

"Britannia," November 19, 1915.

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Britannia

With which is incorporated
"THE SUFFRAGETTE"

Official Organ of the Women's Social
and Political Union

Edited by CHRISTABEL PANKHURST

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Review of the Week.

At All Costs We Must Defeat Germany in the Balkans!

Serbia's fight continues to be the wonder of the world! What morale these people show—what resolution, what a glorious refusal to be daunted by superior numbers! Nothing can defeat Serbia but the treachery of her friends, in other words failure to give or delay in giving the military and other support which we British are bound to give in honour and in self-protection.

Sir Edward Grey's opposition to sending help to Serbia is one of the amazements of the war and forces us to ask him this question:

"Is it then your policy to surrender the Balkans and Constantinople to Germany?"

For the Germans thus to get their way in the Balkans and Constantinople would mean that they would gain material resources enabling them to come back upon us and all Europe with new and terrific force! Therefore at all costs we must defeat them in the Balkans!

300,000 British Troops to the Balkans.

Three hundred thousand men must and can be sent by Great Britain to the Balkans. These men can be drawn from among the 1,000,000 men we have in France.

It cannot be said that we are short of the artillery required, for if that were true it would show a positively criminal lack of provision and preparation for the Balkan struggle which was bound to come as Sir Edward Grey and others obviously were aware. Why the Germans started the war by passing sentence of death upon Serbia and their ambition to possess the Balkans and beyond, and thus gain strength to subjugate Western Europe is notorious.

How Much Longer!

The Kaiser at Constantinople!
A nice result of fifteen months' sacrifice on the part of the nations allied in self-defence

against Germany and German world domination!

If it had been inevitable we should have been the last to publish any save words of encouragement. But it was not inevitable.

The German advance in the Balkans and their expected establishment, however brief, at Constantinople—all that means an advantage gratuitously bestowed upon the enemy as a result of British Foreign Office mismanagement of our affairs.

In view of the great moral and material success, that has been presented to the Germans, we should like to know how much longer the men of this country will tolerate the presence at our Foreign Office of the nephew of Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Naval Staff!

Now how much longer, we should also like to know, will they delay before insisting upon the resignation of Sir Edward Grey, who is responsible for having Admiral von Holtzendorff's nephew at the Foreign Office and is responsible also for the policy that has speeded the Germans on their way to Constantinople!

The position is serious, dangers and difficulties thicken about us. Everything depends on purging the Foreign Office of those who now control it.

He Who's Convinced Against His Will—

The fact that only after obstinate opposition to sending British help to Serbia—only in fact after General Joffre's visit, was the policy of helping Serbia adopted, means that the public must keep a watchful eye upon the way and the speed with which help to Serbia is being given. "He who's convinced against his will is of the same opinion still" they say, and how can we depend upon proper zeal being shown in carrying out the policy of helping Serbia by those who have opposed it?

In short Sir Edward Grey whose policy of leaving Serbia in the lurch has helped the Kaiser to Constantinople and brought the British Empire into terrible danger must go!

The Question of Greece.

One of Sir Edward Grey's excuses for his conduct with regard to Serbia has been that our sending troops to Salonica must depend upon the attitude of Greece. But everybody is now pointing out that Salonica is a free port, and that by landing troops there the Allies in no way infringe the neutrality of Greece. It is another proof of Sir Edward Grey's opposition to helping the Serbs that he should have used the argument in question.

Concerning the relations between Greece and the Entente the *Gaulois* says:

Nothing prevents us from speaking firmly and clearly. We are all the more authorised to do that as we have not violated the neutrality of Greek territory by disembarking at Salonica. We have not violated this, because on the one hand the port of Salonica is, according to the Treaty of Bucharest, considered as a free port, and because, on the other hand, one of the clauses of the Treaty which we signed with Greece in 1831 specifies expressly our right to send troops on to Greek territory in a case in which their independence should be menaced. Now what becomes of this independence on the day when the Sovereign, whose dynasty is of foreign origin and whose Kingdom was constituted more than half a century ago as an independent state under the guarantee of France, England and Russia, obeys the demand of the Central Empires and repudiates all its traditions and all its engagements.

The Power Behind!

We notice serious warnings addressed to the Prime Minister by the Press that Lord Haldane's return to the War Office or his appointment to any other Government office will not be tolerated. But let facts be faced! Lord Haldane is for practical purposes a member of the Government. In other words he exerts a strong and immediate influence

upon the Prime Minister and Sir Edward. And so long as they remain in office, Lord Haldane continues to be the power behind the War Council and behind the Government as a whole.

Lord Haldane and Sir Edward Grey!

Lord Haldane some months ago ceased to be a member of the Government. The reason of this has never been publicly explained, but the general impression is that persons possessing the requisite political influence made private protest sufficiently strong to prevent the continued presence in the Government of Lord Haldane, whom they regarded as disqualified for membership of a Government engaged in war against Germany. But in spite of this Lord Haldane continued to be a dominant power because of his influence with Sir Edward Grey, who chooses the present season to inform a startled and highly disapproving nation that Lord Haldane's policy is Sir Edward Grey's. We are also informed by Sir Edward Grey that at the time Lord Haldane disappeared from ostensible membership of the Government he himself wished to resign. Would to God he had! For this country and our Allies would not then have been faced by the peril and need of further great sacrifice that face them to-day.

That the "Diplomacy of the Allies" has in reality been the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey is proved by the statement of Lord Curzon that Sir Edward Grey has been "driving a team of four horses, the Allied Governments and their Armies."

"Wait and See" Won't Do in War Time!

The senior members of the War Council are the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour, and, if we are to accept the opinion of those claiming to be well-informed, for example, the opinion of Mr. A. G. Gardiner of the *Daily News*, both of them are the last men in the world to be members of a War Council and responsible for the bold and resolute action necessary to bring the Empire through its present peril.

Writing of Mr. Asquith, Mr. Gardiner, in his "Prophets, Priests and Kings," says, "If he is wanting in any essential of statesmanship, it is strong impulse to action." Mr. Gardiner further maintains that "Mr. Asquith is lacking in momentum and that his temperament is a little flaccid." And has not Mr. Asquith himself chosen as his device the uninspiring and in war time disastrous maxim, "Wait and See!"

If He Could Not Save a Party, How Can He Save an Empire!

As to Mr. Balfour, the same author writes as follows:—

Drift—that is the political philosophy of Mr. Balfour. . . . In all his career, Mr. Balfour has never lifted his hand or raised his voice on behalf of an oppressed people. . . . His aristocratic detachment from realities is at the root of all his mistakes. . . . He is a creature of negations and doubts. He breathes no moral oxygen into the air. The murmurs and agonies of men touch him to no passionate purpose.

And we have this further comment upon Balfourian methods:—"The country is not governed ultimately by intellectual gymnastics." It is also true that war is not waged nor victory achieved by intellectual gymnastics.

Perhaps a party political opponent's

judgment of Mr. Balfour's characteristics may be deemed too severe, so let us, looking for enlightenment to his political friends, remember that Mr. Balfour was some years ago deemed by the Unionists disqualified to lead them through party warfare to party victory. Do these same men now think that one who failed to lead and save a party is able to lead and save an Empire!

A crisis has been reached in which bold, resolute and prompt action is essential. We must have a War Council that can give us such action!

Where Are They Going to Meet?

At the moment of writing, we have no further information as to the personnel of the joint common War Council of the Allies, which, as Mr. Asquith some days ago announced, was to consist of British and French Ministers with the possible addition of Ministers representing the other Allied nations. Nor have we heard where it is proposed that this War Council shall meet. If it should meet in London, then a main reason for its coming into existence will be defeated, because it will be meeting in an artificially peaceful atmosphere which will inevitably falsify its decisions. Throughout the war, one enormous disadvantage has been the imperfect realisation of the war—one might almost say its non-realisation—on the part of members of the British Government. Protected by the Navy and far away from the firing line, they have not seen nor felt the war as it really is. It is essential, as we said some time ago, that the British members of the Allies' War Council shall be so situated geographically that they are forced to understand with their very soul, as well as their intelligence, that nothing stands between them and disaster but a wall made of the living bodies of heroes. We go further and we say that if French Ministers and representatives of the other Allied nations were to cross the Channel and come to London, instead of British representatives crossing the Channel and going to France, the French and other Ministers from abroad would themselves find that their comprehension of the war was becoming dulled, as the effect of what "we repeat" is London's artificially peaceful atmosphere.

A German Manœuvre.

The Germans and their friends and agents in this country have tried, and indeed are still trying to procure the abandonment of Serbia and the Balkans by representing that a German advance in that region is either of little importance or else cannot be prevented, and that the Allies ought to arrange to resist the Germans further East. Apart from the total impossibility of deserting Serbia, whose marvellous physical and moral fight is an inspiration to all loyal souls, a reproach to all who would desert her and above all a glorious vindication of her right to live free and independent—apart from all that, there is the further fact that the conquest of the Balkans by Germany would mean a stupendous German victory which must at all costs be prevented.

Why the Germans Hate Serbia.

It was not for nothing that Germany desired and planned the destruction of Serbia! Serbia is the greatest moral force in the Balkans, and the spiritual centre of gravity there—as the circumstances of this war prove. She is the stronghold of liberty and independence and anti-Prussianism. All this besides being a point of vast strategic importance.

Without destroying Serbia, the Germans cannot, they believe, subjugate the Balkans and the subjugation of the Balkans they deem necessary to their domination of the world.

Hence the German-prompted ultimatum to Serbia which precluded the war! Hence the present attack on Serbia. Hence the efforts made to procure Britain's betrayal of Serbia! Hence the efforts made even now to secure the abandonment of the painfully tardy British effort to save Serbia in favour of British military operations to be pursued later on somewhere else!

Optimism, Right and Wrong.

There is no limit to the optimism of a certain type of optimist who has all through the war been of the greatest service to the German cause by preventing a maximum British effort. Such optimists are as cheerful in face of the Germanic advance to Constantinople. As it is not they who have helped or are helping to get British troops to the Balkans in time and in force sufficient to save the situation, their optimism is not of a very serviceable kind. Optimism that neither recognises nor copes with unpleasant facts is a snare and a delusion. The only optimists deserving of the name are those who see the worst and do the best and utmost.

Serious Facts.

In order to obtain a sane appreciation of fact one may recommend consideration of the following passages by the correspondent of *Il Secolo*, M. Guelfo Civinini. Under the heading of "The Route of Constantinople," he describes the desolate condition of the invaded Serbian territory and the suffering of its population and continues:—

But descending the Danube, one sees a sight much more grave. It is the sight of columns of troops and convoys of supplies which pass quietly and without interruption along the Serbian bank of the river as though along their own soil.

It is the German march, by the Ancient Roman Road, which passing the Iron Gates, goes towards the Orient!

The Bulgarian-German junction becomes more consolidated every day and opens up more fully the way from Berlin to Constantinople.

In a few days, when the last mines have been cleared from the Danube, we shall see the passage of convoys laden with munitions, and with the munitions will pass cannon, guns and supplies and there will pass also submarines destined for the Black Sea and the Mediterranean—all in fact that is necessary to Constantinople, while up the river will pass other convoys laden with all Germany needs that Bulgaria and Turkey can give her, and above all the wheat of the Bulgarian fields and the copper of the mines of the Black Sea.

Germany's First Success.

And relentlessly does this plain statement go on:—

The blockade that the Entente had formed round the enemy is broken.

It is useless to conceal that which is!

For the moment Germany has won the game. The passage of the Iron Gates is her first and real victory for the realization of the Pan-Germanist programme: Berlin to Bagdad.

Never, says M. Civinini, had the Entente greater need of a resolve which shall be really a force.

Blows struck here and there in an isolated and inconsecutive way, coast bombardments that are useless—all that is no longer any good. What is needed is that forces shall be united in unified, rapid and violent action.

"The situation is grave," is the summing-up, "but it is not yet desperate." It depends upon the vigorous and immediate

military action of the Allies to prevent it becoming so.

Foreign Office Pledges.

Alas, it is impossible to deny the truth of the contention made by Lord Milner in the House of Lords the other day that Sir Edward Grey's amazing "interpretation," repudiation it may rather be called, of his pledge of September 28th. Lord Milner said:—

I always read the words [of Sir Edward Grey's pledge] in their plain and literal sense. But apparently we were all under a delusion. It appears now that those words mean something totally different and something which I venture to say no unsophisticated reader could possibly have read into them. I think that is a very unfortunate thing.

I believe that foreign nations will in future examine very minutely our declarations and especially our promises and pledges of help. They will not take them at their face value, but will look well round about and under them to see where the catch lies.

The Neutrals and Lord Haldane.

Sir Edward Grey's high-pitched tribute to Lord Haldane and the ostentatious way in which he identified himself with the Haldane point of view is exceedingly bad for our prestige abroad and is a blow to our reputation for determination in dealing with the German peril. For Lord Haldane is regarded in Europe as a pronounced pro-German, and the fact that this country is at war with Germany does not appear to have affected the light in which Lord Haldane, personally is regarded. The peoples of the continent, even those of the small neutral countries, are in certain respects more politically sophisticated than are the people of these islands, for the obvious reason that foreign politics in the past have affected them more directly owing to their possession of land frontiers instead of an entirely sea frontier. These peoples, then, have a very definite view of the part that Lord Haldane has played in European politics.

Such a statement as that of Sir Edward Grey's, indicating as it does that Lord Haldane is still active (even if unofficially so) in our national counsels is highly deplorable in its effect. In order to impress neutrals, not to speak of the enemy, we must be firm and strong. Now nobody in the world associates Lord Haldane with firmness and strength in dealing with Germany. Some time ago Lord Haldane disappeared from our Government. The moral effect of that was excellent. But although, alas, through his influence with Sir Edward Grey he did not cease to play a part, the leading part as is now obvious, in the conduct of our diplomacy and in connection with certain aspects of our warfare. Sir Edward Grey's words, which seem to be in the nature of a public reinstatement of Lord Haldane are a calamity and will have the worst effect on the opinion of neutrals.

IMPORTANT NOTICE.

The Albert Hall meeting, which should have taken place on Thursday, November 18th, has been cancelled by the council of the Royal Albert Hall.

This inspired attempt to deprive the nation of the right to protest against the Foreign Office betrayal of Serbia and to demand a more loyal and vigorous policy in the future will not succeed.

A meeting will be held. The time, place and date will be announced later.

Ticket holders are asked to retain their tickets for a few days until further arrangements have been made.

Admiral von Holtzendorff

who is

CHIEF OF THE GERMAN NAVAL WAR STAFF,

HAS A NEPHEW

in the

BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE!!

THIS NEPHEW IS SIR EYRE CROWE, AND HE IS SIR EDWARD GREY'S PRINCIPAL PERMANENT SERVANT!!

It is reported, and perhaps Sir Edward Grey can say whether it is true, that Sir Eyre Crowe's sister, formerly Miss Crowe and now Frau Siegel does the honours of Admiral von Holtzendorff's house!!

In view of the Holtzendorff family's representation in the BRITISH Foreign Office, is it any wonder that our Diplomacy in the Balkans has failed, and that as a result THE KAISER IS LIKELY SOON TO ENTER CONSTANTINOPLE; and is it right that our brave men should have agonised and perished at the Dardanelles while Sir Eyre Crowe, son of a German, husband of a German and nephew of the Chief of the German Naval Staff, is principal permanent servant at the British Foreign Office—with the deplorable result that the path of the Germans to Constantinople has been made clear?

SIR EDWARD GREY WHO HAS PERMITTED THIS SCANDAL TO EXIST MUST GO, TAKING HIS "GERMAN" WITH HIM.

For how can we win the war with Admiral von Holtzendorff's nephew at the British Foreign Office?

Britannia

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PRICE ONE PENNY WEEKLY.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1915.

SIR EDWARD GREY MUST GO!

The Kaiser's probable arrival at Constantinople forces the British public to take stock of the situation and to consider how that situation may be saved.

We say deliberately that it is Sir Edward Grey—aided and abetted by Lord Haldane and Sir Eyre Crowe—who has cleared the Kaiser's way to Constantinople.

That Sir Edward Grey is responsible for the Allies' diplomacy in the Balkans and for the calamitous result of that diplomacy is proved if only by the claim of his colleague, Lord Curzon, that Sir Edward Grey has been driving a team consisting of the diplomatists and armies of the Alliance!

The Kaiser at Constantinople!

A fine result indeed of fifteen months of Sir Edward Grey's Balkan diplomacy and of his hampering domination of the military and naval as well as the diplomatic operations of this country!

The betrayal of Serbia is the root cause of present difficulties. Yet Sir Edward Grey must have seen from the first that a prime and supreme object of German policy was and is to destroy Serbia, because Serbia is the gate that bars the Germans from destroying the British Empire and from establishing German domination of the world.

Therefore, to protect Serbia ought to have been Sir Edward Grey's first and constant thought from the very moment war began.

But far from that, Sir Edward Grey became rather the instrument of Bulgarian policy—Bulgaria being in reality only the glove covering the mailed fist of Germany.

Although, as he now confesses, he always knew Ferdinand of Bulgaria's sympathy for the Germans and although, for months and months past, he has had warning of Bulgaria's hostile attitude, Sir Edward Grey has screened Bulgaria and enabled the fruition of her pro-German and anti-Serbian military plans. This he did, for example, by securing the suppression of all revelations of Bulgarian policy and intention sent to the British Press; by preventing the Serbs from forestalling

Bulgaria's attack before the Bulgarian mobilisation was complete and by making to the British House of Commons, so lately as September 28th, a statement conveying the impression that Bulgaria did not intend to attack Serbia.

He even declined the offer made by Greece last April to fight on our side, although by declining this offer he did a hideous wrong to Serbia. He declined this Greek offer, made in April, although in that same month he had pressed upon him the knowledge that the Bulgarians were, as he expressed it, "negotiating with the Turks under German influence" and although as he further says, "the Serbs were much perturbed by the raids by Bulgarian bands on the railway near Strumitza at the beginning of April and by rumours of further impending raids at the end of that month."

Much later, when the Serbs asked the assent of Sir Edward Grey to their plan of forestalling the Bulgarian attack before Bulgarian mobilisation was complete, they were cruelly, and as the event has shown, falsely told by him that all the political and diplomatic reasons were against this course.

What the Serbs felt is described by Mr. Magrini of the "Secolo," who quotes a Serb as saying:—

What tragic hours we lived through when, after the Bulgarian mobilisation, we felt the knife approaching our throat. The Entente persevered in its illusions. We could have marched upon Bulgaria and prevented the mobilisation. We besought them to let us do it. **THE REPLY WAS THAT BULGARIA WAS NOT YET LOST AND THAT PERHAPS SHE WAS MOBILISING TO MARCH AGAINST THE TURKS!**

The supreme infamy has been Sir Edward Grey's opposition to sending British military help to Serbia. Nothing can explain away that ugly fact.

It is now well-known to the British public that M. Viviani, then the French Premier, hurried over to London to plead with Sir Edward Grey to allow British military help to be sent to Serbia.

Afterwards General Joffre was obliged to go to London also to plead Serbia's cause and to break down Sir Edward Grey's opposition to helping her.

So far had Sir Edward Grey succeeded in preventing British military help for Serbia, that Sir Edward Carson resigned from the Cabinet as a protest against the betrayal of our noble and heroic Ally and Lord Lansdowne's speech announcing this betrayal was made.

The more amazing does Sir Edward Grey's policy appear when we consider Serbia's over-

whelming importance as a pillar and protection of the British Empire. Even if common humanity and loyalty failed, British interests might have been expected to count for something with Sir Edward Grey.

What Serbia means to Britain and the British Empire is summed up in these words by an authority on the strategic aspect of the affair:—

Serbia separates Germany and Austria-Hungary from Bulgaria and Turkey. If Germany and Austria-Hungary succeed in creating an organic connection with Bulgaria—which can be done by merely seizing the North-East corner of Serbia—these two States can receive from Turkey all the food and raw material they require. **THE BRITISH BLOCKADE IS THEREFORE NULLIFIED TO THAT EXTENT.** On the other hand, Germany can strengthen the Turks immensely by sending them officers, guns and ammunition, money, etc. Possessed of these, the Turks become very formidable.

A great British disaster might occur on the Gallipoli peninsula and a vast German-Turkish expedition would move upon Egypt with some hope of success. England's position in India itself would be threatened by Serbia's defeat.

It follows that the integrity of Serbia is of VITAL interest to the Entente Powers, and especially to Great Britain. To save Serbia, she should receive, without delay, the largest number of troops possible. The larger the number of troops is and the more promptly they are sent, the less will be the danger from Greece.

The position is critical. If once the Germans have got through the North-East corner of Serbia into Bulgaria, they will fortify that precious connecting link and it may be impossible to drive them out again. The war may be decided in Serbia!

Sir Edward Grey's betrayal of Serbia has indeed had appalling results.

It has made of Serbia another and even more unhappy Belgium and has delivered up to massacre unarmed and helpless women children and old men.

It has brought within risk of annihilation the many times victorious Serbian Army.

It has threatened with utter destruction the Serbian national independence, dearer far than life to the Serbian people, whose history is one long fight for liberty, whose passion is liberty.

Sir Edward Grey's betrayal of Serbia has brought British liberty also within reach of destruction and the British Empire within reach of ruin and downfall.

Sir Edward Grey's betrayal of Serbia has threatened the life and liberty of our Allies and taken the Germans nearer to their object of enslaving the world.

The dangers that Sir Edward Grey has brought upon us it is now the task of Fleet and Army to avert, but essential to victory it is that Sir Edward Grey shall go.

CHRISTABEL PANKHURST.

ALL AT STAKE IN THE BALKANS.

Greece Influenced by Military and Naval Force Only. The Entente Must Reject German-Inspired Advice.

THE MILITARY SITUATION.

A Neutral Officer's Opinion.

"The neutral officer whose opinions we reproduced here last week makes further comment upon the situation as follows":

In view of the uncertain situation in Greece the British troops should rush to the Balkans in the largest possible numbers and in the shortest possible time. The Entente command of decisive Naval and Military force is the one argument required to prevent Greek neutrality from degenerating into hostility and to turn it into active Military support of the Allies. Apart from the important question of the number of British troops that have arrived and are to arrive in the Balkans, the Military situation of the Entente would have been far stronger than it is had Great Britain, during the past months, done what was necessary to help the Serbs (severely tried by their victorious battles against the Austrians and by the Typhus epidemic) to put their country into a state of defence.

Long ago the requirements of the present situation should have been foreseen and fulfilled. For example, the railway line from Salonica to Nish ought to have been doubled, a system of trenches should have been organised with barbed wire entanglements and artillery. The British ought also to have made a new railway connecting Montenegro and Serbia.

The incomprehensible neglect to make these preparations is costing and will cost the Entente dear. Great Britain has handicapped herself and the Entente in a manner astonishing to her friends throughout the world.

Unity of action and command is not less important in the Balkans than it is in the war theatre as a whole.

Had the Austro-German attack upon Serbia been foreseen by the British Government—it must, of course, have been foreseen, so it is more appropriate to say had the necessary preparations been made—a better co-ordinated plan of action could have been drawn up in a deliberate manner, King Peter of Serbia being appointed Generalissimo of the Entente forces in Serbia, and the Serbian General Staff being responsible for the control of the Allied operations, they alone having the knowledge of the terrain concerned and the methods of warfare most appropriate.

I would repeat what I have already said, that 300,000 men at least are needed to ensure the success of the Entente in the Balkans,

and that, given the presence of such a force, Greece and Roumania will fight on the side of the Entente, being, under such circumstances, unable to do otherwise.

For the British to refuse to take the Balkan situation sufficiently seriously will be fatal. I entirely dissent from the view which I see advanced in some quarters that the Austro-German advance to Constantinople is of secondary importance and of a more or less spectacular nature. Those who, in opposition to this view, maintain that the threatened advance of the Austro-Germans breaks the Entente blockade and menaces Egypt and India are undoubtedly right.

A matter deserving the serious consideration of the British Government and people is this—that they are not entitled to withhold any possible contribution to victory in the Balkans, and thereby to involve their Allies in a subsequent terrific struggle for the defence of Egypt and India, a struggle which much wiser diplomacy and adequate military action in the Balkans would have rendered, and can still render, unnecessary.

The Germans are likely to reach Constantinople, but it will then be for the Armies of the Entente to attack and destroy their communications.

German Trickery Exposed.

The following is taken from an editorial in the *Journal des Debats*:

The dissolution of the Greek Chamber has naturally excited uneasiness among the Allies. They know that the foreign situation is the sole cause of this sort of *coup d'etat*. They are then, within their rights in wondering if the future will expose them to a new surprise from the same quarter, and whether Greece after having transformed her alliance with Serbia and her arrangements with the Quadruple Entente into a benevolent neutrality will then adopt a neutrality pure and simple, whose consequences might lead to a conflict.

Nevertheless it is proper not to exaggerate the danger. Messieurs Zaimis and Skouloudis successively have given to the Allies most categorical assurances of benevolence as regards our expedition to Macedonia. Hitherto the facts have not been found in contradiction to their words. Nothing indicates that this attitude will change. Not all the adversaries of intervention are pro-Germans. Among them are to be counted a certain number of timid persons. Fear of the Allies, who are masters of the sea and have under

the guns of their Fleets almost all the important towns of the kingdom, may be as efficacious as fear of the Germans, whose Army is still distant.

Do not let us be worried. Let us act in Macedonia with the maximum of vigour and let us prepare ourselves for all eventualities. Let us remain friends with the men who say they are our friends, only let us prepare ourselves in the material sense to make those who should declare themselves our enemies pay dearly for their treachery.

It is through German channels, as always, that disturbing news reaches us. Our enemies had taken great pains to prevent us from intervening in Macedonia and unhappily they succeeded too long in befooling us. Now that Franco-British troops are in full action upon the two banks of the Vardar, they try to make us believe that our operations are doomed to a certain failure. They even have the goodness to indicate to us indirectly, a more favourable theatre of war in the Orient. They almost push us towards the coast of Asia Minor. One would say that they are marking out for us a share in the Turkish inheritance on condition that we will not hinder them any longer in the Balkans.

This plan has evidently something to do with the great projects of peace which the Austro-German agents are methodically suggesting in neutral countries. It is a plan which is certainly of Germanic inspiration. It would be a fine thing to make us desert the Serbs in order to go and take our chance in Asia. But the Allies are not fools enough to fall into that trap. For them the Serbian question is one with the European question. The triumph of Germany in the Balkans would mean her triumph in Europe. It would permit Wilhelm II. to assume elsewhere a cheap moderation.

Do not let us be turned away from the object that our vital interests and our honour assign to us. Let us send to the Balkans all the forces which are not indispensable to us on our main front.

Contrary to an opinion too widely spread in certain circles, these available forces are considerable. We must utilise them. It would be mad to keep indefinitely in reserve well-trained troops when the enemy, counting on the inviolability of his fronts in France and in Russia, DRIVES FORWARD TO THE CONQUEST OF THE ORIENT WHICH IS TO GIVE HIM THE DOMINATION OF THE WORLD.

SIR EDWARD GREY ANSWERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

R. McNEILL, M.P.

Speech delivered on 11th November, 1915.

I cannot believe that when the whole history of this transaction comes to light, if it ever does come to light, we shall be satisfied with the account of it which the right hon. gentleman [Sir Edward Grey] has given us to understand is really the whole truth in the matter. . . . What appears to me to be the central tragedy of all the tragedies of the war is the relation of this country to the small nations.

I agree that, so far as Belgium is concerned, it is no use now trying to apportion the blame. But I cannot help feeling that, with regard to Serbia, which is now undergoing a similar, or even greater, agony than has been inflicted upon Belgium, this country will ultimately be found to be not merely unfortunate but guilty.

The right hon. gentleman [Sir Edward Grey] has told us, with a certain amount of particularity, what happened at a number of quite recent dates. Ever since the beginning of the war the possibility that the Allies would have to send to Serbia and the Balkans must have been apparent to the Government. It is quite true that last year we were not in a military position to offer any assistance, but it does not at all follow to my mind that that inability had not disappeared at all events by the beginning of the present summer.

The right hon. gentleman knew perfectly well, as we all knew from the spring of this year, that this danger had to be looked forward to—that the Germans would break through and attack Serbia. As the Russian retreat proceeded, as the lack of munitions at Constantinople became more and more important, it became more obvious that the policy which Germany was likely to pursue, possibly as a policy of despair, possibly as a gamble if she were held elsewhere, was to make this very rush she is making now, in order to seize the economic resources of the Balkans and assist the Turks with ammunition and men. The right hon. gentleman asked me where he was to get the troops to send help. Obviously that is not for me to say. I do not know where the troops were. What we do know is that the troops in the Empire, instead of numbering a few hundred thousand, as at the beginning of the war, were at that time approaching millions. As a matter of fact, I believe that at that time, in the early summer of this year, troops were to be had in Egypt, in this country, and possibly in India.

I do not know, nor I expect does the Government know, where the troops of the Empire are quartered, but I am not at all certain that at that time it was as impossible as the right hon. gentleman would have us believe to, at all events, make preparations for this danger when it came. I should like to be informed upon one point, I myself do not believe that stock was ever taken even of the situation. The right hon. gentleman has never told us that in the spring or the early summer of this year the Cabinet considered what the situation would be if the Germans did take a new initiative in the Balkans. He has never told us that the military advisers of the Government were consulted as to where the troops were or were not to be procured. All that he says, in answer to what I think is a serious indictment of the Government throughout the whole spring and the early summer, is, "Where would you have got the troops?" I believe men could have been got.

We come now to the recent events of September. There, again, I cannot believe that we have had a complete account of the transactions in the series of questions, and in the short speech that the right hon. Gentleman has just made. The right hon. Gentleman referred to many other things—to the retirement from the Government of my right hon. and learned Friend (Sir E. Carson). We know from the letter that has been published that my right hon. Friend tendered his resignation to the Prime Minister on October 12.

In that letter my right hon. Friend—I am quoting from memory, but I believe correctly—said that he could not believe that without dishonour England could abandon Serbia to her fate. He then went on at considerable length to give his reasons for resignation—on the ground of expediency and possibility against that policy. He spoke as if at that time that was the accepted policy of the Government. Obviously that letter must have been written to the Prime Minister upon some decision which had been arrived at at that time by the Cabinet. That was on October 12.

We have never been told by the Prime Minister, or by the right hon. gentleman, that that letter to the Prime Minister received the reply: "Dear Mr. Attorney-General,—You are entirely mistaken in imagining that the Government ever came to any decision to abandon Serbia to her fate."

My right hon. Friend, who is perfectly capable of understanding the English language, could not have so mistaken the situation and been so utterly out of it as regards the policy which had been arrived at by his colleagues in the Cabinet. I suppose that letter of resignation was laid before the Cabinet. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Grey) shakes his head. I am not surprised at that, seeing that you can give away islands of the British Empire by merely consulting one or two departmental heads. We were told, in answer to a question, that the Departments concerned were consulted. I wonder what departments are concerned when you give away an island of the British Empire before lunch and in an emergency?

I take it from the right hon. Gentleman that my right hon. Friend's letter was not put before the Cabinet. At all events, it reached the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister accepted that statement, that at that time Serbia was to be abandoned to her fate.

It is for that reason, amongst others, that we really cannot accept what is put for now, that from the first there was no lack of foresight, or lack of grasp of the situation; that the danger was prepared against, that troops and transports were to be ready, and that from that day to this there has been no slackness, no want of foresight or endeavour on the part of the Government in sending all the assistance in their power to our Serbian Allies.

I cannot accept that as a true view of the situation, but, of course, at the time we have reached now it is impossible for us to go at any length into these transactions. I must warn the right hon. Gentleman, however, that this is a matter about which, I believe, the country outside is feeling more and more anxious and more and more indignant. I do think the right hon. Gentleman cannot expect that we should now finally leave consideration of this matter, and that the House will have to take a further opportunity of returning to it and giving it fuller consideration.

SIR EDWARD CARSON, M.P.

Speech delivered on 15th November, 1915.

SIR E. CARSON: The observation of the Foreign Secretary concerning my resignation is, in my opinion, inaccurate, misleading, and a great injustice to myself. In speaking of Serbia the Foreign Minister purported to tell the House accurately what had happened in relation to the promises that were made and the preparations that were made for assisting Serbia. Having given an account up to a certain point of those promises and preparations, and having led the House to believe—I am sure inadvertently—that it had been all along the intention of the Government to assist Serbia, he made this statement: "It was at that time—while that was taking place—that the right hon. gentleman the member for Dublin University left the Government, and no decision had been come to."

If I had done so I should have been acting, I think, in a way for which I could not defend myself. I should have had no right to leave the Government on the question set out in my letter of resignation if no decision had been come to.

But at the last War Committee that I attended in my opinion a most emphatic decision had been come to—a decision founded upon the advice of our Military advisers that it was too late to assist Serbia. I myself protested with all the warmth I could that, having regard to our pledges, if that was so Serbia ought to be told through her Minister in order that the little nation might take such steps as she thought necessary to preserve herself from absolute destruction. I LEFT THE CABINET BECAUSE THAT DECISION HAD BEEN COME TO.

What is more than that, if that is controverted as a fact, I say that I discussed the question with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and also with the Minister of Munitions, as being two of the Ministers on whose judgment I most relied in the Cabinet, and they certainly never dissented from that view. Each of them had sent in a memorandum on the subject, and if my statement is controverted I call upon the Government, in justice to me and the statement I now make, to produce the memoranda of those two gentlemen. But I say something more.

During the course of the week that followed I was asked by the Prime Minister to reconsider the question and not to announce any final decision until after some meetings, either of the Committee or of the Cabinet, had intervened, but it never was suggested to me in either of those letters, after I had sent in the letter which has been read in this House and published in the Press, that I was labouring under any delusion whatsoever. Therefore, although I am sure the Foreign Secretary makes his statement *bona fide*, I am obliged, according to my recollection, to give it the most absolute contradiction I can. The matter went on, and we know perfectly well that M. Millerand, the French War Secretary, came over here with a view to inducing the Government to change this policy. Eventually General Joffre himself came over, and it was only after that, nearly three weeks afterwards, that the policy announced by the Prime Minister in this House was come to, and what was too late three weeks before was in time three weeks after.

THE ARAB PEOPLES

FREE THEM FROM THE TURK

AVERT A PAN AND ISLAMIC REVOLT!

Weighty Advice by an Authority on Oriental Questions

The prospect that the Kaiser, if he enters Constantinople, will issue to Islam a resounding incitement to religious war against the Allies, gives a very great and very urgent importance to the following advice given by one of the chief European authorities on the question of the Orient.

The German Emperor is likely to enter Constantinople in a week from now, or at the latest, within three weeks. This will inevitably make a great impression upon all in the Turkish Empire and there is danger that they will rally to the German cause. Of those elements in the Turkish Empire, which resent Turkish rule, the Armenians and the Greeks have little power. The Arabs, however, are very numerous, and they hate the Turks and the Turkish domination.

When Turkey first entered the war, many of the Turks themselves were strongly opposed to this course. There is, however, no doubt that the military and diplomatic successes achieved by the Germans have made a strong impression and have increased pro-German sentiment.

We must expect the Kaiser, when he reaches Constantinople, to exploit the Sultan's position as Khalif and to announce that he and the Khalif intend to deliver the Moslems who are under the rule of the Entente Powers.

In order to prevent a Pan-Islamic rising in response to such an appeal, it is absolutely essential to detach the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire from the cause of the Kaiser and the Sultan. The cardinal fact in this connection is—

That the Sultan has usurped the Khalifate and is not legitimately the Khalif, in other words, the Khalifate of the Sultan is not a fact but a sham. Abdul Hamid, aware of this, was so anxious to keep it secret that he actually tried to exclude from the Turkish Empire the Arabic books of Moslem law.

No Kalif can be legitimate who does not comply with certain conditions. The Khalifate is not hereditary, but is elective, though when elected, a Khalif can appoint his successor by adoption.

No one is eligible for the Khalifate unless he belongs to the Clan of the Prophet. To this Clan the Sultan does not belong and for this reason he is not the true Khalif.

The Arabs are fully aware of the fact and resent it. The necessity of detaching the Arabs from the

Turkish cause is exceedingly urgent from a military point of view. The Turks proper number about six to eight millions, that is to say, they can put into the field about six to eight hundred thousand men. The Arabs of Turkey number, on the other hand, some ten millions, of whom it may be said, a million are available for military purposes and these million men would add in a formidable manner to the military strength of the Germans. Indeed, were they to be put at the service of the Germans, the menace to Egypt is too grave to be expressed in words.

In view of the probable entry of the Kaiser into Constantinople the present moment is very, very late for action, but it is not yet too late. The indisputable action consists, as will have been seen, in dividing Arab Islam from Turkish Islam. To do this is all the more easy because of the contempt felt by the Arabs with their literary, artistic, and scientific potentialities towards the Turks with their more barbarous language, their cruelty and their ineptitude for progress. The Arabs' detestation of Turkish rule is a circumstance of the greatest importance in this connection. And above all, Arabic Islam can be detached from the Turkish Islam because the Turks have usurped the Khalifate.

The action to be taken by the Allies generally, and by Great Britain in particular, therefore consists in this. They must offer to the Arabs deliverance from the Turkish yoke under which they have been for four hundred years. They must restore to the Arabs a Khalif duly elected and of the Arab race.

The Allies should occupy Mecca and then procure the election of a Khalif and make the necessary arrangements for the civil welfare and protection of the Arab people.

Such a policy as this, which will free the Arabs from the cruel and hated domination of the Turks and give them justice in the sphere of their religion will also go far towards averting the German menace to the British Empire.

Action on these lines will, where the Arabs are concerned, more than counteract the moral effect of the Kaiser's appearance in Constantinople and his expected dramatic appeal to Islam.

The British approach to Bagdad is an added reason for, and guarantee of, the efficacy of the action here advised.

If on the other hand, this action be not taken, then grave results must be anticipated.

AMERICAN PROTESTS Against the American Note to the Allies.

The American Note to Great Britain

It will be difficult for Americans to read with unconcern the Note to Great Britain on the blockade of Germany by the Allies. To send such a Note was to play with fire.

President Wilson certainly has no intention of provoking a rupture with the Allies. **But as the blockade is for them a matter of life or death they cannot possibly meet his wishes.** That being self-evident, what was the use of raising the issue? President Wilson has missed an excellent opportunity to continue to remain silent.

That the Note was uncalled for scarcely needs to be affirmed. **Far from having been injured by the war, the foreign trade of the United States has benefited from it to an astounding extent.** Even when full allowance is made for the higher prices to-day of most commodities exported from America to Europe, the exports since the war are vastly greater than the exports of the year preceding the war. On this point, therefore, the framers of the Note have not a leg to stand on.

That it is illogical is equally clear. The blockade is declared to be illegal because ineffective. Yet the Note attempts to justify the protest on the ground that the blockade is disastrously affecting American commerce. The fact is, the blockade is so effective that not a vessel, without the permission of the Allies, can reach a German port or a neutral port in touch with Germany. Even in the Baltic, German commerce with Scandinavia has so suffered from the activity of British and Russian submarines that German shipping has been ordered to remain in port. The world has never seen a blockade so effective as is the blockade of Germany.

That American Note.

But what Americans will most regret is that such an aggressive Note should have been sent ostensibly to protect rights that the Allies do not even threaten, while meagre academic representations have been made regarding the brutal sacrifice Germany of greater, far greater rights. If it be true, as it unquestionably is,

that neutrals have a perfect right to trade it is even truer that they have a right to live. Has that right been respected by Germany? Let President Wilson put that question to the spirits of the Americans murdered in cold blood by the Germans who, with callous contempt for international law or any law, torpedoed and sank the Lusitania and the Hesperian and the Arabic. That innocent blood still cries to heaven unavailingly for vengeance. **Besides such monstrous deeds of infamy what is a little "vexatious interference" with trade?**

"This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights," declare the framers of the Note, "the United States unhesitatingly assumes." Alas, no! The United States has not unhesitatingly assumed such a glorious task. It has so long hesitated that even now, more than sixteen months later, the civilised world is still waiting with aching heart for official America to utter a generous word of righteous protest against the most ignoble crime of history, the unprovoked attack on Belgium, the bestial slaughter of its peaceful population, and the wanton destruction of its fair cities.

Again beside such iniquity what is a little disturbance of commerce?

In a later issue the New York "Herald" said:

Is Not President Wilson Playing with Fire?

The more one studies President Wilson's Note to Great Britain protesting against the blockade of Germany, the more Americans must regret that it was ever written. The President is playing with fire in a powder-magazine. His captious attitude as regards the blockade, which has been forced on the Allies by Germany's amazing declaration that shipping, even neutral shipping, would be sunk if found within an arbitrarily limited zone, might, if the Allies were less cognisant of the real friendliness of the American people, alienate the sympathy of the Allied peoples from Americans. The Note is also a failure as a sop to the German Cerberus. **Although it was sent to propitiate the "German vote" in view of the next Presidential election, it**

has not satisfied either the Germans in America or the Germans in Germany.

It has satisfied nobody. The Allies think the Note goes too far. The Germans think it does not go far enough. President Wilson, in fact, has given a rebuff to America's friends without placating America's enemies.

We use the word enemy advisedly. To realise the furious anger which America's policy has aroused in Germany, one needs only to read the German Press, official, semi-official, or unofficial; the Governmental scribes of the *Kölnische Zeitung* or the rabid Reventlows of the *Deutsche Tages Zeitung*. Thanks to their anti-Americanism, Americans are now hated in Germany only a little less than the English are hated there.

Freedom to Murder Is German Freedom.

Austro-Germany's commentary on the American Note has not been long withheld. As always, it is written in letters of blood. An Austro-German submarine has torpedoed and sent to the bottom the Italian liner *Anconà* and some 300 civilian passengers. **And these are the savages for whom President Wilson demands the freedom of the seas!**

The only freedom they understand is the freedom of bloodthirsty pirates, the freedom to slay.

Among the murdered passengers are, it is said, several Americans. Surely this time, after the Lusitania, and the Hesperian, and the Arabic, drastic action will be taken by the United States Government, expostulation by Note having merely encouraged the savages to continue their bestial work of assassination.

In the meantime, President Wilson would do well to reconsider his Note to the Allies.

This latest crime against civilization, indeed against elemental humanity, proves up to the hilt that the Allies are right. How can they observe the niceties of legal technicalities in dealing with a blood-intoxicated enemy who tramples all law underfoot?

GLADSTONE IN PRAISE OF SOUTHERN SLAVS.

Gladstone contributed to the "Nineteenth Century" of May, 1877, an article on the Southern Slavs and more particularly Montenegro, Serbia's sister State, threatened as she is by destruction after centuries of struggling to be and remain free. We reproduce the following passages, in addition to those which appeared in our last issue.—

Montenegro fought with a valour that rivalled, if it did not surpass, that of Thermopylæ and Marathon; with numbers and resources far inferior, against a foe braver and far more terrible.

A long series of about twenty Prelates, like Moses, or Joshua, or Barak, or the son of Jesse, taught in the sanctuary, presided in the council, and fought in the front of the battle.

There were among them many, who were admirable statesmen. These were especially of the Niegush family, which came in the year 1687 to the permanent possession of power; a power so little begirt with the conveniences of life, and so well weighted with responsibility and care, that in the free air of these mountains it was never coveted and never abused.

The war had been a standing rather than an intermittent war; and each party to it was alternately aggressor and defender. The Turk sought to establish his supremacy by exacting the payment of the *haradsch*, the poll or military service tax, paid in kind, which sometimes, in the more open parts, as we may suppose, of the territory, he succeeded in obtaining. Once the collector complained that the measure used was too small. The taxpayer smashed his skull with it, and said: "That is Tsernagora measure." But the Montenegrins were aggressive as well as the Turks. Of the fair plains they had been compelled to deliver to the barbarians, they still held themselves the rightful owners; and, in carrying on against him a predatory warfare, they did no more than take back, as they deemed, a portion of their own. This predatory warfare, which had a far better justification than any of the Highland or Border raids that we have learned to judge so leniently, has been effectually checked by the efforts of the admirable Vladikas and Princes of the last hundred years.

From 1710 onwards, at intervals, the Sovereigns of Russia and of Austria have used the Montenegrins for their own convenience when at war with Turkey. During the war of the French Revolution the English did the like, and, by their co-operation and that of the inhabitants, effected the conquest of the *Bocche di Cattaro*. To Eng-

land they owe no gratitude; to Austria, on the whole, less than none, for, to satisfy her, the district she did not win was handed over to her with our concurrence. She has rigidly excluded the little State from access to the-sea, and has at times even prevented it from receiving any supplies of arms. Russia, however, from the time of Peter the Great, though using them for her own purposes, has not always forgotten their interests, and has commonly aided the Vladikas with a small annual subvention, raised, through the liberality of the Czar now reigning, to some £3,000 a year; the salary of one of our Railway Commissioners. Nor should it be forgotten that Louis Napoleon, seemingly under a generous impulse, took an interest in their fortunes, and made a further addition to the revenues of the Prince, which raised them in all to an amount such as would equip a well-to-do English country gentleman, provided that he did not bet, or aspire to a deer-forest, or purchase Sevres or even Chelsea porcelain.

The most romantic and stirring passages of other histories may be said to grow pale, if not by the side of the ordinary life of Tsernagora, at least when brought into comparison with that life at the critical emergencies, which were of very constant recurrence.

What was the numerical strength of the Bishop-led community, which held fast its oasis of Christianity and freedom amidst the dry and boundless desert of Ottoman domination?

The fullest details I have seen on this subject are those given by Frilley and Wlahoviti. The present form of the territory exhibits the figure which would be produced if two roughly drawn equilateral triangles, with their apices slightly truncated, had these apices brought together, so that the two principal masses should be severed by a narrow neck or waist of land. The extreme length of the Principality, from the border above Cattaro on the west to Mount Kom, the farthest point eastward of Berda, is about seventy miles; the greatest breadth from north to south is a good deal less; but the line at the narrow point from Spuz on the south to Niksich on the north, both of them on ground still Turkish, does not exceed twenty miles.

At these points the plain makes dangerous incursions into the group of mountains; and from them the Turk has been wont to operate. The population of his empire is forty millions; and I believe his claims for military service extend over the whole, except the five millions (in round numbers) of free people, who inhabit the Serbian and Roumanian principalities.

Let us now see what were the material means of resistance on the other side. About A.D. 1600 there are said to have been 3,500 houses and 8,000 fighting men in Montenegro. The military age is from twelve to fifty; and these numbers indicate a population not much, if at all, over 30,000. This population was liable to be thinned by renegadism and constant war; but since the early siftings, the operation of the baser cause appears to have been slight. On the other hand, freedom attracts the free; and tribes, or handfuls, of Turkish subjects near Montenegro have had a tendency to join it. About 1,800, the population had risen to 55,000. In 1825, to 75,000. In 1835, the official calendar of Cetinje placed it at 100,000, and in 1865 at 196,000.

This included the districts of Grabovo, Rudine, and Joupa, conquered under Prince Danilo. For the mere handful of mountaineers has been strong enough, on the whole, not only to hold, but to increase, its land. Yet, on the establishment of free Serbia, a tendency to emigrate from the sterile rocks into that well-conditioned country was naturally exhibited; and two battalions composed of the children of Montenegrins helped to make up that small portion of the army of General Tcherniaeff, on which alone, in the operations of the recent war, he could confidently rely.

While the gross population of Montenegro, in men, women, and children, was slowly growing through three centuries from some thirty to some fifty thousand, we must inquire with curiosity what amount of Turkish force has been deemed by the Porte equal to the enterprise of attacking the mountain.

And here, strange as it may seem, history proves it to have been the general rule not to attack Montenegro except with armies equalling or exceeding, sometimes doubling, or more, in numbers, all the men, women, and children that it contained. In 1712, under the Vladika Danilo, 50,000 men crossed the Zeta between Podoritza and Spuz. Some accounts raise this force beyond 100,000. Danilo assailed their camp before dawn on July 20 with an army, in three divisions, which could hardly have reached 12,000 men. With a loss of 318 men he slew, at the lowest estimate, 20,000. And in these alone, as far as I know, of all modern wars, it seems not uncommon to find the slain among the Turks exceeding the gross number of the highland heroes arrayed against them.

Great is the glory of the Swiss in the Burgundian wars for freedom; but can it be matched for a moment with the exploits of the Bishops of Montenegro and their martial flocks?

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