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FROM
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Reference only

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[Faint, illegible handwriting on lined paper]

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JOHN STUART MILL
to . . .
MARY CARPENTER
on . . .
WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE.

FROM
JESMOND HILL,
PANGBOURNE

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from "The Life and Work of Mary Carpenter."

Price, 1d. each; 2/- per 25; 3/10 per 50; and 7/- per 100.

Published by the London Society for Women's Suffrage,
58, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W.

Published by
The National Union of Women's
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14, Great Smith St.,
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15. The War and Women's Suffrage

JOHN STUART MILL
 TO
 MARY CARPENTER
 ON
 WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE.

*(Reprinted by kind permission of Messrs. MACMILLAN & Co.,
 from "The Life and Work of Mary Carpenter.")*

AVIGNON,
 December 29th, 1867

DEAR MADAM,

I have to thank you for your letter of August 11th, which a journey of some length on the Continent, and much occupation ever since, have prevented me from answering before now.

Published by
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 Parliament Chambers,
 14, Great Smith St.,
 Westminster, S.W.

If you think that to give your name in aid of the movement for the Political Enfranchisement of Women might be in any degree injurious to the work you have chosen, I cordially agree that those who are working in another department than your own for the public good, have no claim upon you.

Whether giving your name to our Society would have any such mischievous effect, you are far better qualified to judge than I am, and I will not therefore, venture an opinion.

I will content myself with thanking you for the pleasure with which I learn from your letter that you are with us in principle, and with expressing the hope that the time may not be very far distant when the progress of events and of public opinion may remove the obstacles which prevent you from joining us. There are, however, one or two points in your letter in which I cannot agree with you. To take the most important first—most important, because it is a point of moral

obligation. You say you do not desire a vote for yourself. I have too great a respect for you not to venture to say, that in my opinion this is a dereliction of the duty you owe to your fellow creatures. If your vote could affect only yourself, that is to say, if you only could be the sufferer, materially speaking, from allowing yourself to be governed by others, it would still be a question whether, unless those others govern you with perfect justice, you are morally entitled to forego the right and power which a vote would give you to force them to do justice, and thereby themselves become better moral creatures. But it is not the fact that the possession of a vote would enable you only to protect yourself. Every citizen possessed of a vote is possessed of a means of protecting those who cannot vote, such as infants, the sick, idiots, &c., as well as of a means of helping others who can vote to do good in every conceivable way in which just and provident legislation can affect human happiness. I am

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deeply persuaded that nothing but a most regrettable absence of thought on this subject can account for, or even partially excuse—for wholly excuse it cannot—the very common neglect of the power of voting which prevails among gentlemen and educated persons. I am certain that a time will come when it will be felt that a man, and I need not add a woman too, because any rational creature is committing a most gross dereliction of duty when he habitually neglects to make use of this power, conscientiously, and at any cost of labour to himself. He owes it as a return to the civilization to which he owes, not only all the security and peace, all the highest enjoyments of his life, but also the possibility of attaining refinement and moral elevation. He owes it therefore by the deepest debt that man can owe to his fellow creatures. Nor is it less imperative that he should pay it, because, if the duty of voting is not fulfilled from virtuous and public motives, the power of voting will be left to people who are

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induced to exercise it by the spur of selfish interest or ambition. Thus I can conceive no duty, not even the most primary duties of private and personal morality, that it is more absolutely essential to the happiness of mankind that every virtuous and rational citizen should fulfil steadily and carefully.

The right of voting is, in my opinion, not only a power to be coveted (although it is a legitimate power, which may be honestly coveted by an honourable ambition), but it is still more essentially an obligation to be dutifully fulfilled.

You will see from this that I cannot agree in the wish you express that the right should rather be "*given* to women by those who deprived her of it, than from her own *demand*." Because, even if any sentiment of generosity should make one feel that it is a more beautiful thing to receive a legitimate power unasked than asked, there can be no generosity and nothing noble or beautiful in waiting to have a duty thrust upon one, instead

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of asking to be allowed to take it upon oneself for the good of everybody concerned.

In regard to the third point on which you express yourself uncertain whether the time has yet come for agitation, there are several reasons which concur to make me think it has. In the first place, to agitate for the change in the law is not to obtain it; and therefore, even if any of us think that women are not yet prepared to exercise the suffrage, that will still not be a reason against agitating for it, because much smaller changes than this can never be obtained until after the agitation for them has lasted some time, and the agitation itself will be the most effectual means of preparing people for the change whenever it comes. The great change now taking place in the right of voting among men is, however, the main reason for bringing forward this question at this particular time. The subject of the right of voting is under discussion, and people's minds are comparatively open to receiving new ideas on the subject.

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If it is true that women ought to vote, it is wrong to lose the present opportunity of spreading the truth as far and wide as possible. By doing so we are only sowing seed to bear fruit in due time, suited to the soil and the climate. We do not dream of reaping the harvest directly.

I have troubled you, dear Madam, with a very long letter, but I agree too much with you not to wish to agree still further.

I am, dear Madam,

Very truly yours,

J. S. MILL.

Note from J. Estlin Carpenter's Life of Mary Carpenter.

"Mary Carpenter in her last years frequently expressed the belief that legislation would not be established on its true basis until women had the power of voting on the same terms as men; and only a short time before her death she made a brief speech at the Annual Meeting of the Bristol and West of England Society for the Promotion of Women's Suffrage, expressing hearty sympathy with its principles."

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FROM
JESMOND HILL,
PANGBOURNE.

No. 50

“HOMO SUM”

BEING A LETTER TO AN
ANTI-SUFFRAGIST FROM
AN ANTHROPOLOGIST.

By

JANE E. HARRISON, LL.D.

Published by
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14, Great Smith St.,
Westminster, S.W.

14. Votes for women
15. The War and Women's Suffrage

“HOMO SUM.”

Being a letter to an Anti-Suffragist from an Anthropologist.

DEAR ANTI-SUFFRAGIST,

Will it induce you to read this letter if I tell you at the outset that the possession of a vote would grievously embarrass me? Personally, I have no more interest in or aptitude for politics than I have for plumbing. But, embarrassing though I should find the possession of a vote, I strongly feel that it is a gift which ought to be given, a gift which I must nerve myself to receive. May I also add that, had your Society been founded some ten or twenty years ago, I might very possibly have joined it. I cannot do so now, because my point of view has changed. How this change came about, I should like to explain a little later. For the present, will you, by way of apology for this letter, accept the fact that there is between us the deep-down sympathy of a conviction once shared?

And further, by way of preface, may I say that I do not want to argue, probably because I find that in my own case disputation rarely, if ever, is an efficient instrument in my search after truth. What always interests and often helps me is to be told of any conviction seriously and strongly felt by another mind,

especially if I can at the same time learn in detail the avenues by which that conviction has been approached. This is why I venture on the egotism of recounting my own experiences.

In my own case, the avenues of approach to what I believe to be truth have been circuitous and through regions apparently remote and subjects irrelevant. I have been investigating lately the origins of religion among primitive peoples, and this has led me to observe the customs of South Sea Islanders and North American Indians. In order to understand these customs, I have been further driven to acquire the elements of psychology and sociology. Without intentionally thinking about the suffrage question at all, while my thoughts have been consciously engaged with these multifarious topics, dimly at first, and clearly of late, the conviction has grown up in my mind that I ought to be a Suffragist. I can with perfect candour say that for weeks and even months I have tried to shirk the formulation of my own views and the expression of them to you, partly because I feared their expression might cause either boredom or irritation, still more because I wanted to do other things. But the subject, fermenting in my mind, has left me no peace, and irresistibly I have felt compelled to embark on this letter.

Your position is, I think, what mine once was: that a woman is better without a vote. The possession and use of a vote—of political power—is somehow “unwomanly.” With this position in one sense I still heartily agree, but I must add a hasty and perhaps unexpected corollary.

Possession and use of a vote by a man is unmanly. This sounds absurd, because by “man” our language compels us to mean not only a male thing but a human being; whereas of the word “woman” we cannot at present make the correlative statement. In this undoubted linguistic fact lies hidden a long, sad story, the secret indeed of the whole controversy. For the present, may I summarise my position thus? I share with you the feeling that a vote is unwomanly. I add to it the feeling that it is unmanly. What I mean is that, to my mind, a vote has nothing whatever to do with either sex *qua* sex; it has everything to do with the humanity shared in common by two sexes.

May I illustrate this statement? We are apt to speak of certain virtues as “womanly,” certain others as “manly.” It is “womanly” to be meek, patient, tactful, modest. It is manly to be strong, brave, honourable. We make here, I think, an initial mistake, or at least, over-statement, apt to damage the morality of both man and woman. To be meek, patient, tactful, modest, honourable, brave, is not to be either manly or womanly; it is to be humane, to have social virtue. To be womanly is one thing and one only; it is to be sensitive to man, to be highly endowed with the sex instinct; to be manly is to be sensitive to woman. About this sex-endowment other and more complex sentiments may tend to group themselves; but, in the final resort, womanliness and manliness can have no other than this simple significance. When we exhort a woman to be “womanly,” we urge her to emphasise her relation to the other sex, to enhance her sensitiveness, already, perhaps, over keen, to focus her attention on an element

in life which nature has already made quite adequately prominent. We intend to urge her to be refined, we are in peril of inviting her to be coarse.

The moral and social danger of dividing the "humane" virtues into two groups, manly and womanly, is evident. Until quite recent years a boy was often brought up to feel that so long as he was strong, brave, and honourable, he might leave gentleness, patience, modesty to his sister. To her, so long as she was gentle, tactful, modest, much latitude was allowed in the matter of physical cowardice and petty moral shifts. Both were the losers by this artificial division of moral industry. The whole convention rested on a rather complex confusion of thought, which cannot here be completely unravelled. The virtues supposed to be womanly are in the main the virtues generated by subordinate social position. Such are gentleness and the inevitable "tact." They are the weapons of the weaker, physically or socially, of the man or the woman who dare not either strike out or speak out; they are virtues practised by the conquered, by the slave in rude societies, in politer states by the governess and the companion, but also by the private secretary and the tutor; they are virtues not specially characteristic of the average duchess. In a word they are the outcome not of sex but of status.

The attempt, then, to confine man or woman within the limits of sex, to judge of right or wrong for them by a sex standard, is, I think, dangerous and disastrous to the individual, dangerous and disastrous to the society of which he or she is a unit. This is felt and acknowledged about man. We do not incessantly say to a man, "Be male, your manhood is in danger." Such

counsel, we instinctively feel, would be, if not superfluous and impertinent, at least precarious. A man sanely and rightly refuses to have his activities secluded into the accident of sex. We have learnt the lesson—and to this language bears unconscious witness—that "man" connotes and comprises "humanity." Dare we say as much of "woman"? The whole Woman's Movement is, to my mind, just the learning of that lesson. It is not an attempt to arrogate man's prerogative of manhood; it is not even an attempt to assert and emphasize woman's privilege of womanhood; it is simply the demand that in the life of woman, as in the life of man, space and liberty shall be found for a thing bigger than either manhood or womanhood—for humanity. On the banners of every suffrage society, one motto, and one only, should be blazoned:—

Homo sum, humani nihil (ne suffragium quidem) a me alienum puto.*

In the early phases of the woman's movement this point was not, I think, to any of us quite clear. The beginnings of a movement are always dark and half unconscious, characterised rather by a blind unrest and sense of discomfort than by a clear vision of the means of relief. Woman had been told *ad nauseam* that she

* To anyone who has patience to read this letter to the end it will, I hope, be sufficiently clear that I wish to emphasise rather the importance of the general movement for woman's emancipation than the particular question of the vote. The words of Terence chosen for my motto mark my attitude: "I am a human being, nothing that is human do I account alien." But that there may be no ambiguity I have allowed myself the addition of a parenthesis "not even a vote"—*ne suffragium quidem*.

must be womanly, she was not unreasonably sick to death of it, stifled by unmitigated womanliness. By a not unnatural reaction, she sought relief in what seemed the easiest exit—in trying to be manly; she sought salvation in hard collars and billy-cock hats. Considering the extravagance and inconvenience of the feminine dress of the day, small blame to her if she did. I am ashamed to remember now that a certain superficial ugliness in the first beginnings of the movement blinded me for a time to its essential soundness. It was at this date that, had your Anti-Suffrage Society existed, I might have joined it.

The danger, never serious, of any tendency to "ape the man" is over and past. The most militant of Suffragists* never now aims at being masculine. Rather, by a swing of the pendulum we are back in an inverse form of the old initial error, the over-emphasis of sex. Woman, not man, now insists over-loudly on her own womanhood, and in this hubbub of man and woman the still small voice of humanity is apt to be unheard. This new emphasis of sex seems to me as ugly and perhaps coarser than the old error. Still, we are bound to remember that perfect sanity can never fairly be demanded from those in bondage or in pain.

The woman question seems, then, somehow to hinge on the balance between sex and humanity. Between the two there seems some sort of rivalry, some antinomy.

But is this possible? Is there really any conflict, any dissonance? And if so, how may we hope for its resolution?

* I cannot bring myself to use the ugly diminutive now current.

The real issue of a problem is always best seen when its factors are so far as possible simplified. We may therefore be pardoned if for a moment we go back to consider conditions of life less complex than our own. It was indeed in studying the psychology* of primitive man, in noting how primitive man faced the problems of sex and humanity, that what may possibly be in part a solution of the difficulty occurred to me.

That frail, complex, pathetic thing we call our humanity is built up, it would seem, out of some few primitive instincts which we share with other animals and with some plants. Sex† is one of these instincts, nutrition another, self-preservation a third. These three instincts all work together for the conservation of life in the individual. Each in itself gives satisfaction, and—a noticeable point—they do not normally clash. Each makes way for the other, no two acting simultaneously. Hunger appeased makes way for love, and love for hunger. Instincts on the whole tend to be *recurrent* rather than *concurrent*. If we had only these simple instincts to reckon with, if our humanity was based only on sex, self-preservation,

* I should like here to acknowledge my debt to Mr. W. McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology*, a book which should be in the hands of every student of social phenomena. My psychology is almost wholly based on the work of Mr. McDougall and Dr. William James. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to add that for my views on the woman's question neither of these writers is in any way responsible.

† For brevity's sake I use the word *sex* as equivalent to what psychologists term the "instinct of reproduction"; the equivalence is valid for all but the lowest forms of animal life.

nutrition, there would be, it seems, no "war in our members."

But to these simple impulses, these life-functions as it were, man has added another,—the gregarious, or, as sociologists pleasantly term it, the "herd" instinct.* Why men and some other animals herd together—whether for warmth, for food, for mutual protection, or from some obscurer sympathetic impulse—is not very clearly known. But once the "herd" impulse is established, the "simple life" is, it would seem, at an end. Up to this point though individuality was but little developed, the life-impulses of the unit were paramount; but, henceforth, the life-impulses of each unit are controlled by a power from without as well as by instincts from within—controlled by the life-impulses of other units, a power that acts contemporaneously with the inner instincts, and that is bound to control them, to inhibit for its own ends the individualistic impulses of hunger, of reproduction, even of self-preservation. With the "herd" instinct arises the conflict between *our* life-impulses and the life-impulses of others. Out of that conflict is developed our whole religion and morality, our sociology, our politics.

Between "herd" instinct and the individual impulses, all, happily, is not conflict. The "herd" helps the individual to hunt and to get food, above all helps the weaker individual to survive. But, on the whole, what we notice most is *inhibition*, what primitive man calls *tabu*. The history of civilisation is the history of a long conflict between herd-socialism and individualistic im-

* See Mr. Trotter's very suggestive papers on "Herd Instinct" in the *Sociological Review*, 1908.

pulse. What concerns us here is the effect of "herd" instinct on one, and only one, of these impulses, the sex instinct. Herd instinct tends to inhibit *all* individualistic impulse, but the conflict is, in the case of the impulse of sex, most marked, and, it would seem, most ineluctable. The herd aggregates, sex, more than any other instinct, segregates; the herd is social, sex anti-social. Some animals—*e.g.*, birds—are gregarious until breeding time, and then they separate. Had humanity had no sex, it would probably have been civilised ages ago, only there might have been no humanity to civilise.

At this point you will, I am sure, exclaim—I am almost tempted to exclaim myself—"This is impossible, outrageous." What about the primal sanctities of marriage? What about "the voice that breathed o'er Eden"? Are not man and wife the primitive unit of civilisation? From the primitive pair, you will urge, arises the family, from the family the tribe, from the tribe the state, from the state the nation, from the nation the federation, from the federation the brotherhood of all humanity. Alas, alas! To the roots of that fair Family Tree, whose leaves were for the healing of the nations, anthropology, sociology, and psychology have combined to lay the axe. Alas for Eden! Adam and Eve may have learnt there, though they appear to have forgotten, their Duty towards God, but of their Duty towards their Neighbour they necessarily knew less than a pack of hunting wolves. Society, in so far as it deals with sex, starts with the herd. Society is founded, not on the union of the sexes, but on what is a widely different thing, its *prohibition*, its limitation. The "herd" says to primitive man not "thou shalt marry," but, save

under the strictest limitations for the common good, "thou shalt *not* marry."*

Here, again, a glance at primitive conditions may serve to illustrate my point. Without entering on any vexed questions of origins, it is now accepted on all hands that in the social state known as *Exogamy* we find one of the earliest instances of marriage, or, rather, anti-marriage law, of inhibition of the sex-impulse by the herd. Savages over a large portion of the globe are still found who form themselves into groups with *totems*, sacred animals or plants whose name they bear. Within these *totem* groups they agree *not* to marry—the Buffalo man may *not* marry a Buffalo girl; he *may* marry an Antelope girl. All Antelope women are his potential wives. All Buffalo girls are "*tabu*," are his "sisters," or his "mothers." Sex, if it is not, as some sociologists think, the origin of the pugnacious instinct in man, is at least often closely neighbored by it. By the institution of exogamy, by the *tabu* on the women of a man's own group, peace is in this respect secured—secured, be it noted, not through sex union, but by its limitation, its prohibition.

All this, you will say, is curious and interesting; but really too primitive to be of any avail. We have shed these savage instincts. Pugnacity about sex is really out of date, as irrelevant to humanity as the horns that the buffalo exhibits in fighting for his mate. I am not so sure that pugnacity in relation to sex is really obsolete, since sex is still shadowed by its dark familiar,

* I use "marriage" throughout this paper to mean simply the union of man and woman irrespective of any forms or ceremonies that may attend it.

jealousy. But let that pass. The instinct of sex is anti-social, exclusive, not only owing to its pugnacity; it is, we have now to note, anti-social, exclusive, owing also to the intensity of its egotism.

Once more I would not be misunderstood. Egotism, the self-regarding sentiment, is, like pugnacity, an element that has worked and does work for civilisation. The self-regarding sentiment is indeed the very heart and kernel of our volition, and hence of our highest moral efforts. Moreover, all passion, all strong emotion, intellectual passion excepted, is in a sense exclusive and egotistic; but of all passions sex-emotion is nowadays perhaps the most exclusive, the most egotistic.

The reason of this is so far obscure that it must be considered a little in detail. As civilisation advances, the primal instincts, though they remain the bases of character and the motive power of action, are in their cruder form habitually satisfied, and therefore not immediately and obviously operative. Among the well-to-do classes, it is rare to find anyone who has felt the stimulus of acute hunger, and unless he go out into the wilds to seek it—thanks to generations of good government and efficient police—a man may pass his whole life without experiencing the emotion of fear. But, for the prompt and efficient satisfaction of the sex-impulse, society has made and can make no adequate provision. And this for a reason that demands special attention.

It is very important that we should keep hold of the initial fact that at the back of sex lies a blind instinct for the continuance of the race, an instinct shared with plants and animals. This instinct is so bound up with our life, with our keenest and most complex emotions,

that we are inclined to forget that there is an instinct at all, apt to forget not how *low* down but how *deep* down it lies. This instinct, it has been well observed, tends "in mankind to lend the immense energy of its impulse to sentiments and complex impulses into which it enters while its specific character remains submerged and unconscious."* This is not the case with hunger, nor yet, save to some slight degree, with fear. But, if it is important that we should not lose sight of the basal instinct, it is still more important that we clearly recognise the complexity of the emotional system into which that basal instinct enters, because therein lies the complexity of the problem of relating the individual to the herd. So long as the need is simple and instinctive, its inherent egotism is not seriously anti-social; but when the simple instinct of sex develops into the complex sentiment of love, the impulse and its attendant egotism is, if less violent, far more extensive and all-pervading, far more difficult to content and to balance. Desire is a ruthless tyrant, but simple-hearted; love the most exacting of taskmasters.

This egotism, this exclusiveness in sex-emotion, is most easily observed in its acuter phases, and in these analytic days is noted by patient as well as spectator. Take the letters of the newly-engaged. Old style (frankly self-centred and self-projective): "We feel that all the world is the richer for our new-found joy." New style (introspective, altruistic): "We shall try not to be more selfish than we can help." The practical

* See W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 82.

result is probably much the same; in the intensity of the new reinforcement of two lives united, all the outside world, once so interesting, becomes for a time a negligible fringe; but the advance in the new intellectual outlook is marked. Personality we now recognise is not a thing that you can tie up in separate parcels, labelling each parcel with the name of the person to whom it is addressed. Any new strong emotion dyes and alters the whole personality, so that it never is and never can be the same to anyone again. Analogy is usually misleading, but the closest and most instructive analogy to what happens is that of focus. You cannot have a strong emotional focus on two things at the same time. Of this natural and inevitable sex-egotism society is, of course, wisely tolerant. This man and woman will ultimately do society a supreme service, and for a time she accepts as inevitable that they should be, in common parlance, "no good." Society *en masse* has a good deal of common-sense, but in the more intimate clash of individual relations sentiment is apt to obscure clear vision, and the necessarily egotistic and exclusive character of a sex-emotion* is sometimes overlooked.

Sex, then, like other strong instincts, is anti-social and individualistic. In its primal form it induces, perhaps more than any other instinct, pugnacity; in its later and more diffused form, as the emotion of love, it is exclusive through its intensity of focus.

* I apologise to all psychologists, and especially to Mr. McDougall, for a somewhat loose use (unavoidable in a popular discussion) of the terms instinct, emotion, sentiment.

Now, this intensity of focus, this egotism, is often confused with altruism, and is labelled "Devotion to another." Society, it will be urged, may suffer from the exclusiveness of sex, but is it not ennobled by the spectacle of utter self-devotion, the devotion of the lover to his mistress, of the wife to her husband. A Frenchman long ago defined love—with a truth that is not at all necessarily cynical—as *Le grand égoïsme à deux*. No one who has gone through the experience of "falling in love" will deny that the definition is illuminating. One secret of the intense joy of loving and being loved is the immense reinforcement of one's own personality. Suddenly, to another you become what you have always been to yourself, the centre of the universe. You are more vividly conscious, more sure of yourself. Many motives move a man and a woman to marriage, but of these not the meanest is a healthy and hungry egotism.

But surely, it will be urged, self-devotion cannot be akin to egotism. The self is "lost in another." "Hence the purifying, elevating nature of the flame of love, which burns up all the dross of selfishness," etc., etc. But does it? Can any honest man or woman say that he or she, with single-hearted devotion, desires solely the good of the beloved one? A man desires his wife's happiness. That happiness comes to her through another, not through him. Is he utterly content? What he really desires is not solely her happiness but that her happiness should be in him.

Surely, though, there is such a thing as utter devotion, that asks no return. The spirit of "though he slay

me yet will I trust him," a spirit of self-abasement rather than self-enhancement. There is, and it is what modern psychology calls "negative self-feeling."* Its recognition throws a flood of light on the supposed ennobling devotion of sex, and especially, perhaps, of sex in woman.

Egotism or self-feeling takes, we are now taught, two forms, positive and negative; the instinct for self-assertion, the instinct, sometimes equally strong, for self-abasement. With the first form we are all familiar. The second form, which is quite as real, and perhaps more poignant, has been, till lately, somewhat neglected. This instinct of self-abasement, of negative self-feeling, appears in animals. A young dog will crawl on his belly, with his head sunk and his tail drooping, to approach a larger, older dog. The instinct is not fear; it does not accompany flight. The dog approaches, he even wants to attract attention, but it is by deprecation. It is the very ecstasy of humility.

This negative self-regarding sentiment, this instinct of subjection, enters into all intensely passionate relations. It is an ingredient alike of love and of religion, and accounts for many of the analogies between these two complex sentiments. There can, however, be little question that, though it is rarely, in moments of vehement emotion, wholly absent in either sex, it is more highly developed and more uniformly present in women. In the bed-rock of human—or, rather,

* Mr. McDougall (*Social Psychology*, p. 62) says that "negative and positive self-feelings" were "first adequately recognised" by M. Ribot (*Psychology of the Emotions*, p. 240).

animal—nature lies, I think, the sex-subjection of woman, not, be it clearly understood, because man is physically stronger, but because he is man and his form of sex self-feeling is dominant and positive; woman's is more usually submissive and negative.

A superficial thinker may imagine that here I give my case away. "Ah! now at last we have the truth. Man is born to command, woman to obey. Woman is by nature unfitted to rule, and hence to vote. Back to the hearth and home." Not at all. Woman *qua* woman, *qua* sex, is in subjection. What purpose that serves in the divine economy I do not know, but it seems to me a *fact*, one that I have neither the power nor the wish to alter, one also, I think, that has not been clearly enough recognised. But woman *qua* human being, and even *qua* weaker human being, is not in subjection. The argument from superior force is as obsolete as war-paint and woad. When a man first says to a woman, "I must insist that you . . ." he had better take care. He is in danger of toppling over from admiration or friendship into love. The woman, if she is attracted, yields, with a strange thrill. This is not because he is the stronger. The same evening her brother also "insists" that she shall not borrow his latch key. He also is stronger, but there is no corresponding thrill.

My point is, I hope, clear. If woman were woman only, "the sex," as she is sometimes called, she would wish, she would ask, for no vote, no share in dominion. A claim based on sex is, to my mind, doomed to failure, and this not because man is physically or even mentally stronger, but because *qua* man he is dominant, he has more *positive* self-feeling. The consciousness of this

haunts, I believe obscurely, the inward mind of many, both men and women, who object to "women's rights"; they shrink from formulating this consciousness, and confuse it with the argument from superior strength. It is better, I think, that, if true, it be plainly faced and stated. To my mind, one of the most difficult problems that men and women have to work out together is how to reconcile this subjection of sex with that equality and comradeship which is the true and only basis of even married friendship.

Our analysis of egotism into positive and negative has important bearings on the subject of "devotion" and its supposed "hallowing" influences. Sex-devotion is not altruism. This truth women, perhaps, more than men, need to lay to heart. I do not think women can fairly be blamed for their confusion of thought in this matter, because the sanctity of devotion has been so constantly impressed upon them. Their charity is always to begin, and often end, at home. What purpose in evolution this tendency to self-devotion in women serves, remains, as before said, obscure. It is the cause of intense rapture to women, and, so far, is a good. It occurs in strong natures as much, and perhaps more, than in weak. When unduly fostered, and when not balanced by sympathy and comradeship, and by a wide intellectual and social outlook, it acts in married life as an obscure canker, peculiarly irritating and poisonous, because masquerading as a virtue. The egotism of self-assertion atrophies life by over-focus, but the egotism of self-abasement adds to this morbid over-focus a slackening and enfeebling of the whole personality, which defeats its own end and repels where

it would attract. The important thing is to clear the air and see plainly that this sex-devotion, this egotism of self-abasement, is *not* altruism. It causes none of the healthy reactions of altruism, none of that bracing and expanding and uplifting of the spirit that mysteriously comes of "giving ourselves to something other and greater than ourselves."

But, it may again be urged, granted that sex leads to egotism, yet because it is intimately bound up with the parental instinct, it does *also* lead to altruism. Bound up with, associated—yes, but of its essence, no. People do not marry that they may indulge the altruism of bringing up their children. Races exist who are not even aware that marriage has any connection with the birth of children, and to whom therefore the prospect can lend no altruistic impulse. Parental, or, rather, maternal instinct is one, and perhaps the greatest source of "tender" altruistic emotion, of that disinterested love for and desire to protect the helpless which is the least egotistical and perhaps the loveliest of human sentiments. But the maternal instinct in the main is a thing healthy indeed and happy, but nowise specially holy. It is an extended egotism. Our *ego*, we are nowadays taught, is not limited by our own personality. It extends to wife and husband, to children and relations, to our clothes and possessions, to our clubs and associations. The extended *ego*, like the personal *ego*, is apt to be at war with herd-altruism. Love of my own children does not necessarily lead to love of yours. A woman will often shamelessly indulge about her children an egotism that she would blush to

exhibit for herself. Strange though it may seem, the most altruistic members of society, the best citizens, are not invariably those with the largest families. Here, again, we are bound to remember that a large tolerance should be extended by society to the egotism of parents. It is from parents that society draws the raw material of which society is made.

Before leaving the question of sex-egotism and sex-exclusiveness, may I guard against any possible exaggeration or misunderstanding? The instinct of sex, by its association with pugnacity, and by the intensity of its mutual egotism, is, we are obliged to admit, to an extent beyond that of the other instincts, exclusive and anti-social. Under the influence of sex and the intensified self-assertion it brings with it, a man will demand that society should be a sympathetic spectator; here comes in his *positive* self-feeling; he will be sensitive and alert to resent any shadow of criticism as to his choice, but share his emotion he cannot. Most highly civilised human beings have moments when, if they look facts in the face, they feel that under the influence of passion they fall, somehow, a little below themselves, just because of this intense egotism, this inexorable inability to share. The social conscience is sensitive nowadays. Our very religion has come to be not a matter of personal salvation, but rather the sense of sharing a life greater than our own and somehow common to us all.

And yet, all said and done, a man or woman is generally (not always) the better and the bigger for passing through the experience of *le grand egoïsme à deux*. Because of the

frailty of our mortal nature he can have this experience only towards one human being at a time, and that one must be of the opposite sex. But through that one,

" Earth's crammed full of Heaven
And every common bush ablaze with God."

To almost every mortal it is granted once in his life to go up into the Mount of Transfiguration. He comes down with his face shining, and of the things he saw on the Mount he may not speak. But through that revelation he is suddenly humbled before all the rest of the world whom he cannot thus utterly love.

To resume: Sex, we have found, is a splendid and vital instinct with a singular power of inter-penetrating and reinforcing other energies. But it is an instinct that has for its attendant characteristics, among primitive peoples, pugnacity, in later civilisation, intense egotism. Always and everywhere it tends to be exclusive and individualistic. This exclusiveness of sex seems permanently and inexorably imposed by ineluctable nature. Now, if the object of life were the reproduction, the handing on of life, we should say, and rightly say, to woman: "Be womanly: be wife and mother." And we should say to man: "Be manly: be husband and father." So best would our purpose be served. But the problem before us is more difficult, more complex. We want to live life, and human life, for woman as for man, is lived to the full only in and through the "herd," —is social. We want, in a word, for the sake of this fulness of life, to co-ordinate our individualistic instincts, of which sex seems to be the strongest and most exclusive, with our altruistic herd-instincts.

The old view, while we were yet untroubled by ethnology, sociology, and psychology, was that life is a sort of Sunday school, which we entered at birth to fit us for a future life. It had rules we were bound to obey, virtues and vices to be acquired and shunned, praise and, above all, blame, to be duly apportioned. Alas! for the Sunday school and its virtues; it has gone the way of the Garden of Eden. We may well nowadays sometimes sigh for their lost simplicity. The life we know now is more like a great maelstrom of forces out of which man, in tardy self-consciousness, just uprears his head. And the maelstrom is not only of mechanical forces, which he might compute and balance, and which by counterpoise negate each other, but of vital spiritual and mental forces, which *grow* by counterpoise and whose infinite intricacy baffles computation. Not the least difficult, and certainly among the most intricate and complex of the problems before us, is the due counterpoise of sex and humanity.

The problem is not likely to grow simpler. Sex shows no signs of a tendency to atrophy. In view of evolutionary laws, how should it? It is by and through sex that the fittest survive. On the whole, it is those least highly dowered with sex who remain unmarried and die out. It is true, however, that, though the sex-impulse does not atrophy, it becomes milder and less purely instinctive by being blended with other impulses. From a blind reproductive force it becomes a complex sentiment. Therein, in the diffusion and softening of the impulse lies the real hope, but therein lies the complexity of the problem. It is interesting, and may be, I think, instructive, to note a very early and widespread attempt at solution made,

and still being made, by primitive man—an attempt in some respects curiously analogous* to the efforts to-day of beings more highly civilised.

Over the greater part of the world, from the South Pacific Islands, through Australia, Melanesia, Polynesia, Africa and America, an institution has been observed common to nearly all savage tribes called the "Man's House." The savage, instead of living a simple domestic life with wife and child, lives a double life. He has a domestic home and a social home. In the domestic home are his wife and family; in the Man's House is passed all his social civilised life. To the Man's House he goes when he attains maturity. It is his public school, his university, his club, his public-house. Even after marriage, it is in the Man's House he mainly lives. For a woman to enter the Man's House is usually *tabu*; the penalty is often death. Oddest of all to our minds, the Man's House is not only his social home but also his church. A woman among savages must not go to the Man's Church. To join in the mysteries of the Man's Church, or even sometimes to behold them from a distance, is to a woman death. At the sound of the church-bell, the sacred Bull-roarer, woman must flee, or fall flat with her face to the ground. The home is to us the place of hospitality for strangers. Not so for primitive man. The entertainment of strangers, all contact with and

* I should like to state distinctly that the ethnological observations introduced from time to time are to be regarded not as arguments supporting my thesis but merely as illustrations. The desirability of the emancipation of women is no wise bound up with their acceptance, and should they be discredited to-morrow or otherwise interpreted, it would remain untouched. The study of primitive custom has, however, helped me to my present point of view, and may, I hope, help others.

news from the outside world, is reserved for the Man's House. There, too, he discusses the affairs of the tribe, there holds his parliament, in a word, a Man's House is "the House" and has all its "inviolable sanctity." From religion, from politics, from social life, from contact with the outside world, woman is rigidly secluded. She is segregated within her sex. She is invited to be "womanly."

From these undoubted and world-wide facts the learned German,* who has contributed so much to our knowledge of them, draws a conclusion singularly Germane. The province of woman, he urges, always has been, *always must be*, that of natural ties, of sex and of the blood relationships that spring from sex. Her emotional sphere is that of the family. Man, on the other hand, is by nature apt for society. He is naturally drawn to artificial associations made, not under the compulsion of sex, but by free choice, through sympathy, equality of age, similarity of temperament. Woman is the eternal guardian and champion of the union of the sexes. She sets her face always against comradeship, against the free association of equals, which leads to advanced social complexes, to clubs, brotherhoods, artificial societies of every sort. In fact, broadly speaking, woman is of the individualistic instincts; man is of the herd-sentiments. Ethnologically speaking, woman is of the family; man of the Man's House.

This *mutatis mutandis* is the position occupied by many at the present day. But, be it observed, this

* Heinrich Schurtz, *Altersklassen und Männerbünde*, 1902, and for English readers see Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, 1908.

position must not be based on arguments drawn from primitive sociology. Our learned German, had he read to the end of his own book, must have seen the refutation of his own theory. *The Institution of the Man's House almost invariably breaks down.* The doors, once so rigidly closed to all but the initiated man, open inch by inch. Gradually the Man's House alters in character, becomes more religious, the centre of a Secret Society to which woman begs or buys admission; it ends as a mere sanctuary or temple, or as a club-house whose *tabus* are less and less stringent, and whose last survivals are still precariously entrenched in the precincts of Pall Mall.

The institution of the Man's House was unquestionably an advance in civilisation; but what is good for a time is not therefore good for *all* time. The full reasons for its breakdown are too complex for discussion here, but one cause of inadequacy is clear. Good and useful though the Man's House was for man, it left out half of humanity, woman. It civilised man by releasing him from sex, or, rather, by balancing his sex instincts which gather round his home with his "herd" instincts, his comradeship which centred round the Man's House. But the solution was crude, and by segregation. Release was sought, as too often to-day, not by a wise ascetism, but by the banishment of temptation, by the seclusion of women within their sex. It is as noticeable to-day as then that the less self-restraint a man is prepared to exercise, the more rigorously will he insist that woman shall be secluded. It is only the man who has his passions well to heel who is prepared to grant liberty to woman. Man had, and, in part, still *has* yet to learn that one half of humanity cannot be fully humanised without the other.

We are now at the second chapter in the history of the relation of the sexes. Woman, as well as man, is asking to be civilised, woman, who bore man, and who will bear his children. In woman, too, is this tremendous sex-impulse, that may devastate, and that should fertilise. Is woman to live life to the full, or is her function only to hand on life? If she is to live it to the full, there is for her as for him only one solution. Sex must be not ignored or atrophied, still less must it, by a sort of mental jugglery, be at one and the same moment ignored and over-emphasised. Woman cannot be moralised through sex, because sex is a non-moral, that is a non-social instinct. But, for woman as for man, *non-moral* sex, the greatest of life forces, can be balanced, blended with other and humane sentiments. Man, because he is physically stronger, has got a little ahead in civilisation. Woman, not because he is stronger, but merely *qua* sex impulse, is at present subject to him. It is for him, surely, to hand on to her the gospel that has been his salvation, to teach her the words: "Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto."

If sex, then, is egotistic, exclusive, if it needs balance by a broader humanity, what are the chief non-egotistic humanising tendencies? What master passions can we oppose to the individualism, the exclusiveness, the pugnacity, the egotism of sex? The answer is clear. We have two great forces at our disposal, the desire for knowledge,* or, as psychologists call it, the "instinct of

* "The love of knowledge must be a disinterested love; and those who are fortunate enough to possess it, just in proportion to the strength and width of their love, enter into a great kingdom where the strain of disturbing passions grows quiet and even the persecuting whisper of egotism dies at last almost completely away."

PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY.

curiosity," and pure altruism, the desire to use our strength and our knowledge for the welfare of the herd, and specially its weaker members. Now, it is the emergence of these two desires which have marked the two stages of the Woman's Movement—I mean the demand for higher education, the demand for political freedom.

At this point I must make a somewhat shameful confession. For long, very long, I was half-hearted as to the Woman's Movement. I desired higher education, freedom to know, but not, as I explained before, the vote, not freedom to act and control. The reason was mainly pure selfishness, and—for this is always at the back of selfishness—a sluggish imagination. I myself intensely desired freedom to learn; I felt it to be the birthright of every human being. The thing was self-evident to me, I did not care to argue about it; it was a faith held with a passionate intensity beyond any reasoned conviction. Man had always most generously held out to me the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge; I not unnaturally placed him on a pedestal, and did homage to him as my Sacred Serpent.

But as to the vote, politics seemed to me, personally, heavy and sometimes rather dirty work, and I had always, on principle, preferred that a man-servant should bring in the coals. I am not ashamed of my lack of interest in politics. That deficiency still remains and must lie where it has always lain, on the knees of the gods. But that I failed to sympathise with a need I did not feel, of that I am truly ashamed. From that inertia and stupidity I was roused by the Militant Suffragists. I read of delicate and fastidious women who faced the intimate

disgusts of prison life because they and their sister-women wanted a vote. Something caught me in the throat. I felt *that they were feeling*, and then, because I felt, I began to understand.

To feel keenly is often, if not always, an amazing intellectual revelation. You have been wandering in that disused rabbit-warren of other people's opinions and prejudices which you call your mind, and suddenly you are out in the light. If this letter should meet the eye of any Militant Suffragist (pugnacity, may I say, is *not* my favourite virtue, though my sympathies are always apt to go more with the church militant than the church triumphant), I should like, though I do not fight in her camp, to thank her from my heart for doing me a signal service, for making me feel, and thereby teaching me to understand.

An eminent novelist has recently told us that women are to have higher education, but not political power, not the Parliamentary vote. Women are "unfit to govern." An eminent statesman has only yesterday told us that women may have university training, they may even look for that priceless boon, that crown of intellectual effort, the degree of Bachelor of Arts; they may have knowledge, and the label that guarantees them as knowing, but membership of the university, power to govern, power to shape the teachings by which they have profited, No.

Have Mrs. Humphry Ward and Lord Curzon, in their busy and beneficent lives, found time to read M. Henri Bergson's "L'Evolution Créatrice"? Long ago Socrates told us that we only know in order that we may act.

M. Bergson has shown us *how* this is, and *why*. Intellect, as contrasted with instinct, is the tool-maker, is essentially practical, always ultimately intent on action. To a few of us—and we are happy, if sometimes lonely—knowledge, which began with practical intent, becomes an end in itself, an object for rapturous contemplation. But to most human beings, and these are the best of our citizens, knowledge is the outcome of desire, and is always forging on towards action, action which necessarily takes shape as increased dominion over the world of nature and humanity. You can, it is true, shovel ready-made information into the human mind, without seriously affecting life and character. But the awakening of the *desire to know* is primarily nothing but the awakening of the *intention to act*, to act more efficiently and to shape the world more completely to our will.

Mrs. Humphry Ward and Lord Curzon are half-a-century too late. They may entrench themselves on their castle of sand, but the tide has turned, and the sea is upon them. When women first felt the insistent need to know, behind it, from the beginning, unconscious though they were, was for most of them the more imperative impulse to act.

Women *qua* women may remain, for the better continuance of life, subject to men; women as human beings demand to live as well as to continue life. To live effectively they must learn to know the world through and through, in order that, side by side with men, they may fashion life to their common good.

I am, dear Anti-Suffragist,
Sincerely yours,
AN ANTHROPOLOGIST.

FROM
JESMOND HILL,
PANGBOURNE

Physical Force *and* Democracy.

BY

A. MAUDE ROYDEN.



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
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“PHYSICAL FORCE.”

NOTHING is more delightful to a certain type of mind than the construction of a logical theory, the perfection of whose argument depends on a determined ignorance of facts. It is therefore not wonderful that such an argument as that commonly known as the “Physical Force Argument Against Woman Suffrage” should be put forward at regular intervals by those to whom “absolute maxims” are more congenial than hard facts. Such maxims have a very understandable fascination, and the business of laying them down will always be as delightful as it is unprofitable. Here is one, for example: “that every vote cast at an election represents the physical force of the man voting*—which is so neat and clean-cut, that it would be unanswerable if it had any connection with fact. Unfortunately, it seeks in vain for any contact with the solid ground, and its success among the doctrinaire opponents of Women's Suffrage is only equalled by the blank indifference to it shown by the more practical on either side. Nothing is more remarkable in the latest contributions to the “Physical Force” controversy than their complete disregard of facts. Loudly boasting

* This “maxim” is the first assumption made by Mr. MacCallum Scott, Sir Almroth Wright, and other supporters of the “Physical Force” argument.

that they alone are "practical," these logicians make one assumption after another from which the merest schoolboy knowledge of history should have saved them. On every page is "laid down" as "an absolute maxim of statesmanship,"* some new and astonishing principle with which facts have nothing at all to do. The first of these—and the fundamental one—has already been enunciated: it is that a vote represents physical force and a General Election is held to decide on which side the greater physical force is to be found.

Clearly this can only be even approximately true where the Government rests on Manhood Suffrage and every man has a vote to cast as the expression of his individual strength. But through hundreds and thousands of years of the world's history no such method of government existed. Even to-day it is exceptional; and nowhere is it old. Where it has been adopted, it has already, in several cases, been discarded, and some or all women are admitted to a share of political power.

Yet it is asserted with complacency by these "practical" politicians that only a Government based on manhood suffrage can hope to be stable†—nay, this is "laid down" as an absolute maxim of statesmanship.‡ In vain do we hungrily ask for facts—for proof; in vain do students of history point to the Republic of Venice as the stablest of all Governments, the admiration of the civilised world, existing for eleven

* "The Physical Force Argument Against Women's Suffrage," A. MacCallum Scott, p. 4.

† "The Physical Force Argument," Scott, p. 4.

‡ Ditto, p. 4.

hundred years, and for seven hundred of them practically without change, ruling for a considerable part of its history over a great Empire and never admitting to any share of political power, more than 1,400 out of its hundreds of thousands of citizens. Such facts as these (since after all they are *merely* facts) are ignored with a calm that is sublime, by the Anti-Suffrage logician engaged in the more august business of laying down absolute maxims of statesmanship.

But is it perhaps that he is thinking of Great Britain alone? That whereas in those inconsiderable places, Australia, America and New Zealand, women may vote without disaster, there remains some splendid virile force in the mother-country which makes her (male) citizens amenable to brute force alone? Not at all. It is indeed difficult to know of what country these Utopians are thinking; but it is certain that it is not Great Britain. Even the Anti-Suffrage intellect will hardly assert that a General Election *here* "declares which policy and which Government has, for the time being, the physical force of the nation behind it";* since in this country, such an Election is taken on a franchise which makes of equal weight the vote of the member for Romford, with 58,000 electors, and the vote of the member for Kilkenny, with 1,730; which excludes nearly all soldiers, sailors and navvies, but confers a special franchise on the clergymen and the University don; which gives several votes apiece to some individuals, and ignores altogether between three and four millions out of eleven or twelve millions of men; and which finally returns triumphantly to power a Government by a majority of 160,000.

* "Physical Force Argument," Scott, p. 10.

But we are mistaken. The intrepid intellect of one at least of the Anti-Suffrage stalwarts does not hesitate even before this obstacle. If men did not *know*, he solemnly assures us, that physical force was "clearly and unmistakeably"* behind the victorious party, they would not obey the laws it passed. Ah, but how do they know? How does anyone know? How is it possible (without the aid of absolute maxims) even for Mr. MacCallum Scott to know?

But there is better than this to follow. Not content with laying it down as an absolute maxim of statesmanship that the only stable form of Government† is one which is exceedingly modern, still very rare, and in our own country non-existent, the Anti-Suffragist hastens on to fresh and yet more astonishing assertions. "We have learned," he says, "that in the long run, the majority are certain to prevail."‡ Where has he "learned" this? Alas, he does not tell us! In that gracious fairy-land, no doubt, where every man is bursting with chivalrous protection, and every charwoman defends her interests with the weapon of a lovely and submissive charm, here it is that strange things happen and the majority always prevails. In the more dusty realms of mere historical fact, we "learn" how different a lesson! Our fore-fathers, we learn, inspired by patriotic feeling, defeated the Spanish Armada, despite the size and number of its ships, the weight of its guns, and the hosts of its men; despite the

* "Physical Force Argument," Scott, p. 10.

† This astonishing error, contradicted by all history, is proudly stated by Mr. Scott, in his preface, as being the "text" of the entire sermon.

‡ "Physical Force Argument," Scott, p. 1.

indignation of the King of Spain and the outcries of Mr. MacCallum Scott.† We learn that the little country of the Netherlands, inspired by religious feeling, held out against the might of Philip II., when master of the widest Empire, the greatest wealth and most powerful army of the time. How much had they been saved, had but a sage adviser then been by, to ask: "*Why endure all the pain and loss and sacrifice of such a struggle when the result is already a foregone conclusion?*"* All ignorant of absolute maxims and foregone conclusions, they fatuously persisted in the hopeless struggle, and—*horribile dictu!*—they won! So did the Greeks against all the odds at Salamis; so did the early Christian Church against the might of the Roman Empire. They had not "learned" that all good government rests on physical force, and the majority are certain to prevail.

Let us not fall into the opposite error, and with an equal disregard of facts, assume that physical force is not needed at all. No one can live or breathe, or work, without it. No one can govern without it. Neither can they govern without brains; neither can they govern well without morals. It took Joan of Arc some physical strength to mount her horse and grasp her sword; but it was not her physical strength that caused the English to offer a king's ransom for her person, and it was not her physical force which, added to the French army, converted it from a defeated to a conquering host. It took considerable physical force to do the work of Florence Nightingale, but it was not

† For outcries see "Physical Force Argument," Scott, pp. 1 to end.

* "Physical Force Argument," Scott, pp. 1 and 2.

because she was muscular that she saved the British army. It took some degree of physical strength to send Ex-President Roosevelt to Central Africa, and some to lift and point his gun; but it is not therefore by physical force that man holds dominion over the brute creation.

And so of the State. The State requires all kinds of strength for all kinds of work; the muscularly strong to fight and to keep order; the intellectually strong to direct and organise; the morally strong to rule. We do not demand the muscles of the navy in the Minister of War, nor the brain of the Prime Minister in a policeman. We cannot do without any of these forms of strength, or base our Government on the possession of one alone, as the one thing essential. If we must choose, most of us would choose, for governing, brains or morals before brawn. But it is idle to choose at all where all are necessary for different works. To fix one's eyes on the policeman and cry "here is the one essential thing," is at least as ridiculous as to fix one's eyes on the mother of children, and say, "it is here!" It is far more ridiculous. A State cannot exist well without order; but it cannot exist at all without motherhood.

A strange weapon indeed has recently been snatched up to meet the disagreeable fact that before 1867, there were not a million voters in the country, and consequently all the rest of the adult male citizens must be assumed to have had no physical force at all. This looks a little awkward for the upholders of Government by Physical Force. But (we are assured) it is Education which has made all the difference: Education which has made of Government a matter of brute strength. Singular! To most of us (looking at history) the

tendency seemed all the other way. Education has indeed taught us all our strength—and our weakness. "Education," it is said by a particularly naïve Anti-Suffragist, "Education is the *mortal enemy of despotism and autocracy.*"* Why yes, indeed. But the initial error was—to educate the women. Rightly did convinced Anti-Suffragists in their student days at Oxford, lead debates against the higher education of their fellow-students when female.† For "absolute maxims" have a disagreeable obstinacy in refusing to go "so far and no further." Education is as much a sworn foe to autocracy when applied to women as to men. One has indeed only to paraphrase what has been so well put in the latest tract for the times: "Even under autocratic government, we can trace the growth of education by the growth of the spirit of Democracy, and revolt against despotic government. In Great Britain,‡ the spread of education is accompanied by a vehement demand on the part of women§ for a share in the Government of their own country."

Alas! Had we never learnt to read, how much easier for the masculine mind had been the delightful task of laying down absolute maxims of statesmanship! But the education so lamentably mis-applied to women, has taught us that Governments can rarely impose their will by force. It has taught both men and women a deep reluctance to resort to force at all, knowing that its victories are dearly bought, often at the expense of

* "Physical Force Argument" Scott, p. 6.

† See e.g. fine record of Mr. Mackinder, now M.P. for Cam-lachie, in records of the Oxford Union.

‡ "India" in Mr. Scott's pamphlet, p. 7.

§ "Natives" in Mr. Scott's pamphlet, p. 7.

all that is best in a nation's life. We are not more but less eager than we used to be to force any man's conscience. We realise not only the cruelty but the futility of destroying by violence those whose opinions happen to differ from ours. Violence indeed may be met with violence, and "militant" tactics with force. But what army could compel the miners to work if they refused to, or crush the warfare waged by the constitutional suffragist? Are these not problems of government? And how shall physical force help in their solution? "This agitation for Women's Suffrage must be stopped!" cry some. Yes—and how?

The strike of 1911, we are told, drew aside the veil to reveal to us the physical force basis of law and order."* And the far more terrible strike of 1912? What has that revealed? The impotence of physical force; the power of reason and justice.

Problems may still arise, indeed, on which feeling runs so high, that civil war may result. In that there is nothing new. At all times, every man (*and every woman*) reserves to himself the sacred right of rebellion against intolerable wrong. Such revolt is never due to the assurance of success, but to the intolerable nature of the wrong. "The Scottish Covenanters were few in numbers, and naked, and defenceless. They knew how overwhelming was the force arrayed against them but they did not hesitate."† It was not—even in the opinion of the Anti-Suffragist—because they were in a majority that they resisted, but because they felt their wrong intolerable.

* "Physical Force Argument," Scott, p. 10.

† "Physical Force Argument," Scott, p. 5.

Such occasions will not be increased but lessened by Women's Suffrage. Every advance in the direction of freedom, every extension of justice to the unrepresented and unheard makes less the possibility of such intolerable wrongs. Every point of view will at least be heard, and every claim weighed. Here are the elements of good government. For the resort to physical force is always a confession of failure. Such failures will be fewer than before.

All extensions of the franchise to men have been claimed and granted on grounds like these. They needed the vote to protect their interests, and the State needed them for its own guidance. These two are really one, for it is assumed (and rightly) that it is well for the State and well for every class, that none should be subjected to injustice and none left without defence.

But this assumption involves another—that the well-being and contentment of its citizens is the object for which the State exists. This is a wider and a nobler ideal than the Anti-Suffragist admits. To him the State exists only to keep order, and the one essential person is the policeman. Hence the simple conclusion that only potential policemen should have votes. It is easy to argue triumphantly when one ignores all that conflicts with one's argument; but though easy, hardly worth while. The State is far more than a policeman, its duties more complex than his. And all who prefer historical facts to absolute maxims are aware that every extension of the franchise among men was claimed on precisely those grounds on which its extension to women is claimed to-day—that it will make for their well-being and the service of the State.

No one has ever suggested—either in 1832, 1867 or 1884—that any class should be enfranchised because of its physical strength. No one has ever attacked or defended a Plural Voting Bill on the ground that the plural voter was or was not muscular in proportion to his votes. In vain do we bend a listening ear from the Ladies' Gallery—in vain do we search the debates for this argument. Even the intrepid MacCallum Scott has not (unless the reporters have done him grievous wrong) ventured to adduce in the House of Commons an argument so exquisitely fatuous, except when arguing against women. Does he suppose we do not read history or Hansard? Or is it too much to ask that he will not reserve a special brand of argument for our consumption?

But after all, when we read the last pages of the latest tract upon Physical Force, it is to find that we are slaying the slain. Horrified at the absurdity of his own absolute maxims of statesmanship the author proceeds to demolish them, with terrific blows. "For heaven's sake," he seems to say, "let there be something in this pamphlet, with so much that is ingenious, something that is even true. And he begins:—"You cannot base a permanent policy on injustice!" "They are wrong who think that physical force can triumph without the aid of moral ideals, for *moral ideals are the most powerful of all motives of human action.*" "That faint, flickering spark" (of the ideal) "*is the most powerful thing in the world.*" "The name of a martyr for the right is *more terrible than an army with banners.*"*

* "Physical Force Argument," Scott, pp. 14 and 15.

Will it be believed that those sounding statements issue from the pages of an Anti-Suffrage tract to prove that government rests upon physical force? Or must we assume that it was written by mistake, published in error, and sent to every Member of Parliament by accident? For they afford the most crushing reply to all the absolute maxims that preceded them. They constitute an admission that the vote cannot longer be denied to those who possess, equally with men, that spiritual and moral force, which is justly described as "the most powerful thing in the world." For the vote is the democratic way of bringing that force to bear on the problems of government, and we are committed to democracy.

A. MAUDE ROYDEN.

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No. 56

"Gentles, let us rest"

Reprinted from "The Nation"

By

JOHN GALSWORTHY

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“GENTLES, LET US REST!”*

(A PAPER ON THE POSITION OF WOMEN,
REPRINTED FROM *The Nation*.)

A MAN asked to define the essential characteristics of a gentleman—using the term in its widest sense—would presumably reply: The will to put himself in the place of others; the horror of forcing others into positions from which he himself would recoil; the power to do what seems to him right without considering what others may say or think.

There is need just now of aid from these principles of gentility in a question of some importance—the future position of women.

The ground facts of difference between the sexes, no one is likely to deny:

Women are not, and in all probability never will be, physically, as strong as men.

Men are not, nor ever will be, mothers.

Women are not, and never should be, warriors.

To these ground facts of difference are commonly added in argument, many others of more debatable character. But it is beside the purpose of this paper to enquire whether women have as much political sense or aptitude as men, whether a woman has ever produced a masterpiece of music, whether the brain of a woman ever weighed as much as the brain of Cuvier or Turgenev.

This paper designs to set forth one cardinal and over-

* Adam Lindsay Gordon.

mastering consideration, in comparison with which all the other considerations affecting the question seem to this writer but as the little stars to the full moon.

In the lives of all nations there come moments when an idea, hitherto vaguely, almost unconsciously held, assumes sculptured shape, and is manifestly felt to be of vital significance to a large, important, and steadily increasing section of the community. At such moments a spectre has begun to haunt the national house—a ghost which cannot be laid till it has received quietus.

Such a ghost now infests our home.

The full emancipation of women is an idea long vaguely held, but only in the last half-century formulated and pressed forward with real force and conviction, not only by women but by men. Of this full emancipation of women, the political vote is assuredly not, as is rather commonly supposed in a land of party politics, the be-all and end-all; it is a symbol, whose practical importance—though considerable—is as nothing beside the fulfilment of the idea which it symbolises.

The Will to Power, and the Will to Love have been held up, in turn, as the animating principles of the Universe; but these are, rather, correlative half-truths, whose rivalry is surely stilled and reconciled in a yet higher principle, the Will to Harmony, to Balance, to Equity—a supreme adjustment, or harmonising power, present wherever a man turns; by which, in fact, he is conditioned, for he can no more conceive with his mental apparatus of a Universe without a Will to Equity holding it together, than he can conceive the opposite

of the axiom, "*Ex nihilo nihil fit.*" There is assuredly no thought so staggering as that, if a blade of grass or the energy contained within a single emotion were—not transmuted—but *withdrawn* from the Universe, that Universe would crumble in our imaginations to thin air.

Now social and political equity emanates slowly, with infinite labor, from our dim consciousness of this serene and overlording principle. There would seem, for example, no fundamental reason why limits should ever have been put to autocracy, the open ballot destroyed, slavery abolished, save that these things came to be regarded as inequitable. In all such cases, before reaching the point of action, the Society of the day puts forward practical reasons, being, so to speak, unaware of its own sense of divinity. But, underneath all the seeming matter-of-factness of political and social movements, the spirit of Equity is guiding those movements, subtly, unconsciously, a compelling hand quietly pushing humanity onward, ever unseen save in the rare minutes when the spirits of men glow and light up, and things are beheld for a moment as they are. The history of a nation's spiritual development is but the tale of its wistful groping towards the provision of a machinery of State, which shall, as nearly as may be, accord with the demand of this spirit of Equity. Society, worthy of the name, is ever secretly shaping around it a temple, within which all the natural weaknesses and limitations of the dwellers shall be, not exploited and emphasised, but to the utmost levelled away and minimised. It is ever secretly providing for itself a roof under which there shall be the fullest and fairest play for all human energies, however unequal.

The destinies of mankind are seen to be guided, very slowly, by something more coherent than political opportunity; shaped steadily in a given direction, towards the completion of that temple of justice. There is no other way of explaining the growth of man from the cave-dweller to his present case. And this slow spiritual shaping towards Equity proceeds in spite of the workings of the twin bodily agents, force and expediency. Social and political growth is, in fact, a process of evolution, controlled, directed, spiritualised by the supreme principle of Equity.

This is to state no crazy creed, that because equality is mathematically admirable, equality should at all times and in all places forthwith obtain. Equality, balance, is a dream, the greatest of all visions, the beloved star—ever to be worshipped, never quite reached. And the long road towards it travels the illimitable land of compromise. It would have been futile, as it was in fact impossible, to liberate slaves, when the consciousness of the injustice of slavery was present only in a few abnormal minds, and incommunicable by them to the mind of the surrounding society of the time. The process is slow and steady. Equity well knows that there is a time for Her, as for all other things. She is like the brain, saying to the limbs and senses: You are full of queer ways. It is for me to think out gradually the best rule of life, under which you must get on as you can, the Devil taking the hindmost; and from trying to devise this scheme of perfection I may not, nor ever shall, rest.

Social and political justice, then, advances by fits and starts, through ideas—children of the one great idea of Harmony—which are suggested now by one, now by

another, section or phase of national life. The business is like the construction and shaping of a work of art. For an artist is ever receiving vague impressions from people unconsciously observed, from feelings unconsciously experienced, till in good time he discovers that he has an idea. This idea is but a generalisation or harmonious conception derived subconsciously from these vague impressions. Being moved to embody that idea, he at once begins groping back to, and gathering in, those very types and experiences from which he derived this general notion, in order adequately to shape the vehicle—his picture, his poem, his novel—which shall carry his idea forth to the world.

So in social and political progress. The exigencies and inequalities of existing social life produce a crop of impressions on certain receptive minds, which suddenly burst into flower in the form of ideas. The minds in which these abstractions or ideas have flowered, seek then to burgeon them forth, and their method of doing so is to bring to public notice those exigencies and inequalities which were the original fuel of their ideas. In this way is the seed of an idea spread amongst a community. But wherever the seed of an idea falls, it has to struggle up through layers of prejudice, to overcome the rule of force and expediency; and if this idea, this generalisation from social exigencies or inequalities, be petty, retrograde, or distorted, it withers and dies during the struggle. If, on the other hand it be large, consonant with the future, and of true promise, it holds fast and spreads.

Now, one may very justly say that this is all a platitudinal explanation of the crude process of social

and political development, and that in taking a given idea such as the full emancipation of women, the fight only begins to rage round the question whether that idea *is in fact* holding fast and spreading, and, if holding fast and spreading, whether the community is, or is not yet, sufficiently permeated with the idea to be safely entrusted with its fulfilment. None the less must it be borne in mind, that if this idea can be proved to be holding fast and surely spreading, it must be an idea emanating from the root divinity in things, from the overmastering principle of Equity, and sure of ultimate fulfilment; and, the only question will then be, exactly how long the rule of expediency and force may advisably postpone its fulfilment.

Now, in order to discover whether the idea of the full emancipation of women is in accord with the great principle of Equity, it will be necessary, first to show the present inferiority of woman's political and social position; then, to consider the essential reason of that inferiority; and, thirdly, to see whether the facts and figures of the movement towards the removal of that inferiority, clearly prove that the idea has long been holding fast and spreading.

To show, however, that the present political and social position of women is not equal to that of men, it will certainly suffice to state two admitted facts: Women have not the political vote. Women, who can be divorced for one offence, must, before they obtain divorce, prove two kinds of offence against their husbands.

And to ascertain the essential reason of this present inferiority, we need hardly go beyond the ground facts of difference between men and women already mentioned:—

Women are not physically as strong as men.

Men are never mothers.

Women are not warriors.

From these ground facts readily admitted by all, the reason for the present inferiority of women's position emerges clear and unmistakable: *Women are weaker than men.* They are weaker because they are not so physically strong; they are weaker because they have to bear and to rear children; they are weaker because they are unarmed. There is no getting away from it, they are weaker; and one cannot doubt for a moment that their inferior position is due to this weakness. But—so runs an immemorial argument—however equal their opportunities might be, women will never be as strong as men! Why then, for sentimental reasons, disturb the present order of things, why equalise those opportunities? This is the plea which was used before married women were allowed separate property, before the decision in *Regina versus Jackson*, which forbade a husband to hold his wife prisoner. The argument, in fact, of expediency and force.

Now there are no finer statements of the case for the full emancipation of women than Mill's "Subjection of Women," and a pamphlet entitled: "Homo Sum; being a letter from an Anthropologist to an Anti-Suffragist." The reasonings in the former work are too well-known, but to the main thesis of "Homo Sum" allusion must here be made. The most common, perhaps most telling plea against raising the social and political status of women to a level with that of men, is this: Men and women *are* already equal, but in separate spheres of activity. The difference between their physical con-

formation and functions underlies everything in the lives of both. The province and supremacy of women are in the home; the province and supremacy of men in the State. Why seek to alter what Nature has ordained? A plea, in fact, which glorifies *sex quâ sex*.

But the writer of "Homo Sum" is at pains to show that "the splendid and vital instinct of sex" with all its "singular power of interpenetrating and reinforcing other energies" is in essence egotistic, exclusive, anti-social; and that besides and beyond being men and women, we are all human beings. "The whole woman's movement," the writer says, "is just the learning of that lesson. It is not an attempt to arrogate man's prerogative of manhood; it is not even an attempt to assert and emphasize woman's privilege of womanhood; it is simply the demand that in the life of woman, as in the life of man, space and liberty shall be found for a thing bigger than either manhood or womanhood—for humanity."

In fact the splendid instinct of sex—for all its universality, for all that through and by it life is perpetuated, for all its power of bringing delight, and of revealing the heights and depths of human emotion—is still essentially an agent of the rule of force. We cannot but perceive that there is in both men and women something more exalted and impersonal, akin to the supreme principle of Equity, to the divinity in things; and that this something keeps men and women together, as strongly, as inevitably, as sex keeps them apart. What is all the effort of civilisation but the gradual fortifying of that higher part of us, the exaltation of the principle of justice; the chaining of the principle of force? The

full emancipation of women would be one more step in the march of our civilisation; a sign that this nation was still serving humanity, still trying to be gentle and just. For if it has ceased to serve humanity, we must surely pray that the waters may rise over this island, and that she may go down all standing!

If, then, women's position is inferior to men's; if the essential reason of this inferiority is her weakness, or, in other words, the still unchecked dominance of force, to what extent do the facts and figures of the movement towards removing the inferiority of woman's position prove that the idea of the full emancipation of women is, not petty and false, withering and dying, but large and true, holding fast and spreading?

In 1866, a petition for the vote, signed by 1,499 women, was presented to Parliament by John Stuart Mill.

In 1873, petitions for the suffrage from 11,000 women were presented to Gladstone and Disraeli.

In 1896, an appeal was made to members of Parliament by 257,000 women of all classes and parties.

In 1897, 1,285 petitions in favour of a Women's Suffrage Bill were presented to Parliament, being 800 more petitions than those presented in favour of any other Bill.

In 1867, Mill's amendment to substitute "person" for "man" in the Representation of the People Act was rejected by a majority of 121.

In 1908, Stanger's Bill to enable women to vote on the same terms as men passed its second reading by a majority of 179.

In 1893, 1894, and 1895, the franchise was granted to

women in New Zealand, Colorado, South Australia, and Utah.

In 1900, 1902, 1903, 1905, 1908, and 1910, the franchise was granted to women in Western Australia, New South Wales, Tasmania, Finland, Norway, Victoria, and the State of Washington.

In 1902, a petition was signed by 750 women graduates.

In 1906, a petition was signed by 1,530 women graduates.

In 1910, the membership of the various Women's Suffrage Societies, and of bodies of men and women who have declared in favour of the idea of women's suffrage, is estimated by some at over half a million—a figure subject, no doubt, to great deduction; but certainly also to very great addition for sympathisers who belong to no such societies or bodies.

These, briefly, are the main facts and figures. From them but one conclusion can be drawn. The idea of the full emancipation of women having fulfilled the requirements of steady growth over a long space of years, and giving every promise of further steady growth, *is in accord with the principle of Equity*; intrinsically gentle, intrinsically just. How long will it remain possible in the service of expediency and force to refuse to this idea its complete fruition; how long will it be wise? For when the limit of wisdom is reached, expediency has obviously become inexpedient, and force unworthy.

When out of six hundred and seventy members of a House of Commons four hundred have given pledges to support women's suffrage; when a measure for the enfranchisement of women on the same terms as men has

passed its second reading by a majority of one hundred and seventy-nine, and in face of this declaration of sentiment Government has refused to afford facilities for carrying it into law, there must obviously be some definite hostile factor in the political equation. In a country governed as ours is, it is but natural that those who are, heart and soul, bound up with one party or the other, who are, so to speak, trustees for its policy, should not look with favour on any measure which may in their opinion definitely set back that policy, or affect it in some way which they cannot with sufficient clearness foresee. The cause of women, in fact, is a lost dog owned by neither party, distrusted by both. While there is yet danger of being bitten, each watches that dog carefully, holding out a more or less friendly hand. But when the door of the house is safely closed, she may howl her heart out in the cold. The Press, too, with few exceptions, is committed to one or other of these parties. To the Press, also, then, the cause of women is a homeless wanderer to whom it is proper to give casual alms, but who can hardly be brought in to the fire, lest she take up the room of the children of the house. And so out of the despair caused by this lost drifting in a vicious circle; out of a position created by party expediency, the inevitable has come to pass. Militant suffragism has arisen—ironically, and, to my thinking, regrettably, since the real spiritual significance and true national benefit of the full emancipation of women will lie in the *victory of justice over force*; and to employ force to achieve the victory of justice over force, is both strangely paradoxical, and so befogging to the whole matter that the essential issue of Equity is more

than ever hidden from the mind of the public. Militancy may have served certain purposes, but it has added one more element of fixity to an *impasse* already existing, for the woman of action is saying: "Until you give me the vote I shall act like this"; and the man of action is answering her: "So long as you act like that I shall not give you the vote. To yield to you would be to admit the efficacy of violence, and establish a bad precedent."

None the less, human nature being what it is, militancy was inevitable, and the wise will look at the situation, not as it was, or might be, *but as it is*. We must consider what effect that situation is having on the national character. Every little outrage committed on men by women, is met by a little outrage committed on women by men; and each time one of these mutual outrages takes place, tens of thousands of minds in this country are blunted in that most sensitive quality, gentleness. It is idle to pretend that women have not stood, and do not still stand, to men as the chief reason for being gentle; that men have not, and do not still stand to women, in the same capacity. By every little mutual outrage, then, the beneficence of sex is being weakened, its maleficence awakened, throughout the land. And the harm which is thus being done is so impalpable, so subtle, as to be beyond the power of most to notice at all, and surely beyond the power of statesmen to assess. That is the mischief. The scent is stealing away out of the flower of our urbanity. It will be long before the gardeners discover how odourless and arid that flower has become.

For it is not so much the action of the militant

women themselves, nor that of those who are suppressing them, which is doing this subtle harm. It is the effect of this scrimmage on the spectators; the coarsening, and hardening, and general embitterment; the secret glorification of the worst side of the sex instinct; the constant exaltation of the rule of force; the rapid growth of a rankling sense of injustice amongst tens of thousands of women. To say that hundreds of thousands of women are opposed, or indifferent, to the full emancipation of their sex, is not, in truth, to say very much. No civilising movement was ever brought to fruition save in the face of the indifference or opposition of the majority. What proportion of agricultural labourers were actively concerned to win for themselves the vote? How small a fraction of the people actively demanded free education! But when these privileges were won, what number of those for whom they were won would have been willing to resign them? If women were fully emancipated to-morrow, many would certainly resent what they would deem a blow at the influence and power already wielded by them in virtue of their sex. But in two years' time how many would be willing to surrender their freedom? As certainly, not ten in a hundred! To compare the disapproval of women raised against their wills to a state of emancipation in which they can remain inactive if they like, with the bitter resentment spreading like slow poison in the veins of those who fruitlessly demand emancipation, is to compare the energy of vanishing winter snow with that of the spring sun which melts it.

In an age when spirituality has ever a more desperate struggle to maintain hold at all against the inroads of

materialism, any increase of bitterness in the national life, any loss of gentleness, aspiration, and mutual trust between the sexes, however silent, secret, and unmeasurable, is a very serious thing. Justice, neglected, works her own insidious revenge. Every month, every year, the germs of bitterness and brutality will be spreading. If any think that this people has gentleness to spare, and can afford to tamper with the health of its spirit, they are mistaken. If any think that repression can put an end to this aspiration—again they are mistaken. The idea of the full emancipation of women is so rooted that nothing can now uproot it.

But apart from the political *impasse*, there are those, who, satisfied that women have not the political aptitude of men, are chiefly opposed to the granting of the vote for fear that it will come to mean the return of women to Parliament. Now, if their conviction regarding the inferiority of women's political capacity be sound—as I for one, speaking generally, am inclined to believe—there is no danger of women being returned to Parliament save in such small numbers as to make no matter. If it be unsound—if the political capacity of woman be equal to man's—it is time Parliament were reinforced by women's presence. New waters soon find their level. Nor are such as distrust the political capacities of women qualified to prophesy a flood. To debar women for fear of their competition is a policy of little spirit, and not one that the men of this country will consciously adopt, unless we have indeed lost the fire of our fathers. There are many, too, who believe that the granting of the vote to women will increase the emotional element in an electorate whose emotional side they already distrust,

and thereby endanger our relations with foreign Powers. But it has yet to be proved that women are, in a wide sense of the word, more emotional than men; and even conceding that they are, it must not be forgotten that they will bring to the consideration of international matters the solid reinforcement of two qualities—the first, a practical domestic sense lacking to men, and likely to foster national reluctance to plunge into war; the second, a greater faculty for self-sacrifice, tending to fortify national determination to persist in a war once undertaken. It is well known that during the American Civil War the women of the Southern States displayed a spirit of resistance even more heroic than that of their men folk. But in any case, to retain women in their present state of social and political inferiority for reasons which are so debatable, savours, surely, somewhat of the sultanic. We have, in fact, yet to imbibe the spirit of Mill's wisest saying:—"Amongst all the lessons which men require for carrying on the struggle against the evident imperfections of their lot on earth, there is no lesson which they more need than not to add to the evils which Nature inflicts, by their jealous and prejudiced restrictions on one another."

In fine, out of the practical perplexities brooding over this whole matter there is no way save by resort to the first principles of gentility. If it be established—as it has been, and uncontrovertibly—that there are in this country a great and ever increasing body of women suffering from a bitter sense of injustice, what course compatible with true gentility, is left open to us men? Our whole social life is in essence but a long slow striving for the victory of justice over force; and this

demand of our women for full emancipation is but a sign of that striving. Are we not bound in honour to admit this simple fact? Shall we not at last give fulfilment to this idea—with the due caution that should mark all political experiment? Has not, in truth, the time come for us to say: From this resistance to the claims of Equity; from this bitter and ungracious conflict with those weaker than ourselves; from this slow poisoning of the well-springs of our national courtesy, and kindness, and sense of fair play: "Gentles, let us rest!"

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No. 58

The Belief in Innate Rights

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By

H. FRANCES PETERSEN

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THE BELIEF IN INNATE RIGHTS.

“THE belief in innate rights,” says Professor Dicey, in an article against Women’s Suffrage, which appeared in the *Quarterly* for January, 1909, “was expelled from England by the passionate and irresistible reasoning of Burke and the cool and deadly analysis of Bentham.”

Had Professor Dicey written, “was expelled from the mind of the jurist,” in the place of “was expelled from England,” the proposition would have called for no remark. But the Professor wrote ‘England,’ and it behoves every lover of justice to protest against such a statement.

In *Law and Opinion* Professor Dicey has traced with unerring hand the steady growth of socialist ideas in recent years. With this new mental atmosphere has arisen a school of thought which, although it assumes, with Professor Dicey and John Stuart Mill, that utility is the ethical criterion and human welfare the ethical aim, deduces from these assumptions a line of argument as regards ‘rights’ altogether different from Professor Dicey’s.

“The claims to Parliamentary votes as a matter of abstract rights,” says Professor Dicey, a little further on in the same article, “is part of an obsolete creed.” It would be interesting to know on what other philosophical ground any one could claim a vote since legal philosophers could not be so illogical as to contend that anything may

be 'right' in theory and not in practice, or *vice versâ*. But, suppressing such curiosity, there are many persons in England to-day ready to defend the belief that political loyalty to the supremacy of 'Abstract Right,' so far from being obsolete, remains the only possible guide and curb to the inevitable and fast approaching reign of a complete democracy. The political belief in 'Abstract Right' constitutes the only court of appeal there is against democratic oppression and injustice.

Professor Dicey's words carry weight, since he is acknowledged to be one of the most eminent of living jurists, and the serious nature of his contention that the political belief in 'innate rights' and 'abstract right' is obsolete furnishes the excuse for the following essay, which is nothing but a recapitulation of self-evident truths, truths which refute the foregoing quotations from the *Quarterly*.

The modern theory of 'rights,' postulates utilitarian principles and may be summarised somewhat as follows:—

Bentham describes the word 'rights,' as the most ambiguous in the English language. But a careful analysis of the adjective 'right,' the abstract noun 'right,' and the term 'a right,' dispels its ambiguity and places Bentham's immortal legal-philosophy on a sounder basis than the weak and careless framework on which he raised it himself. Following the maxim that we must seek the meaning of the universal in the particular, we must begin by considering the word 'right' in its adjectival and adverbial form.

Derived from the Latin *rectus*, straight, the word 'right,' from constant metaphorical use, gradually acquired

many significations, such as goodness, correctness, truth, etc.

An action was 'right' if it was thought good. A method was 'right' if it was successful in achieving the desired end. The solution of a problem was 'right' if it proved correct. A proposition was 'right' if it was true. But since far the most frequent use of the word 'right' was for judging the moral value of men's actions, and since some system of morality is the *sine quâ non* of society, the adjective 'right' has, of necessity, come to have chiefly a moral significance. It usually means good.

Little by little, through much tribulation and despair, men have noted that which makes for their good and they have called it 'right,' and that which injures them and they have called it 'wrong.' Broadly speaking, therefore, the adjective 'right' signifies the attribute of being for the benefit of humanity, and the adjective 'wrong' the reverse. If this definition be correct, 'right' and 'wrong' are no mere juggle of words, as in pessimistic mood we are inclined to believe. No matter how often, in ignorance and prejudice men have misapplied the terms, there remain a positive and actual 'right' and a positive 'wrong,' just as, in the same way, no matter how often a child makes a mistake in an addition sum and insists that two and two make five, it in no way alters the fact that two and two make four. The word 'right' postulates as immutable relations between men as the word 'mathematics' postulates between quantities and between magnitudes.

The adjective 'right' in its usual, *i.e.*, its moral sense,

signifies the attribute peculiar to those relations between men which further the welfare of humanity. Thus, 'honesty,' is a relation of men to each other which furthers human welfare, hence 'honesty' is 'right.' Again, 'justice' is a relation between men acknowledged by all to be essential to society, hence 'justice' is 'right.' There is no action which can be described as 'right' which does not, on examination, prove to be 'right' only because it is a relation of men which benefits humanity. The difficulty, as everyone knows, does not consist in defining the meaning of 'right,' as to which most of us are agreed, but in pronouncing which relations of men are 'right,' and which 'wrong,' matters in which few of us agree.

The adjective 'right' may be defined therefore as the attribute peculiar to those relations between men which further the welfare of humanity.

Turning now to the universal. The abstract noun 'right' is derived from the adjective 'right,' just as goodness is derived from good, and whiteness from white. We should use the word 'rightness' to signify 'abstract right,' and were this always done much confusion of thought would thereby be avoided. Unfortunately custom has ordained otherwise. 'Abstract right,' or, more correctly, 'rightness,' it is hardly necessary to add, is the name for the attribute connoted by the adjective 'right,' when considered apart from any object. It is the name for the attribute, peculiar to certain relations of men, of furthering the general welfare.

In defining the term 'a right' we return from the universal to the particular. 'A right' is an abbreviation

of the adverbial phrase 'it is right that.' For example, the phrases "All men have a right to justice," and "I have a right to liberty," are merely more concise ways of saying, "It is right that all men should have justice," "It is right that I should have liberty."

Hence 'a right' may be defined as 'a claim to some particular thing on the ground that the claim is founded on a relation between men which has the attribute of rightness.'

To illustrate the meaning of this definition:—A. owes B. £20 for goods supplied to him. Few question that it is right (*i.e.*, a relation between men furthering human welfare) that men should pay their just debts, hence B. has 'a right' to £20 from A. because his claim to that sum is founded on a relation between men which has the attribute of rightness.

Granting that the foregoing analysis is correct, the term 'a right' implies that a given relation has a necessary result, just as the term 'a logarithm' implies that a given relation has a necessary result. 'Rights' being the name for all claims founded on certain relations between men which have a particular, necessary and definite result, are as inherent in the nature of things as are the relations of geometry or physics. Bentham and Burke could expel the belief in 'innate rights,' but they could no more expel innate rights themselves, than they could expel the axioms of geometry, and it follows also that the theory of natural law was raised on a basis of solid truth, and only the ambiguity arising from a confusion between the scientific and the legal signification of the word 'law' can explain the contempt with

which some persons treat the term 'natural law' and its derivative 'natural rights,' a contempt which is truly astonishing.

Now jurists do not admit the truth of the theory of rights described above. They hold that rights are *created by sanctions and cannot exist apart from their sanctions*. They define legal rights as 'rights created and sanctioned by law,' and they further maintain that there are no 'rights,' properly speaking, save 'legal rights,' since all other 'rights,' moral, natural and innate, are metaphors and nothing else. This doubtless is to what Professor Dicey is alluding when he writes, that since the time of Bentham the belief in innate rights is obsolete. This view of 'rights' postulates that men, jurists, can create justice and truth and can demolish them at will. So monstrous a claim should not pass unnoticed. Let us therefore criticise the jurists' definition of legal rights, 'rights *created* and sanctioned by law.'

In the first place, 'rights' is an abstract term. Politics (which includes the science of rights) is an abstract science, since it deals with the attributes of society (*i.e.*, relations of men), considered apart from society; just as mathematics is an abstract science, since it deals with relations of numbers, for numbers are not things but attributes of things. 'Rights' are attributes of society, and 'a right' is as abstract a term as 'an improper fraction.'

It may be objected that this analogy is erroneous, for many hold that the relations of men cannot be considered apart from men, in the way that numbers can be considered apart from things, and that, therefore, politics

cannot be an abstract science. But how can it be maintained that the proverb "Honesty is the best policy" is not as abstract a proposition as that 'a proper fraction is one whose numerator is less than its denominator'? The term 'honesty' is surely an attribute of society considered apart from society.

The term 'a right,' although an abstract term, may be used in reference to concrete things, just as the term, 'a quadratic equation,' although an abstract term, may be used to solve a concrete problem; and it can no more be contended that 'rights' cannot be an abstract term since it is often used in connection with roads and property, than it can be contended that 'a vulgar fraction' is not an abstract term because it may be used in connection with a grocer's accounts.

The relations of men are seldom considered in the abstract, but to deny therefore that politics is, or ought to be, an abstract science is as though the savage counting his toes, were to deny the possibility of considering the relations of numbers apart from toes, or in other words, to deny that mathematics was an abstract science.

The full significance of this, apparently superfluous, metaphysical digression as to the abstract nature of the term 'rights' becomes apparent when we reflect on what its truth involves. If the term 'rights' is an abstract term, denoting particular relations that have a necessary consequence, 'rights' cannot be *created* by any human agency. The most that the law can do is to define, *classify*, and sanction 'rights': it can no more create 'a right' than it can create an axiom of mathematics. Were the law to attempt to create an axiom of mathe-

matics, by decreeing that henceforth two and two are to make five, the decree doubtless might be enforced on accountants at the cost of distracting business complications and no little injustice. Yet, in spite of the law and subservient clerks, two and two would still make four and not five. And in the same way with 'a right.' A given relation between men must have as necessary a result as a given relation between numbers. Those relations which have a beneficial result to society are 'rights,' whether enforced by law or not, and those relations which have an evil result are not 'rights,' though they may be legal and sanctioned by all the terrors of the most powerful law conceivable.

Wherever the law has sanctioned a genuine right it has furthered the welfare of humanity. Wherever it has attempted to *create* 'a right,' by labelling some relation of men 'a legal right,' which was not 'a right' independently of law, it has thereby wrought unmitigated evil.

Our law sanctions the right of every man to be protected from slander, robbery and murder: it sanctions the right of accused persons to a speedy trial. Inasmuch as these rights are unquestionably essential conditions of human welfare it is evident that they exist independently of law, although it is equally evident that by enforcing these rights law confers a benefit on us all. But in France, before the Revolution, the law did not sanction these 'rights.' It preferred to create 'rights.' That is, it sanctioned powers and privileges for the aristocracy and the clergy which, *apart from law*, were not rights, and labelled these, its iniquitous creations, 'legal rights.'

Much the same may be said of Russia at the present day. What has been the result in both cases? The 'legal rights' of the French church and the French nobility reduced France to starvation and a bloody revolution. The 'legal rights' of the Russian bureaucracy are reducing Russia to ruin and anarchy.

Professor Holland contends that "it causes great confusion to imagine any connection between a 'legal right' and the abstract term 'right,' or the eulogistic adjective 'right.'" It certainly does. Yet the fact remains that the connection is anything but imaginary. Sir Henry Maine has pointed out that the origin of 'legal rights' was the judgments of those in authority as to what was right. 'Legal rights,' being derived from moral conceptions of right, it follows that, whenever, as frequently happened, those moral conceptions were erroneous, the term 'legal rights,' when applied to the so-called 'rights' derived from those moral conceptions, was metaphorical. Whenever the term 'legal right' has been, or is, used to cover some 'wrong' sanctioned by law, it has been, or is, a metaphor and nothing else. Therefore, contrary to the teaching of jurists, it is precisely 'legal rights' that are more frequently metaphorical' than any other.

"The ultimate object of law," says Professor Holland, "is no doubt nothing less than the well-being of society," and, although the cynic may smile, it is satisfactory to think that those worthy of the legal profession acknowledge such an aim. But if there is any truth in history, once we admit this exalted aim to be the ultimate object of law, we are forced to admit that the immediate object of

law is the *classification* and protection of rights, and not, as Professor Holland and other jurists teach, the *creation* and protection of rights. It is of course open to jurists to contend that lawyers, *qua* lawyers, are obliged, if they are to fulfil their professional duties, to assume that 'legal rights' are the only genuine 'rights,' and if they assume this they must further assume that the law can create 'rights.' And as long as jurists define 'legal rights' as they do, for legal purposes only, law being what it is now, no one could quarrel with them. But when jurists apply their legal definitions to the decision of matters beyond their own system of law, as for instance, when Professor Dicey summarily dismisses a claim urged on behalf of a large section of the community by the assertion that there are no such things as 'innate rights,' then it is time for the public to rebel, and to point out that legal formulas are often nothing but fictions necessary to justify the imperfections of legal principles.

A knowledge of all the bitter sorrow and care and misery still caused by legal injustice, makes it the duty of every responsible adult to do all that lies in their power to urge the necessity of legal reform, and legal reform will never be completed until such time as genuine 'rights' only are legally recognized, and it thus becomes possible to adequately and truthfully define legal rights as 'those rights which are sanctioned by law.'

It is foreign to our purpose to discuss here the meaning of the terms 'natural' and 'moral rights,' beyond observing that such classifications are, like the term 'legal rights,' distinctions drawn between the sanctions

which enforce 'rights,' and are not distinctions between 'rights' themselves.

The whole object of this inquiry has been to make clear one cardinal point, and that is that *Rights exist independently of any sanction*. The terms 'innate and abstract rights' embody this truth, for they are used in antithesis to such terms as 'moral or legal rights,' to signify all the innumerable rights which are not sanctioned by law, public opinion, religion, or anything else.

Men had 'a right' to freedom in the days of slavery, just as much as they have now, although in those days, that 'right' had no sanction for slaves, either moral, natural or legal. 'Rights,' being claims founded on the necessary result of given relations between men, are 'rights' whether those claims be enforced or not.

I may seem to have somewhat unnecessarily laboured the question as to whether 'rights' are, as jurists maintain, created by their respective sanctions; but it is a matter of profound and far-reaching importance. If rights are created by their sanction, then *there can be no such thing as 'a right' which is not sanctioned either by law or some other agency*, and if legal rights are nothing but the arbitrary creation of the sovereign political power, it follows that the whole case for justice to any class whatever which cannot secure it by force falls to the ground.

If there is no such thing as an 'innate right,' what meaning have the words justice and injustice? Even a jurist could not maintain that 'just and unjust' are synonymous with the words 'legal and illegal.'

"Vous avez la foi, Monsieur, à quoi vous sert-elle?"

says one of the characters in a novel by Anatole France.

"A pécher, Madame," is the reply.

Not to believe in sin is the lowest depth of the scepticism which turns everything into ashes, and the soul of a community is the same as a soul of an individual. Woe betide the nation whose political creed leaves it bereft of a sense of political sin, for hard will be the lot of the oppressed under rulers who deny allegiance to the sovereignty of Abstract Right.

H. FRANCES PETERSEN.

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WOMEN'S
SUFFRAGE

THE DEMAND &
ITS MEANING

ROBERT . F. CHOLMELEY

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THE DEMAND AND ITS MEANING

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

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WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE

THE DEMAND AND ITS MEANING

BY
ROBERT F. CHOLMELEY, M.A.

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WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE

ON the 9th of February, 1907, some two thousand women, of all ranks and almost of all ages, gathered in Hyde Park, and went in procession, the great majority on foot, to meet in Exeter Hall. A large crowd watched the procession: some encouraged it, many mocked it, a few insulted it. What was the business of that procession, and why did it deserve the attention and the sympathy of all English men and women?

Its business was a very simple thing: it wanted a new definition of a common word—the word Citizen. The demand for the enfranchisement of women means just this, that until it is recognised that a woman may be a citizen, citizenship will not mean what it ought to mean, and government will not be able to do what it ought to do. The form of government which the English people has, on the whole, chosen for itself, whether we call it Popular, or Representative, or Democratic, is based upon the idea of citizenship, upon the principle that, so far as is practicable, all who form part of the State shall take part in the management of its affairs. "*Quod omnes tangit: ab omnibus comprobetur*"—What touches all must be approved by all—the maxim put into the mouth of the greatest of our kings as he summoned the first full English Parliament, is the maxim by which the people of England has ever since held. It broke the Stuart despotism, it broke

the Commonwealth ; the fact that it was never seriously questioned by any party or by any class saved this country from social revolution ; it enfranchised the Catholics and Jews, it enfranchised the middle classes, it enfranchised the working man, and it will—it must—enfranchise the women.

The argument may most conveniently be discussed under three headings: Historical, Theoretical, Practical. It is not a perfect classification, but it answers roughly to the different points of view from which some defend and others deplore the continued exclusion of women from full citizenship.

I. The Historical argument is not a favourite with English people. It has been often said that we have no real Constitutional history ; and there are many who hold in general that the one lesson to be learnt from all history is that nothing ever happens twice in the same way. Yet the continuity of English history, which the late Professor Freeman was fond of expounding, is more than a mere phrase ; if we have a Constitution which is rather a series of expedients than a deliberately fashioned instrument, yet the principles which governed its makers have been steady ; if we have done odd things in odd ways, and sometimes with odd results, we have mostly done them for the same reasons and with the same general end. Once only, in this matter of the franchise, have we taken a step backwards, when in the reign of Henry the Sixth the forty shilling freehold was deliberately set up as the limit below which men were to be voteless.

Now the reason which has always governed any extension of the franchise is the right of interests to be represented ; and each successive extension of the franchise adds greatly to the force of that reason, because the more completely representative of interests Parliament becomes the worse it is for any interest that is still voiceless. Imagine for a moment the desperate state of the liquor interest at the present day if by some freak of constitutional law those who made or sold intoxicating liquors had no vote ! The enfranchisement

of the middle classes in 1832 meant that middle-class interests were looked after, the enfranchisement of the lower classes is producing results every day which nothing else could produce but the operation of the vote. Does any one suppose that the Education Bill of 1906 would have been precisely what it was, if the Catholics had been still shut out of political life ? Before the great Reform Bill parliamentary representation was so absurd that the possession of votes was of comparatively little importance ; they had a market value, but they bore little or no relation to the conduct of affairs. To-day the vote is everything. When almost everybody had to appeal to the consideration of the landowners who monopolised political power, the want of a vote was hardly a disability ; when no factory hand was enfranchised, the men and women workers were at least in the same slough of despond. Now, to be without the vote is to be exceptionally and conspicuously helpless. When a Member of Parliament finds himself pressed on all sides to attend to the hopes and fears of those whose disappointment may cost him his seat, it is not to be expected that he will turn aside to listen to those who can command no force but the force of argument ; and he does not turn aside. He dare not.

Thus every change in the direction of widening the franchise makes the position of the unenfranchised worse than before. This is why the Reform Bill of 1832 led directly to the Chartist agitation, and why the later progress of reform has led directly to the agitation for Women's Suffrage. Under a system of popular government every interest must be either enfranchised or enslaved : history has no clearer lesson.

The fact that our representative system means the representation of interests is a historical fact ; that is to say, whenever there has been a question of including in, or excluding from citizenship, the answer has been determined in accordance with the interest which the persons concerned were thought to have in the State. It is unnecessary to labour the point ; nothing proves it more clearly than the failure of the attempt in 1867 to

set up what were called "fancy franchises." Whether this is the ideal method of government or not is a different question; it is the method which the English people has chosen whenever it has had the opportunity to choose.

It is, therefore, an historical anomaly that the special conditions of women's employment, and the special regulations affecting women in every relation of life, should be the object of government, and yet that women should be denied the only means of protecting their interests; and it is an anomaly for which even the best government would be no compensation.

II. The Theoretical argument is more amusing. Those who oppose the enfranchisement of women on theoretical grounds, base themselves upon two main arguments which may be summarised as the Incompetent argument and the *Hausfrau* argument. According to the latter, woman's place is the Home; according to the former, women are, by reason of their physical, intellectual, and moral weakness, unfitted to vote. The Historical argument really disposes of this contention: if the enfranchisement of men had been determined in accordance with their moral, mental, or physical qualities, it would be an arguable contention; as it is, unless we are to admit that women are, as a whole, so intellectually weak as to be classed with lunatics and children, so morally weak as to be classed with criminals, or so physically weak as to be classed with paupers, there is no case against them on this ground. We set women to work; we regulate their work; we encourage them to be educated; we examine them, and we appoint them to posts in public departments and make rules for their conduct; we implore them to become factory inspectors, school inspectors, sanitary inspectors; we elect them to Boards of Guardians; we know that we must have them upon every sort of local authority before long—it is impossible to contend that women have not enough interest in the State, or that their interests are not sufficiently specialised to entitle them to the franchise.

But there is the soldier and policeman argument. We

are told that a citizen must be qualified to serve the State in every way if he is to claim the full privileges of citizenship, or at least that no class is entitled to those privileges which is incapable of undertaking those duties. Thousands of men cannot ever be soldiers or policemen, but Man can fight for his country, Woman cannot, and there is an end of the matter. If this is a proper view of citizenship it is at least a singular fact that until 1887 policemen were actually debarred by statute from exercising the franchise. But is it a proper view of citizenship? It can have but two possible grounds of justification. Either it must be argued that citizenship ought to imply ability to fulfil any or all of the functions upon which the State is founded, or else it must be maintained that it is especially dangerous to allow those who cannot be soldiers or policemen to have a part in deciding what soldiers or policemen are to do. The first argument might well provoke us to ask some man whether the State owes nothing to the mother that bore him. Pass the labours that men and women share; pass the arts in which women are the rivals of men, and those in which their supremacy is seldom challenged; granted, if you will have it so, that men could, if they chose, do all that women do of the world's work, and yet—is motherhood nothing? Has the soldier's mother no stake in the country? If there were no other reason for putting women upon a political equality with men, the claim of motherhood to rank as the greatest of all social services would be reason enough. When men can do without being born of women it will be time to talk of a single qualification for citizenship, attainable by soldiers and policemen, but beyond the reach of the weaker sex.

But women must not vote, lest they should set men to fight for them, while they look on unscathed. Do those who use this and like arguments ever consider what war means to women? If the soldier's mother may claim to have served the State, what of the soldier's wife? What of the hospital nurse? It is nonsense to say that women have not a direct, a desperate interest in the defence of their country, an interest which entitles them as fully to a

voice in its councils, and is as sure a warrant that they would use that voice wisely and patriotically, as all the risks that are taken by those who can bear arms against an enemy.

After all, the stronghold of the opponent of Women's Suffrage is the *Hausfrau* argument. The Place of Woman is the Home. To hear the earnestness with which this plea is urged one might suppose that the male voter never was at home at all. If the arguments used against Women's Suffrage on this ground were applied to men, it would have been demonstrated long since that none but Government clerks could possibly have time to vote. A man may have a business which occupies him day in day out from the time he gets up until the time he goes to bed, but nobody ever suggests that he ought to be disfranchised for fear of his neglecting it; yet the demand of women for the vote is met at once with the cry, Who's going to mind the baby? with the occasional variation, Who's going to wash the clothes? Nobody moves a finger to protest against the rich mother leaving her baby at home, to go out and amuse herself, or the poor mother taking hers to the public-house to spend a happy evening; but the instant that a woman proposes to put her nose out of doors for a political purpose, the sacredness of family life is seen to be in the most horrid danger. How much of her life do these defenders of hearth and home suppose that the most prolific mother could spend in minding babies if she did her utmost, and washed all their clothes and her husband's into the bargain? And is every woman to be obliged to have a baby to mind? If not, are we to disfranchise the whole sex in order to show our appreciation of the nursing mother at her task? The truth is that the *Hausfrau* argument is on this side at any rate both foolish and insincere. It is foolish, because a moment's consideration would show that there is nothing in the occupation of the busiest housewife with which the franchise would interfere any more than it does with the ordinary work of men; it is insincere because it is at bottom merely a cloak for the sentimental objections which make up its other side.

The sentimental objections are despicable; but they

are not to be despised, because sentiment, however false, is far more difficult to overthrow than argument, and because of every ten actions that we perform, nine are generally due to it. In order to move a crowd, you must stir its feelings: and therefore it is against the sentiment opposed to Women's Suffrage that the strongest appeal must be made. These objections are held by many women, singularly enough without any sense of the degradation which they imply: for they are based upon the fact described by Mr. George Meredith in these words: "*Men may have rounded Seraglio Point, they have not yet doubled Cape Turk.*" They may be classified as Romeo and Juliet objections and Primrose League objections—the first dealing with the proper relation of women to men, the second with the proper function of women in politics. The Romeo and Juliet class of objections owe that title to a distracted politician who was once driven to formulate his prejudices by saying that he could not have admired Juliet with a vote. Sexual fascination being the one worthy business of a woman, any other business which might interfere with that is to be denied her. There is nothing else in the objection: and no amount of imaginative talk about the inappropriateness of the vote to Juliet will add anything to it. It does not matter that many women can never be Juliets, and none are Juliets for long; that is their function, and so much the worse for those who fail of it: they have simply missed their vocation, or are superannuated; if we wish to put it nicely, we quote Bacon: "*Wives are young men's mistresses; companions for middle age; and old men's nurses.*"

It is the Oriental view of women, which some no doubt honestly believe to be the true one. What they do not see is that everything which women have been allowed and encouraged and obliged to do for the last thirty years at least has made it impossible for women to accept that view. It is fatal to educate a slave unless you mean to give him his liberty.

The Primrose League class of objections is but a variation of the Romeo and Juliet class. The business of women being to fascinate and cajole men, their

function in politics is to be determined accordingly. Granted that there may be things that they want done in politics, granted that they have an interest in the government, voting is not the proper way to behave. They must wheedle. Miss Marie Corelli expressed this view the other day with a strength of language and a confidence in her own powers of cajolery which was doubtless justified by the facts. On the whole, the Primrose League view is more degrading to women than the Romeo and Juliet view; if women are to have no aspirations but those of slaves, it is at least logical to condemn them to play a slave's part; but to allow them the desires of the free, and then to tell them that they may only use the arts of the slave to obtain them—this is the refinement of mockery.

The whole of the sentimental objections to Women's Suffrage go back to the principle that it is the one and only business of every woman to please some man, and that it is only by pleasing some man or men that she is to get what she wants. That principle is obsolete in the case of property, it is obsolete in the case of education, it is obsolete in the ordinary life of every intelligent family; and it is time that it was obsolete in politics.

III. The Practical argument is concerned with two questions which are really one: first, what will the vote do for women? second, what will the votes of women do for the State?

The answer to the first question is to be found by observing what the vote does for those who already have it. What does the vote do for men? First, it enables groups of men who are conscious of common interests to get those interests looked after. Even to the smallest group it makes the difference between having a little power and having no power at all. Second—and this is of more importance than is generally understood—it enables every man to complete his education. We are told, over and over again, that the true object of education is to make good citizens: and in this country good citizenship culminates in the ability to use the vote.

Both these arguments apply with equal force to women. There are large groups of women who by their special occupations, by their special economic position, are conscious of common interests which they alone can fully understand and which only the vote can enable them to protect against wilful or stupid mismanagement. The vote will not ensure them against mismanagement—there is some mismanagement still in the affairs of men—but it will make it impossible that they should not be listened to. Two ladies were driving away from a great meeting of women a few months ago. They were discussing political and social questions, and their opinions reached the ears of the old family coachman and filled him with horror. He was a privileged person, and when he could bear it no longer he turned round on his box and said, "I've heard what you've been saying: but you see it don't matter, because I've got the vote and you haven't." The coachman's remark sums up the whole position. Without the vote, women are confined to irresponsible chatter.

The educational aspect of the franchise is closely bound up with this. Not only is an education which does not lead to political responsibility imperfect, but the refusal of the vote to women stultifies everything that has been done in educating them during the last thirty years. If we are to go on refusing them the franchise, we ought to pull down Newnham and Girton, turn the High Schools into Academies of Deportment, and see that no working woman's daughter goes beyond the Third Standard. The franchise is the only justification for educating anybody in a country where the people governs; if women are only to get things done by pleasing men, they ought to be taught nothing but accomplishments, and those who complain that education makes them less amenable to the Early Victorian conception of the sphere of women are right. If we were not going to "double Cape Turk," we ought to have seen to it that the women did not get round it. We have let them get round it, and we have got to follow. Besides this, the exercise of the franchise is in itself an education from which no one capable of being educated ought to be debarred. It is ridiculous to teach

women to think, and then to condemn them to irresponsible chatter at the point where thought should stand the test of action. To every class that has been successively admitted to the franchise the mere possession of the vote has been an education : by possessing it they learn to use it, and, though most of us are still a long way from the ideal of citizenship, it is only by being admitted to the sight of that ideal that men and women alike can be really free.

To give reality to their education, to enable them to speak effectively and responsibly for their interests, this is what the franchise will do for women. What will the enfranchisement of women do for the State? Introduce sentiment into politics, say the objectors. If women were likely to bring more sentiment into politics than we already suffer from, there would be something in the objection ; it is a prophecy which time alone can verify ; yet we have at least one indication to go by. If there is one department of government in which the best intentions are continually vitiated by false sentiment, it is the administration of the Poor Law ; and yet it is admitted by everybody that the women who sit upon Boards of Guardians are in every respect the most valuable members of those bodies, both in the attention which they give to their duties and the wisdom which they bring to bear upon some of the most difficult problems of government. We have had some experience of the results of women's work in education, and no one can say that it led to a deluge of sentiment. The danger is chimerical.

On the other hand, the gain to the State from having the woman's point of view presented in every relation of public life must be enormous. Not only in those departments of government which concern women particularly, but everywhere we need them. All legislation that concerns children, all that concerns workers, all that concerns social difficulties and social evils, is bound to be one-sided and haphazard without the aid of the responsible counsels of women ; it is so now, and unless the evil is remedied it will be worse in the future. With every widening of the sphere of government more opportunities are made for

good and evil ; and we can no longer afford to do without the help of half the nation in organising the life of the whole. Instead of mocking at their demands and belittling their work, we ought to be crying, like the men of Macedonia to St. Paul, "Come over and help us."

Two arguments against Women's Suffrage remain to be noticed : that they do not want the vote, and that they will vote Tory when they get it. Both are types of the arguments that have been used against every other measure of enfranchisement since Catholic Emancipation. The second is the argument of a tyrant : it is opposed to the very foundations of representative government, and it ought to be repudiated by every one who believes at all in freedom. If the majority of the nation's citizens, whatever their sex, choose to be governed in accordance with Toryism, whatever that may be, it is not for Liberals to deny them the right of effective choice. That is a cowardly position, and should be left to those who have not the courage of their convictions.

The other argument, that women do not want the vote, is both false and irrelevant. It is irrelevant because the desirability of enfranchising women depends rather upon the need of the State for their help than upon their desire to obtain the franchise. If we had waited until the whole of any given class had demanded the franchise we should have waited until we had a revolution. Let us take heed that we do not deserve to have repeated to us the words in which the Duke of Wellington declared that Catholic emancipation must be granted as the only alternative to civil war. We have been told that the women of England who demand the vote have no chance of reaching the point at which they can intimidate the men ; and we have been told that if the vote were granted and the women of England were to find themselves united in opposition to the men on some great question there would be civil war and that this would be an absurdity. If the women of England should at any time and under any circumstances be united in opposition to the men, we should have arrived at a state of things compared with which a civil war would be a trifle ; but those who repudiate the idea that women,

if sufficiently in earnest, can intimidate men are singularly lacking in imagination. The women are not likely to burn a town for the sake of a vote, as Bristol was burnt in 1832, or even to repeat the scenes that forced through the Reform Bill of 1867; but if it is once understood that the demand for the franchise will not be granted except as the result of intimidation it is perfectly certain that the determination, the intelligence, and the courage of half the population of these islands will find a way. This is no ephemeral agitation: the women's cause must win; it is for us men to determine through what strife, what desperate expedients they are to pass to the end which we may delay but cannot prevent.

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THE WOMEN'S ANTI-SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT

BY

ROBERT F. CHOLMELEY, M.A.

LONDON: NATIONAL UNION OF
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25 VICTORIA STREET, S.W. . . 1908

The Women's Anti-Suffrage Movement

By Robert F. Cholmeley, M.A.

THE formation of the Anti-Suffrage League, which was introduced to the public by Mrs. Humphry Ward in the August number of the *Nineteenth Century*, is the best thing that has yet happened to the cause of Women's Suffrage in England. We have been so long firing away into a kind of blank mist of prejudice, which, even if for a moment it might seem to be pierced, only rolled up again more thickly, that there was a danger lest the taste for combat might be exhausted by the time that the enemy ventured into the open field. Now at last we know what we have to meet. The half-articulate murmurs of elderly gentlemen in the newspapers are superseded; even the cheerful bellows who sun themselves in London parks, and the more practical egg or cabbage-throwers of Black-pool, must take their proper place as mere skirmishers; we have before us the ordered ranks of a disciplined host, and we must deal seriously with it or perish.

The Anti-Suffrage League is born; if its parentage is somewhat dubious, at least its sponsors are most respectable, and the confession of faith with which they have as in duty bound provided it is evidence that the best brains of the opponents of Women's Suffrage have not been cudgelled in vain. Let us contemplate this anti-suffragist confession of faith on the strength of which the women of

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England are summoned to employ their energy, their logic, their time, their money, and their zeal, in order that the insidious attempt to admit them to the Parliamentary franchise may be for ever defeated and overthrown. But before we examine Mrs. Humphry Ward's manifesto in detail, a word of warning is necessary. The manifesto challenges argument, and argument it shall have; but there are two sorts of argument which must not be confused. No one can argue honestly with an opponent who does not admit the facts. It is impossible, for instance, to argue with Mrs. Humphry Ward about the State of Oregon, because she believes that it was the opposition of the women of Oregon that defeated a Women's Suffrage proposal in that State; and a faith so stoutly superior to evidence defies controversy, though it deserves a kind of tender admiration. I am not in the least bored about Oregon, as Mr. Zangwill is said to be, because I consider that the manner in which Women's Suffrage was defeated in Oregon is a striking example of the righteousness of the cause; but to argue about it with any one who still believes that it was the women who did it would be merely ridiculous. Let us therefore for the present leave out of the question not only Oregon but every other state, people, nation, or language, that has, or at any time shall have, adopted Women's Suffrage. We may be quite sure that they are or would be the better for it; Mrs. Humphry Ward may be equally sure of the contrary; but there are two good reasons against arguing about them. We should never agree about the facts; and if we did, the facts are not sufficiently relevant to be worth the trouble of arguing. The utmost that could be proved from them is the advantage or disadvantage of Women's Suffrage to somebody else, and it is the effect of that reform upon ourselves that matters. We are not like Wyoming, we are not like New Zealand, we are not like Finland, we are not even very like Norway: and both those who approve and those who oppose the extension of the franchise to women in England would do well to remember it. Two remarks on the subject are perhaps worth quoting, not as arguments but as illustrations: a Norwegian was asked

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how it was that the vote was so suddenly granted to women in Norway, and he replied that the men of Norway had realised what women in England were going to have to go through in order to get it, and had made up their minds that Norwegian women should not have to suffer a like experience; an American was asked why so many thoughtful Americans were opposed to Women's Suffrage, and he answered that politics in America were not yet fit for women to touch.

Other states may find it easier to grant Women's Suffrage than we do, though surely not more beneficial, either because they have less weight of accumulated prejudice to overcome, or because their political life is less complicated, and the number of the interests to be affected is smaller: it is our prejudices that we must face, and our political life that we have to see to. If our prejudices are too strong, women will not get the vote in England until a stronger feeling beats those prejudices down: if our political life would be damaged by the enfranchisement of women, it is the sacred duty of the Anti-Suffrage League to die in the last ditch sooner than give way.

But let us now examine the Anti-Suffragist's Confession—this Shorter Catechism of the truly reasonable and patriotic Englishwoman, to which we are told that so many admirable persons of both sexes have already subscribed: and if we find a fact in it, let us be respectful, and not inquire too closely what a fact does there or what is expected of it in that company.

The manifesto of the League consists of six clauses, of which the first four may be said to state the general position; the fifth contains in seven paragraphs the reasons for objecting to Women's Suffrage; and the sixth appeals for the support of the women of England against those who would enable them to vote at Parliamentary elections.

With the first clause no one, I think, can have any quarrel. It is undoubtedly 'time that the women who are opposed to the concession of the parliamentary franchise to women should make themselves fully and widely heard'; and I am not sorry to see that Mrs. Humphry

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Ward allows that there are illegitimate methods of enforcing arguments, although we should probably not agree as to the comparative illegitimacy of the methods of the Women's Social and Political Union and those of the Primrose League.

The second clause states that an Anti-Suffrage League has been formed—a fact which, for reasons already given, causes me extreme pleasure.

The third clause states that 'the matter is urgent'—an opinion with which all supporters of Women's Suffrage do most heartily agree.

The fourth clause suggests that the danger may not be so great as it seems, because the Women's Suffrage movement in America has after forty years of agitation been practically defeated; and it is declared that this defeat was due to the steady work and argument of women themselves. This clause contains two statements of fact which are highly disputable. I doubt whether any Suffragist in America or in England would admit either of them in any sense which could encourage Mrs. Humphry Ward; but it would not seriously discredit the cause if both could be proved up to the hilt. Probably there never was a movement which did not at some period in its history present apparently indisputable evidence of decay, sufficient to deceive the very elect. But the movement of which the agitation for the franchise is the most practical expression and the most striking symbol is not capable of defeat.

Like a tide coming up on a wide beach, it may find the gradients steeper in one part than in another, the breakwaters more obstructive, the cliffs more stubborn in their resistance; but sooner or later, both here and there, it must reach its mark, for the flood is behind it. If every nation that has now adopted Women's Suffrage were to be seized with a sudden madness to-morrow and cast it away, the Anti-Suffrage League in England would still do well to be polishing its weapons, collecting its money, advertising for its zeal, buttonholing those four hundred and twenty Members of Parliament whom it discovers to have bowed the knee to Baal, and persuading them to

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contribute to the joy that broods over the repentant sinner. Of one thing at least the peccant four hundred and twenty may rest assured: there will be no violence used towards them; no one will even ring their door-bells without a previous introduction. There will be no interrupting of their best oratorical efforts: no attempt to shake their loyalty to their respective parties: very subtle and very courteous will be the counter-tactics and the counter-arguments to which they must succumb. Happy four hundred and twenty, upon whom is to be directed all the sweet reasonableness of the women of England who are convinced that to persuade reluctant man is the sum total of their political value!

The fifth clause of the manifesto must be examined in detail, for it expounds the theme upon which all subsequent variations of argument are to be based, although the statement at the beginning, to the effect that these are the 'main reasons' against Women's Suffrage, leaves a loophole through which an ingenious Anti-Suffragist may chance to spy a new one.

Paragraph (*a*) runs as follows: 'Because the spheres of men and women, owing to natural causes, are essentially different, and therefore their share in the management of the State should be different.' This admirable sentence contains, as will readily be seen, no less than three premisses to one conclusion; and it is perhaps not surprising that it leaves the argument just where it was before. For the question at issue between Suffragists and Anti-Suffragists is precisely in what particulars the shares of men and women in the management of the State should be different, and whether the Parliamentary vote is one of those particulars: and of the three premisses upon which the solution of this question is supposed to hang, one is so obvious as not to be worth discussing, and the other two will require all the elucidation which the ingenious spirits of the Anti-Suffrage League can provide, before they will contribute one halfpennyworth of force to the argument. Nobody will deny that in some respects the spheres of men and women are different; but to say that they are essentially different, and to say that the whole of that

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difference is due to natural causes, is merely to throw dust in the eyes of the inquirer.

I pass over the natural causes, because it is inconceivable that any member of the Anti-Suffrage League should believe in the existence of such natural causes—by which I suppose physiological causes are intended—as would make it more dangerous for women to vote at a Parliamentary election than at a Borough Council election—or, for the matter of that, to sit in Parliament than to sit on a throne. But what the Anti-Suffrage League has got to prove before it can be said to have an argument to bless itself with, is that the difference between man's sphere and women's is 'essential,' or that if not essential it has at least a direct bearing on the question whether women are to be excluded from the Parliamentary franchise. No one has yet attempted seriously to prove that; and yet it will have to be proved quickly if women are to prove it, because if one may judge by the attitude taken up on this question by the women who are educated or being educated at the schools and Universities of the United Kingdom, there will soon be a difficulty in finding an educated woman equal to the task. In fact, this contention about the essential difference between Man's sphere and Woman's sphere is a very dangerous contention for Anti-Suffragists, for the very reason that the more they prove it the more difficult it is to deny women the only adequate means of protecting their own sphere against the competing interests of those who are at present supposed to look after both; while if they fail to prove it—*cadit quæstio*. On the whole perhaps it would have been better if paragraph (a) had taken the time—or at any rate *Times*-honoured form—'Women are women, and men are men.' That would have possessed the advantage of brevity, and the pitfalls of logic would have been avoided.

Paragraph (b) repeats the old argument that there are important functions of the state 'in none of which can women take any practical part.' What is meant by taking a practical part? What practical part is taken in 'naval and military power, diplomacy, finance, and the great mining, constructive, shipping and transport industries,'

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by hundreds of thousands of male voters, which a woman voter could not equally well discharge? No man votes for members of the Parliament that deals with these questions because he is likely to take a practical part in them—except by paying for them, which is not a monopoly of the male sex; no man becomes a member of Parliament for any such reason. To say that every man might have to fight, might have to go down a mine, might have to become Ambassador in Turkey, is simply to play with the question. Those possibilities—which in an enormous number of cases are not even possibilities—have nothing to do with the reasons why men vote, nor with the reasons why they ought to vote. Men vote and ought to vote upon these and all other questions of State because they are vitally interested in the conduct of the State as a whole; and it is impossible to contend that the same reasoning does not apply to women. Do the Anti-Suffragists maintain that it does not matter to women whether the State is at war or at peace, whether it is respected or despised among nations, whether it is solvent or bankrupt, whether its industries, great or small, are flourishing or decaying? They cannot maintain it. But women are not to vote because they can take no practical part. Women are to go on sending sons, brothers and husbands to fight for their country, they are to pay for the policy and the war, they are to be encouraged to invest their money in the industries, they are to be happy and prosperous or miserable and poverty-stricken according as the State is well or badly managed; but on all these matters their opinion is not to be considered worth having. 'And what's his reason? They are women. Hath not a woman eyes? Hath not a woman hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions?' What conceivable scintilla of reason is there in the attitude of those who press women to form organizations for the support of politicians, if women are unfit to form an opinion upon the most important of the questions with which those politicians have to deal? The only explanation is that the women whose services are requisitioned to persuade men to vote for other men are understood to do so not because they approve of the candidates whom they help, but because

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their nearest male friends or relations have told them what to do. Does the Women's Liberal Federation, does the Primrose League, accept that view of its functions? Do the distinguished women upon the Committee of the Anti-Suffrage League really confine their political meditations to subjects not mentioned in Clause 5, paragraph 4, of the manifesto, while on all those subjects they are content with the conclusions of their fathers, husbands, brothers, sons, or perchance of their coachmen and gardeners? If they do, it is to be hoped that they are careful to explain it when they go canvassing; it must be difficult to be at once so reticent and yet fully persuasive: but I do not see how they can do otherwise, since to persuade a man to vote for a candidate without acknowledging that you have no judgment on three-fifths of his political opinions is scarcely honest. If women cannot form a judgment upon these great questions, they ought to be kept out of politics altogether; to allow them to persuade without allowing them to vote is neither more nor less than saying to them in effect, Rhetoric is your province: you must leave Reason alone. In fact, this is just what all the talk about women's legitimate influence means, when it means anything at all except a desire on the part of men not to lose a fine opportunity for being petted; women are not to decide, but to persuade men to decide; they may be as right as possible, but unless they are persuasive they are to have no chance; they may be as wrong as possible, but if they are persuasive, the thing will be done. Nobody supposes that women will cease to be persuasive when they get the Parliamentary franchise; rhetorical appeals are not unknown, I believe, among men; but to deny them the vote is to leave them with rhetoric for their most respectable weapon: and to tell any large number of intelligent persons that they have no more respectable weapon than rhetoric is to invite every sort of demoralisation.

Paragraph (c) begins with a fact. The local government vote has been conceded to women, and they have been admitted to County and Borough Councils. The manifesto even allows that the sphere so opened to them

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is within their powers. 'To make proper use of it, however, will tax all the energies that women have to spare, apart from the care of the home and the development of the individual life.' This is our old friend the Mind-the-Baby argument, with the 'individual life' thrown in to catch the spinster. Apparently it still escapes the notice of the Anti-Suffragist that the concession of the vote is not necessarily an invitation to spend laborious days in the pursuit of politics, that even some men find the exercise of the franchise not inconsistent with a good deal of diligence in various occupations, that even the most exacting claims of motherhood leave some opportunities for reflection, and that if reflection issues in a visit to the polling booth once in five years or so, the interests of the home and children need not be wholly despaired of. But it really ought not to be necessary at this time of day to refute the Mind-the-Baby argument. It has even dropped out of the *répertoire* of the omnibus-driver. The development of the individual life is another matter. It is an exquisite touch. One can almost imagine the anxious consultations about its birth, and the sigh of heartfelt relief when the paragraph was complete, and no woman, however great her talents, however splendid her resources, however ample her leisure, however undomestic her disposition, could any longer escape from the formula, or plead her talents, her wealth, her leisure, her freedom from domestic claims, as excuses for venturing outside the sheltered waters of local government into those stormy seas where Man must sail alone. Not only the nursing mother now, but the parent of mature citizens has a reason for not wanting to vote: the pertinacious questionings of the rebellious spinster are answered. None must go beyond local politics, for all must be busy with the development of the individual life. Here is a new essential difference between men and women, that to women alone, so long as they keep out of Imperial politics, is committed the cult of the Individual life. What this individual life may be, which is apparently denied to men, since the touch of Imperial politics is fatal to it, is left a mystery. But surely the gods laughed for pure joy when that precious phrase was born; and to that appre-

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ciative laughter we must leave it. It is the one really humorous thing in a great and solemn pronouncement, and to comment on it further would be ungrateful and superfluous.

Paragraph (*d*) deals with the influence of women, social and political, which it is said will be diminished by the possession of the parliamentary vote. What particle of evidence is there of the probability of such a result? 'The legitimate influence of women in politics—in all classes, rich and poor—will always be in proportion to their education and common sense.' I suppose that the legitimate influence of everybody, not only rich and poor, but man and woman, is in proportion to their education and common sense; but why in the world should that influence be diminished by the fact that educated and sensible people can not merely say what they think, but vote accordingly? Have the classes which have successively won the franchise thereby lost what political influence their measure of education and common sense entitled them to? I have known several young men who, even before reaching the age or the position which enabled them to vote at Parliamentary elections, might be described as persons of education and common sense. I never observed that their legitimate social and political influence waned sensibly from the moment that they were able to exercise the franchise. It is quite true that the nearer you are to being able to get what you want by voting, the less you are obliged to wheedle for it; and if the possession of the franchise is going to diminish that kind of political influence, there is one of the strongest arguments for conferring it. As for the statement that in matters of social reform women at present 'stand apart from and beyond party politics and are listened to accordingly,' it is neither very true, nor if it were true would it be a matter for congratulation. It is not true except with regard to a small number of exceptionally favoured women, and it is not desirable because one of the things that help to degrade party politics is the tendency to dissuade people with serious aims from having anything to do with them.

Women's Suffrage is needed even more in the in-

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terests of English politics than in the interests of women themselves.

The paragraph ends with the statement that the physical force of man is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the State. A more misleading remark was never made. It is not physical force that is responsible, but those who direct and control the employment of physical force, whether by paying the wages of policemen and soldiers, or framing the laws and the policy in accordance with which they act; and to refuse women the vote because of the ultimate responsibility of the physical force of man is as absurd as to say that a woman ought not to order her coachman to take her for a drive, because the physical force of the coachman is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the horses.

Paragraph (*e*) begins with an expression of satisfaction with the course of legislation during the past century in relation to women and children, which will probably astonish those who have any acquaintance with the subject. Those who wish to attain an acquaintance cannot do better, by way of a beginning, than read a chapter by Miss Christabel Pankhurst, in a volume entitled *The Case for Women's Suffrage*, published last year by Mr. Fisher Unwin. That satisfaction is a grim illustration of the extent to which it is possible for thoughtful women to persuade themselves that the solution of all difficulties is to trust in the reasonableness and intelligence of male legislators; but it might have been supposed that even such a body of well-born and wealthy women as have conceived and brought forth the Anti-Suffrage League could hardly look back with contentment upon the long struggle which was necessary before a married woman was legally entitled to her own property, even if they are satisfied with the limited extent to which a mother is still allowed to be the parent of her own children.

'The channels of public opinion are always freely open to women.' Even if this were truer than it is, it is the direction of those channels that makes all the difference. In one of Æsop's fables we are told of a hunter who having struck up a friendship with a lion, took him to a

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picture-gallery where were many pictures of the chase. The lion observed that although many of the pictures represented the triumphs of the hunter over the lion, there were none to celebrate those of the lion over the hunter, and he is said to have remarked sarcastically that it was easy to see that all the pictures had been painted by man. The hunter, with a deplorable loss of nerve, forgot to retort that it was open to any lion to send in a picture to the Hanging Committee if he had a mind to. Doubtless Mrs. Humphry Ward can get an article printed in the *Nineteenth Century* or the *Times* whenever she chooses; but the history of the movement for the enfranchisement of women is not marked by any very prodigal hospitality on the part of newspapers and periodicals to opinions, or even to facts, distasteful to their proprietors. And although there have been honourable exceptions, and some improvement in the general attitude, it must be within the knowledge of all readers of newspapers that for a long time a considerable part of the channels of public opinion were devoted to misreporting and misrepresenting every incident that could be twisted into a form likely to discredit the cause of Women's Suffrage, and to suppressing all evidence of the earnest, persistent, and successful work which could be neither denounced nor ridiculed.

This paragraph has at least the merit of ending upon a less positive tone than the rest. 'The true path of progress *seems* to lie along these lines' (women on Royal Commissions and sharing in local government). 'Representative women'—what is a representative woman but a woman for whom other women have voted?—'might be brought into closer consultative relation with Government departments, in matters where the special interests of women are concerned.' The misplaced ingenuity of it all is so pathetic. '*The cat would have fish, but would not wet her feet.*' We are to multiply devices to enable us to hear what women want for themselves, and what they think about their own special interests, in order to avoid giving them the one means that we have found effective for getting what we want, and for discriminating

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and protecting our own special interests; and the women of England are implored to accept this position because they cannot use a sledge-hammer, and because when men are trying to kick a policeman to death the ultimate responsibility for his rescue generally rests with a woman who risks her life in blowing his whistle for assistance.

Paragraph (*f*) is concerned with the practical difficulties attending any given scheme of Women's Suffrage. There never was a reform yet that did not bristle with practical difficulties, and no reform worth having was ever defeated by them.

Three possible solutions of these difficulties are held up for reprobation. The concession of the vote to women on the same terms as to men would, we are told, involve an unjust and invidious limitation. It would, but the limitation would be at least less unjust and less invidious than the refusal of the vote to all women; it would not be enough, but it would be a beginning, and no one can suppose that a reform so begun would end without further progress.

To give the franchise to the wives of voters would 'tend to the introduction of political differences into domestic life.' This is the most amazing of all the arguments against Women's Suffrage, and the one of which its supporters are justly most impatient. Consider what it implies. Domestic peace is to be secured by the suppression of opinion—there can be no other meaning; but does any one seriously believe either that educated women can be prevented from thinking about politics, whether Imperial or domestic, or that if they are allowed to think they can be prevented from speaking, or that if they are allowed to speak they can be forced into agreement with the male members of their households by the mere fact that they cannot back their opinions by a vote? Is it not one of the plainest facts of human nature that no argument is so bitter as an argument between those who have the power to give effect to their opinions and those who have not? The domestic peace argument simply relegates political questions to the list of things

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to be discussed when the ladies have left the table; it is at least a hundred years out of date, and it is the most comprehensive insult to the intelligence and the social capacity of men and women alike that this controversy has produced.

Lastly, Adult Suffrage 'seems the inevitable result of admitting the principle,' and this is condemned because it would place the female vote in an overpowering majority. Well, and what then? The extension of the franchise to the working classes placed the working-class voter in an overpowering majority: and if there should ever arise a question upon which the working-class voters went solid against the rest of the country we should be in a difficult and dangerous position. No one really fears that danger; and the danger that the whole of the women of the United Kingdom might some day vote against the whole of the men is at least equally chimerical; but if the whole of the women of the United Kingdom were ever to be united in mere opinion against the whole of the men, we should have reached a crisis in which the question of votes would vanish into insignificance. That is a danger with which all despotic governments have to reckon: and a government which refuses to enfranchise any part of the sex that constitutes an overpowering majority of the nation is a despotic government, however excellent its intentions may be. So long as women are excluded from the franchise, any broadening of the base of power is likely only to fix that despotism more securely, and to make it more than ever sufficient in its own eyes: and the movement for Adult Suffrage might very well end in enfranchising the whole of the mob that shouted for 'Good old Bob Sievier,' and leaving women to get what gratification they could out of that, coupled with the addition of over thirty thousand members to the Primrose League between April and August.

Paragraph (*g*) begins by asserting that England would run a greater risk by adopting Women's Suffrage than those smaller communities which have adopted it. That is true of any action whatever that England may take. We cannot move without risking our heritage; yet the

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true political wisdom consists not in standing still for fear of the risks of moving, but in choosing the right risks to run. The alternative is not safety, but decay; and the deep and growing resentment of the unenfranchised is already a disintegrating force. That resentment will not be quelled either by entreaties to rely upon the virtues and the accessibility of male politicians, nor by the gloomy vaticinations about the 'weakening of the central governing forces of the State.' The women who demand that their sex shall no longer be a bar to the exercise of the Parliamentary franchise, and the men who support them in that demand, are convinced, with a conviction that every day strengthens, that not only the interests of women but the interests of the whole country—of men, women, and children alike—require that their claim shall no longer be denied. We believe that the denial is neither just, nor wise, nor safe. We believe that the Women's Suffrage movement cannot be defeated. We know that there are great forces against it; the comfortable and contented see no necessity for it, for they have never known what necessity means; the ribald and unprincipled of both sexes hate it, for they know that it symbolises a detestation of ribaldry and a determination to save great principles that are in danger; the timorous fear it because they have no courage to help in building up the future of the race; but the alliance of the comfortable and the ribald and the timid is an unholy alliance that cannot prevail.

The last clause of the manifesto of the Anti-Suffrage League ends with an appeal to the patriotism and common sense of the women of England. Their patriotism is to be tested by their willingness to stand aloof from the management of their country's business, and their common sense by their acquiescence in the doctrine that they are for ever unfit to judge of its interests.

Mrs. Humphry Ward, in commending the manifesto to the members of the Anti-Suffrage League, asked for Time, Money, and Zeal to annihilate the movement that she deplors. It is too late. That movement cannot be destroyed without reversing everything that women have

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done and learnt for two generations, without silencing the voice of education, without crushing the spirit of knowledge, without denying duty; and although time, money, and zeal may for a time be forthcoming even in so pitiful a cause, there is no need to fear that we shall suffer the deadly humiliation of its success. 'But, O Iago, the pity of it!'

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19

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National Union
of
Women's Suffrage Societies.

President: Mrs. Fawcett, LL.D.

Offices: 25 Victoria Street, London, S.W.

THIS SOCIETY demands the Vote for Women on the same terms as it is, or may be, granted to men.

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It has no party. It supports the Candidate who declares himself the best friend to the cause of Women.

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It appeals to every one, man or woman, to make the Members of Parliament feel that the Country has spoken.

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The
Meaning
of the
Women's
Movement

Service

versus

Subjection



PUBLISHED BY
THE NATIONAL UNION OF WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE SOCIETIES,
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1913.

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Suffrage Societies does not hold it-
self responsible for the opinions
expressed in this article on ques-
tions other than Women's Suffrage.

The Meaning of the Women's Movement.

SERVICE versus SUBJECTION.

A profound change has taken place during recent years in the general outlook of women, especially in regard to their own lives and their place in the world. To some this change wears the aspect of a limitless hope. It has meant a rebirth of the whole personality, a rise to a higher level of thought, feeling, and will. And as it has made a better thing, for many women, of their individual lives, so they look to it to work a corresponding revolution in society. But to others, undoubtedly, it stands for a great fear. It has seemed to mean the loss and breaking up of lovely and gracious types of womanhood, while it offers no promise of anything sound and beautiful to take their place. Where does the truth lie? How can we who hope show to those who fear that their fears are groundless—that though we are breaking away from the past, it is only from the evil of the past that we would be free—that though we look forward to a new and different future, that future will bear along with it all the best elements of the past, liberated and purified for higher uses and greater ends?

Let us state in its simplest and baldest form what seems to us to be the chief source of wrong in the outlook of the past.

The world has been regarded as a world of men, rather than of men and women in complementary relations. Humanity has been and is often spoken of as though it

meant men, with women as a mere appendage. And it has followed from this that the place assigned to women in the order of humanity is a place of subjection—a place of dependence on the will and pleasure of a man or of men. And so the normal life that has often been set before a woman is to devote herself, with all her energies and all her desires, to securing and attaching to herself some man who will keep and use her for his service or his pleasure.

This may be thought an extreme expression of the average opinion and practice of our day. It is true that in some respects we have advanced beyond this point of view, but the spirit of it is still very widely prevalent. It dominates much of our social and domestic life. It is openly proclaimed in the marriage service of the Church. It shows itself in economic conditions. It still, in many cases, lays a dead hand upon the education of girls. It checks opportunities, suffers grave injustices to pass unheeded, bars the path of progress, and acts as an obstacle to intelligent and responsible service. Finally, it is the root of most of the ugly and evil elements in the relations between men and women.

But there are some who would accept such a description of humanity, and justify it on the ground of the many beautiful and noble types of womanhood that have existed under the old order. They would point out to us the procession of gracious figures that passes before us in the literature that reflects the life of the past centuries, women endowed with tenderness and passion, with surpassing powers of love and sacrifice; sometimes too women of capacity and energy, of gentle dignity or arresting force of character, rising occasionally to heights of heroism. It is true that in countless instances loveable and admirable qualities have found expression in spite of restricted lives and warped conditions, and that some women have emerged, through all the limitations imposed upon them, to a fuller and greater life. And yet we find something lacking, as an ideal for character, in most of these visions of the past. For an ideal

of character must be limited and coloured by the view taken of the place its possessor is to occupy in the world, and the circumstances in which the character is to be displayed. Because too little has been expected of women, because the sphere of their lives, their interests, their activities, has been artificially narrowed, much has been omitted from the ideal of the past which is essential to the development of the highest forms of personality whether of man or of woman. And the limiting factor seems to be this, that the woman is regarded as essentially dependent on the man's will and pleasure, not in the true sense, according to which all are "members one of another," and the man is equally dependent on the woman, but in a false sense which deprives the woman of that personal responsibility for her own life and action without which there can be no "reasonable service."

To serve is not the same thing as to be subject. The supreme Example of service is also the supreme Example of independence in thought and action. Our Lord certainly "called no man Master upon earth." He submitted to the *compulsion* of external authority, but He never subjected Himself voluntarily to the control of another human will. And again, to take an example that is often held up to women for their special guidance, when the great call came to Mary, she did not consult Joseph as to her duty, but took the responsibility and answered for herself, freely, as "the handmaid of the Lord." The highest form of service is the voluntary service of those who are free to choose; and such service is incompatible with a position of subjection. It is in this matter that misunderstanding of the women's movement is most apt to arise: and a clear conception here is momentous for the realization of the meaning and purpose of women's lives. There is no necessary connection, as some would seem to think, between a position of dependence or subjection and that power of love and sacrifice which has long been recognized as one of the chief glories of woman-

hood. It is not, for the most part, those who hold cheap the special womanly gift of love and self sacrifice, but rather those who hold love and sacrifice to be the supreme thing in human life, and more than that, the very centre of the divine truth of things, whose souls are rising in revolt against the old view of the relation of women to men. No doubt there is a reaction in many minds against some of the forms of sacrifice that have too often been demanded of women. All the best things are liable to the worst perversions. There is a form of sacrifice that exalts and saves; but there is also a form of sacrifice that maims the offerer and degrades the receiver. There can be no truly noble life without the spending of self: we must lose our souls if we would save them. But on the other hand, sacrifice as a *motive*, without the vision of an end which the sacrifice is to serve, has been responsible for the wreckage of many noble lives that might have been. If we set aside then the purposeless sacrifice which sane minds repudiate, is it possible to distinguish between the right and the wrong aim of sacrifice? The ultimate aim in every case must be the good of some other; but there may be mistake in the conception of good. The wrong form of sacrifice aims primarily at producing pleasure, while the right form aims at giving and promoting *life*. Generally it will be found, no doubt, that pleasure is a concomitant of right and healthy life. Our distinction means that it is the greater thing, life, not the less, pleasure, that is to be sought as an end. The type of unselfish woman who, in her anxiety to please, sacrifices, it may be, her health, her happiness, her intellectual interests, loses not only her independence, but with it her effectiveness and power to help others. But the woman who has realized the claims of a larger life, and knows that such life can be promoted best by that self-sacrifice of the several members to the whole which at the same time furthers individual development, is rich in all manner of effective service.

We welcome, as one hopeful sign of advance from the

old point of view, the greater emphasis laid in these days on motherhood, as compared with wifehood, as the fruition of a woman's life. The truth of the wifely relation has been so obscured by false opinion and wrong practice that it may be necessary to focus attention for a while on the conception of motherhood, in order that by its means we may attain to a purified and exalted conception of the position of the wife. For wifehood has been too much identified with the lower aim of giving pleasure, while motherhood means essentially the imparting of life. No permanent spiritual relationship is possible on the lower basis; the heights of human fellowship are only reached through co-operation in the ministry of life. In the old ideal of woman's duty, the wife exists first for the man and the man's pleasure, rather than for the child and the life of the future. So the woman's character, the woman's selfhood, must be subservient to the man's desire. She must cultivate the qualities which are best calculated to please men; and these are not necessarily the qualities that will make her greater or better herself, or will best serve the life that is to be. The ideal of man-pleasing, including expectancy of it on the part of men and acquiescence in it on the part of women, is one of the things that tend most to debase and degrade the high companionship of man and woman, which at its best is one of the greatest goods of life. But further, it must be remembered that a large number of women are precluded from the possibility of marriage, at least under the conditions of modern English life. A woman who has made wifehood her ideal and aim, if she remains unmarried, can have but a stunted and unsatisfied existence, and feel that there is no place for her in the world. But with the conception of motherhood it is otherwise; here we at once come face to face with one of the ultimate mysteries of the universe—the sacrifice of self for the giving of life. So understood, actual motherhood is a material symbol of the truth that lies at the heart of all life, whether of man or of God. It is a great idea, full

of inspiration, full of suggestiveness, and equally significant when applied in the literal and material sense or in the spiritual sense that lies behind the other. The home in which the wife thinks mainly of the pleasure of her husband, and subordinates all else to that, is not the home in which the fullest and best life abounds. The wife's personality is cramped, the husband is made narrower and more selfish, and the children suffer, because the stunting of the mother's life involves the stunting of theirs. But if motherhood is the ruling idea, all is subordinated to the aim of giving and promoting life. Husband and wife become partners and comrades for the furthering of all the great ends of life, and the union adds strength and effectiveness to both. The husband gains an intelligent and sympathetic co-worker instead of a tool, a chattel or a toy. The wife no longer thinks it her duty to suppress her own individuality and give up her own interests; she realises that you cannot give life unless you have it, and that she must have life and have it more abundantly if she is rightly to fulfil her function as wife and mother. And the gain of the children is incalculable. The slowness of our advance from generation to generation is doubtless in large measure due to the fact that we have not yet fully substituted the ideal of motherhood for that of wifehood, and that consequently the education of girls, in spite of the great progress made within the last 30 years, is still in many cases lamentably defective, or conducted on altogether wrong lines. There will be more possibility of noble nurture in the average home when all our women are educated for the great uses of life, with the fullest opportunity of training for every natural aptitude, with a liberal culture that shall ensure wide views of men and things, and last but not least, with that active and personal share in the larger life of the community which is the culmination of true education.

But again, married life is not for all women. . How does the ideal of motherhood affect the rest? Surely in this way

—that the literal and actual fulfilment of the idea of motherhood is not the only possible fulfilment. The idea itself is too great to be confined within these material bounds. The surrender of self for the giving of life—if this is what it means, it may and must be fulfilled in many ways. It is the Divine Idea: it is the secret of personality. And so, however firmly we may hold that actual marriage and motherhood is a woman's highest and happiest destiny, yet the absence of actual motherhood does not leave life barren and purposeless for the woman who has taken to herself the spiritual conception of motherhood as the meaning of her life. There are many ways of giving life besides the giving of physical life, and many ways of promoting and strengthening a life already existing. As doctors, nurses, teachers, civil servants, social workers, and in many obscurer ways, all over the civilized world women are fulfilling in different measure the office of motherhood, in serving the larger life of the community, in the physical, moral, social or intellectual sphere. And not the least of the advantages of this ideal is the exacting claim it makes upon the individual woman, to put forth every effort, to develop every power, use every opportunity, and accept every responsibility. That is the meaning of women's demand for a share in political life. We cannot, when once we have made this ideal our own, with all that it involves, acquiesce in any artificial limitations of our activity or our sphere of service. We must share in the fuller life if we are to impart it. To rob ourselves is to rob the larger life whose servants we desire to be. There can be no narrowed sphere of women's duty when that duty is conceived no longer as subservience to the caprice of an individual will, but as self-surrender to the service of the infinite and universal life. The claims of duty, so regarded, are immeasurably higher and harder than before, and we cannot, if we are true to our vision, set them aside. There must be no pandering to feminine weakness, no cultivation of amiable foibles. Any intellectual sloth or

slackness, any neglect of opportunity or cowardice in the face of responsibility, any personal vanity, any indulgence in those emotional excesses which weaken the character and enfeeble the will—all these are now seen to involve disloyalty to the greater life which it is our purpose to serve. Nothing is too great for our aspiration and endeavour; nothing is too small to be worthy of our scrupulous and loyal care.

The false conception of women and their relation to men has been shaken from its secure position, but it is not yet superseded. The effects of it are active in our social life to-day. In London alone, we are told, there are 80,000 women living lives of shame to serve the pleasure of men. That is the natural and inevitable outcome of the old point of view; and that state of things must remain until the point of view is changed. What is needed now is the co-operation of men and women in substituting the true conception for the false—the exaltation of service for the degradation of subservience.

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Why Men Should Work for Women's Suffrage.

—The Wages and—
Employment Question.

By
CHARLES V. DRYSDALE, D.Sc.

Published by the
Men's League for Women's Suffrage, 136, St. Stephen's House,
Westminster, S.W.

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WESTMINSTER.

This League was founded in 1907 in order to enable men sympathisers with the cause of Women's Suffrage to band themselves into a separate organisation, and thus to concentrate the electoral strength of the movement. It is non-party and non-militant, but contains sympathisers with all phases of the Women's Suffrage movement, and it has given help in all constitutional ways to Women's Suffrage Societies of every kind.

All men are earnestly invited to join, and help to secure justice for women.

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WHY MEN SHOULD WORK FOR WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE.

WHY should men take an active part in helping to secure women's suffrage? Those who have been carrying on the fight for the last few years have observed that a very large proportion of men have become increasingly sympathetic to the women's demand. Large crowds, principally of men, gather in the parks to listen attentively to speeches from men and women advocates of women's suffrage, and testify to their appreciation of the arguments concerning the justice of the cause. They realise that women, as workers, wives, and mothers, perform services to the community which entitle them to recognition; that many of them pay taxes which give them a right to a voice in their amount and expenditure; and that if men may occasionally be called upon to fight for their country, women have to fight the never ceasing battle of maternity which provides its "physical force," a battle which wounds and kills far greater numbers than the most sanguinary war. They also appreciate the fact that women as mothers have the strongest possible interest in the community and the Empire, and that the value of their work has been testified to, wherever opportunity has been given them to do it. Lastly, they realise that women are heavily handicapped by their unrepresented state, as men were before the Reform Bill of 1867, that the marriage and divorce laws are grossly unfair to them, that girls are insufficiently protected, that women's wages are extremely low, and that attempts at improved legislation are balked by the want of political power of those who are oppressed.* All these things they realise are true, whatever anti-suffragists may say to the contrary, and the commonest

* e.g. The recent White Slave Traffic Bill which was "talked out" by Sir F. Banbury (an Anti-Suffragist) after being introduced time after time. It is now receiving attention owing to the persistent agitation of the Suffragists.

dictates of justice and chivalry demand that men should come forward in their numbers to help women to gain the same rights and protection that they have made such struggles to obtain for themselves. Fortunately, for the honour of British men, there are large numbers who have recognised the duty and privilege of assisting in this noble fight; and the number of men who have joined the Men's League for Women's Suffrage, and other men's organisations, which are earnestly working for women's suffrage, independently of all feminine influence, is a testimony to the fact that true chivalry is not dead but is awakening, and that some Britons not only repudiate slavery for themselves and for black men, but for the women of their own race.

On the other hand it must be regretted that for the thousands who are actively helping the cause and the hundreds who are actively opposing (and who are just as useful to it), there are tens or hundreds of thousands of men who are passively sympathetic, who will attend meetings and stand by while the finest women of our country are pouring out their strength in the fight, sacrificing themselves in every way they deem useful for the cause, besides withdrawing their magnificent energies from other causes which need their help, because they feel that this help cannot be effective without political power. They are touched by the proofs which the women bring forward of the injustices under which they suffer, and of their helpless state; but the injustices which would make the blood of Englishmen boil if inflicted on themselves, and which would probably lead to riots or revolutions in which life and property would be sacrificed on a huge scale, leave them comparatively cold and indifferent when the women they profess to love and cherish are concerned. All that can be done with such people is either to shame them into action, or, better still, to show them that these injustices re-act on themselves, and that they suffer in their own pockets and in the security of their livelihood by allowing them to continue. No doubt can exist in the mind of any rational person who has given any attention to the subject that this is the

case, and that the wages or salaries and the security of employment of men are most seriously affected by their refusal to put women upon a social and political equality with themselves. At the present time we are passing through a period of acute labour unrest, wages have fallen in comparison with the cost of living, and we have recently experienced times of severe unemployment. The causes of these painful phenomena are no doubt complex, but a very little examination will show that the position of women is at least one very important factor in the situation, and that little improvement can be expected while women remain politically unrepresented.

Economic Theory of Wages and Unemployment.

The fundamental basis of wages is demand and supply. If demand increases and supply is stationary, wages rise; if the supply of labourers increases faster than the demand, wages tend to fall. Many anti-suffragists, including Mrs. Humphrey Ward, therefore contend that the franchise has no effect upon wages, and they actually bring forward the writings of Mrs. Fawcett and other economists in support of this contention. But this is a gross misrepresentation of the position. In dealing with the general theory of wages, the economist is concerned with the average gains of the whole working classes, and it is certainly true that in a free community this is a matter over which legislation has comparatively little control. But as regards certain trades or classes of labour, no person with the least pretension to intelligence can deny that combination and legislation can have a very great effect upon wages *because they can influence both demand and supply in those industries*, and the whole history of Trades Unionism clearly shows it. Under unrestricted conditions supply of labour always tends to increase more rapidly than the means of subsistence, and real wages therefore tend to fall to the minimum upon which life can be supported. This is well known as the "iron law of wages" of Lasalle, and long before it was recognised as an economic law it was felt and combatted by the Trades Unions. By combining the workers in each




FIG. 1.

trade into a Guild or Union, and limiting the number of apprentices, they restricted the supply of labour in the particular trade, and were thereby able to maintain or even raise wages *provided that they could prevent the employment of non-union labour*. All the various professional societies, legal, medical, engineering, etc., are similarly, in principle, devices for limiting the supply of labour in the profession, by imposing a certain standard of qualification, and, frequently, a minimum scale of fees; and, at the same time, by securing some legal recognition, which militates against the employment of outsiders. So far, the question appears to be chiefly one of voluntary combination, and this was sufficient in the old days of handicrafts and sharply defined trades, and in the days when population was frequently checked by pestilence and wars. But with the great rise of industrialism and machinery, with the consequent sub-division of labour, the power of the Trades Unions became considerably reduced, and it has become increasingly necessary for the workers as a whole to obtain political power if they are to secure a minimum and increasing standard of comfort for all. The power that has been obtained by them since their admission to the franchise in 1867 and the formation of the Labour Party is notorious, and the recent securing of the minimum wage principle after the coal strike is a clear proof of this power, and that it enables them to secure the best conditions that the economic situation admits of.

An actual illustration of this fact is shown by the annexed diagram (Fig. 1), which shows the variation of wages and cost of living from 1850, as given by the Local Government Board in 1909, and employed by Professor Ashley in his well-known enquiry into the cost of living.* In order to make the effect of these changes in the conditions of the working classes more clearly visible, a third line marked "real wages" has been added, obtained by dividing the "wages" by the "prices." It will be seen that in 1867, when the Reform Bill was

* *Pall Mall Gazette*, 28th March, 1912.

passed, the real wages, or the purchasing power of wages, were exactly the same as in 1850, but from then to 1896 they rose over 100 per cent., owing to a maintaining or increase of money wages, while prices fell. Since 1896 prices have risen without a material increase of money wages, and the purchasing power of wages has therefore dropped. This is admitted by most authorities to be the principal cause of labour unrest, and it is certainly the best justification for it.

Women in Industry.

We now come to the entry of women into the industrial world. The majority of anti-suffragists are fond of telling us that woman's place is the home. So it used to be, and so women as an average would perhaps be pleased for it to remain. But men have not allowed it to remain so. At the commencement of last century the numbers of the sexes in Great Britain were approximately equal (5,450,000 males, 5,492,000 females). But since that time the great development of our Empire has taken place, and young men have emigrated in large numbers, leaving their women-folk behind and unprovided for. Owing to this and other causes the disproportion between the sexes has increased, until in 1909 there was an excess of women of a million and a third (19,650,000 males, 20,983,576 females), and this excess is principally in the marriageable ages. It is therefore absolutely futile as well as cruel to say that woman's place is the home, when this million and a third can have no hope of marriage, and an even greater additional number are unlikely to marry, in view of the ever increasing inability or disinclination of men to support wives and families. According to the Registrar-General's Report for 1909,* only 60.5 per cent. of women above 15 years of age were married, as shown by the 1901 census, and the percentage appears to be still falling. The number of women engaged in the industries has therefore necessarily gone on increasing, and it has now reached about five and a half

* p. xi.

millions* in the United Kingdom. In most European countries the number of women in various employments is about half that of men, but being unorganised and unrepresented their remuneration is very low. According to Miss McArthur the average wage of women workers in this country is only 7s. 6d. per week,† and many receive 4s. 6d. or less. It is no wonder that many of them are driven to sell themselves, and it is becoming more and more recognised that the horrible economic position of woman is the chief cause of prostitution. In most European countries the average wage for women is not much over half that obtained by men, as will be seen by the Appendix.

It will, of course, be said that women's work is frequently less skilled or less productive than that of men; and this is no doubt true at present, although less true than is generally assumed. But there is one case in which no one who has the least pretence to knowledge of the subject can suggest that the greater skill or effectiveness lies with men, and that is the case of teachers in elementary schools. On the contrary, women have not only to go through the same training and pass the same examinations, but they are certainly more conscientious, and frequently more capable, and they are often willing to give a great deal of voluntary work. And yet the difference in their salaries starts from the very commencement, even when neither youths nor girls are supposed to be self-supporting. This is by no means the worst, but it is the most clearly defined example of the injustice under which women suffer. In the Appendix is shown the Official list of salaries in the case of the London County Council, as well as in New York, France, Germany, etc. In London, women teachers receive 90 per cent. down to 75 per cent. of the salaries of men for the same qualifications and work. In New York, women teachers obtained, until last year, only from 50 to 60 per cent. of the remuneration of male teachers, although the women are officially admitted to be better teachers and disciplinarians. In

* 5,310,000 at the Census of 1901. Webb's Dictionary of Statistics, p. 428

† Evidence before the Select Committee on Home Work, 1907, p. 139.

France women teachers receive 70 to 85 per cent. of the men's salaries, and in Germany 65 per cent. (in a few German towns the commencing salaries are equal). In Holland and in Sweden, so far as I have been able to ascertain, teachers salaries used to be equal, but the men have gained increases lately, leaving the women behind.

But anti-suffragists tell us that the vote has no effect upon wages. It is amusing to hear this remark from them, as a great many profess to be Imperialists and Tariff Reformers, and promise wonderful improvements in wages if people will only vote for Tariff Reform. And among advanced Liberals the idea is no less prevalent that by redistribution of wealth and land, such as can be produced by legislation of the Lloyd George variety, the gains of the working classes would be greatly increased. All that can be said is, that if votes have no effect upon wages, the utterances of both political parties at elections are terminological inexactitudes. And when we have just seen that a vote in Parliament has enabled our legislators to give themselves salaries of £400 a year, it is going a little too far to suggest that there is no connection between political representation and wages.* In Government employment it is perfectly evident that the consideration given to the employees depends greatly on their political power, and we have recently had a flagrant case of bad faith as regards women in the case of the Post Office, where the present Postmaster-General, Mr. H. Samuel, in the early part of this year, suddenly decided to introduce a new grade of women clerks at a lower salary with longer hours, which would have rendered the scale of payment fixed by the Hobhouse Committee a few years ago to all intents and purposes a dead letter. This project caused a storm of indignation among Women Postal Clerks, and it has been partially dropped, but it

* The strong belief of Anti-Suffrage men as to the power of the vote was vividly shown to the present writer when addressing a large crowd of hostile men a few months ago on the subject of Women's Suffrage. As they ridiculed the idea that the enfranchisement of women would improve their economic position, I stopped short and asked those men who did not believe that their economic position would have been worse if their class had not been enfranchised to raise their hands. Not one single hand went up from among at least 500 men present.

still appears to be enforced in the Telephone Department, and there is no doubt that a few years ago it would have been adopted without any possibility of effective action against it.

Again, not only is the Government a very large employer of labour in itself, but it is indirectly responsible for a great deal of employment through the contracts it gives out. Do the anti-suffragists forget that within the last few years the Government have been forced to insert a fair wages clause into their contracts, and do they suppose that this, or the miners' minimum wage bill would have been obtained without the pressure of the working class vote? But there is no fair wage clause as regards women, or no attempt to render one operative. As Mr. Lloyd George, who as Chancellor of the Exchequer has the greatest knowledge concerning the payments in Government service has said :*

"That inequality would be impossible if women had the same right to vote, and therefore to call the Government to account, as men have. And this is one of the greatest arguments for women's suffrage."

According to Mrs. Ramsay Macdonald in giving evidence before the Select Committee on Home Work in 1907, employers simply laughed when asked if they paid a fair wage to women. Nobody ever came to inspect or to see what they paid.† Does this not show beyond any possibility of dispute how the absence of representative power enables the Government to ignore the interests of any class of the community? There is no need to give illustrations of the terribly low wages obtained by the women sweated workers, as instances of them frequently appear in the newspapers.

Displacement of Men.

As indicated at the outset, however, the object of the present pamphlet is not so much to call attention to the glaring injustices under which women suffer, but to show men that they are very seriously injuring their

* Speech at the Albert Hall, December 5th, 1908.

† "Votes and Wages," Miss Royden, p. 8.

own interests by allowing these inequalities to continue. If two persons, equal in other respects, apply for a situation, the one who will take the lower salary will get it; and, even if he or she is less efficient, the position will as a rule be obtained if the salary accepted is low enough. It is for this reason that Trade Unions, besides maintaining the standard and restricting the number of their members, have always fought so fiercely against the employment of non-union labour, and in the recent strikes and elections this has been a very prominent feature, as well as the question of picketing against "blacklegs." It is sheer nonsense to pretend that the vote has no influence in such matters, and thus upon the rate of wages for union labour. In the early days of industry, before machinery and unskilled labour played such a prominent part, the Unions were fairly easily able to keep the field to themselves, but it has become increasingly difficult of late, especially after the Osborne judgment, which the Labour party is bent on reversing. But, above all, the most serious factor in the situation has been the exceedingly rapid incursion of unorganised and unrepresented women into the labour market, owing to the causes which have already been discussed. At first the men regarded this incursion as of little importance, they made no effort to get the women into their Unions, and were perfectly content to see them taking "pocket money" wages. When a strike took place they would ask the women to strike with them, and the latter generally complied, but if the women ventured to make a claim for the increase of their own wages, they were generally told that this would make the position more difficult, and that if they would forbear to make any claims for themselves the men would help them later. These pledges, like those of many Members of Parliament, being made to women, were never kept, and the women frequently underwent all the privations of a strike to go back to the same conditions. But every time men's wages went up and women's remained low, employers began to take on more women, and men were frequently told to go home and to send their wives in

their stead. Every man who is engaged as an employee realises bitterly to-day how women are coming in and under-selling him, and how difficult it is for him to raise his salary and feel secure of his position.

The facts as regards the entry of women into the labour market are vividly shown by the annexed diagram (Fig. 2), made from the figures compiled by Sir C. Booth.* According to this, in 1841 the number of men engaged in a certain group of industries was 1,030,600, and of women only 463,600, or less than half. By 1891 the men had increased to 1,576,100, and the women had nearly caught up, being 1,447,500. In the succeeding ten years the increase of the number of men was much slower and of the women much faster, and the result was a change over to 1,762,445 women and 1,652,422 men. Probably this will be found even more manifest when the census figures of 1911 come to be published.

The next diagram shows the proportion of women to men employees (Fig. 3) in different industries, according to Webb's Dictionary of Statistics. Of twenty industries cited by him the proportion of women has rapidly risen in the fifteen more important ones, and has only fallen in such relatively small industries as laundry work, strawplaiting, lacemaking, etc. The proportion of women clerks has increased thirty fold over the whole period, and of telegraph and telephone clerks five fold, and so on.

All the evidence goes to confirm the hardly questioned statement, that women are coming more and more into the labour market, and are taking away men's work. And what is the reason? Simply cheapness, due to the uncombined and unrepresented state of women. It is all very well for men to stand idly by and let the women be "exploited" on account of their comparatively helpless position, but in so doing they have cast aside the experience of the last three hundred years or more, and have relegated women to the class of "blacklegs" who are underselling them and casting them out of employment, however unwillingly.

* Quoted in "Why Women Need the Vote," Mrs. C. Osler, p. 14.

**NUMBER OF MEN & WOMEN EMPLOYED
IN A GROUP OF TRADES.**

(RT. HON. C. BOOTH)




FIG. 2

**NUMBER OF WOMEN PER 1000 WORKERS
IN VARIOUS TRADES.**




FIG. 3.

We have said that the case of the teachers is one of the clearest as regards the unequal pay of women. It also affords the clearest example of the injury done to men by their selfish indifference, or even hostility, to the claims of women. In our own country there is little competition between men and women elementary teachers, as the former are almost universally appointed to boys' and the latter to girls and infants' schools; but in the United States there is no rule against women teaching in boys' schools and there is therefore free competition between them and men teachers. It was mentioned above that in New York State the salaries of the women teachers were only from 50 to 60 per cent. of those of men, although the superior efficiency of the women is admitted; and that the women teachers had made several strong efforts to obtain equal pay ever since 1862 and had been rebuffed because of their unrepresented state and because of the hostility of the represented male teachers. And the result which has followed is a vivid illustration of our proposition, and ought to give the keenest pleasure to lovers of justice. Associate Superintendent Edson wrote in Superintendent Maxwell's Tenth Annual Report as follows:—"The usual scarcity of teachers prevailed until near the close of the school year, when a special examination was held in the month of April, 1908, to accommodate teachers from outside the city." "On the other hand the employment of men involves greatly increased expense. As a business proposition, therefore, it does not seem wise *or necessary* to have a large number of men in any teaching corps. As far as any *necessity* exists *a few will do as well as more.*"* Here is the economic question put in a nutshell without any beating about the bush. And this opinion seems to have been accepted by the authorities.

"It is often stated that 'Equal Pay' will drive men out of the schools. It is evident that 'Unequal Pay' is *keeping* them out. The daily press for over a year has contained letters from these men teachers, complaining that they are not appointed, and the men on

* Equal Pay for Equal Work," p. 108.

the eligible list have now organised into what is called 'The Association of Unappointed Men Teachers.' They have compiled facts showing that since June, 1908, 1,500 women and only 39 men have been appointed. This Association has recently presented a petition to the Board of Education, praying for appointment.

"Following are some samples of their plaints:—

"Letters to *Globe*—

"October 13, 1909: 'Since February, 1908, 196 have passed the examination. Only 15 appointed.' 'To see over 1,000 women and young girls (many of whom had barely succeeded in getting the necessary rating of 70 per cent., and had not yet demonstrated their capability) appointed before them. To bitterly realise that most of these girls appointed had passed the examinations later than they.'

"May 17, 1909: 'Three men out of a total of over 100 were appointed last month. And as it happened one of the three was a re-instated teacher at that. The merging of the present and the coming eligible list will mean that some of us, already despairingly distant from the top, will be pushed still further down into the realm of almost utter hopelessness.' 'The men on the No. One list this year seem to be singularly fortunate (?). They were notified of their having passed way back in July. . . . The schools open and no men are appointed. They wait two months, and have the pleasure of witnessing the enlivening spectacle of 250 women appointed and no men. They wait another month and see the entire list of women appointed, and still no men, etc.' " And an official report of the Board of Education, Nov. 10, 1909, stated that 300 vacancies existed at a certain time, "most of which were filled by the appointment at the last meeting of the Board of 250 women and 24 men." *So serious had the matter become that last year, after more than fifty years of agitation, equal pay was at last secured for the teachers of New York in 1911—although complete women's suffrage is not yet granted there. The women's suffrage agitation has, however, recently attained great dimensions in

* "Equal Pay for Equal Work," p. 110.

New York, and has very probably had a considerable influence upon bringing about this result.

During the present writer's visit to Stockholm last year in connection with the great Congress of the International Women Suffrage Alliance, he took the opportunity of enquiring into the position of men and women teachers in Sweden. The information obtained was not official but is believed to be correct, and it was unchallenged when given at a public meeting in Stockholm. It appears that, until about ten years ago the salaries of men and women teachers were equal all over Sweden, and their numbers were approximately equal. Since that time, however, an agitation sprang up among the teachers in Stockholm for a rise of salaries, in consequence of the increased cost of living, and the men teachers being represented got it, while the women did not. *To-day it appears that four-fifths of the teachers in Stockholm are women.* And this cannot be because the men have better opportunities in other directions, as the emigration from Sweden is very great.

Finally, one of the clearest examples of the displacement of men by the cheapness of women's labour has just been given in Germany, in which women hold almost the lowest position obtaining in any civilised country. In order to meet its vast military and naval expenditure, the German Government finds itself forced to economise, and it has just been stated that as a measure of economy 8,600 male Post Office employees are to be replaced by women,* in order to save £300,000 a year in wages. And, according to Sir Francis Oppenheimer, the British Consul-General in Germany, the same thing prevails throughout the country.†

"There is one detail specially deserving of comment, which is characteristic of the general commercial situation. *Female labour has again increased in 1910 (as it had already increased in 1909).* Since 1905 the returns show that female labour has multiplied by one-third,

* *Daily Mail*, 24th June, 1912.

† *Daily Mail Year Book*, 1912, p. 230.

after making due allowance for the growth of population. The steady extension of female labour is due to a determined effort to reduce at least to that extent the total cost of manufacture, because the finishing industries, with the high price of their raw material, find it difficult to make both ends meet. The increasing use of female labour is quoted to explain why the wages for male labour have not yet reached the level of the last boom, though there was great activity, and though the cost of living is still increasing."

Doubtless many other even more glaring instances could be found, but the foregoing ought to be sufficient to convince every sane man that he is simply committing economic suicide by permitting this inequality of wages to continue. It must be remembered that this evil, like many others, is cumulative; and that the displacement of men by women means that fewer men still will be able to marry and that more women still will be forced into the labour market. Unless something is done, and done quickly, to stop this process, the next generation will probably find that man's place is the home, while the women go out to earn a pittance to support themselves and their men dependants.

The Cure of the Evil.

What can be done to check this tendency? Obviously there are two courses. The first, and apparently the more direct, is to debar women from the industries. Mr. John Burns has recently stated that the employment of women must be greatly reduced, and the Factory Acts which have ostensibly been passed in the interests of women are merely ingenious subterfuges for reducing women's value and thereby injuring their prospects of obtaining employment. Only a few months ago a bill for the abolition of barmaids was proposed, and was only rejected by the indignant agitation of the suffragists. Just lately Lord Curzon has given as a reason for refusing the vote to women, that their action in resisting such limitations upon their labour showed their inability to realise what was good for their own interest. What his remarks did show was the absolute inability

of Lord Curzon, in common with many other men, to realise the conditions under which women work; and the necessity for their enfranchisement, in order to teach such men as Mr. John Burns and Lord Curzon that when it is a choice between unpleasant labour and starvation, women have to claim the former.

But in any case the answer to those who would restrict women's labour, without consideration of their sufferings, is that it is now too late. When five and a half millions of women are already in the industries, and all the weight of the employing classes is in favour of retaining them on account of their cheapness, it is hardly likely that any legislation in that direction will be successful. Moreover, there are, fortunately, a fair number of Parliamentary representatives who are sufficiently favourable to the women's cause to repel such attacks. The only thing therefore for men to do, is what they should have done at the outset, to recognise that a woman has precisely the same human rights and privileges as a man, and to help women to combine and to obtain equal pay for equal work, so that they shall no longer be chosen on account of cheapness.

There are many who will appreciate this point, but who say immediately, "Why don't the women combine into Trade Unions and let the vote alone." The answer is that there is no advantage in gradually climbing up a steep staircase as the men have done, if there is a lift ready to take one up rapidly. It has already been said that the great diversity of modern work makes combination much more difficult than formerly. But apart from this, where women have combined, as in the Post Office and the Teaching profession, their wages have rarely approached that of men, and they are still liable to incursions such as that of the Postmaster-General already referred to, and which they are almost powerless to resist. And, in addition to theory, experience shows that the possession of the parliamentary franchise is the most rapid and direct step to equalisation of remuneration. In Wyoming, where women's suffrage was passed as far back as 1869, a measure of equal pay for teachers was passed almost simultaneously.

In Utah, where women were enfranchised in 1896, equal pay for teachers was granted the same year. Idaho also appears to have equal pay for teachers. "In Colorado there is equal pay for teachers, clerks, and stenographers, and in all State employment."* Women's suffrage has also been granted quite recently in Washington and California, but there has not yet been time for much legislation. We see, however, that in the only four States where women have been long enfranchised their pay *has* been equalised.

Turning to our own Empire, New Zealand granted the suffrage to women in 1893. A general election in which women voted took place in the same year, and returned the party to power which passed the Arbitration Act in 1894. A minimum wage has since been fixed which is equal for men and women, and both in educational and other State employments equal pay for equal work is the rule. The Amendment to the Education Act, passed in 1908, put women teachers on a complete equality with men.†

"In Australia the wages of men and women throughout the Federal Public Service are equal, and in the Junior Grade of the State Education Department there is an equal minimum wage for men and women. Women Inspectors have been appointed in all Government institutions.‡ The Federal Public Service Act embodying these reforms was passed in 1903, the year following the grant of the Commonwealth Franchise to Women.§

The only other countries in which women's suffrage has been granted are Finland (1906), Norway (1907), and Iceland (1911). In Finland 26 Bills were introduced by the women into the first Diet, containing the majority of the reforms which women have obtained in other countries, but the interference with the constitution by Russia stopped all progress. Norway does not appear to have made any agitation concerning women's wages,

* "How Women Use the Vote," by Maude Royden, p. 10.

† According to the New Zealand Year Book for 1911 there are only 140 women teachers per 100 men teachers in New Zealand, as against 323-456 in England and Scotland.

‡ "How Women Use the Vote," p. 11.

§ Miss M. Hodge. "Report of International W.S. Alliance," 1911, p. 76.

but in Iceland a woman has been appointed mistress of one of the largest commercial schools and has been granted the same salary as that of men in similar positions.*

We therefore see that of the eleven countries or states in which women's suffrage has been granted, equalisation of wages has followed almost immediately in seven of them, while of the remaining four, three have as yet hardly had an opportunity of carrying out legislation. It cannot be doubted that Washington and California will soon follow the example of the other suffrage States of America. Whatever anti-suffragists may say to the contrary, therefore, women's suffrage *has* brought about an increase of women's wages in a large majority of cases in a very short time, and there is every justification for supposing that it would do the same in this country. Surely, after this, men will realise that the most rapid step towards the removal of the excessive and unfair competition of women, and securing greater security of employment for themselves, will be to enfranchise women.

As this is being sent to the press the following appears in the *Standard* of July 4th, 1912. Will anyone pretend that it has no relation to our vigorous women's suffrage agitation?

"EQUALITY OF SEXES."

An interesting innovation was agreed to without dissent at the County Council Education Committee yesterday, when Miss T. M. Morton and Mr. H. Peploe were appointed principal organisers of Children's Care Work, each at a salary of £350 a year. This is the first time that the Council have recognised the principle of equal pay for similar work for men and women."

This example, like that of the New York teachers, will doubtless be seized upon by the anti-suffragists as showing that women can obtain equalisation or improvement of their wages before securing the suffrage. No suffragist denies this. But it has taken nearly fifty years of agitation to secure this reform in New York; and it, as well as the L.C.C. example above, has not

* "Report of the International W.S. Alliance," 1911, p. 111.


occurred until a strong women's suffrage organisation has been built up, with all its cost of work and funds. Are the women to have to build up these great organisations again in order to redress each single grievance, or should they press forward to secure once for all that representation which ensures that their interests in all departments shall be steadily kept in view? No rational, honourable person can hesitate as to the answer.

Will Raising Women's Wages Lower those of Men.

One further point in conclusion. Admitting, as reasonable men must, that the political recognition of women will lead to equalisation of wages, will this lead to a raising of women's wages to those of men, or to a depression of men's wages? It has been contended that in all cases where equalisation has been brought about, men's wages have fallen part of the way to meet the women's.

It is not easy to give a general answer to this question, as it depends very much on the industrial conditions of the country. In the case of manufactured articles, where severe competition exists with other countries, it would very likely be impossible to bring up the wages of women to those of men at a jump, and it might pay men, in order to regain their footing, to accept somewhat lower wages. But there would be no more necessity for them to do so than at present, and in fact less, as it is clear that men earning say 25s. have less to fear from the competition of women at 15s. than from that of women at 7s. It is difficult to see, therefore, in the industrial labour market, how men could lose by it, while it is clear that they would stand to gain. The difficulty lies rather in the Government Services, where the increase of women's remuneration to that of men would certainly be a serious charge on the Budget. It is not easy to obtain evidence on this point, as legislation affecting the salaries of Government employees is generally accompanied by administrative reforms which make it difficult to ascertain whether the work is the same or not. For example,

SALARIES OF NEW YORK TEACHERS BEFORE & AFTER EQUALISATION



THICK LINES BEFORE EQUALISATION IN 1911
SHADED PORTION AFTER " " "
FIGURES 1-13 REFER TO YEARS OF SERVICE

FIG. 4.

the equalisation of salaries of women with men teachers in New York last year was accompanied by a distinction between kindergarten and other elementary teachers which had not previously existed; and the schedules concerning elementary teachers do not show whether the work is of the same class as before or not. But there seem to be two classes which have remained unchanged—that of assistant teachers in high schools and in training schools. Before the equalisation of salaries, assistant teachers commenced at \$1,100 for women and \$1,300 for men, rising to \$1,900 and \$2,400 respectively in the eleventh year of service. Since the equalisation the commencing salary is \$900-1,000 for each, which is less than for either sex before, but it rises to \$2,450 in the eleventh year, or to more than for either sex previously, and continues rising to \$2,750 in the thirteenth year instead of stopping at the eleventh.* At the same time it was enacted that those previously appointed who would lose under the new schedule should continue to be paid on the old scale. Such a rule is almost invariable in governmental changes, and men already engaged need have little fear of being prejudicially affected by the equalisation. The changes introduced by this law are clearly shown in the diagram (Fig. 4), in which the scale of salaries for men and women separately are shown by the thick lines, and that for men and women together after equalisation by the shaded portion. I am informed by Miss Royden, who has just returned from New York, that a much larger proportion of men teachers have been appointed since the equalisation took place.

There is a most important reason, however, why women's enfranchisement should ultimately lead to a great increase of the remuneration and prosperity of the working classes. It has already been pointed out that the average wage of labour, apart from differences between men and women or between one trade or profession or another, depends upon the rates of total supply to total demand. The average wage has re-

* Official Schedule of Teachers' Salaries, Document No. 1, 1912. Adopted by the Board of Education of the City of New York.

mained low despite all improvements, not only because of the want of combination of women, but because of the over supply of labour. John Stuart Mill, whose zeal for the working classes is so well known, not only brought forward the first Women's Suffrage Amendment in 1867 on the grounds of justice, but in his "Political Economy"* he says: "On the present occasion I shall only indicate, among the probable consequences of the industrial and social independence of women, a great diminution of the evil of over-population." And in the previous chapter he says: "Hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human being. They have enabled a greater population to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment, and an increased number of manufacturers and others to make fortunes. They have increased the comforts of the middle classes. But they have not yet begun to effect those great changes in human destiny which it is their nature and in their futurity to accomplish. Only when in addition to just institutions the increase of mankind shall be under the deliberate guidance of judicious foresight, can the conquests made from the powers of nature by the intellect and energy of scientific discoveries, become the common property of the species, and the means of improving and elevating the universal lot."

Mrs. Fawcett, the pioneer in the women's suffrage movement, in her "Political Economy for Beginners," says (Section III., chapter II.):—

"The cheap food, which the repeal of the Corn Laws brought to England, has stimulated a vast increase of population; the benefit which might have been derived from a plentiful supply of cheap food has been absorbed by the demands of millions of hungry mouths. The principal effect, on the labourer, produced by the repeal of the corn laws, is that cheap food has enabled him, not to live in greater comfort, but to support an increased number of children. Such considerations lead to the conclusion that no material improvement in the con-

* Book iv., Chapter vii., Sec. 3.

dition of the working classes can be permanent unless it is accompanied by circumstances which will prevent a counterbalancing increase of population."

The same view has been strongly expressed by the Dean of St. Paul's, Dr. W. R. Inge, who has recently said that in his opinion the main cause of the labour unrest is the excessive increase of numbers in this country and the breeding from inferior stocks. "As long as our social reformers and agitators shirk these problems, I find it difficult to have much confidence in their intelligence or honesty." Is it not clear that this is a question which above all concerns women? We need not fear that emancipated, economically independent women will flood the labour market with unwanted or unfit children; and experience shows that enfranchised women do not do so, the prosperity of New Zealand and Australia being continually brought to our attention. On all grounds of economic betterment and industrial and national efficiency, thinking men will realise that the political recognition of women and their education in full national responsibility which will result from it, is the most practicable, indeed the indispensable requisite. *Even supposing that women did not want the vote, it is just as necessary for men to induce them to do so, as it is for members of a trade-union to get all men in their industry enrolled in their society.*

The Men's League for Women's Suffrage therefore most earnestly calls upon all men to band themselves together in the interests of men, women, and children and the nation, with the determination to see this far too long delayed measure of justice to women carried into law.

NOTE.—*The statements made in this pamphlet are given on the best authorities I have been able to find, and in most cases have been checked by reference to two or more publications. I should, however, be very glad if any reader would give me references to any official publications in which such information occurs, and shall be pleased to acknowledge and correct any errors, if such are proved.*

C. V. D.

APPENDIX.

A—United Kingdom Census, 1901.

14th Abstract of Labour Statistics, Board of Trade, 1908-09, p. 257.

MALE AND FEMALE POPULATION AT DIFFERENT AGES.

	Under 20.	20—50.	Over 50.	Total.
Males ...	8,781,653	8,407,009	2,913,746	20,102,408
Females	8,787,355	9,170,436	3,398,522	21,356,313
Males & Females }	17,569,008	17,577,445	6,312,268	41,458,721
Excess of Females }	5,702	763,427	484,776	1,253,905

CENSUS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, 1911.

Persons.	Males.	Females.	Excess of Females.
36,070,492	17,445,608	18,624,884	1,179,276
Excess of Females 6.8%.			

NUMBER OF MALES AND FEMALES EMPLOYED.

Census 1901.

	England and Wales.	Scotland.	Ireland.	United Kingdom.
Males	10,156,976	1,391,188	1,403,022	12,951,186
Females	4,171,751	591,624	546,585	5,309,960
Total	14,328,727	1,982,812	1,949,607	18,261,146

TEXTILE FACTORIES.

14th Abstract of Labour Statistics, p. 273.

	1895.	1896.	1897.	1898.
Males	411,881	412,841	396,851	387,583
	1901.	1904.	1907.	
	379,211	382,835	407,360	
Females	663,870	664,846	654,713	648,987
	1901.	1904.	1907.	
	650,142	643,543	679,863	

It will be observed that not only is the number of women employed in these factories 60 per cent. above that of men, but that in 1907 there were fewer men employed than in 1895, while the number of women had materially increased.

B—Average Daily Wages of Workers.

AVERAGE WAGES OF MEN AND WOMEN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Men.

Prof. Bowley gives the number of men employed in regular occupations as about 8,000,000, with the following wages (including valuation for payment in kind). (See *Daily Mail Handbook*, 1912, p. 45).

Under 15s. ...	320,000	Average about 30/- per week.
15s. to 20s. ...	640,000	
20s. to 25s. ...	1,600,000	
25s. to 30s. ...	1,680,000	
30s. to 35s. ...	1,680,000	
35s. to 40s. ...	1,040,000	
40s. to 45s. ...	560,000	
Over 45s. ...	480,000	

Women.

Miss Mary Macarthur, in her evidence before the Select Committee on Home Work, p. 139, Sec. 2,573, estimates the average weekly wage earned by the industrial woman as 7s.

Others have given it as from 7s. to 7s. 7d.

M. L. de Pessargevsky. *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris. August, September, 1911.*

	FRANCS PER DAY.		Women.
	Men. Skilled.	Unskilled.	
Denmark—Capital	6.69	5.39	2.89
Provincial Towns	5.25	4.5	2.40
Country	4.63	4.17	2.71
Average	5.81	4.70	2.71
Germany ...	4.46		2.36
Baden ...	2.43		1.82
Belgium—Textile Workers	2.80		1.92
France ...	3.90		2.10
U.S.A. ...	9.85		5.60

It must, of course, be understood that the above figures are the average for all trades and not for equal work.

C—Salaries in Educational Work.

I.—WHERE WOMEN ARE UNENFRANCHISED.

London County Council.

	Masters.	Mistresses.
Student Teachers: Free training and	£55	£30
Certificated on 2nd year's papers—		
First year	£100	£90
With 6 or more years' service	£125	£102
With University degree—		
* Commencing	£110	£100
Maximum	£200	£150
Head Teachers—		
201-400 pupils	£200-£300	£150-£225
Above 401 pupils	£300-£400	£225-£300

France.†

	Francs.	Francs.
Professors—Paris	5,500-9,000	4,100-6,900
Departements	3,700-6,200	3,000-5,400
Drawing	2,900-4,900	2,000-4,000
Gymnasium	1,600-2,600	1,400-2,200
Economes	4,000-6,000	2,600-4,600
Sous-Economes	2,600-4,600	2,200-2,400

Germany.‡

	Marks.	Marks.
Teachers—Prussia	1,400-3,300	1,200-2,450
Hamburg	2,500-5,000	1,700-3,200
Baden	1,600-3,200	1,600-2,400

Holland.§

Elementary teachers frequently equal.

Amsterdam higher schools—Annual salary per hour per week	Florins 115	85
---	-------------	----

New York.|| (before Equal Pay Act of 1911).
Teachers in Elementary Schools—

* L.C.C. Form E. 40, 1911.

† M. L. Marin "l'Action Feministe" No. 5, 1911.

‡ Lärarekarens Löne-och Pensionsfrågor, Stockholm, 1911.

§ Information specially obtained from National Bureau von Vrouwenarbeit.

|| Document No. 1, 1912, Schedules of Teachers' Salaries, Board of Education, City of New York.

	Men.	Women.
	\$	\$
First year of service	900	600
Second	1,005	648
Third	1,110	696
Fourth	1,215	744
Fifth	1,320	792
Sixth	1,425	840
Seventh	1,520	888
Eighth	1,635	936
Ninth	1,740	984
Tenth	1,845	1,032
Eleventh	1,950	1,080
Twelfth	2,055	1,128
Thirteenth	2,160	1,176
Fourteenth		1,224
Fifteenth		1,272
Sixteenth		1,320
Principals of Elementary Schools—		
	\$	\$
First year of service	2,750	1,750
Second	3,000	2,000
Third	3,250	2,250
Fourth	3,500	2,500

For High Schools and Training Schools see Fig. 4.

Canada.*

Average salaries of Teachers, 1901	£100	£50
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II.—WHERE WOMEN ARE ENFRANCHISED.

New Zealand.§ (Women's Suffrage granted 1893).

By the Amendment to the Education Act 1908 the salaries of men and women teachers were equalised for equal work at from £90 to £400 per annum. Equal minimum wage for men and women, and equal wages for equal work throughout the State service.

Australia.† (Commonwealth Franchise granted to Women 1902).

* Webb's Dictionary of Statistics, p. 627.

§ "How Women Use the Vote," Miss Royden, p. 11.

† Report of International W.S. Alliance, Stockholm, 1911, p. 76.

Federal Public Service Act 1903. Equal pay for equal work throughout the Federal Public Service.

United States.

*Wyoming.** (Women's Suffrage granted 1869).

Equal pay for men and women teachers, in same year.

Colorado.† (Women's Suffrage granted 1893).

Equal pay for men and women teachers, clerks, and stenographers, and in all State employment.

Idaho.‖ (Women's Suffrage granted 1896).

Equal pay for men and women teachers.

Utah.‖ (Women's Suffrage granted 1896).

Equal pay for men and women teachers, 1896.

Washington. 1910. No election till 1913.

California. 1911. No election yet.

Norway. § (Women's Suffrage granted 1907).

Equal pay for women Post Office employees same year.

Iceland. † (Women's Suffrage passed first Parliament, 1911).

A lady has just been appointed Head of Communal School at Akureyn at the same salary as men in similar positions.

New York. † (School and Taxpayers' Suffrage granted to Women).

Equal Pay Bill for teachers passed 1911. See Fig. 4.

D—Metropolitan Tailoring Trade.

"That women are formidable and successful competitors in the making of trousers and vests is, I think, indicated by the census statistics of the entire metropolitan tailoring trade, which show that while the male workers have actually *decreased* in the decade 1871-81, the female workers have increased in number by 25 per cent."¶

* "Women's Suffrage in Many Lands," Alice Zimmern, p. 10.

† "How Women Use the Vote," Miss Royden, p. 10.

‖ "Women's Suffrage in Many Lands," Alice Zimmern, p. 11.

§ "Votes and Wages," Miss Royden, p. 7.

† Report of International W.S. Alliance, Stockholm, 1911, p. 111.

¶ "In the Census of 1871 we find a total of 38,296 workers—23,516 males and 14,780 females; in 1881 a total of 41,221—22,744 males and 18,471 females."—Sir C. Booth's "Life and Labour of the People." Vol. I., p. 217.

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