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## THE LEAGUE IN DECEMBER, 1939

By DR. GILBERT MURRAY

*Dr. Murray was in Geneva during the discussion by the League of Nations of the Russian attack upon Finland. He attended the Meetings of the Council and the Assembly. In the article printed below he gives an account of what happened and points out its significance*

LIGHTED streets; no need of special permits or triplicate photographs; apparently not even of censorship. Such a change raises the spirits and gives one a momentary sense of freedom and even of peace. Only momentary, however. I was not in Geneva long before there came an air-raid practice, and the public, except those who had business at the Palais des Nations, were herded into shelters and cellars. There cannot be much freedom for a small nation with Hitler on one side of her and Mussolini on the other. Certainly the neutral countries cannot admit much free speech except in privacy. For any free discussion of different points of view one must now go to a belligerent country, or else to the Vatican island. Such a topsy-turvy world we live in!

### An Inspiring Spectacle

Inside the Palais des Nations things were different. The Assembly itself was an inspiring spectacle, not merely because of the action it took but because of the spontaneity with which it had come together. Finland made her appeal off her own initiative, without any consultation with the Great Powers. M. Avenol instantly sent out his summons to all members: forty-two nations instantly responded, and within three days the Assembly had met. A committee of fourteen invited Russia to come and discuss plans for a peaceful settlement of the dispute; Russia refused; the Committee drew up a careful report on the history of the whole Russo-Finnish conflict and proposed two resolutions to the Assembly, the first condemning the aggression of Russia, the second declaring that by her refusal to be present or

to recognise the duty of the Council and Assembly under Article 15 of the Covenant Russia had "by her own action placed herself outside the Covenant" and asking the Council to "consider what consequences should follow from this situation."

The tone of the discussion was admirable. It reminded one of the spirit of the old Assemblies, when the League was young and felt itself to be the hope of the world. The main sentiment was clear: a passionate feeling that these cynical and brutal aggressions must at last cease, and a recognition that, however late, England and France had at last risked everything to stop them.

### Mexico Gives a Lead

There were contributory streams no doubt. Nations whose territory lay close to Germany, but far from Russia, like Belgium and Holland, dared to join in the chorus of condemnation; those which had Russia for neighbour thought it best to abstain. Certain Catholic nations, who had always been tender to Italy and did not care much about the Covenant in the case of Spain, felt free to liberate their souls on the aggressions of Russia, but it would be a great mistake to suppose that this anti-Communist current was at all the dominant note of the Assembly. It was, of course, expressed. The first speaker, Portugal, explained that his own country, with Holland and Switzerland, had voted against the admission of the Soviet Government to the League, and now events had shown that they were right. But he was followed by Mexico, a Communist or pro-Communist State, which might well have made a controversial answer and concocted a defence for Russia on *Daily Worker*

lines. Not at all. Signor Tello said he would be objective, and he was objective. Mexico had consistently denounced every previous violation of the Covenant, when certain other members of the League did not; the present was a clear case of brutal unprovoked aggression, made worse by the utter disproportion in size and strength between the aggressor and his victims. Mexico condemned this aggression as she had condemned the others; she supported strongly the proposal that the League should give all assistance possible to Finland. As for the proposal to exclude Russia from the League, a step which had not been taken in the previous cases, Mexico could not approve of it, but she supported the Resolution before the Assembly. Not being a member of the Council she would not have to vote on that point.

### Poland, France, Britain

Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, speaking for India, gave a detailed account of the whole negotiations between Russia and Finland, commenting as he went. His speech will constitute a useful record for reference. M. Gralinski, for Poland, a country which had in old days suffered long under the same oppressor as Finland and had now succumbed to a similar aggression, made a speech all the more moving because of its dignity and restraint. Then came a few admirable words from M. de Ribes, the French Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Since the Senior French Delegate, M. Paul Boncour, was to speak at the Council, M. de Ribes confined himself to two or three sympathetic and sincere sentences. Then came Mr. Butler. He, too, was reserving his main remarks for

the Council. He commented on "the extraordinary propaganda which the people of certain countries are now expected by their leaders to swallow. The technique of propaganda is unfortunately becoming as familiar as the technique of aggression. As these two ugly weapons are the more freely, and the more savagely, used, we must render this organisation for the safeguarding of the standards of international decency better understood and more effective. The case we are considering to-day is the latest link in the chain of aggression in Europe. It follows hard on the attacks made by Germany upon her weaker neighbours, the Czechs and the Poles, of whose cause we are not and shall not be forgetful."

A fine statement, to which the unanimous feeling of the Assembly instinctively responded.

### Abstentions

Then, disappointing, flat, unapplauded, but of course excusable, came the abstentions of the various unhappy neutrals who had the misfortune to be close neighbours of Russia or Germany. One speech for Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia, of whom nothing else could be expected; one for Sweden, Norway and Denmark, whose danger, one might think, was not lessened by their abstention and would not have been increased by a frank expression of their agreement with the conscience of the civilised world. One for Switzerland, who had from the outset only consented to join the League if she might preserve untouched her traditional neutrality. Such an attitude is perhaps not really consistent with membership of the League, but the League agreed long ago to accord Switzerland that special position, and cannot fairly complain that she insists on keeping it. Then came Wellington Koo for China, explaining that, for reasons which all the Assembly understood, China would abstain from voting.

### China Needs No Excuse

The abstention of China needs no excuse. Fighting desperately for her life, a victim of unparalleled cruelties, China is not likely to join in condemning the one nation which, for whatever motive, has hitherto given her effective military help. The abstention of small Baltic States is a necessary result of their dependence on Russia. That of the Swiss and Scandinavians is more significant. It shows the wide range of Nazi terrorism. It has been well said that the whole of Germany is one great concentration camp; it would seem that the numbing poison gas from that camp spreads like a cloud over all the smaller nations of Europe. None of them dare

speak aloud; and soon perhaps not even silence will help them. The German Government is already threatening to regard any attendance at the League of Nations as an "unneutral act." And in its full meaning so it is. As unneutral as to publish facts which Nazi propaganda denies, as unneutral as to express belief in Christianity, or in human brotherhood or in the sanctity of the pledged word. I felt a kind of pity for the two Nazi journalists who wandered rather solitary and friendless about the corridors of the Secretariat, like long-term prisoners puzzled and shy at their first sight of the world outside the prison gates, where people spoke freely and considered that crime was crime even when approved by the Fuhrer.

### The Only Thing to Do

The Council do not make the same emotional appeal as the Assembly, but their decisions are apt to have more direct importance. In this case they were asked by the Assembly, provided they accepted the Assembly's two resolutions, to draw from them the necessary consequences. They did so, and pronounced that Russia was no longer a member of the League of Nations. It was probably the only thing to do. Three courses of action are provided for in Article XVI; to impose sanctions, as was done against Italy; to declare war, as has at last been done against Germany; or to expel from the protection of the Covenant the breaker of the law of the Covenant. The two stronger steps were practically impossible; the third was taken. It is hard to see what else could have been done. Some critics indeed were afraid that the condemnation might provoke Stalin into declaring war against Britain and France; but it seems hardly likely that Stalin would either be goaded into a war which he did not desire by a mere point of punctillio, or restrained from a war which he intended by an act of politeness obviously due to timidity.

### Case Abundantly Clear

The case was abundantly clear. As M. Paul Boncour explained, France stood for the principles of the Covenant. "If they had been defended more strongly in the past we should not now have to defend them with the blood of our youth." He welcomed "this rather late awakening of the universal conscience of mankind." We must return to the full principles of the Covenant, and in speaking of Finland not forget the other previous victims. We must return, at the end of this conflict to the ideas of Collective Security indivisible. He recalled, "not with irony but with real grief," the statements of M. Litvinoff on this subject.

### Why the Democracies are Fighting

Mr. Butler began by referring to the great war in which France and Britain were engaged, "fighting in defence of the principles for which the Covenant was founded." They met now, first, to answer the appeal of a fellow member of the League who had been brutally attacked and, secondly, "to maintain and ensure the continuance of the standards of international morality in which we believe and on which our policy is founded." The British Government had already communicated to the League the reasons for which we had taken up arms against the German Government. "We are not now inspired by prejudice or by any vindictive designs. We are unable to depart from the position we have long since taken up. . . . We do not cling to the principles of the Covenant out of some old-fashioned belief or desire that the world should never be changed. We adhere to them because they form the best and only inspiration upon which an international order can be based. It will be our duty in our generation to make the principles that unite us here prevail."

Noble words, and incontrovertibly true. We may well wish, with Paul Boncour, that the British and French Governments had made their stand earlier; we may ask whether it was not chiefly our Governments' and people's extreme desire to avoid war at almost any price that tempted the aggressive Powers to crime after crime and eventually made war inevitable. But such controversies belong to the past. Mr. Butler's statement of British policy as it now stands will command almost universal support, and certainly expresses well the fundamental principle for which the League of Nations Union stands.

### Work That Goes On

Political affairs always, rightly or wrongly, take precedence of others; and war takes precedence of everything. But two other subjects were treated at Geneva during the week that began on December 10. First, the Central Committee for Economic and Social Affairs contemplated by the Bruce Report was constituted, forming the nucleus of an independent organisation, like the I.L.O., which nations may join without being members of the League itself. And secondly, the Executive of the Committee of Intellectual Co-operation met, reviewed its situation and determined to continue its work with very little reduction. "After all," said one of the national representatives, "why should we cease our efforts to maintain the culture of the civilised world just when it is most threatened, because two of our members happen to be at war?"

## INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF COLONIES

By SIR JOHN MAYNARD, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.Litt.

*In the following article Sir John Maynard assumes that the Colonial possessions of Great Britain and other European powers can become an international trust held primarily for the benefit of their inhabitants and offering equal access and opportunities of co-operation to all nations. Such a possibility has never been considered immediately practicable by the League of Nations Union. But on the assumption that it were practicable Sir John Maynard here outlines the essential technical requirements which he considers would be involved in an international administration of colonies*

A PLAN for the international administration of colonies postulates an international authority which actually governs. It is this which distinguishes the present proposal from a plan of *Condominium*, which places a colony under two or more masters. The form of the international authority depends upon the settlement of a larger question: whether there is to be a federation of now sovereign States as an outcome of the present war. To avoid prejudging that question, which cannot be discussed within the limits of this article, I here assume that the international authority will be a Governing Commission, or Ministry, appointed by the Council of the League of Nations: and that, if it is defeated on any of its proposals, financial or legislative, by the League Assembly, it will have to choose between resignation and abandonment of the defeated proposal. International Government, in any form, involves the sacrifice of the principle of unanimity, and its replacement by majority decision, in the organs corresponding to the Council and the Assembly of the present League. But the international governing commission—I shall call it the Ministry, for sake of brevity—should follow the convention which requires resignation *en bloc* to follow defeat. It will be the duty of the Council to form a new Ministry when the old resigns or is dismissed.

### A Foreign Elite

Associated with the Ministry, and subject to its orders, will be an international Inspectorate and a Public Services Commission. The international Inspectorate will have peripatetic functions, of which there is more to be said below. The great bulk of the employees in the internationalised areas will be natives, supplemented for certain purposes by Asiatics, till the native standard of education is raised. But I contemplate that only the more backward colonies, which are not within measurable distance of the attainment of a self-governing status, will be internationalised: and, during the interval of their tutelage, it will be necessary to appoint a small *élite* of judges, civil

servants, medical men, agricultural and engineering and educational experts, and the like, from the countries which participate in the international control. These officers cannot be chosen by competition, because of the widely differing media of education prevailing in countries so widely separated. They must be picked out by the Public Services Commission from among candidates proposed by a world-wide roster of universities and by professional associations of standing in the worlds of learning, science, and business. Having been selected, they must undergo a period of training for perhaps two years in an international College to be established alongside of the International Labour Organisation and other international organisations at Geneva. It will be the function of this College to create in its pupils the spirit appropriate in a service, drawn from all faiths and races, but working on non-national lines, among backward races in training for a future independence. From the outset they must understand that the goal is such independence, and that they will be working, like enlightened guardians, to render themselves unnecessary to their full-grown charges. But the stage of independence will be reached at very different moments among peoples of such widely differing capacities: and it will be possible to adjust the recruitment of the proposed *élite* to the diminishing geographical area of their employment. At the end, when the last "backward" ward of the international control is ready for emancipation, it will be necessary to provide suitable pensions for those remaining officials for whom posts have ceased to be available.

### Independence the Goal

The process of the internationalisation of the *personnel* will, in the normal course of things, be a gradual one. The existing officials will naturally remain till they reach the age of retirement, and the new services will be pieced on to the old.

I have said that independence is the goal. But, in saying so, I leave scope for varying interpretation. The French

try to educate the most promising of their colonials into complete assimilation as *concitoyens* of the French Republic. The British—those of them who do not share the extreme conception of a permanently segregated black race—waver between two ideals: self-government of the British type; and "indirect government" through native chiefs and their councillors. It may be that different aims are appropriate in different territories. But my plan would be to watch the development of native feeling and adjust the ultimate aims, so far as may be possible, to that. With this plan in view, I propose that the international Inspectorate, while watching and reporting on the progress of native society, should, in particular, devote its attention to the question of native preferences as to the ultimate direction of political development, and to the adjustment of education, in all its forms, including broadcasting, to the goal which may be found to be appropriate. Independence in some form must be guaranteed: but it is altogether too narrow an outlook which assumes that a British Parliamentary system must necessarily be the goal for all.

### Steady Stream of Publicity

The goal of independence is vital to the scheme. Without it internationalisation will be apt to degenerate into a mere inter-imperialism, a plan of perpetuating the colonial status in the interests of a joint imperialism: and the aspirations of the more advanced among the natives will be enlisted against the introduction and the success of the plan.

Reality must be given to the guarantee of ultimate independence by a steady stream of publicity throughout the world regarding the steps, economic, educational and experimental, taken to prepare for it—or to thwart it, if such there be. This will be one of the principal functions of the international Inspectorate. As soon as suitable natives are forthcoming they must be included in the Ministry, in the Inspectorate, and in the ranks of the *élite* services.

Above all, independence must be  
(Continued on page 7)

# WHO ARE - - THE UTOPIANS? AND WHO - - THE REALISTS?

By SIR NORMAN ANGELL

PROFESSOR E. H. CARR has written a book\* extremely critical of the political ideas and attitudes of certain of his contemporaries. Lord Cecil, Dr. Benes, Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. Anthony Eden, Professor Arnold Toynbee, Professor Zimmern, Professor Robbins, Professor Gilbert Murray among the living, and M. Briand and President Wilson among the dead are only some of those who come in for rather scornful treatment. "A compound of platitude and falsehood in about equal parts" is the description Professor Carr applies to an argument which he accuses Professor Toynbee of using; a part of "that post-war utopianism" which became "a hollow and intolerable sham" serving only as a "disguise for the interests of the privileged Powers."

But while Utopianism is thus indicated we cannot, it would seem, do without Utopianism, for:

Having demolished the current Utopia with the weapons of realism, we still need to build a new Utopia of our own which will one day fall to the same weapons. . . . Every political situation contains mutually incompatible elements of Utopia and Reality, of morality and power.

But we are left in the dark as to the manner in which, and the proportions in which, we are to mix our utopianism and realism in order to escape the strictures so freely levelled in this book. All we are certain of is that people like Professors Toynbee and Zimmern are utopians, and their doctrines utopianism of the most mischievous kind. "Orthodoxy is my doxy and heterodoxy is your doxy."

## "The Chief Offence"

Their chief offence seems to be that in supporting the League and "other projects of world order" they have attempted "to apply to Twentieth Century conditions the principles of the Nineteenth Century *laissez-faire* philosophy with its belief in a natural harmony of interests."

Which raises a question as to categories at the outset. *Laissez-faire* is the absence of government in economic relations; the assumption that individual economic relationships will work out to the common good if left to themselves without control, rules, authority; that, economically, anarchy and individualism can be made to work.

But to say that a similar belief in the workability of anarchy and individualism in the political relations of States is what inspired the authors and supporters of the Covenant is simply to turn the truth upside down. The League was attempted precisely because its authors believed that international anarchy, political *laissez-faire* in the relations of States, would no longer work, and that we must come to collective action to ensure at least the basis of organised

\*The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. By E. H. Carr; Macmillan; 10/6.

society namely, the defence, security, self preservation of its constituent members. The League, obviously, was a move away from *laissez-faire*, *laissez-aller* individualism in the field of international politics, towards government, rules of the road, collectivism. A policy based on the assumption that we must establish rules not now existing, and render them effective by using the power of the community to defend the victim of their violation, is not *laissez-faire*; nor, since it recognises this need of common and co-operative defence against violation of the rules, does it imply a "natural" harmony of interests which can be left to work itself out without the intervention of the community. Yet it is this belief which Professor Carr repeatedly attributes to the supporters of the Covenant and collective security.

## Confusion Goes Deep

This confusion of categories goes deeper. Professor Carr sketches the history of the last few years in terms of two opposing groups or schools of thought: utopianism and realism. Utopianism, he explains, is that view of politics which (among other things) insists that peace can be preserved without sacrifice, without assuming onerous obligations or risks; by quite minor day-to-day adjustments; by leaving things to work out naturally, by drift; which assumes that there are no conflicts between nations which cannot be settled by man-to-man talks across a table, or a few friendly visits to heads of foreign States, the maintenance of a friendly atmosphere, appeasement. That sort of facile optimism is rejected by the realists, the realists, these last few years, having been Mr. Chamberlain and his supporters. We know that it is realism which has marked the policy of Mr. Chamberlain and his supporters of recent years, because realism faces the depth of the gulf, for instance, which in outlook, moral values, interest, and philosophy separates us from totalitarianism; faces the likelihood of challenge to those values, the need of defending them; faces the inadequacy of mere day-to-day adjustment or appeasement in bridging such a gulf; faces the need to accept sacrifice, obligations and risks as the price of peace. Mr. Chamberlain, being a realist, has faced those things and has rejected the shallow utopianism and facile optimism of the League of Nations Union because it has refused to recognise them, has been blind to and silent about the grim possibilities. And in order that there shall be no doubt as to who are the realists and who the utopians, Professor Carr (dealing with a criticism of the Chamberlain policy by Dr. Gilbert Murray) explains that Mr. Chamberlain's policy, *before its radical change in March*, "represented a reaction of realism against utopianism" (page 14).

## The Union's Record

This assignment of the roles necessitates a curious reading of recent history and of plain fact.

For years the outstanding members of the L.N.U.—the

Cecils, the Lyttons, the Murrays, the Noel Bakers, the Harold Nicolson, the Arnold-Forsters—have been insisting that it was no trivial difference which separated us from the Totalitarians; that the latter were challenging a principle of international life indispensable to our own security; that sooner or later we should have to defend it or ourselves become the victim of its violation; that it would be better to take the risks of defending it in the early stages of the challenge (to have helped China to defend herself against Japanese aggression in 1932 would not have meant bombs on London) than to be compelled to defend it when the risks might have become so very much greater.

These warnings, so often repeated, have been completely justified by the event. And to-day it is the British Foreign Minister himself who uses almost the very words used so often by the "utopians" in the past. Lord Halifax declares:

We have tried to make it clear by word and deed that we are prepared to assist those countries which feel their independence immediately threatened and are ready to defend their freedom. . . . That is why we gave our undertaking to Poland. . . . In failing to uphold the liberties of others we run great risks of betraying the principle of liberty itself, and with it our own freedom and independence.

## What the "Realists" Said

But the proposal made by the "utopians" in 1932, in 1935, in 1936, in 1937, in 1938, that the British Government should do the very thing to which it has been driven in 1939, in circumstances of great peril, was received by the "realists" with a storm of protest. For saying a few years ago precisely what Lord Halifax and Mr. Chamberlain were to say a few years later, Lord Cecil and other "utopians" of the L.N.U. were described as "fanatical war mongers," "jitterbugs," disturbed at the possibility of war when there was, we were most authoritatively assured by the "realists," not a cloud upon the horizon. One recalls that as late as ten days before the invasion of Moravia and the occupation of Prague, the "appeaser" elements in the Cabinet were putting out "sunshine" stories. The nation could now, we were told, settle down to enjoy a long period of peace. Several "appeaser" members of the House of Commons proposed giving the Government powers to curb those newspapers and writers who wilfully disturbed the public's peace of mind by professing to see a likelihood of war. Such are the "realists" and such the "utopians" when we come to apply these abstractions to the realities of daily politics.

## The "Haves" and the League

Professor Carr's charge of "utopianism" seems to be based on the fact that supporters of the Covenant invoke a principle—the precise principle outlined by Lord Halifax in the passage just quoted—common defence of which they claim to be a necessary condition of order and peace. Professor Carr insists there is no such principle representing the general interest. Plans of peace and order which embody it are merely means used by the rich and powerful, the Haves, to preserve their favoured position.

The League has failed, Professor Carr says, just because its authors refused to recognise that law, order, peace are not general interests. He adds:

These supposedly absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time (p. 111).

He particularises more precisely:

Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace which guarantees its own security and predominance and denounces class war which might threaten them, so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant Powers. . . . To-day, when no single Power is strong enough

to dominate the world, and supremacy is vested in a group of nations, slogans like "collective security" and "resistance to aggression" serve the same purpose of proclaiming an identity of interest between the dominant group and the world as a whole in the maintenance of peace (p. 104).

This theory, it will be noted, gives aid and comfort in about equal degree to the followers of Marx and the followers of Hitler. This fact, and the fact that Goebbels will find the book a veritable gold mine, would be nothing against it if its statement of the case were true. But is it?

## Not Borne Out By Events

This last generalisation—that the espousal of internationalism is the characteristic of strong nations attempting to stereotype their predominance—is certainly not borne out by the course of events. It was when Britain began to recognise her peril that she turned to the rejected doctrine of collective security, and there took place what Mr. Eden has called the diplomatic revolution of March. When Russia felt her position threatened by Japan she joined the League; when she had added immensely to her power she left it and entered upon a career of conquest. So long as America feels completely secure she will be isolationist and nationalist. If German victory threatens, as it did in 1917, and America feels herself endangered, she will once more turn to internationalism, as she did then. Such facts, invalidating the generalisation just mentioned, could be multiplied indefinitely.

A large part of Professor Carr's indictment of the "utopians" is that they refuse to face the need of sacrifice for peace. And towards the end of the book when he comes to consider "The Prospects of a New International Order" he forecasts that "British policy may have to take into account the welfare of Lille or Dusseldorf or Lodz, as well as the welfare of Oldham or Jarrow," and adds that "elegant superstructures" like a better League of Nations must wait "until some progress has been made in digging the foundations," the foundations being, presumably, the preparation of public opinion for some sacrifice by Britain on behalf of Lille or Lodz. The very clear implication is that "utopians," like members of the League of Nations Union, contribute little towards those foundations.

## Who Will Help Peace?

The L.N.U. is, I think, entitled to put a question to men of Professor Carr's views. Assuming that some sacrifice like that mentioned really is necessary if we are to have a stable peace, from which of the two groups or schools of thought into which Professor Carr divides the electorate would he get the readier agreement? From the "utopians" of the L.N.U.—the Cecils, Lyttons, Murrays, Zimmerns, Arnold-Forsters, Toynbees, Noel Bakers—or from "realist" opponents of that body and the League, the benches behind Mr. Chamberlain, to say nothing of the "realists" of the Beaverbrook and Rothermere press, who are also passionate opponents of the Union and the League, and also passionate advocates of tariffs, monopolies, Imperial preferences, economic nationalism generally?

There can only be one honest answer to that question. From the "utopians" he would get overwhelming support, from the "realists" overwhelming opposition. It would seem that after all the "utopians" do something about those foundations.

The truth is this: If Chamberlainite "appeasement" had succeeded and we had maintained peace, there would have been a certain plausibility in many of the theories Professor Carr expounds. As it is, very many of them have been invalidated and discredited by the event.

NORMAN ANGELL.

# THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD

By PHILIP NOEL BAKER, M.P.

In response to a widespread request from the members of the L.N.U., HEADWAY reprints almost in full the brilliant broadcast address of Mr. Noel Baker, M.P., on the League of Nations and the new world.

ONE day in March of 1895 two men sat together in the moonlight on a sledge in the frozen ice-fields of the Arctic Sea. They were farther North than anyone had ever been. One of them was Fritjof Nansen, a famous athlete, a scientist and man of letters, and now the leader of a Norwegian expedition to find the Pole; the other was Otto Sverdrup, the Captain of Nansen's ship, the *Fram*.

It was Nansen who had conceived the expedition's plan: he had formed the theory that there was a current through the Arctic Ocean which, if he could jam his vessel in the ice-floes, would drift it across the Polar region—and so would take it nearer to the Pole than any previous expedition had ever been. Almost with one accord the scientists and explorers of every nation had denounced both Nansen and his plan. Nansen listened to his critics, but he was certain that he was right, and he went on. And they were already victors, Nansen and Sverdrup, as they sat together in the glittering ice-fields beneath the Arctic moon. Everything had gone as Nansen had foreseen. He was farther North than any earlier expedition. His success was greater than he had dared to hope.

## Nansen's Three Rules

Thirty years later I worked for Nansen in the League of Nations. He had been given the task of bringing home half-a-million abandoned prisoners of war whose governments were powerless to help them. Later he was asked to organise relief for the famine-stricken millions on the Volga, to exchange Greek and Turkish populations, to settle a million-and-a-quarter refugees from Asia Minor in their motherland in Greece. Every time a new task was laid upon him, the experts and the "practical politicians" told us that the thing was hopeless; failure this time, they said, was certain—no such thing had been tried in international politics before.

Every time Nansen listened to the difficulties and objections which they made. Every time he overcame them. His successes were not an accident. He once told me the rules by which, in his explorations and at Geneva, his work was done. There were three of them, and they were very simple:

"Never stop because you are afraid—you are never so likely to be wrong."

"Never keep a line of retreat: it is a wretched invention."

"The difficult is what takes a little time; the impossible is what takes a little longer."

## Look Beyond the Confusions

Let us look beyond the confusions of the present moment, and answer those who say that even when we win the war no international institutions can be made to work; that we have tried the League of Nations and it has failed; that the Covenant was a grandiose mistake; that we must face realities and drop our humbug about disarmament and the rule of international law.

I begin by denying that the League was tried and failed, that the Covenant was wrong, that the great experiment in Geneva has left us no further forward than we were before. In actual fact, when the League and the Covenant were used they never failed. The fault lay, not in the tables of the law but in the fact that the commandments of the law were not observed. I remember a conversation I had in Geneva in 1932 with a British Minister, which gives the key. It was when the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was at its height. In answer to a question, the Minister replied: "Oh, we knew that Japan was the aggressor; we didn't want to do anything about it, that was all." But in the twelve years before Manchuria happened, the experience of the League had brought us farther on the road to peace than we had ever been before. It had shown us how war can be abolished; what rules and what machinery are needed: it had shown us this machinery works when it is used.

Let me take four vital factors in its system, in respect of which the experts used to tell us that nothing could be done. The first is law courts. Without courts to settle quarrels, British life and British government would very soon break down. A court to deal with nations' quarrels is just as vital. In 1920 the League drew up its plans for such a court. The basis was that judges, when elected, were to be loyal, not each to his own nation, but to the nations as a whole. The Lord Chief Justice of Great Britain thought the plan impossible; he didn't believe that we or our children's children would see judges who would give verdicts against the States from which they came. But in three years'

time the thing had happened; the court had been established, and had rendered judgment in a case of grave international importance in which a French judge had decided against the thesis which the French Government had maintained.

The second factor is disarmament—by which I mean, of course, not the total disarmament of a single country, but the general reduction of all armaments by an international treaty to which all important countries must agree. Lord Grey told us, after the last Great War, that we must disarm or perish; but an eminent Foreign Office expert wrote a memorandum in 1918 to prove that the technical difficulties of a disarmament treaty could never be overcome. Fourteen years later, when Arthur Henderson was struggling against great odds in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, we heard a lot about these technical difficulties from the experts, but we found, as a witty Spaniard said, that a technical difficulty was really a political objection in uniform. When the Conference had been sitting eighteen months, Sir John Simon told the delegates that every technical problem of disarmament had been solved; only the political decisions were required. It had been proved that a general treaty of disarmament was not impossible; in other words, that the governments could have made one the moment they desired.

## Resistance to Aggressor

The third factor in a peace system is joint resistance to aggressive war. The Covenant was founded on the principle that if any government attacked another, the nations of the League would stand together to protect the victim. While it was believed that this principle would be upheld, the League settled nearly a hundred international disputes, and it actually stopped four dangerous wars that had begun. Then came Manchuria, Abyssinia, Austria and the rest, when the principles of the Covenant were not upheld. But we know now that if they had been, we should never have had this war. The history of these events shows, not as so many experts have asserted, that the Covenant was wrong, not that joint resistance to aggression is a mistake, but that at certain moments of grave international crisis powerful governments made mistakes which have cost us very dear. And we must learn the lesson that the line of least resistance

—surrender to aggression—will never bring us peace.

The fourth factor in international economic action is to promote the common welfare of mankind. Since 1931 almost every government has been trying to prepare itself economically for war; to reduce its dependence on international trade; to make itself "self-sufficient." And everybody knows that the farther they have gone, the poorer they have made their peoples. If the governments would work together, instead of against each other—if they would plan their production of wealth and its distribution—they could double the income of the world, and enormously reduce the present mass of human suffering and disease. There is no economist or banker who would deny that this is true. And when it comes to war, we do such planning. For war we can pool our joint resources in shipping and industry and raw materials, with the French. Why can such things not be done for peace? Not because it is impossible to do them. Not because they would be failures if we tried. The International Labour Office in Geneva has already shown what improvements can be made in the lives of the workers if the governments will co-operate together for a common end. We know how to deal with slumps and unemployment, how to manage currencies and trade, how to plan the work and the production of mankind. Why haven't we done it, and so removed the causes that helped to bring this war? Because the peoples

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economic as well as political. The world cannot continue to believe in the validity of the franchise exercised by the hungry man, among fellow-voters who have lands to lease, debts to collect, and employment to offer or withhold. From the outset co-operation must be fostered in all its forms, taught in the schools, guided by experts, helped with advances of public funds: the public authority must make itself the owner of public resources by buying out large private concerns wholly or partially wherever it appears judicious to do so: and, without excluding private capital, which has a valuable function to discharge in undeveloped countries, always secure for itself a controlling interest in private concessions and enterprises.

In so far as non-native interests are admitted into the sphere of economic development—and in the foreign trade of the internationalised areas they will necessarily play a large part—there must be complete equality between all participating states. This does not merely mean tariff equality and the

don't desire it? But ninety-nine per cent. of all mankind now want it done! In all the last eight years no aggressor has been able to make his people want a war. The enthusiasm, the excitement, have disappeared. The Nazis have spent a decade glorifying war; they won a striking victory in Poland; yet every neutral traveller tells us that Germany is the land where no one smiles. No one indeed in all the world, except the Nazis and a few crazy militarists in other countries, now believes, as nearly everybody believed a quarter-of-a-century ago, that military power can make a nation happier or richer, that victory in war is the hall-mark of greatness and prestige. And this is the fundamental change which Time, and the League of Nations, have brought about.

## Sacrifices Are Well Worth While

This is the real reason why we can still hope—the real reason why the sacrifices of this war are well worth while. Don't misunderstand me; don't think I am saying the League was perfect. I know just as you do that we have got to make a new and better start. I am only saying that we failed because at decisive moments the governments allowed fear to dictate their policy, and so went wrong; because while they were trying to make a new world order they kept open their lines of retreat to the old world of power politics; because they let the so-called "experts" tell them that things were impossible, which in fact were well within their grasp.

absence of positive discrimination. It means also equal facilities for the acquisition of business premises and for advertisement: an equal policy in government's purchases of foreign machinery and products, and in concessions for the construction of public works: and probably also an international bank issuing an international currency. It may mean the rationing of such raw materials as are available for export among the nations desiring to purchase them: and the entertainment of suitable schemes of barter and of the exchange of goods and services.

## Commercial Equality

Commercial equality for the participant non-native peoples is just in itself, and is a means of attracting members to our association or federation of States, and of penalising acts which ought to involve exclusion from it. But "free trade" for the dependent territories must not form part of the programme. It is a grievous wrong to any people to deprive it of the prospect of industrialisation: for without industrialisation there is neither wealth nor power of self-defence.

The rule of law; a general treaty of armament reduction; collective resistance to the criminal who starts a war; joint economic action among nations to end the senseless waste and hunger which our present system now involves—these are the things which together will ensure a real and lasting peace. And experience has proved, not that they are impossible, but that they can all be done.

They can be done when this war is over, provided that one condition is fulfilled; and that condition is that Britain leads. Twenty years of harsh experience have taught us that no other nation in the world can do it, but that other nations follow when Britain leads. Our people want these things more than they ever wanted them before. We are fighting for what we call Democracy. Democracy means that the will of the people shall prevail. Next time neither fear nor vacillation, nor the advice of so-called "experts," nor the power of vested interests, nor the subterfuges of diplomacy, shall stop us. We must lead the peoples. And when we do, we shall find that from the Far North of Nansen's Norway to the remotest village in the Isles of Greece, there are in every country vast multitudes of simple men and women who are longing for a world in which they can be safe and happy, and who know, as you know, that such a world can be created if only statesmen have vision enough and faith enough to make it.

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Space does not permit of the full treatment of some important questions. The greater Powers must guarantee defence, and the territories must co-operate, with local forces, aerodromes and fortified harbours, to make defence possible. The participating States must guarantee development loans.

No colonies which are nearly ripe for self-government should be placed under international administration. Colonies which have a substantial European or Indian non-official population should not be included in the scheme.

I would begin with West and Central Africa from the southern border of Senegambia to the northern border of S.W. Africa. I would include India among the States and Dominions to be admitted as participants in the work of international administration: and all others who may be desirous of joining: unless, like Japan, with its mandated islands treated as national possessions, they are living in open defiance of the principles of the League: and unless, having colonies which might be pooled, they decline to pool any of them.

# NO LEAGUE FUNERAL

By MAURICE FANSHAW, Head of Intelligence Section of L.N.U. Headquarters

THERE has been no League funeral. Nor is one contemplated. To accept, in defiance of the facts, Herr Hitler's claim, in his Reichstag speech, that the League is "a dead thing," is mere defeatism. For the facts are very different. Like everyone else, when the war burst on the world, the League has had to go through a period of adjustment. Losses of personnel, budgetary losses, had to be faced. Russia's going will add to them substantially. But the period was short, and the League is now steadily carrying on most of its important activities.

## The League Expels Russia

At first it seemed as if the League would have no direct part in the War. The Emergency Committee (the Supervisory Committee with the Secretary General, the Director of the I.L.O., Dr. Colijn and M. Carton de Wiart) decided that it would be inadvisable—partly for the sake of certain neutral States with powerful neighbours, to hold a Council or Assembly, but to get on with all the technical activities which have a bearing on international problems, and which cannot be dispensed with. The Russian invasion of Finland on November 30 changed the situation. On December 2 Finland appealed to the League, which handled the dispute in four days. The Council passed the appeal to the specially summoned Assembly, which chose a Committee of 13 to deal with it. Russia was invited to take part, and on her refusal the Assembly reported on the facts and condemned Russia's aggression. The Council then declared Russia, under Article 16, was no longer a member of the League. The League thus passed a severe moral judgment on the aggressor and expelled him. At the same time League members were urged to give all the help they could to the Finns.

The same Assembly adopted the "Bruce" plan for expanding the social and economic work of the League, through a Committee on whom States not Members of the League could share in directing League policy. This was definitely a step towards making the technical work of the League more universal.

## I.L.O. and the Peace

Of the League's activities to-day, the work of the I.L.O. is most remarkable. Between thirty and forty Member States made a special point of urging the full use of the I.L.O. during the war and promising their full support. The I.L.O., too, has had its emergency committee of eight members. Its meetings were attended by members of many Governments and also workers' and employers' members, even from the belligerent States. This committee decided unanimously on a forward programme. The 1940 International Labour Conference is to take place, if possible. Particular emphasis is being laid on the function of the I.L.O. as a *service organisation*, to neutrals as well as countries involved in war. In November a second Labour Conference of American States was held at Havana, attended by representatives of Governments, employers and workers from seventeen States, including Canada, the U.S.A., Brazil and Chile, who have left the League, but support the I.L.O. The British Government sent an observer, Mr. Norman.

President Roosevelt sent an urgent message hoping that "there would be no relaxation in the work of the I.L.O. during the present crisis." The conference dealt with labour problems from the American angle, the work of women and children, social insurance and the organisation of official institutions handling immigration and settlement.

## Large Scale Health Plans

In spite of the war, the League's Health Organisation is working at full steam in many fields. Certain conferences on Nutrition and Rural Life have had to be postponed. But the League's expert investigation continues on nutrition, on radiotherapy of cancer, on the use of synthetic anti-malarial drugs, and so on. The Epidemiological Intelligence Service and the Singapore Bureau are as efficient as ever, and the war has heightened the value of their broadcasting system. The Committee has held a full session and is ready for any emergency arising from the war. It is in close touch with the Roumanian and Yugoslav Governments with a view to meeting the danger of epidemics caused by the influx of war refugees, especially typhus. The Director of the Health Organisation has toured the Balkans, where all the countries were in favour of concerted action, if needed, under the auspices of the Health Organisation. In spite of the European war, the League's assistance to China in the campaign against diseases caused by war is maintained.

## League and Drugs, Legacy of Last War

The League supervision of drug consumption has been working smoothly. The supervisory body has recently examined the estimates for 162 countries and territories out of a total of 177 in the whole world. After supplementary information has been given by one or two Governments, it will draw up at the close of the year the world's estimated requirements of habit-forming drugs for 1940. War may well increase the manufacture of drugs and the volume of exports, but this is simply another reason for maintaining national and international control unimpaired. It is no valid argument for scrapping existing drug control machinery. The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, has declared, "regard it as of the highest importance, not only to the U.S.A., but also to the whole world, that the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Board should be enabled to function adequately and effectively and without interruption, and that they should enjoy the co-operation of all nations."

There is plenty of evidence that League machinery is working to-day effectively in many directions, in spite of the war. And there is promise for the future in the fact that the range of problems in which the League of Nations, and the League of Nations alone, has had twenty years of continuous experience of trial and error is such a wide range. Many of these problems arose directly out of the last war, and will reappear when this one is over; and many are even wider problems which must be faced after the war and may then be nearer to radical solutions, for which the League has in many cases already provided the necessary staff work. "Political progress," said a wise Canadian, "comes not by destruction, but by the use and improvement of our instruments."