than ever they were in the last war. This is most notable in Sweden.

Secondly, it must be recalled that Sweden and Norway have been till now lightly armed; they are now making an unprecedented effort to arm themselves. The Swedish Government may or may not have been right in refusing to enter the war on Finland's side. (As I explained in HEADWAY in February, many Swedes thought they were wrong.) But we must recognise that to fight Germany as well as Russia was an appalling risk. Germany had warned them in the plainest terms that Sweden would be attacked if she allowed Allied forces on a decisive scale to pass through. And Sweden's southern shore, remember, is only a few miles from Germany; England seems a long way off when you live on the Eastern, the German, side of the Skaggerak. Moreover, the Swedes had no very convincing evidence that the Allies really meant to act on this scale, and with the energy necessary for such an enterprise. Mr. Chamberlain's figures, given on March 19, showed that the amounts of war material actually sent, and promised, to Finland were not really large. (The amount was much smaller than that previously reported in the Press.) And it appears from the full report of the debate in Hansard that some or all of the small arms ammunition included in the list was ordered by the Finns in June last, long before the war started. The Allies were, we now learn, preparing a military expedition in Finland. Yes, a brave decision. But surely it was a bit half-hearted or casual, in that case, to neglect the precaution of sending a military mission to Finland and Sweden to prepare the way. Apparently, we didn't even send a Cabinet Minister to Helsinki or Stockholm to negotiate.

There is another explanatory fact to

be remembered. Mr. Chamberlain's past record makes it exceptionally difficult for him to preach the doctrine of collective defence to the Scandinavians: for they regard him, rightly or wrongly, as one of those chiefly responsible for the smashing of confidence in the collective peace system. A great proportion of them (so far as I could judge when I was there lately) believe that his policy leading up to Munich and its sequel was disastrously ill-judged: and that the British Government's part in the betrayal of Abyssinia was inexcusable. Many of them remember that it was Mr. Chamberlain who, two years ago (February 22, 1938), warned all members of the League that collective security was a broken reed, and that the League would "never do its best work" so long as its members were bound "to use force in support of obligations." If you were a politically educated Swede or Norwegian you would, I think, want to reply to Mr. Chamberlain's admonition: "This appeal to us to rally to the principle of collective defence against aggression, and in support of the obligations of a common covenant of peace-keeping, comes late and unpersuasively from you. And how can we, after what has happened, feel confident that England's future policy will be more consistent, resolute, and effective than the past wavering course which has landed so many of England's recent clients in exile or in prison?" But you would agree with Mr. Chamberlain that the democratic Scandinavia which you honour is doomed unless the Nazi régime is defeated; you would agree that Scandinavia even when newly armed, even if newly united, cannot hope to defend itself for long, by its own forces, against a ruthless Germany allied with Russia; and you would recognise that such armament, such unity, can never be an adequate substitute for a collective peace system loyally and effectively supported by the Great Powers, particularly Britain and France.

In short, the lesson of Finland, for the Scandinavians and for ourselves, is surely just what the L.N.U. said in December. "The freedom of no country will be safe" until the League principles "are re-established as the public law of nations."

The proposed meeting on Finland at the Queen's Hall on April 3rd has been indefinitely postponed.

PLANS FOR THE PEACE

Statement adopted at a Conference held in London on March 9 and 10, 1940

THE British League of Nations Union and the French League of Nations Society, at the first of their conferences to define their common peace aims, declare that in opposing the German policy of enslavement the Allied Governments of Great Britain and France are not themselves seeking to dominate Europe, but only desire to secure for other nations the same freedom which they claim for themselves.

They recognise that when the victory of the Allies has been obtained every effort must be made to establish by agreement a new order, and in doing so to be influenced neither by illusions nor feelings of revenge, which are alike productive of future wars.

They are convinced that it is neither just nor moral that an aggressor should gain by his aggression. The wrong done to the people of other States by an act of aggression cannot be obliterated by the mere defeat of the aggressor. Experience has shown the necessity for concerting effective measures to make future aggression impossible.

Finally, they are satisfied that their common peace aims can only be accomplished by successive stages.

First must come a definition of the conditions in which the Allies would be prepared to terminate hostilities with Germany. Next should follow the conclusion of peace between the belligerents; and, finally, the conditions essential for the general organisation of peace should be defined after discussion at a conference in which States that have not been engaged in the hostilities should take part.

I.—Conditions of Armistice

These can only be defined in so far as the military situation leaves the Allies with the power to enforce them. They are fighting against the destroyer of more than one State, who, but for their resistance, would certainly attempt the destruction of many others. A murdered individual cannot be restored to life. A murdered State, fortunately, can, and the liberation of Hitler's victims of yesterday would be an essential condition of any armistice.

To be precise, the Allies should require the restoration of the right of self-determination to the peoples of Austria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia as it was before Munich in those parts of their territory now occupied by German troops, and adequate provision for the exercise of that right without any external pressure. For this purpose German troops would have to be withdrawn from these territories and replaced by other forces sufficient to maintain order and resist any external aggression; national Governments would have to become responsible for the administration in those countries, and their representatives must have the right to sit at the General Peace Conference, together with the representatives of the Allied countries and Germany.

Guarantees for the enforcement of these conditions would be determined by the Allied Governments.

II.—Peace Between the Belligerents

The Treaty of Peace between the belligerents should be concluded as soon as possible after the armistice. The terms of this treaty should be settled after discussion in a concluded as soon as possible after the armistice. The take part.

* *i.e.*, Belligerents and representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria.

III.—The General Peace Settlement

The conference summoned to negotiate the general peace settlement should be attended not only by the States recently at war but by others whose participation is necessary to the establishment of the new world order. It should, if possible, take place at the seat of the League of Nations.

The delimitation of frontiers not previously fixed would be negotiated at this conference. The problems of national, racial, linguistic, and religious minorities, and in general the problem of guaranteeing fundamental human rights, would also be considered.

The main purpose of the conference would be to consider how future wars of aggression can be prevented, it being the fixed determination of the Allies who are now at war with Germany to save future generations from the necessity of experiencing a repetition of the sacrifices which have twice been imposed upon them by the same nation.

For this purpose the establishment of an effective international organisation is essential. Whatever form the ultimate organisation may take, this feature must be found in it—such limitation of national sovereignty as may be necessary for (1) the maintenance of the supremacy of law between nations; (2) the organisation of collective security; and (3) the reciprocal interchange of common interests between the nationals of different States.

Every member of the organisation must therefore accept the obligation:—

(a) To submit to third party judgment its disputes with other States, whether justifiable or not, and to refrain from the use of force except with the sanction of an international authority;

(b) To undertake a share of responsibility for preventing and resisting aggression;

(c) To reduce its armaments progressively to an agreed limit, and to accept the supervision of such limitation by an international authority.

The two societies believe that if there is to be a satisfactory outcome from such a Peace Conference there must be a League of Nations as universal as possible and operating with a measure of publicity comparable to that of a democratic Parliament, and within its framework an association of States or groups of States. This association should be based on the principle that aggression is an international crime, and should therefore provide for a common policy and common action for the purpose of making precise and fulfilling effectively their obligations as members of the League to prevent and resist aggression. It should also provide the opportunity of developing the social and economic welfare of their peoples. As the basis of such association* the present Anglo-French co-operation should be continued, developed further, and opened to other States. This association will, it is hoped, so develop as to become the instrument for maintaining permanent peace in Europe.

It is important that the international organisation referred to in this statement should be brought into operation as speedily as possible in order to take over from the Allied Powers the provision of such effective guarantees as the experience of the war may have caused to be inserted in the Peace Treaty.

* The form and powers of the association to be set up within the framework of a universal League, the problem of general disarmament, and the measures of collective defence, are among the questions which the two Societies will consider further at a meeting to be held in Paris at the end of April.

The two societies are convinced that, in order to give vitality to the idea of peaceful co-operation between all peoples, it is necessary to create without delay closer ties between those nations which are already drawn together by common principles of civilisation.

When the security—stressed in this statement—has been assured, it will become possible to go further in

The removal of causes of friction between nations, in particular by the peaceful adjustment of differences;

The development of such benefits as individual liberty of action and movement, the maintenance of high standards in public health, conditions of labour, education, and social services on which the happiness of the individual citizens in all States depends;

The removal of trade barriers; and, finally,

The encouragement of free flow of thought and knowledge between nations.

OUR CONFERENCE WITH THE FRENCH

By LESLIE R. ALDOUS

“ANGLO-FRENCH collaboration,” a familiar phrase these days, achieved a new significance at

the joint conference held in London on Saturday and Sunday, March 9 and 10, between representatives of the League of Nations Union and the French League of Nations Society. HEADWAY, in welcoming the Anglo-French partnership to win the war, has stressed the equally important part which the two countries together can play in winning the peace. What the Governments do will depend largely upon what their peoples do and think. Thus it is fitting that the close and cordial association which has developed between the British and the French Governments should now be finding its counterpart in more intimate co-operation between the League societies of the two countries. “This is but a beginning,” was the general feeling at the close of the meeting in London. A beginning, not because little had been achieved—for, in fact, the practical results were highly satisfactory; but because those results and, above all, the friendliness of the discussions leading up to them had shown the future possibilities of this kind of unofficial collaboration.

Union Statement Arouses Interest

How did this conference come about? The Union's statement, “World Settlement after the War,” supplied the first stimulus. It aroused great interest in other countries, and nowhere more so than in France. The Union's “opposite numbers” of the French Society thought that their own views on war aims and peace terms were, in the most essential respects, so akin to ours that, if the two Societies could get together and define their common peace aims, each could then support the other in trying to make these effective. The French themselves proposed, through the International Federation, that they should send spokesmen to London for a conference with representatives of the Union's Executive.

The Union's Executive, realising the importance of this development, gave much time and thought to a draft statement which, it was hoped, would go far towards meeting the wishes of the French.

Strong and Able Team

The French Society, for their part, paid the Union the tribute of sending over a strong and able team of negotiators. Their six representatives possessed an embarrassingly long list of distinctions. They included former Cabinet Ministers, members of the Chamber, Government officials, members of the French delegation to the League of Nations, ex-Servicemen, and a soldier with ribbons of the Légion d'Honneur and the Croix de Guerre on his chest.

These were the visitors who, having faced the dangers and discomforts of war-time travel, were welcomed by Lord Lytton in the name of the Union. The war, said Lord Lytton, was a tragedy; but it would have been an even greater tragedy if we had lost our faith in the possibilities of the League. As to their aim, the British and the French Societies were united. As to means, there might be differences. These must be faced frankly, and he hoped that, as a result of the discussions, they would disappear.

The leader of the French delegation, M. Emile Borel, one of the most distinguished of mathematicians and one time Minister of Education, responded. Agreement between the two Societies, he declared, would be nearly as valuable as agreement between their Governments. The spirit was more important than the wording.

Very Close Together

These two opening speeches set the tone of the whole conference. Throughout the Union's representatives were impressed by the spirit of reason and understanding which their French colleagues brought to the conference

table. They hoped that the French delegation found the Union equally reasonable! This does not mean that controversial issues were deliberately avoided. Questions cropped up during the conference on which it was not easy for nationals of the two different countries to see eye to eye. The will to agree, however, invariably brought the two sides very close together.

A discussion in general terms, which occupied the whole of the first morning, cleared the ground for detailed discussion of the Union's paper clause by clause at the following sessions. Both societies agreed that a peace of illusions and a peace of revenge must be equally avoided. To save time in the full conference, a small drafting committee was set up to prepare the actual wording of amendments which had been agreed to in principle. These arrangements worked smoothly. By the evening of the second day, little later than had been expected, the joint statement had been adopted, and the conference closed with friendly handshakes all round.

Return Visit to Paris

The statement, it will be noticed, describes the conference as “the first” of the conferences of the two societies. The Union readily accepted an invitation to pay a return visit to Paris at the end of April. At this further conference the two societies will continue their collaboration with a discussion of certain problems indicated in the statement that could not be covered in the short time available at their first meeting. On this occasion, the British and French representatives will meet representatives of the Polish and Czech League of Nations Societies to discuss their common interests.

At the conclusion of the conference in London, messages were sent to the Finnish and Chinese League of Nations Societies expressing “unbounded admiration” for the heroic struggle which the people of these countries were making against unprovoked aggression.

HANDBOOK TO ECONOMIC COLLECTIVE SECURITY

"The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace," by Mr. J. E. Meade, is a book which will be of much value to all who are thinking seriously about peace aims and who don't mind a bit of reading involving close attention. Mr. Meade has had a rare opportunity for studying the economic problems of the world as a whole, and much practice in writing about those problems lucidly, for, besides being the author of the well-known text-book, "An Introduction to Economic Analysis and Polity," he is a member of the League's Secretariat and is now responsible for the admirable "World Economic Survey" which the League publishes annually.

Assuming that there must be an international organisation of some kind for the prevention of war and the promotion of an acceptable peace, what services could it offer in the economic field? How could it help, for instance, to prevent another great slump, such as that of 1929? How could it promote the freer movement of goods, capital, and men across frontiers? If such an organisation is to work effectively for the advantage of the supporting States, how far must those States restrict their freedom of national action in economic matters? How can such an organisa-

tion work properly when the internal economic policies and structures of its member States are widely different from each other?

Supporters of Federal Union will be particularly interested in what Mr. Meade says about an International Currency. Suppose that there is an International Bank, with powers to issue currency notes, and suppose that Britain and France make these notes their legal currency. He shows why this could only work if the two countries were also willing to give up the national planning of their internal prices and costs. Trade Unions, for instance, would have to give up the idea of keeping national wage-rates fixed rigidly at certain British and French levels in terms of money.

Mr. Meade's view is that such a Bank, with such powers, should be created: but that member States should preserve their national currencies, "pegging" them at a certain value in relation to the notes of the International Bank. This value should be revised from time to time, so as to allow for changes in the balance of payments between one member and another.

Another task for the International

authority would be to arrange for the gradual lowering of trade barriers. Mr. Meade summarily examines the arguments commonly used to justify departures from the Free Trade principle: the claim, for instance, that agriculture or infant industries must be protected. Much better, he says, protect agriculture, if it must be protected, by a straightforward subsidy than by a tariff or a quota system.

Some of the most helpful pages show the need for control by an International authority over International cartels and other organisations which control prices, production and exports of various primary commodities, such as tin, rubber, steel. All such monopolies and controls "affect the public interest": they concern "consumers" as well as "producers," the "Have-not" countries as well as the "Haves," so that public interest must be protected by collective action. The commonwealth needs collective security against poverty and economic tyranny as well as against war.

Mr. Meade has condensed a lot of experience and knowledge about that economic "collective security" into the 190 small pages of this excellent book.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF A DURABLE PEACE
By J. E. Meade. Allen and Unwin. pp. 192. 6s.

OXFORD

April 11-15

*Problems of Education in relation to World Settlement
after the War*

The Council for Education in World Citizenship invites all who are engaged in educational work to attend its Public Inaugural Meetings and Conference on

Speakers will include:—

EARL DE LA WARR, President of the Board of Education

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Prof. SAURAT

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Fees, including board and lodging for four full days at Somerville College, £2 17s. 6d. Or, without board and accommodation, 10s. 6d. In each case there is a separate registration fee of 5s. Full particulars and registration forms may be had from the Council's Secretary at 60, St. Martin's Lane, London, W.C.2.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

HEADWAY READERS DISCUSS FRANCE, GERMANY, THE LEAGUE

Public Opinion in France

Sir,—I would like to comment on three items in March HEADWAY.

The importance of the article surveying French public opinion is obviously great. If France and Britain had not drawn apart after the war of 1914-18 that might have been the last great European war of all time. It is essential that the two nations should retain a common objective when the time comes to make peace and in the years of reconstruction. It is good to see that the trend of French public opinion which has the greatest number of supporters is that which favours the revival of an international organism such as the League of Nations, revised in the light of past experience and aiming to plan the economic reconstruction of Europe and to assist the evolution which would enable the European States to pass gradually from the Nation stage to the Federation stage. The demand that "Geneva must be given a Tribunal and an Army" is also one to be supported. But can the same be said of the demands for a prolonged occupation of the Rhine and an enforced change in the system of education in Germany? How many years of war would be necessary to force such conditions on Germany, and what chance of success would the new educational system have under such circumstances? It is a very good thing to know that the French have such views, as it gives us a chance to persuade them to modify their demands.

The Tyneside L.N.U. conference was very valuable for a similar reason. The results show that there is considerable diversity of opinion among our own people as to what are our true War and Peace Aims, and point to the need for a more definite statement from our Government.

I wish also to support most strongly the letter by J. B. Browne calling for close co-operation between the L.N.U. and Federal Union. It would be very sad if serious wastage of effort resulted from their continued division. And how can we hope to promote co-operation between nations if we cannot agree among ourselves?

T. P. DEE.

Orpington, Kent.

Warning From Experience

Sir,—The Executive Committee's Statement on World Settlement after the war runs counter in one vital respect to British opinion and, I believe, to that of most L.N.U. members. I refer to the passage, "We believe that a lasting peace would not be secured by an attempt so to weaken Germany as to make her powerless again to disturb the peace of the world." The Committee continually anticipates a bona-fide acceptance of international agreements by Germany.

Why? All evidence points the other way. Five times in 75 years has Germany made war for world-power. Why do the Committee fly in the face of history? The British and French peoples are determined that German bullying has to stop. France certainly and almost equally certainly Britain and the Dominions disbelieve that any understanding whatever by Germany would be kept if another gangster leader arose with power to re-arm. We dare not risk it. And we could do Germany no better service than to deprive her for an indefinite time of the possession of arms.

The notion that Versailles caused Hitlerism will not bear examination. Versailles had some clauses which pressed too hard. They were soon dropped, yet Germany accepted with enthusiasm Hitler's cruel and aggressive policies.

Nor can it be said that we are fighting Nazi-dom but not Germany. Those who offer this argument are in a dilemma. For either Hitler's deeds are approved by Germany, or the Germans are so weak that any gangster can intimidate them. Are the Executive Committee prepared to guarantee that another Hitler will not arise? Do they dare to ask France to risk the tiger breaking loose again? France will never listen to such wishful thinking; nor, I believe, will Britain.

It is technically feasible to keep Germany disarmed without interfering with her administration. The Versailles efforts to do so were feeble. All that is needful is to establish permanent plain-clothes inspectors in defined areas (like the Ordnance Survey) with the right to enter instantly any factory, shipyard or mine, and inspectors at custom-houses and aerodromes. Concealment of arms-production would be impossible. Fraud or defiance would be met by sanctions or military occupation of important areas. And the inspectors would be as unnoticed as Ordnance Surveyors are.

If the L.N.U. Executive advocate Germany retaining arms our Union will lose all influence in this country.

E. N. MOZLEY.
(Lieut.-Colonel late R.E.)

War is Suicide

Sir,—I think there are many, including the writer, who have supported and worked for the L.N.U. because we thought that its policy of collective security and reconstruction would establish a just peace. We know that League principles have been betrayed, and that if they had been kept the war would have been averted.

Nevertheless it is disquieting to reflect that the Union's present policy appears to be devoted either to nebulous discussions about Federal Union, or to moralisations regarding the justice of our cause. Now there is a very real difference

between collective security and the *collective suicide* which must ensue if this war is to be fought to the bitter end. There is a very grave danger that this struggle may degenerate into a religious or ideological war, and nothing could be more unchristian or more lawless. It is the business of the League to co-operate with all societies working for peace (America, Italy and the Vatican, the Neutrals, etc.), to try to see if there is not a way out of this terrible impasse. If the League fails it will have done its duty—and it will have borne its witness far more effectively than by spending its time in day-dreams of speculation about the future, and the kind of peace which may, or may not, be formulated in times and circumstances which are quite hypothetical.

W. A. PAYNE.

Kettering.

P.S.—In particular one must deprecate the use of the slogan "No Compromise" which always earns an easy response. It is a rather foolish slogan because our whole democratic system is founded on a most elaborate compromise between freedom and authority, and war itself is a most questionable compromise between supposedly good ends and undeniably evil methods.

Sir,—We are all thinking about the better political organisation of the world. I agree with contributors to HEADWAY that we must begin where we stand—that we must not leave the League to slip into decay in the hope of constructing something better. But where do we stand?

The League includes only two great powers out of five, or of six, if you count Italy. Therefore its first preoccupation must be defence. It seems likely that the division of Europe into free states and slave states will continue for at least a generation, though individual states may change sides. And the same line of division is likely to separate true men and traitors, for the more autocratic a state is the more opportunities of treachery it has.

The problem, then, is to organise the League for defence on a basis that will allow of the admission of any other states and eventually of all. This requires a common executive for purposes of war. The unwillingness of the states to submit their foreign policy to a largely alien body need not be an obstacle; for the League can have no foreign policy save that to which they have already assented on joining, namely the defence of the integrity and independence of each of its members by the forces of all. How can such an executive be framed, and how, without arbitrary exclusion, can we keep traitors out?

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DISCUSSION GROUPS

Work the L.N.U. is Doing

ONE thing which the war has done has been to give an impetus to Discussion Groups. The Union and its branches were quick to appreciate the possibilities of doing solid and useful work along these lines. Early ventures were successful to an extent that was infectious. Up and down the country to-day little bands of members, meeting more often than not in private houses, are giving a practical example of what Mr. Malcolm MacDonald has called "thoughtful democracy functioning."

Many of the Union's discussion groups are running their programmes on the basis of Mr. W. Arnold-Forster's "Suggestions for a Discussion on *War Aims and Peace Aims*." This document, which the Union is issuing in seven parts at the modest charge of 1s. 3d. for the complete series, was planned to meet the popular demand for guiding material which could be used by leaders of discussion groups. Mr. Arnold-Forster has had much experience of discussion of this kind and this has helped him in selecting from among the tangled mass of questions which could be discussed, those essential problems which at the present time will most repay study. Without in any

sense attempting to dictate the answers, he does suggest briefly the broad lines along which (in his idea) adequate replies could be framed. As an indication of where fuller information can be found, reference lists of speeches, pamphlets, and books on each subject are appended.

It is interesting to compare Mr. Arnold-Forster's syllabus with the "Study Outline" recently published by the American Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace—a body sponsored by a number of organisations in the United States, including the American League of Nations Association. The outlook appears to be similar in each case, but the technique is different. The American study course first states the problems before us in *the world we have*, and then turns to the problems of organising *the world we want*. Each section consists of a summary of the problem in an opening paragraph, a group of thought-provoking questions, and a selection of pertinent quotations. A reference list of books and pamphlets covering the whole field is reserved for the end. Whilst the effect of the Outline is to suggest a pattern of thought to follow, the readers are left to supply their own answers from

their study alone. This is the most important respect in which the American plan differs from that of Mr. Arnold-Forster.

The first four parts of Mr. Arnold-Forster's "suggestions," which are already in the hands of subscribers, indicate clearly enough the scope of the whole work. The opening discussion deals with the reasons for our being at war, the declared aims of the belligerent Governments, and the probable stages of peace-making. Secondly comes a reasoned analysis of essential war aims. After this naturally follow the next two parts, devoted to long-range Peace Aims. There is no dearth of good material here—in fact, the fourth discussion of the series could with advantage be expanded to cover two evenings. One question alone, propounded by the author, arouses important speculations—ought there to be *two* sets of obligations; one a sort of "minimum subscription" incumbent upon every member of the new League, and the other a supplement which members can accept if they choose?

On the whole, reports suggest that there is fairly general agreement with the conclusions reached by Mr. Arnold-Forster. According to the Chairman of one Branch, their discussion group is strengthening the Branch now and making it better fitted to carry on normal work at the end of the war.

SIR HUBERT MURRAY

By SIR JOHN HARRIS

THE passing of Sir Hubert Murray, Governor of Papua, is a blow not only to overseas supporters of the League of Nations but to League of Nations Union members in Great Britain. There was much in common between the elder and younger brother, "Dr. Gilbert."

Sir Hubert Murray will be known to history as one of our greatest Colonial Governors. It was probably his absorbing interest in native folk lore and customs which endeared him to the people over whom he ruled so wisely. Two facts are eloquent of his success as an administrator. The English Colonial Office, in its regulations, states that normally the service of a Colonial Governor to a territory should not be extended beyond five years. Sir Hubert Murray refused all suggestions of change, and served Papua for nearly thirty-five years! Most Colonial Governors retire before sixty-five years of age, but Sir Hubert died in harness in his seventy-ninth year! The people, white and native, of Papua, resolutely forbade him to retire. When after thirty years' service the 300,000 natives of Papua discovered that their beloved Governor was

being pressed to retire, they sent a deputation, telling him that they would do anything he wished to help him, but one thing they could not and would not permit was that he should leave them; never, they said, must this happen—he must remain with them as long as he lived. They got their wish, for Sir Hubert Murray accepted their affectionate ultimatum—and died in harness.

The other fact is quite as remarkable. The proposal was mooted about two years ago that the adjoining New Guinea territory with Papua should be placed under a single administration. There was much to be said for the proposal on grounds of economy and administrative efficiency. But there was strong local opposition. The only way the Government could see to propitiate the dissentients was to say that if a single administration could be agreed upon, the Government would appoint Sir Hubert as Governor of both areas. The proposal could not be carried through until he had reached his eightieth year! The very fact that the Government made this offer shows the measure of confidence that not only the Government but the people had in Sir Hubert Murray.

SUMMER HOLIDAYS?

It is most unlikely that the L.N.U. will this year be able to organise Summer Schools and Conferences at Geneva. But a holiday in one of the Oxford Colleges, with all the beauty of Oxford and the river in summer time, is still possible.

The Executive Committee is considering the possibility of holding such a Summer School and of inviting as speakers some of the Union's leaders and representatives of international thought in France and other countries. Before coming to a decision it would like to have some idea of the probable response from branches and members.

The time suggested is the beginning of August or, possibly, the last few days of July. The cost, including conference fees and full board and lodging, might be £3 for four days or £5 for a full week.

If you are interested, *will you please write to the Secretary, L.N.U., 60, St. Martin's Lane, London, W.C.2, as soon as possible.* Don't wait until you know if you can come; there may be no Summer School to attend unless sufficient people write now to say that they would try to attend and to bring others.